Vehicle communication method, vehicle communication device, vehicle, and storage medium

Abstract

This application provides a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle, and a storage medium. The method relates to the field of vehicles. Applied to an in-vehicle gateway, the method includes: receiving a target message sent by the braking system in a vehicle and verifying the target message, wherein the target message includes functional signals; if the target message verification is successful, generating a target verification field based on the functional signals, and adding the target verification field to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used by the vehicle's in-vehicle host for security verification; and sending the processed target message to the in-vehicle host so that the in-vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed target message. This method can avoid braking system malfunctions caused by incorrect verification of messages by the in-vehicle host.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicles, and more specifically, to a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle, and a storage medium in the field of vehicles. Background Technology

[0002] With the increasing prevalence of connected vehicles, the security of in-vehicle communication is receiving more and more attention. However, in current in-vehicle networks, most data transmission occurs without any security measures, making it impossible to verify the trustworthiness of the sending node. Therefore, Secure On Board Communication (SecOC), as a secure and reliable encrypted communication solution, has been included in the in-vehicle secure communication standard to ensure the security of in-vehicle communication.

[0003] Electronic stability systems (ESS) and integrated braking control systems are different types of vehicle braking systems. During signal safety verification, EES may not be compatible with the SecOC verification method, potentially leading to unexpected verification failures and consequently, abnormal vehicle braking function.

[0004] Therefore, how to avoid abnormal braking system function caused by incorrect message verification by the vehicle host is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle, and a storage medium. The method can avoid abnormal braking system function caused by incorrect verification of messages by the on-board host.

[0006] Firstly, a vehicle communication method is provided, which is applied to an in-vehicle gateway, and the method includes:

[0007] Receive target messages sent by the braking system in the vehicle and verify the target messages, which include functional signals;

[0008] If the target message verification is successful, a target verification field is generated based on the function signal, and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain the processed target message. The target verification field is used by the vehicle's on-board host for security verification.

[0009] The processed target message is sent to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed target message.

[0010] In the above technical solution, the messages sent by the braking system are first processed by the vehicle gateway. Since the vehicle gateway adds a target verification field to the target message, the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed message based on the target verification field. This avoids the vehicle host failing to verify the message sent by the braking system due to the absence of the required security verification field in the target message, which would lead to abnormal braking system function. Furthermore, the above solution performs dual verification of the target message by the vehicle gateway and the vehicle host, improving the accuracy of security verification and thus ensuring the security of vehicle network communication.

[0011] Furthermore, compared to existing technologies where the vehicle host performs security verification on packets, in this solution, the vehicle gateway only sends the processed target packet to the vehicle host if the packet verification is successful, and will not send packets that fail verification. This reduces the computational load on the vehicle host and improves the efficiency of packet security verification.

[0012] In conjunction with the first aspect, in some possible implementations, the target message is validated, including:

[0013] Retrieve the configuration field and candidate verification field from the target message, where the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system;

[0014] Based on the configuration fields, determine the target verification strategy for the target message;

[0015] The target message is validated based on functional signals, candidate verification fields, and target verification strategies.

[0016] In the above technical solution, the target verification strategy corresponding to the configuration field indicating the braking system type in the target message is determined. Then, the target message is verified by combining the target verification strategy with the candidate verification fields in the target message. Determining the target type of the braking system through the configuration field, and subsequently determining the target verification strategy, enables more targeted message verification, improves the flexibility of message verification to adapt to messages sent by different types of braking systems, and more accurately detects potential security risks, such as data tampering and erroneous data injection, ensuring the security of vehicle network communication.

[0017] Combining the first aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the target verification strategy for the target message is determined based on the target type of the braking system, including:

[0018] If the target type is an electronic stabilization system, it will be verified using a hash algorithm to determine the target verification strategy;

[0019] If the target type is an integrated braking control system, the target verification strategy will be determined by verifying the target algorithm, where the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0020] In the above technical solution, when the braking system is determined to be an electronic stability system, a hash algorithm is used to perform security verification on the target message; when the braking system is determined to be an integrated braking control system, security verification is performed using the target algorithm corresponding to secure on-board communication verification. For electronic stability systems that do not support secure on-board communication verification, using a hash algorithm for verification can ensure the security of messages sent by the electronic stability system; for higher-configuration integrated braking control systems, the algorithm corresponding to secure on-board communication verification can be used for security verification. Customizing the verification strategy according to the system type can accurately meet the security requirements of different systems, further improving the flexibility and efficiency of message security verification.

[0021] Combining the first aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate verification field is the first hash field;

[0022] Based on functional signals, candidate verification fields, and target verification strategies, the target message is verified, including:

[0023] Based on the functional signal and hash algorithm, the second hash field is obtained;

[0024] The target message is verified based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0025] In the above technical solution, when the target type of the braking system is an electronic stability system, the vehicle gateway calculates a second hash field based on the functional signal and a hash algorithm, and compares it with the first hash field in the target message to achieve security verification of the target message. The deterministic and collision-resistant characteristics of the hash algorithm mean that even a slight change in the functional signal will result in a different hash value. By comparing the two hash fields, the vehicle gateway can determine whether the functional signal retains its original integrity, thereby ensuring that the functional signal sent by the braking system is a genuine and reliable signal, thus guaranteeing the safe execution of the vehicle's braking function.

[0026] Combining the first aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the target packet is verified based on the first hash field and the second hash field, including:

[0027] If the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent, the target message verification is successful.

[0028] If the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, the target message verification is deemed to have failed.

[0029] In the above technical solution, the target message verification is considered successful when the first hash field in the target message matches the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway; otherwise, the target message verification is considered unsuccessful. Comparing the first hash field in the target message with the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway to determine whether the target message verification was successful improves the accuracy of safety verification of vehicle braking system-related data, providing a reliable data foundation for safe vehicle operation.

[0030] Combining the first aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate verification field is the first communication verification field;

[0031] Based on functional signals, candidate verification fields, and target verification strategies, the target message is verified, including:

[0032] Based on the functional signal and the target algorithm, the second communication verification field is obtained;

[0033] The target message is verified based on the first and second communication verification fields.

[0034] The first communication verification field, the second communication verification field, and the target verification field are all verification fields of the same type.

[0035] In the above technical solution, when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is an integrated braking control system, a target algorithm is used to calculate the second communication verification field based on the functional signals in the target message. The target message is then verified by comparing the first and second communication verification fields. This accurately verifies whether the message has been tampered with during transmission, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the instructions and data related to the integrated braking control system, and improving the efficiency and accuracy of message security verification.

[0036] Combining the first aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the target message is verified based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field, including:

[0037] If the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are the same, the target message verification is successful.

[0038] If the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are inconsistent, the target message verification is determined to have failed.

[0039] In the above technical solution, the target message is considered successfully verified when the first communication verification field in the target message matches the second communication verification field calculated by the vehicle gateway; otherwise, the target message verification is considered to have failed. By comparing the first communication verification field in the target message with the second communication verification field calculated by the vehicle gateway, the accuracy of safety verification of vehicle braking system data is improved, providing a reliable data foundation for safe vehicle operation and preventing vehicle braking control errors due to abnormal message signal transmission, thus affecting driving safety.

[0040] In a second aspect, a vehicle communication device is provided, the device comprising:

[0041] The verification module is used to receive the target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle and verify the target message, which includes functional signals.

[0042] The processing module is used to generate a target verification field based on the function signal if the target message verification is successful, and to add the target verification field to the target message to obtain the processed target message. The target verification field is used by the vehicle's on-board host for security verification.

[0043] The sending module is used to send the processed target message to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed target message.

[0044] In conjunction with the second aspect, in some possible implementations, the verification module is also used to obtain the configuration field and candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; based on the configuration field, the target verification strategy of the target message is determined; and the target message is verified based on the function signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy.

[0045] In conjunction with the second aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the verification module is also used to determine the target verification strategy by performing verification through a hash algorithm if the target type is an electronic stability system; and to determine the target verification strategy by performing verification through a target algorithm if the target type is an integrated braking control system, wherein the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0046] Combining the second aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate verification field is the first hash field; the verification module is also used to obtain the second hash field based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm; and to verify the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0047] In conjunction with the second aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the verification module is also used to determine that the target message verification is successful if the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent; and to determine that the target message verification fails if the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent.

[0048] Combining the second aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate verification field is the first communication verification field; the verification module is also used to obtain the second communication verification field based on the functional signal and the target algorithm; and to verify the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field; wherein the first communication verification field, the second communication verification field and the target verification field are verification fields of the same type.

[0049] In conjunction with the second aspect and the above implementation methods, in some possible implementation methods, the verification module is also used to determine that the target message verification is successful if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are consistent; and to determine that the target message verification fails if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are inconsistent.

[0050] Thirdly, a vehicle is provided, including a memory and a processor. The memory is used to store executable program code, and the processor is used to call and run the executable program code from the memory, causing the vehicle to perform the methods described in the first aspect or any possible implementation thereof.

[0051] Fourthly, a computer program product is provided, comprising: computer program code, which, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the methods described in the first aspect or any possible implementation thereof.

[0052] Fifthly, a computer-readable storage medium is provided that stores computer program code, which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform the methods described in the first aspect or any possible implementation thereof. Attached Figure Description

[0053] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a vehicle system architecture provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0054] Figure 2 This is a schematic flowchart illustrating a vehicle communication method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0055] Figure 3 This is a schematic flowchart of another vehicle communication method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0056] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle communication device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0057] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0058] The technical solutions in this application will be clearly and thoroughly described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise stated, " / " means "or," for example, A / B can mean A or B. "And / or" in the text is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone. Furthermore, in the description of the embodiments of this application, "multiple" refers to two or more than two.

[0059] Hereinafter, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as implying or suggesting relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature.

[0060] With the rapid development of technology, the automotive industry is undergoing a massive transformation from traditional mechanical transportation tools to intelligent mobile terminals. Modern cars are equipped with a large number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs), which control various vehicle functions such as engine management, braking systems, and vehicle stability systems. At the same time, the connection between vehicles and external networks is becoming increasingly close; for example, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology enables vehicles to achieve remote information processing, real-time traffic information acquisition, and online software upgrades.

[0061] The network architecture within vehicles is becoming increasingly complex, with multiple communication protocols such as CAN (Controller Area Network), LIN (Local Interconnect Network), and Ethernet being used simultaneously. Different ECUs communicate with each other through these protocols, and in intelligent connected vehicles, the internal network also needs to interact with external networks (such as 4G / 5G networks). Taking the CAN bus as an example, it is a widely used communication protocol within vehicles, used to connect critical ECUs such as those in the powertrain and chassis systems. In traditional vehicles, the CAN bus primarily focuses on internal communication efficiency, but in a connected environment, it can become an entry point for cyberattacks.

[0062] Therefore, a new verification method—Secure On-Board Communication (SecOC)—was proposed for vehicle communication security verification. SecOC is a standard secure communication module that utilizes a freshness value and a checksum (CMAC) to verify the correctness and tampering of messages during transmission. The freshness value and checksum together ensure the security of vehicle CAN communication and are typically applied to messages containing high-risk, critical functional signals.

[0063] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a vehicle system architecture provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 1 As shown, the vehicle's braking system 101, gateway (GW) 102, and head unit (HUT) 103, among other system modules, transmit messages between themselves during vehicle operation. The vehicle braking system 101 may include an integrated brake control (IBC) system and an electronic stability program (ESP).

[0064] Suppose the HUT needs to send a message to the IBC. Since a message consists of many signals, to detect whether the message or the signals within it have been tampered with or attacked during transmission, the HUT calculates an additional value for the message value before transmission and attaches it to the message before sending it to the IBC. This additional value is called the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC). After receiving the message, the IBC uses the same algorithm to calculate the additional value and compares the calculated CMAC with the CMAC sent by the HUT. If they match, it means that the message frame has not been tampered with.

[0065] The freshness value is used to detect whether a received message is up-to-date; that is, to detect any delays in message transmission. SecOC communication uses a master-slave architecture, typically with the vehicle gateway acting as the master node. The vehicle gateway periodically synchronizes the same freshness value with all slave nodes. If the HUT (Host Receiver) needs to send a message frame to the IBC (Integrated Broadband Receiver), in addition to verifying the CMAC (Content Management Requirement) value, it also needs to verify the freshness value. For example, if the first frame from the HUT has a freshness value of 1, the IBC will store this value locally. If the second frame is sent with a freshness value of 3, the IBC will update the freshness value from 1 to 3. The freshness values ​​do not necessarily increase sequentially in an arithmetic order; they could be 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, etc. Adjacent freshness values ​​may not have a logical relationship, but the freshness value of the next frame will always be greater than that of the previous frame. If the local IBC storage has a freshness value of 3, and the next HUT transmission has a freshness value of 2, then it means that the message may be stuck during the transmission process, that is, the message is not fresh.

[0066] During the verification process of CMAC and Freshness value, signal transmission may be interrupted. For redundancy, the number of verifications can be set. For example, if CMAC shows five inconsistencies, an error is determined; if the freshness value shows five instances of being not fresh, an error is also determined.

[0067] The braking system configurations differ across vehicle trim levels. Lower-spec vehicles may have ESP, while higher-spec vehicles may have the more advanced IBC. In existing message signal verification processes, the CMAC and freshness values ​​generated by SecOC verification are attached to the message as CAN signals, with the CMAC value occupying 6 bytes and the freshness value occupying 2 bytes. Traditional CAN data frame payloads are typically 8 bytes. If the CAN message signal contains functional signals, it cannot carry the bytes required for the CMAC and freshness values, thus preventing SecOC verification.

[0068] For vehicles equipped with ESP, because ESP uses ordinary CAN signals during signal transmission, the messages sent by ESP to GW do not include fields required for SecOC verification (such as CMAC and freshness values). Therefore, GW does not verify the messages sent by ESP and only routes them to HUT. At this point, the message signal still lacks the fields required for SecOC verification, causing HUT to fail to perform SecOC verification, resulting in HUT verification failure. The frame is then discarded, and a functional anomaly result is output. However, this result may not be caused by a functional signal anomaly, indicating a functional anomaly due to incorrect verification during the verification process.

[0069] For vehicles equipped with IBC, since IBC uses the CANFD (Controller Area Network Flexible Data-rate) signal, a communication protocol developed from the traditional CAN bus, during signal transmission, the effective payload of the CANFD data frame can reach 64 bytes or more. Therefore, the message sent by IBC can contain the fields required for SecOC verification. GW routes it to HUT, and HUT can perform SecOC verification on the message based on the fields in the message.

[0070] In summary, existing technologies cannot achieve unified verification of message signals sent by different braking systems, and there may be problems with incorrect verification leading to functional abnormalities; if two or more software algorithms are designed for vehicles with different configurations, it will lead to increased costs.

[0071] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, this application provides a vehicle communication method, a vehicle communication device, a vehicle, and a storage medium. After receiving a target message sent by the braking system, the method verifies the target message. When the target message verification is successful, a target verification field is generated based on the functional signals in the target message. The target verification field is then added to the target message to obtain a processed target message. Subsequently, the processed target message is sent to the vehicle's onboard host for verification. This method avoids functional abnormalities caused by incorrect verification of messages by the onboard host and does not increase verification costs.

[0072] The following combination Figure 2 and Figure 3 The vehicle communication method provided in the embodiments of this application will be described in detail.

[0073] Figure 2 This is a schematic flowchart illustrating a vehicle communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. It should be understood that this method can be applied to a vehicle; or, to an in-vehicle gateway within a vehicle; or, to a chip mounted in an in-vehicle gateway within a vehicle.

[0074] For example, such as Figure 2 As shown, the method 200 includes the following steps S201 to S203.

[0075] S201, receive the target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle and verify the target message, which includes functional signals.

[0076] For example, after receiving a target message sent to it by the vehicle's braking system, the vehicle gateway performs a security verification on the target message; the braking system may include an electronic stability system (ESP) or an integrated brake control system (IBC).

[0077] The target message may include a message identifier (ID) and a data portion; the ID can be used to distinguish different types of messages, enabling the vehicle gateway to quickly identify the source of the message; the data portion may include function signals, which the vehicle gateway can use to identify the purpose of the message.

[0078] For example, if the ID of the target message is 0x137 ESP, the vehicle gateway can determine that the target message is a message sent by the ESP based on this ID.

[0079] For example, functional signals may include brake pressure value signals, brake mode signals, and brake component status signals. The braking system converts the pressure values ​​in the brake lines into digital codes, which are reflected in the message. The braking system also includes various modes, such as normal mode, emergency braking, anti-lock braking system (ABS) mode, and electronic parking brake (EPB) mode. These modes are represented by corresponding codes in the message data field. For example, a single byte might represent 00 for normal braking, 01 for emergency braking, 10 for ABS mode in operation, and 11 for EPB mode activation. When the braking system enters a specific mode, it updates the corresponding byte in the message data field, sending the corresponding mode code to the vehicle gateway. The braking system also includes various components, such as brake pads, brake discs, and brake pumps. The status of these components is also reflected in the message. For example, the wear status of brake pads can be represented using a single byte. If the byte value is 0-3, it indicates that the brake pad thickness is normal; 4-6 indicates that the brake pad is about to wear to its limit; and 7 indicates that the brake pad has already worn to its limit and needs to be replaced. Through this encoding method, the braking system can transmit component status information to other systems (such as the vehicle gateway) in a timely manner.

[0080] In one implementation, the process of verifying the target message may include: obtaining the configuration field and candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; determining the target verification strategy of the target message based on the configuration field; and verifying the target message based on the function signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy.

[0081] The types of candidate verification fields included in the target messages sent by different types of braking systems are different.

[0082] For example, the configuration field corresponding to ESP is predefined as EAA01, and the configuration field for IBC is EAA02. These configuration fields are stored in the target message. When the vehicle gateway obtains the configuration field EAA01 in the target message, it can determine that the vehicle is equipped with ESP and the target message is sent by ESP; when the vehicle gateway obtains the configuration field EAA02 in the target message, it can determine that the vehicle is equipped with IBC and the target message is sent by IBC. Accordingly,

[0083] Since different types of braking systems can be adapted to different verification strategies, after determining the type of braking system based on the configuration fields, the corresponding target verification strategy can be determined based on the type of braking system; and the target verification strategy can be used in conjunction with the candidate verification fields in the target message to verify the target message.

[0084] In this embodiment, a target verification strategy corresponding to the configuration field indicating the braking system type in the target message is determined. Then, the target message is verified by combining the target verification strategy with candidate verification fields in the target message. Determining the target type of the braking system through the configuration field, and subsequently determining the target verification strategy, enables more targeted message verification, improves the flexibility of message verification to adapt to messages sent by different types of braking systems, and more accurately detects potential security risks, such as data tampering and erroneous data injection, ensuring the security of vehicle network communication.

[0085] In one implementation, the process of determining the target verification strategy for the target message based on the target type of the braking system may specifically include: if the target type is an electronic stability system, a hash algorithm will be used to verify and determine the target verification strategy; if the target type is an integrated braking control system, a target algorithm will be used to verify and determine the target verification strategy, wherein the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0086] A hash algorithm, also known as a hashing algorithm, is a function that maps data of arbitrary length to a shorter, fixed-length data (hash value). This fixed-length hash value is usually a number or a string. For example, common hash algorithms might output 128-bit or 256-bit binary data, which is then converted to hexadecimal for representation.

[0087] Secure vehicular communication (SecOC) verification is a method of determining whether there are any abnormalities in the message signal by comparing the freshness value and the CMAC value.

[0088] For example, when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is Electronic Stability System (ESP), because the system has a low configuration, it cannot use the corresponding algorithm for Safe Onboard Communication (SecOC) verification. Instead, a hash algorithm can be used for security verification, that is, verification using a hash algorithm is used to determine the target verification strategy. When the target type of the vehicle's braking system is Integrated Brake Control System (IBC), the system is compatible with SecOC verification, so the corresponding algorithm for SecOC verification can be used for security verification, that is, verification using the target algorithm is used to determine the target verification strategy.

[0089] In this embodiment, when the braking system is determined to be an electronic stability system, a hash algorithm is used to perform security verification on the target message; when the braking system is determined to be an integrated braking control system, security verification is performed using the target algorithm corresponding to secure vehicle communication verification. For electronic stability systems that do not support secure vehicle communication verification, using a hash algorithm for verification ensures the security of messages sent by the electronic stability system; for higher-configuration integrated braking control systems, the algorithm corresponding to secure vehicle communication verification can be used for security verification. Customizing the verification strategy according to the system type can accurately meet the security requirements of different systems, further improving the flexibility and efficiency of message security verification.

[0090] In one implementation, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate verification field is the first hash field; the process of verifying the target message based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field, and the target verification strategy may include: obtaining the second hash field based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm; and verifying the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0091] For example, when the target type of the braking system is ESP, a hash algorithm is used for security verification. Accordingly, during the signal processing of ESP, a first hash field is calculated based on the function signal, and the first hash field and the function signal are sent to the vehicle gateway simultaneously. After receiving the target message, the vehicle gateway uses a hash algorithm to calculate a second hash field based on the function signal in the target message. Then, the first hash field and the second hash field can be compared to verify the target message to determine whether the target message has been tampered with or is otherwise abnormal during transmission.

[0092] In this embodiment, when the target type of the braking system is an electronic stability system, the vehicle gateway calculates a second hash field based on the functional signal and a hash algorithm, and compares it with the first hash field in the target message to achieve security verification of the target message. The deterministic and collision-resistant characteristics of the hash algorithm mean that even a slight change in the functional signal will result in a different hash value. By comparing the two hash fields, the vehicle gateway can determine whether the functional signal retains its original integrity, thereby ensuring that the functional signal sent by the braking system is a genuine and reliable signal, thus guaranteeing the safe execution of the vehicle's braking function.

[0093] In one implementation, if the first hash field and the second hash field are the same, the target message verification is determined to be successful; if the first hash field and the second hash field are different, the target message verification is determined to be unsuccessful.

[0094] For example, assuming the first hash field in the target message obtained by the vehicle gateway is 3, if the second hash field calculated based on the function signal in the target message is also 3, consistent with the first hash field, then it can be determined that the target message verification is successful and the data information contained therein has not been tampered with or is otherwise abnormal; if the second hash field calculated based on the function signal in the target message is 7, different from the first hash field 3, then it can be determined that the target message verification fails, indicating that there may be a transmission anomaly in the target message during transmission.

[0095] Optionally, a preset number of times can be set, such as 5 times. The target packet is subjected to 5 security checks. If all 5 checks indicate that the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, the target packet check is determined to have failed.

[0096] In this embodiment, when the first hash field in the target message matches the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway, the target message verification is determined to be successful; when the first hash field and the second hash field do not match, the target message verification is determined to be unsuccessful. By comparing whether the first hash field in the target message and the second hash field calculated by the vehicle gateway match, the accuracy of safety verification of vehicle braking system-related data is improved, providing a reliable data foundation for safe vehicle operation.

[0097] In one implementation, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate verification field is the first communication verification field; the process of verifying the target message based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field, and the target verification strategy may include:

[0098] Based on the functional signal and the target algorithm, the second communication verification field is obtained;

[0099] The target message is verified based on the first and second communication verification fields.

[0100] The first communication verification field, the second communication verification field, and the target verification field are all verification fields of the same type; all three are of type SecOC. Specifically, the first communication verification field includes a first freshness value and a first CMAC value; the second communication verification field includes a second freshness value and a second CMAC value. The second freshness value is used to represent the freshness value stored when the previous message was sent.

[0101] For example, when the target type of the braking system is IBC, a target algorithm (the algorithm corresponding to SecOC verification) is used for security verification. Accordingly, during the signal processing of IBC, a first communication verification field is calculated based on the functional signal, and the first communication verification field and the functional signal are sent to the vehicle gateway simultaneously. After receiving the target message, the vehicle gateway uses the target algorithm to calculate a second communication verification field based on the functional signal in the target message. Then, the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field can be compared to verify the target message to determine whether there are any abnormalities such as tampering during the transmission of the target message.

[0102] In this embodiment, when the target type of the vehicle's braking system is an integrated braking control system, a target algorithm is used to calculate the second communication verification field based on the functional signals in the target message. The target message is then verified by comparing the first and second communication verification fields. This method can accurately verify whether the message has been tampered with during transmission, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the instructions and data related to the integrated braking control system, and improving the efficiency and accuracy of message security verification.

[0103] In one implementation, if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are the same, the target message verification is determined to be successful; if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are different, the target message verification is determined to be unsuccessful.

[0104] For example, suppose the first communication verification field in the target message obtained by the vehicle gateway includes a first CMAC value of CMAC1 and a first freshness value of 2. If the second CMAC value calculated based on the functional signals in the target message is consistent with CMAC1, and the first freshness value is greater than the second freshness value stored when the previous message was sent (e.g., 0 or 1), then it can be determined that the target message verification is successful and the data information contained in the target message has not been tampered with or is otherwise abnormal. If the second CMAC value calculated based on the functional signals in the target message is inconsistent with CMAC1, and / or the first freshness value is less than or equal to the second freshness value stored when the previous message was sent, then it can be determined that the target message verification fails, indicating that there may be a transmission anomaly in the target message during transmission.

[0105] Optionally, a preset number of times can be set, for example, 5 times. The target message is subjected to 5 security checks. If all 5 checks indicate that the first CMAC value and the second CMAC value are inconsistent, and / or the first freshness value is less than or equal to the second freshness value stored when the previous message was sent, then the target message check is determined to have failed.

[0106] In this embodiment, when the first communication verification field in the target message matches the second communication verification field calculated by the vehicle gateway, the target message is determined to have been successfully verified; when the first and second communication verification fields do not match, the target message is determined to have failed to verify. By comparing whether the first communication verification field in the target message matches the second communication verification field calculated by the vehicle gateway, the accuracy of safety verification of vehicle braking system-related data is improved, providing a reliable data foundation for safe vehicle operation and preventing vehicle braking control errors due to abnormal message signal transmission, which could affect driving safety.

[0107] S202, if the target message verification is successful, generate a target verification field based on the function signal, and add the target verification field to the target message to obtain the processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used by the vehicle's on-board host for security verification.

[0108] The target validation fields include freshness value and CMAC value.

[0109] For example, the vehicle gateway performs security verification on the received target message; if the target message verification is successful, a target verification field for SecOC verification is generated based on the functional signals in the target message; after calculating the target verification field, the verification field carried in the target message is discarded, and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain the processed target message.

[0110] Specifically, when the target message is sent by the ESP, the field used for security verification by the vehicle gateway in the target message is the first hash field; if the target message verification is successful, the target algorithm is used to calculate the corresponding target verification field based on the functional signals in the target message; and the hash field in the target message is replaced with the target verification field to obtain the processed target message.

[0111] When the target message is sent by IBC, the field used for security verification by the vehicle gateway in the target message is the first communication verification field. If the target message verification is successful, the target algorithm is used to calculate the corresponding target verification field based on the functional signals in the target message. The first communication verification field in the target message is then replaced with the target verification field to obtain the processed target message.

[0112] S203, send the processed target message to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed target message.

[0113] For example, after receiving the processed target message, the vehicular gateway sends the processed target message to the vehicle host (HUT). Since the processed target message contains a target verification field for SecOC verification, the HUT can perform security verification on the processed target message. Specifically, the security verification performed by the HUT is Secure In-Vehicle Communication Verification, also known as SecOC verification.

[0114] In one implementation, the process of the vehicle-mounted host performing security verification on the processed target message may include: the vehicle-mounted host obtaining the target verification field in the processed target message, and using the target algorithm to obtain the second verification field based on the functional signals in the target message; comparing the target verification field and the second verification field, and determining the verification result based on the comparison result.

[0115] For example, the target verification field includes a freshness value of A and a CMAC value of CMAC2; the second verification field calculated by the vehicle host includes a CMAC value of CMAC3 and a freshness value of the previously received message of B. If CMAC3 in the second verification field is consistent with CMAC2 in the target verification field, and the freshness value A in the target verification field is greater than the freshness value B of the previously received message, then the processed target message verification can be determined to be successful; if CMAC3 in the second verification field is inconsistent with CMAC2 in the target verification field, and / or, the freshness value A in the target verification field is less than or equal to the freshness value B of the previously received message, then the processed target message verification can be determined to be unsuccessful.

[0116] In summary, in this embodiment, the vehicle gateway receives the target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle and performs security verification on the target message. When the target message verification is successful, a target verification field is generated based on the functional signals in the target message and added to the target message to obtain the processed target message. The processed target message is then sent to the vehicle host for security verification. For messages sent by the braking system, they are first processed by the vehicle gateway. Because the vehicle gateway adds a target verification field to the target message, the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed message based on the target verification field. This avoids the vehicle host failing to verify the message sent by the braking system due to the absence of the required security verification field in the target message, which could lead to abnormal braking system function. Furthermore, the above scheme performs dual verification of the target message by the vehicle gateway and the vehicle host, improving the accuracy of security verification and ensuring the security of vehicle network communication.

[0117] Furthermore, compared to existing technologies where the vehicle host performs security verification on packets, in this solution, the vehicle gateway only sends the processed target packet to the vehicle host if the packet verification is successful, and will not send packets that fail verification. This reduces the computational load on the vehicle host and improves the efficiency of packet security verification.

[0118] Figure 3 This is a schematic flowchart illustrating another vehicle communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. It should be understood that this method can be applied to a vehicle; or, to an in-vehicle gateway within a vehicle; or, to a chip mounted in an in-vehicle gateway within a vehicle.

[0119] For example, such as Figure 3 As shown, the method 300 includes the following steps S301 to S306.

[0120] S301, the vehicle gateway receives a message sent by the vehicle's braking system, which includes configuration fields.

[0121] The vehicle's braking system may include an electronic stability system and an integrated braking control system.

[0122] For example, during vehicle signal communication, the braking system sends messages to the on-board unit for use by the on-board unit or other systems. During this process, the messages need to be routed through the on-board gateway. The on-board gateway receives the messages sent by the vehicle's braking system. These messages may include configuration fields indicating the braking system type, function signals indicating the message's function, and verification fields. For example, the configuration fields could be EAA01, EAA02, etc.

[0123] Alternatively, the implementation of S301 can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 2 The relevant description of S201 is not repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0124] S302, based on the configuration field, determine whether the vehicle's braking system is an electronic stability system or an integrated braking control system; if it is an electronic stability system, then execute S303; if it is an integrated braking control system, then execute S304.

[0125] For example, a pre-set correspondence between configuration fields and braking system types is provided: EAA01 corresponds to Electronic Stability Program (ESP), and EAA02 corresponds to Integrated Brake Control (IBC). After receiving a message containing configuration fields, the vehicle's braking system can be determined as either Electronic Stability Program or Integrated Brake Control System based on the configuration fields in the message and the pre-set correspondence.

[0126] Alternatively, the implementation of S302 can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 is not repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0127] S303, the vehicle gateway verifies the hash value in the message a preset number of times.

[0128] For example, when the vehicle's braking system is an electronic stability system, the message contains a hash value; the vehicle gateway performs a preset number of security checks (e.g., 5 times) on the message based on the hash value in the message.

[0129] It should be understood that the preset number of times can be set according to the accuracy requirements in actual application. For example, if higher accuracy is required, a larger preset number of times can be set, such as 10 times or 20 times; if the required accuracy is lower, a smaller preset number of times can be set, such as 3 times or 5 times. This application embodiment does not specifically limit the value of the preset number of times.

[0130] For example, the process of the vehicle gateway verifying the hash value in the message may include: the vehicle gateway using a hash algorithm to calculate the target hash value based on the functional signal in the message; comparing the hash value carried in the message with the target hash value; if the two are consistent, the message verification can be determined to be successful; if the two are inconsistent, the message verification can be determined to be unsuccessful.

[0131] Alternatively, the implementation of S303 can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 is not repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0132] S304, the vehicle gateway verifies the first secure vehicle communication value in the message a preset number of times.

[0133] For example, when the vehicle's braking system is an integrated braking control system, the message contains a first safe on-board communication value; the on-board gateway performs a preset number of security checks (e.g., 5 times) on the message based on the first safe on-board communication value in the message.

[0134] For example, the process of the vehicle gateway verifying the hash value in the message may include: the vehicle gateway using the target algorithm to calculate the target secure vehicle communication value based on the functional signal in the message; comparing the first secure vehicle communication value carried in the message with the target secure vehicle communication value; if the two are consistent, the message verification can be determined to be successful; if the two are inconsistent, the message verification can be determined to be unsuccessful.

[0135] Alternatively, the implementation of S304 can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 is not repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0136] S305, determine whether the verification was successful; if the verification was successful, proceed to S306; if the verification failed, end the verification process.

[0137] For example, after the message undergoes multiple security checks, it is determined whether the message check was successful.

[0138] Optionally, if the number of times the checksum matches in the preset number of checksums is greater than or equal to the threshold, the message checksum is considered successful; if the number of times the checksum matches in the preset number of checksums is less than the threshold, the message checksum is considered failed. When the message checksum fails, the message frame can be discarded without routing it to the vehicle-mounted host.

[0139] Alternatively, the implementation of S305 can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 2 The relevant description of S202 is not repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0140] S306, the vehicle gateway adds a second secure vehicle communication value to the message and sends the processed message to the vehicle host.

[0141] For example, when the vehicle gateway successfully verifies the message, the vehicle gateway recalculates the second secure vehicle communication value based on the function signal in the message; and adds the second secure vehicle communication value to the message to replace the original verification value carried in the message, thus obtaining the processed message; and then sends the processed message to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed message.

[0142] Alternatively, the implementation of S306 can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 2 The relevant descriptions of S202 and S203 are not repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0143] In summary, in this embodiment, the type of vehicle control system—either an electronic stability system or an integrated braking control system—is first determined based on the configuration fields in the message. Then, a message verification method matching the braking system is used to improve the efficiency of message verification. This method enables adaptive message verification for two different braking systems without requiring the design of two or more software sets to adapt to different systems, reducing security verification costs. A corresponding strategy is used to verify the hash value or secure vehicle communication value in the message a preset number of times to determine if the verification is successful. If the verification is successful, the vehicle gateway calculates a new secure vehicle communication value based on the functional signal and adds it to the message. Finally, the processed message is sent to the vehicle host for verification. Utilizing the vehicle gateway for mid-stage verification and processing, only successfully verified messages are sent to the vehicle host, avoiding the vehicle host processing a large number of erroneous or insecure messages and improving vehicle network communication efficiency. By uniformly adding secure vehicle communication values ​​through the vehicle gateway, it is ensured that the vehicle host can perform secure vehicle communication verification on the messages, thus ensuring the security of the message data sent by the braking system.

[0144] The above text combined Figures 1 to 3 The vehicle communication method provided in the embodiments of this application is described in detail below; the following will be combined with Figure 4 and Figure 5 The apparatus embodiments of this application are described in detail below. It should be understood that the apparatus in the embodiments of this application can perform the various methods described in the foregoing embodiments of this application, that is, the specific working processes of the various products described below can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments.

[0145] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle communication device provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0146] For example, such as Figure 4 As shown, the vehicle communication device 400 includes:

[0147] The verification module 401 is used to receive the target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle and verify the target message, wherein the target message includes functional signals.

[0148] The processing module 402 is used to generate a target verification field based on the function signal if the target message verification is successful, and to add the target verification field to the target message to obtain the processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used by the vehicle's on-board host for security verification.

[0149] The sending module 403 is used to send the processed target message to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed target message.

[0150] In one possible implementation, the verification module 401 is further configured to obtain the configuration field and candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; based on the configuration field, determine the target verification strategy of the target message; and verify the target message based on the function signal, the candidate verification field and the target verification strategy.

[0151] In one possible implementation, the verification module 401 is further configured to determine the target verification strategy by performing verification through a hash algorithm if the target type is an electronic stability system; and to determine the target verification strategy by performing verification through a target algorithm if the target type is an integrated braking control system, wherein the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the safe vehicle communication verification.

[0152] In one possible implementation, when the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate verification field is the first hash field; the verification module 401 is also used to obtain the second hash field based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm; and to verify the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

[0153] In one possible implementation, the verification module 401 is further configured to determine that the target message verification is successful if the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent; and to determine that the target message verification fails if the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent.

[0154] In one possible implementation, when the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate verification field is the first communication verification field; the verification module 401 is also used to obtain the second communication verification field based on the functional signal and the target algorithm; and to verify the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field; wherein the first communication verification field, the second communication verification field and the target verification field are verification fields of the same type.

[0155] In one possible implementation, the verification module 401 is further configured to determine that the target message verification is successful if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are consistent; and to determine that the target message verification fails if the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are inconsistent.

[0156] It should be noted that the aforementioned vehicle communication device is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "module" here can be implemented in software and / or hardware, without specific limitations.

[0157] For example, a "module" can be a software program, hardware circuit, or a combination of both that implements the above functions. Hardware circuits may include application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), electronic circuits, processors (e.g., shared processors, proprietary processors, or group processors) and memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, combined logic circuits, and / or other suitable components that support the described functions.

[0158] Therefore, the units of the various examples described in the embodiments of this application can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0159] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0160] For example, such as Figure 5 As shown, the vehicle 500 includes a memory 501 and a processor 502. The memory 501 stores executable program code 503, and the processor 502 is used to call and execute the executable program code 503 to perform a vehicle communication method.

[0161] Furthermore, embodiments of this application also protect an apparatus that may include a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores executable program code, and the processor is used to call and execute the executable program code to perform a vehicle communication method provided in embodiments of this application.

[0162] This embodiment can divide the device into functional modules based on the above method example. For example, each module can correspond to a separate function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The integrated module can be implemented in hardware. It should be noted that the module division in this embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.

[0163] When each functional module is divided according to its corresponding function, the device may also include a verification module, a processing module, and a sending module. It should be noted that all relevant content regarding the steps involved in the above method embodiments can be referenced to the functional descriptions of the corresponding functional modules, and will not be repeated here.

[0164] It should be understood that the device provided in this embodiment is used to execute the above-described vehicle communication method, and therefore can achieve the same effect as the above-described implementation method.

[0165] When using an integrated unit, the device may include a processing module and a storage module. When the device is applied to a vehicle, the processing module can be used to control and manage the vehicle's movements. The storage module can be used to support the vehicle in executing relevant program code.

[0166] The processing module may be a processor or a controller, which can implement or execute the various exemplary logic blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processor may also be a combination of functions that implement computing capabilities, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of digital signal processing (DSP) and a microprocessor, etc., and the storage module may be a memory.

[0167] In addition, the device provided in the embodiments of this application may specifically be a chip, component or module. The chip may include a connected processor and a memory. The memory is used to store instructions. When the processor calls and executes the instructions, the chip can execute a vehicle communication method provided in the above embodiments.

[0168] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer program code. When the computer program code is run on a computer, the computer executes the above-described related method steps to implement the vehicle communication method provided in the above embodiment.

[0169] The computer-readable storage medium may include, but is not limited to, any type of disk, including floppy disks, optical disks, Digital Video Discs (DVDs), Compact Disc Read-Only Memory (CD-ROM), microdrives, and magneto-optical disks, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), video random access memory (VRAM), flash memory devices, magnetic cards or optical cards, nanosystems (including molecular memory ICs), or any type of medium or device suitable for storing instructions and / or data.

[0170] This embodiment also provides a computer program product that, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the aforementioned related steps to implement a vehicle communication method provided in the above embodiment.

[0171] In this embodiment, the device, computer-readable storage medium, computer program product, or chip are all used to execute the corresponding methods provided above. Therefore, the beneficial effects they can achieve can be referred to the beneficial effects in the corresponding methods provided above, and will not be repeated here.

[0172] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, only the division of the above functional modules is used as an example. In actual applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0173] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another device, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0174] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A vehicle communication method, characterized in that, The method is applied to an in-vehicle gateway, and the method includes: Receive a target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle and verify the target message, wherein the target message includes a function signal; If the target message verification is successful, a target verification field is generated based on the function signal, and the target verification field is added to the target message to obtain the processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used by the vehicle's on-board host for security verification. The processed target message is sent to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform a security verification on the processed target message. The verification of the target message includes: Obtain the configuration field and candidate verification field from the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; If the target type is an electronic stability system, it will be verified using a hash algorithm to determine the target verification strategy; If the target type is an integrated braking control system, the target verification strategy will be determined by verifying the target algorithm, wherein the target algorithm is the algorithm corresponding to the secure vehicle communication verification. The target message is verified based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field, and the target verification strategy.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the target type is an electronic stability system, the candidate verification field is the first hash field; The verification of the target message based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field, and the target verification strategy includes: Based on the functional signal and the hash algorithm, the second hash field is obtained; The target message is verified based on the first hash field and the second hash field.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of verifying the target message based on the first hash field and the second hash field includes: If the first hash field and the second hash field are consistent, the target message verification is successful; If the first hash field and the second hash field are inconsistent, the target message verification is determined to have failed.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the target type is an integrated braking control system, the candidate verification field is the first communication verification field; The verification of the target message based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field, and the target verification strategy includes: Based on the functional signal and the target algorithm, the second communication verification field is obtained; The target message is verified based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field; The first communication verification field, the second communication verification field, and the target verification field are all verification fields of the same type.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The step of verifying the target message based on the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field includes: If the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are consistent, the target message verification is determined to be successful. If the first communication verification field and the second communication verification field are inconsistent, the target message verification is determined to have failed.

6. A vehicle communication device, characterized in that, This device is used in an in-vehicle gateway, and the device includes: The verification module is used to receive the target message sent by the braking system in the vehicle and verify the target message, wherein the target message includes functional signals. The processing module is configured to generate a target verification field based on the function signal if the target message verification is successful, and to add the target verification field to the target message to obtain a processed target message, wherein the target verification field is used by the vehicle's on-board unit for security verification. The sending module is used to send the processed target message to the vehicle host so that the vehicle host can perform security verification on the processed target message. The verification module is also used to obtain the configuration field and candidate verification field in the target message, wherein the configuration field is used to indicate the target type of the braking system; The verification module is further configured to, if the target type is an electronic stability system, verify it using a hash algorithm to determine the target verification strategy; and if the target type is an integrated braking control system, verify it using a target algorithm to determine the target verification strategy, wherein the target algorithm is an algorithm corresponding to secure vehicle communication verification. The verification module is also used to verify the target message based on the functional signal, the candidate verification field, and the target verification strategy.

7. A vehicle, characterized in that, The vehicles include: Memory, used to store executable program code; A processor for calling and running the executable program code from the memory, causing the vehicle to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed, implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

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