Method and device for defending attack of power relay protection device

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of data security, and discloses a power relay protection device attack defense method and device, and the method comprises the steps: distributing a budget of a power relay protection device and a system-level budget, and taking the minimum expected energy loss of a system as an optimization target according to the failure probability of the power relay protection device. Therefore, the defense capability of each power relay protection device is improved, a power relay protection device set with the maximum system loss is determined by taking the system loss maximization in multiple attack scenes as a target, and the system loss of the system in the worst attack scene is minimized in combination with a defense budget distribution layer and an attack strategy analysis layer. And minimization of the recovery time after the system is attacked is taken as an optimization target, so that the protection capability of the system when multiple relay protection devices are attacked at the same time is improved, and the problem that the defense effect is insufficient in a complex and changeable attack scene in the prior art is solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data security, and in particular to a method and device for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device. Background Art

[0002] Power system network security technology refers to the technical means to ensure that the power system is protected from the threat of network attacks in the context of informatization and intelligence through various protection measures, and to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the system. It covers multiple aspects from hardware protection of power equipment, encryption of communication networks, to attack detection and defense, aiming to deal with complex network threats, especially attack protection against key equipment such as relays. In recent years, with the rapid development of smart grids and the widespread application of Internet of Things devices, the network security challenges faced by power systems have become increasingly severe. The significance of studying power system network security is to ensure the stable operation of the system, prevent serious consequences such as large-scale power outages caused by network attacks, and provide security for the future development of power systems.

[0003] The Chinese invention patent application with patent number CN118199002A discloses a method, device and system for collecting fixed value information of substation relay protection equipment. The fixed value information of relay protection equipment is collected through blockchain technology and uploaded to the cloud for storage, thereby ensuring the authenticity and reliability of the data and solving the problem that the fixed value information of traditional relay protection equipment is easily tampered with.

[0004] The Chinese invention patent with patent number CN113131506B discloses a fixed turn-off angle control method and stabilizer for suppressing subsequent commutation failure of LCC-HVDC system. By obtaining system parameters and performing logical judgment, the turn-off angle control is adjusted to avoid system commutation failure, solving the challenge of system instability caused by commutation failure in LCC-HVDC system.

[0005] The Chinese invention patent application with patent number CN115640969A discloses a method for allocating power grid operation and maintenance costs based on equipment status and years of operation. This method introduces the equipment health index and combines it with a deep learning model to predict equipment failure rate, reasonably allocates the operation and maintenance costs of power grid equipment, optimizes resource allocation, and solves the problem of unreasonable allocation of power grid equipment operation and maintenance costs.

[0006] The Chinese invention patent application with patent number CN117634875A discloses a power system risk assessment method, system, equipment and medium. By building a network attack model and performing cascading failure analysis, it calculates the system load loss and risk value, helps the power system to formulate more effective defense measures when facing network attacks, and solves the problem that traditional risk assessment methods fail to consider the cascading effect.

[0007] The Chinese invention patent application with patent number CN104009544A discloses a system and method for remote control and communication of photovoltaic power generation. By remotely collecting, transmitting and controlling photovoltaic power generation equipment data, it realizes real-time monitoring and remote control of photovoltaic power station equipment, and solves the problem of high data transmission cost of traditional photovoltaic power station control system.

[0008] The Chinese invention patent application with patent number CN111489091A discloses a comprehensive evaluation method for power system resilience. By constructing a multi-dimensional resilience evaluation index system, the resilience of the power system is compared horizontally and vertically, solving the problem of the single dimension of existing resilience evaluation methods.

[0009] At present, the relevant patents in the field of power system network security have been studied and found:

[0010] Existing technologies are mostly limited to a single type of defense scenario and lack the ability to cope with complex and changing attack scenarios. Although multiple patents involve different types of defense methods, when multiple relay protection devices are attacked at the same time, the defense effect is insufficient and it is difficult to provide comprehensive protection.

[0011] Inefficient resource allocation. Existing methods do not fully consider the balance between device level and system level in the allocation of defense budget, which makes it difficult to reasonably allocate limited resources to maximize the defense effect in practical applications and cannot cope with the diverse threats in smart grids.

[0012] At the same time, existing technologies fail to fully consider the cascading effects of cyber attacks, especially in terms of system resilience and risk assessment. Existing patents lack comprehensive prevention and control measures for the spread of faults, resulting in a large room for improvement in system recovery speed and accuracy when dealing with cascading faults. Summary of the invention

[0013] In view of this, in order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a method and device for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device.

[0014] A first aspect of the present invention provides a method for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device, comprising:

[0015] By allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the defense budget allocation constraint is determined to construct the defense budget allocation layer;

[0016] According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios, the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss is determined, and an attack strategy analysis layer is constructed;

[0017] According to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, the system loss in the worst attack scenario is minimized, and the system loss assessment layer is constructed with minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal;

[0018] The system loss assessment layer is game optimized to obtain a defense optimization plan for the power relay protection device.

[0019] Preferably, the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget are allocated, and according to the failure probability of the power relay device, the expected energy loss of the system is minimized as the optimization goal, and the defense budget allocation restriction constraint is determined to construct a defense budget allocation layer, including:

[0020] By allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the objective function of the defense budget allocation layer is constructed as follows:

[0021]

[0022] In the formula, is the expected energy loss, is the failure probability, For distribution to power relay devices of the defense budget, To allocate system-level defense budget, For power relay protection device The load loss caused by failure, For power relay protection device A collection of; among them,

[0023]

[0024] In the formula, is the weight factor, e is a constant, For power relay protection device The sensitivity coefficient of It is the effect parameter of system-level defense;

[0025] Determine the defense budget allocation constraint, the defense budget allocation constraint is:

[0026]

[0027] In the formula, The maximum budget limit.

[0028] Preferably, the expected loss function of the defense budget allocation layer is:

[0029]

[0030] in, For the defender in the attacker type The loss function under Is the attacker type The probability distribution of To find the derivative symbol, For the defender in the attacker type The loss value below.

[0031] Preferably, the attack strategy analysis layer is constructed based on the failure probability of the power relay protection device and with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios to determine the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss, including:

[0032] According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, the objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is constructed with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios. The objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is:

[0033]

[0034] In the formula, A set of power relay devices to be attacked is selected within the total resource constraints;

[0035] The resource constraints of the attack strategy analysis layer are determined as follows:

[0036]

[0037] In the formula is the total resources, The resources required to select the power relay device r to attack.

[0038] Preferably, the expected loss function of the attack strategy analysis layer is:

[0039]

[0040] In the formula, For the attacker in the defender type The loss function under Is the defender type The probability distribution of For the attacker in the defender type The loss value below.

[0041] Preferably, the system loss assessment layer is constructed by minimizing the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, including:

[0042] According to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, the system loss of the system in the worst attack scenario is minimized, and the system loss function is determined as:

[0043]

[0044] In the formula, is the system loss function;

[0045] Taking minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, a recovery time optimization function of the system loss assessment layer is constructed, and the recovery time optimization function is:

[0046]

[0047] In the formula, is the recovery time after the system is attacked, The budget required to deploy defenses, The recovery time after the system is attacked when there is no defense. The recovery time after the system is attacked after the defense is deployed. Reduced recovery time for deployed defenses, is a parameter that controls the smoothness of the function. Minimum pre-clearance for deployment of defense;

[0048] A system loss assessment layer is constructed according to the system loss function and the recovery time optimization function.

[0049] Preferably, the game optimization of the system loss assessment layer to obtain the defense optimization scheme of the power relay protection device includes:

[0050] Based on the complete information game theory, the system loss assessment layer is solved by game optimization, and the defense optimization scheme of the power relay protection device is determined according to the optimal solution.

[0051] In a second aspect, the present invention further provides a device for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device, comprising:

[0052] The defense budget module is used to allocate the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, take minimizing the expected energy loss of the system as the optimization goal according to the failure probability of the power relay device, and determine the defense budget allocation restriction constraints to build a defense budget allocation layer;

[0053] An attack analysis module is used to determine the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss based on the failure probability of the power relay protection device and to build an attack strategy analysis layer with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios;

[0054] A system loss assessment module, used to minimize the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and to build a system loss assessment layer with the optimization goal of minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked;

[0055] The game optimization module is used to perform game optimization on the system loss assessment layer to obtain a defense optimization plan for the power relay protection device.

[0056] In a third aspect, the present invention further provides an electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the processor executes the steps of the method for defending against attacks on the power relay protection device as described in the first aspect.

[0057] In a fourth aspect, the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed, implements the steps of the method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices as described in the first aspect.

[0058] It can be seen from the above technical solutions that the present invention has the following advantages:

[0059] By allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, thereby improving the defense capability of each power relay device, and by maximizing the system loss in multiple attack scenarios as the goal, the power relay device set with the largest system loss is determined, and the system loss in the worst attack scenario is minimized in combination with the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and the system recovery time after the attack is minimized as the optimization goal, the system's protection capability when facing multiple relay devices being attacked at the same time is improved, solving the problem of insufficient defense effect of the existing technology in complex and changeable attack scenarios, and balancing the allocation of resources on different relay devices through a layered defense budget allocation mechanism, significantly improving resource utilization efficiency, solving the problem of low efficiency of the existing technology in defense budget allocation, and ensuring the maximization of defense effect under limited resources. By calculating the failure probability and load loss of the system, the recovery time is optimized, the system recovery delay caused by the attack is reduced, the occurrence of large-scale cascading failures is reduced, and the defect of the existing technology failing to fully consider the cascading effect of network attacks is solved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0060] Figure 1 An application environment of a method for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 2A flow chart of a method for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0062] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the topology of the power distribution network of the IEEE 123 node test system provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0063] Figure 4 A comparison diagram of load loss of relay protection devices under ARSA and PRSA attacks provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0064] Figure 5 A comparison chart of the maximum EENS of different attack scales under the ARSA and PRSA methods provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0065] Figure 6 A comparison chart of the impact of different budget allocation strategies on EENS under the ARSA and PRSA methods provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0066] Figure 7 A resource allocation trend diagram under different budget levels provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0067] Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the structure of a defense device against attacks on a power relay protection device provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0068] Fig. 9 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0069] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0070] The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices provided in the embodiments of the present application can be applied to Figure 1 In the application environment shown. Among them, each power relay protection device of the distribution network communicates with the server 102 through the network. The data storage system can store the data that the server 102 needs to process. The data storage system can be integrated on the server 102, or it can be placed on the cloud or other network servers. The server 102 can be an independent physical server, or a server cluster or distributed system composed of multiple physical servers, or a cloud server that provides cloud computing services.

[0071] like Figure 2 As shown, a method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices is provided, and the method is applied to Figure 1 Taking the server 102 in the example as an example, this method can defend against the fixed value tampering attack of the relay protection device and minimize the system loss, and specifically includes the following steps S1 to S4. Among them:

[0072] Step S1, by allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, taking minimizing the expected energy loss of the system as the optimization goal, and determining the defense budget allocation restriction constraints, a defense budget allocation layer is constructed.

[0073] Among them, the defense budget allocation layer allocates a limited defense budget to each power relay device to reduce the probability of its tampering. The budget allocation of the defense budget allocation layer describes the defense effect of the relay device through an exponential decay model to minimize the failure risk of the relay device.

[0074] Specifically, in step S1, by allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the defense budget allocation constraint is determined to construct a defense budget allocation layer, including:

[0075] Step S101: By allocating the budget of the power relay protection device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the objective function of the defense budget allocation layer is constructed as follows:

[0076]

[0077] In the formula, is the expected energy loss, is the failure probability, For distribution to power relay devices of the defense budget, To allocate system-level defense budget, For power relay protection device The load loss caused by failure, For power relay protection device A collection of .

[0078] Among them, EENS refers to expected energy not supplied (EENS).

[0079] Among them, the defense budget allocation combines device-level defense and system-level defense. The device-level defense describes the relay protection device through the following exponential decay model: The failure probability ,in, It is a relay protection device The sensitivity coefficient of , which indicates the influence of the defense budget allocated to the relay on its failure probability; then the failure probability is:

[0080]

[0081] In the formula, is the weight factor, e is a constant, For power relay protection device The sensitivity coefficient of It is the effect parameter of system-level defense.

[0082] in, It is a system-level defense budget used to improve the protection capability of the entire system. Reasonable allocation of the defense budget requires a balance between the device level and the system level to minimize the overall failure probability.

[0083] It is understandable that the defense budget allocation layer in the embodiment of the present application can be divided into the defense budget allocated to the system level and the defense budget allocated to the power relay protection device. The defense budget is optimized, and the defense effect of the relay device is described by an exponential decay model. This model combines device-level and system-level defense measures to minimize the failure risk of the relay device.

[0084] In one embodiment, in the process of determining the weight factor, the following factors may be considered based on the different impacts of device-level defense measures and system-level defense measures on the probability of system failure:

[0085] The role of device-level defense budget: Device-level budget Mainly acts on specific relays or equipment, by reducing the failure probability of the equipment itself To improve safety. Prioritize device-level budget allocation for critical loads (such as relays that cause large load losses) because these devices cause greater losses when they fail. Therefore, the weights are allocated based on the probability of each relay failing and the load loss after its failure. .

[0086] The role of system-level defense budget: System-level budget It has a global impact on the security of the entire system and is mainly used to improve the overall defense capabilities of the system (such as communication encryption, system monitoring, attack detection, etc.). System-level budgets help reduce the probability of global failures. Even if some local devices are attacked, system-level measures can reduce further chain reactions.

[0087] The basis for weight allocation of device-level and system-level budgets is as follows: When the local failure of a device has a huge impact on the overall operation of the system (for example, the failure of a certain device will cause a large-scale power outage), the device-level budget should have a larger weight; when the system-level defense measures can effectively prevent the spread of attacks and avoid overall collapse, the system-level budget needs to have a higher weight.

[0088] Weight Factor The impact weights of device-level and system-level budgets on the overall failure probability can be described.

[0089] In order to achieve a reasonable weight distribution, it is necessary to comprehensively optimize the budget effects at the device level and system level. The main steps are as follows:

[0090] (1) Establish equipment priority: First, based on the failure impact of each device (i.e. ), establish a priority order for the devices. Devices with greater load loss need to be allocated device-level budget first.

[0091] (2) Determination Initial range of values: Based on this, an initial The initial allocation ratio of the device-level and system-level budgets can be determined by setting the value. For example, for devices with high load loss, the initial allocation ratio can be set to Favor device-level defense budget.

[0092] (3) Adjustment through simulation and optimization :Through multiple simulations, gradually adjust The goal is to find an optimal , so that the allocation of device-level and system-level budgets can minimize the probability of system failure as a whole.

[0093] Step S102: Determine the defense budget allocation restriction constraint, which is:

[0094]

[0095] In the formula, The maximum budget limit.

[0096] Among them, the defender in the defense budget allocation layer allocates a limited defense budget ,in Indicates the relay device is assigned budget, the total budget is constrained.

[0097] In addition, the budget allocation set satisfy:

[0098]

[0099] In the formula, is a vector space in the space of positive real numbers, where is a set of non-negative numbers, R is the dimension, that is, the relay protection device The total number of .

[0100] Among them, the expected loss function of the defense budget allocation layer is:

[0101]

[0102] in, For the defender in the attacker type The loss function under Is the attacker type The probability distribution of To find the derivative symbol, For the defender in the attacker type The loss value below.

[0103] The type of attacker Refers to the specific characteristics or attributes of the attacker in the game model, which will affect the attacker's strategy selection, attack methods, target priority, etc. Different types of attackers have different attack capabilities, resources, knowledge levels, and goals. The defender must evaluate the attack risk and optimize the defense based on these types.

[0104] In incomplete information games, the types of attackers It is usually unknown, and the defender can only make a prediction based on the probability distribution of the attacker type. Make a decision. The types of attackers usually include the following aspects:

[0105] 1) Resource constraints

[0106] Different attackers have different resources available to them, which affect the scale and complexity of the attack. These include:

[0107] Computing resources: How much computing power the attacker has available to carry out the attack (e.g. cracking a password or launching a large-scale attack).

[0108] Communication capability: Whether the attacker can coordinate attacks on multiple targets.

[0109] Physical resources: Whether the attacker can carry out the attack through physical means (such as direct access to the device).

[0110] 2) Attack capability

[0111] The depth and complexity of the attack are determined by the attacker’s technical capabilities and understanding of the system’s vulnerabilities. For example:

[0112] Skill Level: High-level attackers are able to identify complex vulnerabilities in the system and launch precise attacks.

[0113] Attack method: Some attackers have the ability to attack covertly, while others use more direct destructive means.

[0114] 3) Attack target

[0115] The attacker's goals determine their choice of strategy, for example:

[0116] Maximizing system loss: The attacker's goal is to maximize the load loss in the system.

[0117] Data tampering: Some attackers focus on tampering with or stealing data rather than physical destruction.

[0118] 4) Knowledge level

[0119] The attacker's knowledge of the defender's system:

[0120] Complete understanding: The attacker has detailed information about the system and can choose the most effective attack strategy.

[0121] Partial understanding: The attacker can only attack based on historical data or speculation, which may lead to suboptimal strategies.

[0122] 5) Attack methods

[0123] The type of attacker also depends on the attack method they choose, which can include cyber attack tools (such as DDoS, malware) or physical destruction.

[0124] Step S2: According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios, determine the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss, and build an attack strategy analysis layer.

[0125] Among them, the attack strategy analysis layer is based on the attacker's strategy to determine the vulnerable relay protection devices in the system, simulate the potential damage under different attack scenarios, calculate the possibility of the attacker selecting attack targets for the relay protection devices and the corresponding resource allocation, and maximize the system losses caused by the attack.

[0126] Specifically, according to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, the attack strategy analysis layer is constructed in step S2 with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios to determine the set of power relay protection devices with the largest system loss, including:

[0127] Step S201: According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios, construct an objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer. The objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is:

[0128]

[0129] In the formula, A set of power relay devices to be attacked is selected within the total resource constraints;

[0130] Step S202: Determine the resource constraints of the attack strategy analysis layer as follows:

[0131]

[0132] In the formula is the total resources, The resources required to select the power relay device r to attack.

[0133] Understandably, with the defense budget allocated to each relay and system-level defense budget , by choosing the appropriate and , under the condition of satisfying the resource constraints of the attack strategy analysis layer, the objective function value of the attack strategy analysis layer is maximized. It is worth mentioning that the attack strategy analysis layer determines the vulnerable relay protection devices in the system from the attacker's perspective, simulates the potential damage under different attack scenarios, calculates the possibility of the attacker selecting the attack target for the relay protection device and the corresponding resource allocation, maximizes the system loss caused by the attack, and thus launches the subsequent defense strategy.

[0134] In the defense budget allocation layer, after determining the set of power relay devices with the greatest system losses, the defense budget can be allocated to the defense devices first to reduce their failure probability when attacked, thereby reducing the expected energy loss of the system. This allocation method based on loss assessment ensures that the limited defense budget can be used on the devices that have the greatest impact on system security, thereby optimizing the overall defense effect.

[0135] Among them, the expected loss function of the attack strategy analysis layer is:

[0136]

[0137] In the formula, For the attacker in the defender type The loss function under Is the defender type The probability distribution of For the attacker in the defender type The loss value below.

[0138] Step S3: Minimize the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and build a system loss assessment layer with the optimization goal of minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked.

[0139] The system loss assessment layer determines the system loss by comprehensively evaluating the impact of the attack on the system, the failure probability of the power relay device and its load loss, so as to determine the optimal recovery time of the defender under the worst attack scenario, so as to minimize the time and energy loss of the system to resume operation after the attack.

[0140] In some embodiments, in step S3, the system loss assessment layer is constructed by minimizing the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, including:

[0141] Step S301: Minimize the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and determine the system loss function as:

[0142]

[0143] In the formula, is the system loss function.

[0144] Among them, in this defense method, the system loss function is used to quantify the loss of the system under the worst attack scenario. The objective functions of the aforementioned defense budget allocation layer and attack strategy analysis layer represent different optimization goals. The objective function of the defense budget allocation layer is to minimize the expected energy loss (EENS) of the system, so as to reduce the failure probability of key power relay devices by allocating defense budgets.

[0145] The objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is based on the attacker's perspective, aiming to maximize system losses. It simulates attack strategies by identifying the combination of power relay devices that may cause the greatest system losses. The defense budget allocation layer configures budgets from the defender's perspective to reduce the probability of failure, while the attack strategy analysis layer simulates attack scenarios from the attacker's perspective. The two layers' mutual game determines the system's losses under the worst scenario.

[0146] Step S302: Taking the minimization of the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, a recovery time optimization function of the system loss assessment layer is constructed. The recovery time optimization function is:

[0147]

[0148] In the formula, is the recovery time after the system is attacked, The budget required to deploy defenses, The recovery time after the system is attacked when there is no defense. The recovery time after the system is attacked after the defense is deployed. Reduced recovery time for deployed defenses, is a parameter that controls the smoothness of the function. Minimum pre-screening for deployment of defense.

[0149] The system loss assessment layer combines the defense optimization results of the defense budget allocation layer and the attack simulation results of the attack strategy analysis layer to form a system loss function under the worst attack scenario. That is, in the system loss assessment layer, the failure probability of key equipment is reduced by optimizing the configuration of the defense budget, while the attacker's optimal attack strategy is simulated to determine the weak points of the system, and finally the loss quantification index under this worst attack scenario is calculated. .

[0150] Among them, defense can be achieved by deploying an identification system, which refers to a technical system used to detect and identify the system status and faults after an attack. It includes the following aspects:

[0151] (1) Attack detection system: used to monitor the system's operating status in real time and detect potential anomalies and attack behaviors.

[0152] (2) Fault identification system: used to locate the fault point within the system so as to quickly respond and restore system functions.

[0153] (3) Security monitoring system: ensures that the system can detect threats in a timely manner after being attacked and initiate recovery measures in a timely manner.

[0154] Among them, the parameters is the smoothness of the control function, which affects how quickly the recovery time decreases. Decided when Exceeding the threshold Time, recovery time The speed and magnitude of the reduction. The value of can be obtained through simulation experiments, that is, at different budget levels Under this condition, the system recovery time is simulated to find out The optimal value of .

[0155] Step S303: construct a system loss assessment layer according to the system loss function and the recovery time optimization function.

[0156] The strategic interaction between the defender and the attacker can be described by a game theory model. The defender's goal is to reduce the system's expected energy not supplied (EENS) under attack through reasonable budget allocation, while the attacker attempts to maximize the system's loss by choosing a specific attack strategy. The strategies of the defender and the attacker interact with each other. The defender's budget allocation directly affects the attacker's success rate, while the attacker's strategy selection affects the system's operating status and security.

[0157] Step S4: Perform game optimization on the system loss assessment layer to obtain a defense optimization plan for the power relay protection device.

[0158] The game optimization of the system loss assessment layer in step S4 to obtain the defense optimization scheme of the power relay protection device includes:

[0159] Based on the complete information game theory, the game optimization solution of the system loss assessment layer is solved, and the defense optimization plan of the power relay device is determined according to the optimal solution.

[0160] In certain scenarios, the perfect information game theory assumes that the defender and attacker have complete knowledge of each other's resources, strategies, and goals. In this case, the strategy selection of the game can be simplified to a zero-sum game, and the two sides directly confront each other under perfect information conditions. This kind of situation is more suitable for maximizing one's own benefits or minimizing losses through optimal budget allocation and strategy selection when the other party has fully mastered the information.

[0161] In actual scenarios, complete information games and incomplete information games are applicable to different situations. For situations where both attackers and defenders have a clear understanding of each other's resources and strategies, we can simplify the incomplete information game to a complete information game. In a complete information game, since both parties have the same understanding of the system parameters, resources, and strategies, there is no need to consider uncertainty, and the game can be directly transformed into a zero-sum game problem. Next, we will explore how to use the Lagrange multiplier method to simplify the two-level optimization problem under the framework of a complete information game.

[0162] In order to transform the attacker's budget constraint into the defender's optimization constraint, we introduce the Lagrangian multiplier to form the following Lagrangian function:

[0163]

[0164] This Lagrangian function transforms the two-layer optimization problem into a single-layer optimization problem under the resource constraints of the attacker. The defender selects the optimal budget allocation strategy to minimize the system loss in the worst case scenario while considering all possible attack scenarios. In this way, the defender can solve complex game problems in a simpler calculation method, improving the security and robustness of the system.

[0165] It can be understood that the overall system loss is minimized based on a three-layer optimization structure. The three-layer structure design includes a defense budget allocation layer, an attack strategy analysis layer, and a system loss assessment layer. There is a relationship of mutual dependence and influence between each layer, and each layer is optimized to ensure the optimal overall defense effect.

[0166] It should be noted that the embodiment of the present application allocates the budget and system-level budget of the power relay device, and according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizes the expected energy loss of the system as the optimization goal, thereby improving the defense capability of each power relay device, and by maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios as the goal, to determine the set of power relay devices with the largest system loss, and combines the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer to minimize the system loss under the worst attack scenario, and minimizes the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, so as to improve the system's protection capability when facing multiple relay devices being attacked at the same time, solves the problem of insufficient defense effect of the prior art in complex and changeable attack scenarios, and balances the allocation of resources on different relay devices through a layered defense budget allocation mechanism, significantly improves resource utilization efficiency, solves the problem of low efficiency of the prior art in defense budget allocation, and ensures that the defense effect is maximized when resources are limited. By calculating the failure probability and load loss of the system, optimizing the recovery time, reducing the system recovery delay caused by the attack, reducing the occurrence of large-scale cascading failures, and solving the defect that the prior art fails to fully consider the cascading effect of network attacks.

[0167] The following is a calculation example proposed in conjunction with the embodiments of the present application.

[0168] In this example, if Figure 3The schematic diagram of the IEEE 123-node test system distribution network topology is shown in the figure, which shows a typical power distribution system with 123 nodes. The system is equipped with multiple circuit breakers (marked in red) and reclosers (marked in white), as well as multiple protection relays (indicated by R1 to R6 marked in blue). This schematic diagram is used to illustrate the relay protection mechanism at different locations and its defense configuration when it is attacked by fixed value tampering. Each relay protects the power grid system by being distributed on different line segments, ensuring that the system can respond quickly and isolate the fault when a fault occurs to reduce the load loss of the system. In order to enhance the authenticity of the experiment, seven protection relays were added to the experiment, which are located in line segments (13-18), (13-52), (18-135), (67-97), (67-72) and (76-86). The settings of these relays take into account the differences in line load, distance and line conditions to ensure that the key nodes can isolate the fault in time when attacked.

[0169] The failure of each relay may cause load interruption, so reasonable defense budget allocation becomes the core of the experimental design. The experiment assumes that relay R1 is located in the main substation and initial reinforcement measures have been taken. Its failure probability is close to zero, which is expressed as , while other relays have no initial reinforcement measures and have a higher probability of failure.

[0170] In order to optimize the budget allocation, the experiment also assumes the installation of an attack identification system. The attack identification system can speed up the system recovery after an attack occurs. The experiment sets the required budget to 30 ( ), the system recovery time was reduced from the initial 5 hours to 3 hours ( ). The installation of an attack identification system can significantly reduce the power restoration time. Attacks are divided into active relay setting attacks (ARSA) and passive relay setting attacks (PRSA). ARSA directly modifies the relay settings to trip under normal working conditions, while PRSA delays the response time of the relay under fault conditions, expanding the fault impact range of the system.

[0171] The importance of relays in the system needs to be considered in the allocation of defense budget. Relays located at the core of the system, such as those close to the main substation, will be given priority to receive more defense budget. It can be reduced to near 0 through reinforcement measures. For relays in secondary areas of the system, basic protection is performed, and the probability of successful attack may remain at a high level. The above experimental design ensures a comprehensive evaluation of attack and defense strategies, and evaluates the performance of the system when attacked through experimental results under different defense configurations.

[0172] Figure 4The following is a comparison of the load loss of relay protection devices under ARSA and PRSA attacks, showing the load loss (unit: MW) of each relay under active relay setting attack (ARSA) and passive relay setting attack (PRSA) without defense measures. As can be seen from the figure, the load loss of PRSA on relays R2, R5, R6 and R7 is much higher than that of ARSA. For example, the load loss caused by PRSA attack on R2 is close to 2.2MW, while the loss of ARSA is about 1.2MW. This shows that R2 is more significantly affected by PRSA attack, especially when the relay is upstream, PRSA is likely to cause a larger range of cascading power outages. In relay R3, the situation is the opposite. The load loss caused by ARSA is greater than that of PRSA. The main reason is that R3 is in the downstream position and its load is more directly affected by ARSA. The experimental results reveal the difference in the vulnerability of a single relay under different attack types, especially PRSA is more destructive to the system. Therefore, the system protection strategy should allocate different defense resources according to the importance of different relays, especially key relays such as R2 and R5 need to take priority measures to reduce their vulnerability under PRSA.

[0173] Figure 5 The figure is a comparison of the maximum EENS of different attack scales under the ARSA and PRSA methods, showing the changes in the maximum unpowered energy loss (EENS) of the system when it is attacked by one, two or three relays at the same time. The shaded area in the figure shows the difference between the ARSA and PRSA methods. The results show that the destructive power of PRSA is significantly higher than that of ARSA in the multi-relay attack scenario. For example, when R3, R6 and R7 are attacked by PRSA at the same time, the EENS reaches 17MWh, while the EENS of the same relay combination under ARSA attack is only 16MWh. In the combined attack of R2, R3 and R5, the load loss caused by PRSA almost reaches the maximum upper limit of the system, which reflects the high risk of multi-relay PRSA attack to the system. The experimental results show that PRSA is often more destructive than ARSA under multi-relay attacks, especially when multiple critical relays are attacked at the same time, the chain reaction caused by PRSA may lead to global power outages. Therefore, when formulating defense strategies, the system should make full responses to the special impact of PRSA to ensure that the system stability can be maintained at a high level when multiple relays are attacked at the same time.

[0174] Figure 6The following is a comparison chart of the impact of different budget allocation strategies on EENS under the ARSA and PRSA methods, showing the impact of the three defense strategies on the maximum unpowered energy loss (EENS) of the system under different budget levels. The red solid line represents the optimal allocation strategy that considers both ARSA and PRSA. As the budget increases, EENS gradually decreases. When the budget reaches 30, the decrease in EENS is most obvious, indicating that the defense effect of the system has reached the best state at this time. As the budget increases further, the change in EENS tends to be flat, indicating that under a higher budget, the overall recovery ability of the system has been significantly improved. The blue dotted line represents the defense strategy that only considers ARSA. Under a higher budget, this strategy has a better control ability on the system EENS, but when the budget is low, EENS shows a higher value, especially when the budget is close to 30, the defense effect of this strategy is obviously not as good as the optimal allocation strategy. When only ARSA is considered, the system shows greater vulnerability when facing PRSA attacks and cannot effectively reduce EENS. The green dotted line represents the defense strategy that only considers PRSA. This strategy performs better when the budget is low, and the EENS decreases significantly, but as the budget increases, the defense effect gradually approaches the optimal allocation strategy. In terms of overall defense effect, it is still slightly inferior to the optimal strategy that considers both ARSA and PRSA. When the budget reaches a higher value, the PRSA strategy cannot achieve the optimal defense effect.

[0175] Figure 7 The resource allocation trend chart at different budget levels shows the budget allocation percentage of each relay and system defense measure in the budget range from 50 to 500 units. The vertical axis represents the budget allocation percentage of each defense measure, ranging from 0% to 100%; the horizontal axis represents the size of the budget, ranging from 50 to 500 units. The different color areas in the figure correspond to relays and systems, showing the dynamic process of their allocation ratio in the total budget as the budget changes. When the budget is low, the attack identification system ( ) accounted for the majority of the allocation. As the budget increases, This trend reflects that, with limited resources, defense strategies are more focused on ensuring basic attack identification capabilities. However, as budgets increase, The resources required are gradually reduced, and the focus of resource allocation has changed. At the same time, system-wide defense measures ( ) increases significantly as the budget increases. Almost no resources were allocated to it, but as the budget increased, its share gradually expanded, and finally became the main resource allocation object under high budget conditions. This shows that the defense strategy is gradually changing from single-point protection to comprehensive system protection to improve the overall defense level. , and A relatively constant allocation was maintained across the budget. Regardless of budget increases, these relays always received a certain amount of resources, reflecting their continued importance in system safety. , and The resource allocation ratio of the 2020 NAVY RAID systems is relatively small, but they also receive certain resources as the budget increases, which reflects the further expansion of system defense under the higher budget.

[0176] Based on the same inventive concept, an embodiment of the present application also provides a device for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device for implementing the above-mentioned method for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device.

[0177] The implementation solution to the problem provided by the device is similar to the implementation solution recorded in the above method. Therefore, the specific limitations in the embodiments of the defense device for attacks on one or more power relay protection devices provided below can be found in the above limitations on the defense method for attacks on power relay protection devices, and will not be repeated here.

[0178] like Figure 8 As shown, the embodiment of the present application also provides a defense device for attacking a power relay protection device, comprising:

[0179] The defense budget module 100 is used to allocate the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, take minimizing the expected energy loss of the system as the optimization goal according to the failure probability of the power relay device, and determine the defense budget allocation restriction constraint to build a defense budget allocation layer;

[0180] Attack analysis module 200, used to determine the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss according to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios, and to build an attack strategy analysis layer;

[0181] The system loss assessment module 300 is used to minimize the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and to build a system loss assessment layer with the optimization goal of minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked;

[0182] The game optimization module 400 is used to perform game optimization on the system loss assessment layer to obtain a defense optimization plan for the power relay protection device.

[0183] In some embodiments, the defense budget module 100 is used to allocate the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, and to minimize the expected energy loss of the system as the optimization goal according to the failure probability of the power relay device. The objective function of the defense budget allocation layer is:

[0184]

[0185] In the formula, is the expected energy loss, is the failure probability, For distribution to power relay devices of the defense budget, To allocate system-level defense budget, For power relay protection device The load loss caused by failure, For power relay protection device A collection of; among them,

[0186]

[0187] In the formula, is the weight factor, e is a constant, For power relay protection device The sensitivity coefficient of It is the effect parameter of system-level defense;

[0188] Determine the defense budget allocation constraint, which is:

[0189]

[0190] In the formula, The maximum budget limit.

[0191] In some embodiments, the expected loss function of the defense budget allocation layer is:

[0192]

[0193] in, For the defender in the attacker type The loss function under Is the attacker type The probability distribution of To find the derivative symbol, For the defender in the attacker type The loss value below.

[0194] In some embodiments, the attack analysis module 200 is used to construct an objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer according to the failure probability of the power relay protection device and to maximize the system loss under multiple attack scenarios. The objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is:

[0195]

[0196] In the formula, A set of power relay devices to be attacked is selected within the total resource constraints;

[0197] Determine the resource constraints of the attack strategy analysis layer as follows:

[0198]

[0199] In the formula is the total resources, The resources required to select the power relay device r to attack.

[0200] In some embodiments, the expected loss function of the attack strategy analysis layer is:

[0201]

[0202] In the formula, For the attacker in the defender type The loss function under Is the defender type The probability distribution of For the attacker in the defender type The loss value below.

[0203] In some embodiments, the system loss assessment layer is constructed based on the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer to minimize the system loss in the worst attack scenario, and to minimize the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, including:

[0204] According to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, the system loss in the worst attack scenario is minimized, and the system loss function is determined as:

[0205]

[0206] In the formula, is the system loss function;

[0207] Taking minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, the recovery time optimization function of the system loss assessment layer is constructed. The recovery time optimization function is:

[0208]

[0209] In the formula, is the recovery time after the system is attacked, The budget required to deploy defenses, The recovery time after the system is attacked when there is no defense. The recovery time after the system is attacked after the defense is deployed. Reduced recovery time for deployed defenses, is a parameter that controls the smoothness of the function. Minimum pre-clearance for deployment of defense;

[0210] The system loss assessment layer is constructed based on the system loss function and recovery time optimization function.

[0211] In some embodiments, the game optimization module 400 is used to perform game optimization solutions to the system loss assessment layer based on complete information game theory, and determine the defense optimization plan of the power relay protection device according to the optimal solution.

[0212] like Fig. 9 As shown, an embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device, the electronic device 10 includes a memory 20 and a processor 30, the memory 20 stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor 30, the processor 30 executes the steps of the defense method against attacks on the power relay protection device as described above.

[0213] The embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed, the steps of the method for defending against attacks on the power relay protection device as described above are implemented.

[0214] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described devices, electronic devices and computer storage media can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0215] It should be noted that the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof in the specification and claims of the present invention and the above-mentioned drawings are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product or apparatus comprising a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or apparatus.

[0216] In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it is understood that each box in the flow chart or block diagram can represent a module, a program segment or a part of a code, and a part of a module, a program segment or a code includes one or more executable instructions for realizing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the box can also occur in a different order from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two consecutive boxes can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved.

[0217] In the several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed devices, electronic devices, computer storage media and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0218] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0219] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.

[0220] If the integrated unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including several instructions for executing all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention through a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.). The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (full name in English: Read-Only Memory, English abbreviation: ROM), random access memory (full name in English: Random Access Memory, English abbreviation: RAM), disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.

[0221] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices, characterized in that: include: By allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the defense budget allocation constraint is determined to construct the defense budget allocation layer; According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios, the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss is determined, and an attack strategy analysis layer is constructed; According to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, the system loss in the worst attack scenario is minimized, and the system loss assessment layer is constructed with minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal; The system loss assessment layer is game optimized to obtain a defense optimization plan for the power relay protection device.

2. The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices according to claim 1, characterized in that: By allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the defense budget allocation restriction constraint is determined to construct a defense budget allocation layer, including: By allocating the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, according to the failure probability of the power relay device, minimizing the expected energy loss of the system is taken as the optimization goal, and the objective function of the defense budget allocation layer is constructed as follows: In the formula, is the expected energy loss, is the failure probability, For distribution to power relay devices defense budget, To allocate system-level defense budget, For power relay protection device The load loss caused by failure, For power relay protection device A collection of; among them, In the formula, is the weight factor, e is a constant, For power relay protection device The sensitivity coefficient of It is the effect parameter of system-level defense; Determine the defense budget allocation constraint, the defense budget allocation constraint is: In the formula, The maximum budget limit.

3. The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices according to claim 1, characterized in that: The expected loss function of the defense budget allocation layer is: in, For the defender in the attacker type The loss function under Is the attacker type The probability distribution of To find the derivative symbol, For the defender in the attacker type The loss value below.

4. The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices according to claim 1, characterized in that: According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, the goal is to maximize the system loss under multiple attack scenarios, to determine the set of power relay protection devices with the largest system loss, and to build an attack strategy analysis layer, including: According to the failure probability of the power relay protection device, the objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is constructed with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios. The objective function of the attack strategy analysis layer is: In the formula, A set of power relay devices to be attacked is selected within the total resource constraints; The resource constraints of the attack strategy analysis layer are determined as follows: In the formula is the total resources, The resources required to select the power relay device r to attack.

5. The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices according to claim 1, characterized in that: The expected loss function of the attack strategy analysis layer is: In the formula, For the attacker in the defender type The loss function under Is the defender type The probability distribution of For the attacker in the defender type The loss value below.

6. The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices according to claim 1, characterized in that: The system loss assessment layer is constructed by minimizing the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, including: According to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, the system loss of the system in the worst attack scenario is minimized, and the system loss function is determined as: In the formula, is the system loss function; Taking minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked as the optimization goal, a recovery time optimization function of the system loss assessment layer is constructed, and the recovery time optimization function is: In the formula, is the recovery time after the system is attacked, The budget required to deploy defenses, The recovery time after the system is attacked when there is no defense. The recovery time after the system is attacked after the defense is deployed. Reduced recovery time for deployed defenses, is a parameter that controls the smoothness of the function. Minimum pre-clearance for deployment of defense; A system loss assessment layer is constructed according to the system loss function and the recovery time optimization function.

7. The method for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices according to claim 1, characterized in that: The game optimization of the system loss assessment layer to obtain the defense optimization scheme of the power relay protection device includes: Based on the complete information game theory, the system loss assessment layer is solved by game optimization, and the defense optimization scheme of the power relay protection device is determined according to the optimal solution.

8. A device for defending against attacks on power relay protection devices, characterized in that: include: The defense budget module is used to allocate the budget of the power relay device and the system-level budget, take minimizing the expected energy loss of the system as the optimization goal according to the failure probability of the power relay device, and determine the defense budget allocation restriction constraints to build a defense budget allocation layer; An attack analysis module is used to determine the set of power relay protection devices with the greatest system loss based on the failure probability of the power relay protection device and to build an attack strategy analysis layer with the goal of maximizing the system loss under multiple attack scenarios; A system loss assessment module, used to minimize the system loss in the worst attack scenario according to the defense budget allocation layer and the attack strategy analysis layer, and to build a system loss assessment layer with the optimization goal of minimizing the recovery time after the system is attacked; The game optimization module is used to perform game optimization on the system loss assessment layer to obtain a defense optimization plan for the power relay protection device.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device includes a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the processor executes the steps of the method for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed, the steps of the method for defending against attacks on a power relay protection device as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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