Unmanned aerial vehicle auxiliary vehicle cross-domain authentication method and system based on digital certificate

Abstract

The invention discloses an unmanned aerial vehicle auxiliary vehicle cross-domain authentication method and system based on a digital certificate, and the method comprises the steps: generating system parameters based on a control center; generating an authentication certificate of the vehicle or the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the system parameters; and when the vehicle accesses services of different unmanned aerial vehicle jurisdiction areas, cross-domain authentication is completed by using the authentication certificate. According to the invention, the advanced unmanned aerial vehicle technology is utilized to carry out omnibearing monitoring and analysis on complex terrains such as rural areas or mountainous areas, so that real-time and accurate judgment and support on road conditions are realized, and important information is provided for road safety management. Meanwhile, a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network architecture based on a digital certificate is provided, security is enhanced through a signature mechanism in the certificate, and non-repudiation and integrity of communication are ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of privacy protection, and specifically to a drone-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication method and system based on digital certificates. Background Art

[0002] With the development of Internet technology, the Internet of Vehicles, as an Internet-based intelligent transportation system, connects various elements such as vehicles, roads and traffic facilities to realize information interaction and coordination between vehicles, between vehicles and roads, and between vehicles and traffic facilities, thereby improving traffic efficiency, reducing traffic accident rates, and improving the traffic environment. However, road traffic management in rural areas or mountainous areas has always faced many challenges, including complex terrain, changeable weather conditions, and traffic safety hazards. Therefore, in order to solve the problems of insufficient base station coverage and untimely rescue in rural areas or mountainous areas, it is a current trend to use drones in the Internet of Vehicles. Due to its flying ability, drones are not restricted by the physical structure of the road and can move freely to support the required network. Not only that, it can also reduce the number of deployed infrastructure nodes, thereby reducing deployment costs.

[0003] Secondly, when vehicles move long distances in rural or mountainous areas, they need to interact with vehicles in other areas across domains. During the interaction, information is easily stolen and the privacy of vehicle identity is easily leaked. Therefore, a digital certificate security mechanism is adopted to prevent information leakage. These certificates are usually issued by the control center and contain the public key and identity information of the vehicle or drone, ensuring the legitimacy and authenticity of the identities of both parties in communication. However, the signature mechanism in the certificate further enhances security, so that any unauthorized tampering will cause verification failure, thereby providing non-repudiation and integrity protection for communication. In addition, the use of digital certificates combined with hidden identity lists can effectively authenticate without revealing the true identity of the vehicle, thereby protecting the privacy of users and ensuring the credibility and stability of the vehicle networking system. By combining drones with digital certificates to establish a secure connection between vehicles, the data privacy between drone and vehicle users is guaranteed. However, many solutions for privacy protection have been proposed in existing technologies, but how to efficiently protect privacy and reduce communication overhead and computing overhead resources is still a problem. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve the technical problems in the above background, the present invention provides a UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication method based on digital certificates, the steps comprising:

[0005] Generate system parameters based on the control center;

[0006] Based on the system parameters, generate an authentication certificate for the vehicle or drone;

[0007] When a vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions, the authentication certificate is used to complete cross-domain authentication.

[0008] Preferably, the method for initializing the control center includes: selecting a prime number q, and selecting G1 and G2 as groups of prime order q; selecting P as a generator of G1, representing a bilinear mapping; the control center selects As the system private key, and calculate the corresponding public key, where PK pub =s·P; In addition, the control center selects h1: {0, 1}* → G1 and publicly provide {G1,G2,P,PK pub ,h1}, h1 represents the cryptographic hash function.

[0009] Preferably, the method for generating an authentication certificate for a vehicle or drone includes:

[0010] The vehicle or drone first randomly generates its own private key and calculates the corresponding public key through the parameters generated by the control center;

[0011] Submit identity information, public key and certificate validity period to the control center;

[0012] Use the control center's private key and a predefined cryptographic hash function to sign the information provided by the vehicle or drone to generate a unique digital signature;

[0013] The control center integrates the identity information, public key, certificate validity period and digital signature to generate a complete certificate and returns it to the vehicle or drone.

[0014] Preferably, the cross-domain authentication includes two stages: cross-domain information request and cross-domain information response;

[0015] Cross-domain information request: When a vehicle accesses a service in another drone’s jurisdiction, it initiates a request to the target drone through the local drone. The vehicle first generates a signature, which contains the vehicle’s identity information, request content, and timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the request. The vehicle packages the request information, signature, and its own certificate into a message and forwards it to the target drone through the local drone. After receiving the request, the target drone will verify the legitimacy of the message in the cross-domain information response phase to ensure the credibility of the vehicle’s identity and request content.

[0016] Cross-domain information response; the target drone verifies the cross-domain request from the vehicle, first checking whether the timestamp of the request is valid; then, using the certificate revocation list provided by the control center, confirms whether the vehicle's certificate is still valid; if the certificate has not been revoked, the target drone verifies the vehicle's signature; after the verification is passed, the target drone obtains the hidden identity list from the control center and assigns it to the vehicle. After receiving it, the vehicle will verify the validity of the message again; when everything is verified, the vehicle will be able to use the services provided by the target drone.

[0017] The present invention also provides a UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication system based on digital certificates, the system is used to implement the above method, including: an initialization module, a generation module and an authentication module;

[0018] The initialization module is used to generate system parameters based on the control center;

[0019] The generating module is used to generate a certification certificate of a vehicle or a UAV based on the system parameters;

[0020] When the vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions, the authentication module uses the authentication certificate to complete cross-domain authentication.

[0021] Preferably, the workflow of the initialization module includes: selecting a prime number q, and selecting G1 and G2 as groups of prime order q; selecting P as a generator of G1, representing a bilinear map; and selecting the control center. As the system private key, and calculate the corresponding public key, where PK pub =s·P; In addition, the control center selects h1|{0,1} * →G1 and publicly provide {G1, G2, P, PK pub ,h1}, where h1 represents a cryptographic hash function.

[0022] Preferably, the workflow of the generation module includes:

[0023] First, the vehicle or drone randomly generates its own private key, and then calculates the corresponding public key through the generation parameters of the control center;

[0024] Submit identity information, public key and certificate validity period to the control center;

[0025] Use the control center's private key and a predefined cryptographic hash function to sign the information provided by the vehicle or drone to generate a unique digital signature;

[0026] The control center integrates the identity information, public key, certificate validity period and digital signature to generate a complete certificate and returns it to the vehicle or drone.

[0027] Preferably, the cross-domain authentication includes two stages: cross-domain information request and cross-domain information response;

[0028] Cross-domain information request: When a vehicle accesses a service in another drone’s jurisdiction, it initiates a request to the target drone through the local drone. The vehicle first generates a signature, which contains the vehicle’s identity information, request content, and timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the request. The vehicle packages the request information, signature, and its own certificate into a message and forwards it to the target drone through the local drone. After receiving the request, the target drone will verify the legitimacy of the message in the cross-domain information response phase to ensure the credibility of the vehicle’s identity and request content.

[0029] Cross-domain information response; the target drone verifies the cross-domain request from the vehicle, first checking whether the timestamp of the request is valid; then, using the certificate revocation list provided by the control center, confirms whether the vehicle's certificate is still valid; if the certificate has not been revoked, the target drone verifies the vehicle's signature; after the verification is passed, the target drone obtains the hidden identity list from the control center and assigns it to the vehicle. After receiving it, the vehicle will verify the validity of the message again; when everything is verified, the vehicle will be able to use the services provided by the target drone.

[0030] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0031] 1. The present invention utilizes advanced UAV technology to conduct all-round monitoring and analysis of complex road environments, such as rural areas or mountainous areas with complex terrain, to achieve real-time and accurate judgment and support of road conditions, and provide important information support for road safety management.

[0032] 2. The present invention proposes an innovative vehicle-mounted self-organizing network architecture based on digital certificates. The digital certificate provides a mechanism, and the signature mechanism in the certificate further enhances security, so that any unauthorized tampering will result in verification failure, thereby providing non-repudiation and integrity protection for communication.

[0033] 3. The multi-control center design in the present invention, through a distributed control center architecture, not only effectively shares the burden of the control center, but also solves the single point failure problem and improves the reliability of the system.

[0034] 4. The present invention uses a hidden identity list, which can perform effective authentication without revealing the real identity of the vehicle, thereby protecting the privacy of the user.

[0035] 5. The present invention uses a batch verification mechanism to improve the efficiency and reliability of the authentication process. By batch processing and verifying the authentication requests of multiple vehicles, the system resource utilization is optimized and the authentication delay is reduced. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solution of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.

[0037] Figure 1 is a physical system diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a method flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 3 A process diagram of a digital certificate generation phase according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 4 It is a process diagram of the intra-domain information request phase of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 5 This is a process diagram of the cross-domain information response phase of an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0043] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0044] Before describing the present invention, the following important terms and constraints are introduced:

[0045] The core idea of ​​bilinear pairing is to establish a mapping relationship between elements of two different groups. This mapping satisfies the bilinear property, that is, the multiplication operation of elements within the group can be transformed into the multiplication operation of elements outside the group under the pairing operation.

[0046] The RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm is mainly used for encryption and decryption, but it can also be used for digital signatures. In RSA signatures, the private key is used to generate the signature, while the public key is used to verify the signature.

[0047] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention relates to the following four types of entities:

[0048] Control Center (CC): In the Internet of Vehicles, the control center is considered to be completely trusted. The control center generates system parameters and generates the public-private key pair of the vehicle.

[0049] Drone: As a mobile roadside unit, the drone has the general characteristics of a roadside unit and can store keys and perform encryption / decryption operations. It is an honest and curious wireless communication device. The drone communicates with vehicles through wireless channels and communicates with the control center. It is believed to have ultra-fast transmission speeds to support seamless coverage of vehicle communications and provide network access services for vehicles.

[0050] Vehicles: Vehicles are equipped with an on-board unit for communicating with other entities in the connected vehicle network. The on-board unit stores keys for authentication during cross-domain processes.

[0051] HideIdentityList: The HideIdentityList table is essentially a database containing reusable HideIdentityLists. Each HideIdentityList has an expiration time, and when a HideIdentityList expires, its association with a specific vehicle is revoked and it is set to a usable state in the HideIdentityList table.

[0052] Embodiment 1

[0053] like Figure 2 As shown, it is a schematic diagram of the method flow of the present invention, and the steps include:

[0054] S1. Based on the control center, generate system parameters.

[0055] The control center (CC) is a distributed registration center architecture. Entities in various regions register with the trusted institution CC in their respective regions through a secure channel. Each control center CC in different locations generates a set of local public and private key pairs, as well as system parameters such as the group and generator, hash function, and properties of bilinear mapping.

[0056] The method of initializing the control center CC includes: CC selects a prime number q, and selects G1 and G2 as groups of prime order q. P is selected as the generator of G1, which represents a bilinear map. CC selects As the system private key, and calculate the corresponding public key, where PK pub =s·P; In addition, CC selects h1:{0,1} * →G1 and publicly provide {G1, G2, P, K pub , h1}.

[0057] S2. Generate a vehicle or drone authentication certificate based on the system parameters.

[0058] The vehicle or drone first randomly generates its own private key and calculates the corresponding public key through the generation parameters of the control center; they submit the identity information (such as the unique identifier of the vehicle or drone), the public key and the validity period of the certificate to the control center CC; the CC uses its own private key and a predefined cryptographic hash function to sign this information to generate a unique digital signature; the CC integrates the identity information, public key, certificate validity period and digital signature to generate a complete certificate and returns it to the vehicle or drone.

[0059] S201.Vehicle i Randomly select a private key And calculate the corresponding public key PK vi =s vi ·P, where P is a predefined generator. CC i Use RSA algorithm to calculate vehicle v i Calculate the signature:

[0060]

[0061] Where, ID vi Indicates vehicle v i Identity information; EXP vi Indicates the expiration time of the signature; h1 indicates the cryptographic hash function.

[0062] Therefore, CC i For vehicle v i Generated the certificate:

[0063]

[0064] S202. Using the same method, CC i Register the drone (D) in the area and generate the corresponding certificate. First, D i Randomly select a private key And calculate the corresponding public key:

[0065] PK di =s di ·P

[0066] Where P represents a predefined generator.

[0067] CC i Using RSA algorithm for D i Calculate the signature:

[0068]

[0069] Where, ID di Indicates D i identity information.

[0070] Therefore, CC i D i Generated the certificate:

[0071]

[0072] Finally, CC j Use the same method for D j Generate a certificate. The digital certificate generation process is as follows Figure 3 shown.

[0073] S203. The drone regularly broadcasts service information to the area it is responsible for, such as road information, weather conditions or other related service content; when broadcasting, the drone will generate a signature, which includes its own identity information, timestamp and the content of the broadcast information. This signature is used to prove the source and authenticity of the information; other drones that receive the broadcast information first check whether the timestamp is within the valid range to confirm whether the information is still valid; by verifying the legitimacy of the signature, it ensures that the information has not been tampered with and is indeed from a trusted drone. If the verification is successful, the receiving drone will store its information and further broadcast it within its own service area to remind vehicles or other users to pay attention to related service content or road safety.

[0074] Specifically, D j Regularly report to D i Broadcast service information. j Calculate the signature:

[0075] Sig dj =s dj h1(ID dj ||T dj ||m dj )

[0076] In the formula, m dj Indicates D j To D i Information sent; T dj It is the timestamp of the current information transmission.

[0077] Therefore, the drone D j The information sent is:

[0078] {m dj , T dj , ID dj , Sig dj}.

[0079] D i Receive D j After posting the information, perform the following steps:

[0080] First, check the timestamp T dj Is it within the valid time range? Then, use D j The public key verifies the signature of the published information, that is, e(Sig dj , P)=e(h1(ID dj ||T dj ||m dj ), PK dj ). If the verification is successful, D i Storage D j Service information and D i The information is broadcast in the area to remind drivers and passengers to pay attention to road safety and weather conditions.

[0081] S3. When the vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions, the authentication certificate is used to complete cross-domain authentication.

[0082] This step is divided into two stages: cross-domain information request and cross-domain information response.

[0083] (1) Cross-domain information request

[0084] When a vehicle needs to access services in another drone's jurisdiction, it will initiate a request to the target drone through the current drone (local drone). The vehicle first generates a signature, which contains the vehicle's identity information, request content and timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the request; the vehicle packages the request information, signature and its own certificate into a message and forwards it to the target drone through the local drone; after receiving the request, the target drone will verify the legitimacy of the message in the cross-domain information response phase to ensure the credibility of the vehicle's identity and request content.

[0085] D i broadcasts information in its area. i Want to visit D j When providing services in the area, you need to go through D i To D j Send a cross-domain request message. The specific process is as follows:

[0086] Vehicle i Calculate the signature v i By D i To D j Sending cross-domain request messages In this formula, Respectively represent request information, request timestamp and vehicle v i Signature for this specific request. Information request process as Figure 4 shown.

[0087] (2) Cross-domain information response

[0088] The target drone verifies the cross-domain request from the vehicle. It checks whether the timestamp of the request is valid to ensure that the message has not expired; the target drone uses the certificate revocation list provided by the control center (CC) to confirm whether the vehicle's certificate is still valid; if the certificate has not been revoked, the target drone verifies the vehicle's signature to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the request information;

[0089] After verification, the target drone obtains a hidden identity list (HIDL) from the CC and assigns it to the vehicle. This hidden identity list is used to protect the privacy of the vehicle and support subsequent communication with the target drone; the target drone returns a confirmation message containing the hidden identity list to the vehicle through the local drone, and the vehicle will verify the validity of the message again after receiving it; if everything is verified, the vehicle will be able to use the services provided by the target drone.

[0090] Specifically, D j Received from vehicle v i After the request message, D j Verify Timestamp Is it within the validity period? j From CC j Retrieve the certificate revocation list to check the vehicle v i Whether the certificate has been revoked; j By calculation Verify vehicle v i If the equality holds, the verification is successful.

[0091] If the verification is successful, CC j From the hidden identity list table for vehicle v i Provide a hidden identity list HIDL that will be used to identify the vehicle and D j Subsequent communication between j By D i Towards vehicle v i Send a cross-domain confirmation message. The confirmation message includes and information containing anonymous identities

[0092] Vehicle i Received from D j After receiving the confirmation message, perform the following steps: verify the validity of the timestamp; i By calculation Verify D j If the equation holds true, it means D j Cross-origin request accepted; finally, v i calculate Information response process Figure 5 shown.

[0093] This embodiment adopts a batch verification method for the target drone to simultaneously process cross-domain requests from multiple vehicles. When multiple vehicles send requests containing signatures, the traditional method needs to verify each signature one by one, which is computationally intensive and inefficient. Batch verification combines multiple signatures to generate an overall verification formula, thereby verifying the legitimacy of all signatures at once.

[0094] Single verification: When the vehicle v i By D i To D j Send signature Sig vi =s vi ·h1(m vi ||T vi ||ID vi ),D j The individual validation calculations performed are as follows:

[0095] e(Sig vi , P)=e(h1(ID vi ||T vi ||m vi ), PK vi )

[0096] If this equation holds true, D j Complete the vehicle v i verification; when m vehicles initiate requests at the same time, m separate verifications are required.

[0097] Batch verification: When D j Receive information m from m different vehicles vk Signature vk =s vk ·h1(m vk ||T vk ||ID vk ), where k = 1, 2...m, D j ; Perform batch validation by calculating:

[0098]

[0099] If this equation holds true, D j Complete batch verification of these m vehicles.

[0100] Embodiment 2

[0101] This embodiment also provides a drone-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication system based on digital certificates, including: an initialization module, a generation module and an authentication module; the initialization module is used to generate system parameters based on a control center; the generation module is used to generate an authentication certificate for a vehicle or drone based on the system parameters; the authentication module uses the authentication certificate to complete cross-domain authentication when the vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions.

[0102] The following will explain in detail how the present invention solves technical problems in real life in conjunction with this embodiment.

[0103] First, the initialization module generates system parameters based on the control center.

[0104] The control center (CC) is a distributed registration center architecture. Entities in various regions register with the trusted institution CC in their respective regions through a secure channel. Each control center CC in different locations generates a set of local public and private key pairs, as well as system parameters such as the group and generator, hash function, and properties of bilinear mapping.

[0105] The method of initializing the control center CC includes: CC selects a prime number q, and selects G1 and G2 as groups of prime order q. P is selected as the generator of G1, which represents a bilinear map. CC selects As the system private key, and calculate the corresponding public key, where PK pub =s·P; In addition, CC selects h1: {0, 1} * →G1 and publicly provide {G1, G2, P, PK pub , h1}.

[0106] The generation module generates an authentication certificate for the vehicle or drone based on the system parameters.

[0107] The vehicle or drone first randomly generates its own private key and calculates the corresponding public key through the generation parameters of the control center; they submit the identity information (such as the unique identifier of the vehicle or drone), the public key and the validity period of the certificate to the control center CC; the CC uses its own private key and a predefined cryptographic hash function to sign this information to generate a unique digital signature; the CC integrates the identity information, public key, certificate validity period and digital signature to generate a complete certificate and returns it to the vehicle or drone.

[0108] S201.Vehicle i Randomly select a private key And calculate the corresponding public key PK vi =s vi ·P, where P is a predefined generator. CC i Use RSA algorithm to calculate vehicle v i Calculate the signature:

[0109]

[0110] Where, ID vi Indicates vehicle v i Identity information; EXP vi Indicates the expiration time of the signature; h1 indicates the cryptographic hash function.

[0111] Therefore, CC i For vehicle v i Generated the certificate:

[0112]

[0113] S202. Using the same method, CC i Register the drone (D) in the area and generate the corresponding certificate. First, D i Randomly select a private key And calculate the corresponding public key:

[0114] PK di =s di ·P where P represents a predefined generator.

[0115] CC i Using RSA algorithm for D i Calculate the signature:

[0116]

[0117] Where, ID di Indicates D i identity information.

[0118] Therefore, CC i D i Generated the certificate:

[0119]

[0120] Finally, CC j Use the same method for D j Generate a certificate. The digital certificate generation process is as follows Figure 3 shown.

[0121] S203. The drone regularly broadcasts service information to the area it is responsible for, such as road information, weather conditions or other related service content; when broadcasting, the drone will generate a signature, which includes its own identity information, timestamp and the content of the broadcast information. This signature is used to prove the source and authenticity of the information; other drones that receive the broadcast information first check whether the timestamp is within the valid range to confirm whether the information is still valid; by verifying the legitimacy of the signature, it ensures that the information has not been tampered with and is indeed from a trusted drone. If the verification is successful, the receiving drone will store its information and further broadcast it within its own service area to remind vehicles or other users to pay attention to related service content or road safety.

[0122] Specifically, D j Regularly report to D i Broadcast service information. j Calculate the signature:

[0123] Sig dj =s dj h1(ID dj ||T dj ||m dj )

[0124] In the formula, m dj Indicates D j To D i Information sent; T dj It is the timestamp of the current information transmission.

[0125] Therefore, the drone D j The information sent is:

[0126] {m dj , T dj , ID dj , Si gdj}.

[0127] D i Receive D j After publishing the information, execute the following process:

[0128] First, check the timestamp T dj Is it within the valid time range? Then, use D j The public key verifies the signature of the published information, that is, e(Sig dj , P)=e(h1(ID dj ||T dj ||m dj ), PK dj ). If the verification is successful, D i Storage D j Service information and Di The information is broadcast in the area to remind drivers and passengers to pay attention to road safety and weather conditions.

[0129] The authentication module is used to complete cross-domain authentication using the authentication certificate when the vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions.

[0130] The process is divided into two stages: cross-domain information request and cross-domain information response.

[0131] (1) Cross-domain information request

[0132] When a vehicle needs to access services in another drone's jurisdiction, it will initiate a request to the target drone through the current drone (local drone). The vehicle first generates a signature, which contains the vehicle's identity information, request content and timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the request; the vehicle packages the request information, signature and its own certificate into a message and forwards it to the target drone through the local drone; after receiving the request, the target drone will verify the legitimacy of the message in the cross-domain information response phase to ensure the credibility of the vehicle's identity and request content.

[0133] D i broadcasts information in its area. i Want to visit D j When providing services in the area, you need to go through D i To D j Send a cross-domain request message. The specific process is as follows:

[0134] Vehicle i Calculate the signature v i By D i To D j Sending cross-domain request messages In this formula, Respectively represent request information, request timestamp and vehicle v i Signature for this specific request. Information request process as Figure 4 shown.

[0135] (2) Cross-domain information response

[0136] The target drone verifies the cross-domain request from the vehicle. It checks whether the timestamp of the request is valid to ensure that the message has not expired; the target drone uses the certificate revocation list provided by the control center (CC) to confirm whether the vehicle's certificate is still valid; if the certificate has not been revoked, the target drone verifies the vehicle's signature to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the request information;

[0137] After verification, the target drone obtains a hidden identity list (HIDL) from the CC and assigns it to the vehicle. This hidden identity list is used to protect the privacy of the vehicle and support subsequent communication with the target drone; the target drone returns a confirmation message containing the hidden identity list to the vehicle through the local drone, and the vehicle will verify the validity of the message again after receiving it; if everything is verified, the vehicle will be able to use the services provided by the target drone.

[0138] Specifically, D j Received from vehicle v i After the request message, D j Verify Timestamp Is it within the validity period? j From CC j Retrieve the certificate revocation list to check the vehicle v i Whether the certificate has been revoked; j By calculation Verify vehicle v i If the equality holds, the verification is successful.

[0139] If the verification is successful, CC j From the hidden identity list table for vehicle v i Provide a hidden identity list HIDL that will be used to identify the vehicle and D j Subsequent communication between j By D i Towards vehicle v i Send a cross-domain confirmation message. The confirmation message includes and information containing anonymous identities

[0140] Vehicle i Received from D j After receiving the confirmation message, the following process is executed: verify the validity of the timestamp; i By calculation Verify D j If the equation holds true, it means D j Cross-origin request accepted; finally, v i calculate Information response process Figure 5 shown.

[0141] This embodiment adopts a batch verification method for the target drone to simultaneously process cross-domain requests from multiple vehicles. When multiple vehicles send requests containing signatures, the traditional method needs to verify each signature one by one, which is computationally intensive and inefficient. Batch verification combines multiple signatures to generate an overall verification formula, thereby verifying the legitimacy of all signatures at once.

[0142] Single verification: When the vehicle v i By D i To D j Send signature Sig vi =s vi ·h1(m vi ||T vi ||ID vi ),D j The individual validation calculations performed are as follows:

[0143] e(Sig vi , P)=e(h1(ID vi ||T vi ||m vi ), PK vi ) If this equation holds true, D j Complete the vehicle v i verification; when m vehicles initiate requests at the same time, m separate verifications are required.

[0144] Batch verification: When D j Receive information m from m different vehicles vk Signature vk =s vk ·h1(m vk ||T vk ||ID vk ), where k = 1, 2...m, D j ; Perform batch verification by calculating:

[0145]

[0146] If this equation holds true, D j Complete batch verification of these m vehicles.

[0147] The embodiments described above are only descriptions of the preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Without departing from the design spirit of the present invention, various modifications and improvements made to the technical solutions of the present invention by ordinary technicians in this field should all fall within the protection scope determined by the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A cross-domain authentication method for drone-assisted vehicles based on digital certificates, characterized in that the steps include: Generate system parameters based on the control center; Based on the system parameters, generate an authentication certificate for the vehicle or drone; When a vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions, the authentication certificate is used to complete cross-domain authentication.

2. The UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication method based on digital certificates according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The method of initializing the control center includes: selecting a prime number q, and selecting G1 and G2 as groups of prime order q; selecting P as the generator of G1, representing a bilinear map; the control center selects As the system private key, and calculate the corresponding public key, where PK pub =s·P; In addition, the control center selects h1: {0, 1} * →G1 and publicly provide {G1, G2, P, PK pub , h1}h1 represents the cryptographic hash function.

3. The UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication method based on digital certificates according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Methods for generating a vehicle or drone authentication certificate include: The vehicle or drone first randomly generates its own private key and calculates the corresponding public key through the parameters generated by the control center; Submit identity information, public key and certificate validity period to the control center; Use the control center's private key and a predefined cryptographic hash function to sign the information provided by the vehicle or drone to generate a unique digital signature; The control center integrates the identity information, public key, certificate validity period and digital signature to generate a complete certificate and returns it to the vehicle or drone.

4. The UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication method based on digital certificates according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Cross-domain authentication consists of two stages: cross-domain information request and cross-domain information response; Cross-domain information request: When a vehicle accesses a service in another drone’s jurisdiction, it initiates a request to the target drone through the local drone; The vehicle first generates a signature, which contains the vehicle's identity information, request content, and timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the request; The vehicle packages the request information, signature, and its own certificate into a message and forwards it to the target drone via the local drone. After receiving the request, the target drone will verify the legitimacy of the message in the cross-domain information response phase to ensure the credibility of the vehicle identity and request content. Cross-domain information response: The target drone verifies the cross-domain request from the vehicle, first checking whether the timestamp of the request is valid; then, it uses the certificate revocation list provided by the control center to confirm whether the vehicle's certificate is still valid; If the certificate has not been revoked, the target drone will verify the vehicle's signature; after the verification, the target drone obtains the hidden identity list from the control center and assigns it to the vehicle. After receiving it, the vehicle will verify the validity of the message again; when everything is verified, the vehicle will be able to use the services provided by the target drone.

5. A UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication system based on digital certificates, the system is used to implement the method described in any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: include: Initialization module, generation module and authentication module; The initialization module is used to generate system parameters based on the control center; The generating module is used to generate a certification certificate of a vehicle or a UAV based on the system parameters; When the vehicle accesses services in different drone jurisdictions, the authentication module uses the authentication certificate to complete cross-domain authentication.

6. The UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication system based on digital certificates according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The workflow of the initialization module includes: selecting a prime number q, and selecting G1 and G2 as the groups of prime order q; selecting P as the generator of G1, representing a bilinear map; and selecting the control center. As the system private key, and calculate the corresponding public key, where PK pub =s·P; In addition, the control center selects h1:{0,1}*→G1 and publicly provides {G1, G2, P, PK pub ,h1}, where h1 represents a cryptographic hash function.

7. The UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication system based on digital certificates according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The workflow for generating a module includes: First, the vehicle or drone randomly generates its own private key, and then calculates the corresponding public key through the generation parameters of the control center; Submit identity information, public key and certificate validity period to the control center; Use the control center's private key and a predefined cryptographic hash function to sign the information provided by the vehicle or drone to generate a unique digital signature; The control center integrates the identity information, public key, certificate validity period and digital signature to generate a complete certificate and returns it to the vehicle or drone.

8. The UAV-assisted vehicle cross-domain authentication system based on digital certificates according to claim 5 is characterized in that: Cross-domain authentication includes two stages: cross-domain information request and cross-domain information response; Cross-domain information request: When a vehicle accesses a service in another drone’s jurisdiction, it initiates a request to the target drone through the local drone; The vehicle first generates a signature, which contains the vehicle's identity information, request content, and timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the request; The vehicle packages the request information, signature, and its own certificate into a message and forwards it to the target drone via the local drone. After receiving the request, the target drone will verify the legitimacy of the message in the cross-domain information response phase to ensure the credibility of the vehicle identity and request content. Cross-domain information response: The target drone verifies the cross-domain request from the vehicle, first checking whether the timestamp of the request is valid; then, it uses the certificate revocation list provided by the control center to confirm whether the vehicle's certificate is still valid; If the certificate has not been revoked, the target drone will verify the vehicle's signature; after the verification, the target drone obtains the hidden identity list from the control center and assigns it to the vehicle. After receiving it, the vehicle will verify the validity of the message again; when everything is verified, the vehicle will be able to use the services provided by the target drone.

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