Heartbeat uploading method, system and device for trusted thermal power DCS controller

Abstract

A method, system, and device for heartbeat transmission in a trusted thermal power DCS controller are disclosed. The method includes: a trusted agent periodically sending heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state; the trusted agent acquiring the trusted service status and attaching the acquired trusted service status to the heartbeat message; the DCS controller returning a heartbeat message confirmation to the trusted agent; and the DCS controller sending the heartbeat message with the attached trusted service status to a trusted management center, which then centrally manages the DCS controller. If the trusted management center does not receive the heartbeat message with the attached trusted service status within a preset time, it determines that the trusted service of the DCS controller has malfunctioned or is abnormal and takes corresponding action. This invention can detect the connection status between the trusted agent and the DCS controller in real time and promptly identify potential trust issues.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of DCS controller technology, specifically relating to a heartbeat transmission method, system, and device for a reliable thermal power DCS controller. Background Technology

[0002] In the thermal power industry, Distributed Control Systems (DCS) play a crucial role. They are widely used in the control of boilers, turbines, generators, and other auxiliary equipment, greatly promoting the automation level of thermal power units. Through highly integrated hardware and software design, DCS systems achieve comprehensive monitoring, control, and optimization of the thermal power plant's production process, significantly improving the safety, reliability, and economy of the units.

[0003] The DCS system distributes control functions across various control stations, each responsible for controlling a portion of the equipment, thus mitigating risk. Simultaneously, a high-speed communication network connects these control stations, enabling centralized information processing and display, facilitating unified management and monitoring by operators. Furthermore, the DCS system employs redundant configurations, including controller redundancy, power supply redundancy, and communication redundancy, ensuring seamless switching in the event of partial system failures and guaranteeing continuous and stable system operation. In addition, the system features self-diagnostic and fault alarm functions, enabling timely detection and resolution of potential problems. Due to its modular design, the DCS system can be flexibly configured and expanded according to the actual needs of the thermal power plant. As the scale of the thermal power plant expands or equipment is upgraded, control stations can be easily added or software upgraded to meet new control requirements.

[0004] In the thermal power industry, the DCS system precisely controls the boiler's combustion process by collecting various parameters (such as temperature, pressure, and flow rate), ensuring the boiler's safe and stable operation. Simultaneously, it improves boiler thermal efficiency and reduces pollutant emissions by optimizing combustion strategies. The DCS system monitors and controls key parameters of the steam turbine in real time, such as speed, load, and temperature, ensuring the turbine operates under optimal conditions. Furthermore, the system features overspeed protection and vibration monitoring functions to ensure safe turbine operation. The DCS system precisely controls the generator's output power by adjusting parameters such as excitation current and voltage. It also has grid connection and disconnection control functions to ensure a safe and stable connection between the generator and the power grid. The DCS system also controls auxiliary equipment in the thermal power plant, such as feedwater pumps, circulating water pumps, and fans, ensuring these devices operate according to predetermined process flows and control strategies, providing a stable operating environment and conditions for the thermal power units. When the DCS system is working, the Trusted Management Center needs to have a comprehensive and real-time understanding of the connection status of all unit controllers, so as to provide more accurate security services to the managed unit controllers and display the trusted security policies and status. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to address the problems in the prior art by providing a method, system, and device for transmitting heartbeats to a trusted thermal power DCS controller, which can detect the connection status between the trusted agent and the DCS controller in real time, promptly identify potential trust issues, and improve the reliability and stability of the system.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0007] Firstly, a heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller is provided, including:

[0008] The trusted agent periodically sends heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state;

[0009] The trusted agent obtains the status of trusted related services and appends the obtained status of trusted related services to the heartbeat message;

[0010] The DCS controller sends a heartbeat message confirmation to the trusted agent.

[0011] The DCS controller sends a heartbeat message with the trusted service status to the Trusted Management Center, which then centrally manages the DCS controller.

[0012] The trusted service status includes a statically trusted overall trusted status, and the steps to obtain the statically trusted overall trusted status include:

[0013] Check if static trusted applications are enabled;

[0014] If not enabled, the overall trust status of statically trusted entities is determined to be untrustworthy;

[0015] If static trusted applications are enabled, check whether the critical files that need to be protected are configured with static trusted policies;

[0016] If a static trust policy is not configured, the overall trust status of static trust is determined to be untrustworthy;

[0017] If a static trust policy is configured, a hash algorithm is used to calculate the first hash value for each critical file in each heartbeat cycle. The first hash value and the second hash value of each critical file are compared. If the first hash value and the second hash value of at least one critical file are different, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be untrustworthy. If the first hash value and the second hash value of each critical file are the same, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be trustworthy. The second hash value of the critical file is the hash value calculated by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) using the hash algorithm for the critical file during the configuration of the static trust policy for the critical file.

[0018] As a preferred embodiment, the trusted related service status also includes a dynamically trusted overall trusted status, and the steps for obtaining the dynamically trusted overall trusted status include:

[0019] Check if dynamic trusted applications are enabled;

[0020] If not enabled, the overall trust status of dynamic trust is determined to be untrusted;

[0021] If dynamic trusted applications are enabled, the system will check whether the application files that need to be protected are configured with dynamic trusted policies.

[0022] If no dynamic trust policy is configured, the overall trust status of dynamic trust is determined to be untrustworthy.

[0023] If a dynamic trust policy is configured, during the lifecycle of each dynamic trusted application process, according to a pre-configured measurement period, the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) uses the hash algorithm to calculate the third hash value of the memory code segment of the dynamic trusted application process. The third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trusted application process are compared. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of at least one process's memory code segment are different, the process is determined to be untrustworthy, and the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system is determined to be untrustworthy. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trusted application process are the same, the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system is determined to be trustworthy. The fourth hash value of the process's memory code segment is the hash value of the process's memory code segment calculated using the hash algorithm by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) during the startup process of a state-trusted application with a configured dynamic trust policy.

[0024] As a preferred embodiment, the trusted related service status also includes static trusted security service operation status, dynamic trusted security service operation status, unknown program immune security service operation status, process trusted security service operation status, application access control security operation status, and the number of dynamically trusted untrusted processes.

[0025] As a preferred solution, the trusted proxy periodically polls to obtain the status of various trusted related services.

[0026] As a preferred embodiment, the trusted agent attaches the obtained trusted service status to the heartbeat message to form a heartbeat packet before sending it to the DCS controller.

[0027] As a preferred approach, the DCS controller sends the heartbeat packet to the Trusted Management Center via the existing communication channel.

[0028] As a preferred embodiment, the trusted agent attaches the acquired trusted service status to the heartbeat message at set time intervals.

[0029] As a preferred embodiment, if the Trusted Management Center does not receive a heartbeat message with the trusted service status attached within a preset time, it determines that the trusted service of the DCS controller has malfunctioned or is abnormal, and takes corresponding actions.

[0030] Secondly, a heartbeat transmission system for a trusted thermal power DCS controller is provided, including:

[0031] The heartbeat message sending module is used by the trusted agent to periodically send heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state.

[0032] The Trusted Related Service Status Attachment Module is used by the Trusted Agent to obtain the Trusted Related Service Status and attach the obtained Trusted Related Service Status to the heartbeat message;

[0033] The heartbeat message acknowledgment module is used by the DCS controller to return a heartbeat message acknowledgment to the trusted agent.

[0034] The DCS controller message sending module is used by the DCS controller to send heartbeat messages with the trusted service status to the Trusted Management Center, which then centrally manages the DCS controller.

[0035] The trusted service status includes a statically trusted overall trusted status, and the trusted service status supplementary module includes:

[0036] The first detection module is used to detect whether static trusted applications are enabled.

[0037] The first determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of statically trusted entities as untrustworthy if it is not enabled.

[0038] The second detection module is used to detect whether the critical files that need to be protected are configured with a static trust policy if static trust application is enabled.

[0039] The second determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of static trust as untrustworthy if no static trust strategy is configured.

[0040] The third determining module is used to calculate the first hash value for each key file using a hash algorithm in each heartbeat cycle if a static trust policy is configured. It then compares the first hash value and the second hash value of each key file. If the first hash value and the second hash value of at least one key file are different, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be untrustworthy. If the first hash value and the second hash value of each key file are the same, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be trustworthy. The second hash value of the key file is the hash value calculated using the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) and the hash algorithm applied to the key file during the configuration of the static trust policy for the key file.

[0041] Thirdly, an electronic device is provided, comprising:

[0042] Memory, storing at least one instruction; and

[0043] The processor executes instructions stored in the memory to implement the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller as described in the first aspect.

[0044] Fourthly, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, the computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller as described in the first aspect.

[0045] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0046] The trusted agent periodically sends heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that it is in normal working condition. Simultaneously, the trusted agent obtains the trusted service status and appends this information to the heartbeat message before sending it to the DCS controller. The DCS controller then forwards the heartbeat message with the added trusted service status to the trusted management center. This allows for real-time monitoring of the connection status between the trusted agent and the DCS controller, timely detection of potential trust issues, and improved system reliability and stability. Furthermore, the heartbeat message with the added trusted service status can also be used for auditing and logging, helping system administrators better understand the system's operational status. This invention effectively utilizes the existing DCS controller data transmission channels, and the domestically developed trusted management center can obtain the security and trust status of each DCS controller in a timely manner while simultaneously acquiring the connection and operational status of each controller, thus improving the safety and controllability of the entire thermal power control system. Attached Figure Description

[0047] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0048] Figure 1 A flowchart of the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 2 This invention provides a schematic diagram of the principle of a heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller. Detailed Implementation

[0050] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, those skilled in the art can obtain other embodiments without creative effort.

[0051] Please see Figure 1-2To enable the Trusted Management Center to comprehensively and in real-time understand the connection status of all unit DCS controllers and to more accurately provide security services to the managed unit DCS controllers, displaying trusted security policies and status, the DCS controllers need to periodically report their own status. This invention proposes a heartbeat reporting method for trusted thermal power DCS controllers, mainly including the following steps:

[0052] S1. The trusted agent periodically sends heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state.

[0053] S2. The trusted agent obtains the trusted service status and appends the obtained trusted service status to the heartbeat message;

[0054] S3, DCS controller returns a heartbeat message to trusted agent for confirmation;

[0055] S4, DCS controller sends heartbeat messages with trusted service status to Trust Management Center, Trust Management Center centrally manages DCS controller;

[0056] The trusted service status includes a statically trusted overall trusted status, and the steps to obtain the statically trusted overall trusted status include:

[0057] Check if static trusted applications are enabled;

[0058] If not enabled, the overall trust status of statically trusted entities is determined to be untrustworthy;

[0059] If static trusted applications are enabled, check whether the critical files that need to be protected are configured with static trusted policies;

[0060] If a static trust policy is not configured, the overall trust status of static trust is determined to be untrustworthy;

[0061] If a static trust policy is configured, a hash algorithm is used to calculate the first hash value for each critical file in each heartbeat cycle. The first hash value and the second hash value of each critical file are compared. If the first hash value and the second hash value of at least one critical file are different, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be untrustworthy. If the first hash value and the second hash value of each critical file are the same, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be trustworthy. The second hash value of the critical file is the hash value calculated by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) using the hash algorithm for the critical file during the configuration of the static trust policy for the critical file.

[0062] A trusted agent is an entity trusted by all parties in an information system security framework. It typically handles tasks such as key generation and distribution, and dispute arbitration. In a zero-trust architecture, the trusted agent is a key component of the data plane, responsible for intercepting access requests and performing authentication and dynamic authorization. The trusted agent acts as the policy enforcement point for dynamic access control capabilities, working in conjunction with the dynamic access control engine to authenticate and dynamically authorize all access requests.

[0063] Trusted proxies can easily adapt to application scenarios where resources have a large number of IP address information and the IP addresses are not fixed. They provide trusted access for untrusted external network users and a trusted security barrier for internal network resources. Trusted proxies play an important role in information system security and zero-trust architecture, and are a key component to ensure secure business access and data security.

[0064] In one possible implementation, the trusted related service state further includes a dynamically trusted overall trusted state, and the step of obtaining the dynamically trusted overall trusted state includes:

[0065] Check if dynamic trusted applications are enabled;

[0066] If not enabled, the overall trust status of dynamic trust is determined to be untrusted;

[0067] If dynamic trusted applications are enabled, the system will check whether the application files that need to be protected are configured with dynamic trusted policies.

[0068] If no dynamic trust policy is configured, the overall trust status of dynamic trust is determined to be untrustworthy.

[0069] If a dynamic trust policy is configured, during the lifecycle of each dynamic trusted application process, according to a pre-configured measurement period, the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) uses the hash algorithm to calculate the third hash value of the memory code segment of the dynamic trusted application process. The third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trusted application process are compared. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of at least one process's memory code segment are different, the process is determined to be untrustworthy, and the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system is determined to be untrustworthy. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trusted application process are the same, the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system is determined to be trustworthy. The fourth hash value of the process's memory code segment is the hash value of the process's memory code segment calculated using the hash algorithm by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) during the startup process of a state-trusted application with a configured dynamic trust policy.

[0070] In one possible implementation, the trusted related service status further includes:

[0071] The operational status of statically trusted security services, the operational status of dynamically trusted security services, the operational status of security services immune to unknown programs, the operational status of security services trusted by processes, the operational status of security services for application access control, and the number of dynamically trusted but untrusted processes.

[0072] Furthermore, the statically trusted security service operation state typically refers to the state in which the system is ensured to be secure and trusted at startup or earlier through a series of predefined, immutable security mechanisms. This includes starting trusted code from trusted modules and progressively verifying the integrity of the system's loaded code, operating system kernel, other parts of the operating system, and upper-layer applications. If all steps pass verification, the system enters a statically trusted state. In this state, the system and services operate based on preset security policies and mechanisms.

[0073] Dynamic and trusted security service operation status refers to the continuous monitoring of the integrity and security of the system and services through real-time and dynamic security mechanisms after system startup. This includes, but is not limited to, checking the legitimacy of running programs, verifying the integrity of newly installed or running programs, and monitoring system resource usage. The dynamic and trusted mechanism can adapt to dynamic changes in the system's operating status, promptly detecting and responding to potential security threats.

[0074] The "Immune Security Service for Unknown Programs" refers to the system's ability to identify and block unknown programs to prevent malware intrusion. This is typically achieved through various methods such as blacklists, whitelists, and behavioral analysis. When the "Immune Security Service for Unknown Programs" is running, the system can identify unverified or risky programs and prevent them from executing or accessing sensitive resources.

[0075] The trusted process security service operation state emphasizes the verification and management of the trustworthiness of each process in the system. This includes checking the process's origin, integrity, and whether its behavior matches expectations. Under the trusted process security service operation state, the system can ensure that only trusted processes can access sensitive resources or perform critical operations, thereby improving the overall security of the system.

[0076] Application access control security refers to the system's strict management and control over application access permissions. This includes access control policies based on user identity, roles, and permissions, as well as access auditing and monitoring of sensitive resources and operations. When application access control is securely in operation, the system can ensure that application access behavior complies with security policies, preventing security issues such as unauthorized access and data leaks.

[0077] A statically trusted overall trust state is a comprehensive and integrated trust state achieved at or before system startup. It encompasses the static trustworthiness of all system components (including hardware, software, and services) and forms the foundation for the system's subsequent secure and stable operation. In this statically trusted overall trust state, the various system components mutually verify and depend on each other through a chain of trust mechanism, forming a secure and trustworthy whole.

[0078] Dynamically trusted overall trustworthiness refers to a comprehensive trustworthiness state that a system continuously maintains during operation. It relies on dynamic trust mechanisms to monitor and adjust the system state in real time, ensuring that the system remains secure and trustworthy in the face of various dynamic changes. Dynamically trusted overall trustworthiness not only focuses on the system's current security status but also on its response and recovery capabilities to potential security threats.

[0079] The number of dynamically trusted but untrusted processes refers to the number of processes identified as untrusted or posing a security risk while the system is running under dynamically trusted security services. This number changes dynamically, depending on the results of real-time monitoring and detection by the system. When the system detects an untrusted process, it takes appropriate security measures (such as isolation and deletion) to eliminate the threat and updates the statistics on the number of untrusted processes. However, since real-time system data is currently not directly accessible, a specific number of untrusted processes cannot be provided. In practical applications, this information is typically provided by the system's security monitoring and auditing tools.

[0080] Each of the above states is an important component of system security services, and together they form the cornerstone of system security and trustworthiness. In practical applications, these security service states need to be configured and optimized appropriately based on specific security requirements and system environment.

[0081] In one possible implementation, the trusted proxy periodically polls to obtain the status of various trusted related services.

[0082] In one possible implementation, the trusted agent attaches the obtained trusted service status to the heartbeat message to form a heartbeat packet before sending it to the DCS controller.

[0083] Furthermore, the DCS controller sends the heartbeat packet to the Trusted Management Center through the existing communication channel.

[0084] Trusted Management Centers (TMCs) play a crucial role in information security. They are typically comprehensive management platforms responsible for managing and maintaining the trustworthiness, security, and stability of the entire system. The basic idea of ​​a TMC is to create a secure root of trust, and from this root, measure and trust each subsequent level, thus building a complete trust chain from hardware to operating system to application systems. This trust chain ensures that every step of the system from startup to operation is in a trusted state. The main functions of a TMC include trusted node management, application management, policy management, and audit management. The specific details of each function are as follows: Trusted node management refers to managing the status of all trusted verification nodes in the system, ensuring they operate according to established security policies. Application management refers to providing full-process management of application software signing, publishing, updating, distribution, and verification, reducing system maintenance complexity and improving platform usability. Policy management refers to formulating and enforcing security policies, including access control, data encryption, and behavior auditing, ensuring the consistency and effectiveness of system security policies. Audit management refers to receiving and processing audit log information from various nodes to provide data support for the investigation and analysis of security incidents.

[0085] In a trusted network architecture, the trusted management center typically exists as a core component, responsible for the trust management and security policy execution of the entire network. It works closely with other network devices (such as trusted switches, trusted servers, etc.) to jointly build a secure and trusted network environment. Its specific functions include: (1) Authentication and authorization: Authenticating and authorizing devices accessing the network to ensure that only legitimate devices can access network resources. (2) Security policy execution: Monitoring and managing network traffic, data, and behaviors according to preset security policies to prevent the spread of security threats. (3) Log auditing and response: Collecting and analyzing security event logs in the network to promptly detect and respond to potential security threats.

[0086] The technical implementation of a Trusted Management Center (TMC) typically involves multiple aspects, including a Hardware Security Module (HSM), a Trusted Computing Platform (TCP), and a security policy engine. These components work together to ensure the efficient and reliable operation of the TMC. However, in practical applications, TMCs also face several challenges, including: as system scale and functionality increase, the complexity and operational difficulty of the TMC also rise; the increasing diversity and complexity of cybersecurity threats place higher demands on the security protection capabilities of the TMC; and compatibility and interoperability issues may exist between TMCs from different vendors, affecting the overall system performance and security.

[0087] In summary, the Trusted Management Center is an important component in the field of information security. It ensures that the system is in a trusted state at every stage from startup to operation by building a chain of trust, enforcing security policies, and managing audit logs.

[0088] In one possible implementation, the trusted agent attaches the acquired trusted service status to the heartbeat message at a set time interval, which is 5 seconds in this embodiment of the invention.

[0089] In step S3, after the DCS controller receives a heartbeat message from the trusted agent containing the trusted service status, it returns an ACK (Acknowledgment) heartbeat message to the trusted agent. ACK stands for "acknowledgment" or "response." The ACK signal or message is used to confirm the successful reception or processing of data. In many communication protocols, such as TCP / IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol), the ACK mechanism is a crucial part of ensuring reliable data transmission.

[0090] In the TCP protocol, ACK is used to acknowledge the reception of a TCP segment or packet. When a TCP segment is successfully received and error-checked, the receiver sends an ACK to the sender, informing them of the sequence number of the last successfully received TCP segment. This mechanism ensures reliable data transmission because the sender waits for the ACK to arrive to confirm that the data has been correctly received by the receiver. If no ACK is received, the sender may retransmit the data.

[0091] The primary function of an ACK is to confirm the successful reception of data. This helps the sender know when to continue sending new data or whether unacknowledged data needs to be retransmitted. Simultaneously, through ACKs, the receiver can inform the sender of the size of its receive buffer, thereby controlling the sender's transmission rate and avoiding network congestion. Furthermore, if the sender does not receive the expected ACK, it may assume that the data was lost or corrupted during transmission and take appropriate recovery measures, such as retransmitting the data.

[0092] In TCP, ACKs are sent automatically without requiring explicit requests from the upper-layer application. Whenever TCP receives a TCP segment that has passed all error checks (such as checksum verification), the receiver sends an ACK with an acknowledgment number set to the sequence number of the received TCP segment plus 1.

[0093] To improve network efficiency, TCP implementations typically use a delayed ACK mechanism. This means that the receiver does not immediately send an ACK for each received TCP segment, but waits a short period (usually 200 milliseconds) to see if more TCP segments arrive. If so, it can merge these ACKs into one, thus reducing the number of ACKs on the network. However, if no more TCP segments arrive during this period, or if data requiring an immediate response (such as a FIN packet) is received, the receiver will send a delayed ACK.

[0094] Acknowledgment (ACK) is a crucial mechanism in computer communication and network protocols for ensuring reliable data transmission. By confirming successful data reception, ACK helps maintain synchronization between the sender and receiver, and promotes efficient and reliable data transmission.

[0095] Furthermore, if the Trusted Management Center does not receive a heartbeat message with the trusted service status attached within a preset time, it determines that the trusted service of the DCS controller has malfunctioned or is abnormal, and takes corresponding actions.

[0096] The method of this invention enables real-time monitoring of the connection status between the trusted agent and the DCS controller, timely detection of potential trust issues, and improvement of system reliability and stability. It effectively utilizes the existing data transmission channels of the DCS controller. Simultaneously, the domestically developed trusted management center can obtain the security and trustworthiness status of each DCS controller while acquiring its connection and operational status, thereby enhancing the safety and controllability of the entire thermal power control system. Furthermore, heartbeat messages carrying the trustworthiness status can be used for auditing and logging, helping system administrators better understand the system's operational status.

[0097] Another embodiment of the present invention also proposes a heartbeat transmission system for a trusted thermal power DCS controller, comprising:

[0098] The heartbeat message sending module is used by the trusted agent to periodically send heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state.

[0099] The Trusted Related Service Status Attachment Module is used by the Trusted Agent to obtain the Trusted Related Service Status and attach the obtained Trusted Related Service Status to the heartbeat message;

[0100] The heartbeat message acknowledgment module is used by the DCS controller to return a heartbeat message acknowledgment to the trusted agent.

[0101] The DCS controller message sending module is used by the DCS controller to send heartbeat messages with the trusted service status to the Trusted Management Center, which then centrally manages the DCS controller.

[0102] The trusted service status includes a statically trusted overall trusted status, and the trusted service status supplementary module includes:

[0103] The first detection module is used to detect whether static trusted applications are enabled.

[0104] The first determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of statically trusted entities as untrustworthy if it is not enabled.

[0105] The second detection module is used to detect whether the critical files that need to be protected are configured with a static trust policy if static trust application is enabled.

[0106] The second determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of static trust as untrustworthy if no static trust strategy is configured.

[0107] The third determining module is used to calculate the first hash value for each key file using a hash algorithm in each heartbeat cycle if a static trust policy is configured. It then compares the first hash value and the second hash value of each key file. If the first hash value and the second hash value of at least one key file are different, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be untrustworthy. If the first hash value and the second hash value of each key file are the same, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be trustworthy. The second hash value of the key file is the hash value calculated using the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) and the hash algorithm applied to the key file during the configuration of the static trust policy for the key file.

[0108] In one possible implementation, the trusted related service state further includes a dynamically trusted overall trusted state, and the trusted related service state supplementary module further includes:

[0109] The third detection module is used to detect whether dynamic trusted applications are enabled.

[0110] The fourth determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system as untrusted if it is not enabled.

[0111] The fourth detection module is used to detect whether the application files to be protected are configured with dynamic trust policies if dynamic trusted applications are enabled.

[0112] The fifth determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of dynamic trust as untrustworthy if no dynamic trust policy is configured.

[0113] The sixth determining module is used, if a dynamic trust policy is configured, to calculate the third hash value of the memory code segment of the process of each dynamic trust application during its process lifecycle according to a pre-configured measurement period using the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) and the hash algorithm. It then compares the third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trust application process. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of at least one process are different, the process is determined to be untrustworthy, and the overall trust status of the dynamic trust is determined to be untrustworthy. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trust application process are the same, the overall trust status of the dynamic trust is determined to be trustworthy. The fourth hash value of the process's memory code segment is the hash value of the process's memory code segment calculated using the hash algorithm by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) during the startup process of a state-trusted application with a configured dynamic trust policy.

[0114] Another embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory storing at least one instruction; and a processor executing the instruction stored in the memory to implement the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller as described in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0115] Another embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller as described in this embodiment of the invention.

[0116] For example, the instructions stored in the memory can be divided into one or more modules / units. These modules / units are stored in a computer-readable storage medium and executed by the processor to complete the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted thermal power DCS controller as described in this embodiment of the invention. The one or more modules / units can be a series of computer-readable instruction segments capable of performing specific functions, which describe the execution process of the computer program in the server.

[0117] The electronic device may be a smartphone, laptop, PDA, or cloud server, among other computing devices. It may include, but is not limited to, a processor and memory. Those skilled in the art will understand that the electronic device may also include more or fewer components, or combinations of certain components, or different components; for example, it may also include input / output devices, network access devices, buses, etc.

[0118] The processor can be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0119] The memory can be an internal storage unit of the server, such as a hard drive or RAM. It can also be an external storage device, such as a plug-in hard drive, Smart Media Card (SMC), Secure Digital (SD) card, or FlashCard. Furthermore, the memory can include both internal and external storage units. The memory is used to store computer-readable instructions and other programs and data required by the server. It can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.

[0120] It should be noted that the information interaction and execution process between the above-mentioned module units are based on the same concept as the method embodiment. For details on their specific functions and technical effects, please refer to the method embodiment section. They will not be repeated here.

[0121] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the above-described division of functional units and modules is merely an example. In practical applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The functional units and modules in the embodiments can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. Furthermore, the specific names of the functional units and modules are only for easy differentiation and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above system can be referred to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0122] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments of this application can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include at least: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code to a photographing device / terminal device, a recording medium, a computer memory, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), an electrical carrier signal, a telecommunication signal, and a software distribution medium. Examples include USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0123] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0124] The above-described embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application, and are not intended to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and should all be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A method for sending heartbeats to a DCS controller in a reliable distributed control system for thermal power plants, characterized in that, include: The trusted agent periodically sends heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state; The trusted agent obtains the status of trusted related services and appends the obtained status of trusted related services to the heartbeat message; The DCS controller sends a heartbeat message confirmation to the trusted agent. The DCS controller sends a heartbeat message with the trusted service status to the Trusted Management Center, which then centrally manages the DCS controller. The trusted service status includes a statically trusted overall trusted status, and the steps to obtain the statically trusted overall trusted status include: Check if static trusted applications are enabled; If not enabled, the overall trust status of statically trusted entities is determined to be untrustworthy; If static trusted applications are enabled, check whether the critical files that need to be protected are configured with static trusted policies; If a static trust policy is not configured, the overall trust status of static trust is determined to be untrustworthy; If a static trust policy is configured, a hash algorithm is used to calculate the first hash value for each critical file in each heartbeat cycle. The first hash value and the second hash value of each critical file are compared. If the first hash value and the second hash value of at least one critical file are different, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be untrustworthy. If the first hash value and the second hash value of each critical file are the same, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be trustworthy. The second hash value of the critical file is the hash value calculated by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) using the hash algorithm for the critical file during the configuration of the static trust policy for the critical file.

2. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 1, characterized in that, in, The trusted service status also includes a dynamically trusted overall trust status. The steps for obtaining the dynamically trusted overall trust status include: Check if dynamic trusted applications are enabled; If not enabled, the overall trust status of dynamic trust is determined to be untrusted; If dynamic trusted applications are enabled, the system will check whether the application files that need to be protected are configured with dynamic trusted policies. If no dynamic trust policy is configured, the overall trust status of dynamic trust is determined to be untrustworthy. If a dynamic trust policy is configured, during the lifecycle of each dynamic trusted application process, according to a pre-configured measurement period, the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) uses the hash algorithm to calculate the third hash value of the memory code segment of the dynamic trusted application process. The third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trusted application process are compared. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of at least one process's memory code segment are different, the process is determined to be untrustworthy, and the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system is determined to be untrustworthy. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value of the memory code segment of each dynamic trusted application process are the same, the overall trust status of the dynamic trust system is determined to be trustworthy. The fourth hash value of the process's memory code segment is the hash value of the process's memory code segment calculated using the hash algorithm by the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) during the startup process of a state-trusted application with a configured dynamic trust policy.

3. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trusted related service status also includes the static trusted security service operation status, the dynamic trusted security service operation status, the unknown program immune security service operation status, the process trusted security service operation status, the application access control security operation status, and the number of dynamically trusted untrusted processes.

4. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 3, characterized in that, The trusted proxy periodically polls to obtain the status of various trusted related services.

5. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 4, characterized in that, The trusted agent attaches the obtained trusted service status to the heartbeat message to form a heartbeat packet, which is then sent to the DCS controller.

6. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 5, characterized in that, The DCS controller sends the heartbeat packet to the Trusted Management Center through the existing communication channel.

7. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trusted agent attaches the acquired trusted service status to the heartbeat message at set time intervals.

8. The heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller in thermal power plants according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the Trusted Management Center does not receive a heartbeat message with the trusted service status attached within a preset time, it determines that the trusted service of the DCS controller has malfunctioned or is abnormal, and takes corresponding actions.

9. A heartbeat transmission system for a DCS controller in a reliable distributed control system for thermal power plants, characterized in that, include: The heartbeat message sending module is used by the trusted agent to periodically send heartbeat messages to the DCS controller to indicate that the trusted agent is in a normal working state. The Trusted Related Service Status Attachment Module is used by the Trusted Agent to obtain the Trusted Related Service Status and attach the obtained Trusted Related Service Status to the heartbeat message; The heartbeat message acknowledgment module is used by the DCS controller to return a heartbeat message acknowledgment to the trusted agent. The DCS controller message sending module is used by the DCS controller to send heartbeat messages with the trusted service status to the Trusted Management Center, which then centrally manages the DCS controller. The trusted service status includes a statically trusted overall trusted status, and the trusted service status supplementary module includes: The first detection module is used to detect whether static trusted applications are enabled. The first determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of statically trusted entities as untrustworthy if it is not enabled. The second detection module is used to detect whether the critical files that need to be protected are configured with a static trust policy if static trust application is enabled. The second determination module is used to determine the overall trust status of static trust as untrustworthy if no static trust strategy is configured. The third determining module is used to calculate the first hash value for each key file using a hash algorithm in each heartbeat cycle if a static trust policy is configured. It then compares the first hash value and the second hash value of each key file. If the first hash value and the second hash value of at least one key file are different, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be untrustworthy. If the first hash value and the second hash value of each key file are the same, the overall trust status of the static trust policy is determined to be trustworthy. The second hash value of the key file is the hash value calculated using the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) and the hash algorithm applied to the key file during the configuration of the static trust policy for the key file.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: Memory, storing at least one instruction; and The processor executes instructions stored in the memory to implement the heartbeat transmission method for a trusted distributed control system (DCS) controller for thermal power plants as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

11. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the heartbeat transmission method for a DCS controller of a trusted distributed thermal power system as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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