A Substation Remote Operation and Maintenance Method and System Based on SM4 Encryption Communication

Abstract

The present invention discloses a method and system for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national cryptographic communication, which relates to the technical field of secure operation and maintenance of a power system, and includes: generating a national cryptographic authentication identifier by applying a national cryptographic algorithm according to the security level of a substation operation and maintenance instruction, and performing encrypted transmission; verifying the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier by using a security gateway; checking the context relevance of the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction; executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the context relevance check of the device operation sequence, monitoring the operation status of the device, and associatively analyzing the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the operation status of the device to generate an operation and maintenance security record. The present invention solves the technical problems of insufficient communication security protection and difficult identification of operation risks in the remote operation and maintenance of a substation, improves the security and reliability of the remote operation and maintenance of a substation through national cryptographic algorithm encryption and operation sequence relevance check, and effectively prevents potential safety hazards of a power system caused by remote operation errors.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of power system safety operation and maintenance, and specifically provides a substation remote operation and maintenance method and system based on national cryptographic communication. Background Technique

[0002] The remote operation and maintenance of substation equipment in the power system is an important part of the construction of the smart grid, and its security and reliability are directly related to the stable operation of the power grid. With the deep integration of the power communication network and information technology, the secure transmission and execution mechanism of substation remote operation and maintenance instructions has become the core component of the smart grid security protection system. Substation remote operation and maintenance technology has developed from the traditional one-way instruction transmission mode to a full-process security control mechanism including identity authentication, permission control, instruction verification, execution monitoring, and security auditing. Especially in the context of the construction of the new power system, the power system security protection standard GB / T 36323-2018 puts forward security requirements such as hierarchical authorization and multi-factor authentication for substation remote operations, promoting the development of substation remote operation and maintenance technology to a higher security level.

[0003] However, there are still many deficiencies in the existing substation remote operation and maintenance technology. First, most of the existing authentication mechanisms use fixed keys and single authentication methods, lacking the ability to dynamically adjust the authentication intensity according to the security level of instructions, resulting in redundant verification of low-risk instructions or insufficient protection of high-risk instructions. Second, the instruction verification and execution links are separated. The verification only focuses on the legality of the instruction itself, ignoring the context relevance of the instruction in the operation sequence, and cannot effectively prevent legal but unreasonable operation sequences. Third, the instruction execution monitoring mechanism is simple, only recording the execution results and lacking the correlation analysis of the execution process and device responses, making it difficult to support post-event security auditing and liability tracing. Finally, the integrated application of national cryptographic algorithms in the existing substation operation and maintenance system is still in its infancy, lacking a systematic national cryptographic authentication and encrypted transmission solution. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the above problems, the present invention is proposed.

[0005] Therefore, the present invention provides a substation remote operation and maintenance method and system based on national cryptographic communication, which can solve the problems mentioned in the background technique.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solution: A substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication, including: generating a national secret authentication identifier by applying a national secret algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypting and transmitting the substation operation and maintenance instruction; using a security gateway to verify the validity of the national secret authentication identifier; performing a context relevance check on the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national secret authentication identifier; executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the context relevance check of the device operation sequence, monitoring the device operation status, and associatively analyzing the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction with the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance security record.

[0007] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication of the present invention, wherein: applying a national secret algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction includes the following steps: receiving the substation operation and maintenance instruction, extracting the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and determining the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction according to the instruction type, the operation object, and the operation parameters; the security level includes a query level, a configuration level, and a control level; selecting an encryption mode of the national secret algorithm based on the security level, and adopting different encryption modes for substation operation and maintenance instructions of different security levels; constructing an instruction security attribute tag containing security level information, and selecting an encryption key based on the instruction security attribute tag; using the selected encryption mode of the national secret algorithm and the encryption key to encrypt the substation operation and maintenance instruction to obtain the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction.

[0008] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication of the present invention, wherein: the generation of the national secret authentication identifier is specifically to perform a digital signature process on the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction to generate a national secret authentication identifier including the substation operation and maintenance instruction digest information, signature information, and the instruction security attribute tag.

[0009] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication of the present invention, wherein: the using a security gateway to verify the validity of the national secret authentication identifier includes: receiving a security message containing the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national secret authentication identifier; extracting the digital signature and digest information in the national secret authentication identifier; selecting a corresponding verification key and verification algorithm according to the security level to verify the digital signature; calculating the digest value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and comparing it with the digest information; wherein, the query level instruction adopts single-factor verification, the configuration level instruction adopts two-factor verification, and the control level instruction adopts three-factor verification.

[0010] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication according to the present invention, wherein: the context relevance check of the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national secret authentication identifier includes: extracting the instruction sequence number from the national secret authentication identifier; querying the associated instruction history record according to the instruction sequence number; judging whether the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction are satisfied; matching the substation operation and maintenance instruction with the preset substation device operation rules to confirm the operation compliance.

[0011] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication according to the present invention, wherein: the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction include: the current operation state of the device meets the instruction execution condition; the previous instruction related to the substation operation and maintenance instruction has been successfully executed; the time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction meets the preset substation operation timing requirement; the execution of the substation operation and maintenance instruction will not cause a state conflict between mutually coupled devices.

[0012] As a preferred solution of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national secret communication according to the present invention, wherein: the correlation analysis of the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation state to generate an operation and maintenance security record includes: converting the substation operation and maintenance instruction into a control command recognizable by the device, establishing a mapping relationship table between the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the control command, and collecting device operation state parameters according to the mapping relationship table; the device operation state parameters include pre-operation state parameters and post-operation state parameters, and the state change amount is calculated by comparing the pre-operation state parameters and the post-operation state parameters; executing the control command, recording the execution timing information, execution response time and execution result code, and constructing an execution feature vector; constructing an operation and maintenance execution correlation model based on the state change amount and the execution feature vector, and the operation and maintenance execution correlation model performs feature fusion on the state change amount and the execution feature vector to generate the operation and maintenance security record including the execution process of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device response situation.

[0013] To further solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: A substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national cryptographic communication, comprising: an encryption transmission module, configured to generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier by applying a national cryptographic algorithm according to the security level of a substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instruction; a verification module, configured to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier by using a security gateway; an inspection module, configured to perform a context relevance check on the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier; and an execution monitoring module, configured to execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that has passed the validity verification and the context relevance check of the device operation sequence, monitor the device operation status, and perform an associated analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance security record.

[0014] A computer device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and wherein, when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the above-mentioned substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication are implemented.

[0015] A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above-mentioned substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication are implemented.

[0016] The beneficial effects of the present invention: The present invention realizes a differential authentication mechanism based on the security level of instructions, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the operation and maintenance instruction transmission process; establishes a context relevance check mechanism for operation and maintenance instructions to prevent legal but unreasonable operation sequences; constructs an associated analysis model between the execution process and device responses, forming a complete proof of the security closed-loop for instruction execution, providing comprehensive security protection for substation remote operation and maintenance. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the following drawings are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0018] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the overall process of a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication proposed by the present invention;

[0019] Figure 2 It is a flowchart of generating an operation and maintenance security record in a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication proposed by the present invention;

[0020] Figure 3Schematic diagram of the overall structure in a substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national cryptographic communication proposed by the present invention. Detailed implementation manners

[0021] To make the above objects, features, and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the following will describe the detailed implementation manners of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings of the specification. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0022] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention. However, the present invention may be implemented in other ways different from those described herein. Those skilled in the art can make similar generalizations without departing from the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0023] Embodiment 1, referring to Figure 1 and Figure 2 is an embodiment of the present invention, which provides a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication.

[0024] Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the overall process of a substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication, including the following steps:

[0025] S1: Apply national cryptographic algorithms according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instructions to generate national cryptographic authentication identifiers, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instructions.

[0026] Specifically, the national cryptographic algorithms in this embodiment include SM2 and SM4 algorithms.

[0027] S1.1: Apply national cryptographic algorithms according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instructions, including the following steps:

[0028] Receive the substation operation and maintenance instructions, extract the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters of the substation operation and maintenance instructions, and determine the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instructions according to the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters; where the security level includes query level, configuration level, and control level.

[0029] In this embodiment, the instruction types include data query types, parameter configuration types, and device control types; the operation objects include protection devices, monitoring units, and auxiliary systems; the operation parameters include set values and execution conditions. The determination of the security level is calculated using a risk assessment model:

[0030] ;

[0031] Wherein, Represents the comprehensive risk value of the instruction , Represents the risk value of the instruction type Represents the risk value of the operation object Represents the risk value of the operation parameter , and are the weights of the three factors respectively, and . According to the calculated risk value, the instructions are divided into three security levels: query level, configuration level, and control level by setting a threshold. Through the design of this risk assessment model, the security risks of different instructions can be accurately quantified, and the security level division can be realized, so as to implement different intensities of security protection measures for instructions with different risk levels.

[0032] Select the encryption mode of the national secret algorithm based on the security level, and adopt different encryption modes for substation operation and maintenance instructions with different security levels.

[0033] In this embodiment, the query-level instructions are encrypted in the ECB mode of the SM4 algorithm; the configuration-level instructions are encrypted in the CBC mode of the SM4 algorithm; the control-level instructions adopt an encryption method combining SM2 and SM4. First, the session key is encrypted by SM2, and then the instruction content is encrypted by the GCM mode of SM4 with this session key. This differential encryption strategy can balance the security and performance requirements, adopt a lightweight encryption method for low-risk instructions to improve the processing efficiency, and adopt a strong cipher suite for high-risk instructions to ensure security, effectively solving the problem that the traditional single encryption mode cannot balance efficiency and security.

[0034] Construct an instruction security attribute label containing security level information, and select an encryption key based on the instruction security attribute label.

[0035] The instruction security attribute label is encapsulated in a structured format, and the corresponding key is selected from the key management system according to the security level:

[0036] ;

[0037] Among them, represents the selected encryption key, represents the security level, represents the identifier of the instruction initiator, represents the identifier of the instruction recipient. The function KeySelect selects the appropriate key from the key library according to these parameters. This key selection mechanism based on the security attribute label realizes the automation and refinement of key management, avoids the security risks brought by traditional fixed keys, and reduces the complexity of key distribution and management at the same time.

[0038] Encrypt the substation operation and maintenance instructions using the encryption mode and encryption key of the selected national cryptographic algorithm to obtain the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instructions.

[0039] For the SM4-ECB mode, the encryption process is as follows:

[0040] ;

[0041] Among them, represents the th ciphertext block, represents the th plaintext block, represents the SM4 encryption algorithm, represents the encryption key.

[0042] For the SM4-CBC mode, the encryption process is as follows:

[0043] ;

[0044] Among them, when i = 0, is the initialization vector, represents the exclusive OR operation.

[0045] Using the national cryptographic algorithm for encryption processing ensures the security and efficiency of the encryption process. The SM4 algorithm has better performance on domestic hardware platforms compared to the traditional AES algorithm and can meet the low-latency requirements of substation real-time operation and maintenance.

[0046] S1.2: Generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier, specifically, perform a digital signature on the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instructions to generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier containing the summary information, signature information, and instruction security attribute label of the substation operation and maintenance instructions.

[0047] First, calculate the digest of the encrypted instructions using the SM3 hash algorithm:

[0048] ;

[0049] Among them, represents the digest value, represents the encrypted instruction data, SM3 represents the SM3 hash algorithm, and outputs a 256-bit hash value.

[0050] Then, sign the digest using the SM2 signature algorithm:

[0051] ;

[0052] Among them, is the signature value, is the private key of the signer, Represents the SM2 signature algorithm.

[0053] Finally, combine the summary information, signature information, and instruction security attribute label to form a national cryptography authentication identifier:

[0054] ;

[0055] Among them, AUTH represents the national cryptography authentication identifier, TAG represents the instruction security attribute label.

[0056] Through the generation process of the national cryptography authentication identifier, the authenticity of the instruction source and the protection of data integrity are realized, effectively preventing instruction tampering and forgery attacks. Compared with the traditional MAC authentication method, the SM2 digital signature also provides a non-repudiation function, ensuring the traceability and clear responsibility of operation and maintenance operations, and significantly improving the security control level of substation remote operation and maintenance.

[0057] S1.3: Encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instructions, specifically assemble the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instructions and the national cryptography authentication identifier to form a security message and transmit it.

[0058] The security message is assembled in the following format:

[0059] ;

[0060] Among them, MSG represents the security message, Header represents the message header, including information such as version number and length, represents the encrypted instruction content, AUTH represents the national cryptography authentication identifier, represents the connection operation.

[0061] The message is transmitted through a secure channel. After receiving the message, the receiving party first verifies the validity of the authentication identifier, then decrypts the instruction content, and finally performs a permission check based on the instruction security attribute label.

[0062] The design of this security message realizes the integrated protection of data transmission confidentiality, integrity, and identity authentication. Compared with the traditional separate security mechanism, it greatly reduces the number of protocol interactions and processing delays, improves the transmission efficiency, simplifies the implementation complexity, and reduces the maintenance cost.

[0063] Among them, the instruction security attribute label includes the identity information of the instruction initiator, the identity information of the instruction recipient, the security level identifier, the instruction validity time window, and the instruction sequence number. The instruction sequence number is used to identify the position of the substation operation and maintenance instruction in the operation sequence.

[0064] The instruction sequence number is generated in a monotonically increasing manner:

[0065] ;

[0066] wherein, represents the sequence number of the current instruction, represents the sequence number of the previous instruction. By verifying the continuity of the sequence numbers, the receiving party can prevent replay attacks and ensure that the instructions are executed in the correct order.

[0067] The introduction of the instruction security attribute tag solves the problem of the separation of identity authentication and instruction control in traditional substation operation and maintenance systems, realizes fine-grained access control based on instruction content and context, and effectively prevents unauthorized operations and replay attacks. In particular, the design of the instruction valid time window limits the effective execution period of the instruction. Even if the key is leaked, the expired instruction cannot be executed, reducing the scope of influence of security incidents.

[0068] Through the implementation of the above S1 step, the present invention constructs a complete set of substation operation and maintenance instruction security processing mechanisms based on national cryptographic algorithms, taking into account both security and processing efficiency.

[0069] S2: Use the security gateway to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier.

[0070] Specifically, receive the security message containing the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national cryptographic authentication identifier; extract the digital signature and digest information in the national cryptographic authentication identifier; select the corresponding verification key and verification algorithm according to the security level to verify the digital signature; calculate the digest value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and compare it with the digest information; among them, the query-level instruction adopts single-factor verification, the configuration-level instruction adopts two-factor verification, and the control-level instruction adopts three-factor verification.

[0071] First, the substation security gateway receives the security message transmitted through the network. The security message contains the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national cryptographic authentication identifier. As the security barrier between the substation and the external network, the security gateway is responsible for performing security verification on all operation and maintenance instructions entering the substation. The receiving process of the security message adopts a redundant channel design to ensure that when the main channel fails, the standby channel can take over in time to ensure the reliability of instruction reception.

[0072] After receiving the security message, the security gateway parses the national cryptographic authentication identifier from the security message and extracts the digital signature and digest information therein. The parsing of the national cryptographic authentication identifier is consistent with the structure described in the S1 part. The security gateway accurately extracts the three parts of information, namely the digest information, the signature value, and the instruction security attribute tag, through a preset data structure parsing algorithm, to prepare for the subsequent verification process. Through this structured parsing method, the problem of mixed and difficult-to-extract security metadata in traditional systems is solved, and the efficiency of verification processing is improved.

[0073] Next, based on the security level information in the instruction security attribute tag, the security gateway selects the corresponding verification key and verification algorithm from the key management system. For the SM2 algorithm, the verification key is the public key of the sender. This adaptive key selection mechanism based on security level effectively solves the security risks in the traditional fixed key mode and realizes the refined control of key usage.

[0074] Subsequently, the security gateway uses the selected verification key to verify the digital signature. The verification process for the SM2 signature is as follows:

[0075] ;

[0076] Among them, result represents the verification result (Boolean value), is the public key of the signer, is the digest value, is the signature value, represents the SM2 signature verification algorithm. Only when the verification result is true does it indicate that the signature is valid, and then the legitimacy of the instruction source is confirmed. Compared with the traditional password verification method, the SM2 digital signature verification provides a higher-strength identity authentication guarantee and effectively resists the risk of forgery attacks.

[0077] Meanwhile, the security gateway recalculates the digest value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and compares it with the digest information in the national cryptography authentication identifier. The security gateway verifies whether the instruction has been tampered with during transmission by comparing whether the recalculated digest value is equal to the received digest value. The collision resistance performance of the SM3 algorithm is superior to the traditional MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms, which can effectively prevent hash collision attacks and improve the reliability of instruction integrity verification.

[0078] In this embodiment, different verification mechanisms with different strengths are adopted for instructions with different security levels:

[0079] 1. For query-level instructions, single-factor verification is adopted: only the validity of the digital signature is verified. This lightweight verification is suitable for low-risk query operations. While ensuring basic security, it minimizes the verification overhead and improves the system response speed. For frequently executed query operations, the single-factor verification mechanism can reduce the verification latency and improve the processing efficiency.

[0080] 2. For configuration-level instructions, two-factor verification is adopted: in addition to verifying the digital signature, the validity of the instruction time window also needs to be verified. The instruction time window verification adopts the following conditions:

[0081] ;

[0082] Among them, represents the current time, and respectively represent the valid start time and end time of the instruction. This dual safeguard mechanism effectively prevents replay attacks and delay attacks, ensuring that the configuration instruction is executed within the specified validity period.

[0083] 3. Control-level instructions adopt three-factor verification: In addition to the above two verifications, sequence number continuity verification is added. The sequence number verification conditions are:

[0084] ;

[0085] Among them, represents the sequence number of the current instruction, represents the sequence number of the previous successfully executed instruction. The three-factor verification mechanism provides the strictest security guarantee for high-risk control instructions, ensuring that the instructions are executed in the correct order, preventing instruction replay, out-of-order execution, and missed execution, and significantly enhancing the security of substation operation control.

[0086] Through this multi-level security verification design, the present invention achieves an accurate match between the verification strength and the instruction risk level. While ensuring the security of high-risk instructions, it avoids the performance loss caused by over-verifying low-risk instructions. This differential verification mechanism solves the inefficiency problem caused by the "one-size-fits-all" in traditional verification methods, not only guarantees the security of critical instructions but also improves the overall response efficiency of the system, providing a solid technical guarantee for the safe operation and maintenance of substations.

[0087] S3: Check the context relevance of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptography authentication identifier.

[0088] S3.1: Extract the instruction sequence number from the national cryptography authentication identifier.

[0089] The security gateway obtains the instruction sequence number information by extracting the instruction security attribute tag in the national cryptography authentication identifier. The instruction sequence number is the position identifier of the substation operation and maintenance instruction in the operation sequence, which is crucial for ensuring the correctness of the instruction execution order.

[0090] The extraction process of the instruction sequence number is realized by parsing the instruction security attribute tag, and the serial number field is included in the tag structure. Structured parsing technology is used to accurately extract the sequence number information to avoid parsing errors caused by chaotic data formats in traditional methods. This precise extraction mechanism lays a solid foundation for subsequent context relevance checks.

[0091] S3.2: Query the associated instruction history record according to the instruction sequence number.

[0092] According to the extracted instruction sequence number, query the historical instruction records associated with the current instruction from the instruction history database. The query of associated instructions uses a context - associated analysis algorithm, which not only considers the continuity of the instruction sequence but also the functional relevance between instructions.

[0093] By constructing an instruction association graph structure, quickly locate the previous instructions directly related to the current instruction, and extract their execution status and result information. This graph - based association analysis method solves the problem that traditional linear checks cannot effectively handle complex instruction dependencies, and is especially suitable for the scenario of collaborative operation of multiple substation devices.

[0094] The historical record query results include key information such as the execution status, execution time, operation object, and operation result of the previous instruction, providing data support for subsequent pre - condition judgment. This comprehensive historical information acquisition mechanism effectively solves the problem of unclear instruction execution context in traditional operation and maintenance systems.

[0095] S3.3: Judge whether the pre - conditions of the substation operation and maintenance instructions are met.

[0096] Based on the queried associated instruction historical records, comprehensively judge the pre - conditions of the substation operation and maintenance instructions to ensure the safety and effectiveness of instruction execution. The judgment of pre - conditions uses rule - engine technology, and through preset condition - judgment rules, parallel evaluation of multi - dimensional pre - conditions is carried out.

[0097] The pre - condition judgment not only focuses on the legality of the instruction itself but also pays more attention to the context adaptability of the instruction in the entire operation sequence. This context - aware condition - judgment method effectively prevents potential safety hazards caused by isolated instruction judgment.

[0098] S3.4: Match the substation operation and maintenance instructions with the preset substation equipment operation rules to confirm the compliance of the operation.

[0099] Match the substation operation and maintenance instructions that have passed the pre - condition judgment with the preset substation equipment operation rule library to confirm the compliance of the operation. The operation rule matching uses semantic analysis technology. By extracting the operation intention and operation object of the instruction, pattern matching is carried out with the standard operation process in the rule library.

[0100] The matching process of operation rules is not only a simple rule search but also includes rule reasoning and conflict detection. It can intelligently identify the deviation between the instruction operation and the preset rules and give specific non - compliance reasons. This deep - semantic - analysis rule - matching mechanism solves the problem that traditional keyword - matching methods are difficult to accurately identify complex operation semantics.

[0101] Through the implementation of the above four steps, the present invention realizes the comprehensive context relevance check of substation operation and maintenance instructions, ensuring the safety, orderliness, and compliance of instruction execution. This context relevance check mechanism based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier not only enhances the safety of substation remote operation and maintenance but also optimizes the rationality of the operation process, providing technical support for the intelligent operation and maintenance of substations.

[0102] Furthermore, the preconditions for substation operation and maintenance instructions include: the current operating state of the equipment meets the instruction execution conditions; the previous instructions related to the substation operation and maintenance instructions have been successfully executed; the time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instructions meets the preset substation operation timing requirements; the execution of the substation operation and maintenance instructions will not cause state conflicts between mutually coupled devices.

[0103] The current operating state of the equipment meets the instruction execution conditions: Through the real-time equipment status monitoring interface, obtain the current operating state of the instruction operation object and compare it with the prerequisite state required for instruction execution. This state adaptability check mechanism avoids the risk of forced execution of instructions when the equipment does not have the execution conditions. For example, for the circuit breaker closing instruction, check whether the current state of the circuit breaker is in the open state, whether the mechanical energy storage is completed, whether the operating mechanism is normal, etc. This dynamic check mechanism based on the actual state of the equipment solves the limitation of traditional static rule checks that cannot cope with changes in equipment status.

[0104] The previous instructions related to the substation operation and maintenance instructions have been successfully executed: Based on the previously queried associated instruction history records, verify whether the previous instructions directly related to the current instruction have been successfully executed. The successful execution of the previous instructions is an important prerequisite for ensuring the safe and effective execution of the current instruction.

[0105] It should be noted that the verification of previous instructions not only checks the execution status of the instructions but also analyzes whether the execution results meet the execution requirements of the current instruction. For example, before executing the instruction to modify the setting value of a protection device, verify whether the withdrawal instruction of the protection device has been successfully executed. This relevance check considering the execution results of instructions effectively prevents logical breaks in the operation sequence and improves the integrity of the operation process.

[0106] The time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instructions meets the preset substation operation timing requirements: Check the rationality of the instruction execution time to ensure that it meets the timing requirements of substation operations. The timing requirements include the minimum time interval between instructions, time window limitations for specific operations, etc.

[0107] In an alternative embodiment, the timing check may adopt a time correlation model, which not only considers absolute time requirements but also pays attention to the relative time constraints between operations. For example, after the transformer tap is switched, a certain period of time needs to elapse before load adjustment can be performed. According to this timing requirement, it is judged whether the execution timing of the current load adjustment instruction is appropriate. This timing constraint check mechanism solves the problems of equipment damage and system instability caused by improper operation timing in traditional operation and maintenance systems.

[0108] The execution of substation operation and maintenance instructions will not cause state conflicts between mutually coupled devices: Through the analysis of the device topology relationship, it is evaluated whether the execution of the current instruction will conflict with the states of mutually coupled devices. The coupling relationship between devices is an important constraint for the safe operation of the substation, and state conflicts may lead to system instability or even faults.

[0109] It should be noted that the coupling conflict detection is based on the device state transition model. By simulating the device state changes after the instruction execution, possible state conflicts between devices are predicted. For example, it is checked whether the closing operation of the bus section circuit breaker will cause voltage or phase conflicts on the two bus sections. This prediction-based conflict detection method effectively prevents system anomalies caused by the interaction between devices and improves the stability of substation operation.

[0110] Furthermore, the preset operation rules for substation equipment include: performing power equipment operations in the order of "isolate first, then close"; the operation order of high-voltage side equipment and low-voltage side equipment follows the principle of "high first, then low"; the operation of the protection device follows the order of "energize the differential protection first, then the backup protection"; the operation order of the transformer follows the rule of "adjust the tap first, then load"; the circuit breaker reclosing operation must be performed after the fault is eliminated.

[0111] Performing power equipment operations in the order of "isolate first, then close": This rule requires that when performing power equipment operations, the isolation operation must be performed first to ensure that the equipment is in a safe isolation state, and then the closing operation can be performed. This rule is the basic safety principle for power equipment operations and is of great significance for preventing misoperations and ensuring personal safety.

[0112] It should be noted that by analyzing the logical order of the instruction operations, it is ensured that the isolation-type operations are performed before the closing-type operations. For example, when operating a circuit breaker, it is checked whether the relevant isolating switches have been operated and whether these operations meet the requirements of safe isolation. This forced constraint mechanism for the operation order effectively prevents equipment damage and safety accidents caused by incorrect operation order.

[0113] The operating sequence of high-voltage side equipment and low-voltage side equipment follows the principle of "high first, then low": This rule stipulates that when operating equipment combinations (such as transformers) that include high-voltage side and low-voltage side, the high-voltage side equipment should be operated first, and then the low-voltage side equipment. This principle is formulated based on the energy flow direction and safety considerations of the power system.

[0114] It should be noted that by identifying the voltage level attributes of the equipment, it is judged whether the operating sequence conforms to the principle of "high first, then low". For example, in the transformer outage operation, check whether the opening operation of the high-voltage side circuit breaker is executed before the low-voltage side circuit breaker. This operating sequence constraint considering voltage levels avoids the risks of equipment overload and damage caused by energy backflow.

[0115] The operating sequence of the protection device follows the order of "energize the differential protection first, and then the backup protection": This rule requires that when energizing the protection device, the main protection (such as differential protection) should be energized first, and then the backup protection (such as distance protection, overcurrent protection, etc.). This sequence is formulated based on the cooperation relationship and selectivity principle of the protection device.

[0116] It should be noted that by analyzing the function type and protection range of the protection device, it is judged whether the energizing sequence conforms to the rule requirements. For example, in the line protection energizing operation, check whether the energizing of the line differential protection is executed before the distance protection. This intelligent judgment mechanism for the energizing sequence of the protection device ensures the correct cooperation of the protection system and improves the reliability and selectivity of fault handling.

[0117] The operating sequence of the transformer follows the rule of "adjust the tap first, and then load": This rule stipulates that before adjusting the transformer load, the tap adjustment should be completed first to ensure that the transformer operates at an appropriate turns ratio. This rule is based on the considerations of the safe operation and efficiency optimization of the transformer.

[0118] It should be noted that by identifying the type and purpose of the transformer operation instruction, it is judged whether the operating sequence conforms to the rule of "adjust the tap first, and then load". For example, during the transformer commissioning process, the system will check whether the tap has been adjusted to the appropriate position before allowing the load to be added. This constraint mechanism for the transformer operating sequence avoids problems such as reduced efficiency and equipment overload caused by operation at an unreasonable turns ratio.

[0119] The circuit breaker reclosing operation must be performed after the fault is eliminated: This rule requires that the circuit breaker reclosing operation can only be performed after it is confirmed that the fault has been eliminated, to prevent system shocks and equipment damage caused by reclosing with a fault.

[0120] It should be noted that the safety of reclosing operation is judged by analyzing the fault information and the breaker status. Before executing the reclosing command, check whether the fault flag of the relevant line or equipment has been cleared and whether the protection device has been reset. This operation constraint based on the fault status effectively prevents the risk of secondary fault expansion and equipment damage caused by blind reclosing.

[0121] Through the matching check of the above-mentioned equipment operation rules, the present invention realizes a comprehensive evaluation of the compliance of substation operation and maintenance instructions, ensuring the safety and standardization of instruction execution. This compliance check mechanism based on refined rules effectively solves the safety risks and equipment damage problems caused by non-standard operations in traditional operation and maintenance systems, providing technical support for the safe and stable operation of substations.

[0122] S4: Execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that has passed the validity verification and the context relevance check of the equipment operation sequence, monitor the equipment operation status, and perform correlation analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the equipment operation status to generate an operation and maintenance safety record.

[0123] As Figure 2 shown, it is a schematic execution flow diagram of step S4, including:

[0124] S4.1: Convert the substation operation and maintenance instruction into a control command recognizable by the equipment, establish a mapping relationship table between the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the control command, and collect equipment operation status parameters according to the mapping relationship table.

[0125] This link is the process of converting the verified high-level operation and maintenance instruction into a control command that can be directly executed by specific equipment, solving the adaptation problem between high-level semantic instructions and low-level equipment control.

[0126] Substation operation and maintenance instructions are usually high-level semantic instructions facing the business layer, while substation equipment needs to receive low-level control commands in a specific format. To solve the semantic difference between the two, the present invention designs an instruction-to-command mapping conversion mechanism. This mechanism is based on instruction semantic parsing technology, extracts the operation intention, operation object, and operation parameters of the instruction, and then converts them into control commands recognizable by the equipment through preset mapping rules.

[0127] The mapping relationship table is a structured set of conversion rules, including the mapping rules between instruction types, operation objects, parameter conditions, and corresponding control commands. This table not only realizes static mapping but also supports dynamic parameter filling, and can generate parameterized control commands according to the specific parameter values in the instruction. This flexible mapping mechanism solves the problem that traditional fixed mapping methods are difficult to adapt to complex parameter combinations.

[0128] Based on the established mapping relation table, the present invention can specifically determine the device operation state parameters to be collected. This targeted parameter collection mechanism solves the problems of heavy system burden and data redundancy caused by traditional full-volume collection, and improves the accuracy and efficiency of state monitoring. Through this precise collection method guided by the mapping relation, the present invention can obtain the state parameters most relevant to the current operation, providing precise data support for subsequent correlation analysis.

[0129] Specifically, the device operation state parameters include pre-operation state parameters and post-operation state parameters. The pre-operation state parameters are collected before executing the control command, and the post-operation state parameters are collected after executing the control command. The state change amount is calculated by comparing the pre-operation state parameters and the post-operation state parameters.

[0130] The collection of pre-operation state parameters is a comprehensive record of the current state of the device before executing the control command. According to the list of key parameters determined by the mapping relation table, the real-time state data of the device is collected through the device communication interface. These parameters usually include information such as the switch state, operation parameters, and alarm state of the device, providing reference data for subsequent state change analysis.

[0131] The collection of post-operation state parameters is a record of the new state of the device after the control command is executed. The same type of state parameters as those before the operation are collected to ensure data comparability. An appropriate delay is usually set for post-operation collection to ensure that the device state is completely stable before collection. This delay collection mechanism considering the device response characteristics solves the problem that traditional immediate collection may capture intermediate states.

[0132] The calculation of the state change amount adopts the parameter difference analysis method, comparing the state parameters before and after the operation one by one to calculate the change amount of each parameter. The calculation process not only considers simple numerical differences but also considers the type characteristics of the parameters. Corresponding change amount calculation methods are used for different types of parameters such as digital quantities, analog quantities, and state quantities. This type-aware change amount calculation mechanism solves the problem that traditional simple difference calculation cannot accurately express complex state changes.

[0133] The state change amount, as an objective reflection of the device's response to the instruction, provides an important basis for subsequent evaluation of the execution effect. By analyzing the state change amount, the present invention judges the actual effect of the instruction execution and identifies potential execution anomalies or device failures.

[0134] S4.2: Execute the control command, record the execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result code of the control command, and construct an execution feature vector containing the execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result code.

[0135] This step comprehensively monitors and records the process of executing control commands, solving the problems of opaque execution process and difficult-to-locate fault causes resulting from the simplicity of traditional execution records.

[0136] The execution of control commands adopts a secure sequential execution mechanism. According to the predefined execution process, the control commands are sent to the target devices. During the execution process, the transmission status of the commands, the response status of the devices, and the execution feedback information are monitored in real time to ensure the reliable execution of the commands. For complex combined commands, a transaction processing mechanism can be adopted to ensure that the combined commands are executed completely as a whole or fully rolled back, avoiding inconsistent system states caused by partial execution.

[0137] The recording of execution timing information adopts a multi-level timestamp mechanism, which not only records the start time and completion time of command execution, but also records the timestamp of key nodes during the execution process. These timestamps form the time track of command execution, providing a timing basis for subsequent execution anomaly analysis. This fine-grained timing recording mechanism solves the problem that it is difficult to locate the execution bottleneck by only recording the start and end times in the traditional way.

[0138] The measurement of execution response time adopts an end-to-end timing method, and the time interval from the command issuance to the receipt of the device response is used as the execution response time. The response time is monitored in real time and compared with the preset normal response time range to detect response anomalies in a timely manner. This response time monitoring mechanism solves the problem of lack of timeliness evaluation in traditional execution monitoring and improves the sensitivity to execution anomalies.

[0139] The generation of execution result codes is based on the comprehensive analysis of device feedback and status detection. The execution results are divided into three basic types: success, failure, and partial completion, and the specific result status is represented by a refined code system. This structured result code system solves the problem that traditional simple success / failure marks cannot express complex execution results and provides rich result information for subsequent execution analysis.

[0140] The construction of execution feature vectors structurally organizes execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result codes to form a multi-dimensional vector representing the characteristics of command execution. This vector representation method converts discrete execution information into a quantifiable analysis data structure, providing a data basis for subsequent pattern recognition and anomaly detection.

[0141] Specifically, the execution timing information includes the execution start time, execution completion time, and timestamp of intermediate key nodes. The execution response time is the time required for the device to respond to the control command. The execution result codes include success codes, failure codes, and partial completion codes.

[0142] The execution start time is the time point when the control command starts to be issued. This time point is recorded using a high-precision clock and serves as the starting marker for the execution process.

[0143] The execution completion time is the time point when all executions of the control command end. For multi-step commands, the completion time is the time point when the last step is executed and completed.

[0144] The intermediate key node timestamps are the time records of important stages during the execution process, including the command issuance time, command reception confirmation time, execution start time, intermediate status change time, and execution end time, etc. These timestamps constitute a complete execution timeline and provide detailed timing information for the analysis of the execution process.

[0145] The execution response time is calculated using a multi-point measurement method, which records the time interval from command issuance to device response and distinguishes between communication delay and device processing time. This refined response time measurement helps to identify the specific reasons for response delays and provides a basis for system optimization.

[0146] The execution result code adopts a hierarchical coding structure. The main code represents the basic result type of the execution (success, failure, partial completion), and the secondary code represents the specific result status or failure reason. For example, the failure code not only indicates that the execution fails but also includes specific reason codes such as communication failure, device rejection, timeout, parameter error, etc. This detailed result code system improves the information content of the execution result and facilitates subsequent fault diagnosis and problem-solving.

[0147] S4.3: Construct an operation and maintenance execution association model based on the state change amount and execution feature vector. The operation and maintenance execution association model performs feature fusion on the state change amount and execution feature vector to generate an operation and maintenance safety record that includes the execution process of substation operation and maintenance instructions and the device response situation.

[0148] This link is the core step for correlative analysis of the instruction execution process and the device response result, which solves the problem that the execution process and execution effect are separated from each other in traditional operation and maintenance records.

[0149] The operation and maintenance execution association model is a data model that correlates state changes with execution features. Through this model, a correspondence relationship is established between the instruction execution process and the device response result. The association model adopts a two-way mapping structure, which can not only infer the expected state changes based on execution features but also evaluate the rationality of the execution process based on state changes. This two-way association mechanism solves the problem that traditional one-way judgment cannot comprehensively evaluate the execution quality.

[0150] The feature fusion process adopts multi-dimensional feature alignment technology to synchronize the state change amount with each dimension of the execution feature vector in terms of time and semantic alignment, and identify the causal relationships and relevant patterns between them. The fusion process not only focuses on numerical matching, but also considers temporal logic and functional relevance to form a fusion feature set that comprehensively represents the execution process and response results. This multi-dimensional feature fusion method solves the problem that traditional simple associations cannot capture complex execution patterns.

[0151] The generation of operation and maintenance security records is based on the comprehensive analysis of fusion features. The execution process information and device response conditions are organized into structured security records, including basic instruction information, execution process details, state change results, and security assessment conclusions. Such security records containing rich information provide comprehensive data support for subsequent operation and maintenance analysis, fault diagnosis, and security audits.

[0152] Specifically, feature fusion includes calculating the deviation value between the state change amount and the expected response of the device; if the execution result code is a success code and the deviation value is zero, a normal execution identifier is marked in the operation and maintenance security record; if the execution result code is a success code but the deviation value is not zero, the ratio of the deviation value to the execution response time is calculated as the security risk index, and a potential risk identifier is marked in the operation and maintenance security record; if the execution result code is a failure code, the corresponding relationship between the intermediate key node timestamps in the execution timing information and the state change amount is analyzed to identify the failure link, and a faulty execution identifier is marked in the operation and maintenance security record; if the execution result code is a partially completed code, the execution feature vector is compared with the historical execution feature vector to determine the reason for partial completion, and a partially completed identifier is marked in the operation and maintenance security record.

[0153] The deviation value calculation adopts a multi-parameter weighted method. According to the importance and sensitivity of different parameters, the deviations of each parameter are weighted and calculated to obtain a comprehensive deviation value. This deviation calculation method considering parameter importance solves the problem that traditional simple mean calculations cannot reflect the importance of key parameters and improves the accuracy of deviation evaluation.

[0154] The generation of the normal execution identifier is based on strict consistency judgment. It is required that when the execution result code shows success and the state change is completely consistent with the expectation (deviation value is zero), it is marked as normal execution. Such a strict normal standard ensures that the executions marked as normal truly achieve the expected effect and improves the reliability of operation and maintenance quality control.

[0155] The generation of potential risk identifiers adopts a risk quantification method. By calculating the ratio of the deviation value to the execution response time as the safety risk index, a quantitative assessment of potential risks is carried out. This risk quantification mechanism solves the problem of ambiguity in traditional risk assessments and provides a data basis for risk management. The higher the safety risk index, the greater the state deviation per unit time and the higher the risk level. Based on this, the risk levels are classified and marked.

[0156] The generation of fault execution identifiers is based on the analysis of failure cause location. By associating the correspondence between the timestamps of intermediate nodes and state changes, the fault links in the execution process are identified. This fault location method based on timing analysis solves the problem of lack of location information in traditional fault records and provides precise guidance for fault diagnosis and problem solving.

[0157] The generation of partially completed identifiers adopts pattern matching technology. By comparing the current execution feature vector with the historical execution feature vector, the specific reasons for partial completion are identified through similarity analysis. This cause analysis method based on historical data solves the problem of unclear description of partial completion in traditional records and improves the pertinence of problem solving.

[0158] Specifically, the operation and maintenance security record simultaneously records the instruction security attribute label, instruction serial number of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and the inspection result of the context relevance of the device operation sequence, forming a complete proof of the safety closed-loop of instruction execution.

[0159] The integrity design of the operation and maintenance security record adopts the idea of full-link tracing, and the record contains the whole process information from instruction verification to execution completion. The instruction security attribute label in the record provides the security characteristic information of the instruction, the instruction serial number ensures the traceability of the execution order, the context relevance inspection result proves the rationality of instruction execution, and the execution process and response result record the actual execution effect. This comprehensive record mechanism forms a complete proof of the safety closed-loop of instruction execution and provides a reliable basis for post-event auditing and responsibility tracing.

[0160] The design of the safety closed-loop proof adopts anti-tampering technology. Digital signatures and timestamp encapsulations are performed on the generated operation and maintenance security records to ensure the authenticity and immutability of the records. This legally binding safety record solves the problem that traditional operation and maintenance records are easily modified and difficult to be used as evidence, and provides a reliable liability guarantee mechanism for the safe operation and maintenance of substations.

[0161] Through the implementation of the above-mentioned step S4, the present invention realizes the whole-process monitoring and recording of substation operation and maintenance instructions from verification to execution and then to effect evaluation, and constructs a complete operation and maintenance safety closed-loop system. This operation and maintenance method based on national cryptography authentication and context association not only improves the safety and reliability of substation operation and maintenance, but also provides a solid data foundation for operation and maintenance quality evaluation and security audit, realizing the safety control and traceability of substation remote operation and maintenance, and has important practical value and promotion significance.

[0162] Embodiment 2, referring to Figure 3 , is an embodiment of the present invention, and provides a substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national cryptography communication.

[0163] As Figure 3 shown, it is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of the system, including:

[0164] An encryption transmission module, configured to generate a national cryptography authentication identifier by applying a national cryptography algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypt and transmit the substation operation and maintenance instruction;

[0165] A verification module, configured to verify the validity of the national cryptography authentication identifier by using a security gateway;

[0166] An inspection module, configured to perform context relevance inspection on the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptography authentication identifier;

[0167] An execution monitoring module, configured to execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the context relevance inspection of the device operation sequence, monitor the device operation status, and perform correlation analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance safety record.

[0168] Embodiment 3, which is an embodiment of the present invention. The difference from the previous embodiment is that if the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on such an understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, in essence, or the part that makes a contribution to the prior art or a part of this technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: various media such as USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memories (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic disks, or optical discs that can store program codes.

[0169] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowchart or otherwise described herein can, for example, be considered as a definable series of executable instructions for implementing a logical function, which can be embodied specifically in any computer-readable medium for use by an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other systems that can fetch and execute instructions from the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, or in combination with these instruction execution systems, apparatus, or devices. For the purposes of this specification, a "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by or in combination with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0170] More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable media include the following: an electrical connection portion (electronic device) having one or more wirings, a portable computer disk cartridge (magnetic device), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber device, and a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM). Additionally, the computer-readable medium can even be paper or other suitable media on which the program can be printed, since the program can be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other media, followed by editing, interpretation, or otherwise processing as appropriate, and then storing it in a computer memory.

[0171] It should be understood that various parts of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented in hardware, as in another embodiment, any one or a combination of the following techniques well known in the art can be used: discrete logic circuits having logic gate circuits for implementing logical functions on data signals, application-specific integrated circuits having appropriate combinational logic gate circuits, programmable gate arrays (PGAs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.

[0172] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit them. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present invention can be modified or equivalently replaced without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, and they should all be covered by the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication, characterized in that Including: Generating a national cryptography authentication identifier by applying the national cryptography algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and encrypting and transmitting the substation operation and maintenance instruction; Selecting the encryption mode of the national cryptography algorithm based on the security level, and adopting different encryption modes for the substation operation and maintenance instructions with different security levels; Using a security gateway to verify the validity of the national cryptography authentication identifier; Performing a context relevance check on the device operation sequence of the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptography authentication identifier, including matching the substation operation and maintenance instruction with the preset substation device operation rules to confirm the compliance of the operation; Executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the context relevance check of the device operation sequence, monitoring the device operation status, and performing an associated analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operation status to generate an operation and maintenance security record, including: Converting the substation operation and maintenance instruction into a control command recognizable by the device, establishing a mapping relationship table between the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the control command, and collecting device operation status parameters according to the mapping relationship table; the device operation status parameters include pre-operation status parameters and post-operation status parameters, and calculating the status change amount by comparing the pre-operation status parameters and the post-operation status parameters; Executing the control command, recording the execution timing information, execution response time, and execution result code, and constructing an execution feature vector; Constructing an operation and maintenance execution association model based on the status change amount and the execution feature vector, where the operation and maintenance execution association model performs feature fusion on the status change amount and the execution feature vector to generate the operation and maintenance security record including the execution process of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device response situation.

2. The method for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national cryptographic communication according to claim 1, wherein: Applying the national cryptography algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction includes the following steps: Receiving the substation operation and maintenance instruction, extracting the instruction type, operation object, and operation parameters of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and determining the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction according to the instruction type, the operation object, and the operation parameters; the security level includes query level, configuration level, and control level; Constructing an instruction security attribute tag containing security level information, and selecting an encryption key based on the instruction security attribute tag; Encrypting the substation operation and maintenance instruction using the selected encryption mode and encryption key of the national cryptography algorithm to obtain the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction.

3. The method for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national cryptographic communication according to claim 2, characterized in that: The generation of the national cryptography authentication identifier is specifically to perform a digital signature process on the encrypted substation operation and maintenance instruction to generate a national cryptography authentication identifier including the substation operation and maintenance instruction summary information, signature information, and the instruction security attribute tag.

4. The method for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national cryptographic communication according to claim 3, wherein: The using the security gateway to verify the validity of the national cryptography authentication identifier includes: Receiving a security message containing the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the national cryptography authentication identifier; Extracting the signature information and summary information in the national cryptography authentication identifier; Selecting the corresponding verification key and verification algorithm according to the security level to verify the signature information; Calculating the summary value of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and comparing it with the summary information; Among them, single-factor verification is adopted for query-level instructions, two-factor verification is adopted for configuration-level instructions, and three-factor verification is adopted for control-level instructions.

5. The method for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national cryptographic communication according to claim 4, wherein: The device operation sequence context relevance check for the substation operation and maintenance instructions based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier includes: Extracting the instruction serial number from the national cryptographic authentication identifier; Querying the associated instruction history record according to the instruction serial number; Judging whether the preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction are met.

6. The method for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national cryptographic communication according to claim 5, characterized in that: The preconditions of the substation operation and maintenance instruction include: The current operating state of the device meets the instruction execution condition; The previous instructions related to the substation operation and maintenance instruction have been successfully executed; The time for executing the substation operation and maintenance instruction meets the preset substation operation timing requirements; The execution of the substation operation and maintenance instruction will not cause state conflicts between mutually coupled devices.

7. A substation remote operation and maintenance system based on national secret communication, based on the method for remote operation and maintenance of a substation based on national secret communication according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: Including, An encryption transmission module, configured to generate a national cryptographic authentication identifier by applying a national cryptographic algorithm according to the security level of the substation operation and maintenance instruction, and perform encrypted transmission on the substation operation and maintenance instruction; A verification module, configured to verify the validity of the national cryptographic authentication identifier by using a security gateway; An inspection module, configured to perform a device operation sequence context relevance check on the substation operation and maintenance instruction based on the national cryptographic authentication identifier; An execution monitoring module, configured to execute the substation operation and maintenance instruction that passes the validity verification and the device operation sequence context relevance check, monitor the device operating state, and perform associated analysis on the execution result of the substation operation and maintenance instruction and the device operating state to generate an operation and maintenance security record.

8. A computer device, comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, the steps of the substation remote operation and maintenance method based on national cryptographic communication according to any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.

Images