A cross-regional vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions

Abstract

This invention discloses a cross-regional vehicle authentication method based on a physically unclonable function (PUF), which belongs to the field of vehicle network information security. The method includes the following steps: initialization of a trusted management system; initialization of regional agencies; selection of a local trusted vehicle (LTV) by a cross-regional vehicle (CDV); cross-regional vehicle authentication; creation of an interactive identity by an agent (ATA); generation of a temporary key by the LTV; acquisition and verification of the key by the CDV; and verification of the CDV's trustworthiness by the LTV. This method utilizes a physically unclonable function (PUF) to generate a unique identity, ensuring authentication security while reducing computational and communication overhead, improving the robustness and diversity of authentication information, and effectively reducing security risks in cross-regional authentication. The method has broad application prospects in areas such as intelligent transportation and autonomous driving.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network information security, and in particular to a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physically unclonable function. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of intelligent transportation services, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), as one of its core technologies, are playing an increasingly important role. VANETs enable data sharing and information exchange through wireless communication between vehicles, providing key services for intelligent transportation systems, such as real-time road condition monitoring, vehicle safety warnings, and environmental awareness. VANETs not only improve traffic efficiency but also play a vital role in enhancing road safety and optimizing traffic flow. However, with the widespread adoption of VANETs, network security issues have become a bottleneck hindering their widespread application, particularly in cross-regional authentication and vehicle identity verification.

[0003] Traditional encryption technologies are widely used in network security. However, in the Internet of Things (IoT), particularly in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANN), traditional computation-based security approaches face numerous challenges due to limited resources, weak computing power, and evolving attack vectors. Therefore, how to reduce computational overhead and resource consumption while ensuring network security has become an unresolved issue. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function with good security.

[0005] The present invention solves the above technical problems with a technical solution: a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, comprising the following steps:

[0006] S1: Trusted management system initialization;

[0007] S2: Initialization of regional agencies;

[0008] S3: Cross-regional vehicle CDV selects local trusted vehicle LTV;

[0009] S4: Cross-regional vehicle certification;

[0010] S5: The agency ATA creates an interactive identity;

[0011] S6: LTV generates a temporary key;

[0012] S7: CDV obtains the key and verifies it;

[0013] S8: LTV verifies the credibility of CDV.

[0014] In the above-mentioned cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S1 is as follows:

[0015] S11: The trusted authority TA generates P t and S t , P t is the public key of TA, S t is the private key of TA;

[0016] S12: Each TA agent ATA generates AS m and AID m ,AS m is the long-term private key of the mth agency, AID m is the unique identifier of the mth agency;

[0017] S13: The TA loads the {AID, AS} pairs of all ATAs into the memory, and each ATA stores its own {AID, AS}, where AID is the unique identifier of the ATA and AS is the long-term private key of the ATA.

[0018] In the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S2 is as follows:

[0019] S21: ATA Settings P A and S A , P A is the public key of ATA, S A ATA's private key;

[0020] S22: ATA assigns a CID to vehicles registered within the service area n and private key CK n , where CID n Unique identifier for the nth registered vehicle, CK n The private key for the nth registered vehicle;

[0021] S23: The vehicle registers multiple challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of the physical unclonable function (PUF) in the local ATA server.

[0022] S24: ATA sets a reputation value RE and a corresponding time limit for each registered vehicle , and sign the reputation value RE, , where SG is the signature of RE, R is the response of PUF, It is a concatenation operation, and Hash() is a hash function;

[0023] S25: ATA will {CIDn ,{C,R},RE n , deadline n} pre-loaded into the memory, C is the challenge of vehicle storage in the ATA server, RE n is the reputation value of the nth registered vehicle, deadline n is the time limit for the nth registered vehicle.

[0024] In the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S3 is as follows:

[0025] S31: Each local vehicle broadcasts the information {RE, deadline, SG, C, CID}, where CID is the unique identifier of the registered vehicle;

[0026] S32: CDV checks whether the deadline meets the requirements and then verifies RE. The formula is as follows:

[0027] ;

[0028] Among them, T1 is the first timestamp; when the time difference between T1 and deadline is less than the set time difference , then continue verification, otherwise end verification; CDV initiates verification to the local ATA and sends a message , where T2 is the second timestamp;

[0029] S33: ATA receives the message After decryption, the credibility is verified based on C and CID. The formula is as follows:

[0030] ;

[0031] ;

[0032] ;

[0033] Among them, PUF ( ) is a physical unclonable function used to map challenge-response pairs; is the response obtained by inputting C through the PUF function, SG generated by ATA based on relevant information, is the comparison function; if it passes the verification, then and If they are equal, the message is broadcast through , if the verification fails, reselect the vehicle;

[0034] S34: According to the information , select the vehicle with the highest reputation value as the trusted vehicle, and the unique identifier of the trusted vehicle is CID $ .

[0035] In the above-mentioned cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S4 is as follows:

[0036] S41: CDV generates the third timestamp T3 and sends message M1 to LTV. The formula is as follows:

[0037] ;

[0038] ;

[0039] in, is the CDV's identifier, The first challenge for CDV is to deposit the ATA of the place of registration at the time of registration. yes The corresponding response, For message verification;

[0040] S42: After LTV receives message M1, it compares the timestamps:

[0041] ;

[0042] in, is the fourth timestamp, if and The time difference is greater than If the result does not meet the requirements, the verification ends immediately. If the result meets the requirements, LTV generates the fifth timestamp T5 and message M2. The formula is as follows:

[0043] ;

[0044] ;

[0045] in yes The corresponding response, The first challenge is to deposit LTV into the ATA of the registered place at the time of registration. For message verification;

[0046] S43: LTV sends {M1, M2} to the ATA server ATA in the area where CDV is located through a public channel ^ ,ATA ^ Compare the sixth timestamp and the fifth timestamp , if the comparison passes, that is, the time difference is less than , then according to and Find the corresponding , then generate the message verification , the formula is as follows:

[0047] ;

[0048] ;

[0049] ;

[0050] ;

[0051] in, Input through the PUF function The response received;

[0052] S44: If the message verification is successful, and If they are completely equal, the cross-region vehicle CDV information is retrieved from a temporary database that is not on the local server.

[0053] In the above cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, step S44 is divided into two cases:

[0054] Case 1: If the cross-region vehicle CDV information is not in the temporary database of the local server, the message Send it to TA, TA will calculate the value of Find the original registration of the vehicle and then send an encrypted message ,in ATA, the registered agency of CDV & ATA & Encrypted messages After decryption, according to , use the PUF function to generate the corresponding response , and then compare the message verification and ,in = If the comparison passes, and If they are completely equal, the message is returned. ,in This is the second challenge response pair of CDV; TA receives the message After that, use S t Decrypt and then use ATA ^ Private key Encrypt the message , and then the message Send to ATA^ ;

[0055] The second case: If the CDV information of the cross-region vehicle is in the temporary database of the local server, ATA ^ according to( ), verify and compare the message again and ,in The generation method is the same as case 1; if it does not pass, that is and If they are not equal, then ATA ^ Mark suspicious vehicles and report them to TA; if passed, enter the interactive identity generation stage.

[0056] In the above-mentioned cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S5 is as follows:

[0057] S51: ATA ^ Generate interactive identity IID for CDV and LTV;

[0058] S52: ATA ^ Generate Message , and use LTV's private key CK $ After encryption, send to LTV:

[0059] .

[0060] In the above-mentioned cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S6 is as follows:

[0061] S61: LTV receives message Then, use the private key CK $ Decrypting the message ;

[0062] S62: Generate the seventh timestamp T7, temporary key SK, and sub-message , sub-message , message verification And message M4 is sent to CDV, the formula is as follows:

[0063] ;

[0064] ;

[0065] ;

[0066] ;

[0067] ;

[0068] in It is an exclusive OR operation.

[0069] In the above-mentioned cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S7 is as follows:

[0070] S71: CDV first verifies the real-time nature of the message based on the timestamp, then generates a key and verifies the integrity of the message based on the following formula:

[0071] ;

[0072] ;

[0073] ;

[0074] ;

[0075] ;

[0076] ;

[0077] in Is input through the PUF function The response obtained, Generated by CDV , Is input through the PUF function The response obtained, is the interactive identity generated by CDV, Verify the generated message;

[0078] S72: If the comparison passes, and If they are equal, a key is generated. :

[0079] ;

[0080] S73: CDV generates the eighth timestamp ,information Sent to LTV, the formula is as follows:

[0081] ;

[0082] ;

[0083] in Verification message between CDV and LTV.

[0084] In the above-mentioned cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, the specific process of step S8 is as follows:

[0085] S81: When receiving , LTV generation comparison message , and verify and :

[0086] ;

[0087] ;

[0088] S82: If the comparison is successful, and If they are equal, LTV considers CDV to be trustworthy, and CDV will use the interactive identity IID and key. to communicate.

[0089] The beneficial effects of this invention include: using a physically unclonable function (PUF) to generate a unique identity, ensuring authentication security while reducing computational and communication overhead; and by incorporating a regional authentication mechanism, avoiding the risk of identity forgery. This invention improves the robustness and diversity of authentication information, effectively reducing security risks in cross-region authentication, and has broad application prospects in areas such as intelligent transportation and autonomous driving. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0090] Figure 1 It is the overall flow chart of the present invention.

[0091] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of step S8 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0092] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0093] like Figure 1 As shown, a cross-region vehicle authentication method based on a physical unclonable function includes the following steps:

[0094] S1: Trusted management system initialization.

[0095] The specific process of step S1 is:

[0096] S11: The trusted authority TA generates P t and S t , P t is the public key of TA, S t is the private key of TA;

[0097] S12: Each TA agent ATA generates ASm and AID m ,AS m is the long-term private key of the mth agency, AID m is the unique identifier of the mth agency;

[0098] S13: The TA loads the {AID, AS} pairs of all ATAs into the memory, and each ATA stores its own {AID, AS}, where AID is the unique identifier of the ATA and AS is the long-term private key of the ATA.

[0099] S2: Initialization of regional agencies.

[0100] The specific process of step S2 is:

[0101] S21: ATA Settings P A and S A , P A is the public key of ATA, S A ATA's private key;

[0102] S22: ATA assigns a CID to vehicles registered within the service area n and private key CK n , where CID n Unique identifier for the nth registered vehicle, CK n The private key for the nth registered vehicle;

[0103] S23: The vehicle registers multiple challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of the physical unclonable function (PUF) in the local ATA server.

[0104] S24: ATA sets a reputation value RE and a corresponding time limit for each registered vehicle , and sign the reputation value RE, , where SG is the signature of RE, R is the response of PUF, || is the concatenation operation, and Hash() is the hash function;

[0105] S25: ATA will {CID n ,{C,R},RE n , deadline n} pre-loaded into the memory, C is the challenge of vehicle storage in the ATA server, RE n is the reputation value of the nth registered vehicle, deadline n is the time limit for the nth registered vehicle.

[0106] S3: Cross-regional vehicle CDV selects local trusted vehicle LTV.

[0107] The specific process of step S3 is:

[0108] S31: Each local vehicle broadcasts the information {RE, deadline, SG, C, CID}, where CID is the unique identifier of the registered vehicle;

[0109] S32: CDV checks whether the deadline meets the requirements and then verifies RE. The formula is as follows:

[0110] ;

[0111] Among them, T1 is the first timestamp; when the time difference between T1 and deadline is less than the set time difference , then continue verification, otherwise end verification; CDV initiates verification to the local ATA and sends a message , where T2 is the second timestamp;

[0112] S33: ATA receives the message After decryption, the credibility is verified based on C and CID. The formula is as follows:

[0113] ;

[0114] ;

[0115] ;

[0116] Among them, PUF ( ) is a physical unclonable function used to map challenge-response pairs; is the response obtained by inputting C through the PUF function, SG generated by ATA based on relevant information, is the comparison function; if it passes the verification, then and If they are equal, the message is broadcast through , if the verification fails, reselect the vehicle;

[0117] S34: According to the information , select the vehicle with the highest reputation value as the trusted vehicle, and the unique identifier of the trusted vehicle is CID $ .

[0118] S4: Cross-regional vehicle certification.

[0119] The specific process of step S4 is:

[0120] S41: CDV generates the third timestamp T3 and sends message M1 to LTV. The formula is as follows:

[0121] ;

[0122] ;

[0123] in, is the CDV's identifier, The first challenge for CDV is to deposit the ATA of the place of registration at the time of registration. yes The corresponding response, For message verification;

[0124] S42: After LTV receives message M1, it compares the timestamps:

[0125] ;

[0126] in, is the fourth timestamp, if and The time difference is greater than If the result does not meet the requirements, the verification ends immediately. If the result meets the requirements, LTV generates a fifth timestamp T5 and a message M2. The formula is as follows:

[0127] ;

[0128] ;

[0129] in yes The corresponding response, The first challenge is to deposit LTV into the ATA of the registered place at the time of registration. For message verification;

[0130] S43: LTV sends {M1, M2} to the ATA server ATA in the area where CDV is located through a public channel ^ ,ATA ^ Compare the sixth timestamp and the fifth timestamp , if the comparison passes, that is, the time difference is less than , then according to and Find the corresponding , then generate the message verification , the formula is as follows:

[0131] ;

[0132] ;

[0133] ;

[0134] ;

[0135] in, Input through the PUF function The response received;

[0136] S44: If the message verification is successful, and If they are completely equal, the cross-region vehicle CDV information is retrieved from a temporary database that is not on the local server.

[0137] The step S44 is divided into two cases:

[0138] Case 1: If the cross-region vehicle CDV information is not in the temporary database of the local server, the message Send it to TA, TA will calculate the value of Find the original registration of the vehicle and then send an encrypted message ,in ATA, the registered agency of CDV & ATA & Encrypted messages After decryption, according to , use the PUF function to generate the corresponding response , and then compare the message verification and ,in = If the comparison passes, and If they are completely equal, the message is returned. ,in This is the second challenge response pair of CDV; TA receives the message After that, use S t Decrypt and then use ATA ^ Private key Encrypt the message , and then the message Send to ATA ^ ;

[0139] The second case: If the CDV information of the cross-region vehicle is in the temporary database of the local server, ATA ^ according to( ), verify and compare the message again and ,in The generation method is the same as case 1; if it does not pass, that is and If they are not equal, then ATA ^Mark suspicious vehicles and report them to TA; if passed, enter the interactive identity generation stage.

[0140] S5: The agency ATA creates an interactive identity.

[0141] The specific process of step S5 is:

[0142] S51: ATA ^ Generate interactive identity IID for CDV and LTV;

[0143] S52: ATA ^ Generate Message , and use LTV's private key CK $ After encryption, send to LTV:

[0144] .

[0145] S6: LTV generates a temporary key.

[0146] The specific process of step S6 is:

[0147] S61: LTV receives message Then, use the private key CK $ Decrypting the message ;

[0148] S62: Generate the seventh timestamp T7, temporary key SK, and sub-message , sub-message , message verification And message M4 is sent to CDV, the formula is as follows:

[0149] ;

[0150] ;

[0151] ;

[0152] ;

[0153] ;

[0154] in It is an exclusive OR operation.

[0155] S7: CDV obtains the key and verifies it.

[0156] The specific process of step S7 is:

[0157] S71: CDV first verifies the real-time nature of the message based on the timestamp, then generates a key and verifies the integrity of the message based on the following formula:

[0158] ;

[0159] ;

[0160] ;

[0161] ;

[0162] ;

[0163] ;

[0164] in Is input through the PUF function The response obtained, Generated by CDV , Is input through the PUF function The response obtained, is the interactive identity generated by CDV, Verify the generated message;

[0165] S72: If the comparison passes, and If they are equal, a key is generated. :

[0166] ;

[0167] S73: CDV generates the eighth timestamp ,information Sent to LTV, the formula is as follows:

[0168] ;

[0169] ;

[0170] in Verification message between CDV and LTV.

[0171] S8: LTV verifies the credibility of CDV.

[0172] like Figure 2 As shown, the specific process of step S8 is:

[0173] S81: When receiving , LTV generation comparison message , and verify and :

[0174] ;

[0175] ;

[0176] S82: If the comparison is successful, and If they are equal, LTV considers CDV to be trustworthy, and CDV will use the interactive identity IID and key. to communicate.

Claims

1. A cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1: Trusted management system initialization; S2: Initialization of ATAs in each region; The specific process of step S2 is: S21: ATA Settings P A and S A , P A is the public key of ATA, S A ATA's private key; S22: ATA assigns a CID to vehicles registered within the service area n and private key CK n , where CID n Unique identifier for the nth registered vehicle, CK n The private key for the nth registered vehicle; S23: The vehicle registers multiple challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of the physical unclonable function (PUF) in the local ATA server. S24: The ATA sets a reputation value RE and a corresponding deadline for each registered vehicle, and signs the reputation value RE, SG = Hash(RE||R||deadline), where SG is the signature of RE, R is the response of the PUF, || is a concatenation operation, and Hash() is a hash function; S25: ATA will {CID n ,{C,R},RE n , deadline n } pre-loaded into the memory, C is the challenge of vehicle storage in the ATA server, RE n is the reputation value of the nth registered vehicle, deadline n is the time limit for the nth registered vehicle; S3: Cross-regional vehicle CDV selects local trusted vehicle LTV; S4: Cross-regional vehicle certification; S5: The agency ATA creates an interactive identity; S6: LTV generates a temporary key; S7: CDV obtains the key and verifies it; S8: LTV verifies the credibility of CDV.

2. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S1 is: S11: The trusted authority TA generates P t and S t , P t is the public key of TA, S t is the private key of TA; S12: TA generates AS for each agency ATA m and AID m ,AS m is the long-term private key of the mth agency ATA, AID m is the unique identifier of the mth agency ATA; S13: The TA loads the {AID, AS} pairs of all ATAs into the memory, and each ATA stores its own {AID, AS}, where AID is the unique identifier of the ATA and AS is the long-term private key of the ATA.

3. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S3 is: S31: Each local vehicle broadcasts the information {RE, deadline, SG, C, CID}, where CID is the unique identifier of the registered vehicle; S32: CDV checks whether the deadline meets the requirements and then verifies RE. The formula is as follows: T1-deadline<ΔT; Among them, T1 is the first timestamp; when the time difference between T1 and deadline is less than the set time difference ΔT, the verification continues, otherwise the verification ends; CDV initiates verification to the local ATA and sends a message Where T2 is the second timestamp; S33: ATA receives the message After decryption, the credibility is verified based on C and CID. The formula is as follows: R′←PUF(C); SG′=Hash(RE||R′||deadline); Compare(SG, SG′); PUF() is a physically unclonable function used to map challenge-response pairs; R′ is the response obtained by inputting C into the PUF function; SG′ is the SG generated by the ATA based on relevant information; and Compare() is a comparison function. If verification passes, that is, SG and SG′ are equal, a pass message {T2, CID} is broadcast; if verification fails, a new vehicle is selected. S34: Based on the information {T2, CID}, select the vehicle with the highest credibility as the trusted vehicle. The unique identifier of the trusted vehicle is CID $ .

4. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S4 is: S41: CDV generates the third timestamp T3 and sends message M1 to LTV. The formula is as follows: O1=Hash(R *1 ||T3||CID * ): M1={CID * ,C *1 ,O1,T3}; Among them, CID * is the identifier of CDV, C *1 The first challenge for CDV is to deposit it into the ATA of the place of registration when registering. *1 It is C *1 The corresponding response, O1 is message verification; S42: After LTV receives message M1, it compares the timestamps: T4-T3<ΔT; Where T4 is the fourth timestamp. If the time difference between T4 and T3 is greater than ΔT, the requirement is not met and verification ends immediately. If the requirement is met, LTV generates the fifth timestamp T5 and generates message M2. The formula is as follows: O2=Hash(R $1 ||T5||CID $ ); <h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr">M2 = {CID<h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr"> $ <h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr"> C<h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr"> $1 <h2 style=";text-align:left;direction:ltr"> O2, T5 where R $1 It is C $1 The corresponding response, C $1 This is the first challenge for LTV to be deposited into the ATA at the time of registration, and O2 is for message verification; S43: LTV sends {M1, M2} to the ATA server ATA^ in the area where CDV is located through a public channel. ATA^ compares the sixth timestamp T6 with the fifth timestamp T5. If the comparison is successful, that is, the time difference is less than ΔT, then the CID $ and C $1 Find the corresponding R′ $1 , then generate message verification O′2, the formula is as follows: T6-T5<ΔT; R′ $1 ←PUF(C $1 ); O′2=Hash(R′ $1 ||T5||RID $ ); Compare(O2, O′2); Among them, R′ $1 To pass the PUF function input C $1 The response received; S44: If the comparison message verification is passed, that is, O2 and Q′2 are completely equal, the information of the cross-region vehicle CDV is retrieved in the temporary database of the local server.

5. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The step S44 is divided into two cases: Case 1: If the cross-region vehicle CDV information is not in the temporary database of the local server, the message Send it to TA, TA uses the CID in M1 * Find the original registration of the vehicle and then send an encrypted message Among them AS & ATA, the registered agency of CDV & ATA & Encrypted messages After decryption, according to C *1 , use the PUF function to generate the corresponding response R′ *1 , then compare the message verification O′1 and O1, where O′1=Hash(R′ *1 ||T3||CID * ); If the comparison passes, that is, O1 and O′1 are completely equal, then return the message Among them (C *2 , R *2 ) is the second set of challenge response pairs of CDV; TA receives the message After that, use S t Decrypt and then encrypt using ATA^'s private key AS^ to get message E AS^ ((C *1 , R *1 ), (C *2 , R *2 ), CID * ), then the message E AS^ ((C *1 , R *1 ), (C * 2, R *2 ), CID * ) is sent to ATA^; The second case: If the information of the cross-region vehicle CDV is in the temporary database of the local server, ATA^ according to (C *1 , R *1 ), verify and compare messages O′1 and O1 again, where O′1 is generated in the same way as in case 1; if it fails, that is, O1 and O′1 are not equal, then ATA^ marks the vehicle as suspicious and reports it to TA; If passed, it will enter the stage of generating interactive identity.

6. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S5 is: S51: ATA^ generates the interactive identity IID of CDV and LTV; S52: ATA^ generates message M3 and uses LTV's private key CK $ After encryption, it is sent to LTV: M3 = {(C *1 , R *1 ), (C *2 , R *2 ), IID}.

7. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S6 is: S61: After LTV receives message M3, it uses the private key CK $ Decrypt message M3; S62: Generate the seventh timestamp T7, temporary key SK, sub-message Y1, sub-message U1, message verification O3 and message M4 and send them to CDV. The formula is as follows: SK=Hash(R *1 ||R *2 ||T7); O3=Hash(R *1 ||R *2 ||C *1 ||C *2 ||IID||T7); M4={Y1,U1,O3,C *1 ,T7}; in It is an exclusive OR operation.

8. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S7 is: S71: CDV first verifies the real-time nature of the message based on the timestamp, then generates a key and verifies the integrity of the message based on the following formula: R′ *1 ←PUF(C *1 ); R′ *2 ←PUF(C *2 ); O′3=Hash(R′ *1 ||R′ *2 ||C *1 ||C′ *2 ||IID′||T7); Compare(O3, O′3); where R′ *1 It is input through the PUF function C *1 The response obtained, C′ *2 It is the C generated by CDV *2 , R′ *2 It is input through the PUF function C *2 The response obtained, IID′ is the interaction identity generated by CDV, and O′3 is the generated message verification; S72: If the comparison passes, that is, O3 and O′3 are equal, the key SK′ is generated: SK′=Hash(R′ *1 ||R′ *2 ||T A ); S73: CDV generates an eighth timestamp T8 and sends a message M5 to LTV. The formula is as follows: Y2=Hash(IID′||SK′||T8); M5 = {Y′2, T8}; Where Y2 is the verification message between CDV and LTV.

9. The cross-region vehicle authentication method based on physical unclonable functions according to claim 8 is characterized in that: The specific process of step S8 is: S81: Upon receiving M5, LTV generates a comparison message Y′2 and verifies Y2 and Y′2: Y′2=Hash(IID||SK||T8); Compare(Y2, Y′2); S82: If the comparison is successful, that is, Y2 and Y′2 are equal, LTV considers CDV to be trustworthy, and CDV subsequently uses the interactive identity IID and key SK for communication.

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