A Redundancy Architecture for a Helicopter Fly-by-Wire Actuator
Through the innovative design of 3×2 excess motor and sensor, the safety and reliability of the helicopter servo is improved, the contradiction between safety and cost in the existing technology is solved, and a high safety and high reliability helicopter fly-by-speed flight control system is realized.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510689582.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-05-27
- Publication Date
- 2025-08-01
- Estimated Expiration
- 2045-05-27
AI Technical Summary
The existing helicopter servo architecture is difficult to balance between safety and cost, the monitoring coverage rate of the three-dimensional design is insufficient, and the four-dimensional design is large in size and high in cost, which cannot meet the high safety needs.
The design of 3×2 overdegree motor, 3×2 overdegree valve sensor and 3×2 overdegree cylinder sensor is adopted. Each motor contains two motor coils. The valve sensor and cylinder sensor adopt a single input dual output winding structure to form a six-channel closed-loop control, achieving strong fault tolerance and monitoring coverage rate of 100%.
It improves the safety and reliability of the helicopter's fly-by-wire flight control system, can tolerate two motor mechanical jams and five motor electrical failures, achieves 100% fault detection coverage, and solves the matching and safety issues in traditional designs.
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Figure CN120207593B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of aviation hydraulic actuation technology, and particularly to a redundant architecture for a fly-by-wire helicopter servo. Background Art
[0002] As a unique aircraft, a helicopter has no aerodynamic reconstruction ability between its two rotors. If any one of the rotors malfunctions, the helicopter will be uncontrollable, leading to catastrophic accidents. Therefore, the helicopter servo must have high safety. To meet the high safety requirements of the helicopter servo, the usual design approach is redundant design. The three-redundancy servo architecture has insufficient monitoring coverage, and the sensors cannot achieve self-monitoring, unable to meet the requirements for more safety redundancies. The four-redundancy servo architecture has a large volume and high cost for the servo.
[0003] Therefore, it is necessary to propose a solution to improve one or more problems existing in the above-mentioned related technical solutions.
[0004] It should be noted that the information disclosed in the above background art section is only used to enhance the understanding of the background of this application, and thus may include information that does not constitute the prior art known to those of ordinary skill in the art. Summary of the Invention
[0005] An embodiment of this application provides a redundant architecture for a fly-by-wire helicopter servo, including:
[0006] A 3×2 redundant motor, a 3×2 redundant valve sensor, and a 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor;
[0007] The 3×2 redundant motor includes three motors, each motor includes two motor coils, and each motor coil receives a servo current command to drive the motor rotor to rotate, thereby driving the valve to rotate. The valve outputs flow pressure to drive the actuator cylinder to move;
[0008] The 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes multiple valve sensors, and each valve sensor is connected to the valve core to output the displacement signal of the valve;
[0009] The 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor includes three cylinder sensors. The stator winding of each cylinder sensor adopts a single-input double-output winding structure, and each cylinder sensor outputs the displacement signals of two actuator cylinders;
[0010] Among them, each motor coil receives a servo current command to drive the motor rotor to output torque to drive the valve to rotate. The valve outputs flow pressure to drive the actuator cylinder to move. The valve sensor outputs the displacement signal of the valve, and the cylinder sensor outputs the displacement signal of the actuator cylinder and feeds it back to the synthesis port of the servo loop to form a closed-loop control path. The 3×2 redundant motor, the 3×2 redundant valve sensor, and the 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor together form six closed-loop control paths.
[0011] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, each of the three motors includes a motor stator and two motor rotors. A motor stator includes two paths of motor coils, and each path of motor coils drives two motor rotors to rotate simultaneously, and each motor rotor drives a valve to rotate.
[0012] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, a clutch is provided between each motor rotor and the output shaft of the motor, and the disengaging torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor rotor.
[0013] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, all the motor rotors of the three motors are coaxially arranged. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in one motor rotor of a motor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate with a first torque, and the first torque is greater than the minimum torque for the valve to rotate during normal operation of the steering gear.
[0014] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, among the three motors, when a mechanical jamming fault occurs in one motor rotor of a motor and a mechanical jamming fault also occurs in another motor rotor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate with a second torque, and the second torque is greater than or equal to the minimum torque for the valve to rotate during normal operation of the steering gear.
[0015] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, the 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor includes three cylinder sensors, and each cylinder sensor outputs displacement signals of two actuating cylinders. The output displacement signals of the actuating cylinders are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of cylinder sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0016] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, the 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes three valve sensors. The stator winding of each valve sensor adopts a single-input and dual-output winding structure, and each valve sensor outputs displacement signals of two valves. The output displacement signals of the valves are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0017] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, the 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes six valve sensors. The stator winding of each valve sensor adopts a single-input and single-output winding structure, and the six valve sensors output six displacement signals of the valves. The output displacement signals of the valves are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0018] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, the six-way closed-loop control is distributed in three redundant electrical channels, and each redundant electrical channel includes a motor, a valve sensor, and a cylinder sensor.
[0019] In an exemplary embodiment of the present application, the six-way closed-loop control is distributed in three redundant electrical channels, and each redundant electrical channel includes a motor, a group of valve sensors, and a cylinder sensor.
[0020] A redundant architecture for a helicopter electro - mechanical actuator proposed in this application. On the one hand, the electrical redundancy design of the 3×2 redundant motors has strong fault - tolerance ability and can tolerate two cases of motor mechanical jamming and five cases of motor electrical faults, improving product safety. On the other hand, the valve sensor and the cylinder sensor are compared and monitored by pairwise comparison of the output signals, improving the fault - detection ability with a monitoring coverage rate of 100%. It solves the matching and safety problems of traditional triple - redundant architectures and quadruple - redundant architectures and is applicable to helicopter electro - mechanical flight control systems with high reliability requirements. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0021] The drawings herein are incorporated into and constitute a part of this specification, showing embodiments consistent with the present application and, together with the specification, are used to explain the principles of the present application. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.
[0022] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of a redundant architecture for a helicopter electro - mechanical actuator in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0023] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of a motor structure in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0024] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the 3×2 redundant motor structure in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0025] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of a motor rotor fault in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0026] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of two motor rotor faults in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0027] Figure 6 Schematic diagram of the principle of a single - input double - output winding structure in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0028] Figure 7 Schematic diagram of a closed - loop control in one path of the redundant architecture for a helicopter electro - mechanical actuator in an exemplary embodiment of the present application;
[0029] Figure 8 Schematic diagram of the servo control block of channel A in three electrical channels in an exemplary embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS
[0030] Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the example embodiments can be implemented in various forms and should not be construed as limited to the examples set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this application will be more complete and comprehensive, and will fully convey the concept of the example embodiments to those skilled in the art. The features, structures, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.
[0031] In addition, the accompanying drawings are only schematic illustrations of this application and are not necessarily drawn to scale. The same reference numerals in the drawings denote the same or similar parts, and thus repeated descriptions thereof will be omitted. Some of the block diagrams shown in the drawings are functional entities and do not necessarily correspond to physically or logically independent entities. These functional entities may be implemented in software form, or in one or more hardware modules or integrated circuits, or in different networks and / or processor devices and / or microcontroller devices.
[0032] To improve flight safety, the actuator architecture of modern fly-by-wire flight control systems usually adopts a redundant design, such as dual redundancy, triple redundancy, or quadruple redundancy design. Taking the triple redundancy design as an example, it includes three independent control channels, and each channel has its own sensor. During operation, for example, in the case of triple redundancy, the three channels operate simultaneously, and a voting mechanism is used to determine the final control output. If one of the channels fails, the system can automatically detect and isolate the faulty channel, and the remaining normal channels continue to operate to ensure the normal operation of the actuator.
[0033] This example embodiment provides a redundant architecture for a helicopter fly-by-wire actuator, as Figure 1 shown, which may include: 3×2 redundant motors, 3×2 redundant valve sensors, and 3×2 redundant cylinder sensors;
[0034] Among them, the 3×2 redundant motors include three motors, each motor includes two motor coils, and each motor coil receives a servo current command to drive the motor rotor to rotate, thereby driving the valve to rotate. The valve outputs flow pressure to drive the actuator cylinder to move;
[0035] The 3×2 redundant valve sensors include multiple valve sensors, and each valve sensor is connected to the valve core and is used to output the displacement signal of the valve;
[0036] The 3×2 redundant cylinder sensors include three cylinder sensors. The stator winding of each cylinder sensor adopts a single-input double-output winding structure, and each cylinder sensor outputs the displacement signals of two actuator cylinders;
[0037] Among them, each motor coil receives a servo current command to drive the motor rotor to output torque to drive the valve to rotate. The valve outputs flow and pressure to drive the actuator to move. The valve sensor outputs the displacement signal of the valve, and the cylinder sensor outputs the displacement signal of the actuator, which is fed back to the synthesis port of the servo loop to form a closed-loop control path. The 3×2 redundant motors, 3×2 redundant valve sensors, and 3×2 redundant cylinder sensors together form six closed-loop control paths.
[0038] A redundant architecture for a helicopter fly-by-wire actuator proposed in an embodiment of the present application. On the one hand, the electrical redundancy design of the 3×2 redundant motors has strong fault tolerance ability and can tolerate two mechanical jams of the motors and five electrical faults of the motors, improving the product safety. On the other hand, the valve sensors and the cylinder sensors perform comparison monitoring through pairwise comparison of the output signals, improving the fault detection ability, and the monitoring coverage rate reaches 100%, solving the matching and safety problems of the traditional triple-redundancy architecture and quadruple-redundancy architecture, and is applicable to helicopter fly-by-wire flight control systems with high reliability requirements.
[0039] The following Figure 1-6 will provide a more detailed description of a redundant architecture for a helicopter fly-by-wire actuator proposed in an embodiment of this example.
[0040] In one embodiment, as Figure 2 shown, each of the three motors includes a motor stator and two motor rotors. One motor stator includes two motor coils, and each motor coil drives two motor rotors to rotate simultaneously. Each motor rotor drives the valve to rotate. It should be understood that when one motor coil of each motor fails, the closed-loop control loop fails; when five motor coils fail, there is one remaining motor coil, and the closed-loop control loop corresponding to the remaining one motor coil can control normally. The 3×2 redundant architecture has the ability to work with 5 electrical redundancy faults.
[0041] It should also be understood that since the 3×2 redundant motors include three motors and each motor includes a motor stator, one motor stator includes two motor coils, there are a total of three motor stators for the three motors, and there are a total of six motor coils for the three motor stators. When five motor coils fail, there is one remaining motor coil. At this time, there is no mechanical jam fault in the motor rotor. The remaining one motor coil corresponds to a motor that includes two motor rotors. The remaining one motor coil drives the two motor rotors in the corresponding motor to rotate. Each motor rotor drives the valve to rotate. For example, the minimum torque requirement for the valve to rotate is T, and the rated output torque of each motor rotor is T. The remaining one motor coil drives the two motor rotors in the corresponding motor to rotate. At this time, the rated output torque of the two motor rotors is 2T, which is greater than the minimum torque requirement T for the valve to rotate. The closed-loop control loop corresponding to the remaining one motor coil can control normally. The 3×2 redundant architecture has the ability to work with 5 electrical redundancy faults.
[0042] In one embodiment, as Figure 3 shown, a clutch is provided between each motor rotor and the output shaft of the motor. The disengaging torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor rotor. All the motor rotors of the three motors are coaxially arranged. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of one motor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate with a first torque, and the first torque is greater than the minimum torque for the valve to rotate during the normal operation of the steering gear. All the motor rotors of the three motors are coaxially arranged. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of one motor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate, meeting the torque requirement for the valve to rotate, and the steering gear operates normally. Among the three motors, when a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of one motor and a mechanical jamming fault also occurs in another motor rotor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate with a second torque, and the second torque is greater than or equal to the minimum torque for the valve to rotate during the normal operation of the steering gear.
[0043] It should be understood that, for example, the minimum torque requirement for the valve to rotate is T, which requires the minimum torque for the shaft of the motor to rotate to be T, so as to ensure the safety of the operation of the steering gear. In a triple-redundancy steering gear architecture, among the three motors, the rated output torque corresponding to each motor is 2T. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in one motor, the damping torque generated by the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the output torque of each motor. When one motor fails, the total rated output torque of the other two motors is 4T. Subtracting the damping torque of 2.6T - 3T generated by the clutch, the remaining output torque of T - 1.4T is greater than the minimum torque T for the shaft of the motor to rotate, and the steering gear can operate safely. When another failure occurs in the remaining two motors when one motor fails, the remaining output torque is less than T at this time, and the steering gear cannot operate normally. Therefore, in a triple-redundancy steering gear architecture, only one mechanical jamming fault of the motor can be tolerated.
[0044] It should also be understood that the minimum torque requirement for the valve to rotate is T, which requires the minimum torque for the shaft of the motor to rotate to be T, so as to ensure the safety of the operation of the steering gear. The disengaging torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of one motor, the clutch corresponding to this motor rotor is dragged by the remaining 5 motor rotors. For example, as Figure 4As shown, the rated output torque of a motor rotor of a single motor is T, and the rated output torque of six motor rotors is 6T. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of a single motor, the clutch corresponding to this faulty motor rotor will terminate the output of this faulty motor rotor and connect it to the shaft. Since the disengaging torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor, a torque damping of 1.3T - 1.5T will be generated on the shaft. The rated output torque of the remaining five motor rotors is 5T. Subtracting the torque damping of 1.3T - 1.5T generated on the shaft by the clutch, the remaining first torque is 3.5T - 3.7T, which is greater than the minimum torque T for the rotation of the motor shaft, meeting the requirement of the rated output torque for shaft rotation, and the servo can operate safely.
[0045] As Figure 5 shown, when a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of a single motor and another motor rotor also has a mechanical jamming fault, the remaining four motor rotors drive the clutches corresponding to the two faulty motor rotors; the servo can operate normally. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in a motor rotor of a single motor, the clutch corresponding to this faulty motor rotor will terminate the output of this faulty motor rotor and connect it to the shaft. Since the disengaging torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor, a torque damping of 1.3T - 1.5T will be generated on the shaft. At this time, another motor rotor fails, and the clutch corresponding to this faulty motor rotor will terminate the output of this faulty motor rotor and connect it to the shaft. Since the disengaging torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor, a torque damping of 1.3T - 1.5T will be generated on the shaft. The total rated output torque of the remaining four normal motor rotors is 4T. Subtracting the total damping torque of 2.6T - 3T generated by the two faulty motor rotors on the shaft, the remaining second torque is T - 1.4T, which is greater than or equal to the minimum torque T for the rotation of the motor shaft, meeting the requirement of the rated output torque for shaft rotation, and the servo can operate safely. The 3×2 redundancy architecture has the ability to withstand two mechanical jamming faults of motor rotors.
[0046] The 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes multiple valve sensors. Each valve sensor is connected to the valve core to output the displacement signal of the valve. The output displacement signals of the valves are grouped in pairs, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0047] In one embodiment, the 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes three valve sensors. The stator winding of each valve sensor adopts a single-input double-output winding structure. Each valve sensor can output the displacement signals of two valves. The output displacement signals of the valves are grouped in pairs, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0048] It should be understood that generally, a valve sensor includes a stator and a rotor. The stator winding adopts a single-input single-output winding structure. At this time, a valve sensor can only output the displacement signal of one valve. In a triple-redundancy actuator architecture, the triple-redundancy valve sensor includes three valve sensors, and each valve sensor can only output the displacement signal of one valve. In the triple-redundancy electrical channel, the three output displacement signals are voted on to exclude the faults of the valve sensors in the electrical channel. There is only one vote, and the fault tolerance rate of excluding the faults of one valve sensor is achieved. In addition, when a high-low end short circuit fault occurs in the valve sensor, self-checking cannot be performed.
[0049] It should also be understood that as Figure 6 shown, the 3×2 redundancy valve sensor includes three valve sensors. Each valve sensor includes a stator and a rotor. Each stator winding adopts a single-input double-output winding structure. Each valve sensor can output two groups of valve displacement signals. The two groups of valve displacement signals output by one valve sensor are compared. When a high-low end short circuit fault occurs in the valve sensor, the two output signals of the valve sensor are inconsistent. The fault can be detected through the comparison and monitoring of the two output signals, achieving 100% monitoring coverage rate of electrical faults and realizing the self-monitoring ability of the valve sensor, with a high safety level.
[0050] In addition, each stator winding in the three valve sensors adopts a single-input double-output winding structure, and each valve sensor can output two groups of valve displacement signals. When an independent output winding of one valve sensor fails, the closed-loop control loop corresponding to the independent output winding fails. The six-way closed-loop control is distributed in the triple-redundancy electrical channel. Each electrical channel of the redundancy includes a motor, a valve sensor and a cylinder sensor. In the triple-redundancy electrical channel, the electrical channel corresponding to the independent output winding will be cut off. The two groups of valve displacement signals output by the valve sensor in each electrical channel are compared, and three groups of comparison and monitoring pairs can achieve the fault tolerance rate of excluding the faults of two valve sensors.
[0051] Among them, according to the monitored and compared displacement signals output by the double-output windings of each valve sensor, it is judged whether to cut off the valve sensor;
[0052] When any one of the independent output windings in the output signals of the double-output windings of the valve sensor does not output a displacement signal, the valve sensor is cut off;
[0053] When the output signals of the double-output windings of the valve sensor are inconsistent and remain within a preset time period, the valve sensor is cut off;
[0054] When any one of the independent output windings in the output signals of the double-output windings of the valve sensor outputs a signal exceeding the set threshold and remains within a preset time period, the valve sensor is cut off.
[0055] In one embodiment, the 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes six valve sensors. The stator winding of each valve sensor adopts a single-input single-output winding structure. The displacement signals of six valves output by the six valve sensors are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0056] It should be understood that the 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes six valve sensors. Each valve sensor includes a stator, and the stator winding adopts a single-input single-output winding structure. At this time, one valve sensor can only output the displacement signal of one valve. The six valve sensors output the displacement signals of six valves. The six displacement signals are paired in pairs, forming three groups of comparison and monitoring pairs. The two displacement output signals are compared. When a high-low end short circuit fault occurs in the valve sensor, the two output signals of the valve sensor are inconsistent. The fault can be detected through the comparison and monitoring of the two output signals, achieving 100% monitoring coverage of electrical faults, realizing the self-monitoring ability of the sensor, and having a high safety level.
[0057] In addition, in the six valve sensors, the stator winding adopts a single-input single-output winding structure. One valve sensor can only output the displacement signal of one valve. The six valve sensors output the displacement signals of six valves. The six displacement signals are paired in pairs, forming three groups of comparison and monitoring pairs. When one valve sensor fails, the corresponding closed-loop control loop of the valve sensor fails. The six-way closed-loop control is distributed in the three-redundancy electrical channels. Each redundancy electrical channel includes a motor, a group of valve sensors, and a cylinder sensor. In the three-redundancy electrical channels, the electrical channel corresponding to the valve sensor will be cut off. In the three-redundancy electrical channels, the displacement signals of two valves output by the two valve sensors in each electrical channel are compared, and three groups of comparison and monitoring pairs are formed to achieve a fault tolerance rate for excluding two valve sensor faults.
[0058] Among them, according to the monitoring and comparison of the detection signals of the two valve sensors in each group of comparison and monitoring pairs, it is judged whether to cut off the self-monitoring pair of this group;
[0059] When in any group of comparison and monitoring pairs, any one valve sensor does not output a detection signal, then cut off this group of comparison and monitoring pairs;
[0060] When in any group of comparison and monitoring pairs, the detection signals output by the two valve sensors are inconsistent and remain in a preset time period, then cut off this group of comparison and monitoring pairs;
[0061] When in any group of comparison and monitoring pairs, the detection signal output by any one valve sensor exceeds the set threshold and remains in a preset time period, then cut off this group of comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0062] In one embodiment, the 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor includes three cylinder sensors. Each cylinder sensor outputs displacement signals of two actuating cylinders. The output displacement signals of the actuating cylinders are grouped in pairs, forming three groups of cylinder sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
[0063] It should be understood that the actuating cylinder includes an actuating cylinder with two parallel piston rods and an actuating cylinder with an independent piston rod. Two cylinder sensors are respectively arranged inside the two parallel piston rods, and the remaining one cylinder sensor is arranged outside the actuating cylinder with an independent piston rod. The independent piston rod is connected to the parallel piston rods through a connecting piece.
[0064] It should also be understood that as Figure 6 shown, each cylinder sensor outputs displacement signals of two actuating cylinders. The displacement signals of the two actuating cylinders are compared. If the two output signals of the cylinder sensor are inconsistent, self-monitoring can be formed through the comparison and monitoring of the two output signals, achieving 100% monitoring coverage of electrical faults, realizing the self-monitoring ability of the cylinder sensor, and having a high safety level.
[0065] In addition, each stator winding in the three cylinder sensors adopts a single-input and dual-output winding structure. Each cylinder sensor can output displacement signals of two actuating cylinders. When an independent output winding of a cylinder sensor fails, the closed-loop control loop corresponding to the independent output winding fails. The six-way closed-loop control is distributed in the three-redundancy electrical channels. Each redundancy electrical channel includes a motor, a valve sensor, and a cylinder sensor. In the three-redundancy electrical channels, the electrical channel corresponding to the independent output winding will be cut off. In the three-redundancy electrical channels, the two groups of displacement signals of the actuating cylinders output by the cylinder sensor in each electrical channel, and the three groups of comparison and monitoring pairs can achieve a fault tolerance rate for excluding cylinder sensor failures twice.
[0066] Among them, according to the monitored and compared displacement signals output by the dual-output windings of each cylinder sensor, it is judged whether to cut off the cylinder sensor;
[0067] When any one of the independent output windings in the output signals of the dual-output windings of the cylinder sensor does not output a displacement signal, the cylinder sensor is cut off;
[0068] When the output signals of the dual-output windings are inconsistent and remain within a preset time period, the cylinder sensor is cut off;
[0069] When any one of the independent output windings in the output signals of the dual-output windings outputs a signal exceeding the set threshold and remains within a preset time period, the redundancy of the cylinder sensor is cut off.
[0070] As Figure 8As shown, it is the servo control block diagram of Channel A among the three electrical channels. During normal operation, all 3×2 redundancies of the steering gear work simultaneously. The motor coil receives the servo current command, drives the valve to rotate, and the valve outputs flow pressure to drive the actuator to move. The valve sensor and the cylinder sensor respectively feedback the displacement signal of the valve and the displacement signal of the actuator, and feedback them to the synthesis port of the servo loop to form a closed-loop control system. The steering gear moves to the command position under the control of the command signal.
[0071] When any one of the motor coils, valve sensors, or cylinder sensors in Channel A of the steering gear fails, the channel corresponding to the fault signal will be cut off, and the remaining channels will continue to work normally to ensure the safety of the steering gear. For example, when an open circuit fault occurs in one of the motor coils in the motor, when the monitor detects the fault, this motor coil will be cut off. When all five motor coils fail, the channel with the remaining normal motor coil can work normally, achieving the ability to work with five motor electrical faults. Conventional triple redundancies can only achieve the ability to work with two faults, and quadruple redundancies can only achieve the ability to work with three faults. In comparison, the fault tolerance ability is improved, enhancing the product safety. Similarly, when the valve sensor or the cylinder sensor fails. The two sensors form a monitoring pair, solving the requirement that the original sensors cannot achieve 100% self-monitoring, improving the monitoring coverage rate, avoiding the safety risks brought by undetected sensor faults, and enhancing the product safety.
[0072] In the triple-redundancy electrical channels, the status of one motor in each redundant electrical channel is monitored. One motor includes two motor coils with different winding arrangements. Each motor coil receives the servo current command of the redundant electrical channel to drive the valve to rotate, improving the fault tolerance ability and enabling tolerance of two motor mechanical jams and five motor electrical faults to enhance the product safety; the cylinder sensor adopts a double-output winding structure and realizes self-monitoring by virtue of the double-output signals. The valve sensor forms three groups of valve sensor comparison monitoring pairs through two output valve displacement signals in a group to realize self-monitoring. Achieving 100% self-monitoring coverage rate for the valve sensor and the cylinder sensor, comprehensively enhancing the system reliability, fault tolerance ability, and control accuracy.
[0073] In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are only used for descriptive purposes and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the quantity of the indicated technical features. Thus, the features defined with "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of such features. In the description of the embodiments of the present application, "a plurality" means two or more, unless otherwise specifically defined.
[0074] In the description of this specification, the descriptions referring to the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples", etc., mean that the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in connection with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art can combine and combine the different embodiments or examples described in this specification.
[0075] Other embodiments of the present application will be readily envisioned by those skilled in the art after considering the specification and practicing the invention disclosed herein. The present application is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of the present application, which follow the general principles of the present application and include the common general knowledge or conventional technical means in the technical field not disclosed in the present application.
Claims
1. A redundant architecture for a helicopter fly-by-wire servo, characterized in that, Including: 3×2 redundant motors, 3×2 redundant valve sensors, and 3×2 redundant cylinder sensors; The 3×2 redundant motor includes three motors, each motor includes two sets of motor coils, and each set of motor coils receives a servo current command to drive the motor rotor to rotate, thereby driving the valve to rotate. The valve outputs flow pressure to drive the actuator cylinder to move; Among them, each of the three motors includes a motor stator and two motor rotors. One motor stator includes two sets of motor coils, and each set of motor coils simultaneously drives the two motor rotors to rotate. Each motor rotor drives the valve to rotate, and all the motor rotors among the three motors are coaxially arranged; A clutch is provided between each motor rotor and the output shaft of the motor, and the separation torque of the clutch is 1.3 - 1.5 times the rated output torque of each motor rotor; The 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes multiple valve sensors, and each valve sensor is connected to the valve core and is used to output the displacement signal of the valve. The output displacement signals of the valve are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs; The 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor includes three cylinder sensors. The stator winding of each cylinder sensor adopts a single - input double - output winding structure, and each cylinder sensor outputs the displacement signals of two actuator cylinders. The output displacement signals of the actuator cylinders are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of cylinder sensor comparison and monitoring pairs; Among them, each set of motor coils receives a servo current command to drive the motor rotor to output torque to drive the valve to rotate. The valve outputs flow pressure to drive the actuator cylinder to move. The valve sensor outputs the displacement signal of the valve, and the cylinder sensor outputs the displacement signal of the actuator cylinder, and feeds back to the synthesis port of the servo loop, forming a closed - loop control path. The 3×2 redundant motor, 3×2 redundant valve sensor, and 3×2 redundant cylinder sensor jointly form six - path closed - loop control.
2. The redundant architecture of the helicopter fly-by-wire servo according to claim 1, wherein All the motor rotors among the three motors are coaxially arranged. When a mechanical jamming fault occurs in one motor rotor of a motor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate with a first torque, and the first torque is greater than the minimum torque for the valve to rotate during the normal operation of the steering gear.
3. The redundant architecture of the helicopter fly-by-wire servo according to claim 2, characterized in that, Among the three motors, when a mechanical jamming fault occurs in one motor rotor of a motor and a mechanical jamming fault also occurs in another motor rotor, the remaining motor rotors continue to drive the valve to rotate with a second torque, and the second torque is greater than or equal to the minimum torque for the valve to rotate during the normal operation of the steering gear.
4. The redundancy architecture of the helicopter fly-by-wire servo according to claim 1, wherein The 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes three valve sensors. The stator winding of each valve sensor adopts a single - input double - output winding structure, and each valve sensor outputs two displacement signals of the valve. The output displacement signals of the valve are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
5. The redundant architecture of the helicopter fly-by-wire servo according to claim 1, wherein, The 3×2 redundant valve sensor includes six valve sensors. The stator winding of each valve sensor adopts a single - input single - output winding structure, and the six displacement signals of the six valves output by the six valve sensors are grouped in pairs of two, forming three groups of valve sensor comparison and monitoring pairs.
6. The redundant architecture of the helicopter fly-by-wire servo according to claim 4, wherein The six - path closed - loop control is distributed in a three - redundant electrical channel, and each redundant electrical channel includes a motor, a valve sensor, and a cylinder sensor.
7. The redundant architecture of the helicopter fly-by-wire servo according to claim 5, wherein, The six-way closed-loop control is distributed in a triple-redundancy electrical channel, and each electrical channel of the redundancy contains a motor, a set of valve sensors, and a cylinder sensor.
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