High-speed train operation accident analysis method and system

Abstract

The invention discloses a high-speed train operation accident analysis method and system. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring all reasons of a high-speed train accident; classifying the accident reasons according to a preset accident process fault tree, and classifying the accident reasons into a preset accident occurrence process; according to a pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model, mapping all accident causes according to the relationship between the accident process fault tree and each barrier unit in the high-speed train operation accident analysis model, and outputting each accident cause, the type of each accident cause and the mapping relationship; and extracting the schematic diagram of the promotion effect of each accident reason in the accident development process. According to the invention, through direct modeling of an accident occurrence and evolution mechanism, high-speed train operation risk prediction and accident prevention are facilitated.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of high - speed train operation accident analysis, and particularly relates to a high - speed train operation accident analysis method and system. Background Art

[0002] The safe operation of high - speed railways faces unprecedented challenges, mainly due to the influence of factors such as a huge road network scale, complex and diverse operation environments, and high running speeds. Once an accident occurs during the operation of a high - speed train, it will cause irreparable losses to assets and human lives. Abnormal events such as safety risks, near - misses, and non - fatal accidents will all pose potential safety hazards. Timely identification and correction of risk factors in abnormal events can effectively reduce the probability of major accidents. Therefore, the recording and analysis of abnormal events are very important, and it is crucial to establish a high - speed train operation accident analysis model with risk identification, accident analysis, and prevention functions.

[0003] An accident analysis model is a theoretical framework that can provide the way an accident occurs, its causes, and the relationship between causes and consequences. The earliest accident analysis models were linear accident analysis models represented by the "Domino Model", which described an accident as a series of discrete events occurring sequentially at a specific time. Such models can effectively analyze accidents caused by physical component failures or human errors in relatively simple systems, but they have limitations in reasonably explaining accidents occurring in complex socio - technical systems. In the 1990s, epidemiological accident causal models were widely used to analyze the causal relationships of accidents in complex systems. The most representative models include the Swiss Cheese Model, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), and the Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM). Due to the limitations of the above - mentioned two types of models in describing the dynamics and non - linear interactions between components in complex socio - technical systems, accident causation models based on system theory, such as the AcciMap model, the STAMP model, the CREAM model, and the FRAM model, etc., were developed. However, these models lack quantitative analysis functions. The above - mentioned models lack direct modeling of the accident occurrence and evolution mechanism. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a high - speed train operation accident analysis method and system to solve the deficiencies in the prior art. It directly models the accident occurrence and evolution mechanism to facilitate high - speed train operation risk prediction and accident prevention.

[0005] The present invention provides a method for analyzing high-speed train operation accidents, which includes the following steps:

[0006] Obtain all the causes of high-speed train accidents;

[0007] Classify the accident causes according to a preset accident process fault tree and classify them into a preset accident occurrence process;

[0008] According to a pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model, map all the accident causes according to the relationship between the accident process fault tree and each barrier unit in the high-speed train operation accident analysis model, output each accident cause, the type of each accident cause, and the mapping relationship, and extract a schematic diagram of the promoting effect of each accident cause in the accident development process.

[0009] The high-speed train operation accident analysis method as described above, wherein, optionally, the preset accident process fault tree includes a risk generation prevention barrier fault tree, a diffusion prevention barrier fault tree, an own accident prevention barrier fault tree, a collateral accident prevention barrier fault tree, and an emergency management barrier fault tree;

[0010] The pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model includes a risk generation prevention barrier unit, a diffusion prevention barrier unit, an own accident prevention barrier unit, a collateral accident prevention barrier unit, and an emergency management barrier unit sequentially set according to the accident occurrence process;

[0011] The risk generation prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the risk generation prevention barrier unit, the diffusion prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the diffusion prevention barrier unit, the own accident prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the own accident prevention barrier unit, the collateral accident prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the collateral accident prevention barrier unit, and the emergency management barrier fault tree corresponds to the emergency management barrier unit.

[0012] The high-speed train operation accident analysis method as described above, wherein, optionally, the classifying the accident causes according to the preset accident process fault tree includes:

[0013] After classifying each accident cause, determine the level of each accident cause in the accident process fault tree. For the accident causes that can still be further subdivided according to the accident process fault tree, make further subdivisions and classify the subdivided accident causes.

[0014] The high-speed train operation accident analysis method as described above, wherein, optionally, the pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model further includes an external factor prevention barrier, an organizational management factor prevention barrier, a technical factor prevention barrier, a personnel factor prevention barrier, and an equipment factor prevention barrier;

[0015] Any one or more of the external factor prevention barrier, organizational management factor prevention barrier, technical factor prevention barrier, personnel factor prevention barrier, and equipment factor prevention barrier can act on one or more of the risk generation prevention barrier unit, diffusion prevention barrier unit, self-accident prevention barrier unit, associated accident prevention barrier unit, and emergency management barrier unit.

[0016] The high-speed train operation accident analysis method as described above, wherein, optionally, when classifying the accident causes, the accident causes are also classified according to the external factor prevention barrier, organizational management factor prevention barrier, technical factor prevention barrier, personnel factor prevention barrier, and equipment factor prevention barrier.

[0017] The high-speed train operation accident analysis method as described above, wherein, optionally, the schematic diagram of the promoting effect of the accident causes in the accident development process includes the accident categories corresponding to each accident cause and the accident development process affected by the accident causes.

[0018] The present invention also provides a high-speed train operation accident analysis system, which includes a data acquisition module, an analysis and processing module, and an output module;

[0019] Both the data acquisition module and the output module are communicatively connected to the analysis and processing module;

[0020] The data acquisition module is used to acquire high-speed train operation accidents;

[0021] The analysis and processing module is used to classify the accident causes of the high-speed train operation accidents according to a preset accident process fault tree and classify them into a preset accident occurrence process;

[0022] The analysis and processing module is also used to extract the relationship between the accident causes and the accident process;

[0023] The output module is used to output the relationship between the accident causes and the accident process in the form of a picture.

[0024] The high-speed train operation accident analysis system as described above, wherein, optionally, the analysis and processing module is also used to classify the accident causes according to the external factor prevention barrier, organizational management factor prevention barrier, technical factor prevention barrier, personnel factor prevention barrier, and equipment factor prevention barrier;

[0025] The output module includes multiple areas classified according to the external factor prevention barrier, organizational management factor prevention barrier, technical factor prevention barrier, personnel factor prevention barrier, and equipment factor prevention barrier;

[0026] Each of the accident causes is distributed in the corresponding area.

[0027] Compared with the prior art, by setting up multiple fault trees according to the accident occurrence process and matching the fault causes with the fault trees, the present invention can clarify the stages at which each fault cause plays a role in the accident occurrence process, can clarify how the accident causes promote the development of the accident, is conducive to clearly sorting out the logical relationship of the event occurrence and evolution process, and is conducive to identifying and quantifying the possible subsequent consequences after the risk appears.

[0028] The present disclosure can directly model the accident occurrence and evolution mechanism to provide theoretical guidance and technical support for the operation risk prediction and accident prevention of high-speed trains. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] Figure 1 is a flowchart of the steps of the high-speed train operation accident analysis method proposed by the present invention;

[0030] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the accident development process proposed by the present invention;

[0031] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of each accident prevention barrier in the accident development process;

[0032] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the accident process fault tree proposed by the present invention;

[0033] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the risk generation prevention barrier fault tree proposed by the present invention;

[0034] Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the diffusion prevention barrier fault tree proposed by the present invention;

[0035] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of the self-accident prevention barrier fault tree proposed by the present invention;

[0036] Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of the associated accident prevention barrier fault tree proposed by the present invention;

[0037] Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of the emergency management barrier fault tree proposed by the present invention;

[0038] Figure 10 is a schematic diagram of the structure after classifying the accident causes according to the fault tree;

[0039] Figure 11 is a schematic diagram of the promoting effect of the accident causes of a certain accident in the accident development process;

[0040] Figure 12 is a block diagram of the structure of the high-speed train operation accident analysis system proposed by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0041] The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

[0042] Embodiment 1

[0043] Please refer to Figure 1 , this embodiment proposes a method for analyzing high-speed train operation accidents, which includes the following steps:

[0044] S1. Obtain all the causes of high-speed train accidents; in specific implementation, all the causes of high-speed train accidents can be based on investigation reports, monitoring data of various systems on the train, manual inspection records, etc. In specific implementation, when it is difficult to accurately obtain all the causes, it can also be to obtain all the accident causes that can be obtained.

[0045] S2. Classify the accident causes according to a preset accident process fault tree and classify them into a preset accident occurrence process. In specific implementation, the process fault tree includes a risk generation prevention barrier fault tree, a diffusion prevention barrier fault tree, an own accident prevention barrier fault tree, a collateral accident prevention barrier fault tree, and an emergency management barrier fault tree. Please refer to Figures 2 to 9, among which, the risk generation prevention barrier fault tree includes operation failure, train control system failure, traction power supply system failure, car body and car end connection system failure, bogie system failure, high-voltage traction system failure, braking and air supply system failure, control and communication system failure, track maintenance system failure, equipment / system design defects, detection equipment warning failure, imperfect management system, improper maintenance, insufficient on-site inspection, natural disasters, malicious acts and foreign object collisions. The diffusion prevention barrier fault tree includes manual detection system failure, automatic detection system failure, failure to detect abnormal conditions, failure to handle abnormal conditions in a timely manner, failure to control after timely handling, failure of fault point maintenance, design defects and insufficient on-site supervision. The self-accident prevention barrier fault tree includes manual detection system failure, automatic detection system failure, failure to detect abnormal conditions, failure to handle abnormal conditions in a timely manner, failure to control after timely handling, failure of fault point maintenance, design defects and insufficient on-site supervision. The associated accident prevention barrier fault tree includes insufficient risk identification, failure of timely handling, failure of fault point repair, failure of manual emergency stop, insufficient braking distance, unstable braking, failure of automatic emergency stop, improper layout design, failure of external fire source prevention, wrong actions, malicious damage, cable leakage or short circuit, failure of lightning strike prevention, failure of manual fire detection barrier and failure of automatic fire detection barrier. The associated accident prevention barrier fault tree includes failure of train control center train operation dispatching, failure of sprinkler fire extinguishing, failure of fire fighting, failure of explosion suppression, failure of explosion isolation, insufficient safety distance design and insufficient equipment safety index design. The emergency management barrier fault tree includes failure of emergency communication, failure of emergency rescue, failure of emergency response, failure of evacuation and escape, insufficient preparation of emergency plan, insufficient emergency resource guarantee, insufficient emergency drill, insufficient emergency personnel training, no available medical assistance, no available medical institution, failure of on-site medical treatment and insufficient first aid personnel training.

[0046] Furthermore, in order to classify various fault causes during the accident process in more detail, the following will respectively elaborate on the fault trees of risk generation prevention barriers, diffusion prevention barriers, self-accident prevention barriers, associated accident prevention barriers, and emergency management barriers. In each fault tree, there are four levels. For example, the failure of the risk generation prevention barrier is the first-level failure cause, which includes multiple second-level failure causes, namely operation failure, technical barrier, organization / management barrier failure, and external event prevention barrier failure; operation failure contains two third-level failure causes, namely technical or business reasons, and psychological and mental aspects reasons; and technical or business reasons can be further divided into fourth-level failure causes such as incorrect execution of the dispatching plan, improper equipment operation, and unclear operation instructions. Psychological and mental aspects reasons also include fourth-level failure causes such as physical discomfort, negative emotions, and fatigue operation. Technical barrier failure includes third-level failure causes such as equipment component failure and detection equipment warning failure, as well as fourth-level failure causes such as equipment / system design defects. Equipment component failure is divided into fourth-level failure causes such as train control system failure, traction power supply system failure, communication system failure, and track maintenance system failure, as well as third-level failure causes such as vehicle system; among them, the vehicle system is further divided into third-level systems such as car body and car end connection system, bogie system, high-voltage traction system, braking and air supply system, and control and communication system; the car body and car end connection system is divided into fourth-level faults such as car body functional structure failure, car end connection device failure, window failure, door failure, and car body load-bearing structure failure. The bogie system includes fourth-level faults such as wheel alignment device failure, suspension device failure, bogie failure, drive device failure, basic braking device failure, and auxiliary device failure; the high-voltage traction system includes fourth-level faults such as high-voltage system failure, traction system failure, and auxiliary power supply system failure; braking and air supply system failure includes fourth-level faults such as braking system failure, air supply system failure, and air consumption system failure; control and communication system failure includes fourth-level faults such as driving facility failure, control system failure, communication system failure, and on-vehicle equipment failure. Detection equipment warning failure faults include fourth-level faults such as alarm failure and detection device failure. Organization / management barrier failure includes third-level faults such as imperfect management system and improper maintenance, and fourth-level faults such as insufficient on-site inspection; imperfect management system faults include fourth-level faults such as inadequate safety education and training, imperfect safety production system, ineffective implementation of management measures, and imperfect safety guarantee system; improper maintenance includes fourth-level faults such as lack of inspection rules, long-term delay in inspection time, and failure to handle known problems. External event prevention barrier failure includes fourth-level faults such as natural disasters, malicious acts, and foreign object collisions.

[0047] Diffusion prevention barrier failures include second-level failures such as detection barrier failures, operation failures, and organizational / management barrier failures; detection barrier failures include third-level failures such as manual detection system failures and automatic detection system failures; among them, manual detection system failures include fourth-level failures such as too long inspection intervals and lack of experience of technicians; automatic detection system failures include fourth-level failures such as detection sensor failures, detection controller failures, detection alarm failures, and insufficient detection coverage; operation failures include third-level failures such as timely handling failures and fault point maintenance failures, and timely handling failures include fourth-level failures such as failure to detect abnormal situations, failure to handle abnormal situations in a timely manner, and failure to control after timely handling; fault point maintenance failures include fourth-level failures such as lack of maintenance and maintenance failures; organizational / management barrier failures include third-level failures such as design defect prevention barrier failures and fourth-level failures such as insufficient on-site supervision. Design defect prevention barrier failures include fourth-level failures such as lack of safety-related equipment and facilities and insufficient safety index design.

[0048] Self-accident prevention barrier failures include second-level failures such as operation failures, emergency stop failures, and fire prevention barrier failures. Operation failures include fourth-level failures such as insufficient risk identification, timely handling failures, and fault point repair failures at the third level; timely handling failures include fourth-level failures such as failure to detect abnormal situations, timely handling of abnormal situations, and handling failures; fault point repair failures include fourth-level handling failures such as lack of maintenance and incomplete repair. Emergency stop failures include fourth-level handling failures such as manual emergency stop failures and automatic emergency stop failures. Fire prevention barrier failures include third-level failures such as open fire prevention failures, lightning strike prevention failures, manual fire detection barrier failures, and automatic fire detection barrier failures, as well as cable leakage or short circuit failures; among them, open fire prevention failure faults include fourth-level handling faults such as improper layout design, external fire source prevention failure faults, wrong behavior faults, and malicious damage faults; lightning strike prevention failures include fourth-level handling failures such as incomplete or damaged lightning protection facilities, inappropriate lightning protection regulations, and improper operation. Manual fire detection barrier failures include fourth-level handling failures such as the operator not detecting a fire and the operator not activating the fire alarm in a timely manner. Automatic fire detection barrier failures include fourth-level failures such as fire alarm failures, insufficient detector coverage, fire detection sensor failures, and fire detection controller failures.

[0049] The failure of associated accident prevention barriers includes secondary faults such as the failure of train control center operation debugging, the failure of fire escalation mitigation barriers, the failure of explosion escalation mitigation, and the failure of inherent safety design; the failure of train control center operation dispatching includes fourth-level faults such as the failure of the train control center to collect train operation information and the failure of train control center equipment; the failure of fire escalation mitigation barriers includes third-level faults such as the failure of sprinkler fire extinguishing and the failure of fire fighting, and the failure of sprinkler fire extinguishing includes fourth-level faults such as the unavailability of sprinkler devices, insufficient sprinkler device functions, and the failure of sprinkler devices; the failure of fire fighting includes fourth-level faults such as insufficient fire fighting capacity, failure to execute fire fighting, and long delays in fire fighting; the failure of explosion escalation mitigation barriers includes fourth-level faults such as the failure of explosion suppression and the failure of explosion isolation; the inherent safety design includes fourth-level faults such as insufficient safety distance design and insufficient equipment safety index design.

[0050] The failure of emergency management barriers includes secondary faults such as the failure of emergency response barriers, the failure of emergency preparedness barriers, and the failure of emergency medical barriers; the failure of emergency response barriers includes third-level faults such as the failure of evacuation and escape and fourth-level faults such as the failure of emergency communication, the failure of emergency rescue, and the failure of emergency response; the failure of evacuation and escape includes fourth-level faults such as the failure of emergency route design, too short evacuation time, the failure of evacuation procedures, the unavailability of available escape modes, and the damage of evacuation modes. The failure of emergency preparedness barriers includes fourth-level faults such as insufficient emergency plan preparation, insufficient emergency resource guarantee, insufficient emergency drills, and insufficient emergency personnel training; the failure of emergency medical barriers includes the unavailability of medical assistance, the unavailability of medical institutions, the failure of on-site medical treatment, and insufficient first-aid personnel training.

[0051] Please refer to Figure 2 and Figure 3 The pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model includes a risk generation prevention barrier unit, a diffusion prevention barrier unit, an own accident prevention barrier unit, an associated accident prevention barrier unit, and an emergency management barrier unit set in sequence according to the accident occurrence process. The risk generation prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the risk generation prevention barrier unit, the diffusion prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the diffusion prevention barrier unit, the own accident prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the own accident prevention barrier unit, the associated accident prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the associated accident prevention barrier unit, and the emergency management barrier fault tree corresponds to the emergency management barrier unit.

[0052] S3. According to the pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model, map all accident causes according to the relationship between the accident process fault tree and each barrier unit in the high-speed train operation accident analysis model, output each accident cause, the type of each accident cause, and the mapping relationship, and extract the schematic diagram of the driving effect of each accident cause in the accident development process.

[0053] The SHIPP model's analysis of accidents can be divided into three stages: occurrence, propagation, and termination. At each stage, various risk factors interact and evolve step by step. Modeling the accident process helps to clearly utilize specific safety barriers to prevent, control, or mitigate the deterioration of the situation. The SHIPP model is a systematic and comprehensive accident process analysis model that can make full use of abnormal event records, evaluate the risks of the entire process system and subsystems, and predict the current and future accident possibilities and safety trends. The SHIPP model framework constructed by Rathnayaka et al. covers factors such as technology, personnel, management, and organization, and divides them into seven preventive barriers. Five safety barriers are set up to prevent and control accidents, including release prevention barrier, dispersion prevention barrier, ignition prevention barrier, escalation prevention barrier, damage control prevention barrier, and emergency management prevention barrier. Human behavior and organizational management play important roles in the prevention and control at all stages of accidents, and have a significant impact on the evolution of the sequence in the accident process and the effectiveness of safety barriers. The SHIPP model uses fault trees to characterize the causal relationships between safety barriers and event trees to characterize the development process of operational accidents from safety to catastrophic consequences. Subsequently, the quantification of fault trees and event trees can be used to predict the safety of high-speed train operations.

[0054] Considering comprehensively the types and characteristics of high-speed railway operation accidents, based on the SHIPP model, improve the occurrence sequence of the accident process, and set the five safety barriers in the accident process as risk generation prevention barrier, dispersion prevention barrier, self-accident prevention barrier, associated accident prevention barrier, and emergency management barrier, as Figure 2 shown. The accident trigger and evolution sequence is as Figure 3 shown.

[0055] The classification of accident causes according to the preset accident process fault tree described above includes:

[0056] After classifying each accident cause, determine the level of each accident cause in the accident process fault tree. For accident causes that can still be further subdivided according to the accident process fault tree, make further subdivisions and classify the subdivided accident causes. As mentioned above, the accident causes, that is, faults, are divided into four levels, and the fourth-level faults are faults that cannot be further subdivided.

[0057] By combining the above fault tree with the accident occurrence sequence, it is convenient to judge the specific reasons for the failure of different preventive barriers at different stages during the entire process from internal factors to accident occurrence and then to accident termination, which is conducive to discovering the true causes of accidents. In order to further distinguish the types of accident causes for further improvement, the present invention further improves as follows: the pre-established accident analysis model for high-speed train operation further includes an external factor preventive barrier, an organizational management factor preventive barrier, a technical factor preventive barrier, a personnel factor preventive barrier, and an equipment factor preventive barrier.

[0058] Any one or more of the external factor preventive barrier, the organizational management factor preventive barrier, the technical factor preventive barrier, the personnel factor preventive barrier, and the equipment factor preventive barrier can act on one or more of the risk generation preventive barrier unit, the diffusion preventive barrier unit, the self-accident preventive barrier unit, the associated accident preventive barrier unit, and the emergency management barrier unit.

[0059] In specific implementation, according to another accident cause classification method, it is divided into five criteria: external factor preventive barrier, organizational management factor preventive barrier, technical factor preventive barrier, personnel factor preventive barrier, and equipment factor preventive barrier.

[0060] When classifying the accident causes, the accident causes are also classified according to the external factor preventive barrier, the organizational management factor preventive barrier, the technical factor preventive barrier, the personnel factor preventive barrier, and the equipment factor preventive barrier. The schematic diagram of the driving effect of the accident causes in the accident development process includes the accident categories corresponding to each accident cause and the accident development process affected by the accident causes. In this way, it is convenient to observe the causes of accidents and the role played by the accident causes in the accident development process. It is beneficial to more intuitively and effectively deduce the accident causes and development process. As Figure 10 and Figure 11 shown, during the analysis of the causes of a certain train accident, the accident causes mainly include insufficient braking distance, failure to control in a timely manner, failure of the detection equipment warning, insufficient on-site inspection, and natural disasters. The schematic diagram of the driving effect of the obtained accident causes in the accident development process is as Figure 11 shown. The external factor preventive barrier, insufficient on-site inspection, and detection equipment failure play a role in the risk generation stage. The failure of timely handling promotes the occurrence of the accident in the risk diffusion stage and ultimately leads to collision and derailment.

[0061] Embodiment 2

[0062] This embodiment is a further improvement based on Embodiment 1. The same parts will not be repeated here, and only the differences will be described below.

[0063] Please refer to Figure 12This embodiment proposes a high-speed train operation accident analysis system, which includes a data acquisition module, an analysis and processing module, and an output module. In specific implementation, the data acquisition module can be components such as microphones, cameras, or other input components.

[0064] Both the data acquisition module and the output module are communicatively connected to the analysis and processing module. The analysis and processing module is used to analyze and process the data acquired by the data acquisition module, and output the analysis and processing results to the output module.

[0065] The data acquisition module is used to acquire high-speed train operation accidents; in specific implementation, it can acquire sound information, image information, key node data in the input, output, and control processes of each train system control module, and investigation reports after the accident from the generation of risks to the end of the accident. The data acquisition module is also used to convert the sound information into text information. Among them, the image information includes picture contents displayed on the train, image information of key points of the train accident, etc.

[0066] In practical applications, the data acquisition module outputs the information to the analysis and processing module in the form of text and images.

[0067] The analysis and processing module classifies the received text information and image information. For the text information, the analysis and processing module identifies the key information. Specifically, it can perform semantic recognition by accessing a semantic recognition module, organize all the information related to the accident cause, and obtain the first accident cause. That is, the first accident cause is the accident cause extracted by the analysis and processing module from the text information. At the same time, determine the points where each first accident cause plays a role in the accident development process, and reasonably speculate on the failure of subsequent prevention barriers to obtain the second accident cause; for example, during the risk generation process, the train control system fails, and in the subsequent process, neither the diffusion prevention barrier nor the self-accident prevention barrier works, which will cause an accident. Therefore, there are also failures in the diffusion prevention barrier and the self-accident prevention barrier, which are recorded as the second accident cause.

[0068] Obtain the corresponding third accident cause according to the image information, and reasonably speculate on the interrelated fourth accident cause based on the third accident cause. The method of speculating the fourth accident cause from the third accident cause is the same as the method of speculating the second accident cause from the first accident cause, and will not be elaborated here.

[0069] Merge the first accident cause, the second accident cause, the third accident cause, and the fourth accident cause, and remove the duplicate accident causes. Among them, the duplicate accident causes refer to the same cause in the same accident stage. Similar causes in different accident stages do not belong to duplicate accident causes; for example, the operation failure in the risk generation stage and the operation failure in the risk diffusion stage do not belong to duplicate accident causes.

[0070] After the above process, all possible accident causes have been obtained. However, based on the classification criteria of accident causes, there are still situations where detailed classification fails, which can easily lead to inaccurate analysis of accident causes. Therefore, in this embodiment, the accident causes are classified into levels: the first-level fault, the second-level fault, the third-level fault, and the fourth-level fault. Among them, the fourth-level fault is a specific fault that cannot be further divided. According to the characteristics of the fault, the fourth-level fault can be directly included in the first-level fault and the second-level fault.

[0071] The possible accident causes are split into fourth-level faults, and all fourth-level faults are screened to determine the accident causes under the fourth-level fault type and exclude some other causes. For example, in the third-level fault of the failure of the manual inspection system, the accident cause is that the inspection time interval is too long. When the failure of the manual inspection system is split into too long inspection time interval and lack of experience of technicians, the lack of experience of technicians may be regarded as one of the fault causes. Therefore, it is necessary to exclude the fourth-level fault of lack of experience of technicians.

[0072] After the above processing, all accident causes belong to the fourth-level fault.

[0073] The analysis and processing module is used to classify the accident causes of the high-speed train operation accident according to a preset accident process fault tree and classify them into a preset accident occurrence process. That is, all fourth-level faults are classified into the corresponding fault tree and classified into a preset accident occurrence process.

[0074] The analysis and processing module is also used to extract the relationship between the accident cause and the accident process. For example, when a natural disaster occurs, its corresponding accident process is risk generation. In specific implementation, the analysis and processing module extracts the relationship between all accident causes and the accident process.

[0075] The output module is used to output the relationship between the accident cause and the accident process in the form of a picture.

[0076] Through the above process, the promoting role of each accident cause in the accident process can be clearly shown. In order to further reflect the promoting role of different types of causes in the accident process, the present invention has made further improvements. Specifically, the analysis and processing module is also used to classify the accident causes according to external factor prevention barriers, organizational management factor prevention barriers, technical factor prevention barriers, personnel factor prevention barriers, and equipment factor prevention barriers. The output module includes multiple areas classified according to external factor prevention barriers, organizational management factor prevention barriers, technical factor prevention barriers, personnel factor prevention barriers, and equipment factor prevention barriers. Each of the accident causes is distributed in the corresponding area.

[0077] The structure, features, and effects of the present invention have been described in detail based on the embodiments shown in the drawings. The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited to the scope of implementation shown in the drawings. Any changes made in accordance with the concept of the present invention, or equivalent embodiments modified to equivalent changes, that still do not exceed the spirit covered by the specification and the drawings should be within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A high-speed train operation accident analysis method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Get all the causes of high-speed train accidents; Classify the causes of the accident according to the preset accident process fault tree and classify them into the preset accident occurrence process; According to the pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model, all accident causes are mapped according to the relationship between the accident process fault tree and the barrier units in the high-speed train operation accident analysis model, and the cause of each accident, the type of each accident cause and the mapping relationship are output, and a schematic diagram of the driving role of each accident cause in the accident development process is extracted.

2. The high-speed train operation accident analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The preset accident process fault tree includes risk generation prevention barrier fault tree, diffusion prevention barrier fault tree, self-accident prevention barrier fault tree, joint accident prevention barrier fault tree and emergency management barrier fault tree; The pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model includes a risk generation prevention barrier unit, a diffusion prevention barrier unit, a self-accident prevention barrier unit, a joint accident prevention barrier unit and an emergency management barrier unit, which are set up in sequence according to the accident occurrence process; The risk generation prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the risk generation prevention barrier unit, the diffusion prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the diffusion prevention barrier unit, the self-accident prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the self-accident prevention barrier unit, the joint accident prevention barrier fault tree corresponds to the joint accident prevention barrier unit, and the emergency management barrier fault tree corresponds to the emergency management barrier unit.

3. The high-speed train operation accident analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The classification of the cause of the accident according to the preset accident process fault tree includes: After classifying the causes of the accidents, determine the level of each cause of the accidents in the accident process fault tree. For the causes of the accidents that can still be subdivided according to the accident process fault tree, further subdivide them and classify the subdivided causes of the accidents.

4. The high-speed train operation accident analysis method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The pre-established high-speed train operation accident analysis model also includes external factor prevention barriers, organizational management factor prevention barriers, technical factor prevention barriers, personnel factor prevention barriers and equipment factor prevention barriers; Any one or more of the external factor prevention barrier, organizational management factor prevention barrier, technical factor prevention barrier, personnel factor prevention barrier and equipment factor prevention barrier can act on one or more of the risk generation prevention barrier unit, diffusion prevention barrier unit, self-accident prevention barrier unit, joint accident prevention barrier unit and emergency management barrier unit.

5. The high-speed train operation accident analysis method according to claim 4, characterized in that: When classifying the causes of accidents, they are also classified according to external factor prevention barriers, organizational management factor prevention barriers, technical factor prevention barriers, personnel factor prevention barriers and equipment factor prevention barriers.

6. The high-speed train operation accident analysis method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The schematic diagram of the driving effect of the accident cause in the accident development process includes the accident category corresponding to each accident cause and the accident development process affected by the accident cause.

7. A high-speed train operation accident analysis system, characterized in that: It includes a data acquisition module, an analysis and processing module and an output module; The data acquisition module and the output module are both in communication connection with the analysis and processing module; The data acquisition module is used to acquire high-speed train operation accidents; The analysis and processing module is used to classify the causes of the high-speed train operation accident according to a preset accident process fault tree and classify them into a preset accident occurrence process; The analysis and processing module is also used to extract the relationship between the cause of the accident and the accident process; The output module is used to output the relationship between the cause of the accident and the accident process in the form of a picture.

8. The high-speed train operation accident analysis system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The analysis and processing module is also used to classify the causes of accidents according to external factor prevention barriers, organizational management factor prevention barriers, technical factor prevention barriers, personnel factor prevention barriers and equipment factor prevention barriers; The output module includes a plurality of areas classified by external factor prevention barriers, organizational management factor prevention barriers, technical factor prevention barriers, personnel factor prevention barriers and equipment factor prevention barriers; The various causes of the accidents are distributed in corresponding areas.

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