Identity authentication method in vehicular ad hoc network

Abstract

The invention discloses an identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network, which relates to the field of vehicle-mounted self-organizing networks, and comprises the following steps: a trusted center TA generates elliptic curve cryptography parameters, a master key and a public key, and defines a hash function and a symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm; the vehicle Vi and the roadside unit RSUi respectively register to the trusted center TA; after the vehicle Vi logs in and enters the communication range of the roadside unit RSUi, bidirectional authentication is carried out between the vehicle Vi and the trusted center TA and between the vehicle Vi and the roadside unit RSUi; the vehicle Vi broadcasts the message by using the temporary key, and receives the vehicle to carry out timeliness, identity validity and message integrity verification; the roadside unit RSUi detects malicious broadcast and submits related information to the trusted center TA, and the trusted center TA decrypts the related information and then obtains a real identity and implements tracking; according to the method, efficient security authentication, privacy protection and authorization tracking of malicious nodes are realized, and the security, privacy and real-time communication efficiency of the vehicle-mounted ad hoc network are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle-mounted self-organizing networks, and more particularly to an identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network. Background Art

[0002] Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) provide critical support for improving road safety and traffic efficiency through real-time communication between vehicles and with roadside infrastructure. In this dynamic, open communication environment, ensuring the authenticity of vehicles and roadside units and the security of communications is crucial.

[0003] Existing VANET authentication schemes generally face severe challenges from physical vehicle security threats. Because vehicles are often parked in unmanned areas, their on-board units (OBUs) are vulnerable to physical intrusion and side-channel attacks. Traditional schemes typically pre-install or store secret information, such as sensitive keys, in the OBUs. Once an attacker physically obtains this information, they can impersonate a legitimate vehicle to launch attacks, eavesdrop on communications, or decrypt sensitive data, seriously threatening the fundamental security of the system. Existing technologies lack effective mechanisms to combat such attacks at the physical level of the device.

[0004] Existing solutions also have significant shortcomings in balancing the anonymity of vehicle communications with the traceability of malicious behavior. On the one hand, to protect the privacy of vehicle location and trajectory, some solutions adopt a completely anonymous mechanism. However, this makes it difficult or even impossible to efficiently and accurately track the actual vehicle responsible in the event of a malicious broadcast, making accountability difficult and ineffective in curbing insider attacks. On the other hand, solutions that directly expose or easily link the vehicle's true identity pose a serious risk of privacy leakage, which does not meet the basic requirements of VANET for user privacy protection. Existing technologies struggle to achieve both strong anonymity and reliable conditional privacy.

[0005] Furthermore, the high dynamics and high mobility of VANETs place stringent demands on the efficiency of authentication protocols. However, many existing solutions suffer from complex authentication processes and high computational overhead. For example, when a vehicle broadcasts a message, the receiving vehicle needs to perform complex two-way authentication or signature verification involving a large number of public key operations, resulting in high verification delays and making it difficult to meet the low-latency requirements of real-time communication in the Internet of Vehicles. Furthermore, each time a vehicle communicates with a different entity or enters the range of a new RSU, it may need to repeat the entire authentication process, increasing the overall network load and the vehicle's computational burden, limiting the system's scalability and practicality.

[0006] Therefore, how to design an identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network that can effectively resist physical attacks, achieve a balance between anonymous communication and authorized tracking, and significantly improve the efficiency of authentication and broadcast verification is an urgent problem that technicians in this field need to solve. Summary of the Invention

[0007] In view of this, the present invention provides an identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted self-organizing network. By integrating the three-in-one authentication mechanism of PUF dynamic key generation, temporary identity anonymous communication and trusted center authorization tracking, it realizes the secure authentication of vehicle identity, privacy protection and traceability of malicious behavior, while reducing the system computing load to meet the high real-time communication requirements of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0008] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0009] An identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network comprises the following steps:

[0010] S1. The trusted center TA generates elliptic curve cryptography parameters, master keys, and public keys, and defines hash functions and symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.

[0011] S2, vehicle V i Submit registration information, the trusted center TA assigns pseudo identity and PUF incentives; roadside unit RSU i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair;

[0012] S3, Vehicle V i Log in and enter the Roadside Unit (RSU) i After the communication range, the trusted center TA and roadside unit RSU i Perform two-way authentication to obtain a temporary key and temporary identity;

[0013] S4, Vehicle V i Use the temporary key to broadcast the message, and the receiving vehicle verifies the timeliness, identity validity and message integrity;

[0014] S5, Roadside Unit RSU i When a malicious broadcast is detected, the relevant information is submitted to the trusted center TA, which decrypts the information to obtain the real identity and implement tracking.

[0015] Preferably, the S1 includes: the trusted center TA is based on a large prime number p, an integer multiplication group modulo p Select parameters a and b to construct an elliptic curve , in the elliptic curve Select a q-order base point G on the multiplicative group of integers modulo q Select a random number s as the master key and generate the public key P pub =s·G, and disclose the system parameter set ;

[0016] Among them, h1 and h2 represent one-way collision-resistant hash functions, h1(·): ,h2(·)∶ , E k 、D k Indicates the symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm.

[0017] Preferably, in said S2, the vehicle V i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo identity and PUF incentives including:

[0018] Vehicle V i Based on bioinformatics , calculate the biometric key through the extraction algorithm of biometric fuzzy extraction function and auxiliary information , and submit your real identity , password and biometric keys Make a registration request to the trusted center TA;

[0019] The trusted center TA calculates the pseudo identity through the master key s and generate incentives As a registration response;

[0020] Vehicle V i After receiving the registration response, calculate the PUF response Send back to the trusted center TA and store locally ,in, , , n is the modulus, used for modular operations in hash functions.

[0021] Preferably, in S2, the roadside unit RSU i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair including:

[0022] Roadside Unit (RSU) i Submit real identity Make a registration request to the trusted center TA;

[0023] The trusted center TA calculates the pseudo identity through the master key s , and select a random number r as the private key and generate a public key As a registration response.

[0024] Preferably, in S3, logging in includes:

[0025] Vehicle V i Calculating biometric keys through recovery algorithm of biometric fuzzy extraction function

[0026] 、 、 ,like , the login is successful.

[0027] Preferably, in S3, performing two-way authentication includes:

[0028] Access Request: Vehicle V i Pick a random number ,calculate and , send To Roadside Unit RSU i ;

[0029] Authentication request: Roadside Unit RSU i verify , select a random number ,calculate 、 、 ,send To the trusted center TA;

[0030] Authentication response: Trusted Center TA verification , decrypt verify , decrypt verify ,calculate 、 ,send To Roadside Unit RSU i ;

[0031] Access Response: Roadside Unit RSU i verify ,verify ,calculate , select a random number , calculate the temporary identity of the vehicle And set the validity period Te, calculate ,send To vehicle V i ;

[0032] Verify Access Response: Vehicle V i verify , calculate the response , decrypt get ,verify ,storage .

[0033] Preferably, the S4 includes:

[0034] Vehicle V i Use the temporary private key a to sign the message M, ,Will Broadcast as a message to the receiving vehicle;

[0035] Receiving vehicles undergoes multi-level verification, including verification ,examine Whether it exists in the broadcast list , whether it is within the validity period and verification .

[0036] Preferably, the S5 includes:

[0037] Roadside Unit (RSU) i After detecting malicious broadcast, according to the Query broadcast list ;

[0038] From Broadcast List Extracted from Associated encrypted pseudo-identity , and encrypt the pseudo-identity Send to the trusted center TA;

[0039] The trusted center TA uses the private key s to decrypt the pseudo-identity ,get , obtain the real identity of the malicious vehicle And implement tracking.

[0040] Preferably, it also includes S6, vehicle V i Passwords and identities are updated regularly through the trusted center TA, which redistributes pseudo identities and PUF incentives.

[0041] Preferably, the S6 includes:

[0042] Vehicle V i After logging in with the old password, select your real identity. , password Will Sent to the trusted center TA, which generates PUF incentives and false identities ;

[0043] Vehicle V i Calculate PUF response 、 、 , update storage as .

[0044] It can be seen from the above technical solution that compared with the prior art, the technical solution of the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0045] 1. This method utilizes a challenge-response mechanism using a physically unclonable function (PUF), eliminating the need for vehicle key storage and avoiding the risk of key leakage from physical attacks on onboard devices in traditional solutions. The uniqueness of the PUF ensures the unclonability of key generation. Combined with biometric fuzzy extraction, this method provides dual reinforcement of vehicle identity, effectively defending against physical intrusion and side-channel attacks.

[0046] 2. A temporary identity mechanism is used, whereby vehicles only reveal their TID during broadcast communications, ensuring the anonymity of their location and trajectory. Conditional privacy is also achieved through pseudo-identities encrypted and managed by a trusted authority (TA). When a malicious broadcast is detected, the RSU submits the encrypted PID associated with the TID, which is decrypted by the TA to reveal the true identity. This provides an authorized channel for tracking malicious nodes while protecting the privacy of legitimate vehicles.

[0047] 3. Communication efficiency is significantly optimized through temporary key signatures and a multi-level verification mechanism. After two-way authentication, the vehicle obtains a valid TID and becomes an internal node of the RSU, eliminating the overhead of repeated authentication. When broadcasting a message, the receiver only needs to verify the timeliness, TID validity, and signature authenticity, avoiding complex public key calculations. Signature verification is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, ensuring non-repudiation while reducing the computational load and meeting the high real-time requirements of the vehicular self-organizing network (VANET). BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are merely embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without paying any creative work.

[0049] Figure 1 A flow chart of an identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the vehicle-mounted self-organizing network structure provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0051] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0052] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides an identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network, comprising the following steps:

[0053] S1. The trusted center TA generates elliptic curve cryptography parameters, master keys, and public keys, and defines hash functions and symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms.

[0054] S2, vehicle V i Submit registration information, the trusted center TA assigns pseudo identity and PUF incentives; roadside unit RSU i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair;

[0055] S3, Vehicle V i Log in and enter the Roadside Unit (RSU) i After the communication range, the trusted center TA and roadside unit RSU i Perform two-way authentication to obtain a temporary key and temporary identity;

[0056] S4, Vehicle V i Use the temporary key to broadcast the message, and the receiving vehicle verifies the timeliness, identity validity and message integrity;

[0057] S5, Roadside Unit RSU i When a malicious broadcast is detected, the relevant information is submitted to the trusted center TA, which decrypts the information to obtain the real identity and implement tracking.

[0058] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a dynamic wireless communication network consisting of vehicle nodes and roadside units (RUs), managed and coordinated by a trusted center. In this network, vehicles exchange information in real time, both with each other and with RRUs, through wireless communication. RRUs are connected to the trusted center via wired or wireless connections for data upload and download. Each vehicle broadcasts its status information and receives information from other vehicles and RRUs, forming a communication network that covers the entire road area.

[0059] This architecture not only supports direct communication between vehicles, but also allows information to be transmitted to more distant vehicles or back-end systems via roadside units, thereby improving driving safety and traffic efficiency. In addition, through the management of the trusted center, the security and reliability of the network can be ensured, preventing malicious attacks and information leakage.

[0060] This method uses the PUF challenge-response mechanism to achieve dynamic generation and zero storage of vehicle keys, effectively resisting physical attacks and key theft; by combining temporary identities with encrypted pseudo-identities managed by a trusted center (TA), it achieves authorized tracking of malicious nodes while ensuring the anonymity and privacy of vehicle communications; at the same time, based on temporary key signatures and a lightweight multi-level verification mechanism, it significantly reduces the authentication computing load, supports free communication of vehicles within the validity period, and overall improves the security, privacy and real-time communication efficiency of the on-board self-organizing network.

[0061] The following further describes each step in the above embodiment in detail;

[0062] In this embodiment S1, the trusted center TA generates elliptic curve cryptography parameters, a master key, and a public key, and defines a hash function and a symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm; including:

[0063] The trusted center TA is based on a large prime number p and the integer multiplication group modulo p. Select parameters a and b to construct an elliptic curve , in the elliptic curve Select a q-order base point G on the multiplicative group of integers modulo q Select a random number s as the master key and generate the public key P pub =s·G, and disclose the system parameter set ; Among them, h1 and h2 represent one-way collision-resistant hash functions, h1(·): ,h2(·)∶ , E k 、D k Indicates the symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm.

[0064] In this embodiment S2, the vehicle V i Submit registration information, the trusted center TA assigns pseudo identity and PUF incentives; roadside unit RSU i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair;

[0065] Vehicle V i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo identity and PUF incentives including:

[0066] Vehicle V i Based on bioinformatics , calculate the biometric key through the extraction algorithm of biometric fuzzy extraction function and auxiliary information , and submit your real identity , password and biometric keys Make a registration request to the trusted center TA;

[0067] The trusted center TA calculates the pseudo identity through the master key s and generate incentives As a registration response;

[0068] Vehicle V i After receiving the registration response, calculate the PUF response Send back to the trusted center TA and store locally ,in, , , n is the modulus, used for modular operation in hash function.

[0069] Furthermore, roadside units (RSUs) i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair including:

[0070] Roadside Unit (RSU) i Submit real identity Make a registration request to the trusted center TA;

[0071] The trusted center TA calculates the pseudo identity through the master key s , and select a random number r as the private key and generate a public key As a registration response.

[0072] In this embodiment S3, vehicle V i Log in and enter the Roadside Unit (RSU) i After the communication range, the trusted center TA and roadside unit RSU i Perform two-way authentication to obtain a temporary key and temporary identity;

[0073] Logging in includes:

[0074] Vehicle V i Calculating biometric keys through recovery algorithm of biometric fuzzy extraction function 、 、 like , the login is successful, otherwise the session is terminated.

[0075] Furthermore, two-way authentication includes:

[0076] Access Request: Vehicle V i Pick a random number ,calculate and , send To Roadside Unit RSU i ;

[0077] Authentication request: Roadside Unit RSU i verify If the inequality holds, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and a random number is selected. ,calculate 、 、 ,send To the trusted center TA;

[0078] Authentication response: Trusted Center TA verification If the inequality holds, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and decryption is performed. verify If they are equal, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and decryption is performed. verify If they are equal, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and the calculation 、 ,send To Roadside Unit RSU i ;

[0079] Access Response: Roadside Unit RSU i verify If the inequality holds, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and the verification If they are equal, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and the calculation , select a random number , calculate the temporary identity of the vehicle And set the validity period Te, calculate ,send To vehicle V i ;

[0080] Verify Access Response: Vehicle V i verify If the inequality holds, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and the response is calculated. , decrypt get ,verify If they are equal, the verification is successful, otherwise the session is terminated and stored. .

[0081] In this embodiment, vehicle S4 V i Utilize the temporary key to broadcast the message, and the receiving vehicle verifies the timeliness, identity validity, and message integrity; specifically, it includes:

[0082] Vehicle V i Use the temporary private key a to sign the message M, ,Will Broadcast as a message to the receiving vehicle;

[0083] Receiving vehicles undergoes multi-level verification, including verification , if the inequality holds, receive the message,

[0084] examine Whether it exists in the broadcast list If it exists, extract Verify whether it is within the validity period. If it is, further verification is performed. If they are equal, the message is received; otherwise, the message is rejected.

[0085] In this embodiment S5, the roadside unit RSU i When a malicious broadcast is detected, the relevant information is submitted to the trusted center TA, which decrypts the information to obtain the real identity and implement tracking. Specifically, the following steps are included:

[0086] Roadside Unit (RSU) i After detecting malicious broadcast, according to the Query broadcast list ;

[0087] From Broadcast List Extracted from Associated encrypted pseudo-identity , and encrypt the pseudo-identity Send to the trusted center TA;

[0088] The trusted center TA uses the private key s to decrypt the pseudo-identity ,get , obtain the real identity of the malicious vehicle And implement tracking.

[0089] The identity authentication method in this embodiment also includes S6, vehicle V i Passwords and identities are regularly updated through the trusted center TA, which redistributes pseudo identities and PUF incentives. Specifically,

[0090] Vehicle V iAfter logging in with the old password, select your real identity. , password Will Sent to the trusted center TA, which generates PUF incentives and false identities ;

[0091] Vehicle V i Calculate PUF response 、 、 , update storage as .

[0092] Based on the core structure of VANET, the trusted center TA, roadside unit RSU, and vehicle, the working process of the identity authentication method in this implementation is further explained:

[0093] During the registration and initialization phase, the vehicle submits its identity information to the trusted authority (TA), which generates an encrypted pseudo-identity (PID) and PUF stimulus for it. The vehicle stores only the PID and verification parameters locally, using the PUF response to generate a key but not store it, achieving zero key storage. Simultaneously, the roadside unit (RSU) also registers with the TA and obtains a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair. As the core trust anchor, the TA is responsible for publishing system parameters and managing the registration information of all entities.

[0094] Dynamic Authentication and Secure Communication Phase: When a vehicle enters the range of a new RSU, it must log in and undergo a three-way authentication process with the TA and RSU. After successful authentication, the RSU assigns the vehicle a temporary identity (TID) and a temporary key, making the vehicle an internal node of that RSU. During the TID's validity period, the vehicle uses the temporary key to sign and broadcast messages. Receiving vehicles then perform lightweight multi-level verification (timeliness, TID validity, and signature authenticity) based on the list information broadcast by the RSU. If the RSU detects a malicious broadcast, it extracts the associated encrypted PID and submits it to the TA. The TA decrypts the PID to obtain the true identity for tracking. Vehicles can periodically request updates to the TA's password and identity information.

[0095] This embodiment of the identity authentication method in an ad hoc network establishes a three-in-one vehicle-based ad hoc network identity authentication system, with a trusted center (TA) centrally managing keys and identities, roadside units (RSUs) dynamically allocating temporary credentials and monitoring communications, and vehicles (Vs) implementing secure key generation and lightweight authentication based on PUFs. This system significantly improves authentication efficiency and the real-time nature of broadcast verification while ensuring communication security and user privacy, providing core technical support for building highly reliable and efficient intelligent transportation systems.

[0096] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. References to the same or similar parts between the various embodiments are sufficient. For the systems disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple. For relevant parts, refer to the method description.

[0097] The above description of the disclosed embodiments is intended to enable one skilled in the art to implement or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to one skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the embodiments shown herein but is intended to conform to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. An identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. The trusted center TA generates elliptic curve cryptography parameters, master keys, and public keys, and defines hash functions and symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms. S2, vehicle V i Submit registration information, the trusted center TA assigns pseudo identity and PUF incentives; roadside unit RSU i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair; S3, Vehicle V i Log in and enter the Roadside Unit (RSU) i After the communication range, the trusted center TA and roadside unit RSU i Perform two-way authentication to obtain a temporary key and temporary identity; S4, Vehicle V i Use the temporary key to broadcast the message, and the receiving vehicle verifies the timeliness, identity validity and message integrity; S5, Roadside Unit RSU i When a malicious broadcast is detected, the relevant information is submitted to the trusted center TA, which decrypts the information to obtain the real identity and implement tracking.

2. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S1 includes: the trusted center TA is based on a large prime number p, an integer multiplication group in modulo p Select parameters a and b to construct an elliptic curve , in the elliptic curve Select a q-order base point G on the multiplicative group of integers modulo q Select a random number s as the master key and generate the public key P pub =s·G, and disclose the system parameter set ; Among them, h1 and h2 represent one-way collision-resistant hash functions, h1(·): ,h2(·)∶ , E k 、D k Indicates the symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm.

3. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S2, the vehicle V i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo identity and PUF incentives including: Vehicle V i Based on bioinformatics , calculate the biometric key through the extraction algorithm of biometric fuzzy extraction function and auxiliary information , and submit your real identity , password and biometric keys Make a registration request to the trusted center TA; The trusted center TA calculates the pseudo identity through the master key s and generate incentives As a registration response; Vehicle V i After receiving the registration response, calculate the PUF response Send back to the trusted center TA and store locally ,in, , , n is the modulus, used for modular operations in hash functions.

4. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S2, the roadside unit RSU i Submit registration information, and the trusted center TA will assign a pseudo-identity and public-private key pair including: Roadside Unit (RSU) i Submit real identity Make a registration request to the trusted center TA; The trusted center TA calculates the pseudo identity through the master key s , and select a random number r as the private key and generate a public key As a registration response.

5. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the S3, logging in includes: Vehicle V i Calculate the biometric key through the recovery algorithm of the biometric fuzzy extraction function: 、 、 ,like , the login is successful.

6. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: In S3, performing two-way authentication includes: Access Request: Vehicle V i Pick a random number ,calculate and , send To Roadside Unit RSU i ; Authentication request: Roadside Unit RSU i verify , select a random number ,calculate 、 、 ,send To the trusted center TA; Authentication response: Trusted Center TA verification , decrypt verify , decrypt verify ,calculate 、 ,send To Roadside Unit RSU i ; Access Response: Roadside Unit RSU i verify ,verify ,calculate , select a random number , calculate the temporary identity of the vehicle And set the validity period Te, calculate ,send To vehicle V i ; Verify Access Response: Vehicle V i verify , calculate the response , decrypt get ,verify ,storage .

7. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S4 includes: Vehicle V i Use the temporary private key a to sign the message M, ,Will Broadcast as a message to the receiving vehicle; The receiving vehicle undergoes multi-level verification, including verification ,examine Whether it exists in the broadcast list , whether it is within the validity period and verification .

8. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The S5 includes: Roadside Unit (RSU) i After detecting malicious broadcast, according to the Query broadcast list ; From Broadcast List Extracted from Associated encrypted pseudo-identity , and encrypt the pseudo-identity Send to the trusted center TA; The trusted center TA uses the private key s to decrypt the pseudo-identity ,get , obtain the real identity of the malicious vehicle And implement tracking.

9. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 1, characterized in that: Also includes S6, vehicle V i Passwords and identities are updated regularly through the trusted center TA, which redistributes pseudo identities and PUF incentives.

10. The identity authentication method in a vehicle-mounted ad hoc network according to claim 9, characterized in that: The S6 includes: Vehicle V i After logging in with the old password, select your real identity. , password Will Sent to the trusted center TA, which generates PUF incentives and false identities ; Vehicle V i Calculate PUF response 、 、 , update storage as .

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