A vehicle-mounted controller encryption communication method

Abstract

The present invention discloses an encrypted communication method for a vehicle-mounted controller, which relates to the field of encrypted communication technology. The method comprises the following steps: significantly improving synchronization efficiency, dynamically weighting relay nodes, substantially reducing key distribution traffic, avoiding broadcast storms in large-scale formations, and ensuring the real-time performance of vehicle collaborative control; enhancing anti-attack, fusing multi-source noise and clock disturbances by chaotic timestamps, generating non-replicable dynamic identifiers, and effectively defending against replay attacks and signal tampering; and automatically adapting to vehicle position changes and link fluctuations through triple weight adjustment of hop attenuation, signal-to-noise compensation, and delay deduction, eliminating the risk of synchronization failure in scenarios such as tunnels; introducing a security degradation mechanism, prohibiting control command transmission in abnormal situations, and maintaining basic communications in combination with pre-stored keys to prevent vehicle misoperation caused by key synchronization failure.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of encrypted communications, and in particular to an encrypted communications method for a vehicle-mounted controller. Background Art

[0002] With the large-scale application of autonomous driving fleets, vehicles need to share control commands in real time, such as coordinated lane changes and emergency obstacle avoidance. The current mainstream solution uses a dynamic temporary key mechanism and the SecOC authentication framework to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of the command sources. When multiple vehicles are in a platoon, the vehicles must complete key synchronization within 100ms to maintain the encrypted link. In high-speed scenarios, the dynamic entry and exit of vehicles causes frequent changes in the network topology, which greatly increases the complexity of key management.

[0003] The dynamic key mechanism relies on flooding broadcast synchronization, and each vehicle must forward the new key to the entire network. When the convoy size exceeds 10 vehicles, the key update traffic increases exponentially, causing communication channel congestion. At the same time, SecOC's strict verification process exacerbates control command delays, and real-time operations such as vehicle spacing control face the risk of loss of control. Some solutions have attempted to introduce group key negotiation, but have not solved the convergence efficiency problem under dynamic topology changes, and the key distribution failure rate increases significantly when vehicles accelerate or decelerate.

[0004] In recent years, some solutions have proposed clustered key management, which groups the fleet by location and elects cluster head nodes to relay keys to reduce synchronization traffic. However, this solution relies on GPS positioning accuracy, and cluster head election fails in scenarios such as tunnels, resulting in isolated subgroup keys. Other solutions use lightweight PKI to pre-allocate certificate chains for each vehicle. Although this avoids real-time synchronization, it has difficulty supporting millisecond-level temporary key rotation requirements, and certificate updates require cloud intervention, which cannot meet the needs of offline collaborative control scenarios for formations. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of the above existing problems, the present invention is proposed.

[0006] The present invention provides an on-board controller encryption communication method to solve the problem of coexistence of real-time control and security risks due to excessive key synchronization traffic, poor topology adaptability and insufficient defense replay capability in existing encrypted communications in dynamic formation scenarios.

[0007] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0008] An embodiment of the present invention provides an encrypted communication method for a vehicle-mounted controller, which includes:

[0009] Step S1: The lead vehicle controller generates a temporary session key and calculates the distribution weight value of each follower vehicle controller based on the real-time topological distance of the vehicles;

[0010] The real-time topological distance of the vehicle is dynamically calculated by obtaining the signal strength and propagation delay of adjacent vehicles through the V2X communication module, and the logical distance to the leading vehicle is measured in hops;

[0011] Step S2, selecting a subset of relay nodes from the vehicle controller according to the distribution weight value;

[0012] The relay node subset must satisfy the preset ratio of the sum of its weight values ​​to the total weight of the formation;

[0013] Step S3, distributing the temporary session key to other controllers in the formation through the relay node subset;

[0014] In step S4, each controller uses the temporary session key to encrypt and transmit the communication data, and embeds a dynamically generated chaotic timestamp in the data packet.

[0015] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method described in the present invention, the acquisition of the real-time topological distance of the vehicle in step S1 includes:

[0016] Periodically broadcast a heartbeat signal containing the vehicle location code;

[0017] Dynamically modify the hop value based on signal propagation delay and packet loss rate;

[0018] Enable redundant path backup mechanism for tunnel / signal obstruction scenarios.

[0019] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method of the present invention, in step S1, the calculation of the distribution weight value satisfies:

[0020] The vehicle weight base value with a hop count of 1 is set to the highest priority;

[0021] The weight decreases according to the nonlinear decay rule with each additional hop.

[0022] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method described in the present invention, in step S1, during the calculation of the distribution weight value, the head vehicle controller obtains the real-time topological distance of the vehicle, the link signal-to-noise ratio and the one-way propagation delay, and calculates the distribution weight value of each slave vehicle controller. Construct a triple coupling weight model and calculate the hop attenuation factor, signal-to-noise gain factor, and delay reduction factor. The steps include:

[0023] Calculate the hop count reduction factor:

[0024] ,

[0025] in, Indicates vehicle Hop count attenuation factor, is the attenuation coefficient, For vehicles The number of logical hops with the lead vehicle, is the nonlinear order control quantity, the subscript Indicates the serial number of the vehicle;

[0026] Calculate the signal-to-noise gain factor:

[0027] ,

[0028] in, For vehicles The signal-to-noise gain factor, For vehicles Receive signal-to-noise ratio, is the maximum signal-to-noise ratio in the current formation, is the gain buffer index;

[0029] Calculate the delay deduction factor:

[0030] ,

[0031] in, For vehicles The delay reduction factor, For vehicles One-way propagation delay to the first vehicle, To allow the upper limit of delay, is the delay sensitivity index;

[0032] Perform weight integration and normalization, the formula is:

[0033] ,

[0034] in, For vehicles The original comprehensive weight of is the proportional calibration constant, is the normalized weight, To sum the index, is the total number of vehicles involved in the calculation;

[0035] The adaptive adjustment method of the attenuation coefficient is:

[0036] ,

[0037] in, and are the lower and upper bounds of the attenuation coefficient, respectively, which are determined by the statistical characteristics of the vehicle network delay. is the standard deviation of the current formation delay distribution, is the standard deviation of the delay in the reference scenario.

[0038] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method of the present invention, after the relay node subset is selected in step S2:

[0039] Real-time monitoring of vehicle acceleration changes, triggering weight recalculation if it exceeds the threshold;

[0040] When a vehicle exits the formation, its adjacent relay node takes over the key forwarding responsibility;

[0041] When a new vehicle joins, it only requests the key from the nearest relay node.

[0042] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method of the present invention, step S3 includes:

[0043] Relay nodes use directional unicast forwarding keys and prohibit broadcast diffusion;

[0044] The forwarding path prioritizes vehicle links with stable signal strength;

[0045] The key message carries the version number and the topology snapshot hash value.

[0046] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method of the present invention, in step S4, the generation of the chaotic timestamp includes:

[0047] Initialize chaotic parameters using vehicle-mounted multi-source sensor noise;

[0048] The timestamp accuracy matches the controller's local clock source.

[0049] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method described in the present invention, in the process of generating a chaotic timestamp in step S4, the controller introduces multi-source sensor noise and local clock jitter before encapsulating the encrypted data packet to generate a unique chaotic timestamp. The process includes:

[0050] Perform entropy collection and reduction:

[0051] ,

[0052] in, is the instantaneous entropy value, is the number of sensors involved in sampling, For the sensor weights, is the noise sequence amplitude, is the sliding window length, is the time interval between adjacent samplings, is the window index, Indicates the current sampling reference time;

[0053] The initial state mapping is expressed as:

[0054] ,

[0055] in, is the normalized initial value of chaos, Indicates the operation of taking the decimal part;

[0056] Perform perturbation Logistic iteration:

[0057] ,

[0058] in, For the The chaotic state of the iteration, For the control parameters, is the clock jitter disturbance term, which is taken from the phase jitter value of the controller’s local clock source. is the iteration index, Indicates the next step status;

[0059] Iteration termination and scaling are expressed as:

[0060] , ,

[0061] in, For the The final state of the iteration, is the preset number of iterations, is the integer result after amplification and rounding, is the timestamp precision order;

[0062] The chaotic timestamp assembly process is as follows:

[0063] ,

[0064] in, is the final chaos timestamp, represents bitwise exclusive OR, Identifies the controller with a hash value.

[0065] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method described in the present invention, it also includes:

[0066] If the key distribution times out, the communication data will be downgraded and encrypted using the pre-stored key.

[0067] During the encryption downgrade period, the transmission of vehicle control commands is prohibited;

[0068] Key renegotiation is automatically triggered after network recovery.

[0069] As a preferred solution of the vehicle controller encryption communication method of the present invention, after the distribution of step S3 is completed:

[0070] Each controller generates a key verification code and broadcasts it to directly adjacent nodes;

[0071] Detect distribution consistency by comparing the checksum differences of neighboring nodes;

[0072] If inconsistency is detected, the head vehicle controller initiates local key retransmission.

[0073] The beneficial effects of the present invention are: the present invention significantly improves synchronization efficiency, dynamically weights the relay nodes, greatly reduces key distribution traffic, avoids broadcast storms in large-scale formations, and ensures the real-time performance of vehicle collaborative control; enhances anti-attack, chaotic timestamps fuse multi-source noise and clock disturbances to generate non-replicable dynamic identifiers, and effectively defends against replay attacks and signal tampering; and through triple weight adjustment of hop attenuation, signal-to-noise compensation, and delay deduction, automatically adapts to vehicle position changes and link fluctuations, eliminating the risk of synchronization failure in scenarios such as tunnels; introduces a security degradation mechanism, prohibits control command transmission in abnormal situations, combines pre-stored keys to maintain basic communications, and prevents vehicle misoperation caused by key synchronization failure. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0074] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0075] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the encrypted communication method of the vehicle controller in Example 1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0076] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0077] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention. However, the present invention may also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein. Those skilled in the art may make similar generalizations without violating the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0078] Secondly, the term "one embodiment" or "embodiment" herein refers to a specific feature, structure, or characteristic that may be included in at least one implementation of the present invention. The phrase "in one embodiment" appearing in various places throughout this specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor does it refer to a separate or selective embodiment that is mutually exclusive of other embodiments.

[0079] With the large-scale application of autonomous driving fleets, vehicles need to share control commands in real time, such as coordinated lane changes and emergency obstacle avoidance. The current mainstream solution uses a dynamic temporary key mechanism and the SecOC authentication framework to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of the command sources. When multiple vehicles are in a platoon, the vehicles must complete key synchronization within 100ms to maintain the encrypted link. In high-speed scenarios, the dynamic entry and exit of vehicles causes frequent changes in the network topology, which greatly increases the complexity of key management.

[0080] The dynamic key mechanism relies on flooding broadcast synchronization, and each vehicle must forward the new key to the entire network. When the convoy size exceeds 10 vehicles, the key update traffic increases exponentially, causing communication channel congestion. At the same time, SecOC's strict verification process exacerbates control command delays, and real-time operations such as vehicle spacing control face the risk of loss of control. Some solutions have attempted to introduce group key negotiation, but have not solved the convergence efficiency problem under dynamic topology changes, and the key distribution failure rate increases significantly when vehicles accelerate or decelerate.

[0081] In recent years, some proposals have proposed clustered key management, grouping fleets by location and electing cluster head nodes to relay keys, reducing synchronization traffic. However, this solution relies on GPS positioning accuracy, making cluster head election ineffective in scenarios such as tunnels, resulting in the isolation of subgroup keys. Other solutions use lightweight PKI to pre-assign certificate chains to each vehicle. While this avoids real-time synchronization, it struggles to support millisecond-level temporary key rotation requirements. Furthermore, certificate updates require cloud-based intervention, making them unsuitable for offline collaborative control scenarios in formations. The following solution is proposed to address this issue.

[0082] Example 1, reference Figure 1 , this embodiment provides a vehicle controller encryption communication method, comprising the following steps:

[0083] Step S1: The lead vehicle controller generates a temporary session key and calculates the distribution weight value of each follower vehicle controller based on the real-time topological distance of the vehicles;

[0084] The real-time topological distance of a vehicle is dynamically calculated by obtaining the signal strength and propagation delay of adjacent vehicles through the V2X communication module, and the logical distance to the leading vehicle is measured in hops.

[0085] The acquisition of the real-time topological distance of the vehicle in step S1 includes:

[0086] Periodically broadcast a heartbeat signal containing the vehicle location code;

[0087] Dynamically modify the hop value based on signal propagation delay and packet loss rate;

[0088] Enable redundant path backup mechanism for tunnel / signal obstruction scenarios;

[0089] The calculation of the distribution weight value satisfies:

[0090] The vehicle weight base value with a hop count of 1 is set to the highest priority;

[0091] The weight decreases according to the nonlinear attenuation rule with each additional hop;

[0092] In step S1, during the calculation of the distribution weight value, the head vehicle controller obtains the real-time topological distance of the vehicle, the link signal-to-noise ratio and the one-way propagation delay, and then calculates the weight value of each follower vehicle controller. Construct a triple coupling weight model and calculate the hop attenuation factor, signal-to-noise gain factor, and delay reduction factor. The steps include:

[0093] Calculate the hop count reduction factor:

[0094] ,

[0095] in, Indicates vehicle Hop count attenuation factor, is the attenuation coefficient, For vehicles The number of logical hops with the lead vehicle, is the nonlinear order control quantity, the subscript Indicates the serial number of the vehicle;

[0096] Calculate the signal-to-noise gain factor:

[0097] ,

[0098] in, For vehicles The signal-to-noise gain factor, For vehicles Receive signal-to-noise ratio, is the maximum signal-to-noise ratio in the current formation, is the gain buffer index;

[0099] Calculate the delay deduction factor:

[0100] ,

[0101] in, For vehicles The delay reduction factor, For vehicles One-way propagation delay to the first vehicle, To allow the upper limit of delay, is the delay sensitivity index;

[0102] Perform weight integration and normalization, the formula is:

[0103] ,

[0104] in, For vehicles The original comprehensive weight of is the proportional calibration constant, is the normalized weight, To sum the index, is the total number of vehicles involved in the calculation;

[0105] The adaptive adjustment method of the attenuation coefficient is:

[0106] ,

[0107] in, and are the lower and upper bounds of the attenuation coefficient, respectively, which are determined by the statistical characteristics of the vehicle network delay. is the standard deviation of the current formation delay distribution, is the standard deviation of the delay of the reference scenario;

[0108] Specifically, the triple coupling model uses exponential decay, normalized signal-to-noise ratio improvement and delay reduction to construct a comprehensive evaluation of hop count, link quality and network congestion. Hop count attenuation prioritizes weakening distant nodes, signal-to-noise gain compensation stabilizes links, delay reduction suppresses congested paths, and adaptive adjustment The algorithm maintains flexibility in tunnel obstruction or dense traffic scenarios by adjusting the delay dispersion. The normalized weights enable subsequent relay node screening to directly compare the importance of each vehicle according to the preset coverage ratio.

[0109] Step S2, selecting a subset of relay nodes from the vehicle controller according to the distribution weight value;

[0110] The relay node subset must satisfy the preset ratio of the sum of its weight values ​​to the total weight of the formation;

[0111] After selecting the relay node subset in step S2:

[0112] Real-time monitoring of vehicle acceleration changes, triggering weight recalculation if it exceeds the threshold;

[0113] When a vehicle exits the formation, its adjacent relay node takes over the key forwarding responsibility;

[0114] When a new vehicle joins, it only requests the key from the nearest relay node;

[0115] Step S3, distributing the temporary session key to other controllers in the formation through the relay node subset;

[0116] Step S3 includes:

[0117] Relay nodes use directional unicast forwarding keys and prohibit broadcast diffusion;

[0118] The forwarding path prioritizes vehicle links with stable signal strength;

[0119] The key message carries the version number and topology snapshot hash value;

[0120] After step S3 distribution is completed:

[0121] Each controller generates a key verification code and broadcasts it to directly adjacent nodes;

[0122] Detect distribution consistency by comparing the checksum differences of neighboring nodes;

[0123] If an inconsistency is detected, the head vehicle controller initiates a local key resend;

[0124] Step S4: Each controller uses the temporary session key to encrypt the communication data for transmission and embeds a dynamically generated chaotic timestamp in the data packet;

[0125] The generation of chaotic timestamps includes:

[0126] Initialize chaotic parameters using vehicle-mounted multi-source sensor noise;

[0127] The timestamp accuracy matches the controller's local clock source;

[0128] In the process of generating chaotic timestamp in step S4, the controller introduces multi-source sensor noise and local clock jitter before encapsulating the encrypted data packet to generate a unique chaotic timestamp. The process includes:

[0129] Perform entropy collection and reduction:

[0130] ,

[0131] in, is the instantaneous entropy value, is the number of sensors involved in sampling, For the sensor weights, is the noise sequence amplitude, is the sliding window length, is the time interval between adjacent samplings, is the window index, Indicates the current sampling reference time;

[0132] The initial state mapping is expressed as:

[0133] ,

[0134] in, is the normalized initial value of chaos, Indicates the operation of taking the decimal part;

[0135] Perform perturbation Logistic iteration:

[0136] ,

[0137] in, For the The chaotic state of the iteration, For the control parameters, is the clock jitter disturbance term, which is taken from the phase jitter value of the controller’s local clock source. is the iteration index, Indicates the next step status;

[0138] Iteration termination and scaling are expressed as:

[0139] , ,

[0140] in, For the The final state of the iteration, is the preset number of iterations, is the integer result after amplification and rounding, is the timestamp precision order;

[0141] The chaotic timestamp assembly process is as follows:

[0142] ,

[0143] in, is the final chaos timestamp, represents bitwise exclusive OR, Identify the hash value for the controller;

[0144] Specifically, by weighted averaging of multi-source noise, introducing window smoothing and normalized mapping, a high entropy initial value can be continuously provided, and the perturbation Logistic iteration is When in the completely chaotic region, the initial small difference diverges exponentially, combined with clock jitter To further amplify randomness, the scaling step maps real states to high-resolution integers. After identification by the XOR controller, possible repetitive patterns are removed to ensure that different nodes at the same time do not collide. This method does not require external synchronization and can maintain timestamp independence based on local noise even in tunnel scenarios with short GNSS outages.

[0145] This embodiment also includes:

[0146] If the key distribution times out, the communication data will be downgraded and encrypted using the pre-stored key.

[0147] During the encryption downgrade period, the transmission of vehicle control commands is prohibited;

[0148] Key renegotiation is automatically triggered after network recovery.

[0149] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present invention may be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, which should all be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A vehicle controller encryption communication method, characterized in that: include, Step S1: The lead vehicle controller generates a temporary session key and calculates the distribution weight value of each follower vehicle controller based on the real-time topological distance of the vehicles; The real-time topological distance of the vehicle is dynamically calculated by obtaining the signal strength and propagation delay of adjacent vehicles through the V2X communication module, and the logical distance to the leading vehicle is measured in hops; Step S2, selecting a subset of relay nodes from the vehicle controller according to the distribution weight value; The relay node subset must satisfy the preset ratio of the sum of its weight values ​​to the total weight of the formation; Step S3, distributing the temporary session key to other controllers in the formation through the relay node subset; Step S4, each controller uses the temporary session key to encrypt the communication data for transmission, and embeds a dynamically generated chaotic timestamp in the data packet; In step S1, during the calculation of the distribution weight value, the head vehicle controller obtains the real-time topological distance of the vehicle, the link signal-to-noise ratio and the one-way propagation delay, and then calculates the weight value of each follower vehicle controller. Construct a triple coupling weight model and calculate the hop attenuation factor, signal-to-noise gain factor, and delay reduction factor. The steps include: Calculate the hop count reduction factor: ， in, Indicates vehicle Hop count attenuation factor, is the attenuation coefficient, For vehicles The number of logical hops with the lead vehicle, is the nonlinear order control quantity, the subscript Indicates the serial number of the vehicle; Calculate the signal-to-noise gain factor: ， in, For vehicles The signal-to-noise gain factor, For vehicles Receive signal-to-noise ratio, is the maximum signal-to-noise ratio in the current formation, is the gain buffer index; Calculate the delay deduction factor: ， in, For vehicles The delay reduction factor, For vehicles One-way propagation delay to the first vehicle, To allow the upper limit of delay, is the delay sensitivity index; Perform weight integration and normalization, the formula is: ， in, For vehicles The original comprehensive weight of is the proportional calibration constant, is the normalized weight, To sum the index, is the total number of vehicles involved in the calculation; The adaptive adjustment method of the attenuation coefficient is: ， in, and are the lower and upper bounds of the attenuation coefficient, respectively, which are determined by the statistical characteristics of the vehicle network delay. is the standard deviation of the current formation delay distribution, is the standard deviation of the delay in the reference scenario.

2. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 1, wherein: The acquisition of the real-time topological distance of the vehicle in step S1 includes: Periodically broadcast a heartbeat signal containing the vehicle location code; Dynamically modify the hop value based on signal propagation delay and packet loss rate; Enable redundant path backup mechanism for tunnel / signal obstruction scenarios.

3. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step S1, the calculation of the distribution weight value satisfies: The vehicle weight base value with a hop count of 1 is set to the highest priority; The weight decreases according to the nonlinear decay rule with each additional hop.

4. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 1, wherein: After the relay node subset is selected in step S2: Real-time monitoring of vehicle acceleration changes, triggering weight recalculation if it exceeds the threshold; When a vehicle exits the formation, its adjacent relay node takes over the key forwarding responsibility; When a new vehicle joins, it only requests the key from the nearest relay node.

5. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 1, wherein: The step S3 comprises: Relay nodes use directional unicast forwarding keys and prohibit broadcast diffusion; The forwarding path prioritizes vehicle links with stable signal strength; The key message carries the version number and the topology snapshot hash value.

6. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 1, wherein: In step S4, the generation of the chaotic timestamp includes: Initialize chaotic parameters using vehicle-mounted multi-source sensor noise; The timestamp accuracy matches the controller's local clock source.

7. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 6, characterized in that: In the process of generating chaotic timestamp in step S4, the controller introduces multi-source sensor noise and local clock jitter before encapsulating the encrypted data packet to generate a unique chaotic timestamp. The process includes: Perform entropy collection and reduction: ， in, is the instantaneous entropy value, is the number of sensors involved in sampling, For the sensor weights, is the noise sequence amplitude, is the sliding window length, is the time interval between adjacent samplings, is the window index, Indicates the current sampling reference time; The initial state mapping is expressed as: ， in, is the normalized initial value of chaos, Indicates the operation of taking the decimal part; Perform perturbation Logistic iteration: ， in, For the The chaotic state of the iteration, For the control parameters, is the clock jitter disturbance term, which is taken from the phase jitter value of the controller’s local clock source. is the iteration index, Indicates the next step status; Iteration termination and scaling are expressed as: ， in, For the The final state of the iteration, is the preset number of iterations, is the integer result after amplification and rounding, is the timestamp precision order; The chaotic timestamp assembly process is as follows: ， in, is the final chaos timestamp, represents bitwise exclusive OR, Identifies the controller with a hash value.

8. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 1, wherein: Also includes: If the key distribution times out, the communication data will be downgraded and encrypted using the pre-stored key. During the encryption downgrade period, the transmission of vehicle control commands is prohibited; Key renegotiation is automatically triggered after network recovery.

9. The encrypted communication method for a vehicle controller according to claim 1, wherein: After the step S3 is completed: Each controller generates a key verification code and broadcasts it to directly adjacent nodes; Detect distribution consistency by comparing the checksum differences of neighboring nodes; If inconsistency is detected, the head vehicle controller initiates local key retransmission.

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