Security authentication method for unmanned aerial vehicle network

Abstract

The invention discloses an unmanned aerial vehicle network-oriented security authentication method, which comprises the following steps that: when first preset equipment submits a registration application to a ground control unit, the ground control unit generates a user certificate of the first preset equipment, generates a signature of the first preset equipment according to a private key of the ground control unit, and sends the signature to the first preset equipment; sending a bill composed of the user certificate of the first preset device and the signature of the first preset device to the first preset device to obtain a private key and a public key of the first preset device; when the first preset device requests to communicate with the second preset device, when the public key of the second preset device is equal to the preset formula, an encrypted message is obtained according to the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device, and after the second preset device receives a two-tuple constructed by the encrypted message, the second preset device sends the two-tuple to the first preset device; and determining a session key between the first preset device and the second preset device. The method is high in operability and applicability, and privacy protection can be provided for unmanned aerial vehicle data.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and in particular relates to a security authentication method for UAV networks. Background Art

[0002] With technological advancements and the continued reduction in drone manufacturing costs, drones are becoming increasingly widespread, gradually moving from their initial military applications into industrial production and everyday consumer life. Today, drones are widely used in agricultural monitoring, meteorological monitoring, forest fire rescue, traffic control, and emergency rescue. However, while drones offer numerous benefits, they also pose certain security concerns, such as unauthorized data access and message modification. Unauthorized data leaks can result in significant losses, making drone data privacy protection crucial.

[0003] Drone privacy protection ensures that data is not leaked during use. It is also a key security requirement for secure drone transmission and has long been a hot topic in industry and academia. In fact, achieving secure drone transmission relies on data authentication to ensure the legitimacy and reliability of the exchanged data. During data exchange, some private information can be easily leaked, jeopardizing the privacy and security of users or endpoints.

[0004] Therefore, providing a method for protecting drone data privacy has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In order to solve the above problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a security authentication method for drone networks.

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0007] The present invention provides a security authentication method for a drone network, the security authentication method comprising:

[0008] Obtain the private key k and public key J of the ground control unit as the certificate authority;

[0009] When the first preset device submits a registration application to the ground control unit, the ground control unit generates a user certificate of the first preset device according to the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve obtained based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, generates a signature of the first preset device according to a one-way hash function constructed by the user certificate of the first preset device and the private key of the ground control unit, and sends a ticket of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate of the first preset device and the signature of the first preset device to the first preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the first preset device;

[0010] When the first preset device requests communication from the second preset device, when the public key of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula, an encrypted message is obtained based on the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device, and after the second preset device receives the tuple constructed by the encrypted message, the session key between the first preset device and the second preset device is determined.

[0011] Optionally, obtaining the private key k and public key J of the ground control unit includes:

[0012] The ground control unit acts as a certificate issuing authority to generate a private key k of the ground control unit according to a random number k, wherein k∈[1,l-1], l is an integer greater than 1;

[0013] Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, the public key J of the ground control unit is generated according to the private key k of the ground control unit, where J=kD, and D is the primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve.

[0014] Optionally, the ground control unit generates a user certificate of the first preset device according to a point L1 on a hyperelliptic curve obtained based on a hyperelliptic curve encryption method, and generates a signature of the first preset device according to a one-way hash function constructed using the user certificate of the first preset device and a private key of the ground control unit, including:

[0015] The first preset device selects a random number v1, v1∈[1,l-1], where l is an integer greater than 1;

[0016] Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, a point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve is obtained according to the random number v1, where L1=v1D, and a tuple (L1, ID1) consisting of the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve and ID1 is sent to the ground control unit, where D is a primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve, I is a set of positive integers, and D1 is a first preset device;

[0017] After receiving the tuple (L1, ID1), the ground control unit obtains the user certificate C1 of the first preset device based on L1, and obtains the signature a1 of the first preset device based on the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and ID1, the random number o1 and the private key k of the ground control unit.

[0018] Optionally, after receiving the tuple (L1, ID1), the ground control unit obtains the user certificate C1 of the first preset device according to L1, and obtains the signature a1 of the first preset device according to the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and ID1, the random number o1, and the private key k of the ground control unit, including:

[0019] After receiving the binary group (L1, ID1), the ground control unit selects a random number o1 and obtains a point Q1 on the hyperelliptic curve according to the random number o1, where Q1=o1D, o1∈[1,l-1];

[0020] Obtaining the user certificate C1 of the first preset device according to the point L1 and the point Q1 on the hyperelliptic curve, C1=L1+Q1;

[0021] The signature a1 of the first preset device is obtained according to the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 and ID1 of the first preset device, the random number o1 and the private key k of the ground control unit, a1=k+o1h(ID1, C1).

[0022] Optionally, sending the ticket m of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate of the first preset device and the signature of the first preset device to the first preset device to obtain the private key and the public key of the first preset device includes:

[0023] Sending a ticket m1 of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and the signature a1 of the first preset device to the first preset device, where m1 = (C1, a1), o1∈[1, l-1];

[0024] After the first preset device receives the ticket m1, it obtains the first preset device private key p1 according to the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and the signature a1 of the first preset device, where p1 = v1h (ID1, C1) + a1;

[0025] The public key B1 of the first preset device is obtained according to the private key p1 of the first preset device, where B1=p1D.

[0026] Optionally, when the public key of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula, obtaining an encrypted message based on the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device, and determining a session key between the first preset device and the second preset device after the second preset device receives a tuple constructed from the encrypted message includes:

[0027] Determine whether the public key B2 of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula. If they are equal, the first preset device selects a random number r1, r1∈[1,l-1], where l is an integer greater than 1, and the preset formula is expressed as C2h(ID2,C2)+J, where h(ID2,C2) is a one-way hash function of the user certificate C2 of the second preset device and ID2, I is a set of positive integers, and D2 is the second preset device;

[0028] The encrypted message is obtained according to the random number r1, the timestamp t1, the ID1, the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and the public key B2 of the second preset device.

[0029] Obtain a hash value H1 according to a one-way hash function constructed by the random number r1, the timestamp t1, ID1, and the user certificate C1 of the first preset device, where H1 = h(r1, t1, ID1, C1);

[0030] Encrypt the message and hash value H1 Sending to the second preset device;

[0031] The second preset device receives the binary Then, the private key p2 of the second preset device is used to Decrypt to obtain a hash value H′1 based on the decryption result, and obtain the session key K between the first preset device and the second preset device according to the hash value H1 and the hash value H′1 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device.

[0032] Optionally, the private key p2 of the second preset device is used to Decrypt to obtain a hash value H′1 based on the decryption result, and obtain the session key K between the first preset device and the second preset device according to the hash value H1 and the hash value H′1 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device, including:

[0033] Use the private key p2 of the second preset device to pair Decryption is performed using the following method: The hash value H′1 is obtained based on the decryption result, H′1=h(r1, t1, ID1, C1);

[0034] Determine whether the hash value H1 is equal to the hash value H′1. If they are equal, the second preset device selects a random number r2 and calculates the point on the hyperelliptic curve. r2∈[1,l-1];

[0035] According to ID1, ID2, random number r1, random number r2 and the point on the hyperelliptic curve Construct a one-way hash function to generate the session key K 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device, wherein,

[0036] Optionally, the security authentication method further includes:

[0037] When a third preset device needs to be added, the ground control unit calculates the point L on the hyperelliptic curve obtained based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method. new Generate a user certificate for the third preset device, and generate a signature of the third preset device based on a one-way hash function constructed by the user certificate of the third preset device and the private key of the ground control unit, and send a ticket for the third preset device consisting of the user certificate of the third preset device and the signature of the third preset device to the third preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the third preset device.

[0038] Optionally, the ground control unit obtains a point L on the hyperelliptic curve based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method. new Generating a user certificate of the third preset device, generating a signature of the third preset device based on a one-way hash function constructed using the user certificate of the third preset device and a private key of the ground control unit, and sending a ticket of the third preset device consisting of the user certificate of the third preset device and the signature of the third preset device to the third preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the third preset device, including:

[0039] The third preset device selects a random number v new , v new ∈[1,l-1], l is an integer greater than 1;

[0040] Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, according to the random number v new Get the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new , L new =v new D, will be represented by the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new and ID new The binary group (L new , ID new ) is sent to the ground control unit, D is the primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve, I is a set of positive integers, D new For the third preset device;

[0041] The ground control unit receives the two-tuple (L new , ID new ), select a random number o new , and according to the random number o new Get point Q on the hyperelliptic curve new , Q new =o new D,o new ∈[1,l-1];

[0042] According to the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new and point Q on the hyperelliptic curve new Get the user certificate C of the third preset device new , C new =L new +Q new ;

[0043] According to the user certificate C of the third preset device new With ID new The constructed one-way hash function h(ID new ,C new ), the random number o new And the private key k of the ground control unit obtains the signature a of the third preset device new , a new =k+o new h(ID new ,C new );

[0044] The user certificate C of the third preset device new and the signature a of the third preset device new The third preset device consisting of a ticket m new Sent to the third preset device, m new =(C new ,a new );

[0045] When the third preset device receives the ticket m new Then, according to the user certificate C of the third preset device new and the signature a of the third preset device new Get the third preset device private key p new , p new =v new h(ID new ,C new )+a new ;

[0046] According to the private key p of the third preset device newGet the public key B of the third preset device new , B new =p new D.

[0047] Optionally, the first preset device and the second preset device both include one of a drone device and a mobile edge computing device.

[0048] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0049] The present invention also provides a security authentication method for drone networks. During the registration phase of a first preset device, the ground control unit of the security authentication method generates a user certificate of the first preset device based on a point L1 on a hyperelliptic curve obtained based on a hyperelliptic curve encryption method, and generates a signature of the first preset device based on a one-way hash function constructed from the user certificate of the first preset device and the private key of the ground control unit. The first preset device ticket consisting of the user certificate of the first preset device and the signature of the first preset device is then sent to the first preset device, thereby obtaining the private key and public key of the first preset device. When the first preset device requests communication from the second preset device, the security authentication method obtains an encrypted message based on the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device when the public key of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula. After the second preset device receives the binary constructed by the encrypted message, the session key between the first preset device and the second preset device is determined. Thus, the security authentication method of the present invention provides a knowledge sum by combining hyperelliptic curve encryption technology, digital signatures, and hash functions to propose a privacy-protected identity authentication method. The method has strong operability and applicability and can provide privacy protection for drone data.

[0050] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0051] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of a system architecture applicable to a security authentication method for a drone network provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of a security authentication method for a drone network provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of a Proverif prover architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of an event definition implementation method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 5is a schematic diagram of a query statement provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0056] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of a test result provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0057] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific examples, but the embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto.

[0058] Example 1

[0059] The embodiment of the present invention provides a security authentication method for drone networks, such as Figure 1 As shown in the figure, the system architecture of the security authentication method consists of a ground control unit (GCU), several unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) devices and several mobile edge computing (MEC) devices.

[0060] Drone devices: Drone devices are the primary entities in the proposed model. Equipped with essential equipment such as cameras, sensors, inertial measurement units, and GPS (Global Positioning System) units, they can adapt to different application scenarios. The onboard unit on the drone device collects all relevant information, and the drone device utilizes 5G-enabled wireless communication technology to facilitate communication between these entities.

[0061] Mobile edge computing device: Each mobile edge computing device is a mobile base station provided by a wireless service provider with storage and computing capabilities to facilitate secure and efficient communication between drone devices; each drone device can also communicate with the mobile edge computing device; each mobile edge computing device can communicate with the ground control unit and other mobile edge computing devices through a secure and fast communication channel.

[0062] The ground control unit (GCU) acts as a CA (Certificate Authority) and a trusted third party. UAVs and mobile edge computing devices must register with the GCU to join the network. The GCU generates certificates for the necessary information to ensure communication security. During IoD communication, the GCU protects the true identity of each UAV. Therefore, if illegal behavior is detected, the GCU will reveal the true identity of the UAV.

[0063] Based on the system architecture provided above, please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 : This is a flow chart of a security authentication method for a drone network provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The security authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes:

[0064] S1. Obtain the private key k and public key J of the ground control unit serving as the certificate authority.

[0065] In a specific embodiment, S1 may specifically include:

[0066] S1.1. The ground control unit acts as a certificate issuing authority and generates a private key k of the ground control unit according to a random number k, where k∈[1,l-1], and l is an integer greater than 1.

[0067] S1.2. Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, the public key J of the ground control unit is generated according to the private key k of the ground control unit, where J=kD, D is the base point in the Jacobian group of the hyperelliptic curve, that is, D is the primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve.

[0068] Specifically, the ground control unit, acting as the certificate authority, selects a random number k as the ground control unit's private key, where k∈[1,l-1]. Therefore, the ground control unit's private key is denoted by k. Then, the ground control unit's public key J is calculated using the HECC (Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography) method. The public key J is available on the Internet. It's worth noting that if the calculated J is a zero primitive root, a new random number k is selected until the requirement is met.

[0069] S2. When the first preset device submits a registration application to the ground control unit, the ground control unit generates a user certificate of the first preset device based on the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve obtained based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, and generates a signature of the first preset device based on the one-way hash function constructed by the user certificate of the first preset device and the private key of the ground control unit, and sends the ticket of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate of the first preset device and the signature of the first preset device to the first preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the first preset device.

[0070] In a specific embodiment, S2 may specifically include:

[0071] S2.1. The first preset device selects a random number v1, where v1∈[1,l-1];

[0072] S2.2. Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve is obtained according to the random number v1, L1 = v1D, and the tuple (L1, ID1) consisting of the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve and ID1 is sent to the ground control unit, I is a set of positive integers, and D1 is the first preset device.

[0073] S2.3. After receiving the tuple (L1, ID1), the ground control unit obtains the user certificate C1 of the first preset device according to the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve, and obtains the signature a1 of the first preset device according to the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and ID1, the random number o1 and the private key k of the ground control unit, so as to send the ticket m1 of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and the signature a1 of the first preset device to the first preset device, o1∈[1,l-1].

[0074] S2.31. After receiving the binary tuple (L1, ID1), the ground control unit selects a random number o1 and obtains a point Q1 on the hyperelliptic curve based on the random number o1, where Q1 = o1D, o1∈[1, l-1].

[0075] S2.32. Obtain the user certificate C1 of the first preset device according to the point L1 and the point Q1 on the hyperelliptic curve, where C1 = L1 + Q1.

[0076] S2.33. Obtain the signature a1 of the first preset device based on the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 and ID1 of the first preset device, the random number o1 and the private key k of the ground control unit, a1=k+o1h(ID1, C1).

[0077] S2.34. Send the first preset device ticket m1 consisting of the first preset device user certificate C1 and the first preset device signature a1 to the first preset device, where m1 = (C1, a1).

[0078] S2.4. After the first preset device receives the ticket m1, it obtains the first preset device private key p1 based on the first preset device user certificate C1 and the first preset device signature a1, where p1 = v1h(ID1, C1) + a1;

[0079] S2.5. Obtain the public key B1 of the first preset device according to the private key p1 of the first preset device, where B1=p1D.

[0080] In this embodiment, the first preset device is a device that needs to submit a registration application to the ground control unit. The first preset device can be a drone device or a mobile edge computing device.

[0081] In the following embodiment, the registration process will be explained by taking the first preset devices as the i-th drone device, the j-th drone device, and the mobile edge computing device as examples.

[0082] When the first preset device is the i-th UAV device and a registration application is submitted to the ground control unit, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0083] First, the i-th drone device D i Pick a random number v i , where v i ∈[1,l-1], use HECC to calculate L i =v i D, and the binary (L i , ID i ) is sent to the ground control unit.

[0084] Then, the ground control unit receives the i-th UAV device D i The sent two-tuple (L i , ID i ) and then randomly select a random number o i , where o i ∈[1,l-1], calculate Q i =o i D, then Q i Calculate C i =L i +Q i As the user certificate, calculate a i =k+o i h(ID i ,C i ) as a signature, and then the bill m i =(C i ,a i ) is sent to the i-th drone device D i .

[0085] Finally, the i-th drone device D i Receive the ticket m sent by the ground control unit i Then, calculate p i =v i h(ID i ,C i )+a i As the i-th drone device D i The private key of B i =p i D is the i-th drone device D i The public key of

[0086] When the first preset device is the jth UAV device and a registration application is submitted to the ground control unit, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0087] First, the jth drone device D j Pick a random number v j , where v j ∈[1,l-1], use HECC to calculate L j =v j D, and the binary (L j , ID j ) is sent to the ground control unit.

[0088] Then, the ground control unit receives the jth UAV device D j The sent two-tuple (L j , ID j ) and then randomly select a random number o j , where o j ∈[1,l-1], calculate Q j =o j D, then Q j Calculate C j =L j +Q j As the jth UAV device D j The user certificate of a j =k+o j h(ID j ,C j ) as the jth drone device D ) The signature of the bill m j =(C j ,a j ) is sent to the jth drone device D j .

[0089] Finally, the jth drone device D j Receive the ticket m sent by the ground control unit j Then, calculate p j =b j h(ID j ,C j )+a j As the jth UAV device D j The private key of B j =p j D is the jth UAV device D j The public key of

[0090] When the first preset device is a mobile edge computing device and submits a registration application to the ground control unit, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0091] First, the mobile edge computing device D MEC Pick a random number v MEC , where v MEC ∈[1,l-1], use HECC to calculate L MEC =v MEC D, and the binary (L MEC , ID MEC ) is sent to the ground control unit.

[0092] Then, the ground control unit receives the data from the mobile edge computing device D MEC The sent two-tuple (L MEC , ID MEC ) and then randomly select a random number o MEC , where o MEC ∈[1,l-1], calculate Q MEC =o MEC D, then Q MEC Calculate C MEC =L MEC +Q MEC As a mobile edge computing device D MEC The user certificate of a MEC =k+o MEC h(ID MEC ,C MEC ) as a mobile edge computing device D MEC The signature of the bill m MEC =(C MEC ,a MEC ) is sent to the mobile edge computing device D MEC .

[0093] Finally, the mobile edge computing device D MEC Receive the ticket m sent by the ground control unit MEC Then, calculate p MEC =v MEC h(ID MEC ,C MEC )+a MEC As a mobile edge computing device D MEC The private key of B MEC =p MEC D as a mobile edge computing device MEC The public key of

[0094] S3. When the first preset device requests communication from the second preset device, when the public key of the second preset device is equal to the preset formula, an encrypted message is obtained according to the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device, and after the second preset device receives the tuple constructed by the encrypted message, the session key between the first preset device and the second preset device is determined.

[0095] In a specific embodiment, S3 may include:

[0096] S3.1. Determine whether the public key B2 of the second preset device is equal to the preset formula. If they are equal, the first preset device selects a random number r1, r1∈[1,l-1]. The preset formula is expressed as C2h(ID2,C2)+J, where h(ID2,C2) is a one-way hash function of the user certificate C2 of the second preset device and ID2.

[0097] Specifically, the process of determining whether the public key B2 of the second preset device is equal to the preset formula is:

[0098] C2h(ID2,C2)+J

[0099] =(L2+Q2)h(ID2,C2)+kD

[0100] =(v2D+o2D)h(ID2,C2)+kD

[0101] =[(v2+o2)h(ID2,C2)+k]D

[0102] =[v2h(ID2,C2)+k+o2h(ID2,C2)]D

[0103] =[v2h(ID2,C2)+a2]D

[0104] =p2D

[0105] =B2

[0106] Therefore, the above formula can be used to determine whether the other party is the drone device designated for communication.

[0107] S3.2, obtain an encrypted message based on the random number r1, the timestamp t1, ID1, the user certificate C1 of the first preset device, and the public key B2 of the second preset device

[0108] S3.3. Obtain a hash value H1 according to a one-way hash function constructed by the random number r1, the timestamp t1, ID1, and the user certificate C1 of the first preset device, where H1 = h(r1, t1, ID1, C1).

[0109] S3.4, Encrypt the message and hash value H1 Send to the second preset device.

[0110] S3.5. The second preset device receives the binary Then, use the private key p2 of the second preset device to pair the two tuples Decrypt to get a hash value based on the decryption result And obtain the session key K between the first preset device and the second preset device according to the hash value H1 and the hash value H′1 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device.

[0111] S3.51, using the private key p2 of the second preset device to pair Decryption is performed using the following method: The hash value H′1 is obtained based on the decryption result, H′1=h(r1, t1, ID1, C1);

[0112] S3.52, determine whether the hash value H1 is equal to the hash value H′1. If they are equal, the second preset device selects a random number r2 and calculates the point on the hyperelliptic curve r2∈[1,l-1].

[0113] S3.53, based on ID1, ID2, random number r1, random number r2 and the point on the hyperelliptic curve Construct a one-way hash function to generate the session key K 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device, wherein,

[0114] To better understand the communication authentication between drone devices in this embodiment, an example in which the j-th drone device requests communication from the i-th drone device will be used for illustration.

[0115] First, calculate the i-th drone device D i Public key B i Is it equal to C i h(ID i ,C i )+J; if the two are equal, then the jth drone device D j A random number r will be selected j2 ∈[1,l-1], then calculate H2=h(r j2 ,t j1 ,ID j ,C j ), and the tuple Sent to the i-th drone device D i .

[0116] Then, the i-th drone device D i Receive a tuple After that, first use the private key p i To decrypt: Then calculate the hash value H′2=h(rj2 ,t j1 ,ID j ,C j ), determine whether H′2 is equal to H2.

[0117] Finally, if the hash value H′2 is equal to H2, then the i-th drone device D i Pick a random number r i2 ∈[1,l-1], calculate δ1=p i B j =p i p j D and obtain the session key K j-i =h(ID i ,ID j ,r i2 ,r j2 ,δ1).

[0118] In this embodiment, the second preset device is a device that the first preset device needs to communicate with. The second preset device can be a drone device or a mobile edge computing device.

[0119] In the following embodiment, the registration process will be explained by taking the second preset devices as the i-th drone device, the j-th drone device, and the mobile edge computing device as examples.

[0120] When the first preset device is the i-th drone device and the second preset device is the j-th drone device, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0121] First, calculate the j-th drone device D j Public key B j Is it consistent with the preset formula C j h(ID j ,C j )+J are equal, if the two are verified to be equal, then the i-th drone device D i A random number r will be selected i ∈[1,l-1], then calculate H=h(r j ,t j ,ID i ,C i ). Finally, the tuple Sent to the jth drone device D j .

[0122] Specifically, determine the public key B of the j-th drone device j Whether with C j h(ID j ,C j The process of )+J being equal is:

[0123] C j h(ID j ,C j )+J

[0124] =(L j +Q j )h(ID j ,C j )+kD

[0125] =(v j D+o j D)h(ID j ,C j )+kD

[0126] =[(v j +o j )h(ID j ,C j )+k]D

[0127] =[v j h(ID j ,C j )+k+o j h(ID j ,C j )]D

[0128] =[v j h)ID j ,C j )+a j ]D

[0129] =p j D

[0130] =B j

[0131] Therefore, the above formula can be used to determine whether the other party is the drone device designated for communication.

[0132] Then, the jth drone device D j Receive a tuple Then, first use the jth drone device D j The private key p j To decrypt: Then calculate the hash value H′=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ), and determine whether H′ is equal to H.

[0133] Finally, if H′ is equal to H, then the jth UAV device D j Pick a random number r j∈[1,l-1], then calculate δ=p j B i =p j p i D and session key K i-j =h(ID i ,ID j ,r i ,r j ,δ).

[0134] When the first preset device is the jth drone device and the second preset device is the ith drone device, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0135] First, calculate the i-th drone device D i Public key B i Is it consistent with the preset formula C i h(ID i ,C i )+J are equal. If the two are verified to be equal, then the jth drone device D j A random number r will be selected j ∈[1,l-1], then calculate H=h(r j ,t j ,ID j ,C j ). Finally, the tuple Sent to the i-th drone device D i .

[0136] Then, the i-th drone device D i Receive a tuple Then, first use the i-th drone device D i The private key p i To decrypt: Then calculate the hash value H′=h(r j ,t j ,ID j ,C j ), and determine whether H′ is equal to H.

[0137] Finally, if H′ is equal to H, then the i-th drone device D i Pick a random number r i ∈[1,l-1], then calculate δ=p i B j =p i p j D and obtain the session key K j-i =h(ID j ,ID j ,r i ,rj ,δ).

[0138] When the first preset device is the i-th drone device and the second preset device is a mobile edge computing device, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0139] First, calculate the mobile edge computing device D MEC Public key B MEC Is it consistent with the preset formula C MEC h(ID MEC ,C MEC )+J are equal, if the two are verified to be equal, then the i-th drone device D i A random number r will be selected i ∈[1,l-1], then calculate H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ). Finally, the tuple Sent to the mobile edge computing device D MEC .

[0140] Then, the mobile edge computing device D MEC Receive a tuple Then, first use the mobile edge computing device D MEC The private key p MEC To decrypt: Then calculate the hash value H′=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ), and determine whether H′ is equal to H.

[0141] Finally, if H′ is equal to H, then the mobile edge computing device D MEC Pick a random number r MEC ∈[1,l-1], then calculate φ=p MEC B i =p MEC p i D and session key K i-MEC =h(ID i ,ID MEC ,r i ,r MEC ,φ).

[0142] When the first preset device is a mobile edge computing device and the second preset device is the i-th drone device, the detailed steps are as follows:

[0143] First, calculate the i-th drone device D i Public key B iIs it consistent with the preset formula C i h(ID i ,C i )+J are equal. If the two are equal, then the mobile edge computing device D MEC A random number r will be selected MEC ∈[1,l-1], then calculate H=h(r MEC ,t MEC ,ID MEC ,C MEC ). Finally, the tuple Send to device D i .

[0144] Then, the i-th drone device D i Receive a tuple Then, first use the i-th drone device D i The private key p i To decrypt: Then calculate the hash value H′=h(r MEC ,t MEC ,ID MEC ,C MeC ), and determine whether H′ is equal to H.

[0145] Finally, if H′ is equal to H, then the i-th drone device D i Pick a random number r i ∈[1,l-1], calculate φ=p i B MCC =p i p MEC D and obtain the session key K MEC-i =h(ID i ,ID MEC ,r i ,r MEC ,φ).

[0146] S4. When a third preset device needs to be added, the ground control unit obtains the point L on the hyperelliptic curve based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method. new Generate a user certificate of the third preset device, and generate a signature of the third preset device based on a one-way hash function constructed by the user certificate of the third preset device and the private key of the ground control unit, and send the ticket of the third preset device consisting of the user certificate of the third preset device and the signature of the third preset device to the third preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the third preset device.

[0147] In a specific embodiment, S4 may include:

[0148] S4.1. The third preset device selects a random number v new , v new ∈[1,l-1].

[0149] S4.2, based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, according to the random number v new Get the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new , L new =v new D, will be the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new and ID new The binary group (L new , ID new ) is sent to the ground control unit, P new For the third preset device.

[0150] S4.3, the ground control unit receives the two-tuple (L new , ID new ), select a random number o new , and according to the random number o new Get point Q on the hyperelliptic curve new , Q new =o new D,o new ∈[1,l-1].

[0151] S4.4. According to the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new and a point Q on the hyperelliptic curve new Get the user certificate C of the third preset device new , C new =L new +Q new .

[0152] S4.5, according to the user certificate C of the third preset device new With ID new The constructed one-way hash function h(ID new ,C new ), random number o new And the private key k of the ground control unit obtains the signature a of the third preset device new , a new =k+o new h(ID new ,C new ).

[0153] S4.6, the user certificate C of the third preset device new and the signature a of the third preset device new The third preset device consisting of a ticket m new Send to the third preset device, m new=(C new ,a new ).

[0154] S4.7. Receive the bill m at the third preset device new After that, the user certificate C of the third preset device is used. new and the signature a of the third preset device new Get the third preset device private key p new , p new =v new h(ID new ,C new )+a new .

[0155] S4.8, according to the private key p of the third preset device new Get the public key B of the third preset device new , B new =p new D.

[0156] In order to verify the effectiveness of the security authentication method provided by this embodiment, this embodiment will be analyzed from the aspects of security and performance.

[0157] First, the security authentication method proposed in this embodiment uses the well-known ROR (Real-Or-Random) security model to prove the semantic security (key security) of the proposed security authentication method, which is actually stronger than the FTG (Find-Then-Guess) security model. This is because the security proof in the ROR model can be easily converted to the security proof in the FTG model, with only a two-factor loss in the reduction. However, the opposite is not necessarily true, as reduction does not guarantee security. Second, in the informal security analysis, various currently common attacks are mainly used to analyze whether the set scheme has the function of secure transmission.

[0158] To facilitate the subsequent security analysis, the following two definitions are given here:

[0159] Definition 1: Assume that the collision-resistant one-way hash function h: {0,1} * →{0,1} t It is considered as a deterministic function that takes a variable-length input string and produces a fixed-length t-bit output string.

[0160] Definition 2: HECDLP (Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem): Given J = kD, it is not feasible to find k using public information. Solving this problem requires HECDLP.

[0161] (1) Safety analysis under real or random models.

[0162] The ROR model assumes the existence of active and passive adversaries that attack the UAV during its communication. In the challenger-attacker game, the adversary can issue the following queries, which may cause damage to the operation:

[0163] 1) Execute query: This allows attackers to intercept communication messages transmitted when establishing communication links between UAVs and MECs, and between UAVs.

[0164] 2) Corrupt query: An attacker can obtain secret credentials between communicating devices through corrupted query.

[0165] 3) Reveal query: An attacker can reveal the session key K between communicating devices through a reveal query. i-j =h(ID i ,ID j ,r i ,r j ,δ) or K j-i .

[0166] 4) Test query: Using this query, the attacker can check whether the selected binary digits are correct or not.

[0167] 5) Hash query: An attacker can use hash query to infer the true value of the hash function used.

[0168] Before proving this theorem, we first need to introduce a theorem: Assume that an adversary attempts to calculate the session key shared by a specific session between drones in polynomial time. If q h , |Hash| and Adversary AVR (t poly ) represent the number of “hash queries”, the range of “a one-way collision-resistant hash function h(·)” and the advantage of breaking the “hyperelliptic curve decision Diffie-Hellman problem (HECDLP / DH)”, respectively. Then:

[0169]

[0170] The following three games will be used A , G B , G C To verify the effectiveness and robustness of the key security mechanism of this system solution.

[0171] Game G A:The attacker selects a random bitρ for a real attack on the security of the session key. The adversary's advantage is obtained from the semantic security and the result is the following formula 1, which is:

[0172]

[0173] Game G B :An attacker can monitor drone communication messages, for example, by executing (execute) queries to obtain H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i )as well as At the end of the game, the session key can be verified to be real or random by revealing the query and testing the query. j The private key p j If , then it is possible to obtain the session key of both parties, but the private key is unknown to the adversary, and the same is true for other messages, that is, the attacker can never successfully obtain the key, so these queries will not increase the probability of winning the game, that is, the game G A With the game G B is indistinguishable, then the following formula 2 can be obtained:

[0174]

[0175] Game G C :The attacker conducts an active attack and uses hash query and destruction query to find the real session key K i-j =h(ID i ,ID j ,r i ,r j ,δ), if the attacker guesses the exact value during the hash query, then K i-j , but due to the irreversibility of the hash function in Definition 1, this is impossible so far. In addition, when the adversary executes another hash query H = h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ), you must know the ID i 、ID j , and r i , it is obvious that this is an irreversible problem.

[0176] In addition, for the parameters involved in the hash function in the scheme, r iis a random secret key, which is only known by the drone device participating in the communication, and the parameter δ=p j B i This can only be achieved by solving the HECDLP / DH problem in Definition 2, so the adversary cannot obtain the session key. Therefore, if the simulation of Hash and Corrupt query is excluded, then the game G B and G C They are all indistinguishable, and solving ECDDHP is not a difficult problem. With the help of the birthday paradox of hash functions and the HECDLP / DH problem, we can derive the following conclusion from Formula 3:

[0177]

[0178] However, even though the adversary still cannot obtain the session key after executing the above query, it can still win the game by executing display queries and test queries to detect whether a random bitρ is correct or not, so we can get Formula 4:

[0179]

[0180] From formula 1, we can get:

[0181]

[0182] Then, using the triangle inequality, we can derive from Formula 2, Formula 3, and Formula 4:

[0183]

[0184] Finally, multiply both sides of the above formula by 2 to get the final result:

[0185]

[0186] Therefore, during the access control and key agreement phase, the adversary can derive:

[0187]

[0188] This formula means that in order to obtain any two communicating devices D i and D j The key K between i-j And undermine the estimation of the advantages of semantic security.

[0189] (2) Informal security analysis

[0190] This example uses informal security analysis to demonstrate that the designed secure transmission scheme can resist the following major attacks and supports other functional features (integrity, non-repudiation, and anonymity protection):

[0191] 1) Man-in-the-middle attack: When two devices communicate, the attacker can obtain and H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ), so if an attacker wants to crack the The attacker must know the device D j The private key p j However, if you want to obtain the private key, you must solve the HECDLP problem, which is currently unsolvable. In addition, if the adversary wants to obtain the private key from H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ) to extract useful information. Due to the one-way nature of the hash function, this attempt will inevitably fail. Therefore, the communication authentication process of the scheme can effectively prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0192] 2) Impersonation attack: When devices communicate, if an attacker wants to perform an impersonation attack, then the attacker must forge messages. and H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ) to become a trusted communication party, which means that the variable r must be known i , such attempts will ultimately require a large amount of computation to generate only device D i and D j Known variable r i ,Therefore, the designed scheme can resist impersonation attacks.

[0193] 3) Replay attack: In this attack, the adversary can intercept the message and H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ) and can send it repeatedly to device D j However, this attack method is ineffective because when the adversary replays the message next time, device D i A new timestamp t is added i After receiving the message, the receiving device will verify the timestamp t received in each session i The freshness of the authentication data enables the security authentication method of this embodiment to resist replay attacks by attackers.

[0194] 4) Random number leakage attack: If the attacker wants to obtain the device's session key , the attacker must calculate the random number and , but they only have equipment and equipment Know. Assume Want to To communicate: equipment ①Computing equipment Public key Is it equal to ;②If equal, the device Select random number ,calculate and ③ will Send to device ; equipment :①Private key for decryption = ;②Calculate the hash value ,judge Is it equal to , if they are equal, proceed to the next step; ③ Equipment Pick a random number ,calculate And get the session key .

[0195] According to this process, we can know that in order to obtain the random number r i and r j , you must know the private key of the device, you must solve the HECDLP problem, but it is impossible to solve it at present.

[0196] 5) Anonymity protection: The designed scheme retains anonymity, with device D i Want to be with D j For example, in the process of communication, the relevant information is not leaked because and H=h(r i ,t i ,ID i ,C i ) is always in an encrypted state during the device communication process, so the security authentication method of this embodiment has anonymous protection.

[0197] 6) Anti-cloning attack: In this attack, the attacker will intercept the device and copy the session key. However, in the security authentication method of this embodiment, this attack is impossible because the identity of the valid user is protected through interaction; for example, device D i Choose a random number r j ∈[1,l-1], calculate and H=h(ri ,t i ,ID i ,C i ), and send the tuple To D j In this process, the attacker cannot obtain the ID i , because the attacker cannot obtain device D j The private key to decrypt the binary At the same time, due to the irreversibility of the one-way hash function, the information in H cannot be obtained.

[0198] 7) Anti-wormhole attack: A wormhole attack is generally initiated by collusion between at least two malicious nodes that are far apart. A private channel is established between the colluding nodes that is more efficient than that between normal nodes. When a wormhole attack is initiated, one of the colluding nodes obtains data packets in the network at one end of the network, transmits the data packets to another colluding node through a private channel, and then the colluding node replays the data packets back to the network. During the transmission of the private channel, the malicious node may selectively discard or tamper with the data, etc. However, in the security authentication method of this embodiment, each node in the network must first register with the CA, and a device selects a random number v i ∈[1,l-1], calculate L i =v i D, and (L i , ID i ) is sent to GCU; GCU selects a random number o after receiving the message i ∈[1,l-1], calculate Q i =o i D; Calculate C i =L i +Q i As a device certificate, a i =k+o i h(ID i ,C i ) as the signature, and the bill m=(C i ,a i ) forwarded to device D i , and then device D i Calculate p after receiving bill m i =v i h(ID i ,C i )+a i As the private key of the device, B i =p i D is used as the public key of the device; secondly, in the security authentication method of this embodiment, a new timestamp t is added to each communication session of the device. iThis allows the message to be discovered in time when it is being replayed, thus preventing the network from being overloaded and causing a crash.

[0199] (3) Formal security analysis using Proverif

[0200] The Proverif tool is a tool for analyzing and verifying the security properties of network protocols. It is a formal automatic verification tool for cryptographic protocols based on the DY model mentioned in Chapter 2. It is a system implemented in a logic programming language. If Proverif finds a vulnerability in the cryptographic protocol when analyzing it, it will give a corresponding attack sequence.

[0201] The Proverif prover architecture is mainly divided into three parts: system input, core processing module and result output. Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the system input is a description of the cryptographic protocol and its security properties, and a preprocessing of the written language for syntax checking. The core processing module mainly performs logical reasoning and proof on the user-submitted part based on the security property definition. The execution module is different depending on the written statement. The result output part displays the security analysis results in a user-readable manner.

[0202] Then, the automated formal tool proverif is used to verify the security of the proposed solution.

[0203] The steps described in the security authentication method of this embodiment are modeled in the code implementation, including some cryptographic functions such as encryption, hashing functions and signatures. The verification model is mainly divided into the following three parts: parameter and function declaration; macro process description; main process and query test. These declarations define all the names and variables used in the proposed scheme, including public keys, private keys, identities, certification authority public keys and private keys, etc., and also various functions. The macro process mainly includes four processes corresponding to three authentication participants, namely device D i and D j Each device registers with the GCU CA, and the devices perform mutual communication authentication. The main process primarily models the actual implementation of the method, while enabling concurrent authentication. The query test primarily tests the solution's security properties and the attacks it can defend against.

[0204] Proverif uses an event-based approach to achieve the security of protocols and authentication. It can prove the three properties of confidentiality, authentication, and strong confidentiality. In order to ensure its confidentiality and authentication, it is necessary to define the key node events of the protocol (event), that is, the key node events of the drone D i For D j Authentication is performed, so if it completes the protocol, Dj To D i The certification should be maintained. j , it can interact with many other devices, so after running the protocol, if D j Think D i is its communication partner, then D i To D j The authentication should be maintained. The event definition is as follows Figure 4 .

[0205] First, let's introduce the description of the inj-event event. It defines the two processes as follows: inj-event(e(M1,···,M j ))==>inj-event(e(N1,···,N k )), the purpose of this statement is to expect the agreement process between the two parties to occur only once, while ensuring that the other party is a trusted communication party. In order to verify the security of the protocol when facing replay attacks, the query statement is executed to verify the security of identity authentication between drone devices. In addition, in order to verify whether the session key is secure during the protocol exchange process and whether it will be attacked by random numbers, the query statement is executed to verify whether it has the above security. The query statement is as follows Figure 5 shown.

[0206] Since proveif only supports command line execution, first enter the proveif2.0 directory, open cmd and then enter to start the .pv file written in a language supported by proveif.

[0207] The test results are as follows Figure 4 The query results show that in this scheme, attackers cannot steal the session keys between communicating drones or between drones and MEC facilities.

[0208] In addition, in the scheme, the test results show that the adversary cannot obtain the private key of the drone device or MEC facility, and the random number r selected during the communication process is i and r j It will not be obtained by the adversary. If the adversary wants to obtain useful information, it must go through a lot of calculations, which is theoretically impossible. This also makes the scheme resistant to random number attacks.

[0209] like Figure 6 The test results of the last two lines in the result are true, which means that the communication authentication between the drone devices has been completed, that is, there is no middleman pretending to be a drone to communicate with the other party; in addition, we can also know that the drone device D iBelieve that you have communicated with your trusted drone device, and the drone device D j In D i During the communication process, identity authentication can still be performed with other devices.

[0210] This paper combines hyperelliptic curve cryptography, digital signatures, and hash functions to provide a comprehensive knowledge base, proposing a privacy-preserving identity authentication method. It also establishes a secure communication method for drones, verifying the operability and applicability of the proposed communication system using system architecture and threat models. Furthermore, this paper establishes session keys for drone communication transmissions based on hyperelliptic curve cryptography, and processes these keys using a one-way hash function to further enhance key security.

[0211] The security of the scheme is analyzed using formal security analysis methods. That is, the security characteristics of the proposed scheme are evaluated under the ROR model and using the proverif formal tool. At the same time, informal security analysis methods are used to further prove the feasibility of the scheme.

[0212] It should be noted that the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood to indicate or imply relative importance or implicitly specify the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, features defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more features. In the description of the present invention, "plurality" means two or more, unless otherwise specifically defined.

[0213] In the description of this specification, the reference terms "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples" mean that the specific features or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features or characteristics described can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. In addition, those skilled in the art can combine and combine different embodiments or examples described in this specification.

[0214] Although the present invention has been described herein with reference to various embodiments, those skilled in the art may understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments by reviewing the drawings and the disclosure in the process of implementing the claimed invention. In the specification, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude multiple components or steps. The fact that certain measures are described in different embodiments does not mean that these measures cannot be combined to produce good results.

[0215] The above is a further detailed description of the present invention in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, and the specific implementation of the present invention should not be considered to be limited to these descriptions. For those skilled in the art of the present invention, without departing from the concept of the present invention, several simple deductions or substitutions can be made, which should be considered to fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A security authentication method for drone networks, characterized in that: The security authentication method includes: Obtain the private key k and public key J of the ground control unit as the certificate authority; When the first preset device submits a registration application to the ground control unit, the ground control unit generates a user certificate of the first preset device according to the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve obtained based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, generates a signature of the first preset device according to a one-way hash function constructed by the user certificate of the first preset device and the private key of the ground control unit, and sends a ticket of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate of the first preset device and the signature of the first preset device to the first preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the first preset device; When the first preset device requests communication from the second preset device, when the public key of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula, an encrypted message is obtained based on the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device, and after the second preset device receives the tuple constructed by the encrypted message, the session key between the first preset device and the second preset device is determined.

2. The security authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: Obtain the private key k and public key J of the ground control unit, including: The ground control unit acts as a certificate issuing authority to generate a private key k of the ground control unit according to a random number k, wherein k∈[1,l-1], l is an integer greater than 1; Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, the public key J of the ground control unit is generated according to the private key k of the ground control unit, where J=kD, and D is the primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve.

3. The security authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: The ground control unit generates a user certificate of the first preset device according to a point L1 on a hyperelliptic curve obtained based on a hyperelliptic curve encryption method, and generates a signature of the first preset device according to a one-way hash function constructed using the user certificate of the first preset device and a private key of the ground control unit, including: The first preset device selects a random number v1, v1∈[1,l-1], where l is an integer greater than 1; Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, a point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve is obtained according to the random number v1, where L1=v1D, and a tuple (L1, ID1) consisting of the point L1 on the hyperelliptic curve and ID1 is sent to the ground control unit, where D is a primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve, I is a set of positive integers, and D1 is a first preset device; After receiving the tuple (L1, ID1), the ground control unit obtains the user certificate C1 of the first preset device based on L1, and obtains the signature a1 of the first preset device based on the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and ID1, the random number o1 and the private key k of the ground control unit.

4. The security authentication method according to claim 3, wherein: After receiving the tuple (L1, ID1), the ground control unit obtains the user certificate C1 of the first preset device according to L1, and obtains the signature a1 of the first preset device according to the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and ID1, the random number o1, and the private key k of the ground control unit, including: After receiving the binary group (L1, ID1), the ground control unit selects a random number o1 and obtains a point Q1 on the hyperelliptic curve according to the random number o1, where Q1=o1D, o1∈[1,l-1]; Obtaining the user certificate C1 of the first preset device according to the point L1 and the point Q1 on the hyperelliptic curve, C1=L1+Q1; The signature a1 of the first preset device is obtained according to the one-way hash function h(ID1, C1) constructed by the user certificate C1 and ID1 of the first preset device, the random number o1 and the private key k of the ground control unit, a1=k+o1h(ID1, C1).

5. The security authentication method according to claim 3, wherein: Sending the first preset device's ticket m, which consists of the first preset device's user certificate and the first preset device's signature, to the first preset device to obtain the first preset device's private key and public key, includes: Sending a ticket m1 of the first preset device consisting of the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and the signature a1 of the first preset device to the first preset device, where m1 = (C1, a1), o1∈[1, l-1]; After the first preset device receives the ticket m1, it obtains the first preset device private key p1 according to the user certificate C1 of the first preset device and the signature a1 of the first preset device, where p1 = v1h (ID1, C1) + a1; The public key B1 of the first preset device is obtained according to the private key p1 of the first preset device, where B1=p1D.

6. The security authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: When the public key of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula, obtaining an encrypted message according to the user certificate of the first preset device and the public key of the second preset device, and determining a session key between the first preset device and the second preset device after the second preset device receives a tuple constructed by the encrypted message, including: Determine whether the public key B2 of the second preset device is equal to a preset formula. If they are equal, the first preset device selects a random number r1, r1∈[1,l-1], where l is an integer greater than 1, and the preset formula is expressed as C2h(ID2,C2)+J, where h(ID2,C2) is a one-way hash function of the user certificate C2 of the second preset device and ID2, I is a set of positive integers, and D2 is the second preset device; Obtain an encrypted message θ according to the random number r1, the timestamp t1, ID1, the user certificate C1 of the first preset device, and the public key B2 of the second preset device, θ=(r1, t1, ID1, c1)B2; Obtain a hash value H1 according to a one-way hash function constructed by the random number r1, the timestamp t1, ID1, and the user certificate C1 of the first preset device, where H1 = h(r1, t1, ID1, C1); Sending a tuple (θ, H1) consisting of the encrypted message θ and the hash value H1 to the second preset device; After receiving the tuple (θ, H1), the second preset device decrypts the tuple (θ, H1) using the private key p2 of the second preset device to obtain a hash value H′1 based on the decryption result, and obtains the session key K between the first preset device and the second preset device based on the hash value H1 and the hash value H′1. 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device.

7. The security authentication method according to claim 6, characterized in that: Decrypt the tuple (θ, H1) using the private key p2 of the second preset device to obtain a hash value H′1 based on the decryption result, and obtain the session key K between the first preset device and the second preset device based on the hash value H1 and the hash value H′1. 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device, including: Decrypt the tuple (θ, H1) using the private key p2 of the second preset device, using the decryption method θp2 = (r1, t1, ID1, C1) to obtain a hash value H′1 based on the decryption result, where H′1 = h(r1, t1, ID1, C1); Determine whether the hash value H1 is equal to the hash value H′1. If they are equal, the second preset device selects a random number r2 and calculates the point on the hyperelliptic curve. r2∈[1,l-1]; According to ID1, ID2, random number r1, random number r2 and the point on the hyperelliptic curve Construct a one-way hash function to generate the session key K 1-2 , enabling the first preset device to communicate with the second preset device, wherein, 8. The security authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: The security authentication method further includes: When a third preset device needs to be added, the ground control unit calculates the point L on the hyperelliptic curve obtained based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method. new Generate a user certificate for the third preset device, and generate a signature of the third preset device based on a one-way hash function constructed by the user certificate of the third preset device and the private key of the ground control unit, and send a ticket for the third preset device consisting of the user certificate of the third preset device and the signature of the third preset device to the third preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the third preset device.

9. The security authentication method according to claim 1, wherein: The ground control unit obtains a point L on the hyperelliptic curve based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method. new Generating a user certificate of the third preset device, generating a signature of the third preset device based on a one-way hash function constructed using the user certificate of the third preset device and a private key of the ground control unit, and sending a ticket of the third preset device consisting of the user certificate of the third preset device and the signature of the third preset device to the third preset device to obtain the private key and public key of the third preset device, including: The third preset device selects a random number v new , v new ∈[1,l-1], l is an integer greater than 1; Based on the hyperelliptic curve encryption method, according to the random number v new Get the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new , L new =v new D, will be the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new and ID new The binary group (L new , ID new ) is sent to the ground control unit, D is the primitive root of the hyperelliptic curve, I is a set of positive integers, D new For the third preset device; The ground control unit receives the two-tuple (L new , ID new ), select a random number o new , and according to the random number o new Get point Q on the hyperelliptic curve new , Q new =o new D, O new ∈[1,l-1]; According to the point L on the hyperelliptic curve new and point Q on the hyperelliptic curve new Get the user certificate C of the third preset device new , C new =L new +Q new ; According to the user certificate C of the third preset device new With ID new The constructed one-way hash function h(ID new ,C new ), the random number o new And the private key k of the ground control unit obtains the signature a of the third preset device new , a new =k+o new h(ID new ,C new ); The user certificate C of the third preset device new and the signature a of the third preset device new The third preset device consists of a note m new Sent to the third preset device, m new =(C new ,a new ); When the third preset device receives the ticket m new Then, according to the user certificate C of the third preset device new and the signature a of the third preset device new Get the third preset device private key p new , p new =v new h(ID new ,C new )+a new ; According to the private key p of the third preset device new Get the public key B of the third preset device new , B new =p new D.

10. The security authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that: The first preset device and the second preset device both include a drone device and a mobile edge computing device.

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