Blockchain-based mobile intelligent node lightweight identity authentication method

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of trusted authentication, and discloses a mobile intelligent node lightweight identity authentication method based on a block chain, which comprises an initialization stage, a trusted center generates public password parameters, writes a PUF challenge-response table subjected to redundancy coding, a dynamic pseudonym and each entity public key into a block chain; a message signature stage, a node obtains a random challenge through an intelligent contract once, calculates a single frame signature according to a local PUF response and public parameters, and broadcasts; an authentication stage, a receiver completes decentralized verification according to on-chain parameters, and if verification fails, the trusted center traces a real identity through a pseudonym mapping. The method discards multiple rounds of handshaking, only the minimum auxiliary data exists on the chain, the anonymity, traceability and low calculation and low communication load of resource-restricted equipment are considered, and the method is suitable for high-dynamic scenes such as Internet of Vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicle clusters.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of trusted authentication technology, and in particular to a lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread deployment of various mobile intelligent nodes, such as connected vehicles, drone fleets, and mobile robots, in transportation, logistics, and public safety, these terminals must rapidly verify their identities in highly dynamic, low-power, and even intermittently connected environments to ensure coordinated control and data integrity. Traditional handshake mechanisms that rely on certificate authorities often involve multiple rounds of interaction and the download of large certificate chains, making them inadequate for scenarios with limited on-chip resources and unstable links. Furthermore, software-only key storage is susceptible to duplication and lacks protection against physical side-channel attacks. In this context, the industry is beginning to combine the uniqueness of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) with the decentralized and tamper-proof nature of blockchains. Key parameters and challenge-response tables are initialized once by a trusted center, and minimal necessary information is made public on-chain. Off-chain nodes then rapidly generate one-time signatures using their own PUFs, which are then automatically verified using smart contracts. Dynamic pseudonyms are used to balance privacy and regulatory oversight. This fusion approach has become a key development direction for the next generation of lightweight identity authentication technologies.

[0003] However, existing solutions still have the following shortcomings: First, writing a complete PUF response chain will occupy a large amount of blockchain storage and provide material for offline recovery attacks; second, random challenges require multiple round trips to be issued, resulting in high communication load and cumulative latency, making it difficult to adapt to high-speed mobile scenarios; third, the system usually still relies on a centralized certificate server to distribute public keys. Once the node is offline, it will cause large-scale verification failures; fourth, some solutions use fixed identifiers or one-time certificates for authentication, which cannot support subsequent accountability while protecting node anonymity. Summary of the Invention

[0004] (1) Technical problems solved: In response to the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain, which solves the above problems.

[0005] (II) Technical Solution: To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain, comprising an initialization phase, a message signing phase, and an authentication phase, characterized in that:

[0006] The initialization phase includes:

[0007] S1: The trusted center TA generates public cryptographic parameters and creates a physical unclonable function PUF challenge-response table CRT for each mobile intelligent node, and writes the challenge-response table into the blockchain together with the public cryptographic parameters after encoding;

[0008] S2: The trusted center TA assigns a pseudonym dynamically updated with timestamp to each mobile intelligent node, and binds the pseudonym to the corresponding blockchain address through a smart contract;

[0009] The message signature stage includes:

[0010] S3: The mobile intelligent node calls a smart contract deployed on the blockchain to obtain a random challenge sequence;

[0011] S4: The mobile intelligent node generates a response to the random challenge using a local PUF, and calculates a one-time signature according to the response, a public cryptographic parameter, and a message to be sent;

[0012] The authentication stage includes:

[0013] S5: The receiving node obtains the signature and the corresponding random challenge sequence, and calls the public cryptographic parameter on the chain to verify the signature;

[0014] S6: When the verification fails, a conditional traceability process of the trusted center TA can be triggered to recover the real identity.

[0015] Further, the trusted center TA further writes the public keys of the mobile intelligent node OBU and the roadside unit RSU into the blockchain, so that any node can use the on-chain public key to verify the digital signature in a decentralized manner.

[0016] Further, in step S1, the challenge-response table CRT is encoded, including:

[0017] An erasure code operation is applied to each response data to generate helper data Helper;

[0018] Only the Helper is written into the blockchain, while the complete response data is retained in the local secure storage of the trusted center TA, so as to reduce the on-chain storage overhead and hide the complete response content while ensuring on-chain verifiability.

[0019] Further, in step S2, the pseudonym dynamically updated with timestamp is generated according to the following process:

[0020] Obtain the unique identifier ID of the mobile intelligent node;

[0021] Concatenate the ID and the current timestamp TS to obtain a message string (ID‖TS);

[0022] Perform a one-way hash operation on the message string to obtain a pseudonym PID;

[0023] When the timestamp reaches the preset update time interval, repeat the above steps to update the pseudonym.

[0024] Furthermore, the smart contract includes:

[0025] The first method is used to receive a write request from a trusted center TA, and write the pseudonym and the encoded challenge-response table CRT into the blockchain;

[0026] The second method is used for randomly selecting k challenges from the challenge-response table CRT according to a secure random number generator and returning the challenges to the mobile intelligent node when receiving a call request from the mobile intelligent node.

[0027] Furthermore, before the message signing stage, the trusted center TA pre-generates a random number vector and iterative tensor product for the target mobile smart node, and provides the random number vector and iterative tensor product as part of the random challenge sequence to the mobile smart node through the blockchain, so that the smart node can directly generate a response and complete the signature calculation in one go using the local PUF without further interaction in the subsequent signing stage.

[0028] Furthermore, the conditional traceability process in S6 includes:

[0029] When the receiving node detects a signature verification failure during the authentication phase, it sends a backtracking request to the trusted center TA;

[0030] The trusted center TA uses the preset master key to decrypt or map the current pseudonym of the mobile intelligent node and restore the corresponding real identity;

[0031] The real identity and the failed verification record are written into the blockchain for subsequent evidence collection or security management.

[0032] (III) Beneficial Effects: Compared with the existing technology, the present invention provides a lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain, which has the following beneficial effects:

[0033] 1. This blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile smart nodes redundantly encodes the PUF challenge-response table (CRT) during the initialization phase, writing only the irreversible auxiliary data (Helper) to the blockchain while storing the complete response data in encrypted form in a trusted center. This method implements a hierarchical storage architecture in which only the minimum fragment required to complete verification is retained on-chain and confidential original data is centrally stored off-chain. This architecture significantly compresses the blockchain space while cutting off possible paths for attackers to reconstruct the complete response based on on-chain information, thereby reducing the on-chain storage burden and significantly improving the confidentiality of response data.

[0034] 2. This lightweight identity authentication method for mobile smart nodes based on blockchain randomly selects a second method in a single call by setting the second method in the smart contract. The challenge is returned to the mobile intelligent node, and the node uses the local PUF and the pre-generated random number vector and its iterative tensor product to calculate the signature in one go, realizing a non-interactive process for completing identity authentication without multiple rounds of handshakes, significantly reducing the number of link round trips and on-chain transactions; thereby effectively shortening the authentication delay and reducing the communication load in highly dynamic or low-bandwidth environments, while maintaining the system throughput, and ultimately achieving the beneficial effects of improving real-time performance and reducing communication overhead.

[0035] 3. This blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes, by uniformly writing the public keys of all entities such as mobile intelligent nodes (OBUs) and roadside units (RSUs) into the blockchain at the trusted center stage, enables any node in the network to directly rely on the tamper-proof public key on the chain to complete decentralized verification and signature without relying on a centralized certificate server. This design eliminates single points of failure and certificate distribution bottlenecks, allowing the system to continue to operate stably even when nodes are temporarily offline or in high-concurrency scenarios, ultimately achieving the beneficial effects of enhanced reliability and scalability.

[0036] 4. This blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile smart nodes achieves compatibility between strong anonymity in the communication process and traceability in security incidents by assigning a pseudonym that is dynamically updated with the timestamp to the mobile smart node and triggering the master key mapping to restore the real identity when authentication fails. This mechanism not only avoids privacy leaks caused by long-term static identification, but also ensures post-event accountability and security audit requirements, ultimately achieving the beneficial effect of maintaining identity anonymity while taking into account regulatory compliance. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0037] Figure 1 A flowchart of the lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain provided by the present invention;

[0038] Figure 2 This is a diagram showing the interaction principle of the blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0040] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, and the identifiers and their specific meanings in the following table are given:

[0041] See also Figures 1-2 , Figure 1 and Figure 2 The following are the flowchart and interaction principle diagram of the lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain includes an initialization phase, a message signing phase, and an authentication phase, and is characterized by:

[0042] The initialization phase includes:

[0043] S1: The trusted center TA generates public cryptographic parameters and creates a physical unclonable function PUF challenge-response table CRT for each mobile intelligent node, and writes the challenge-response table into the blockchain together with the public cryptographic parameters after encoding;

[0044] Specifically, the trusted center TA first selects the cyclic group and its generators , and determine the group order ; Then configure the hash function for challenge index, response obfuscation and message digest one-way hash function And AES-256 symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm , which together constitute the public cryptographic parameters. Next, For each mobile intelligent node (OBU) to be registered, the TA issues a preset number of random challenges to its on-chip PUF and records the responses, generating a unique challenge-response table (CRT) for that node. The TA performs an irreversible redundant encoding process on the CRT to generate auxiliary data for public disclosure on the blockchain. Simultaneously, the complete CRT ciphertext and the node's private key are securely stored locally. Finally, the TA writes the public cryptographic parameters and the corresponding node's encoded CRT into the blockchain through an initialization contract.

[0045] Furthermore, in step S1, the challenge-response table CRT is encoded, including: applying an erasure code operation to each response data to generate auxiliary data Helper; only writing the Helper to the blockchain, while retaining the complete response data in the local secure storage of the trusted center TA, so as to reduce on-chain storage overhead and hide the complete response content while ensuring on-chain verifiability.

[0046] Specifically, the trusted center TA processes the challenge-response table CRT of the mobile intelligent node one by one, first converting each response bit string Divide it into data segments and redundant segments of the required fixed length, and then call the erasure code library to perform Encoding, generating Redundant check characters; TA packages this set of check characters with the original response length, challenge index and other minimum check information to obtain auxiliary data After all responses are processed, TA hashes the entire Helper set by node ID and writes it into the blockchain. The ciphertext of the data segment is encrypted and stored in the local security module together with the node private key. In this way, the chain verifier only needs to use Helper to check whether the real-time response submitted by the node is consistent with the original This ensures verifiability while avoiding exposing the complete response content on the chain and significantly reducing on-chain storage overhead.

[0047] Furthermore, the trusted center TA further writes the public keys of the mobile intelligent node OBU and the roadside unit RSU into the blockchain, so that any node can use the public key on the chain to perform decentralized verification of the digital signature;

[0048] Specifically, each mobile intelligent node OBU and roadside unit RSU generates its own key pair locally ; Then, the public key collected by the trusted center TA Together with the corresponding entity identification, these three types of public keys are written into the blockchain by submitting a transaction through the initialization of the smart contract. Once the chain record is completed, any node in the network can directly query and obtain , thereby performing decentralized verification of the digital signatures sent by OBU and RSU during operation, while the private keys of each entity are always retained locally and are not made public on the chain.

[0049] S2: The trusted center TA assigns a pseudonym to each mobile intelligent node that is dynamically updated with the timestamp, and binds the pseudonym to the corresponding blockchain address through a smart contract;

[0050] Specifically, the trusted center TA receives the unique identifier of the mobile intelligent node OBU After obtaining the blockchain account address, the current timestamp TS is generated first, and the pseudonym used by the node in this time window is calculated based on it. ; Then, TA initiates a transaction through the “pseudonym binding” smart contract deployed on the chain, The account address is written into the blockchain, and the generation time and validity period are recorded in the transaction data. After the record on the chain is confirmed, TA will Returned to the corresponding mobile intelligent node, used as the identity field in the subsequent message signature; at the same time, TA stores the " ” ternary mapping so that the true identity of the node can be traced back in the event of authentication failure or security audit scenarios.

[0051] Furthermore, in step S2, the pseudonym dynamically updated with the timestamp is generated according to the following process:

[0052] Get the unique identifier ID of the mobile intelligent node;

[0053] Concatenate the ID and the current timestamp TS to get the message string ;

[0054] Performing a one-way hash operation on the message string to obtain a pseudonymous PID;

[0055] When the timestamp reaches the preset update time interval, the above steps are repeated to update the pseudonym.

[0056] Specifically, the trusted center TA concatenates the unique identifier ID and the previous timestamp TS to form a message string , which then calls the one-way hash function published in the public cryptographic parameters Perform a hash operation on the message string, and the output result is the pseudonym corresponding to this cycle TA immediately submits the transaction through the pseudonym binding contract, writes the PID and the node's account address on the blockchain (derived from its public key) to the chain and records the generation time. When the chain is confirmed, TA sends the PID to the node to be used as the identity field for subsequent message signatures; the local node also updates the " ” Mapping table. The system has a preset update time interval , TA periodically checks whether the current timestamp exceeds the last refresh time Once it expires, the above process of "obtaining timestamp, splicing, hashing, writing chain, and issuing" will be re-executed to generate and enable a new pseudonym to achieve dynamic rolling updates.

[0057] Furthermore, the smart contract includes:

[0058] The first method is used to receive a write request from a trusted center TA, and write the pseudonym and the encoded challenge-response table CRT into the blockchain;

[0059] The second method is used for randomly selecting k challenges from the challenge-response table CRT according to a secure random number generator and returning the challenges to the mobile intelligent node when receiving a call request from the mobile intelligent node.

[0060]

[0061] Before the message signing phase, the trusted center TA pre-generates a random number vector and iterative tensor product for the target mobile smart node, and provides the random number vector and iterative tensor product to the mobile smart node through the blockchain as part of the random challenge sequence, so that the smart node can directly generate a response and complete the signature calculation in one go using the local PUF without further interaction in the subsequent signing phase.

[0062] The message signing phase includes:

[0063] S3: The mobile smart node calls the smart contract deployed on the blockchain to obtain a random challenge sequence;

[0064] Specifically, the mobile intelligent node OBU first reads the currently valid pseudonym PID, and then initiates a transaction to the smart contract through the on-chain interface. Calling a transaction, only carrying the PID in the transaction data can indicate the identity. After receiving and verifying that the caller address is consistent with the PID-address mapping on the chain, the contract will use the challenge quantity parameter recorded on the chain. (By TA in ) and the node-specific random number vector and its iterative tensor product . The random seed on the chain is used as the entropy source. or The corresponding challenge pool is drawn with equal probability Bar index, forming a random challenge sequence , and returns it to the OBU through an event or return value in the same transaction receipt. Once the node monitors the confirmation on the chain, it has all the challenge data required to complete the signature and does not need to shake hands with any recipient.

[0065] S4: The mobile intelligent node generates a response to the random challenge using the local PUF, and calculates a one-time signature based on the response, the public cryptographic parameters, and the message to be sent;

[0066] Specifically, OBU responds to each challenge returned by the contract Call the on-chip PUF and get a response , then with the public hash Obtain the message to be authenticated summary: ;

[0067] Reuse For each response Confusing and corresponding The weighted sum is: ;

[0068] make , and then find: ;

[0069] in, It is the private key generated when the node is initialized. The final one-time signature , together with the original message The PID and pseudonym are encapsulated in a single-frame message and broadcasted, and msgCommit can be called again to reset the chain count to zero, marking the end of the signature process. and The chain is written and made public as a challenge pool. The entire signing phase implements the zero-interaction feature of "single on-chain request - local calculation - immediate broadcast", which not only ensures the randomness and public verifiability of the challenge, but also greatly reduces the authentication delay and communication overhead.

[0070] The authentication phase includes:

[0071] S5: The receiving node obtains the signature and the corresponding random challenge sequence, and verifies the signature by calling the public cryptographic parameters on the chain;

[0072] Specifically, the receiving node receives the message After that, first find the corresponding account address through the pseudonym-address mapping on the chain, and read the public key accordingly With public password parameters And the random number vector / tensor product bound to the PID. Then recalculate the message digest In the model group Seeking in the Middle and , the ratio of the two is If the comparison result satisfies , then it means Time Satisfaction and If the signature is valid, the message will be deemed forged or replayed and rejected. Throughout the verification process, the recipient relies solely on the immutable public key and public cryptographic parameters on the chain, eliminating the need for additional interaction with the trusted center or sender. This enables decentralized, one-time signature verification.

[0073] S6: When verification fails, the conditional traceability process of the trusted center TA can be triggered to restore the real identity.

[0074] Furthermore, the conditional traceability process in S6 includes:

[0075] When the receiving node detects a signature verification failure during the authentication phase, it sends a backtracking request to the trusted center TA;

[0076] The trusted center TA uses the preset master key to decrypt or map the current pseudonym of the mobile intelligent node and restore the corresponding real identity;

[0077] The real identity and the failed verification record are written into the blockchain for subsequent evidence collection or security management.

[0078] Specifically, when the receiving node finds that , that is, the signature is invalid, then in the same on-chain event, it carries the pseudonymous PID, timestamp and failure reason of the message to initiate a "backtracking request" to the trusted center TA. After receiving the request, TA first checks whether the PID is still in the ternary mapping table maintained locally. If the mapping exists, the root credential used as the "master key" is called (the key has been generated in the initialization phase, only TA is mastered) or the table is directly looked up to quickly map the PID to the corresponding unique identification ID. TA generates the master key in the initialization phase. , only saved locally. This transaction, packaged as a "traceability event," is written to the blockchain: only the necessary indexes and hash summaries are stored on-chain, while the complete failure data and parsing process remain in the TA's audit storage. This ensures that the node's true identity can be retrieved by regulators in abnormal scenarios while preventing privacy leaks during normal communication. Furthermore, the persistent on-chain record provides an immutable chain of evidence for subsequent security forensics and accountability.

[0079] At this point, the entire process ends.

[0080] In summary, this blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes, by redundantly encoding the PUF challenge-response table CRT in the initialization phase, only writes the irreversible auxiliary data Helper into the blockchain, and stores the complete response data in encrypted form in a trusted center, realizes a hierarchical storage architecture in which only the minimum fragment required to complete the verification is retained on the chain and confidential original data is centrally stored off-chain; on the one hand, this architecture significantly compresses the space occupied by the blockchain, and on the other hand, cuts off the possible path for attackers to reconstruct the complete response based on the on-chain information, thereby achieving the beneficial effect of reducing the on-chain storage burden and significantly improving the confidentiality of the response data.

[0081] This lightweight identity authentication method for mobile smart nodes based on blockchain randomly selects a second method in a single call by setting a second method in the smart contract. The challenge is returned to the mobile intelligent node, and the node uses the local PUF and the pre-generated random number vector and its iterative tensor product to calculate the signature in one go, realizing a non-interactive process for completing identity authentication without multiple rounds of handshakes, significantly reducing the number of link round trips and on-chain transactions; thereby effectively shortening the authentication delay and reducing the communication load in highly dynamic or low-bandwidth environments, while maintaining the system throughput, and ultimately achieving the beneficial effects of improving real-time performance and reducing communication overhead.

[0082] This blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes, by uniformly writing the public keys of all entities such as mobile intelligent nodes OBU and roadside units RSU into the blockchain at the trusted center stage, enables any node in the network to directly rely on the tamper-proof public key on the chain to complete decentralized verification and signature without relying on a centralized certificate server; this design eliminates single points of failure and certificate distribution bottlenecks, allowing the system to still operate stably when nodes are temporarily offline or in high-concurrency scenarios, ultimately achieving the beneficial effects of enhanced reliability and scalability.

[0083] This blockchain-based lightweight identity authentication method for mobile smart nodes achieves compatibility between strong anonymity in the communication process and traceability in security incidents by assigning a pseudonym that is dynamically updated with the timestamp to the mobile smart node and triggering the master key mapping to restore the real identity when authentication fails. This mechanism not only avoids privacy leaks caused by long-term static identification, but also ensures post-event accountability and security audit requirements, ultimately achieving the beneficial effect of maintaining identity anonymity while taking into account regulatory compliance.

[0084] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply the existence of any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article, or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the element.

[0085] While embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations may be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, and that the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain, including an initialization phase, a message signing phase, and an authentication phase, is characterized by: The initialization phase includes: S1: the trusted center TA generates public cryptographic parameters and establishes a physical unclonable function PUF challenge-response table CRT for each mobile smart node, and writes the challenge-response table into the blockchain together with the public cryptographic parameters after encoding; S2: the trusted center TA assigns a pseudonym that is dynamically updated with the timestamp to each mobile smart node, and binds the pseudonym to the corresponding blockchain address through a smart contract; the message signing phase includes: S3: the mobile smart node calls the smart contract deployed on the blockchain to obtain a random challenge sequence; S4: the mobile smart node uses the local PUF to generate a response to the random challenge, and calculates a one-time signature based on the response, public cryptographic parameters and the message to be sent; the authentication phase includes: S5: the receiving node obtains the signature and the corresponding random challenge sequence, and calls the public cryptographic parameters on the chain to verify the signature; S6: when the verification fails, the conditional traceability process of the trusted center TA can be triggered to restore the true identity.

2. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The trusted center TA further writes the public keys of the mobile intelligent node OBU and the roadside unit RSU into the blockchain, so that any node can use the public key on the chain to perform decentralized verification of the digital signature.

3. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S1, the challenge-response table CRT is encoded, including: applying an erasure coding operation to each response data to generate auxiliary data Helper; only the Helper is written to the blockchain, while the complete response data is retained in the local secure storage of the trusted center TA, so as to reduce on-chain storage overhead and hide the complete response content while ensuring on-chain verifiability.

4. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S2, the pseudonym dynamically updated with the timestamp is generated according to the following process: obtain the unique identifier ID of the mobile intelligent node; concatenate the ID with the current timestamp TS to obtain the message string ; Perform a one-way hash operation on the message string to obtain a pseudonym PID; when the timestamp reaches a preset update time interval, repeat the above steps to update the pseudonym.

5. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The smart contract includes: a first method for receiving a write request from a trusted center TA, and writing the pseudonym and the encoded challenge-response table CRT into the blockchain; a second method for randomly selecting k challenges from the challenge-response table CRT according to a secure random number generator when receiving a call request from a mobile smart node, and returning them to the mobile smart node.

6. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Before the message signing phase, the trusted center TA pre-generates a random number vector and iterative tensor product for the target mobile smart node, and provides the random number vector and iterative tensor product to the mobile smart node through the blockchain as part of the random challenge sequence, so that the smart node can directly generate a response and complete the signature calculation in one go using the local PUF without further interaction in the subsequent signing phase.

7. The lightweight identity authentication method for mobile intelligent nodes based on blockchain according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The conditional traceability process in S6 includes: when the receiving node detects a signature verification failure during the authentication phase, it sends a backtracking request to the trusted center TA; the trusted center TA uses a preset master key to decrypt or map the current pseudonym of the mobile intelligent node to restore the corresponding real identity; and the real identity and the failed verification record are written into the blockchain for subsequent evidence collection or security management.

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