Collision safety analysis method for nuclear power station bearing device

Abstract

The invention relates to a collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power station bearing device. The method comprises the following steps: simulating preset collision of a nuclear power plant bearing device, and performing collision resistance simulation calculation on a bearing device structure of the nuclear power plant bearing device to obtain a collision resistance calculation result and a collision impact load generated by the preset collision; based on the anti-collision capability calculation result, analyzing a first influence result of preset collision on equipment in the nuclear power station bearing device; evaluating a second influence result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power station bearing device; determining a failure non-impact-resistant item from the nuclear power station bearing device based on the collision impact load, and evaluating a third influence result of a secondary disaster of the failure non-impact-resistant item on the safety-level item; and obtaining a safety analysis result of the nuclear power station bearing device based on the first influence result, the second influence result and the third influence result. By adopting the method, the accuracy of safety evaluation can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of safety analysis of external events in nuclear power plants, and in particular to a collision safety analysis method for a load-bearing device in a nuclear power plant. Background Art

[0002] With the increasing occurrence of various external events at nuclear power plants and the serious consequences they can cause, risk assessment for these events has received increasing attention both domestically and internationally, with significant research efforts underway. The "Regulations on the Design Safety of Nuclear Power Plants" (HAF 102-2016) mandates that designs must appropriately consider natural and man-made external events (i.e., events originating outside the plant) identified during site assessment. All foreseeable external events, such as collisions, must be identified, including potential man-made events that could directly or indirectly affect nuclear power plant safety, and their impacts must be assessed.

[0003] Currently, research on the safety impacts of collision events primarily focuses on evaluating the collision resistance of nuclear power plant load-bearing structures through experimental methods, simplified analytical methods, or numerical simulations. Numerical simulations can study the impact response of equipment under collision. Existing methods make it difficult to comprehensively assess the safety of collisions from the perspective of the entire nuclear power plant, resulting in low accuracy. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Based on this, it is necessary to provide a nuclear power plant carrier collision safety analysis method, collision safety analysis device, computer equipment, computer-readable storage medium and computer program product that can improve the accuracy of safety evaluation in response to the above technical problems.

[0005] On the one hand, the present application provides a collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant carrying device, comprising: simulating a preset collision on a nuclear power plant carrying device, and performing a collision resistance simulation calculation on the carrying device structure of the nuclear power plant carrying device, to obtain a collision resistance calculation result and a collision impact load generated by the preset collision; wherein, the nuclear power plant carrying device is traveling on the sea; based on the collision resistance calculation result, analyzing a first impact result of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant carrying device; evaluating a second impact result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant carrying device; determining failed non-impact-resistant items from the nuclear power plant carrying device based on the collision impact load, and evaluating a third impact result of the secondary disasters of the failed non-impact-resistant items on safety-level items; based on the first impact result, the second impact result and the third impact result, obtaining a safety analysis result of the nuclear power plant carrying device.

[0006] On the other hand, the present application also provides a collision safety analysis device, including: a simulation calculation module, used to simulate a preset collision on a nuclear power plant carrying device, and perform anti-collision capability simulation calculation on the carrying device structure of the nuclear power plant carrying device, to obtain anti-collision capability calculation results and the collision impact load generated by the preset collision; wherein, the nuclear power plant carrying device is traveling on the sea; a first impact result acquisition module, used to analyze the first impact result of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant carrying device based on the anti-collision capability calculation results; a second impact result acquisition module, used to evaluate the second impact result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant carrying device; a third impact result acquisition module, used to determine failed non-impact-resistant items from the nuclear power plant carrying device based on the collision impact load, and evaluate the third impact result of the secondary disasters of the failed non-impact-resistant items on safety-level items; an analysis result acquisition module, used to obtain the safety analysis result of the nuclear power plant carrying device based on the first impact result, the second impact result and the third impact result.

[0007] On the other hand, the present application also provides a computer device including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps in the above-mentioned nuclear power plant load-bearing device collision safety analysis method when executing the computer program.

[0008] On the other hand, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above-mentioned nuclear power plant carrier collision safety analysis method.

[0009] On the other hand, the present application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the above-mentioned nuclear power plant load-bearing device collision safety analysis method.

[0010] The aforementioned nuclear power plant carrier collision safety analysis method, collision safety analysis device, computer equipment, computer-readable storage medium, and computer program product simulate a preset collision on a nuclear power plant carrier and perform collision resistance simulation calculations on the carrier structure of the nuclear power plant carrier, obtaining collision resistance calculation results and collision impact loads generated by the preset collision. The nuclear power plant carrier is traveling at sea. Based on the collision resistance calculation results, the method analyzes the first impact of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant carrier, evaluates the second impact of the collision impact load on the key structures of the nuclear power plant carrier, identifies failed non-impact-resistant items in the nuclear power plant carrier based on the collision impact load, and evaluates the third impact of the secondary hazards of the failed non-impact-resistant items on safety-level items. Based on the first, second, and third impact results, a safety analysis result for the nuclear power plant carrier is obtained. This provides a more comprehensive safety analysis method for nuclear power plant carrier collisions and improves the accuracy of safety assessments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0011] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or related technologies, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments of the present application or related technical descriptions. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0012] Figure 1 This is a diagram of an application environment of a method for collision safety analysis of a nuclear power plant carrier in one embodiment;

[0013] Figure 2 A schematic flow chart of a method for analyzing collision safety of a nuclear power plant carrier in one embodiment;

[0014] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant carrier device in one embodiment;

[0015] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a single failure analysis in one embodiment;

[0016] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a multiple failure analysis in one embodiment;

[0017] Figure 6 is a structural block diagram of a collision safety analysis device in one embodiment;

[0018] Figure 7 is a diagram of the internal structure of a computer device in one embodiment;

[0019] Figure 8FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the internal structure of a computer device in another embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of this application more clearly understood, the present application is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain this application and are not intended to limit this application.

[0021] The collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant carrier provided in the embodiment of the present application can be applied to Figure 1 The application environment shown in the figure includes a computer device that can perform safety analysis on collisions occurring in a nuclear power plant's load-bearing device. The computer device can be a terminal or a server. Terminals include, but are not limited to, desktop computers, laptops, and tablets. A server can be a standalone physical server, a server cluster or distributed system consisting of multiple physical servers, or a cloud server providing cloud computing services. Cloud servers are used to provide basic cloud computing services such as cloud services, cloud databases, cloud computing, cloud functions, cloud storage, network services, cloud communications, middleware services, domain name services, security services, CDNs (Content Delivery Networks), and big data and artificial intelligence platforms. Specifically, the computer device simulates a pre-set collision on the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device and calculates the collision resistance of the load-bearing device structure, obtaining collision resistance calculation results and collision impact loads generated by the pre-set collision. The nuclear power plant's load-bearing device is traveling at sea. Based on the collision resistance calculation results, the computer device analyzes the first impact of the pre-set collision on the equipment in the load-bearing device. The computer device then evaluates the second impact of the collision impact load on the critical structures of the load-bearing device. Based on the collision impact load, the computer equipment identifies failed non-shock-resistant items from the nuclear power plant's load-bearing devices and assesses the third impact of the secondary hazards caused by the failed non-shock-resistant items on safety-level items. Based on the first, second, and third impact results, the computer equipment obtains safety analysis results for the nuclear power plant's load-bearing devices.

[0022] In an exemplary embodiment, Figure 2 As shown, a method for collision safety analysis of a nuclear power plant load-bearing device is provided. The method can be executed by a terminal or a server, or by both the terminal and the server. Figure 1 The computer device in the embodiment is used as an example to illustrate the method, including the following steps 202 to 210. Among them:

[0023] Step 202 is to simulate a preset collision of the nuclear power plant carrier and perform a collision resistance simulation calculation on the carrier structure of the nuclear power plant carrier to obtain the collision resistance calculation result and the collision impact load generated by the preset collision; wherein the nuclear power plant carrier is traveling on the sea.

[0024] Among them, the preset collision is a designed collision, and the collision is an external event. The preset collision can be designed as the nuclear power plant carrier being hit by an object when it is stationary, and the tonnage, impact direction and impact speed of the object can be designed according to needs or relevant criteria. The object can be a hypothetical object traveling on the sea. The carrier structure can be the part that supports and maintains the overall shape of the nuclear power plant carrier. The collision impact load refers to the impact load generated by the collision of the nuclear power plant carrier. The anti-collision capacity calculation result is the anti-collision capacity calculation result of the carrier structure, which may include the deformation and damage of the carrier structure.

[0025] In some embodiments, a computer device performs a stability analysis on the structure of the supporting device to obtain a stability analysis result, wherein the stability analysis includes an intact stability analysis and a damaged stability analysis; when the intact stability analysis result indicates that the nuclear power plant supporting device meets the preset stability requirements, a preset collision of the nuclear power plant supporting device is simulated. The fact that the nuclear power plant supporting device meets the preset stability requirements means that the nuclear power plant supporting device maintains stability and does not sink when encountering wind, waves, and currents while sailing on the sea. When performing a damaged stability analysis on the supporting device structure, it is possible to assume the damage of the supporting device structure, and then perform a damaged stability analysis under the assumed damage condition. Even if part of the supporting device structure is damaged and flooded, the nuclear power plant supporting device still meets the preset stability requirements.

[0026] Step 204: Based on the anti-collision capability calculation result, analyze the first impact result of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant support device.

[0027] Specifically, the computer equipment can use a simplified analytical method, a numerical simulation method or a combination of experimental data to calculate the anti-collision capacity of the load-bearing device structure and obtain a calculation result of the anti-collision capacity of the load-bearing device structure.

[0028] In some embodiments, the computer device determines the damaged or deformed position of the support structure based on the anti-collision capability calculation results, and determines the equipment affected by the collision based on the damaged or deformed position, and analyzes the impact of the failure of the affected equipment on the safety-level system and the function of the equipment to obtain a first impact result.

[0029] Step 206 : evaluating the second impact result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant support device.

[0030] Specifically, the critical structure includes at least one of a primary structure, a containment vessel, or a safety-grade liquid tank structure. The computer device can evaluate the impact of the collision impact load on the primary structure, the containment vessel, and the safety-grade liquid tank structure to obtain a second impact result.

[0031] Step 208 : determining failed non-impact-resistant items from the nuclear power plant's carrying devices based on the collision impact load, and evaluating the third impact result of the secondary disasters of the failed non-impact-resistant items on the safety-level items.

[0032] Equipment within a nuclear power plant's carrier structure can be referred to as items. Equipment within a nuclear power plant's carrier structure can be divided into safety-grade items and non-safety-grade items. Equipment within a nuclear power plant's carrier structure can be divided into shock-resistant Class I, shock-resistant Class II, and non-shock-resistant categories based on their impact resistance. In addition to their design loads, shock-resistant Class I and Class II items can also withstand collision impact loads. Safety-grade items are designated as shock-resistant Class I or Class II; therefore, the equipment qualification impact load for shock-resistant Class I and Class II items should include collision impact loads. Non-shock-resistant items are considered non-safety-grade items.

[0033] If a non-impact-resistant item fails under the impact loads generated by a collision (i.e., collision shock loads), it may become a secondary hazard, further affecting safety-rated items. Secondary hazards refer to the failure of other items caused by the failure of a non-impact-resistant item.

[0034] Non-impact-resistant items may include, but are not limited to, non-impact-resistant piping, non-impact-resistant HVAC ducts, non-impact-resistant mechanical equipment, non-impact-resistant steel structures, non-impact-resistant electrical / instrumentation control cabinets and small three-boxes, ordinary doors (only doors that remain open during normal operation are considered), fire hydrants, or non-impact-resistant movable walls / movable walls. Non-impact-resistant mechanical equipment includes, but is not limited to, at least one of the following: pumps, fans, storage tanks, heat exchangers, heaters, filters, valves, instruments, or cranes. Non-impact-resistant steel structures may include, but are not limited to, secondary steel structures. Equipment-supporting steel structures are considered part of the equipment and are not considered non-impact-resistant steel structures. A failed non-impact-resistant item is one whose failure could potentially harm or impact surrounding items.

[0035] Due to the global nature of collision impact loads, non-shock-resistant items can be categorized into two failure modes that can lead to the failure of safety-rated items: a single failure mode and a multiple failure mode. Based on these two failure modes, the consequences and scope of safety-rated item failures are further analyzed to determine their acceptability. If acceptable, the non-shock-resistant item will have no impact on nuclear safety as a secondary hazard source. If unacceptable, the design of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing devices must be optimized, or protective measures must be implemented for the safety-rated items.

[0036] The third impact result includes the impact of failed non-impact-resistant items as secondary disasters on safety-level items in their environment.

[0037] Step 210: Obtain safety analysis results of the nuclear power plant's supporting device based on the first impact result, the second impact result, and the third impact result.

[0038] The safety analysis results include the first impact result, the second impact result and the third impact result.

[0039] Specifically, if the safety analysis results indicate damage to the structure containing radioactive material or functional failure of a safety-rated item, the computer equipment will instruct the design to be modified (i.e., modify the design plan of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device). Otherwise, the safety assessment of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device will be completed (i.e., certify that the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device has passed the safety assessment). The design refers to the design plan of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device.

[0040] In the above-mentioned nuclear power plant load-bearing device collision safety analysis method, a preset collision is simulated on the nuclear power plant load-bearing device, and the collision resistance of the load-bearing device structure of the nuclear power plant load-bearing device is simulated and calculated to obtain the collision resistance calculation results and the collision impact load generated by the preset collision. In particular, the nuclear power plant load-bearing device is traveling on the sea. Based on the collision resistance calculation results, the first impact of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant load-bearing device is analyzed, and the second impact of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant load-bearing device is evaluated. Based on the collision impact load, failed non-impact-resistant items are identified from the nuclear power plant load-bearing device, and the third impact of the secondary hazards of the failed non-impact-resistant items on safety-level items is evaluated. Based on the first impact results, the second impact results, and the third impact results, the safety analysis results of the nuclear power plant load-bearing device are obtained. This provides a more comprehensive safety analysis method for nuclear power plant load-bearing device collisions and improves the accuracy of safety assessments.

[0041] Existing methods only consider the structural impact of nuclear power plant load-bearing devices and the design of the equipment's impact resistance. They do not comprehensively analyze the impact of nuclear power plant load-bearing device collisions on nuclear power plant safety, do not consider the impact of secondary disasters caused by nuclear power plant load-bearing device collisions, do not assess the safety level (according to HAD102-03 "Safety Functions and Component Classification for Boiling Water Reactors, Pressurized Water Reactors, and Pressure Tube Reactors," nuclear power plants classify safety functions according to their safety importance and determine their design requirements. The various rules that should be followed for various activities such as design, manufacturing, and inspection can be formulated based on their safety levels) system and equipment functions are available, and do not consider the impact of the stability of nuclear power plant load-bearing devices. This makes it difficult to conduct a comprehensive safety evaluation of nuclear power plant load-bearing device collisions from the perspective of the entire nuclear power plant. In comparison, the solution provided in this application can conduct a more comprehensive safety evaluation of nuclear power plant load-bearing device collisions, improving the accuracy of safety evaluations.

[0042] In response to new external event types (i.e., collisions) that are not found in traditional land-based nuclear power plants, this application provides a collision safety analysis method for nuclear power plant carrier devices, which conducts a holistic analysis of the safety impact of nuclear power plants. This is used to solve the evaluation problem of nuclear power plant carrier device design using collisions as external man-made events in offshore operating areas, improves the design safety level of nuclear power plants, is extremely innovative, and fills the gap in external event analysis in the domestic civilian nuclear power field.

[0043] In some embodiments, as Figure 3 As shown, a schematic diagram of a collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant load-bearing device is provided, including:

[0044] 1. Analysis of the impact of direct collision on the structure of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing equipment, including:

[0045] (1) Intact stability and damage stability calculation: The purpose is to ensure that the nuclear power plant's supporting equipment does not sink under the pre-set collision conditions;

[0046] (2) Calculation and simulation of the anti-collision capability of the load-bearing device structure, and obtain the calculation results of the anti-collision capability of the load-bearing device structure and the collision impact load generated by the preset collision.

[0047] 2. Analysis of the impact of direct collision on the equipment of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing devices, including:

[0048] (1) Based on the calculation results of the anti-collision capability, analyze whether the functions of the safety-level systems and equipment are available when the nuclear safety systems and equipment are flooded by external water due to damage to the load-bearing device structure;

[0049] (2) Based on the calculation results of the anti-collision capability, determine the equipment affected by the deformation of the load-bearing device structure that squeezes the equipment layout space, and analyze whether the affected equipment will affect the realization of the safety-level system and equipment functions in the event of failure.

[0050] 3. Analysis of the impact of the impact load generated by the collision on the structure of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device, including:

[0051] Based on the collision impact load generated by the preset collision, the main structure, containment and safety-level liquid tank structure are subjected to mechanical calculation and verification for impact resistance.

[0052] 4. Analysis of the impact of the impact load generated by the collision on the equipment of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device, including:

[0053] (1) Impact-resistant items: The impact load of impact-resistant equipment should include the collision impact load;

[0054] (2) Non-impact resistant items: Single failure analysis: Inducing falling / toppling effects to determine the impact on safety-rated items; Multiple failure analysis: Inducing internal flooding / internal explosion effects to determine the impact on safety-rated items.

[0055] 5. If the structure containing radioactive materials is damaged or the function of safety-level items fails, the design should be modified. Otherwise, the safety assessment should be completed. The design refers to the design plan of the nuclear power plant's carrier device.

[0056] This application evaluates the impact of direct collisions on the structure and equipment of nuclear power plant load-bearing devices from two perspectives: the external impact of direct collisions and the internal impact of impact loads. This application not only takes into account the structural impact of load-bearing devices and the design of equipment impact resistance, as considered in existing collision safety evaluation methods, but also comprehensively analyzes the impact of external collision events on nuclear power plant safety, including the impact of stability, the impact of collision-induced structural damage / deformation on equipment arranged near the collision point, and proposes design requirements for the impact resistance of the main structure, containment structure, and safety-level liquid tank structure. It also considers the secondary hazards of safety-level items caused by the failure of non-impact-resistant items under collision-induced impact loads, and evaluates whether the safety-level functions are available under the influence of secondary hazards. This application conducts a comprehensive safety evaluation of external collision events from the perspective of nuclear power plants.

[0057] In some embodiments, based on the anti-collision capability calculation results, the first impact results of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant's carrying device are analyzed, including: when it is determined according to the anti-collision capability calculation results that the carrying device structure is deformed but not damaged, determining the first impact results of the first equipment arranged in the cabin affected by the deformed structure on the functional realization of the safety-level system and equipment; when it is determined according to the anti-collision capability calculation results that the carrying device structure is deformed and damaged, evaluating the impact of external flooding on the second equipment in the flooded partition of the cabin belonging to the impacted side, and determining the first impact results of the external flooding on the functional realization of the safety-level system and equipment.

[0058] The deformable structure refers to the portion of the load-bearing structure that deforms due to a collision. The first equipment refers to the equipment within the nuclear power plant's load-bearing structure that is affected by the deformable structure, for example, the first equipment is equipment that is squeezed or collided with the deformable structure. The second equipment refers to equipment within the flooded zone of the compartment where the impact damage occurs. The first impact result may include the degree of impact on the functional performance of safety-level systems and equipment.

[0059] In some embodiments, if it is determined based on the calculation results of the anti-collision capability of the load-bearing device structure that the load-bearing device structure is damaged and deformed, the computer equipment evaluates the impact of external seawater / river water flooding on the equipment in the flooded partition of the cabin belonging to the impacted side, and verifies whether the functions of the nuclear power plant's safety-level systems and equipment are available under external flooding; if it is determined based on the calculation results of the anti-collision capability of the load-bearing device structure that the load-bearing device structure is only deformed but not damaged, the computer equipment determines whether the structural deformation occupies the equipment layout space, whether extrusion and collision between the equipment and the deformed structure are generated, and whether the failure of the affected equipment affects the realization of the functions of the safety-level systems and equipment.

[0060] In this embodiment, in the case of damage or deformation, the affected devices are determined, and then the impact on the functional implementation of the safety-level system and equipment is evaluated based on the affected devices, thereby achieving security analysis of the safety-level system and equipment.

[0061] In some embodiments, the key structures include the main structure, the containment shell and the safety-level liquid tank structure, and evaluating the second impact result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant support device includes: evaluating the impact of the collision impact load on the main structure, the containment shell and the safety-level liquid tank structure to obtain the second impact result.

[0062] The primary structure can be understood as the skeleton of a nuclear power plant's load-bearing equipment. The primary structure and secondary light structures enclose various compartments, including those housing nuclear power equipment and load-bearing equipment. Load-bearing equipment refers to equipment related to the operation of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing equipment or the living quarters of personnel, and is unrelated to nuclear power generation. Requirements for nuclear power plant load-bearing equipment require that the primary structure withstand collision impact loads. The structural design of the containment vessel should meet the requirements for steel containment vessels in nuclear safety-rated products, such as those required by the ASME Code, Section II, Materials, Part D; Section III, Division 1, Section NE; and Section V, Nondestructive Testing. For designs that utilize compartment walls as containment structures, consideration should be given to liquid tanks containing radioactive materials or performing safety function classifications. The secondary light structure of the tank walls must be capable of withstanding collision impact loads. For collision impact loads, the impact response spectrum calculation should utilize an enveloping, conservative impact point and angle, focusing on load magnitude, structural response characteristics, component damage and deformation modes, and the absorption process of plastic properties.

[0063] Specifically, computer equipment performs mechanical calculation verification on the impact resistance of the main structure, containment and safety-level liquid tank structure based on the collision impact load to determine whether the main structure, containment and safety-level liquid tank structure can remain stable under the action of the collision impact load, thereby determining whether the design requirements are met.

[0064] In this embodiment, the impact of the collision impact load on the main structure, the containment shell and the safety-level liquid tank structure is evaluated, making the safety assessment more comprehensive.

[0065] In some embodiments, failed non-shock-resistant items are determined from the carrier devices of a nuclear power plant based on the collision impact load, including: determining the equipment identification impact load based on the collision impact load, wherein the equipment identification impact load should envelope the collision impact load; determining the impact-resistant items from the item list of the carrier devices of the nuclear power plant based on the equipment identification impact load, wherein the items in the item list other than the impact-resistant items are non-shock-resistant items; and in a preset collision, determining the non-shock-resistant items as failed non-shock-resistant items.

[0066] Impact-resistant items have been certified to withstand equipment-certified impact loads and are therefore also capable of withstanding collision impact loads. Non-impact-resistant items have not undergone equipment certification, so it is impossible to determine whether they can withstand equipment-certified impact loads or collision impact loads. Therefore, in this simulated collision, non-impact-resistant items are assumed to fail.

[0067] Specifically, the computer equipment can identify the failed non-shock-resistant items based on the equipment identification shock load and according to the item list and shock resistance classification of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing devices.

[0068] In this embodiment, since the equipment identification impact load envelopes the collision impact load, based on the equipment identification impact load, the impact-resistant items are determined to be usable items from the nuclear power plant carrier device. If the non-shock-resistant items cannot be proven to be usable, they are assumed to be failed non-shock-resistant items, which can improve the accuracy and conservatism of the determined failed non-shock-resistant items.

[0069] In some embodiments, evaluating the third impact of the secondary disaster of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the safety-level item includes: determining the safety-level item within the impact range of the single failure of the failed non-shock-resistant item as the first item; and determining the impact of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the first item.

[0070] The first item refers to a safety-level item affected by a single failure of a non-shock-resistant item. Safety-level items can be shock-resistant items. For example, for non-shock-resistant piping, it is necessary to consider whether its fall could cause a smaller diameter (i.e., the first item) to fracture. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider whether its fall (conservatively assuming the nuclear power plant's support structure sways) could cause leakage or circumferential cracking in a pipe of equal or greater diameter but thinner wall (i.e., the first item). For non-shock-resistant heating and ventilation ducts, it is necessary to consider whether its fall could cause the failure of the shock-resistant item (i.e., the first item) located directly below it (conservatively assuming the nuclear power plant's support structure sways). For non-shock-resistant mechanical equipment, if it is located on a foundation, its failure could cause the failure of the shock-resistant item (i.e., the first item) within a radius of rotation around the edge of the equipment foundation. If it is suspended or connected to a pipeline, its failure could cause the failure of the shock-resistant item (i.e., the first item) directly below it (conservatively assuming the nuclear power plant's support structure sways). For non-impact-resistant steel structures, failure could cause failure of impact-resistant items directly below them (conservatively assuming swaying of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing structure). For non-impact-resistant electrical / instrumentation and control cabinets and small three-boxes, failure could cause failure of impact-resistant items within the range of rotation (i.e., the first item) around the edge of the equipment base and with the equipment height as the radius. For ordinary doors (considering only doors that remain open during normal operation), failure could endanger impact-resistant items within their opening trajectory (i.e., the first item). For non-impact-resistant fire hydrants, failure could cause failure of impact-resistant items directly below them (i.e., the first item) (conservatively assuming swaying of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing structure). For impact-resistant fire hydrants with fire hose reels, failure could cause failure of impact-resistant items within the range of rotation (i.e., the first item) around the fire hose reel diameter. For non-impact-resistant movable or movable walls, failure could cause failure of impact-resistant items within the range of rotation (i.e., the first item) around the wall base in the unconstrained direction and with the height of the revolving radius.

[0071] In some embodiments, the computer device can determine the impact resistance level of the first item. If the impact resistance level of the first item is Class II or Class I, further mechanical analysis can be performed to determine the impact of a single failure of the non-impact-resistant item, such as a fall or tilt, on the first item. The computer device determines whether the impact on the first item is acceptable. If not, it is necessary to determine whether the failure of the first item will affect the implementation of the safety-level function or cause damage to the structure containing the radioactive material. If so, the consequences are unacceptable and recommendations for optimized design or protective measures are required.

[0072] like Figure 4As shown in the figure, the direct and local impact of the failure of non-impact-resistant items on safety-level items is analyzed through the analysis of single failure. Specifically, a list of non-impact-resistant items is identified. According to the judgment principle and based on the equipment layout model, the non-impact-resistant items that may be hazardous sources and the items within the scope of failure impact are analyzed. The impact resistance classification of the affected items (impact resistance Class I or Class II) is determined. Further mechanical analysis is performed to determine whether the consequences are acceptable. If so, the analysis of single failure is completed. If not, the design can be optimized or protective measures can be provided for further analysis.

[0073] In this embodiment, the secondary disaster caused by a single failure of a non-impact-resistant item under the impact load caused by a collision on the safety-level item is considered, and the usability of the safety-level item under the influence of the secondary disaster is evaluated, making the safety assessment more comprehensive.

[0074] In some embodiments, evaluating the third impact result of the secondary disaster of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the safety-level item includes: screening out a first non-shock-resistant item and a first only-shock-resistant stability item from the item list, the first non-shock-resistant item and the first only-shock-resistant stability item are failed items, and the first non-shock-resistant item and the first only-shock-resistant stability item contain non-hazardous liquid or non-hazardous steam; determining the impact of the leakage of the first non-shock-resistant item and the leakage of the first only-shock-resistant stability item on the safety-level item.

[0075] The list of items includes items used in nuclear power plant carriers. If the impact loads from a collision cause non-shock-resistant items and items requiring only shock stability to fail, this could indirectly and globally impact safety-related items, primarily through internal flooding and explosions, such as leaks from non-shock-resistant pipelines or hydrogen-containing containers.

[0076] The performance requirements for impact resistance classification can be divided into operability, functional capacity, integrity and stability. An impact resistance stability only item refers to the stability requirement that only meets the impact resistance requirement. Operability includes the requirements of functional capacity, integrity and stability. Operability refers to the ability of active components, including all necessary auxiliary systems and support systems, to perform safety functions to achieve safety goals. Functional capacity refers to the ability of active or passive components to withstand impact loads to limit component deformation and ensure that their safety functions are not compromised. Integrity refers to the ability of active and passive components to withstand specific loads to ensure that they maintain structural integrity after being subjected to impact loads. Stability refers to the ability of active or passive components to withstand loads that may cause them to change their direction or position, such as causing unacceptable swaying, falling, sliding, or causing shearing of components. The stability of a component includes the necessary stability of its supporting structure.

[0077] In some embodiments, the internal flooding effect requires screening out non-resistant and only impact-resistant items containing liquid or vapor from the item list, calculating the flooding volume and flooding height of each room / flooding zone, considering the layout height and water flow path of safety-level equipment and the waterproof performance of the equipment, and determining whether it affects the safety-level items.

[0078] In this embodiment, the secondary disaster of flooding of safety-level items caused by the failure of non-impact-resistant items under the impact load caused by the collision is taken into consideration, and the availability of safety-level items under the influence of the secondary disaster of flooding is evaluated, making the safety assessment more comprehensive. Moreover, due to the global nature of the impact load, the impact of the simultaneous failure of the first non-impact-resistant item and the first impact-resistant stability item is considered, thereby realizing multiple failure analysis of internal flooding.

[0079] In some embodiments, evaluating the third impact result of the secondary disaster of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the safety-level item includes: screening out a second non-shock-resistant item and a second only-shock-resistant stability item from the item list, the second non-shock-resistant item and the second only-shock-resistant stability item are failed items, and the second non-shock-resistant item and the second only-shock-resistant stability item contain hazardous liquids or hazardous vapors; determining the impact of the leakage of the second non-shock-resistant item and the leakage of the second only-shock-resistant stability item on the safety-level item.

[0080] In some embodiments, the internal explosion effect requires screening out non-resistance-resistant and only impact-resistant stability items that contain flammable gases or produce flammable gases from the item list, considering factors such as whether the room where the flammable and explosive dangerous goods are located is in a confined space, whether there is an ignition source, whether the gas concentration reaches a certain range, etc., to determine whether a secondary explosion will be triggered.

[0081] In this embodiment, the secondary explosion disaster caused by the failure of non-impact-resistant items under the impact load caused by collision is taken into account, and whether the safety-level items are available under the influence of the secondary explosion disaster is evaluated, making the safety assessment more comprehensive. Due to the global nature of the impact load, the impact of the simultaneous failure of the second non-impact-resistant item and the second impact-resistant stability item is considered, thereby realizing multiple failure analysis of the internal explosion.

[0082] In some embodiments, as Figure 5The figure shows a schematic diagram of a multiple failure analysis. This analysis is used to determine the global impact of the failure of non-shock-resistant items or shock-stabilization-only items on safety-rated items. For internal flooding effects, a list of system items containing liquids or vapors (liquids or vapors refers to water or water vapor) is identified. From this list, non-shock-resistant and shock-stabilization-only items are identified. The impact of factors such as flooding volume, flooding height, water flow path, equipment waterproofing, and equipment layout height on safety-rated items is analyzed. The consequences are analyzed to determine whether they are acceptable. If so, the internal flooding effect analysis is completed. If not, design optimization or protective measures are implemented. For internal explosion effects, a list of system items containing liquids or vapors (liquids or vapors refers to flammable or explosive liquids or gases) is identified. From this list, non-shock-resistant and shock-stabilization-only items are identified. The explosion risk is analyzed based on factors such as explosive gas concentration, ignition source, and confined space. Analyze whether the consequences are acceptable. If so, complete the analysis of the internal explosion effects. If not, indicate whether to optimize the design or provide protective measures.

[0083] It should be understood that, although the steps in the flowcharts of the above embodiments are shown in sequence as indicated by the arrows, these steps are not necessarily performed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless otherwise specified herein, there is no strict order restriction on the execution of these steps, and these steps can be performed in other orders. Moreover, at least a portion of the steps in the flowcharts of the above embodiments may include multiple steps or multiple stages, and these steps or stages are not necessarily performed at the same time, but can be performed at different times. The execution order of these steps or stages is not necessarily to be performed in sequence, but can be performed in turn or alternately with other steps or at least a portion of steps or stages in other steps.

[0084] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of the present application also provide a collision safety analysis device for implementing the aforementioned method for analyzing collision safety of a nuclear power plant carrier. The solution provided by this device is similar to the solution described in the aforementioned method. Therefore, the specific limitations of one or more collision safety analysis device embodiments provided below can be found in the aforementioned limitations of the method for analyzing collision safety of a nuclear power plant carrier, and will not be further elaborated here.

[0085] In an exemplary embodiment, Figure 6 As shown, a collision safety analysis device is provided, comprising: a simulation calculation module 602, a first impact result obtaining module 604, a second impact result obtaining module 606, a third impact result obtaining module 608 and an analysis result obtaining module 610, wherein:

[0086] The simulation calculation module 602 is used to simulate a preset collision of the nuclear power plant carrier and perform a collision resistance simulation calculation on the carrier structure of the nuclear power plant carrier to obtain the collision resistance calculation results and the collision impact load generated by the preset collision; wherein the nuclear power plant carrier is traveling on the sea.

[0087] The first impact result obtaining module 604 is used to analyze the first impact result of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant carrier based on the anti-collision capability calculation result.

[0088] The second impact result obtaining module 606 is used to evaluate the second impact result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant support device.

[0089] The third impact result obtaining module 608 is used to determine the failed non-impact-resistant items from the nuclear power plant carrier based on the collision impact load, and evaluate the third impact result of the secondary disasters of the failed non-impact-resistant items on the safety-level items.

[0090] The analysis result obtaining module 610 is used to obtain the safety analysis result of the nuclear power plant's carrying device based on the first impact result, the second impact result, and the third impact result.

[0091] In some embodiments, the first impact result obtaining module 604 is also used to determine the first impact result of the first equipment arranged in the cabin affected by the deformed structure on the functional realization of the safety-level system and equipment when it is determined according to the anti-collision capability calculation result that the load-bearing device structure is deformed but not damaged; when it is determined according to the anti-collision capability calculation result that the load-bearing device structure is deformed and damaged, the impact of external flooding on the second equipment in the flooded partition of the cabin belonging to the impacted side is evaluated to determine the first impact result of the external flooding on the functional realization of the safety-level system and equipment.

[0092] In some embodiments, the key structures include the main structure, the containment shell and the safety-level liquid tank structure. The second impact result acquisition module 606 is also used to evaluate the impact of the collision impact load on the main structure, the containment shell and the safety-level liquid tank structure to obtain the second impact result.

[0093] In some embodiments, the third impact result obtaining module 608 is also used to determine the equipment identification impact load based on the collision impact load, wherein the equipment identification impact load envelopes the collision impact load; based on the equipment identification impact load, shock-resistant items are determined from the item list of the nuclear power plant carrier device, and the items in the item list other than the shock-resistant items are non-shock-resistant items; in the preset collision, the non-shock-resistant items are determined as failed non-shock-resistant items.

[0094] In some embodiments, the third impact result obtaining module 608 is further used to determine the safety-level items within the impact range of the failed non-shock-resistant item as the first item; and determine the impact of a single failure of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the first item.

[0095] In some embodiments, the third impact result obtaining module 608 is also used to screen out a first non-shock-resistant item and a first only-shock-resistant stability item from the item list, the first non-shock-resistant item and the first only-shock-resistant stability item are failed items, and the first non-shock-resistant item and the first only-shock-resistant stability item contain non-hazardous liquids or non-hazardous steam; determine the impact of the leakage of the first non-shock-resistant item and the leakage of the first only-shock-resistant stability item on the safety-level items.

[0096] In some embodiments, the third impact result obtaining module 608 is also used to screen out a second non-shock-resistant item and a second only shock-resistant stability item from the item list, the second non-shock-resistant item and the second only shock-resistant stability item are failed items, and the second non-shock-resistant item and the second only shock-resistant stability item contain hazardous liquids or hazardous vapors; determine the impact of the leakage of the second non-shock-resistant item and the leakage of the second only shock-resistant stability item on the safety-level item.

[0097] In some embodiments, the simulation calculation module 602 is also used to perform stability analysis on the load-bearing device structure to obtain stability analysis results; when the stability analysis results indicate that the nuclear power plant load-bearing device meets the preset stability requirements, a preset collision of the nuclear power plant load-bearing device is simulated.

[0098] In some embodiments, the stability analysis includes intact stability analysis and damaged stability analysis.

[0099] Each module in the aforementioned collision safety analysis device may be implemented in whole or in part through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. Each module may be embedded in or independent of a processor within a computer device in the form of hardware, or may be stored in a computer device memory in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute the corresponding operations of each module.

[0100] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a server, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in FIG. Figure 7As shown. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, an input / output interface (Input / Output, abbreviated as I / O) and a communication interface. The processor, memory and input / output interface are connected via a system bus, and the communication interface is connected to the system bus via the input / output interface. The processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device is used to store data involved in the collision safety analysis method of the nuclear power plant load-bearing device. The input / output interface of the computer device is used to exchange information between the processor and an external device. The communication interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, a collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant load-bearing device is implemented.

[0101] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as shown in FIG. Figure 8 As shown. The computer device includes a processor, memory, an input / output interface, a communication interface, a display unit, and an input device. The processor, memory, and input / output interface are connected via a system bus, and the communication interface, display unit, and input device are connected to the system bus via the input / output interface. The processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and computer programs. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The input / output interface of the computer device is used to exchange information between the processor and external devices. The communication interface of the computer device is used to communicate with external terminals via wired or wireless communication, and the wireless communication can be achieved via Wi-Fi, mobile cellular networks, near-field communication (NFC), or other technologies. When executed by the processor, the computer program implements a collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant load-bearing device. The display unit of the computer device is used to produce a visually visible image and can be a display screen, a projection device, or a virtual reality imaging device. The display screen can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer device can be a touch layer covering the display screen, or a button, trackball or touchpad set on the computer device casing, or an external keyboard, touchpad or mouse.

[0102] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 7 and Figure 8The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific computer device may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different component arrangement.

[0103] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps in the above-mentioned nuclear power plant load-bearing device collision safety analysis method are implemented.

[0104] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above-mentioned nuclear power plant load-bearing device collision safety analysis method are implemented.

[0105] In one embodiment, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program, which implements the steps in the above-mentioned nuclear power plant load-bearing device collision safety analysis method when executed by a processor.

[0106] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiments can be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. In particular, any reference to memory, database, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile memory and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can take various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM). The databases involved in the various embodiments provided herein may include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, blockchain-based distributed databases. The processors involved in the various embodiments provided herein may be, but are not limited to, general-purpose processors, central processing units (CPUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), digital signal processors (DSPs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), quantum computing-based data processing logic devices, artificial intelligence (AI) processors, and the like.

[0107] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. In order to make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this application.

[0108] The above-described embodiments merely represent several implementation methods of the present application. While the descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present application. It should be noted that a person of ordinary skill in the art may make various modifications and improvements without departing from the spirit of the present application, and these modifications and improvements fall within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application shall be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A collision safety analysis method for a nuclear power plant load-bearing device, characterized in that: The method comprises: Simulating a preset collision on a nuclear power plant carrier, and performing a collision resistance simulation calculation on the carrier structure of the nuclear power plant carrier, to obtain a collision resistance calculation result and a collision impact load generated by the preset collision; wherein the nuclear power plant carrier is traveling at sea; Analyzing a first impact result of the preset collision on equipment in the nuclear power plant carrier device based on the anti-collision capability calculation result; Evaluating a second impact result of the collision impact load on a key structure of the nuclear power plant support device; Determining failed non-shock-resistant items from the nuclear power plant carrier based on the collision impact load, and evaluating the third impact of secondary hazards of the failed non-shock-resistant items on safety-level items; Based on the first impact result, the second impact result and the third impact result, a safety analysis result of the nuclear power plant carrying device is obtained.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The analyzing, based on the anti-collision capability calculation result, a first impact result of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant carrier device includes: When it is determined according to the anti-collision capability calculation result that the load-bearing device structure is deformed but not damaged, determining a first impact result of a first device arranged in the cabin affected by the deformed structure on the function of the safety-level system and equipment; When it is determined that the load-bearing device structure is deformed and damaged according to the anti-collision capability calculation result, the impact of external flooding on the second equipment in the flooded partition of the cabin on the impacted side is evaluated to determine the first impact result of the external flooding on the functional realization of the safety-level system and equipment.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The key structures include a main structure, a containment vessel, and a safety-grade liquid tank structure. The second impact result of evaluating the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant support device includes: The impact of the collision impact load on the main structure, the containment shell and the safety-level liquid tank structure is evaluated to obtain a second impact result.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The determining of failed non-impact-resistant items from the nuclear power plant carrier device based on the collision impact load includes: determining an equipment qualification impact load based on the collision impact load, wherein the equipment qualification impact load envelops the collision impact load; Based on the impact load identification of the equipment, shock-resistant items are determined from the list of items of the nuclear power plant's load-bearing device, and items in the list other than the shock-resistant items are non-shock-resistant items; In the preset collision, the non-impact-resistant item is determined as the failed non-impact-resistant item.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The results of the assessment of the third impact of the secondary hazards of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the safety-level items include: Determine the safety-level items within the impact range of the failed non-impact-resistant items as the first items; Determine the impact of a single failure of the failed non-shock resistant item on the first item.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The results of the assessment of the third impact of the secondary hazards of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the safety-level items include: Selecting a first non-shock-resistant item and a first shock-stabilization-only item from the list of items, wherein the first non-shock-resistant item and the first shock-stabilization-only item are invalid items, and the first non-shock-resistant item and the first shock-stabilization-only item contain non-hazardous liquid or non-hazardous vapor; An impact of leakage of the first non-shock resistant item and leakage of the first shock stability-only item on the safety-rated item is determined.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The results of the assessment of the third impact of the secondary hazards of the failed non-shock-resistant item on the safety-level items include: Screening out a second non-shock-resistant item and a second shock-stabilization-only item from the list of items, wherein the second non-shock-resistant item and the second shock-stabilization-only item are invalid items, and the second non-shock-resistant item and the second shock-stabilization-only item contain hazardous liquids or hazardous vapors; Determine the impact of leakage of the second non-shock resistant item and leakage of the second shock stability-only item on the safety-rated item.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that The simulation performs a preset collision on the nuclear power plant carrier, including: Performing a stability analysis on the load-bearing device structure to obtain a stability analysis result; When the stability analysis result indicates that the nuclear power plant carrying device meets the preset stability requirements, a preset collision of the nuclear power plant carrying device is simulated.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The stability analysis includes intact stability analysis and damaged stability analysis.

10. A collision safety analysis device, characterized in that: The collision safety analysis device comprises: a simulation calculation module, configured to simulate a preset collision of a nuclear power plant carrier, and perform a collision resistance simulation calculation on the carrier structure of the nuclear power plant carrier, to obtain a collision resistance calculation result and a collision impact load generated by the preset collision; wherein the nuclear power plant carrier is traveling at sea; A first impact result obtaining module is configured to analyze a first impact result of the preset collision on the equipment in the nuclear power plant carrier device based on the anti-collision capability calculation result; A second impact result obtaining module is used to evaluate the second impact result of the collision impact load on the key structure of the nuclear power plant support device; a third impact result obtaining module, configured to determine, based on the collision impact load, failed non-impact-resistant items from the nuclear power plant carrier, and evaluate a third impact result of secondary hazards of the failed non-impact-resistant items on safety-level items; An analysis result obtaining module is used to obtain a safety analysis result of the nuclear power plant carrying device based on the first impact result, the second impact result and the third impact result.

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