Airport employee safety information management method and device

Abstract

The invention provides an airport employee safety information management method and device, and the method comprises the steps: constructing an evolutionary game model quintuple about the safety information of airport employees in an excitation environment, the evolutionary game model quintuple comprises a game participant node set, an action strategy set adopted by two game parties, a probability corresponding to an action strategy, a parameter corresponding to the action strategy and an excitation variable; based on an evolutionary game tree associated with an evolutionary game model quintuple, a payment matrix is determined in combination with a revenue quantification method; determining a replication dynamic equation according to the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple; and calculating an evolution stable equilibrium solution based on the replication dynamic equation, and determining an airport employee safety information management scheme. The proposal for improving the enthusiasm of employees to actively report unsafe factors is provided in an airport working environment, so that the safe operation capability of an airport is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of safety information management technology, and more particularly to a method for managing safety information of airport employees. The present application also relates to a device for managing safety information of airport employees, a computing device, and a computer-readable storage medium. Background Art

[0002] Existing research starts from constructing a DID model of an unbalanced panel, conducting a realistic evaluation of the indicator system from three dimensions: individual, organization, and environment. By constructing a relational motivation theory, it predicts the impact of incentive mechanisms at different subject and individual levels. However, there is little research on this in the airport work environment.

[0003] In addition, existing technologies usually adopt a macro perspective, using a series of historical data to predict the future, and lack research on small-scale and interactive situations. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, the embodiments of the present application provide a method for managing airport employee safety information to address the technical deficiencies in the prior art. The embodiments of the present application also provide an airport employee safety information management device, a computing device, and a computer-readable storage medium.

[0005] According to a first aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a method for managing airport employee safety information is provided, comprising:

[0006] Construct a five-tuple evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information under an incentive environment: AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, where Θ is the set of game participant nodes, S is the set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is the incentive variable.

[0007] Determine the payoff matrix based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} and in combination with the benefit quantification method;

[0008] Determine a replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0009] Based on the replicated dynamic equation, the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated and the airport employee safety information management plan is determined.

[0010] Optionally, the five-tuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, C, R} of the evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information under the incentive environment is constructed, including:

[0011] Determine the game participant node set Θ={θ e ,θ m}, where θ e Representing employee nodes, θ m Represents the security management department node;

[0012] Determine the action strategy set S taken by both parties of the game = {S e ,S m}, where S e Characterizes the action strategy set of the employee node, S m A set of action strategies representing the security management department node;

[0013] Determine the probability P = {α, β, λ, q} of the corresponding action strategy, where α is the probability that the security management department node performs a management action, β is the probability that the employee node performs a security information reporting action, λ is the probability that the security management department node performs an investigation action on the reported security information after the employee node performs the security information reporting action, and q is the probability that the employee node is discovered after reporting false security information or failing to report security information;

[0014] Determine the parameters Cs = {A, B, C, D, M, N, O} of the corresponding action strategy, wherein A is the cost of the security management department node executing the management action, B is the cost of the security management department node executing the investigation action, C is the loss caused by the employee node not executing the security information reporting action, D is the benefit generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, M is the overhead generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, N is the penalty received by the employee node after reporting false security information, and O is the penalty received by the employee node for not executing the security information reporting action.

[0015] Optionally, the action strategy set S taken by the two parties in the game is determined to be {S e ,S m},include:

[0016] Determine the action strategy set of the employee node in, Execute the security information reporting action for the employee node, The employee node does not perform the security information reporting action;

[0017] Determine the action strategy set of the security management department node in, executing said management action for said security authority node, The security management department node does not perform the management action, For the security management department node, perform the investigation action on the reported security information, The security management department node does not perform the investigation action on the reported security information.

[0018] Optionally, the payment matrix is ​​determined based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} in combination with a benefit quantification method, including:

[0019] Constructing an evolutionary game tree according to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0020] Determine all game pair combinations according to the evolutionary game tree;

[0021] Calculating the payoff functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations;

[0022] The payment matrix is ​​determined according to all the payment functions.

[0023] Optionally, calculating the payoff functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations includes:

[0024] Select one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed;

[0025] According to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, calculate the benefits of the security management department node and the benefits of the employee node in the pending game pair combination;

[0026] Determining a payment function corresponding to the pending game pair combination according to the income of the security management department node and the income of the employee node in the pending game pair combination;

[0027] The step of selecting one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed is performed until the payment functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations are obtained.

[0028] Optionally, determining the replication dynamic equation according to the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} includes:

[0029] Determine the expected benefit of the security management department node executing the management action and the expected benefit of not executing the management action based on the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0030] Determine a replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node according to the expected benefit of the security management department node executing the management action and the expected benefit of not executing the management action;

[0031] Determine the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0032] The replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node is determined according to the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action.

[0033] Optionally, the calculating an evolutionary stable equilibrium solution based on the replicated dynamic equation includes:

[0034] An evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated based on the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node and the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node.

[0035] According to a second aspect of an embodiment of the present application, there is provided an airport employee safety information management device, comprising:

[0036] The construction module is configured to construct a five-tuple AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, an evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information under an incentive environment, where Θ is the set of game participant nodes, S is the set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is the incentive variable.

[0037] A matrix determination module is configured to determine a payment matrix based on an evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} in combination with a benefit quantification method;

[0038] An equation determination module is configured to determine a replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0039] The solution determination module is configured to calculate the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution based on the replicated dynamic equation and determine the airport employee safety information management solution.

[0040] According to a third aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a computing device is provided, including:

[0041] memory and processor;

[0042] The memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor implements the steps of the airport employee safety information management method when executing the computer-executable instructions.

[0043] According to a fourth aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, which stores computer-executable instructions. When the instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the airport employee safety information management method are implemented.

[0044] According to a fifth aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a chip is provided, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by the chip, the steps of the airport employee safety information management method are implemented.

[0045] The present application provides a method for managing airport employee safety information. The method constructs an evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R} for airport employee safety information under an incentive environment, wherein Θ is a set of game participant nodes, S is a set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is an incentive variable. Based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, a payoff matrix is ​​determined in combination with a benefit quantification method. Based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, a replication dynamic equation is determined. Based on the replication dynamic equation, an evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated to determine an airport employee safety information management plan. The method implements a method for proposing suggestions to enhance employees' initiative in reporting unsafe factors in an airport working environment, thereby improving the airport's safe operation capabilities. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.

[0047] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a method for managing airport employee safety information provided by one embodiment of the present application;

[0048] Figure 2 This is a simplified execution flow chart of a method for managing airport employee safety information according to an embodiment of the present application for solving a stable strategy equilibrium solution;

[0049] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of an evolutionary game tree of a method for managing airport employee safety information provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0050] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a safety information management device for airport employees provided by one embodiment of the present application;

[0051] Figure 5 This is a structural block diagram of a computing device provided in one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0052] The following description sets forth many specific details to facilitate a thorough understanding of the present application. However, the present application can be implemented in many other ways than those described herein, and those skilled in the art can make similar generalizations without violating the scope of the present application. Therefore, the present application is not limited to the specific implementations disclosed below.

[0053] The terms used in one or more embodiments of the present application are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit one or more embodiments of the present application. The singular forms "a", "the" and "the" used in one or more embodiments of the present application and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" used in one or more embodiments of the present application refers to and includes any or all possible combinations of one or more associated listed items.

[0054] It should be understood that although the terms "first," "second," and the like may be used to describe various information in one or more embodiments of the present application, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are merely used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, "first" may also be referred to as "second," and similarly, "second" may also be referred to as "first," without departing from the scope of one or more embodiments of the present application.

[0055] This application provides a method for managing airport employee safety information. This application also relates to an airport employee safety information management device, a computing device, and a computer-readable storage medium, each of which is described in detail in the following embodiments.

[0056] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for managing airport employee safety information according to an embodiment of the present application is shown, which specifically includes the following steps:

[0057] Step S102: Constructing a five-tuple evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information under an incentive environment, AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, where Θ is the set of game participant nodes, S is the set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is the incentive variable;

[0058] Step S104: determining a payoff matrix based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} and in combination with a benefit quantification method;

[0059] Step S106: Determine a replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0060] Step S108: Based on the replicated dynamic equation, an evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated to determine a safety information management plan for airport employees.

[0061] First, regarding the process of solving the stable strategy equilibrium solution based on the evolutionary game model, the execution process is as follows: Figure 2 A simplified execution flow chart of a method for airport employee safety information management to solve a stable strategy equilibrium solution is provided.

[0062] Among them, the basic form of constructing the evolutionary game model is shown in Table 1 below:

[0063] Table 1 Basic form of evolutionary game model

[0064] Game participants A / B <![CDATA[Strategy S1]]> <![CDATA[Strategy S2]]> <![CDATA[Strategy S1]]> (g,g) (k,f) <![CDATA[Strategy S2]]> (f,k) (c,c)

[0065] Among them, g is the profit when both parties adopt strategy S1, c is the profit when both parties adopt strategy S2, k is the profit of game participant A when A chooses strategy S1 and game participant B chooses strategy S2, f is the profit of game participant A when A chooses strategy S2 and game participant B chooses strategy S1, the proportion of game participants who choose strategy S1 is x, and the proportion of game participants who choose strategy S2 is 1-x.

[0066] According to the basic form of the above evolutionary game model, the payoff function of the game player and the average payoff process of the group are constructed. Specifically, the payoff function of the game player A is U A =xg+(1-x)k, the payoff function of the game participant B is U B =xc+(1-x)f, the average benefit of the group is

[0067] After that, the final expression F(x) is obtained by combining the copied dynamic equation and performing form transformation, as shown below

[0068] F(x)=x(1-x)[k-f+x(gf-k+c)],

[0069] In the process of solving F(x), let F(x)=0 and get three solutions, namely x1=0, x2=1, Substituting these three solutions into the first-order derivative F′(x) of F(x), the expression of F′(x) is as follows:

[0070] F'(x)=(1-2x)(kf)+x(2-3x)(gf-k+c),

[0071] If the obtained F′(x)<0, then the solution is the stable strategy equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game, and improvement suggestions are made based on the stable strategy equilibrium solution. Conversely, if F′(x)≥0, the solution is discarded.

[0072] The process of further constructing the evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R} under the incentive environment is compared with the basic form of the evolutionary game model. The incentive variable R is introduced. This variable is the reward from the security management department node to the employee node when the employee node performs the safety information reporting action, and R>0.

[0073] Based on this, the associated evolutionary game tree is determined based on the constructed evolutionary game model quintuple. The structural relationship between employee nodes and safety management department nodes is clarified. In combination with a benefit quantification method, the corresponding benefit functions of employee nodes and safety management department nodes are determined. A payoff matrix is ​​then constructed using these two benefit functions. Combining the payoff matrix with the evolutionary game model quintuple, the replication dynamic equation for the evolutionary game model quintuple is determined. The evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is further calculated, and the airport employee safety information management plan is determined based on the calculated results.

[0074] Furthermore, in the process of constructing the evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, C, R} under the incentive environment, the specific implementation method in this embodiment is as follows:

[0075] Determine the game participant node set Θ={θ e ,θ m}, where θ e Representing employee nodes, θ m Represent the security management department node; determine the action strategy set S taken by both parties of the game = {S e ,S m}, where S e Characterizes the action strategy set of the employee node, S mCharacterize the action strategy set of the security management department node; determine the probability P of the corresponding action strategy = {α, β, λ, q}, where α is the probability that the security management department node performs a management action, β is the probability that the employee node performs a security information reporting action, λ is the probability that the security management department node performs an investigation action on the reported security information after the employee node performs the security information reporting action, and q is the probability that the employee node is discovered after reporting false security information or failing to report security information; determine the parameter Cs of the corresponding action strategy = {A, B, C, D, M, N, O}, where A is the cost of the security management department node executing the management action, B is the cost of the security management department node executing the investigation action, C is the loss caused by the employee node not executing the security information reporting action, D is the benefit generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, M is the overhead generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, N is the penalty received after the employee node reports false security information, and O is the penalty received by the employee node for not executing the security information reporting action.

[0076] Furthermore, we determine the action strategy set S={S e ,S m In this embodiment, the specific implementation is as follows:

[0077] Determine the action strategy set of the employee node in, Execute the security information reporting action for the employee node, The employee node does not perform the security information reporting action; determine the action strategy set of the security management department node in, executing said management action for said security authority node, The security management department node does not perform the management action, For the security management department node, perform the investigation action on the reported security information, The security management department node does not perform the investigation action on the reported security information.

[0078] For example, the employee node is the airport employees, that is, the airport staff; the safety management department node is the airport safety supervision department; and the action of employees voluntarily reporting safety information is the safety information reporting action.

[0079] Then Θ={θ e ,θ m} is the set of game participants. e On behalf of airport staff, θm Represents the airport safety supervision department; S={S e ,S m} is the set of strategies adopted by both parties in the game. e represents the set of action strategies made by employees, That is, to perform safety information reporting actions, That is, no safety information reporting action is performed; Represents the action strategy set of the safety supervision department, where It means that the safety supervision department manages the voluntarily reported safety information, that is, it executes management actions. It means that the safety supervision department does not manage the voluntarily reported safety information, that is, it does not take any management action. It means that after the employee voluntarily reports, the safety supervision department will investigate the content of the safety information, that is, carry out investigation actions. This means that after an employee voluntarily reports, the safety supervision department will not investigate the content of the safety information, that is, no investigation action will be taken.

[0080] P = {α, β, λ, q} represents the probability of the corresponding action strategy. α represents the probability that the safety supervision department will perform the "manage" action, where α∈(0,1), and the probability of "not managing" is 1-α; β represents the probability that the employee will perform the "report" action, where β∈(0,1), and the probability of "not reporting" is 1-β; λ represents the probability that the safety supervision department will perform the "investigation" action on the safety information after the employee performs the "report" action, where λ∈(0,1), and the probability of "not investigating" is 1-λ; q represents the probability that the employee will be discovered after reporting false information or failing to voluntarily report, where q∈(0,1).

[0081] Cs = {A, B, C, D, M, N, O} represents the parameters of various action strategies. A represents the management cost of employee voluntary reporting by the safety and supervision department, where A > 0; B represents the investigation cost of employee voluntary reporting by the safety and supervision department, where B > 0; C represents the loss caused by employees not making voluntary reports, where C > 0; D represents the benefit of employee voluntary reporting to the safety and supervision department, where D > 0; M represents the employee's expenses during the voluntary reporting process, where M > 0; N represents the penalty imposed on employees for making false voluntary reports, where N > 0; and O represents the penalty imposed on employees for not making voluntary reports, where O > 0.

[0082] Based on the above construction, the five-tuple evolutionary game model of voluntary reporting of airport employees under the incentive environment is obtained, that is, the five-tuple evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R}.

[0083] Furthermore, based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, and combined with the benefit quantification method, the payment matrix is ​​determined. In this embodiment, the specific implementation is as follows:

[0084] According to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, an evolutionary game tree is constructed; according to the evolutionary game tree, all game pair combinations are determined; the payment functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations are calculated; and according to all the payment functions, the payment matrix is ​​determined.

[0085] Furthermore, the process of calculating the payoff functions corresponding to all game pair combinations is specifically implemented as follows in this embodiment:

[0086] Select one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed; calculate the income of the security management department node and the income of the employee node in the game pair combination to be processed according to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}; determine the payment function corresponding to the game pair combination to be processed according to the income of the security management department node and the income of the employee node in the game pair combination to be processed; execute the step of selecting one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed until the payment functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations are obtained.

[0087] Among them, using the above example, the airport staff voluntarily reports the evolutionary game model quintuple, that is, the evolutionary game tree corresponding to the evolutionary game model quintuple in the airport environment, as shown in Figure 3 The following is a schematic diagram of an evolutionary game tree for a safety information management method for airport employees.

[0088] According to the evolutionary game tree, all the game pairs are determined to be combinations 1 to 6. In the process of calculating the payoff functions corresponding to all the game pairs, for combination 1, there is a payoff function F1. Under this combination, the game pair between the safety supervision department and the employees is {management, reporting, investigation}, and the benefit for the safety supervision department is The benefits to employees are Then the payment function F1 is as follows:

[0089] F1=λ(-A-B+D)+(1-λ)(-A+D)=-A-λB+D.

[0090] Approximately, for combination 2, there is a payment function F2. Under this combination, the game pair between the safety supervision department and the employees is {manage, report, do not investigate}, and the benefit for the safety supervision department is The benefits to employees are Then F2=λ(-MN)+(1-λ)[-M-qN]=-M-λN-(1-λ)qN.

[0091] For combination 3, there is a payment function F3. Under this combination, the game pair between the safety supervision department and the employees is {manage, do not report, investigate}, and the benefit for the safety supervision department is The benefits to employees are Then F3=λ(-AB-qC)+(1-λ)(-A-qC)=-A-qC-λB.

[0092] For combination 4, there is a payment function F4. Under this combination, the game pair between the safety supervision department and the employees is {manage, do not report, do not investigate}, and the benefit for the safety supervision department is The benefits to employees are Then the payment function F4 is as follows:

[0093] F4=λ(-MO)+(1-λ)[-Mq(N+O)]=-M-λO-(1-λ)(qN+qO).

[0094] After calculating the payment function in the above way, the payment matrix can be determined as shown in Table 2 below:

[0095] Table 2 Payment Matrix

[0096]

[0097] Furthermore, based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, the process of replicating the dynamic equation is determined. In this embodiment, the specific implementation is as follows:

[0098] According to the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, the expected benefit of the security management department node performing the management action and the expected benefit of not performing the management action are determined; according to the expected benefit of the security management department node performing the management action and the expected benefit of not performing the management action, the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node is determined; according to the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action are determined; according to the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action, the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node is determined.

[0099] Furthermore, based on the process of replicating the dynamic equation and calculating the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, in this embodiment, the specific implementation method is as follows:

[0100] An evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated based on the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node and the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node.

[0101] Continuing with the above example, the expected benefits of the Safety Supervision Department when choosing the "Management" action strategy are as follows:

[0102] Y1=β(-A-λB+D)+(1-β)(-A-qC-λB)=-A-λB-qC+β(qC+D);

[0103] The expected return when choosing the "no management" strategy is as follows:

[0104] Y2=β·0+(1-β)(-qC)=-(1-β)qC;

[0105] Then the average income Therefore, the replication dynamic equation of the safety supervision department can be obtained as follows:

[0106]

[0107] When F(α)=0, α * =0 or α * =1, At this time, the safety supervision department chooses the "management" strategy to achieve stability.

[0108] Similarly, for employees, the expected benefits of choosing the “report” action strategy are as follows:

[0109] Y1′=α[RM-λN-(1-λ)qN]+(1-α)(-MN)=-M-N+αR-α[(λ-1)(N-qN)];

[0110] The expected return when choosing the "no report" strategy is as follows:

[0111] Y2′=α[-M-λO-(1-λ)(qN+qO)]+(1-α)[-Mq(N+O)]=-M-qN-qO+α[λ(qN+qO-O)];

[0112] Then, the employee replication dynamic equation expression is as follows:

[0113]

[0114] When F(β)=0, β * =0 or β * =1, At this point, the strategy of employees choosing “report” has become stable.

[0115] The equilibrium points EP are the five system equilibrium points of the above game model, namely:

[0116]

[0117] Furthermore, through the analysis of the evolutionary stable point strategy, that is, in the process of determining the airport employee safety information management plan, when A+λB>0,Nq(N+O)>0,-A-λB+D<0,qO-λ(N+qO-O)≠0, or when A+λB>0,Nq(N+O)>0,-A-λB+D>0,qO-λ(N+qO-O)<0, (0,0) is the system's evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and both parties in the game will choose the (no management, no reporting) strategy. That is, when the probability of the safety supervision department investigating is When safety and security departments are faced with a situation where they maximize their own interests, they choose a "no-management" strategy. Employees, realizing this, choose a "no-reporting" strategy. Therefore, by reducing the safety and security department's management costs and adopting a hierarchical management system, the recurring phenomenon of employees failing to report can be reduced by lowering management costs.

[0118] When -A-λB+D<0,Nq(N+O)<0,λ(N+qO-O)-qO<0, (0,1) is the system's evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and both parties in the game will choose the (no management, report) strategy. That is, the probability of an employee being discovered after making false content or failing to voluntarily report is When employees choose to "report," the safety and security department, motivated by its own interests, may opt for "no management." In this scenario, the safety and security department doesn't need to conduct further management, and employees will continue to report voluntarily. Therefore, to increase the efficiency of voluntary reporting, penalties for employees who report false information or who fail to report should be increased, thereby reducing the likelihood of employees being caught after reporting false information or failing to report voluntarily.

[0119] When A+λB-D<0, qO-λ(N+qO-O)<0 and Nq(N+O)≠0, (1,1) is the system's evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and both parties in the game will choose the (management, reporting) strategy. That is, when the safety supervision department chooses to investigate the voluntary report, the probability is When [ ] is set to [ ] , the safety and supervision department will choose the "manage" strategy, while employees will choose the "report" strategy. This strategy can ensure the safety and supervision department's enthusiasm for management and employees' enthusiasm for reporting by adjusting the penalty N for employees who voluntarily report false content, the penalty O for employees who do not voluntarily report, and the probability q of employees being discovered for false content.

[0120] In practical application scenarios, simulation analysis shows that when the management probability α = 0 and α = 0.05, the probability of employees voluntarily reporting tends to zero, and the slope gradually increases as α increases. This phenomenon suggests that when the safety and supervision department chooses no management or the management probability is extremely low, employees may choose not to report out of a sense of luck. The increasing slope of the curve with increasing management probability indicates that more and more effective management measures taken by the safety and supervision department will increase employees' willingness to voluntarily report, improving the frequency and efficiency of voluntary reporting. As α increases, the evolution time t shows a decreasing trend, indicating that the time employees are willing to voluntarily report is decreasing. In other words, employees' willingness to voluntarily report is increasing, reaching its maximum when α = 1. However, considering that the management probability α = 1 for the safety and supervision department incurs higher management costs, in reality not all management departments will choose to fully implement management. Therefore, it can be found that the value of α exhibits abnormal fluctuations over a period of evolution, and its evolution time to reach 1 is approximately the same, indicating that this value achieves a balance between management cost and management efficiency.

[0121] Corresponding to the above method embodiment, the present application also provides an embodiment of an airport employee safety information management device, Figure 4 FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the structure of a device for managing airport employee safety information provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 As shown, the device includes:

[0122] Construction module 402 is configured to construct a five-tuple evolutionary game model AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R} for airport employee safety information under an incentive environment, where Θ is a set of game participant nodes, S is a set of action strategies adopted by both game players, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is a parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is an incentive variable;

[0123] The matrix determination module 404 is configured to determine the payoff matrix based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} in combination with a benefit quantification method;

[0124] An equation determination module 406 is configured to determine a replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R};

[0125] The solution determination module 408 is configured to calculate the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution based on the replicated dynamic equation and determine the airport employee safety information management solution.

[0126] In an optional embodiment, the building module 402 is further configured to:

[0127] Determine the game participant node set Θ={θ e ,θ m}, where θ e Representing employee nodes, θ m Represent the security management department node; determine the action strategy set S taken by both parties of the game = {S e ,S m}, where S e Characterizes the action strategy set of the employee node, S m Characterize the action strategy set of the security management department node; determine the probability P of the corresponding action strategy = {α, β, λ, q}, where α is the probability that the security management department node performs a management action, β is the probability that the employee node performs a security information reporting action, λ is the probability that the security management department node performs an investigation action on the reported security information after the employee node performs the security information reporting action, and q is the probability that the employee node is discovered after reporting false security information or failing to report security information; determine the parameter Cs of the corresponding action strategy = {A, B, C, D, M, N, O}, where A is the cost of the security management department node executing the management action, B is the cost of the security management department node executing the investigation action, C is the loss caused by the employee node not executing the security information reporting action, D is the benefit generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, M is the overhead generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, N is the penalty received after the employee node reports false security information, and O is the penalty received by the employee node for not executing the security information reporting action.

[0128] In an optional embodiment, the building module 402 is further configured to:

[0129] Determine the action strategy set of the employee node in, Execute the security information reporting action for the employee node, The employee node does not perform the security information reporting action; determine the action strategy set of the security management department node in, executing said management action for said security authority node, The security management department node does not perform the management action, For the security management department node, perform the investigation action on the reported security information, The security management department node does not perform the investigation action on the reported security information.

[0130] In an optional embodiment, the matrix determination module 404 is further configured to:

[0131] According to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, an evolutionary game tree is constructed; according to the evolutionary game tree, all game pair combinations are determined; the payment functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations are calculated; and according to all the payment functions, the payment matrix is ​​determined.

[0132] In an optional embodiment, the matrix determination module 404 is further configured to:

[0133] Select one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed; calculate the income of the security management department node and the income of the employee node in the game pair combination to be processed according to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}; determine the payment function corresponding to the game pair combination to be processed according to the income of the security management department node and the income of the employee node in the game pair combination to be processed; execute the step of selecting one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed until the payment functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations are obtained.

[0134] In an optional embodiment, the equation determination module 406 is further configured to:

[0135] According to the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, the expected benefit of the security management department node performing the management action and the expected benefit of not performing the management action are determined; according to the expected benefit of the security management department node performing the management action and the expected benefit of not performing the management action, the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node is determined; according to the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action are determined; according to the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action, the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node is determined.

[0136] In an optional embodiment, the solution determination module 408 is further configured to:

[0137] An evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated based on the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node and the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node.

[0138] The airport employee safety information management device provided by the present application constructs an evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R} about airport employee safety information under an incentive environment, wherein Θ is a set of game participant nodes, S is a set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is an incentive variable; based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, a payoff matrix is ​​determined in combination with a benefit quantification method; based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ,S,P,Cs,R}, a replication dynamic equation is determined; based on the replication dynamic equation, an evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated to determine an airport employee safety information management plan. This device implements suggestions for enhancing employees' initiative to proactively report unsafe factors in an airport work environment, thereby improving the airport's safe operation capabilities.

[0139] The above is a schematic scheme of an airport employee safety information management device of this embodiment. It should be noted that the technical solution of the airport employee safety information management device and the technical solution of the above-mentioned airport employee safety information management method belong to the same concept. For details not described in detail in the technical solution of the airport employee safety information management device, please refer to the description of the technical solution of the above-mentioned airport employee safety information management method. In addition, the various components in the device embodiment should be understood as functional modules that must be established to implement each step of the program flow or each step of the method, and each functional module is not an actual functional division or separation definition. The device claim defined by such a group of functional modules should be understood as a functional module architecture that mainly implements the solution through the computer program recorded in the specification, and should not be understood as a physical device that mainly implements the solution through hardware.

[0140] Figure 5 The block diagram shows a structure of a computing device 500 according to an embodiment of the present application. The components of the computing device 500 include, but are not limited to, a memory 510 and a processor 520. The processor 520 is connected to the memory 510 via a bus 530, and a database 550 is used to store data.

[0141] The computing device 500 also includes an access device 540 that enables the computing device 500 to communicate via one or more networks 560. Examples of such networks include a public switched telephone network (PSTN), a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a personal area network (PAN), or a combination of communication networks such as the Internet. The access device 540 may include one or more of any type of network interface (e.g., a network interface card (NIC)), whether wired or wireless, such as an IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN) wireless interface, a Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (Wi-MAX) interface, an Ethernet interface, a universal serial bus (USB) interface, a cellular network interface, a Bluetooth interface, a near field communication (NFC) interface, and the like.

[0142] In one embodiment of the present application, the above components of the computing device 500 and Figure 5 Other components not shown in the figure may also be connected to each other, for example, via a bus. Figure 5 The computing device structure block diagram shown is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to limit the scope of the present application. Those skilled in the art may add or replace other components as needed.

[0143] Computing device 500 can be any type of stationary or mobile computing device, including a mobile computer or mobile computing device (e.g., a tablet computer, a personal digital assistant, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a netbook computer, etc.), a mobile phone (e.g., a smartphone), a wearable computing device (e.g., a smartwatch, smart glasses, etc.), or other types of mobile devices, or a stationary computing device such as a desktop computer or PC. Computing device 500 can also be a mobile or stationary server.

[0144] The processor 520 is configured to execute computer executable instructions for each step of the method for managing safety information of airport employees.

[0145] The above is a schematic diagram of a computing device according to this embodiment. It should be noted that the technical solution of this computing device is based on the same concept as the technical solution of the aforementioned method for managing airport employee safety information. For details not described in detail in the technical solution of the computing device, please refer to the description of the technical solution of the aforementioned method for managing airport employee safety information.

[0146] An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, are used to execute the steps of the airport employee safety information management method.

[0147] The above is a schematic diagram of a computer-readable storage medium according to this embodiment. It should be noted that the technical solution of this storage medium is based on the same concept as the technical solution of the aforementioned method for managing airport employee safety information. For details not described in detail in the technical solution of the storage medium, please refer to the description of the technical solution of the aforementioned method for managing airport employee safety information.

[0148] An embodiment of the present application further provides a chip storing a computer program, which, when executed by the chip, implements the steps of the airport employee safety information management method.

[0149] The foregoing description describes specific embodiments of the present application. Other embodiments are within the scope of the appended claims. In some cases, the actions or steps recited in the claims can be performed in an order different from that described in the embodiments and still achieve the desired results. Furthermore, the processes depicted in the accompanying drawings do not necessarily require the specific order shown or the sequential order to achieve the desired results. In certain embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are also possible or may be advantageous.

[0150] The computer instructions include computer program code, which may be in source code form, object code form, executable file, or some intermediate form. The computer-readable medium may include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code, recording medium, USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, magnetic disk, optical disk, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electric carrier signal, telecommunication signal, and software distribution medium, etc. It should be noted that the content contained in the computer-readable medium may be appropriately increased or decreased according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice in the jurisdiction. For example, in some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media do not include electric carrier signals and telecommunication signals.

[0151] It should be noted that for the aforementioned method embodiments, for ease of description, they are all expressed as a series of action combinations, but those skilled in the art should be aware that this application is not limited by the order of the actions described, because according to this application, certain steps can be performed in other orders or simultaneously. Secondly, those skilled in the art should also be aware that the embodiments described in this specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily required by this application.

[0152] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own focus. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0153] The preferred embodiments of the present application disclosed above are intended only to help illustrate the present application. The optional embodiments do not describe all details in detail, nor do they limit the invention to the specific embodiments described. Obviously, many modifications and variations can be made based on the content of this application. This application selects and describes these embodiments in detail in order to better explain the principles and practical applications of this application, so that those skilled in the art can better understand and utilize this application. This application is limited only by the claims and their full scope and equivalents.

Claims

1. A method for managing airport employee safety information, characterized in that: include: Construct a five-tuple evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information under an incentive environment: AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, where Θ is the set of game participant nodes, S is the set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is the incentive variable. Determine the payoff matrix based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} and in combination with the benefit quantification method; Determine a replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}; Based on the replicated dynamic equation, the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated and the airport employee safety information management plan is determined.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, C, R} of airport employee safety information under the incentive environment is constructed, including: Determine the game participant node set Θ={θ e ,θ m }, where θ e Representing employee nodes, θ m Represents the security management department node; Determine the action strategy set S taken by both parties of the game = {S e ,S m }, where S e Characterizes the action strategy set of the employee node, S m A set of action strategies representing the security management department node; Determine the probability P = {α, β, λ, q} of the corresponding action strategy, where α is the probability that the security management department node performs a management action, β is the probability that the employee node performs a security information reporting action, λ is the probability that the security management department node performs an investigation action on the reported security information after the employee node performs the security information reporting action, and q is the probability that the employee node is discovered after reporting false security information or failing to report security information; Determine the parameters Cs = {A, B, C, D, M, N, O} of the corresponding action strategy, wherein A is the cost of the security management department node executing the management action, B is the cost of the security management department node executing the investigation action, C is the loss caused by the employee node not executing the security information reporting action, D is the benefit generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, M is the overhead generated by the employee node executing the security information reporting action, N is the penalty received by the employee node after reporting false security information, and O is the penalty received by the employee node for not executing the security information reporting action.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The action strategy set S taken by the two parties in the game is determined to be {S e ,S m },include: Determine the action strategy set of the employee node in, Execute the security information reporting action for the employee node, The employee node does not perform the security information reporting action; Determine the action strategy set of the security management department node in, executing said management action for said security authority node, The security management department node does not perform the management action, For the security management department node, perform the investigation action on the reported security information, The security management department node does not perform the investigation action on the reported security information.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein The payoff matrix is ​​determined based on the evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} and the income quantification method, including: Constructing an evolutionary game tree according to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}; Determine all game pair combinations according to the evolutionary game tree; Calculating the payoff functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations; The payment matrix is ​​determined according to all the payment functions.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The calculating of the payoff functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations includes: Select one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed; According to the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, calculate the benefits of the security management department node and the benefits of the employee node in the pending game pair combination; Determining a payment function corresponding to the pending game pair combination according to the income of the security management department node and the income of the employee node in the pending game pair combination; The step of selecting one of all the game pair combinations as the game pair combination to be processed is performed until the payment functions corresponding to all the game pair combinations are obtained.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The method of determining the replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} includes: Determine the expected benefit of the security management department node executing the management action and the expected benefit of not executing the management action based on the payment matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}; Determine a replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node according to the expected benefit of the security management department node executing the management action and the expected benefit of not executing the management action; Determine the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}; The replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node is determined according to the expected benefit of the employee node performing the security information reporting action and the expected benefit of not performing the security information reporting action.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The step of calculating an evolutionary stable equilibrium solution based on the replicated dynamic equation comprises: An evolutionary stable equilibrium solution is calculated based on the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the security management department node and the replication dynamic equation corresponding to the employee node.

8. A device for managing airport employee safety information, characterized in that: include: The construction module is configured to construct a five-tuple AEAR-EGM = {Θ, S, P, Cs, R}, an evolutionary game model of airport employee safety information under an incentive environment, where Θ is the set of game participant nodes, S is the set of action strategies adopted by both parties, P is the probability of the corresponding action strategy, Cs is the parameter of the corresponding action strategy, and R is the incentive variable. A matrix determination module is configured to determine a payment matrix based on an evolutionary game tree associated with the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R} in combination with a benefit quantification method; An equation determination module is configured to determine a replication dynamic equation based on the payoff matrix and the evolutionary game model quintuple AEAR-EGM={Θ, S, P, Cs, R}; The solution determination module is configured to calculate the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution based on the replicated dynamic equation and determine the airport employee safety information management solution.

9. A computing device, characterized in that include: memory and processor; The memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute the computer-executable instructions to implement the steps of the airport employee safety information management method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions, characterized in that: When the instruction is executed by the processor, the steps of the airport employee safety information management method described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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