Tamper-proof safe starting method and device, equipment and medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a tamper-proof security starting method, device, equipment and medium, which are applied to power equipment, the power equipment comprises a hardware security module and a starting component, and the method comprises the following steps: acquiring a trusted time source; according to the trusted time source and the hardware security module, performing multi-level integrity verification on the starting component to obtain component integrity verification information of the starting component, the component integrity verification information comprises a firmware hash value, a boot hash value and a kernel hash value in which the trusted time source and a timestamp provided by the hardware security module are embedded; performing information analysis processing on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data; and safely starting the power equipment according to the information analysis data. According to the method, the safety of the power equipment in the starting process can be effectively improved. The invention relates to the technical field of information security.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a tamper-proof secure startup method, device, equipment and medium. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread deployment and application of power equipment in power grids, the system security of power equipment has become one of the important factors for the stable operation of power grids.

[0003] Currently, related technologies usually rely on local time sources to verify the startup of power equipment. This method is vulnerable to external attacks or internal failures, making it difficult to ensure the time consistency of the verification logic. Power equipment is easily tampered with during the startup process, and the startup security is unsatisfactory.

[0004] Therefore, the problems existing in related technologies still need to be solved and optimized urgently. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to solve one of the technical problems existing in the related art to at least a certain extent.

[0006] To this end, an object of an embodiment of the present invention is to provide a tamper-proof secure startup method, apparatus, device, and medium, wherein the method can effectively improve the security of power equipment during the startup process.

[0007] In order to achieve the above technical objectives, the technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of the present application include:

[0008] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a tamper-resistant secure boot method, which is applied to an electric power device, wherein the electric power device includes a hardware security module and a boot component. The method includes:

[0009] Obtain a trusted time source;

[0010] performing multi-level integrity verification on the startup component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, the component integrity verification information including a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module;

[0011] Performing information analysis on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data;

[0012] The power equipment is safely started based on the information analysis data.

[0013] In addition, the method according to the above embodiment of the present application may also have the following additional technical features:

[0014] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present application, the startup component includes a firmware startup module, a boot startup module, and a kernel startup module. The multi-level integrity verification of the startup component is performed based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, including:

[0015] Performing firmware integrity verification on the firmware startup module according to the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain a firmware hash value;

[0016] Performing boot integrity verification on the boot startup module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the firmware hash value to obtain a boot hash value;

[0017] Performing kernel integrity verification on the kernel boot module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the boot hash value to obtain a kernel hash value;

[0018] The component integrity verification information is obtained according to the firmware hash value, the boot hash value, and the kernel hash value.

[0019] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present application, performing firmware integrity verification on the firmware startup module based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain a firmware hash value includes:

[0020] Obtaining an initial hash value of the firmware startup module, and obtaining a firmware timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module;

[0021] The initial hash value is hashed according to the firmware timestamp to obtain the firmware hash value.

[0022] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present application, obtaining the firmware timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module includes:

[0023] Obtaining a synchronization timestamp provided by the trusted time source;

[0024] Generating a device unique identifier through a physically unclonable function built into the hardware security module;

[0025] Perform timestamp encryption binding on the synchronization timestamp and the device unique identifier to obtain the firmware timestamp.

[0026] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present application, performing boot integrity verification on the boot startup module based on the trusted time source, the hardware security module, and the firmware hash value to obtain the boot hash value includes:

[0027] Performing digital signature verification on the boot and start module to obtain signature verification information, wherein the signature verification information is used to indicate whether the digital signature verification of the boot and start module is successful;

[0028] If the signature verification information indicates that the digital signature of the boot module is successfully verified, obtaining a boot timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module, wherein the boot timestamp is greater than the firmware timestamp;

[0029] The firmware hash value is hashed according to the boot timestamp to obtain the boot hash value.

[0030] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present application, the power device further includes a security log recording module, and the information analysis processing of the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data includes:

[0031] Obtaining security log data in the security log recording module;

[0032] Performing a time chain detection on the firmware timestamp, the boot timestamp, and the kernel timestamp in the component integrity verification information according to the time log information in the security log data to obtain a time detection result;

[0033] Performing hash detection on the firmware hash value, the boot hash value, and the kernel hash value in the component integrity verification information according to the verification log information in the security log data to obtain a hash detection result;

[0034] The information analysis data is constructed according to the time detection result and the hash detection result.

[0035] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present application, the method further includes:

[0036] Sending the component integrity verification information to a cloud server, so that the cloud server decrypts and verifies the component integrity verification information, and obtains an authorization instruction returned by the cloud server, wherein the authorization instruction is used to indicate whether to authorize the startup of the power device;

[0037] If the permission instruction is to start the electric power device without authorization, the electric power device is image rolled back.

[0038] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a tamper-resistant secure boot device, which is applied to an electric power device. The electric power device includes a hardware security module and a boot component. The device includes:

[0039] A first processing unit, configured to obtain a trusted time source;

[0040] a second processing unit, configured to perform multi-level integrity verification on the startup component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module, and obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, the component integrity verification information including a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module;

[0041] a third processing unit, configured to perform information analysis on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data;

[0042] The fourth processing unit is used to analyze data according to the information and safely start the power equipment.

[0043] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an electronic device, including:

[0044] at least one processor;

[0045] at least one memory for storing at least one program;

[0046] When the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor, the at least one processor implements the above method.

[0047] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a program executable by a processor, and the program executable by the processor is used to implement the above method when executed by the processor.

[0048] The advantages and benefits of this application will be partially given in the following description, and partially become apparent from the following description, or learned through practice of this application:

[0049] The embodiments of the present application disclose a tamper-proof secure boot method, apparatus, device, and medium, wherein the method obtains a trusted time source; performs multi-level integrity verification on the boot component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the boot component, wherein the component integrity verification information includes a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module; performs information analysis processing on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data; and securely boots the power equipment based on the information analysis data. The method performs multi-level integrity verification on the boot component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module, which can ensure the time consistency of the verification logic and effectively improve the security of the power equipment during the boot process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0050] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following introduction is made to the drawings of the embodiments of the present application or the related technical solutions in the prior art. It should be understood that the drawings introduced below are only for the convenience of clearly expressing some embodiments of the technical solutions of the present application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.

[0051] Figure 1 A flowchart of a tamper-proof secure boot method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0052] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structural framework of a tamper-proof secure boot device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0053] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] The embodiments of the present application are described in detail below, and examples of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals throughout represent the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present application and are not to be construed as limiting the present application. For the step numbers in the following embodiments, they are provided only for the convenience of explanation and are not intended to limit the order of the steps. The order of execution of the steps in the embodiments can be adaptively adjusted according to the understanding of those skilled in the art.

[0055] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which this application pertains. The terms used herein are for the purpose of describing the embodiments of this application only and are not intended to limit this application.

[0056] Currently, related technologies typically rely on a local time source to verify the startup of power equipment. This approach is vulnerable to external attacks or internal failures, making it difficult to ensure the time consistency of the verification logic. Power equipment is easily tampered with during the startup process, resulting in unsatisfactory startup security. Furthermore, the chained startup verification process for power equipment typically relies solely on hash values ​​and digital signatures, which lack an embedded timestamp. This makes the verification sequence of the chained startup process difficult to trace, resulting in limited tamper resistance and poor startup security.

[0057] In view of this, an embodiment of the present invention provides a tamper-proof secure boot method, apparatus, device and medium, wherein the method performs multi-level integrity verification on the boot component based on a trusted time source and a hardware security module, specifically by sequentially verifying the integrity of the firmware boot module, the boot boot module and the kernel boot module, and embedding and binding the synchronization timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module to the corresponding hash value (such as the firmware hash value, the boot hash value or the kernel hash value). This not only ensures the time consistency of the logical verification, but also embeds the firmware timestamp, the boot timestamp and the kernel timestamp in the chained boot process of the power equipment. These timestamps are conducive to ensuring the time logic of the verification sequence in the chained boot process, making the verification sequence of the chained boot process traceable, and effectively improving the security of the boot.

[0058] Reference Figure 1 In an embodiment of the present application, a tamper-proof secure boot method is applied to an electric power device, wherein the electric power device includes a hardware security module and a boot component. The method includes:

[0059] Step 110: Obtain a trusted time source;

[0060] Step 120: Perform multi-level integrity verification on the boot component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the boot component, where the component integrity verification information includes a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module.

[0061] In an embodiment of the present application, the trusted time source may be an external trusted time server, and the startup components may include the firmware, boot program and operating system kernel of the power equipment, among which the firmware of the power equipment is recorded as a firmware startup module, the boot program is recorded as a boot startup module and the operating system kernel is recorded as a kernel startup module during the startup process of the power equipment; the power equipment may be an intelligent device combined with Internet of Things technology, such as a smart meter.

[0062] It can be understood that multi-level integrity verification can be to perform integrity verification on the firmware startup module, boot startup module and kernel startup module in the startup component in sequence and step by step, and embed the timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module in the integrity verification process of each module, wherein the trusted time source is used to provide the current synchronization timestamp to the integrity verification process of each module, and the hardware security module is used to provide each synchronization timestamp with a corresponding device unique identifier to prevent the synchronization timestamp from being tampered with, thereby ensuring the time consistency of the logical verification.

[0063] In some embodiments, the startup component includes a firmware startup module, a boot startup module, and a kernel startup module. The multi-level integrity verification of the startup component is performed based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, including:

[0064] Performing firmware integrity verification on the firmware startup module according to the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain a firmware hash value;

[0065] Performing boot integrity verification on the boot startup module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the firmware hash value to obtain a boot hash value;

[0066] Performing kernel integrity verification on the kernel boot module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the boot hash value to obtain a kernel hash value;

[0067] The component integrity verification information is obtained according to the firmware hash value, the boot hash value, and the kernel hash value.

[0068] In an embodiment of the present application, the integrity of the firmware startup module can be verified based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain the firmware hash value of the firmware startup module, and the firmware verification information includes the initial hash value and the firmware timestamp after encryption and binding; then the integrity of the boot startup module can be verified based on the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the firmware hash value of the firmware startup module to obtain the boot hash value; then, based on the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the boot hash value, the kernel hash value of the kernel startup module is determined.

[0069] It can be understood that after obtaining the firmware hash value of the firmware startup module, the boot hash value of the boot startup module and the kernel hash value of the kernel startup module, the component integrity verification information can be integrated based on the logical verification order between the firmware hash value, the boot hash value and the kernel hash value.

[0070] Furthermore, the performing firmware integrity verification on the firmware startup module based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain a firmware hash value includes:

[0071] Obtaining an initial hash value of the firmware startup module, and obtaining a firmware timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module;

[0072] The initial hash value is hashed according to the firmware timestamp to obtain the firmware hash value.

[0073] In an embodiment of the present application, the power equipment can first read the initial hash value of the firmware startup module through the hardware security module, and obtain a trusted, tamper-proof synchronization timestamp through the hardware security module and the trusted time source. The synchronization timestamp can specifically be the timestamp when the hardware security module reads the initial hash value of the firmware startup module, and is recorded as the firmware timestamp; then, the initial hash value and the firmware timestamp are hashed through the national secret SM3 algorithm to generate a new hash value, which is recorded as the firmware hash value.

[0074] Furthermore, obtaining the firmware timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module includes:

[0075] Obtaining a synchronization timestamp provided by the trusted time source;

[0076] Generating a device unique identifier through a physically unclonable function built into the hardware security module;

[0077] Perform timestamp encryption binding on the synchronization timestamp and the device unique identifier to obtain the firmware timestamp.

[0078] In an embodiment of the present application, the power equipment can first obtain a synchronization timestamp provided by a trusted time source, and generate a unique identifier for the power equipment through a physical unclonable function (PUF) built into a hardware security module (HSM), which is recorded as a device unique identifier; then, based on the encryption unit built into the hardware security module, the synchronization timestamp and the device unique identifier are encrypted and bound, and the generated firmware timestamp is stored in an encrypted storage area that is only accessible to the hardware security module, thereby obtaining a firmware timestamp.

[0079] Furthermore, performing boot integrity verification on the boot startup module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module, and the firmware hash value to obtain the boot hash value includes:

[0080] Performing digital signature verification on the boot and start module to obtain signature verification information, wherein the signature verification information is used to indicate whether the digital signature verification of the boot and start module is successful;

[0081] If the signature verification information indicates that the digital signature of the boot module is successfully verified, obtaining a boot timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module, wherein the boot timestamp is greater than the firmware timestamp;

[0082] Performing hash calculation on the firmware hash value according to the boot timestamp to obtain the boot hash value;

[0083] In an embodiment of the present application, before the boot module is loaded, the power equipment can verify the digital signature of the boot module through the hardware security module. There are many specific digital signature verification methods, which will not be repeated in this application; then, if the signature verification information is that the digital signature verification of the boot module is successful, the boot timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module can be obtained. The boot timestamp is similar to the aforementioned firmware timestamp and can be simply deduced by analogy. The difference is that the boot timestamp is the timestamp when the hardware security module performs digital signature verification on the boot module, and since the time point corresponding to the boot timestamp is later than the time point corresponding to the firmware timestamp, the boot timestamp is greater than the firmware timestamp.

[0084] It can be understood that after obtaining the boot timestamp, the firmware hash value and the boot timestamp can be hashed using the national encryption SM3 algorithm to generate a new hash value, recorded as the boot hash value, which includes the previous level firmware hash value and the current boot timestamp.

[0085] It should be noted that the kernel hash value is similar to the boot hash value described above and can be derived by analogy. Specifically, the kernel boot module's digital signature is first verified to obtain its signature verification information. If the signature verification information indicates that the kernel boot module's digital signature verification is successful, the kernel timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module is obtained. This kernel timestamp is greater than the boot timestamp. The kernel hash value is then determined through a hash calculation based on the kernel timestamp and the boot hash value.

[0086] Step 130: Analyze and process the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data.

[0087] In an embodiment of the present application, after obtaining component integrity verification information for a startup component, the component integrity verification information can be analyzed to obtain information analysis data. The information analysis data indicates whether the component integrity verification information is abnormal. Specifically, if the component integrity verification information is abnormal, it indicates that the startup component is abnormal during the startup process, and there is a risk of data tampering.

[0088] In some embodiments, the power device further includes a security log recording module, and the information analysis and processing of the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data includes:

[0089] Obtaining security log data in the security log recording module;

[0090] Performing a time chain detection on the firmware timestamp, the boot timestamp, and the kernel timestamp in the component integrity verification information according to the time log information in the security log data to obtain a time detection result;

[0091] Performing hash detection on the firmware hash value, the boot hash value, and the kernel hash value in the component integrity verification information according to the verification log information in the security log data to obtain a hash detection result;

[0092] The information analysis data is constructed according to the time detection result and the hash detection result.

[0093] In an embodiment of the present application, in addition to the hardware security module and the startup component, the power equipment may also include a security log recording module, which records time log information and verification log information. The time log information records the timestamps of each module of the startup component, and the verification log information records the hash values ​​of each module of the startup component. These timestamps and corresponding hash values ​​are recorded in real time in the security log in the security log recording module. The security log can be encrypted and stored using the SM4 encryption algorithm, and distributed storage values ​​can be distributed to multiple edge nodes through blockchain technology, so that the security log can achieve tamper-proof audit records.

[0094] It can be understood that the time chain detection can be to detect whether the firmware timestamp, boot timestamp and kernel timestamp in the component integrity verification information conform to the logical verification order, that is, based on the timestamp size, they are sorted from small to large as firmware timestamp, boot timestamp and kernel timestamp; and respectively detect whether the firmware timestamp, boot timestamp and kernel timestamp are the same or similar to the corresponding timestamp in the time log information; when the firmware timestamp, boot timestamp and kernel timestamp conform to the logical verification order, and are all the same or similar to the corresponding timestamp in the time log information, a time detection result representing normality can be generated, otherwise, a time detection result representing abnormality is generated.

[0095] It is worth mentioning that to detect whether the firmware timestamp is the same as or close to the timestamp of the firmware startup module in the time log information, it can be to calculate the difference between the firmware timestamp and the timestamp of the firmware startup module in the time log information, and when the difference is less than the preset deviation threshold, it is considered that the firmware timestamp is close to the timestamp of the firmware startup module in the time log information, and the contents of the boot timestamp and the kernel timestamp are similar to the contents of the aforementioned firmware timestamp, which can be simply inferred.

[0096] It should be noted that hash detection can be based on the hash value of each module in the verification log information, and is matched and verified with the corresponding firmware hash value, boot hash value or kernel hash value in the component integrity verification information. When the firmware hash value, boot hash value and kernel hash value all match the corresponding hash values ​​in the verification log information, a hash detection result representing normality is generated; otherwise, a hash detection result representing an abnormality is generated.

[0097] It is worth noting that after obtaining the time detection results and hash detection results, if the time detection results and hash detection results are both normal, information analysis data representing that the component integrity verification information is normal can be generated; conversely, if the time detection results or hash detection results are abnormal, information analysis data representing that the component integrity verification information is abnormal can be generated.

[0098] Step 140: Analyze data based on the information and safely start the power equipment.

[0099] In an embodiment of the present application, if the information analysis data indicates that the component integrity verification information is normal, it means that the power equipment has not been affected by external attacks or internal interference, and the power equipment is safely started.

[0100] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0101] Sending the component integrity verification information to a cloud server, so that the cloud server decrypts and verifies the component integrity verification information, and obtains an authorization instruction returned by the cloud server, wherein the authorization instruction is used to indicate whether to authorize the startup of the power device;

[0102] If the permission instruction is to start the electric power device without authorization, the electric power device is image rolled back.

[0103] In an embodiment of the present application, after obtaining the component integrity verification information, the power device can also send the component integrity verification information to the cloud server through a communication link; then, the cloud server decrypts and verifies the component integrity verification information based on the preset device information and time strategy to achieve remote verification, and returns the corresponding authority instructions to the power device.

[0104] Specifically, if the permission instruction is an authorization instruction, the permission instruction may indicate authorization to start the power device. After receiving the permission instruction, the power device may continue to perform information analysis and processing on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data, or continue to perform the step of securely starting the power device based on the information analysis data. Alternatively, if the permission instruction is an unauthorized instruction, the permission instruction may indicate unauthorized startup of the power device. After receiving the permission instruction, the power device may start the system mirroring or system rollback function of the power device to ensure the system availability and security of the power device.

[0105] The following describes in detail an anti-tampering secure boot device proposed according to an embodiment of the present application with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0106] Reference Figure 2 In an embodiment of the present application, a tamper-proof secure boot device is provided, which is applied to an electric power device. The electric power device includes a hardware security module and a boot component. The device includes:

[0107] The first processing unit 101 is configured to obtain a trusted time source;

[0108] a second processing unit 102, configured to perform multi-level integrity verification on the boot component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module, and obtain component integrity verification information of the boot component, the component integrity verification information including a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module;

[0109] The third processing unit 103 is configured to perform information analysis on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data;

[0110] The fourth processing unit 104 is configured to analyze data according to the information and perform a safe start-up on the power equipment.

[0111] It can be understood that the contents of the above method embodiments are all applicable to the present device embodiments, the functions specifically implemented by the present device embodiments are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.

[0112] Reference Figure 3 , an embodiment of the present application further provides an electronic device, including:

[0113] at least one processor 201;

[0114] At least one memory 202, configured to store at least one program;

[0115] When the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor 201 , the at least one processor 201 implements the above method embodiment.

[0116] Similarly, it can be understood that the contents of the above method embodiments are applicable to the present device embodiments, the functions specifically implemented by the present device embodiments are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.

[0117] An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a program executable by the processor 201 is stored. The program executable by the processor 201 is used to implement the above-mentioned method embodiment when executed by the processor 201.

[0118] Similarly, the contents of the above method embodiments are applicable to the computer-readable storage medium embodiments. The functions specifically implemented by the computer-readable storage medium embodiments are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.

[0119] In some optional embodiments, the functions / operations mentioned in the block diagram may not occur in the order mentioned in the operation diagram. For example, depending on the functions / operations involved, the two boxes shown in succession may actually be executed substantially simultaneously or the boxes can sometimes be executed in reverse order. In addition, the embodiments presented and described in the flow chart of the present application are provided in an exemplary manner for the purpose of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the technology. The disclosed method is not limited to the operations and logic flows presented herein. Optional embodiments are contemplated in which the order of the various operations is changed and the sub-operations described as a part of a larger operation are performed independently.

[0120] In addition, although the present application is described in the context of functional modules, it should be understood that, unless otherwise stated, one or more of the functions and / or features may be integrated into a single physical device and / or software module, or one or more functions and / or features may be implemented in separate physical devices or software modules. It is also understood that a detailed discussion of the actual implementation of each module is not necessary for understanding the present application. More specifically, given the properties, functions, and internal relationships of the various functional modules in the devices disclosed herein, the actual implementation of the module will be understood within the routine skills of an engineer. Therefore, a person skilled in the art can implement the present application as set forth in the claims using ordinary techniques without undue experimentation. It is also understood that the specific concepts disclosed are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the scope of the present application, which is determined by the full scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.

[0121] If the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the embodiment method of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[0122] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowcharts or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as an ordered list of executable instructions for implementing the logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device (e.g., a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch and execute instructions from an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device). For purposes of this specification, a "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0123] More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable media include the following: an electrical connection with one or more wires (electronic devices), a portable computer disk cartridge (magnetic devices), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a fiber optic device, and a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium, followed by editing, deciphering, or processing in another suitable manner as necessary, and then stored in a computer memory.

[0124] It should be understood that various parts of the present application can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented using software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented using hardware, as in another embodiment, any one of the following technologies known in the art or a combination thereof can be used to implement: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function on a data signal, an application-specific integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0125] In the above description of this specification, reference to the terms "one embodiment / example," "another embodiment / example," or "certain embodiments / examples" means that the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the schematic representation of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described can be combined in any appropriate manner in any one or more embodiments or examples.

[0126] Although the embodiments of the present application have been shown and described, those skilled in the art will appreciate that various changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and intent of the present application, and that the scope of the present application is defined by the claims and their equivalents.

[0127] The above is a specific description of the preferred implementation of the present application, but the present application is not limited to the embodiments. Those skilled in the art may make various equivalent modifications or substitutions without violating the spirit of the present application, and these equivalent modifications or substitutions are all included in the scope defined by the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A tamper-proof secure boot method, characterized in that: Applied to an electric power device, the electric power device includes a hardware security module and a startup component, and the method includes: Obtain a trusted time source; performing multi-level integrity verification on the startup component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, the component integrity verification information including a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module; Performing information analysis on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data; The power equipment is safely started based on the information analysis data.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The startup component includes a firmware startup module, a boot startup module, and a kernel startup module. The multi-level integrity verification is performed on the startup component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, including: Performing firmware integrity verification on the firmware startup module according to the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain a firmware hash value; Performing boot integrity verification on the boot startup module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the firmware hash value to obtain a boot hash value; Performing kernel integrity verification on the kernel boot module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module and the boot hash value to obtain a kernel hash value; The component integrity verification information is obtained according to the firmware hash value, the boot hash value, and the kernel hash value.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The step of performing firmware integrity verification on the firmware startup module according to the trusted time source and the hardware security module to obtain a firmware hash value includes: Obtaining an initial hash value of the firmware startup module, and obtaining a firmware timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module; The initial hash value is hashed according to the firmware timestamp to obtain the firmware hash value.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The obtaining of the firmware timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module includes: Obtaining a synchronization timestamp provided by the trusted time source; Generating a device unique identifier through a physically unclonable function built into the hardware security module; Perform timestamp encryption binding on the synchronization timestamp and the device unique identifier to obtain the firmware timestamp.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The step of performing boot integrity verification on the boot startup module according to the trusted time source, the hardware security module, and the firmware hash value to obtain a boot hash value includes: Performing digital signature verification on the boot and start module to obtain signature verification information, wherein the signature verification information is used to indicate whether the digital signature verification of the boot and start module is successful; If the signature verification information indicates that the digital signature of the boot module is successfully verified, obtaining a boot timestamp provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module, wherein the boot timestamp is greater than the firmware timestamp; The firmware hash value is hashed according to the boot timestamp to obtain the boot hash value.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The power equipment further includes a security log recording module, and the information analysis and processing of the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data includes: Obtaining security log data in the security log recording module; Performing a time chain detection on the firmware timestamp, the boot timestamp, and the kernel timestamp in the component integrity verification information according to the time log information in the security log data to obtain a time detection result; Performing hash detection on the firmware hash value, the boot hash value, and the kernel hash value in the component integrity verification information according to the verification log information in the security log data to obtain a hash detection result; The information analysis data is constructed according to the time detection result and the hash detection result.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that The method further comprises: Sending the component integrity verification information to a cloud server, so that the cloud server decrypts and verifies the component integrity verification information, and obtains an authorization instruction returned by the cloud server, wherein the authorization instruction is used to indicate whether to authorize the startup of the power device; If the permission instruction is to start the electric power device without authorization, the electric power device is image rolled back.

8. A tamper-resistant secure boot device, characterized in that: Applied to power equipment, the power equipment includes a hardware security module and a startup component, and the device includes: A first processing unit, configured to obtain a trusted time source; a second processing unit, configured to perform multi-level integrity verification on the startup component based on the trusted time source and the hardware security module, and obtain component integrity verification information of the startup component, the component integrity verification information including a firmware hash value, a boot hash value, and a kernel hash value embedded with timestamps provided by the trusted time source and the hardware security module; a third processing unit, configured to perform information analysis on the component integrity verification information to obtain information analysis data; The fourth processing unit is used to analyze data according to the information and safely start the power equipment.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: at least one processor; at least one memory for storing at least one program; When the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor, the at least one processor implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a program executable by a processor, characterized in that: The program executable by the processor is used to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed by the processor.

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