Hypersonic velocity rocket vehicle invasion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent cooperative safety control method

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of control, and particularly discloses a hypersonic velocity rocket vehicle invasion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent cooperative safety control method, which comprises the following steps: constructing a model of a hypersonic velocity rocket vehicle control system; introducing an intermittent control mechanism; spoofing attacks and random actuator faults are considered; designing an intermittent cooperative safety controller of the hypersonic rocket vehicle; and a Lyapunov function is constructed, a Lyapunov stability theory is utilized to obtain a stable condition of a system index, and the system reaches an expected steady-state value. According to the invention, cruise control and surface temperature control of the hypersonic rocket vehicle are realized by using the intermittent cooperative safety controller, the control cost is reduced, and the anti-interference capability is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of control, and in particular to a method for coordinated safety control of hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods. Background Technology

[0002] The control of hypersonic rocket vehicles is extremely complex. The difficulty lies in the coupling relationship between the speed and surface temperature of these vehicles, and the fact that the surface temperature is not only time-dependent but also space-dependent. The cruise control and surface temperature control of hypersonic rocket vehicles can be represented by linearly coupled partial differential equations (PDEs) and ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Therefore, the difficulty in cruise control and surface temperature control of hypersonic rocket vehicles can be summarized as the infinite-dimensional PDE states and the coupling relationship between the PDEs and ODEs. Furthermore, signal transmission during the control process of hypersonic rocket vehicles relies on a stable cyberspace; however, the open communication environment in cyberspace makes the control process more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Spoofing attacks are a form of cyberattack that can compromise data integrity and degrade system performance. On the other hand, faults are unavoidable during the control process. Many conditions in industrial processes can contribute to faults, including actuator failures, sensor failures, and parameter failures. In particular, random faults are particularly difficult to handle, as they can degrade control system performance and even trigger catastrophic accidents. Therefore, mitigating its adverse effects on the system becomes crucial to ensuring the safety and reliability of the control system. Thus, developing a cooperative safety control method for hypersonic rocket vehicles that combines intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance during intermittent periods is of significant research value. Summary of the Invention

[0003] To achieve control of hypersonic rocket vehicles, this invention provides a method for coordinated safety control of hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0005] A method for coordinated safety control of intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent phases for hypersonic rocket vehicles, the method comprising:

[0006] S1, Construct a model of the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system, including mathematical models for cruise control and surface temperature control of the hypersonic rocket vehicle.

[0007] S2 introduces an intermittent control mechanism;

[0008] S3, consider deception attacks and random executor failures;

[0009] S4, Design of a coordinated safety controller for hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods;

[0010] S5. Construct a Lyapunov functional, use Lyapunov stability theory to obtain the conditions for the system to be exponentially stable, and make the system reach the desired steady-state value.

[0011] As a further technical solution of the present invention, the model for constructing the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system includes mathematical models for the cruise control and surface temperature control of the hypersonic rocket vehicle, expressed as follows:

[0012] ;

[0013] in, for about The derivative, For speed error, For time; for about The derivative, For temperature error, Spatial location; , , , , , , , To set coefficients; Input speed error to the controller. Input the temperature error to the controller.

[0014] As a further technical solution of the present invention, the step of introducing an intermittent control mechanism includes:

[0015] Divide the total time interval into a series of non-overlapping time intervals. , ,in satisfy Each control time interval Each from the rest area and work area composition, For interval Intermediate time variable: the controller only operates within the working range, defining the working time interval. Control time interval , Set two positive scalars and To make the work area meet The controller is shown below:

[0016] ;

[0017] in, For speed controller, For speed controller gain, For temperature controller, For temperature controller gain;

[0018] Consider random actuator failures, which are generated according to Markov transitions. The actuator switches between normal and fault states according to a Markov transition chain; define the actuator effectiveness coefficient. and And there are , Representing the The Markov process followed by a controller failure; This represents the transition rate from actuator state m to state n; The time required for the transition to occur. yes higher-order infinitesimals; Let m represent the transition rate at which the actuator remains in state m. Then, the probability of the actuator failing is as follows:

[0019] ;

[0020] in, Take a value between 1 and 2. and In finite sets and Take a value from the middle, and have , The following three situations are included:

[0021] 1) This indicates that the actuator has completely failed.

[0022] 2) This indicates that the actuator is operating normally;

[0023] 3) This indicates that part of the actuator has failed;

[0024] Consider a deception attack, which completely replaces the original data or appends a malicious attack signal to the original data, thereby disrupting data transmission. This study assumes that the attacker will completely replace the original data, and the malicious attack signal can be modeled as follows: and The attack signal is related to the previously sent data and meets the following settings;

[0025] Setting 1: Deception attacks are bounded, meaning the attack signal is bounded under the following conditions:

[0026] ;

[0027] ;

[0028] in, and These are parameters given by humans to describe the strength of the upper bound of the attack;

[0029] Under the influence of deception attacks and random actuator failures, the intermittent collaborative security controller for intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance can be represented as:

[0030] ;

[0031] For ease of representation, For the redefined actuator effectiveness coefficients, For speed controller, For the speed controller gain under actuator failure, For temperature controller, The temperature controller gain under actuator failure.

[0032] As a further technical solution of the present invention, in step S5, the stability is proved using Lyapunov's theorem, and the Lyapunov functional used is as follows:

[0033] ;

[0034] in, ;

[0035] ;

[0036] in, , Define the Lyapunov functional components; define the parameters. , Thus, we can obtain .

[0037] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: This invention proposes a collaborative safety control method for hypersonic rocket vehicles that combines intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance through intermittent operation; the intermittent control method can effectively save control costs and significantly improve control efficiency, and has the characteristics of being easy to implement and having strong anti-interference ability. At the same time, it considers deception attacks and random actuator failures, and establishes a collaborative safety control method for hypersonic rocket vehicles that combines intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance through intermittent operation; it constructs a Lyapunov function, uses Lyapunov stability theory to obtain the conditions for the exponential stability of the system, and enables the system to reach the desired steady-state value. Attached Figure Description

[0038] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention.

[0039] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a method for coordinated safety control of hypersonic rocket vehicles, combining intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods.

[0040] Figure 2 When there is no control effect in the simulation results of the embodiments of the present invention The image.

[0041] Figure 3 When there is no control effect in the simulation results of the embodiments of the present invention The image.

[0042] Figure 4 After applying control to the simulation results of the embodiments of the present invention The image.

[0043] Figure 5 After applying control to the simulation results of the embodiments of the present invention The image.

[0044] Figure 6 The control signal in the simulation results of the embodiments of the present invention The image.

[0045] Figure 7 The control signal in the simulation results of the embodiments of the present invention The graph of the 2-norm. Detailed Implementation

[0046] In order to make the technical problems, technical solutions and beneficial effects to be solved by the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0047] The notation used in this invention is standard and is introduced here before proceeding. If the dimension of a matrix is ​​not explicitly stated, it is assumed to be compatible with algebraic operations. The Euclidean norm represents the vector. All indicate Victorious space, express The set of real matrices. Let represent a diagonal matrix. For a symmetric matrix... , Terms caused by symmetry.

[0048] Please see Figure 1 This invention provides a method for coordinated safety control of hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods, the method comprising:

[0049] S1, Construct a model of the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system, including mathematical models for cruise control and surface temperature control of the hypersonic rocket vehicle.

[0050] S2 introduces an intermittent control mechanism;

[0051] S3, consider deception attacks and random executor failures;

[0052] S4, Design of a coordinated safety controller for hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods;

[0053] S5. Construct a Lyapunov functional, use Lyapunov stability theory to obtain the conditions for the system to be exponentially stable, and make the system reach the desired steady-state value.

[0054] In this embodiment, the steps of constructing the model of the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system, including the mathematical models of the hypersonic rocket vehicle's cruise control and surface temperature control, include:

[0055] Formula 1: ;

[0056] The following boundary conditions apply:

[0057] , ;

[0058] and initial conditions:

[0059] , ;

[0060] in, This indicates the mass of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. This indicates the displacement of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. and This indicates the speed and acceleration of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. Indicates the aerodynamic drag coefficient. Indicates the coefficient of viscous friction. This indicates the material density of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. This indicates the specific heat of the materials used in hypersonic rocket vehicles. The temperature of the hypersonic rocket vehicle surface depends on time. Spatial position of the rocket vehicle's body surface subscript Indicates about The partial derivatives, express Spatial location The second-order partial derivative, This represents the thermal conductivity of a hypersonic rocket vehicle. This indicates the circumference of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. This represents the convective heat transfer coefficient of a hypersonic rocket vehicle. This represents the cross-sectional area of ​​the hypersonic rocket vehicle. This indicates the emissivity of the material used in hypersonic rocket vehicles. Denotes the Bolzmann constant. This indicates the temperature of the material surrounding the surface of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. This indicates the temperature of the material perpendicular to the surface direction of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. Indicates dynamic viscosity. , For known parameters, Indicates controller input, This indicates the length of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. and They represent exist and Location in space The first-order partial derivative, and This represents the initial values ​​of the hypersonic rocket vehicle system;

[0061] The required stable speed and temperature meet , Where, and are the steady-state inputs of the controller. The control objective is to bring the speed and temperature of the hypersonic rocket vehicle to the desired steady state. and To simplify the representation of the original system, the following dimensionless transformation is introduced:

[0062] ;

[0063] in, , After dimensionless transformation and substituting into Formula 1, the original system is transformed into the following form:

[0064] Formula 2: ;

[0065] Define the speed error as Temperature error is And define coefficients , , , , , , , , Assume the controller input error , The original system then transforms into the following:

[0066] Formula 3: ;

[0067] Constrained by boundary conditions and initial conditions:

[0068] Formula 4: , ;

[0069] Formula 5: , ;

[0070] in, Let these be the initial values ​​of the error system. The parameters are set, and there are ;

[0071] Then, the model of the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system can be represented by the following model:

[0072] Formula 6: ;

[0073] in, ,and and These represent spatial location and time, respectively.

[0074] In this embodiment, the step of introducing the intermittent control mechanism includes:

[0075] Divide the total time interval into a series of non-overlapping time intervals. , ,in satisfy Each control time interval Each from the rest area and work area composition, For interval Intermediate time variable: the controller only operates within the working range, defining the working time interval. Control time interval , Set two positive scalars and To make the work area meet The controller is shown below:

[0076] Formula 7: ;

[0077] in, For speed controller, For speed controller gain, For temperature controller, For temperature controller gain;

[0078] Consider random actuator failures, which are generated according to Markov transitions. The actuator switches between normal and fault states according to a Markov transition chain; define the actuator effectiveness coefficient. and And there are , Representing the The Markov process followed by a controller failure; This represents the transition rate from actuator state m to state n. The time required for the transition to occur; Let m represent the transition rate at which the actuator remains in state m. Then, the probability of the actuator failing is as follows:

[0079] ;

[0080] in, Take a value between 1 and 2. and In finite sets and Take a value from the middle. And it has , The following three situations are included:

[0081] 1) This indicates that the actuator has completely failed.

[0082] 2) This indicates that the actuator is operating normally;

[0083] 3) This indicates that part of the actuator has failed;

[0084] Consider a deception attack, which completely replaces the original data or appends a malicious attack signal to the original data, thereby disrupting data transmission. This study assumes that the attacker will completely replace the original data, and the malicious attack signal can be modeled as follows: and The attack signal is related to the previously sent data and meets the following settings;

[0085] Setting 1: Deception attacks are bounded, meaning the attack signal is bounded under the following conditions:

[0086] Formula 8: ;

[0087] Formula 9: ;

[0088] in, and These are parameters given by humans to describe the strength of the upper bound of the attack;

[0089] Under the influence of deception attacks and random actuator failures, the intermittent collaborative security controller for intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance can be represented as:

[0090] Formula 10: ;

[0091] For ease of representation, For the redefined actuator effectiveness coefficients, For speed controller, For the speed controller gain under actuator failure, For temperature controller, Temperature controller gain under actuator failure;

[0092] Substituting the controller into Equation 6 yields:

[0093] Formula 11: .

[0094] In step S5 of this embodiment, the stability is proved using Lyapunov's theorem, and the Lyapunov functional used is as follows:

[0095] Formula 12: ;

[0096] in, ;

[0097] ;

[0098] and, , For Lyapunov functional components; parameters , Thus, we can obtain ;

[0099] when At that time, Differentiating, we get:

[0100] Formula 13: ;

[0101] in, It is a positive scalar. ;

[0102] when At that time, Differentiating, we get:

[0103] Formula 14: ;

[0104] in, It is a positive scalar;

[0105] If the following linear matrix inequalities hold:

[0106] Formula 15: ;

[0107] Formula 16: ;

[0108] in, ;

[0109] ;

[0110] ;

[0111] ;

[0112] ;

[0113] ;

[0114] ;

[0115] ;

[0116] parameter , , , , , , , , , For the pre-set coefficients;

[0117] Therefore, the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system is exponentially stable.

[0118] According to Schulbu's theorem and Formula 15, we can obtain:

[0119] Formula 17: ;

[0120] Then, integrating both sides, we can further obtain:

[0121] Formula 18: ;

[0122] Then, according to Formula 16, we can obtain:

[0123] Formula 19: ;

[0124] Furthermore, we can obtain:

[0125] Formula 20: ;

[0126] because In the interval The above is continuous, based on formulas 18 and 20, we get:

[0127] Formula 21: ;

[0128] in, , , It is a positive scalar. This represents the system's decay rate, i.e., the speed at which the system tends to stabilize. The duty cycle represents the intermittent control. The smaller, The larger the value, the better the system's stability. Therefore, it can be deduced from the above formula that the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system is exponentially stable.

[0129] Furthermore, based on the above inequalities, the gain of the collaborative safety controller for intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent operation is calculated:

[0130] Definition: Parameter ;

[0131] Diagonal matrix ;

[0132] Diagonal matrix ;

[0133] By multiplying formula 15 in Theorem 1 by approximately Formula 16 multiplied by We can obtain the following inequality:

[0134] Formula 22: ;

[0135] Formula 23: ;

[0136] in, ;

[0137] ;

[0138] ;

[0139] ;

[0140] ;

[0141] ;

[0142] ;

[0143] The controller gain is as follows:

[0144] Formula 24: .

[0145] The effects of this invention can be further illustrated by the following simulation experiments.

[0146] The specific parameters of the hypersonic rocket vehicle are as follows:

[0147]

[0148] Select control time interval work area , , Then we can obtain , Set the actuator effectiveness coefficient The Markov transition rate matrix is:

[0149] ;

[0150] Solving formulas 22 and 23 using the LMI toolbox in MATLAB yields the following results:

[0151] ;

[0152] ;

[0153] And set initial conditions Control duration is Deception attack , Attack Limit , Now, we apply the aforementioned intrusion-tolerant and fault-tolerant intermittent collaborative safety controller with the controller gain to this system to obtain simulation results. Figure 2 and Figure 3 These represent the situation when there is no control effect. and The image. Figure 4 and Figure 5 These represent the combined security controls of intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods, respectively. and From the image, it can be seen that... and It quickly approaches 0, which means that the speed and temperature of the hypersonic rocket vehicle quickly reached the control target under control. Figure 6 and Figure 7 Control signals Images and The graph of the 2-norm.

[0154] It should be noted that, in this document, the term "comprising" or any other variation thereof is intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or system that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or system. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or system that includes that element.

[0155] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and do not limit the scope of the patent. Any equivalent structural or procedural transformations made based on the description and drawings of the present invention, or direct or indirect applications in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for coordinated safety control of hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods, characterized in that, The method includes: S1, Construct a model of the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system, including mathematical models for cruise control and surface temperature control of the hypersonic rocket vehicle. S2 introduces an intermittent control mechanism; S3, consider deception attacks and random executor failures; S4, Design of a coordinated safety controller for hypersonic rocket vehicles with intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance intermittent periods; S5. Construct a Lyapunov functional, use Lyapunov stability theory to obtain the conditions for the system to be exponentially stable, and make the system reach the desired steady-state value.

2. The hypersonic rocket vehicle intrusion-tolerant and fault-tolerant intermittent coordinated safety control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The model for constructing the hypersonic rocket vehicle control system, including the mathematical models for cruise control and surface temperature control of the hypersonic rocket vehicle, is expressed as follows: ； in, for about The derivative, For speed error, For time; for about The derivative, For temperature error, Spatial location; , , , , , , , To set coefficients; Input speed error to the controller. Input the temperature error to the controller.

3. The hypersonic rocket vehicle intrusion-tolerant and fault-tolerant intermittent coordinated safety control method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The steps for introducing the intermittent control mechanism include: Divide the total time interval into a series of non-overlapping time intervals. , ,in satisfy Each control time interval Each from the rest area and work area composition, For interval Intermediate time variable: the controller only operates within the working range, defining the working time interval. Control time interval , Set two positive scalars and To make the work area meet The controller is shown below: ； in, For speed controller, For speed controller gain, For temperature controller, For temperature controller gain; Consider random actuator failures, which are generated according to Markov transitions. The actuator switches between normal and fault states according to a Markov transition chain; define the actuator effectiveness coefficient. and And there are , Representing the The Markov process followed by a controller failure; This represents the transition rate from actuator state m to state n. The time required for the transition to occur. yes higher-order infinitesimals; Let m represent the transition rate at which the actuator remains in state m. Then, the probability of the actuator failing is as follows: ； in, Take a value between 1 and 2. and In finite sets and Take a value from the middle, and have , The following three situations are included: 1) This indicates that the actuator has completely failed; 2) This indicates that the actuator is operating normally; 3) This indicates that part of the actuator has failed; Consider a deception attack, which completely replaces the original data or appends a malicious attack signal to the original data, thereby disrupting data transmission. This study assumes that the attacker will completely replace the original data, and the malicious attack signal can be modeled as follows: and The attack signal is related to the previously sent data and meets the following settings; Setting 1: Deception attacks are bounded, meaning the attack signal is bounded under the following conditions: ； ； in, and These are parameters given by humans to describe the strength of the upper bound of the attack; Under the influence of deception attacks and random actuator failures, the intermittent collaborative security controller for intrusion tolerance and fault tolerance can be represented as: ； For ease of representation, For the redefined actuator effectiveness coefficients, For speed controller, For the speed controller gain under actuator failure, For temperature controller, The temperature controller gain under actuator failure.

4. The hypersonic rocket vehicle intrusion-tolerant and fault-tolerant intermittent coordinated safety control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S5, its stability is proved using Lyapunov's theorem, and the Lyapunov functional used is as follows: ； in, ; ； in, , Define the Lyapunov functional components; define the parameters. , Thus, we can obtain .

Images