Train protection partition processing method based on train-to-train communication architecture
By using a train protection zone processing method under the vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture, protection zones are dynamically divided, solving the problem of imperfect emergency response in traditional train control systems. This enables real-time information exchange and automated emergency response between trains, improving the safety and efficiency of train operation, reducing system complexity and maintenance costs, and promoting the intelligent development of rail transit.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202511383239.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-09-26
- Publication Date
- 2025-10-31
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Traditional train control systems rely on ground equipment and vehicle-to-ground communication, resulting in imperfect emergency response mechanisms and unreasonable protection zone divisions in complex and ever-changing rail transit environments, which affects train safety and efficiency.
The system adopts a vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture, which dynamically divides protection zones through direct information exchange between the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system and the Resource Controller (RC), enabling real-time information interaction and automated emergency response between trains.
It improves the safety and efficiency of train operation, reduces operational restrictions caused by the division of fixed protection zones, lowers system complexity and maintenance costs, enhances system flexibility and adaptability, and promotes the intelligent development of rail transit.
Smart Images

Figure CN120863718A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of rail transit technology, and in particular to a method for processing protective zones of vehicles based on a vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture. Background Technology
[0002] With the continuous development of rail transit technology, the safety and efficiency of train operation have become the focus of industry attention. Traditional train control systems mainly rely on ground equipment and vehicle-to-ground communication; however, this approach has certain limitations in dealing with the complex and ever-changing rail transit environment. For example, in situations with high train density and complex operating environments, delays and malfunctions in ground equipment and vehicle-to-ground communication may affect the safe operation of trains.
[0003] In recent years, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication technology has gradually become a research hotspot in the rail transit field. V2V allows trains to exchange information directly without the need for ground equipment. This not only reduces reliance on ground equipment but also improves information acquisition channels and proactive protection capabilities. However, the application of V2V in the rail transit sector is still in its early stages, particularly in the handling of protected areas, where mature technical solutions have not yet been developed. Summary of the Invention
[0004] In view of this, this application provides a protection zone processing method for trains based on a vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture, which improves the flexibility and safety of train operation and reduces the operational restrictions caused by fixed protection zone division.
[0005] This application discloses a method for protecting vehicle partitions based on a vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture, which includes: Step 1: When a malfunctioning train detects that it has derailed or detects an obstacle on the track, causing it to brake suddenly, in fully automatic operation mode (FAM) and creep mode (CAM), the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system of the malfunctioning train outputs an emergency braking signal to the vehicle and reports to the Resource Controller (RC) that the malfunctioning train has collided with an obstacle or derailed. The malfunctioning train takes emergency braking measures, and after the malfunctioning train comes to a complete stop, the operation mode of the malfunctioning train is switched to manual operation mode (CM) under safety protection. The ATP applies emergency braking to the vehicle of the malfunctioning train and reports to the RC that the malfunctioning train has collided with an obstacle or derailed. Trains include malfunctioning trains and normal trains; normal trains are non-malfunctioning trains. The ATP of the malfunctioning train submits a request to the RC to establish a protected area to prevent trains outside the protected area from entering the protected area and to prevent other trains within the protected area from approaching. Step 2: After receiving the request from the disabled train to establish a protected area, the RC determines whether the disabled train has come to a complete stop. If the disabled train has come to a complete stop, the RC determines the position of the centerline of the disabled train based on the maximum safe front end position and the minimum safe rear end position. The RC sends an inquiry message to all trains within its control area that have established communication with it. The inquiry message includes the position of all logical segments within the protected area and the centerline of the disabled train. After receiving the inquiry message from the RC, the train checks its relationship with the protected area and replies. If all trains reply that they agree to establish the protected area, the RC establishes the protected area. Step 3: Determine the train's operating status based on the distance between the trains within and outside the protected area and the faulty train, as well as their respective directions of travel; the operating status is either emergency braking or continued travel. Step 4: Once the disabled train no longer reports to the RC that it has derailed or that there is an obstacle on the track, remove the protected area for the disabled train.
[0006] Furthermore, the establishment of the protected area includes: If the RC's data configuration item is "two stations and one section protection", then the protection area is two stations and one section, in which protection needs to be established for both uplink and downlink stations; The RC (Regulator) queries the protected area from the data table within the data configuration based on the maximum safe leading-edge position and the minimum safe trailing-edge position of the faulty train within the designated section. The data table within the data configuration contains the correspondence between section positions and protected areas, as well as all logical segments within the protected area. A logical segment is the logical unit for dividing the track between two axle counters. The maximum safe leading-edge position is the position of the train's head after deviating from the distance measurement error along the train's running direction. The minimum safe trailing-edge position is the position of the train's tail after deviating from the distance measurement error along the opposite direction of the train's running direction. If the train is entirely within the platform area, then the protected area is the platform.
[0007] Furthermore, the establishment of the protected area includes: If the data configuration option is set to protect based on protection distance, then the protection area will be calculated based on the distance: The RC extends a first distance forward and backward from the track where the faulty train is located, with the maximum safe front position and the minimum safe rear position of the faulty train as boundaries, to establish a protective zone. The first distance is the most unfavorable emergency braking distance at the train's maximum speed. The most unfavorable emergency braking distance at the maximum speed refers to the maximum value of the travel distance of all trains under the conditions of the highest operating speed and the worst performance of all internal and external trains, from the time t when the ATP outputs the emergency braking signal to the train until the train comes to a complete stop.
[0008] Furthermore, it also includes: When a protected area spans the control areas of multiple RCs, adjacent RCs exchange protected area information and agree to establish protected area information; the RC where the faulty train is located sends the protected area to the Automatic Train Control System (ATS), while adjacent RCs do not send protected areas to the ATS; similarly, the ATS issues a command to cancel the protected area to the RC where the protected area is located, and that RC sends the command to cancel the protected area to the adjacent RCs.
[0009] Furthermore, in step 2, checking and responding to the relationship between oneself and the protected area includes: If a normal train is outside the protected area and stops after emergency braking, but is still outside the protected area, then the RC should be notified to agree to establish a protected area. If a normal train is outside the protected area and enters the protected area after emergency braking, emergency braking measures should be taken, and after stopping, the RC should be notified to agree to establish the protected area. If a normal train is within the protected area, it should reply to the RC (Regulator) agreeing to establish the protected area, and then take emergency braking measures or continue driving depending on its position relative to the faulty train.
[0010] Furthermore, before all trains reply with their agreement to establish a protected area, the RC sends an inquiry message to all trains until all trains reply with their agreement to establish a protected area; if any normal train experiences a communication failure during the process of sending the inquiry message, it is assumed that the normal train has agreed to establish a protected area.
[0011] Further, step 3 includes: When the front or rear of a normal train is within the protected area and the normal train's speed is zero, ATP sends an emergency braking signal to the vehicle, prohibiting it from moving. When a normal train and a faulty train are on the same track within the protection zone, if the normal train in the protection zone gets close to the faulty train, the normal train will brake suddenly; otherwise, it will continue to move forward. When a normal train and a faulty train are on different tracks within the protected area, the normal train will apply emergency braking if the minimum safe rear end of the normal train has not crossed the centerline of the faulty train; otherwise, the normal train will continue to move forward. The Normal Train Movement Authorization (MA) outside the protected area allows a train to travel as far as the boundary point of the protected area; once data communication is established between two trains, the following Normal Train Movement Authorization (MA) will track the rear position of the preceding Normal Train or the malfunctioning Train.
[0012] Furthermore, step 3 also includes: When the protected area crosses platforms, MA will be affected: When the ATP configuration does not allow the protected area to cross the platform to protect the faulty train and the normal train has not entered the platform, it is determined whether the current MA's endpoint meets the precise stopping distance requirement of the Automatic Train Operation (ATO). If it does not meet the requirement, the MA will not enter the platform area to reduce the distance between the MA and the platform; otherwise, the current MA's endpoint remains unchanged. In the direction of train operation, one end of the platform is the starting point and the other end is the ending point; the endpoint of the MA is the platform terminal. When the ATP configuration does not allow the protected area to cross the platform to protect the faulty train and the normal train has already entered the platform, the MA is withdrawn to the platform terminal. When the ATP configuration allows the protection zone to protect faulty trains across platforms, the MA tracks to the boundary point of the protection zone.
[0013] Furthermore, prior to step 4, the following steps are also included: If the faulty train's data is configured to support obstacle or derailment protection in CM mode, and the ATP no longer collects derailment or obstacle detection from the train input, then the ATP will no longer report derailment or obstacle detection to the RC. If the data configuration of the faulty train does not support obstacle / derailment protection in CM mode, then after switching the operating mode of the faulty train to CM mode, ATP will no longer report to RC that it has derailed or detected an obstacle on the track.
[0014] Furthermore, after step 4, the following steps are included: After the protected area is removed, the emergency braking status of the faulty train is cancelled, and the emergency braking status of the normal train that was forced to brake due to the protected area is also cancelled. In fully automatic operation mode (FAM) or creep mode (CAM), after a train traveling normally within the protected area undergoes emergency braking and comes to a stop, if the protected area that caused the emergency braking of the train is canceled, the automatic train operation system (ATO) of the train sends a departure request to the automatic train monitoring system (ATS). After the train receives confirmation of the departure request from the ATS, the emergency braking state is released, and the automatic train operation system starts the train.
[0015] By adopting the above-mentioned technical solution, this application has the following advantages: It aims to solve the limitations of existing train control systems in rail transit systems, particularly the problems of imperfect emergency response mechanisms and unreasonable protection zone divisions caused by reliance on ground equipment and train-to-ground communication. By introducing train-to-train communication technology, direct information exchange between trains is achieved, improving information acquisition channels and proactive protection capabilities. It also enhances train operation safety: through real-time interaction of protection zone information and automated emergency response mechanisms via train-to-train communication technology, trains can promptly obtain and respond to emergencies, avoiding entry into dangerous areas and significantly improving train operation safety.
[0016] Improve train operation efficiency: Dynamic protection zone division can be adjusted in real time according to the train's operating status and location information, ensuring that the normal operation of the train is not affected and reducing the operation restrictions and delays caused by fixed protection zone division.
[0017] Reduced system complexity and maintenance costs: Automated emergency response and dynamic protection zone delineation reduce the need for manual intervention, thereby reducing system complexity and maintenance costs and improving the overall operational efficiency of the rail transit system.
[0018] Enhancing the system's flexibility and adaptability: Train-to-train communication technology enables trains to exchange information directly without the need for transfers via ground equipment, thus enhancing the system's flexibility and adaptability, especially in complex and ever-changing rail transit environments.
[0019] Promoting the intelligent development of rail transit: The implementation of this technology provides strong support for the intelligent development of rail transit, and promotes the development of rail transit systems towards a more efficient, safe, and intelligent direction. Attached Figure Description
[0020] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in the embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings.
[0021] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the protection between two stations and one section according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a protected area according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of another protected area according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of MA calculation for trains outside the derailment protection zone in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of MA cross-station tracking according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of MA pullback in an embodiment of this application; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the MA retraction to the platform terminal according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the protection area for MA cross-station tracking in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0022] The present application will be further described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. The described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art should fall within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.
[0023] See Figure 2 This application provides an embodiment of a protection zone processing method for vehicles based on a vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture, which includes: Step 1: When a malfunctioning train detects that it has derailed or detects an obstacle on the track, causing it to brake suddenly, in fully automatic operation mode (FAM) and creep mode (CAM), the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system of the malfunctioning train outputs an emergency braking signal to the vehicle and reports to the Resource Controller (RC) that the malfunctioning train has collided with an obstacle or derailed. The malfunctioning train takes emergency braking measures, and after the malfunctioning train comes to a complete stop, the operation mode of the malfunctioning train is switched to manual operation mode (CM) under safety protection. The ATP applies emergency braking to the vehicle of the malfunctioning train and reports to the RC that the malfunctioning train has collided with an obstacle or derailed. Trains include malfunctioning trains and normal trains; normal trains are non-malfunctioning trains. The ATP of the malfunctioning train submits a request to the RC to establish a protected area to prevent trains outside the protected area from entering the protected area and to prevent other trains within the protected area from approaching. Step 2: After receiving the request from the disabled train to establish a protected area, the RC determines whether the disabled train has come to a complete stop. If the disabled train has come to a complete stop, the RC determines the position of the centerline of the disabled train based on the maximum safe front end position and the minimum safe rear end position. The RC sends an inquiry message to all trains within its control area that have established communication with it. The inquiry message includes the position of all logical segments within the protected area and the centerline of the disabled train. After receiving the inquiry message from the RC, the train checks its relationship with the protected area and replies. If all trains reply that they agree to establish the protected area, the RC establishes the protected area. Step 3: Determine the train's operating status based on the distance between the trains within and outside the protected area and the faulty train, as well as their respective directions of travel; the operating status is either emergency braking or continued travel. Step 4: Once the disabled train no longer reports to the RC that it has derailed or that there is an obstacle on the track, remove the protected area for the disabled train.
[0024] Optionally, establishing a protected area includes: See Figure 1 If the RC's data configuration item is "two stations and one section protection", then the protection area is two stations and one section, in which protection needs to be established for both up and down stations. The RC (Regulator) queries the protected area from the data table within the data configuration based on the maximum safe leading-edge position and the minimum safe trailing-edge position of the faulty train within the designated section. The data table within the data configuration contains the correspondence between section positions and protected areas, as well as all logical segments within the protected area. A logical segment is the logical unit for dividing the track between two axle counters. The maximum safe leading-edge position is the position of the train's head after deviating from the distance measurement error along the train's running direction. The minimum safe trailing-edge position is the position of the train's tail after deviating from the distance measurement error along the opposite direction of the train's running direction. If the train is entirely within the platform area, then the protected area is the platform.
[0025] Optionally, establishing a protected area includes: See Figure 2 and Figure 3 If the data configuration option is set to protect based on protection distance, then the protection area will be calculated based on the distance. The RC extends a first distance forward and backward from the track where the faulty train is located, with the maximum safe front position and the minimum safe rear position of the faulty train as boundaries, to establish a protective zone. The first distance is the most unfavorable emergency braking distance at the train's maximum speed. The most unfavorable emergency braking distance at the maximum speed refers to the maximum value of the travel distance of all trains under the conditions of the highest operating speed and the worst performance of all internal and external trains, from the time t when the ATP outputs the emergency braking signal to the train until the train comes to a complete stop.
[0026] Figure 2 In this system, the RC (Responsible Train Control) establishes a protection zone for a faulty train (e.g., car 3) and sends this zone information to all communicating trains. If a train within this protection zone approaches the faulty train, that train will apply emergency braking (e.g., cars 2 and 6); other trains will move away from the faulty train and continue their journey (e.g., cars 4 and 7). Figure 2 and Figure 3 In the middle, the first distance can be and , and These are all the most unfavorable emergency braking distances at the train's maximum speed.
[0027] Optionally, it also includes: When a protected area spans the control areas of multiple RCs, adjacent RCs exchange protected area information and agree to establish protected area information; the RC where the faulty train is located sends the protected area to the Automatic Train Control System (ATS), while adjacent RCs do not send protected areas to the ATS; similarly, the ATS issues a command to cancel the protected area to the RC where the protected area is located, and that RC sends the command to cancel the protected area to the adjacent RCs.
[0028] Optionally, in step 2, checking and responding to the relationship between itself and the protected area includes: If a normal train is outside the protected area and stops after emergency braking, but is still outside the protected area, then the RC should be notified to agree to establish a protected area. If a normal train is outside the protected area and enters the protected area after emergency braking, emergency braking measures should be taken, and after stopping, the RC should be notified to agree to establish the protected area. If a normal train is within the protected area, it should reply to the RC (Regulator) agreeing to establish the protected area, and then take emergency braking measures or continue driving depending on its position relative to the faulty train.
[0029] Optionally, before all trains reply with their agreement to establish a protected area, the RC sends an inquiry message to all trains until all trains reply with their agreement to establish a protected area; if any normal train experiences a communication failure during the process of sending the inquiry message, it is assumed that the normal train has agreed to establish a protected area.
[0030] Optionally, step 3 includes: When the front or rear of a normal train is within the protected area and the normal train's speed is zero, ATP sends an emergency braking signal to the vehicle, prohibiting it from moving. When a normal train and a faulty train are on the same track within the protection zone, if the normal train in the protection zone gets close to the faulty train, the normal train will brake suddenly; otherwise, it will continue to move forward. When a normal train and a faulty train are on different tracks within the protected area, the normal train will apply emergency braking if the minimum safe rear end of the normal train has not crossed the centerline of the faulty train; otherwise, the normal train will continue moving. (See also...) Figure 2 If the minimum safe rear end of a normal train (e.g., car 6) has not crossed the centerline of the disabled train, the normal train will apply emergency braking. See also Figure 3 If a normal train (e.g., car 6) has already passed the centerline of the disabled train, the normal train (e.g., car 6) will continue to move forward.
[0031] Normal train movement authorization (MA) outside the protected area allows trains to travel as far as the boundary point of the protected area (e.g., Figure 4 Once data communication is established between the two trains, the following normal train (MA) will track the rear position of the preceding normal train or the malfunctioning train.
[0032] Optionally, step 3 further includes: When the protected area crosses platforms, MA will be affected (e.g., Figure 5 ): When the ATP configuration does not allow the protected area to cross platform boundaries to protect faulty trains and a normal train has not entered the platform, it is determined whether the current MA's endpoint meets the precise stopping distance requirement of the Automatic Train Operation (ATO). If not, the MA does not enter the platform area to reduce the distance between the MA and the platform (the MA is based on the tracking distance from the platform's origin to the platform, such as...). Figure 6 Otherwise, the current endpoint of the MA remains unchanged; where, in the direction of train operation, one end of the platform is the starting point and the other end is the ending point; the endpoint of the MA is the platform terminal. When the ATP configuration does not allow the protected area to cross platform boundaries to protect faulty trains and a normal train has already entered the platform, the MA is withdrawn to the platform terminal (e.g., Figure 7 ); When the ATP configuration allows the protected area to protect faulty trains across platforms, the MA tracks to the boundary point of the protected area (e.g., ...). Figure 8 ).
[0033] Optionally, before step 4, the following steps are also included: If the faulty train's data is configured to support obstacle or derailment protection in CM mode, and the ATP no longer collects derailment or obstacle detection from the train input, then the ATP will no longer report derailment or obstacle detection to the RC. If the data configuration of the faulty train does not support obstacle / derailment protection in CM mode, then after switching the operating mode of the faulty train to CM mode, ATP will no longer report to RC that it has derailed or detected an obstacle on the track.
[0034] Optionally, after step 4, the following steps are included: After the protected area is removed, the emergency braking status of the faulty train is cancelled, and the emergency braking status of the normal train that was forced to brake due to the protected area is also cancelled. In fully automatic operation mode (FAM) or creep mode (CAM), after a train traveling normally within the protected area undergoes emergency braking and comes to a stop, if the protected area that caused the emergency braking of the train is canceled, the automatic train operation system (ATO) of the train sends a departure request to the automatic train monitoring system (ATS). After the train receives confirmation of the departure request from the ATS, the emergency braking state is released, and the automatic train operation system starts the train.
[0035] This application proposes a protection zone processing method for rail transit, utilizing vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology to achieve direct information exchange between trains. This overcomes the limitations of traditional train control systems that rely on ground equipment and vehicle-to-ground communication, improving the safety and efficiency of train operation. By transmitting the status information of protected areas in real time through ground equipment (RC), trains can promptly address hazardous areas. Simultaneously, an automated emergency response mechanism reduces manual intervention and achieves intelligent fault handling. This application also employs dynamic protection zone division to ensure adequate protection for trains under different operating environments, reducing system complexity and maintenance costs.
[0036] The scope of the protected area is calculated and adjusted in real time based on the train's operating status and location information, ensuring that the protected area meets the needs of safety protection without affecting the normal operation of the train. This improves the flexibility and safety of train operation and reduces the operational restrictions caused by fixed protected area divisions.
[0037] The train can automatically detect and analyze fault information and submit a protection zone application to the ground equipment RC. The ground equipment RC automatically calculates the protection zone based on the train's operating status and location information. The train then performs intelligent emergency handling based on the assigned protection zone, which improves the speed and accuracy of emergency response, reduces the need for manual intervention, and lowers the safety risks caused by improper emergency handling.
[0038] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this application and not to limit them. Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can still be made to the specific implementation of this application. Any modifications or equivalent substitutions that do not depart from the spirit and scope of this application should be covered within the protection scope of the claims of this application.
Claims
1. A method for protecting vehicle partitions based on a vehicle-to-vehicle communication architecture, characterized in that, include: Step 1: When a malfunctioning train detects that it has derailed or detects an obstacle on the track, causing it to brake suddenly, in fully automatic operation mode (FAM) and creep mode (CAM), the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system of the malfunctioning train outputs an emergency braking signal to the vehicle and reports to the Resource Controller (RC) that the malfunctioning train has collided with an obstacle or derailed. The malfunctioning train takes emergency braking measures, and after the malfunctioning train comes to a complete stop, the operation mode of the malfunctioning train is switched to manual operation mode (CM) under safety protection. The ATP applies emergency braking to the vehicle of the malfunctioning train and reports to the RC that the malfunctioning train has collided with an obstacle or derailed. Trains include malfunctioning trains and normal trains; normal trains are non-malfunctioning trains. The ATP of the malfunctioning train submits a request to the RC to establish a protected area to prevent trains outside the protected area from entering the protected area and to prevent other trains within the protected area from approaching. Step 2: After receiving the request from the faulty train to establish a protected area, the RC determines whether the faulty train has come to a complete stop; If the faulty train has come to a complete stop, the RC determines the position of the centerline of the faulty train based on the maximum safe front end and minimum safe rear end positions of the faulty train. The RC sends an inquiry message to all trains within its control area that have established communication with it. The inquiry message includes the position of all logical segments within the protected area and the centerline of the faulty train. After receiving the inquiry message from the RC, the train checks its relationship with the protected area and replies. If all trains reply that they agree to establish a protected area, the RC establishes the protected area. Step 3: Determine the train's operating status based on the distance between the trains within and outside the protected area and the faulty train, as well as their respective directions of travel; the operating status is either emergency braking or continued travel. Step 4: Once the disabled train no longer reports to the RC that it has derailed or that there is an obstacle on the track, remove the protected area for the disabled train.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The establishment of the protected area includes: If the RC's data configuration item is "two stations and one section protection", then the protection area is two stations and one section, in which protection needs to be established for both uplink and downlink stations; The RC (Regulator) queries the protected area from the data table within the data configuration based on the maximum safe leading-edge position and the minimum safe trailing-edge position of the faulty train within the designated section. The data table within the data configuration contains the correspondence between section positions and protected areas, as well as all logical segments within the protected area. A logical segment is the logical unit for dividing the track between two axle counters. The maximum safe leading-edge position is the position of the train's head after deviating from the distance measurement error along the train's running direction. The minimum safe trailing-edge position is the position of the train's tail after deviating from the distance measurement error along the opposite direction of the train's running direction. If the train is entirely within the platform area, then the protected area is the platform.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The establishment of the protected area includes: If the data configuration option is set to protect based on protection distance, then the protection area will be calculated based on the distance: The RC extends a first distance forward and backward from the track where the faulty train is located, with the maximum safe front position and the minimum safe rear position of the faulty train as boundaries, to establish a protective zone. The first distance is the most unfavorable emergency braking distance at the train's maximum speed. The most unfavorable emergency braking distance at the maximum speed refers to the maximum value of the travel distance of all trains under the conditions of the highest operating speed and the worst performance of all internal and external trains, from the time t when the ATP outputs the emergency braking signal to the train until the train comes to a complete stop.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, Also includes: When a protected area spans the control areas of multiple RCs, adjacent RCs exchange protected area information and agree to establish protected area information; the RC where the faulty train is located sends the protected area to the Automatic Train Control System (ATS), while adjacent RCs do not send protected areas to the ATS; similarly, the ATS issues a command to cancel the protected area to the RC where the protected area is located, and that RC sends the command to cancel the protected area to the adjacent RCs.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step 2, the relationship between itself and the protected area is checked and responded to, including: If a normal train is outside the protected area and stops after emergency braking, but is still outside the protected area, then the RC should be notified to agree to establish a protected area. If a normal train is outside the protected area and enters the protected area after emergency braking, emergency braking measures should be taken, and after stopping, the RC should be notified to agree to establish the protected area. If a normal train is within the protected area, it should reply to the RC (Regulator) agreeing to establish the protected area, and then take emergency braking measures or continue driving depending on its position relative to the faulty train.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, Before all trains reply with their consent to establish a protected area, the RC sends an inquiry message to all trains until all trains reply with their consent to establish a protected area. If any normal train experiences a communication failure during the process of sending the inquiry message, it is assumed that the normal train has consented to establish a protected area.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 3 includes: When the front or rear of a normal train is within the protected area and the normal train's speed is zero, ATP sends an emergency braking signal to the vehicle, prohibiting it from moving. When a normal train and a faulty train are on the same track within the protection zone, if the normal train in the protection zone gets close to the faulty train, the normal train will brake suddenly; otherwise, it will continue to move forward. When a normal train and a faulty train are on different tracks within the protected area, the normal train will apply an emergency brake if the minimum safe rear end of the normal train has not crossed the centerline of the faulty train; otherwise, the normal train will continue to move forward. The Normal Train Movement Authorization (MA) outside the protected area allows a train to travel as far as the boundary point of the protected area; once data communication is established between two trains, the following Normal Train Movement Authorization (MA) will track the rear position of the preceding Normal Train or the malfunctioning Train.
8. The method according to claim 1 or 7, characterized in that, Step 3 also includes: When the protected area crosses platforms, MA will be affected: When the ATP configuration does not allow the protected area to cross the platform to protect the faulty train and the normal train has not entered the platform, it is determined whether the current MA's endpoint meets the precise stopping distance requirement of the Automatic Train Operation (ATO). If it does not meet the requirement, the MA will not enter the platform area to reduce the distance between the MA and the platform; otherwise, the current MA's endpoint remains unchanged. In the direction of train operation, one end of the platform is the starting point and the other end is the ending point; the endpoint of the MA is the platform terminal. When the ATP configuration does not allow the protected area to cross the platform to protect the faulty train and the normal train has already entered the platform, the MA is withdrawn to the platform terminal. When the ATP configuration allows the protection zone to protect faulty trains across platforms, the MA tracks to the boundary point of the protection zone.
9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before step 4, the following are also included: If the faulty train's data is configured to support obstacle or derailment protection in CM mode, and the ATP no longer collects derailment or obstacle detection from the train input, then the ATP will no longer report derailment or obstacle detection to the RC. If the data configuration of the faulty train does not support obstacle / derailment protection in CM mode, then after switching the operating mode of the faulty train to CM mode, ATP will no longer report to RC that it has derailed or detected an obstacle on the track.
10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After step 4, the following is included: After the protected area is removed, the emergency braking status of the faulty train is cancelled, and the emergency braking status of the normal train that was forced to brake due to the protected area is also cancelled. In fully automatic operation mode (FAM) or creep mode (CAM), after a train traveling normally within the protected area undergoes emergency braking and comes to a stop, if the protected area that caused the emergency braking of the train is canceled, the automatic train operation system (ATO) of the train sends a departure request to the automatic train monitoring system (ATS). After the train receives confirmation of the departure request from the ATS, the emergency braking state is released, and the automatic train operation system starts the train.
Citation Information
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