Resource allocation method and device under power asymmetry condition, equipment and medium

Abstract

The application relates to a resource allocation method, device and equipment under the condition of power asymmetry, and a medium, and relates to the technical field of resource allocation. The method comprises the following steps: modeling a power resource allocation problem as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model containing multiple decision makers; establishing a local matrix according to the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision maker in each local conflict, modifying the local matrix based on the power asymmetry relationship between the decision makers, and integrating to obtain a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers; analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, determining the possible global equilibrium outcome of the power resource allocation problem, and then predicting the decision development trend to allocate the power resource under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers. The method can accurately depict the hierarchical conflict characteristics in the power resource allocation process, provide reliable guarantee for power grid operation, and meet the diversified power allocation demand in complex scenes.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of resource allocation, and in particular to a resource allocation method, device and equipment under power asymmetry condition and a medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] Under the background of global energy transformation and increasingly prominent contradiction between power supply and demand, the problem of power resource allocation involves multiple decision-making subjects with different functional positioning, such as power grid physical constraint party, power distribution executive party and power demand response party. The power grid physical constraint party represents the objective operation limit of the power system, and the power demand response party reflects the power consumption characteristics and demand elasticity of power users. The power distribution executive party is responsible for the optimization scheduling of power distribution between the physical constraint range and the user demand response. These subjects form a typical two-level conflict structure: there is a technical feasibility conflict between the power grid physical constraint party and the power distribution executive party, and there is an interest conflict between the power distribution executive party and the power demand response party. How to coordinate these conflicts and achieve safe and economic allocation of power resources is an important challenge faced by the construction of new power systems.

[0003] At present, for the hierarchical conflict problem in power resource allocation, traditional optimization algorithms and game theory methods are mainly used for research, such as double-layer planning model, master-slave game model, etc. However, these methods have obvious limitations: first, the data requirements are too high, and accurate quantification of power grid physical parameters, generation cost function and demand elasticity coefficient, etc. is required, which is often difficult to achieve in actual power systems due to incomplete data or insufficient precision; second, existing research usually simply treats physical constraints as constraint conditions of optimization problems, without fully reflecting the characteristics of the power grid physical constraint party as an independent decision-making subject; in addition, the traditional method is based on the idealized assumption that the status of decision-making subjects is equal, which is difficult to accurately simulate and analyze the complex hierarchical conflict situation of power resource allocation problem, and cannot provide a reasonable solution to the power resource allocation problem under the actual power asymmetry condition of decision-making subjects.

[0004] Therefore, it is urgent to design a power resource allocation method that can fully consider the objective operation law of the power system and the functional asymmetry of the decision-making subjects, overcome the excessive dependence of existing methods on accurate data, more accurately depict the hierarchical conflict characteristics in the process of power resource allocation, and provide reliable protection for power grid operation and meet the diversified needs of complex scenarios. SUMMARY

[0005] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a resource allocation method, device, equipment and medium under power asymmetry condition in view of the above technical problems.

[0006] A resource allocation method under power asymmetry condition, the method comprising:

[0007] According to the technical feasibility conflicts between the power distribution executor and the power grid physical constraint party and the interest conflicts between the power distribution executor and the power demand response party, the power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model containing multiple decision parties; the power grid physical constraint party and the power demand response party are local decision parties, and the power distribution executor is a common decision party;

[0008] According to the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision party in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, a local preference matrix reflecting the local decision preference, a local reachable matrix describing the local strategy adjustment feasibility, and a local promotion matrix measuring the local strategy improvement effect are established.

[0009] Based on the power asymmetry relationship between the decision parties, the local preference matrix and the local promotion matrix are corrected to obtain a local power preference matrix and a local power promotion matrix.

[0010] By integrating the local power preference matrix, the local reachable matrix, and the local power promotion matrix of all decision parties, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision parties is formed, including a global power preference matrix, a global reachable matrix, and a global power promotion matrix.

[0011] By analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, the possible global equilibrium outcome of the power resource allocation problem is determined, and the decision development trend is predicted to allocate the power resource under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision parties.

[0012] A resource allocation device under the condition of power asymmetry, the device comprising:

[0013] A resource allocation modeling module is configured to model the power resource allocation problem as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model containing multiple decision parties according to the technical feasibility conflicts between the power distribution executor and the power grid physical constraint party and the interest conflicts between the power distribution executor and the power demand response party; the power grid physical constraint party and the power demand response party are local decision parties, and the power distribution executor is a common decision party.

[0014] A local conflict analysis module is configured to establish a local preference matrix reflecting the local decision preference, a local reachable matrix describing the local strategy adjustment feasibility, and a local promotion matrix measuring the local strategy improvement effect according to the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision party in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model.

[0015] A power influence module is configured to correct the local preference matrix and the local promotion matrix based on the power asymmetry relationship between the decision parties to obtain a local power preference matrix and a local power promotion matrix.

[0016] a global conflict analysis module, configured to form a global matrix reflecting a global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers by integrating the local power preference matrix, the local reachable matrix and the local power promotion matrix of all decision makers, the global matrix including a global power preference matrix, a global reachable matrix and a global power promotion matrix;

[0017] a power resource allocation module, configured to determine a possible global equilibrium outcome of the power resource allocation problem by analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, and further predict the decision development trend to allocate the power resource under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers.

[0018] A computer device, comprising a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor implementing the power asymmetry condition-based resource allocation method when executing the computer program.

[0019] A computer readable storage medium, having a computer program stored thereon, the computer program being executed by a processor to implement the power asymmetry condition-based resource allocation method.

[0020] The power asymmetry condition-based resource allocation method, device, equipment and medium, for the power resource allocation problem under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers, constructs a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model involving multiple decision makers related to power resource allocation, based on which the decision preferences of each decision maker in the local conflict and global conflict of power resource allocation can be effectively simulated, and the specific influence of power on the preferences of different decision makers is revealed, overcoming the limitations of the power equality assumption of existing methods, and more truly reflecting the power asymmetry decision environment of power resource allocation, which is conducive to providing a global prediction perspective for the decision trend development of the power resource allocation problem, improving the scientificity, feasibility and sustainability of the power resource allocation scheme, and providing reliable protection for power grid operation and meeting the diversified power allocation needs of complex scenarios. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0021] Figure 1 a flowchart of the power asymmetry condition-based resource allocation method in one embodiment;

[0022] Figure 2 a schematic diagram of the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model in one embodiment;

[0023] Figure 3 an internal structure diagram of the computer device in one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] In order to make the purpose, technical scheme and advantages of the present application clearer, the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and not used to limit the present application.

[0025] In one embodiment, as shown in Figure 1 , a resource allocation method under power asymmetry is provided, comprising the following steps:

[0026] Step 101, according to the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party and the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party, the power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model containing multiple decision makers; the power grid physical constraint party and the electricity demand response party are local decision makers, and the power allocation executor is a common decision maker.

[0027] Step 102, according to the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, a local preference matrix reflecting the local decision preference, a local reachable matrix describing the local strategy adjustment feasibility and a local promotion matrix measuring the local strategy improvement effect are established.

[0028] Step 103, based on the power asymmetry relationship between each decision maker, the local preference matrix and the local promotion matrix are corrected to obtain a local power preference matrix and a local power promotion matrix.

[0029] Step 104, by integrating the local power preference matrix, the local reachable matrix and the local power promotion matrix of all decision makers, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers is formed, including a global power preference matrix, a global reachable matrix and a global power promotion matrix.

[0030] Step 105, by analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, the possible global equilibrium outcome of the power resource allocation problem is determined, and the decision development trend is predicted to perform the power resource allocation under the condition of power asymmetry of multiple decision makers.

[0031] In one of the embodiments, the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party is defined as a first local conflict , the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party is defined as a second local conflict , which are respectively represented as:

[0032] ;

[0033] By combining the first local conflict and the second local conflict The power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model with multiple decision makers, denoted as The binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model is shown in Figure 2 where "binary" means that the model focuses on two local conflicts, each of which can contain multiple common decision makers and local decision makers, i.e., those decision makers that are involved in both conflicts and those decision makers that only appear in a single conflict.

[0034] where denotes the set of decision makers, denotes the set of common decision makers, which can make power resource allocation strategy choices in both and and denote the set of local decision makers in the first local conflict and the second local conflict, respectively, which can only make power resource allocation strategy choices in the corresponding local conflict; denotes the number of common decision makers, and denote the number of local decision makers in the first local conflict and the second local conflict, respectively; denotes the global state set in is the Cartesian product of the first local state and the second local state denotes the global move set of all decision makers in is the union of the first local move set and the second local move set denotes the global decision preference set of all decision makers in contains the union of the first local decision preference set and the second local decision preference set

[0035] Based on the expression of the global decision preference set , it can be seen that since the local decision makers only participate in the local conflict in which they are located, their global decision preference information only depends on the decision preference information in that conflict. For example, it can be determined by that , but for common decision makers, it is impossible to determine the states s and q by and ​​​​In this case, additional rules are needed to determine the global decision preference relationship in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model.

[0036] One simple approach is to introduce the concept of relative importance, i.e., the common decision makers' views on the importance of each local conflict are represented by three relative relations: "important (>)", "unimportant (<)", and "same importance (~)". Based on the relative importance of different common decision makers, a lexicographic preference structure for the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model can be constructed. This rule assumes that the common decision makers tend to compare the gains and losses in more important local conflicts, and thus a unique ranking result of the global state can be obtained. Specifically, in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, the lexicographic preference of the common decision maker and the local decision maker is defined as follows: given two global states , there exist:

[0037] (1) For the common decision maker , if the technical feasibility requirement of the first local conflict is given priority over the interest demand of the second local conflict in the allocation of power resources, i.e., , then if and only if , or and ; where and are two local states describing the first local conflict, and are two local states describing the second local conflict; denotes that the common decision maker is more inclined to the global state than the global state ; denotes that the local state and the local state have the same preference intensity for the common decision maker .

[0038] (2) For the local decision maker , if and only if ; where is the serial number of the local conflict.

[0039] In one embodiment, according to the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, the local improvement preference matrix, the local inferiority preference matrix, and the local equivalence preference matrix reflecting the local decision preference of each decision maker are established, which are respectively denoted as:

[0040] ;

[0041] ;

[0042] ;

[0043] in, For decision-makers Locally modified preference matrix The elements in the decision-making party Local state ; This indicates the decision-making party In contrast to the local state Prefer local states ; For decision-makers The local disadvantage preference matrix, where the superscript T denotes transpose; For decision-makers The local equivalent preference matrix; Indicates and A matrix in which all elements in the same dimension are 1. Let represent a same-dimensional identity matrix. Where, the first local conflict... The dimension of the preference matrix is Second local conflict The dimension of the preference matrix is .

[0044] It should be understood that in the improved preference matrix, an element with a value of 1 indicates that the state in that column is better than the state in that row. Conversely, in the inferior preference matrix, an element with a value of 1 indicates that the state in that row is better than the state in that column. Meanwhile, each element of the equivalent preference matrix reflects whether the current row state is equivalent to the current column state. Therefore, when the local improved preference matrix is ​​known, the local inferior preference matrix and the local equivalent preference matrix can be derived through matrix operations.

[0045] Based on the local unilateral movements achieved by each decision-maker in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model after changing the power resource allocation strategy in each local conflict, a local reachability matrix describing the feasibility of local strategy adjustment is established, represented as:

[0046] ;

[0047] in, For decision-makers Local reachability matrix The elements in For decision-makers Local movement set, If and only if and This is valid when the conditions are met. A feasible state is defined as a feasible combination of all decision-makers' current strategy choices. This indicates that decision-makers can transition from one state to another by adjusting their strategy choices; this is called a unilateral move. In local conflict, a local unilateral move achieved solely by changing local strategies can be accomplished through specific... A local reachable matrix can be used to accurately represent this.

[0048] When a decision-maker intentionally makes a change, especially in a direction they perceive as more advantageous, this action is typically called a unilateral improvement, which can be represented by a lift matrix. A local lift matrix, constructed based on the local improvement preference matrix and the local reachability matrix, measures the effectiveness of local policy improvements and is expressed as follows:

[0049] ;

[0050] ;

[0051] in, For decision-makers Local lifting matrix The element in, symbol " "This indicates the Hadamardi accumulation."

[0052] In one embodiment, due to differences in resources, capabilities, and status, decision-makers in power resource allocation conflicts typically wield varying degrees of power. Some decision-makers can influence the strategy choices of other decision-makers, thereby affecting the possible trajectory of the conflict. For example, the physical constraints of the power grid can limit the decisions of the power allocation executor based on the physical operational limits of the power network (such as line transmission capacity limits and voltage stability limits). Specifically, this application classifies decision-makers in power resource allocation conflicts into three categories: dominant players with greater power, subordinate players influenced by power, and ordinary players who have neither power nor influence. In a game of power asymmetry, dominant players tend to pay less attention to the potential interests of their opponents, while subordinate players tend to focus on achieving the goals of dominant players and gain benefits through summation. The binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model involves two local conflicts, each involving multiple decision-makers. This complexity may cause one party to play both the role of dominant player and subordinate player simultaneously. Therefore, within each conflict, the power distribution among the decision-makers needs to be further clarified. Thus, this application constructs a local power matrix based on the asymmetric power relationship among the decision-makers in the power resource allocation scenario. The elements in the local power matrix are represented as follows:

[0053] ;

[0054] in, This indicates that the power of the previous decision-making party dominates that of the subsequent decision-making party. Indicates the decision-making party Power dominates decision-making That is, the decision-making party For decision-makers The rulers and decision-makers For decision-makers The obedient ones; Conversely; Indicates the decision-making party and decision-makers The power symmetry between them means that they are either general entities or the same decision-maker.

[0055] Building upon the construction of a local power matrix, this paper further hypothesizes that the application of power will force some decision-makers to change their preferences, thus reflecting the exercise of power. Specifically, between a pair of decision-makers with asymmetrical power, the dominant party can forcefully maintain its own preferences without being influenced by other decision-makers, while the subordinate party can only achieve its own goals when the superior's demands are met, and at the same time, without violating its own will, it pursues the interests of the dominant party more. In contrast, between a pair of decision-makers with symmetrical power, both are generalists and do not affect each other's preferences.

[0056] Specifically, based on the local power matrix, the local improvement preference matrix, local disadvantage preference matrix, local equivalence preference matrix, and local promotion matrix of the followers in power domination are modified to obtain the local power improvement preference matrix, local power disadvantage preference matrix, local power equivalence preference matrix, and local power promotion matrix of the followers. This is specifically represented as follows:

[0057] obedient The local power improvement preference matrix is ​​represented as:

[0058] ;

[0059] ;

[0060] in, For the obedient The local improved preference matrix, For the obedient The local equivalent preference matrix, Indicates the ruler Locally modified preference matrix and locally equivalent preference matrix: symbol " "Indicates the Hadamardi accumulation; This refers to the sequence number of the local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model; for Elements in; Indicating obedience to the obedient In contrast to the local state Prefer local states ; Indicating the dominator In contrast to the local state Prefer local states Or local state and local state They have the same preference intensity.

[0061] obedient The local power disadvantage preference matrix is ​​expressed as The superscript T indicates transpose.

[0062] obedient The local power equivalence preference matrix is ​​expressed as ;in, Indicates and A matrix in which all elements in the same dimension are 1. This represents a single-dimensional identity matrix.

[0063] obedient The local power enhancement matrix is ​​represented as ;in, For the obedient The local reachability matrix is ​​given. It should be understood that this application mainly considers the impact of power asymmetry on the decision-maker's preference relationship; therefore, the local reachability matrix does not change under the influence of power.

[0064] In one embodiment, by integrating the local power preference matrix, local reachability matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers is formed. This global matrix includes the global power preference matrix, the global reachability matrix, and the global power enhancement matrix, including:

[0065] The global power preference matrix includes the global power improvement preference matrix, the global power disadvantage preference matrix, and the global power equivalence preference matrix; among them, for the shared decision-making parties... Its global power improvement preference matrix and elements in They are represented as follows:

[0066] ;

[0067] ;

[0068] in, and They are the common decision-makers First local conflict Second local conflict The local power improvement preference matrix in The dimension is , The dimension is First local conflict The second local conflict is a technical feasibility conflict between the power distribution implementer and the power grid physical constraint party. The conflict of interest between the electricity distribution implementer and the electricity demand responder; Indicates that all elements are 1 3D matrix and They represent order and An identity matrix of order 1. and They are the common decision-makers First local conflict Second local conflict The local power equivalence preference matrix in; and This represents two local states describing the first local conflict; This means that in the allocation of power resources, the technical feasibility requirements of the first local conflict should be given priority before considering the interests of the second local conflict. This indicates that in the allocation of power resources, the interests of the second local conflict should be prioritized before considering the technical feasibility requirements of the first local conflict.

[0069] For the first local conflict Local decision-making Second local conflict Local decision-making Their global power improvement preference matrices are expressed as follows:

[0070] ;

[0071] in, Indicates local decision-making parties The global power improvement preference matrix Indicates local decision-making parties The local power improvement preference matrix; Indicates local decision-making parties The global power improvement preference matrix Indicates local decision-making parties The local power improvement preference matrix; Indicates that all elements are 1 3D matrix; "" indicates the Kronecker operation.

[0072] For any decision-making party Its global power disadvantage preference matrix is ​​represented as ;in, The superscript T indicates transpose.

[0073] For any decision-making party Its global power equivalence preference matrix is ​​expressed as ; Indicates and A matrix in which all elements in the same dimension are 1. This represents a single-dimensional identity matrix.

[0074] For joint decision-makers Its global reachability matrix is ​​represented as:

[0075] ;

[0076] in, and Representing the joint decision-making parties First local conflict Second local conflict The local reachable matrix in The dimension is , The dimension is .

[0077] For the first local conflict Local decision-making Second local conflict Local decision-making Their global reachability matrices are respectively expressed as:

[0078] ;

[0079] in, Indicates local decision-making parties The globally reachable matrix, Indicates local decision-making parties The locally reachable matrix; Indicates local decision-making parties The globally reachable matrix, Indicates local decision-making parties The locally reachable matrix.

[0080] For any decision-making party Its global power boosting matrix is ​​represented as ;in, Indicates the decision-making party The global boosting matrix.

[0081] In one embodiment, the core issue of power resource allocation conflict lies in deeply understanding the subjective judgments of each decision-making entity regarding the conflict state and predicting the possible stable outcome of the conflict. During the dynamic process of continuous strategic interaction among decision-makers, each entity tends to pursue the strategy of maximizing its own interests based on its own decision-making style. This reflects not only the decision-makers' understanding of the current situation but also their expectations of possible consequences, both of which are deeply influenced by the unique behavioral patterns of the decision-makers. Specifically, this application analyzes the global stability characteristics of the global matrix in a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model under conditions of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers from a holistic perspective, including power Nash stability (PNash), power sequential stability (PSEQ), power general meta-rational stability (PGMR), and power symmetric meta-rational stability (PSMR). By integrating global information, it is possible to deeply analyze the stable outcomes of power resource allocation conflicts with power influence under different levels of foresight, risk attitudes, and preference knowledge. Specifically, under a certain stability concept, if a state is stable in the eyes of all decision-makers, then this state is considered an equilibrium solution of the hierarchical conflict.

[0082] The power Nash stability is expressed as follows: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers In terms of stability, Nash is more stable; among them, Indicates the first All elements are 1 3D column vector, for transpose, For elements all equal to 1 Dimensional column vectors. Under the concept of power Nash stability, decision-makers are considered risk-seeking, considering only whether there are actions more advantageous to themselves, and deciding whether to change the current power resource allocation strategy accordingly.

[0083] Power Sequential Stability This can be expressed as: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers In terms of sequence stability, among which, ; For elements all equal to 1 3D matrix; For the global alliance power enhancement matrix, the alliance Defined as any decision party in a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model The opponents' assembly, and ; This refers to the set of decision-makers in a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model. For decision-makers The global power disadvantage preference matrix and the global power equivalent preference matrix are derived. In contrast, the PSEQ stability assumption is that decision-makers are risk-averse, and while considering whether to improve their own interests, they also take into account the possible rational countermeasures of their adversaries.

[0084] General meta-rational stability of power This can be expressed as: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers Generally speaking, it is a stable meta-rationality; among them, ; It is a global alliance reachability matrix. PGMR stability is similar to PSEQ, also taking into account the opponent's countermeasures. However, unlike PSEQ, PGMR also considers actions that the opponent might take, even if they are detrimental to itself, to harm the other party.

[0085] Power-symmetric meta-rational stability This can be expressed as: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers In terms of symmetry, it is rationally stable; among them, , PSMR stability, building on PGMR, further considers whether decision-makers can escape sanctions from adversaries in order to minimize risk.

[0086] In summary, the aforementioned resource allocation method under asymmetric power conditions addresses the power resource allocation problem under multi-party power asymmetry. It constructs a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model involving multiple decision-makers with stakeholder interests in power resource allocation. This model effectively simulates the decision preferences of each party in local and global conflicts related to power resource allocation, revealing the specific impact of power on the preferences of different decision-makers. It overcomes the limitations of existing methods that assume power equality, and more realistically reflects the asymmetric decision-making environment of power resource allocation. This provides a global predictive perspective for the development of decision-making trends in power resource allocation, enhances the scientific rigor, feasibility, and sustainability of power resource allocation schemes, and contributes to providing reliable guarantees for grid operation while meeting diverse power allocation needs in complex scenarios.

[0087] In one embodiment, a resource allocation apparatus under conditions of power asymmetry is provided, comprising:

[0088] The resource allocation modeling module is used to model the power resource allocation problem as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model with multiple decision-makers, based on the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party, as well as the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party. The power grid physical constraint party and the electricity demand response party are local decision-makers, while the power allocation executor is a shared decision-maker.

[0089] The local conflict analysis module is used to establish a local preference matrix that reflects the local decision-making preferences, a local reachability matrix that describes the feasibility of local strategy adjustment, and a local improvement matrix that measures the effect of local strategy improvement, based on the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision-maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model.

[0090] The power influence module is used to modify the local preference matrix and the local promotion matrix based on the power asymmetry relationship between the decision-makers, so as to obtain the local power preference matrix and the local power promotion matrix.

[0091] The global conflict analysis module is used to integrate the local power preference matrix, local reachability matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers to form a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers. This includes the global power preference matrix, global reachability matrix, and global power enhancement matrix.

[0092] The power resource allocation module is used to determine the possible global equilibrium outcomes of the power resource allocation problem by analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, and then predict the development trend of decision-making to carry out power resource allocation under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers.

[0093] For specific limitations regarding a resource allocation device under asymmetric power conditions, please refer to the limitations on resource allocation methods under asymmetric power conditions mentioned above, which will not be repeated here. Each module in the aforementioned resource allocation device under asymmetric power conditions can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in a computer device in hardware form, or stored in the memory of a computer device in software form, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to each module.

[0094] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as follows: Figure 3As shown, the computer device includes a processor, memory, network interface, display screen, and input devices connected via a system bus. The processor provides computing and control capabilities. The memory includes non-volatile storage media and internal memory. The non-volatile storage media stores the operating system and computer programs. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs stored in the non-volatile storage media. The network interface is used to communicate with external terminals via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements a resource allocation method under conditions of power asymmetry. The display screen can be a liquid crystal display (LCD) or an e-ink display. The input devices can be a touch layer covering the display screen, buttons, a trackball, or a touchpad mounted on the computer device casing, or an external keyboard, touchpad, or mouse.

[0095] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 3 The structure shown is merely a block diagram of a portion of the structure related to the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the present application is applied. Specific computer devices may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0096] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, the processor executing the computer program to perform the following steps:

[0097] Based on the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party, as well as the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party, the power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model with multiple decision-makers; the power grid physical constraint party and the electricity demand response party are local decision-makers, and the power allocation executor is a shared decision-maker;

[0098] Based on the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision-maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model, a local preference matrix reflecting their local decision preferences, a local reachability matrix describing the feasibility of local strategy adjustment, and a local improvement matrix measuring the effect of local strategy improvement are established.

[0099] Based on the power asymmetry relationship among the decision-makers, the local preference matrix and local promotion matrix are modified to obtain the local power preference matrix and local power promotion matrix;

[0100] By integrating the local power preference matrix, local accessibility matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers is formed, including the global power preference matrix, global accessibility matrix, and global power enhancement matrix.

[0101] By analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, the possible global equilibrium outcomes of the power resource allocation problem are determined, and the development trend of decision-making is predicted to carry out power resource allocation under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers.

[0102] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, the computer program performing the following steps when executed by a processor:

[0103] Based on the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party, as well as the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party, the power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model with multiple decision-makers; the power grid physical constraint party and the electricity demand response party are local decision-makers, and the power allocation executor is a shared decision-maker;

[0104] Based on the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision-maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model, a local preference matrix reflecting their local decision preferences, a local reachability matrix describing the feasibility of local strategy adjustment, and a local improvement matrix measuring the effect of local strategy improvement are established.

[0105] Based on the power asymmetry relationship among the decision-makers, the local preference matrix and local promotion matrix are modified to obtain the local power preference matrix and local power promotion matrix;

[0106] By integrating the local power preference matrix, local accessibility matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers is formed, including the global power preference matrix, global accessibility matrix, and global power enhancement matrix.

[0107] By analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, the possible global equilibrium outcomes of the power resource allocation problem are determined, and the development trend of decision-making is predicted to carry out power resource allocation under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers.

[0108] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When executed, the computer program can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. Any references to memory, storage, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in a variety of forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), dual data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), RAMbus direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), etc.

[0109] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0110] The above embodiments are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and their descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, but they should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make several modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A resource allocation method under conditions of power asymmetry, characterized in that, The method includes: Based on the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party, and the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party, the power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model containing multiple decision-makers; the power grid physical constraint party and the electricity demand response party are local decision-makers, and the power allocation executor is a shared decision-maker; Based on the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision-maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, a local preference matrix reflecting their local decision preferences, a local reachability matrix describing the feasibility of local strategy adjustment, and a local improvement matrix measuring the effect of local strategy improvement are established. Based on the power asymmetry relationship among the decision-makers, the local preference matrix and local promotion matrix are modified to obtain the local power preference matrix and local power promotion matrix; By integrating the local power preference matrix, local accessibility matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers is formed, including the global power preference matrix, global accessibility matrix, and global power enhancement matrix. By analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, the possible global equilibrium outcomes of the power resource allocation problem are determined, and the decision development trend is predicted to carry out power resource allocation under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers. Specifically, by integrating the local power preference matrix, local accessibility matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers, a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision-making under conditions of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers is formed. This global matrix includes the global power preference matrix, global accessibility matrix, and global power enhancement matrix, including: The global power preference matrix includes a global power improvement preference matrix, a global power disadvantage preference matrix, and a global power equivalence preference matrix; wherein, for the shared decision-making parties Its global power improvement preference matrix and elements in They are represented as follows: ； ； in, and They are the common decision-makers First local conflict Second local conflict The local power improvement preference matrix in The dimension is , The dimension is First local conflict The second local conflict is a technical feasibility conflict between the power distribution implementer and the power grid physical constraint party. The conflict of interest between the electricity distribution implementer and the electricity demand responder; Indicates that all elements are 1 3D matrix and They represent order and An identity matrix of order 1. and They are the common decision-makers First local conflict Second local conflict The local power equivalence preference matrix in; and This represents two local states describing the first local conflict; This means that in the allocation of power resources, the technical feasibility requirements of the first local conflict should be given priority before considering the interests of the second local conflict. This indicates that in the allocation of power resources, the interests of the second local conflict should be prioritized before considering the technical feasibility requirements of the first local conflict; For the first local conflict Local decision-making Second local conflict Local decision-making Their global power improvement preference matrices are expressed as follows: ； in, Indicates local decision-making parties The global power improvement preference matrix Indicates local decision-making parties The local power improvement preference matrix; Indicates local decision-making parties The global power improvement preference matrix Indicates local decision-making parties The local power improvement preference matrix; Indicates that all elements are 1 3D matrix; " indicates the Kronecker operation; For any decision-making party Its global power disadvantage preference matrix is ​​represented as ;in, The superscript T indicates transpose; For any decision-making party Its global power equivalence preference matrix is ​​expressed as ; Indicates and A matrix in which all elements in the same dimension are 1. Represents an identity matrix of the same dimension; For joint decision-makers Its global reachability matrix is ​​represented as: ； in, and Representing the joint decision-making parties First local conflict Second local conflict The local reachable matrix in The dimension is , The dimension is ; For the first local conflict Local decision-making Second local conflict Local decision-making Their global reachability matrices are respectively expressed as: ； in, Indicates local decision-making parties The globally reachable matrix, Indicates local decision-making parties The locally reachable matrix; Indicates local decision-making parties The globally reachable matrix, Indicates local decision-making parties The locally reachable matrix; For any decision-making party Its global power boosting matrix is ​​represented as ;in, Indicates the decision-making party The global boosting matrix.

2. The resource allocation method under power asymmetry conditions according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party, and the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party, the power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model involving multiple decision-makers, including: The technical feasibility conflict between the power distribution implementer and the power grid physical constraint party is defined as the first local conflict. The conflict of interest between the electricity distribution implementer and the electricity demand responder is defined as the second local conflict. , respectively represented as: ； By combining the first local conflict Second local conflict The power resource allocation problem is modeled as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model involving multiple decision-makers, represented as follows: ;in, Represents the set of decision-makers. Denotes a set of shared decision-makers, who are capable of... and China will simultaneously make choices regarding power resource allocation strategies. and These represent the sets of local decision-makers in the first local conflict and the second local conflict, respectively. The local decision-makers can only make power resource allocation strategy choices in the corresponding local conflict. Indicates the number of decision-makers. and These represent the number of local decision-makers in the first local conflict and the second local conflict, respectively. express global state set in For the first local state Second local state Cartesian product; express The global move set of all decision-makers For the first local move set Second local movement set The union of; express The global decision preference set of all decision-makers in the process. Includes the first local decision preference set Second local decision preference set The union of; In the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, the lexicographical preference of the common decision-makers and the local decision-makers is defined, i.e., given two global states. ,exist: For joint decision-makers If, in the allocation of power resources, priority is given to the technical feasibility requirements of the first local conflict before considering the interests of the second local conflict, that is... ,but If and only if ,or and ;in, and To describe the two local states of the first local conflict, and These are two local states describing the second local conflict; This indicates that for the joint decision-making parties In relation to the global state Prefer global state ; This indicates that for the joint decision-making parties In terms of local state and local state They have the same preference intensity; For local decision-makers , If and only if ;in, This refers to the sequence number of the local conflict.

3. The resource allocation method under power asymmetry conditions according to claim 2, characterized in that, Based on the power resource allocation strategy choices of each decision-maker in each local conflict within the aforementioned binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, a local preference matrix reflecting their local decision preferences, a local reachability matrix describing the feasibility of local strategy adjustments, and a local improvement matrix measuring the effectiveness of local strategy improvements are established, including: Based on the power resource allocation strategy choices of each decision-maker in each local conflict within the aforementioned binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model, a local improvement preference matrix, a local disadvantage preference matrix, and a local equivalent preference matrix reflecting their local decision preferences are established, respectively expressed as: ； ； ； in, For decision-makers Locally modified preference matrix The elements in the decision-making party Local state ; This indicates the decision-making party In contrast to the local state Prefer local states ; For decision-makers The local disadvantage preference matrix, where the superscript T denotes transpose; For decision-makers The local equivalent preference matrix; Indicates and A matrix in which all elements in the same dimension are 1. Represents an identity matrix of the same dimension; Based on the local unilateral movements achieved by each decision-maker in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model after changing the power resource allocation strategy in each local conflict, a local reachability matrix describing the feasibility of local strategy adjustment is established, represented as: ； in, For decision-makers Local reachability matrix The elements in For decision-makers Local movement set, If and only if and Established at that time; Based on the aforementioned local improved preference matrix and local reachability matrix, a local boosting matrix is ​​constructed to measure the effectiveness of local policy improvement, denoted as: ； ； in, For decision-makers Local lifting matrix The element in the symbol " "This indicates the Hadamardi accumulation." 4. The resource allocation method under power asymmetry conditions according to claim 3, characterized in that, Based on the power asymmetry among the decision-makers, the local preference matrix and local promotion matrix are modified to obtain the local power preference matrix and local power promotion matrix, including: Based on the power asymmetry among decision-makers in a power resource allocation scenario, a local power matrix is ​​constructed; where the elements of the local power matrix are represented as follows: ； in, This indicates that the power of the previous decision-making party dominates that of the subsequent decision-making party. Indicates the decision-making party Power dominates decision-making That is, the decision-making party For decision-makers The rulers and decision-makers For decision-makers The obedient ones; Conversely; Indicates the decision-making party and decision-makers The power symmetry between them means that they are either general entities or the same decision-maker. Based on the local power matrix, the local improvement preference matrix, local disadvantage preference matrix, local equivalent preference matrix, and local promotion matrix of the followers in the power domination are modified to obtain the local power improvement preference matrix, local power disadvantage preference matrix, local power equivalent preference matrix, and local power promotion matrix of the followers. Among them, the obedient The local power improvement preference matrix is ​​represented as: ； ； in, For the obedient The local improved preference matrix, For the obedient The local equivalent preference matrix, Indicates the ruler Locally modified preference matrix and locally equivalent preference matrix: symbol " "Indicates the Hadamardi accumulation; This refers to the sequence number of the local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis diagram model; for Elements in; Indicating obedience to the obedient In contrast to the local state Prefer local states ; Indicating the dominator In contrast to the local state Prefer local states Or local state and local state They have the same preference intensity; obedient The local power disadvantage preference matrix is ​​expressed as The superscript T indicates transpose. obedient The local power equivalence preference matrix is ​​expressed as ;in, Indicates and A matrix in which all elements in the same dimension are 1. Represents an identity matrix of the same dimension; obedient The local power enhancement matrix is ​​represented as ;in, For the obedient The locally reachable matrix.

5. The resource allocation method under power asymmetry conditions according to claim 1, characterized in that, The global stability characteristics of the global matrix are analyzed, including: The global stability characteristics of the global matrix under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers are analyzed, including power Nash stability, power sequential stability, power general meta-rational stability, and power symmetric meta-rational stability. The power Nash stability is expressed as follows: In the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers In terms of stability, Nash is more stable; among them, Indicates the first All elements are 1 3D column vector, for transpose, For elements all equal to 1 3D column vector; Power Sequential Stability This can be expressed as: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers In terms of sequence stability, among which, ; For elements all equal to 1 3D matrix; For the global alliance power enhancement matrix, the alliance Defined as any decision party in a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model The opponents' assembly, and ; This refers to the set of decision-makers in a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model. For decision-makers The global power disadvantage preference matrix and the global power equivalent preference matrix; General meta-rational stability of power This can be expressed as: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers Generally speaking, it is a stable meta-rationality; among them, ; This is the global union reachability matrix; Power-symmetric meta-rational stability This can be expressed as: In a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model, if and only if At that time, a global state For decision-makers In terms of symmetry, it is rationally stable; among them, , .

6. A resource allocation device under conditions of power asymmetry, characterized in that, The apparatus is implemented based on the resource allocation method under power asymmetry conditions as described in any one of claims 1-5, and the apparatus comprises: The resource allocation modeling module is used to model the power resource allocation problem as a binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model containing multiple decision-makers, based on the technical feasibility conflict between the power allocation executor and the power grid physical constraint party, and the interest conflict between the power allocation executor and the electricity demand response party; the power grid physical constraint party and the electricity demand response party are local decision-makers, and the power allocation executor is a shared decision-maker; The local conflict analysis module is used to establish a local preference matrix that reflects the local decision-making preferences, a local reachability matrix that describes the feasibility of local strategy adjustment, and a local improvement matrix that measures the effect of local strategy improvement, based on the power resource allocation strategy selection of each decision-maker in each local conflict in the binary hierarchical conflict analysis graph model. The power influence module is used to modify the local preference matrix and the local promotion matrix based on the power asymmetry relationship between the decision-makers, so as to obtain the local power preference matrix and the local power promotion matrix. The global conflict analysis module is used to integrate the local power preference matrix, local reachability matrix, and local power enhancement matrix of all decision-makers to form a global matrix reflecting the global power resource allocation decision under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers. This includes the global power preference matrix, global reachability matrix, and global power enhancement matrix. The power resource allocation module is used to determine the possible global equilibrium outcomes of the power resource allocation problem by analyzing the global stability characteristics of the global matrix, and then predict the decision development trend to carry out power resource allocation under the condition of power asymmetry among multiple decision-makers.

7. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5.

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