Train control method and device based on quantum key distribution, equipment and medium

Abstract

The invention relates to a train control method and device based on quantum key distribution, equipment and a medium, and belongs to the technical field of quantum communication. According to the method, a quantum key distribution device is configured for each ground device in the train control system, session key construction between any two devices in the system is completed based on an initial quantum key provided by the quantum key distribution device, and a new session key is reconstructed without using a current session key after each data transmission. Namely, by means of the use of the session key in the quantum key form and the encryption form setting of different session keys in each data transmission between the same devices, the capability of the train control system for resisting the quantum computing attack is remarkably improved, and finally the security of information transmission in the train control system is remarkably improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of quantum communication technology, and in particular to a train control method, apparatus, device, and medium based on quantum key distribution. Background Technology

[0002] In the train control system, key train control signals need to be transmitted between ground equipment, between ground equipment and onboard equipment, and between onboard equipment, based on the Internet or mobile communication system. The RSSP secure transmission protocol is used to protect the transmitted information.

[0003] Existing RSSP protocol implementations primarily employ pre-session keys or digital certificates for authentication, and key exchange protocols based on cryptographic algorithms for session key negotiation. Taking data transmission between TSRS (Temporary Speed ​​Restriction Server) and RBC (Radio Block Center) based on digital certificate authentication as an example, the workflow is as follows:

[0004] Identity Authentication: TSRS and RBC exchange digital certificates, and the identity authentication between the two parties is completed based on the digital certificates;

[0005] Session key negotiation: Use a key negotiation algorithm (such as ECDHE) to calculate a temporary session key between the two parties, and derive the AES encryption key and HMAC key;

[0006] Data transmission: TSRS uses the AES encryption key in the session key to encrypt the rate limit command, and uses the HMAC key in the session key to calculate the MAC value of the encrypted data before transmitting it to RBC. The receiving RBC uses the same key to verify the MAC value and decrypt the encrypted data to obtain the plaintext rate limit command.

[0007] Session termination: The session key is retained until timeout (e.g., 30 minutes), and subsequent communication requires TSRS and RBC to renegotiate the session key.

[0008] As can be seen from the example of data transmission between TSRS and RBC above, the existing technical solutions have the following problems:

[0009] Digital certificates based on asymmetric algorithms such as RSA / ECC are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. The session key generation process uses cryptographic key exchange protocols, which are weakly resistant to quantum attacks. Data transmission uses symmetric cryptographic algorithms for encryption and decryption, which carries the risk of key brute-force attacks or quantum computing attacks. Pre-session keys require manual intervention, leading to high update costs and long update cycles, making it difficult to meet the real-time requirements of highly dynamic speed-limiting commands. More importantly, key reuse increases the risk of leakage and attack. In other words, the overall data transmission process in current train control systems is susceptible to quantum computing attacks, resulting in insufficient security.

[0010] In summary, the current train control system suffers from insufficient overall security due to the risk of being hacked at every stage of the data transmission process. Summary of the Invention

[0011] In view of this, embodiments of the present invention provide a train control method and train control system based on quantum key distribution to solve the technical problem of insufficient data transmission security in current train control systems.

[0012] In a first aspect, a train control method based on quantum key distribution is provided, the method comprising:

[0013] Configure a corresponding quantum key distribution device for each ground device in the train control system, and generate a session key for any two ground devices based on the quantum key distribution device;

[0014] The vehicle-mounted device obtains and stores an initial quantum key through a quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device it communicates with. The vehicle-mounted device then generates session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or each of the ground devices based on the initial quantum key.

[0015] Based on the session key between any two devices, data transmission between the two devices is completed, and after the data transmission is completed, the session key between the two devices is discarded, and a new session key between the two devices is generated.

[0016] Secondly, a train control device based on quantum key distribution is provided, the device comprising:

[0017] The ground equipment session key generation module is used to configure a corresponding quantum key distribution device for each ground device in the train control system, and generate a session key for any two ground devices based on the quantum key distribution device.

[0018] The vehicle-mounted device session key generation module is used to enable the vehicle-mounted device to obtain and store an initial quantum key through a quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device with which it communicates, and the vehicle-mounted device completes the generation of session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or each of the ground devices based on the initial quantum key;

[0019] The data transmission and session key regeneration module is used to complete the data transmission between any two devices based on the session key between the two devices, and discard the session key between the two devices after the data transmission is completed, and regenerate the session key between the two devices.

[0020] Thirdly, embodiments of the present invention provide a computer device, the computer device including a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the train control method based on quantum key distribution as described in the first aspect.

[0021] Fourthly, embodiments of the present invention provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the train control method based on quantum key distribution as described in the first aspect.

[0022] The advantages of this invention compared to the prior art are:

[0023] This invention first configures quantum key distribution devices for various ground-based equipment in the train control system. Then, based on the initial quantum key provided by the quantum key distribution devices, a session key is constructed between any two devices in the system using a specific method. After each data transmission between any two devices, the current session key is discarded, and a new session key is constructed for them. The technical advantages of this invention compared to existing train control methods are as follows:

[0024] 1. Existing technologies use digital certificates based on asymmetric cryptographic algorithms for identity authentication, and session keys are negotiated using key exchange protocols based on cryptographic algorithms, making them vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. The present invention employs quantum key distribution technology to distribute quantum keys as session keys for data transmission between devices in the train control system, thus resisting quantum computing attacks and improving the security of key distribution.

[0025] 2. Existing digital certificates are updated annually, and session keys are updated hourly, increasing the risk of being cracked. The key update frequency of this invention is increased to update with every session. This means that each session uses a renegotiated session key for authentication and secure communication. Data encryption can employ a "one-time pad" encryption method, reducing the risk of attacks and improving the security of transmitted information.

[0026] In summary, by distributing and using quantum key type session keys and setting different session keys for each data transmission between the same devices, the present invention can significantly improve the train control system's ability to resist quantum computing attacks, and ultimately significantly improve the security of information transmission in the train control system. Attached Figure Description

[0027] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0028] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a train control method based on quantum key distribution provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0029] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a train control system structure capable of quantum key distribution provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0030] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the train control system structure in a specific example provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0031] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the RSSP data packet content provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0032] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the key negotiation and authentication process between ATP1 and RBC1 provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0033] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the data transmission process between ATP1 and RBC1 provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0034] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a train control device based on quantum key distribution provided in Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 8This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in Embodiment 3 of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0036] In the following description, specific details such as particular system architectures and techniques are set forth for illustrative purposes and not for limitation, in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. However, those skilled in the art will understand that the invention can be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, apparatuses, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the invention with unnecessary detail.

[0037] It should be understood that, when used in this specification and the appended claims, the term "comprising" indicates the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components and / or collections thereof.

[0038] It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used in this specification and the appended claims refers to any combination of one or more of the associated listed items and all possible combinations, and includes such combinations.

[0039] As used in this specification and the appended claims, the term "if" may be interpreted, depending on the context, as "when," "once," "in response to determination," or "in response to detection." Similarly, the phrase "if determined" or "if [described condition or event] is detected" may be interpreted, depending on the context, as meaning "once determined," "in response to determination," "once [described condition or event] is detected," or "in response to detection of [described condition or event]."

[0040] Furthermore, in the description of this invention and the appended claims, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc., are used only to distinguish descriptions and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0041] References to "one embodiment" or "some embodiments" as described in this specification mean that one or more embodiments of the invention include a specific feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment. Therefore, the phrases "in one embodiment," "in some embodiments," "in other embodiments," "in still other embodiments," etc., appearing in different parts of this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, but rather mean "one or more, but not all, embodiments," unless otherwise specifically emphasized. The terms "comprising," "including," "having," and variations thereof mean "including but not limited to," unless otherwise specifically emphasized.

[0042] It should be understood that the sequence number of each step in the following embodiments does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0043] To illustrate the technical solution of the present invention, specific embodiments are described below.

[0044] First, let me explain the overall concept and expected technical effects of this invention:

[0045] This invention employs quantum key distribution technology to distribute shared quantum keys between ground devices, between ground devices and vehicle-mounted devices, and between vehicle-mounted devices. These keys can be used to replace pre-session keys or digital certificates for device authentication, and to replace session keys generated based on cryptographic algorithms for data encryption and integrity verification.

[0046] Meanwhile, the key is destroyed in real time after use. Since the key is updated online in real time, more keys can be provided for data encryption, thus supporting a high-security level of "one-time key" encryption. Since only some devices need to be configured with quantum key distribution equipment and quantum key distribution is required, the efficiency and security of key distribution, as well as the security of critical information transmission in the train control system, can be improved without changing the original train control system architecture.

[0047] For details, see Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a train control method based on quantum key distribution provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the train control method based on quantum key distribution may include the following steps:

[0048] Step S101: Configure a corresponding quantum key distribution device for each ground device in the train control system, and generate a session key for any two ground devices based on the quantum key distribution device.

[0049] like Figure 2 The schematic diagram of the train control system capable of quantum key distribution is shown. This embodiment, based on the existing deployment architecture and equipment of the railway signal transmission system, deploys a quantum key distribution (QKD) device to provide the prerequisite for distributing quantum keys between ground devices, between ground devices and onboard devices, and between onboard devices. Preferably, each ground device is configured with one quantum key distribution device. However, it is easily understood that in other embodiments, one quantum key distribution device can be configured for multiple ground devices simultaneously, that is, the same quantum key distribution device can be configured for multiple ground devices.

[0050] Wired network communication is used between ground devices and between quantum key distribution devices and ground devices. Wireless mobile communication is used between vehicle-mounted devices and ground devices. Quantum key distribution devices use QKD communication based on quantum key distribution protocols (such as BB84, MDI-QKD, TF-QKD, etc.).

[0051] The establishment of session keys between ground devices can be directly completed based on the quantum key distribution equipment configured for each ground device. Specifically:

[0052] For ease of explanation, all equipment will be numbered sequentially, with ground equipment 1, ground equipment 2, ground equipment 3, vehicle-mounted equipment 1, and vehicle-mounted equipment 2 designated as equipment numbers 1 through 5.

[0053] The key distribution method between adjacent ground devices is as follows: QKD communication between each QKD device can ensure the consistency of the initial quantum key content. Specifically, QKD1 and QKD2 use quantum key distribution technology based on the initial quantum key to generate a session key Key12 between ground device 1 and ground device 2, which is transmitted to ground device 1 and ground device 2 respectively through the network, thereby completing the session key construction between ground device 1 and ground device 2. Similarly, QKD2 and QKD3 distribute session key Key23 to ground device 2 and ground device 3.

[0054] Non-adjacent ground devices distribute session keys via secure relays from intermediate adjacent devices. For example, to establish a session key between ground device 1 and ground device 3, ground device 1 randomly selects a predetermined number of keys from the generated initial quantum keys as the session key Key13, encrypts Key13 using Key12, and transmits it to ground device 2. Ground device 2 decrypts Key13 using Key12, then encrypts Key13 again using Key23 and sends it to ground device 3. Ground device 3 decrypts Key13 using Key23 to obtain Key13. Thus, ground device 1 and ground device 3 have the session key Key13. The specific value of the predetermined number can be set by technicians based on the number of initial quantum keys and the required level of encryption security; this embodiment does not impose specific limitations on its value.

[0055] In step S102, the vehicle-mounted device obtains and stores an initial quantum key through the quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device it communicates with. Based on the initial quantum key, the vehicle-mounted device generates session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or each of the ground devices.

[0056] Regarding the construction of session keys between the vehicle-mounted device and other devices, since the vehicle-mounted device does not have a corresponding quantum key distribution device directly configured, it needs to first obtain and store the initial quantum key from the quantum key distribution device via the ground device. Preferably, the vehicle-mounted device obtains and stores the initial quantum key from the quantum key distribution device via the ground device using a secure medium, while the ground device also stores the initial quantum key. The session key between the vehicle-mounted device and the ground device it directly communicates with is generated by the quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device and sent to the ground device. The ground device uses the initial quantum key pre-set for the vehicle-mounted device to encrypt the generated session key before transmitting it to the vehicle-mounted device as the session key between the vehicle-mounted device and the ground device. For example, the initial quantum key Key14 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and ground device 1, and the initial quantum key Key15 between vehicle-mounted device 2 and ground device 1, are both pre-set and used for session key distribution between vehicle-mounted device 1 and ground device 1, and between vehicle-mounted device 2 and ground device 1.

[0057] Then, the vehicle-mounted device can generate session keys based on the initial quantum key to communicate with other vehicle-mounted devices or the various ground devices that do not communicate directly:

[0058] If vehicle-mounted device 1 uses vehicle-mounted device 2 as the key to build the target device, then ground device 1 can act as a relay to generate the session key Key45 between it and vehicle-mounted device 2. If vehicle-mounted device 1 uses ground device 3 as the key to build the target device, then ground device 1 and ground device 2 can act as relays to generate the session key Key34 between it and ground device 3, and so on.

[0059] Specifically, taking vehicle-mounted device 2 as the target device for key construction of vehicle-mounted device 1 as an example, the generation method of the session key Key45 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and vehicle-mounted device 2 is as follows: ground device 1, which communicates directly with vehicle-mounted device 1, randomly selects a set number of keys from the initial quantum keys provided by the quantum key distribution device QKD1 corresponding to ground device 1 as the target session key Key45 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and vehicle-mounted device 2. Ground device 1 sends the generated target session key Key45 to vehicle-mounted device 1 and simultaneously to vehicle-mounted device 2, thus completing the generation of the session key Key45 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and vehicle-mounted device 2.

[0060] If we take ground device 3 as the key for vehicle-mounted device 1 to construct the target device, the generation method of the session key Key34 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and ground device 3 is as follows: ground device 1, which communicates directly with vehicle-mounted device 1, randomly selects a set number of keys from the initial quantum keys provided by the quantum key distribution device QKD1 corresponding to ground device 1 as the target session key Key34 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and ground device 3. Ground device 1 sends the generated target session key Key34 to vehicle-mounted device 1, and at the same time, ground device 2 acts as a relay to send the target session key Key34 to vehicle-mounted device 3, thus completing the generation of the session key Key34 between vehicle-mounted device 1 and ground device 3.

[0061] Step S103: Based on the session key between any two devices, complete the data transmission between the two devices, discard the session key between the two devices after the data transmission is completed, and regenerate the session key between the two devices.

[0062] The session key constructed in this embodiment specifically includes: a device authentication key, an encryption key, and an HMAC key (Hash-based message authentication code), where the HMAC key is also known as the message authentication key.

[0063] Through the aforementioned two steps, the session key between any two devices has been established. Based on the established session key, the two devices can perform bidirectional authentication using the device authentication key in the session key between them, based on the Railway Signal Safety Communication Protocol (RSSP). After successful authentication, the data requester in the two devices registers with the data sender in the two devices. The data sender responds to the data requester's request for the required data and sends the required data to the data requester, thus completing the data transmission between the two devices.

[0064] Furthermore, to improve the security of data transmission in the train control system, after the data transmission between any two devices is completed, the session key used for the data transmission between those two devices is immediately discarded, and a new session key is generated between the two devices to complete the data transmission in a "one-time key" manner.

[0065] Furthermore, for ease of understanding, the present invention will be described below with specific examples:

[0066] Assuming that the ground equipment in the train control system of this embodiment includes TSRS (Temporary Speed ​​Restriction Server) equipment and RBC (Radio Block Center) equipment, and the onboard equipment is ATP (Automatic Train Protection) equipment, specifically as follows... Figure 3 The diagram shows a train control system with a single TSRS and multiple RBCs. Ground equipment 1 is the TSRS device, ground equipment 2 is the RBC1 device, ground equipment 3 is the RBC2 device, onboard equipment 1 is the ATP1 device, and onboard equipment 2 is the ATP2 device. The serial numbers of each device follow the order described above.

[0067] Among them, a shared key Key12 has been distributed between TSRS and RBC1, a shared key Key23 has been distributed between RBC1 and RBC2 based on quantum key distribution technology, a shared key Key14 has been pre-set between the vehicle-mounted device ATP1 and TSRS, and a shared key Key15 has been pre-set between the vehicle-mounted device ATP2 and TSRS.

[0068] Once the on-board device ATP1 enters the jurisdiction of RBC1, it can obtain the shared key Key24 with RBC1 via TSRS. The shared key consists of three parts: a device authentication key, an encryption key, and an HMAC key. The on-board device ATP1 uses the RSSP protocol to perform two-way authentication with RBC1. After successful authentication, it registers with RBC1 and requests necessary data, such as MA (Movement Authority), which is then sent from RBC1 to the on-board device ATP1.

[0069] like Figure 4 As shown, the RSSP data packet content includes four parts: Header, Security Field, Payload, and Integrity Verification MAC / Tag. The Payload is encrypted using the "encryption key" in the session key, and the Integrity Verification MAC / Tag uses the HMAC key pair (Header + Security Field + Payload) to calculate the MAC value of this part.

[0070] In other words, the interaction between ATP1 and RBC1 can be broadly divided into the session key construction and authentication process, and the information transmission process, as detailed below:

[0071] like Figure 5 The diagram shown illustrates the key negotiation and authentication process between ATP1 and RBC1, which specifically includes:

[0072] 1. When ATP1 reaches the jurisdiction of RBC1, it sends a link establishment message to RBC1 to establish a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) link, negotiate the RSSP protocol version, and exchange the device identifiers (ATP1) and (RBC1) of both parties.

[0073] 2. ATP1 sends the Device Identifier ID (RBC1) to TSRS, requesting the session key Key24 between ATP1 and RBC1. This process uses the shared key Key14 between ATP1 and TSRS for authentication and encryption protection.

[0074] 3. TSRS returns the Session Key Identifier ID (Key24) and Session Key Key24 to ATP1. This process uses the shared key Key14 between ATP1 and TSRS for authentication and encryption protection.

[0075] 4. ATP1 sends the session key identifier ID (Key24) to RBC1, requesting negotiation of the session key. The data packet format is as follows:

[0076] Header: RSSP protocol version, message type (key negotiation), sequence number, length identifier.

[0077] Security Field: Session Key Identifier ID (Key24), Nonce (random number C), Timestamp.

[0078] Payload: The hash value H of session key Key24 (Key24).

[0079] MAC / Tag: Integrity verification value, calculated using the HMAC key of session key Key24. The HMAC calculation range is HMAC(Header + Security Field + Payload).

[0080] 5. RBC1 sends its ID (ATP1) and key identifier ID (Key24) to TSRS, requesting the session key Key24. This process uses the shared key Key12 between RBC1 and TSRS for authentication and encryption protection.

[0081] 6. TSRS returns Key24 to RBC1. This process uses the shared key Key12 between RBC1 and TSRS for authentication and encryption protection.

[0082] 7. RBC1 calculates the hash value of Key24 and compares it with H(Key24) to ensure key consistency. After the comparison is successful, the HMAC key in Key24 is used to verify the integrity check value of the ATP1 message.

[0083] 8. RBC1 returns a message to ATP1 indicating successful key negotiation. The message format is as follows:

[0084] Header: RSSP protocol version, message type (key negotiation), sequence number, length identifier.

[0085] Security Field: Session Key Identifier ID (Key24), Nonce (random number C), Timestamp.

[0086] Payload: Key negotiation successful instruction.

[0087] MAC / Tag: Integrity verification value, calculated using the HMAC key of session key Key24. The HMAC calculation range is HMAC(Header + Security Field + Payload).

[0088] 9. ATP1 uses the HMAC key of Key24 to verify the integrity check value of RBC1.

[0089] Through the information exchange in steps 1 to 9 above, ATP1 and RBC1 have completed the negotiation and construction of the session key Key24. The session key includes: a device authentication key, an encryption key, and an HMAC key. ATP1 and RBC1 will subsequently use the device authentication key from the session key to complete the following... Figure 5 The authentication process from steps 9 to 14 shown will not be described again.

[0090] The authentication process between ATP2 and RBC2 is the same as that in steps 1 to 14 above. When RBC2 obtains the session key Key35 between RBC2 and ATP2 from TSRS, it first needs to obtain the shared key Key13 between RBC2 and TSRS through RBC1 relay. Since the principle of constructing and authenticating the session key between ATP2 and RBC2 is essentially the same as that in steps 1 to 14 above, it will not be described again here.

[0091] like Figure 6 The diagram shown illustrates the data transmission process between ATP1 and RBC1, which specifically includes:

[0092] (1) ATP1 registers with RBC1 and applies for an MA (Movement Authority). Data transmission uses the negotiated RSSP protocol, and the data packet format is as follows:

[0093] Header: RSSP protocol version, message type (registration request), sequence number, and length identifier.

[0094] Security Field: Session Key Identifier ID (Key24), Nonce (random number C), Timestamp.

[0095] Payload: The registration instruction is encrypted using the encryption key of the session key Key24, and the encryption method is "one-time pad".

[0096] MAC / Tag: Integrity verification value, calculated using the HMAC key of session key Key24. The HMAC calculation range is HMAC(Header + Security Field + Payload).

[0097] (2) RBC1 uses the HMAC key in session key Key24 to verify the integrity check value, and uses the encryption key in session key Key24 to decrypt the ciphertext of the registration instruction to obtain the plaintext instruction. Then it returns MA to ATP1. Data transmission uses the negotiated RSSP protocol, and the data packet format is as follows:

[0098] Header: RSSP protocol version, message type (registration confirmation), sequence number, and length identifier.

[0099] Security Field: Session Key Identifier ID (Key24), Nonce (random number C), Timestamp.

[0100] Payload: MA instruction ciphertext (encrypted using the encryption key of session key Key24, with a "one-time pad" encryption method).

[0101] MAC / Tag: Integrity verification value, calculated using the HMAC key of session key Key24. The HMAC calculation range is HMAC(Header + Security Field + Payload).

[0102] ATP1 uses the HMAC key in session key Key24 to verify the integrity check value, and uses the encryption key in session key Key24 to decrypt the ciphertext of the MA command to obtain the plaintext of the MA command.

[0103] (3) APT1 and RBC1 destroy the original session key Key24 and renegotiate the session key Key24'. The negotiation process is the same as the Key24 key negotiation process.

[0104] (4) The renegotiated session key Key24' is used between ATP1 and RBC1 to protect the security of information transmission such as rate limiting instructions.

[0105] The registration operation in step (1) only needs to be performed during the first communication between the devices. Subsequent communication does not require repeated registration. Before each transmission of information, APT1 and RBC1 renegotiate the session key according to the process of steps (3)-(4) and use the renegotiated session key to protect the security of the transmitted data.

[0106] The embodiments of the present invention do not change the original train control system architecture or the original RSSP protocol. Instead, they only need to add a quantum key distribution device to distribute shared quantum keys to relevant devices in the train control system through quantum key distribution technology, complete the construction of session keys between different devices, destroy the original key after each session, and complete the negotiation of a new session key before the start of a new session, thereby realizing "one-time pad" information encryption. In this way, by using quantum keys and significantly shortening the session key update cycle, the attack of quantum computing can be effectively resisted, and the security of information transmission in the train control system can be improved.

[0107] Corresponding to the method in the above embodiments, Figure 7 A structural block diagram of a train control device based on quantum key distribution according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention is shown. This train control device is applied to a computer device, which connects to a target database through a preset application programming interface (API). When the target database is driven to run and execute corresponding tasks, corresponding task logs are generated, which can be collected through the API. For ease of explanation, only the parts relevant to the embodiments of the present invention are shown.

[0108] See Figure 7 The train control device includes:

[0109] Ground equipment session key generation module 21 is used to configure a corresponding quantum key distribution device for each ground device in the train control system, and generate a session key for any two ground devices based on the quantum key distribution device.

[0110] The vehicle-mounted device session key generation module 22 is used to enable the vehicle-mounted device to obtain and store an initial quantum key through the quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device with which it communicates, and the vehicle-mounted device completes the generation of session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or each of the ground devices based on the initial quantum key;

[0111] The data transmission and session key regeneration module 23 is used to complete the data transmission between any two devices based on the session key between the two devices, and discard the session key between the two devices after the data transmission is completed, and regenerate the session key between the two devices.

[0112] Optionally, the above-mentioned device further includes:

[0113] The session key content restriction module is used to restrict the session key to include the device authentication key, encryption key, and message authentication key.

[0114] Optionally, the ground equipment session key generation module 21 includes:

[0115] A ground equipment session key generation unit, configured to generate session keys for any two of the ground equipment, includes:

[0116] Two quantum key distribution devices corresponding to two adjacent ground devices use quantum key distribution technology to generate a session key between the two adjacent ground devices and transmit it to the two adjacent ground devices;

[0117] The first ground device among two non-adjacent ground devices randomly selects a set number of keys from the initial quantum keys provided by its corresponding quantum key distribution device as the session keys between the two non-adjacent ground devices, and transmits them to the second ground device among the two non-adjacent ground devices via other ground devices between the two non-adjacent ground devices as relays.

[0118] Optionally, the in-vehicle device session key generation module 22 includes:

[0119] A vehicle-mounted device session key generation unit is used to limit the vehicle-mounted device to generate session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or various ground devices based on the initial quantum key, including:

[0120] One device is selected from all ground devices that have never communicated directly with the current vehicle device or other vehicle devices other than the current vehicle device as the key construction target device. The ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle device randomly selects a set number of keys from the initial quantum keys provided by its corresponding quantum key distribution device as the target session key between the current vehicle device and the key construction target device. The ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle device transmits the target session key to the current vehicle device, and at the same time transmits the target session key directly or via the ground device that is connected to the key construction target device as a relay to the key construction target device.

[0121] The session key between the current vehicle-mounted device and the ground device that communicates directly with it is generated by a quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle-mounted device. The generated session key is encrypted using an initial quantum key stored in the ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle-mounted device and then transmitted to the current vehicle-mounted device through the ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle-mounted device.

[0122] Optionally, the data transmission and session key regeneration module 23 includes:

[0123] The data transmission unit, configured to define the session key between any two devices and complete the data transmission between them, includes:

[0124] The two devices perform bidirectional authentication based on the railway signal security communication protocol and the device authentication key in the session key between the two devices. After successful authentication, the data sender in the two devices responds to the data requester in the two devices for the required data and sends the required data to the data requester.

[0125] Optionally, the data transmission unit includes:

[0126] The railway signal safety communication protocol data packet content limiting subunit is used to limit the data packet content of the railway signal safety communication protocol to include: header content, security field content, payload content, and integrity verification content;

[0127] The payload content is encrypted using the encryption key, and the integrity verification content uses the message authentication key to calculate the message authentication code for the header content, security field content, and payload content.

[0128] Optionally, the above-mentioned device further includes:

[0129] The communication method limitation module is used to limit the communication between the ground devices and between the ground devices and the quantum key distribution device to wired network communication, the communication between the vehicle-mounted devices and the ground devices to wireless mobile communication, and the communication between the quantum key distribution devices to be based on the quantum key distribution protocol.

[0130] It should be noted that the information interaction and execution process between the above modules are based on the same concept as the method embodiments of the present invention. For details on their specific functions and technical effects, please refer to the method embodiments section, which will not be repeated here.

[0131] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in Embodiment 3 of the present invention. Figure 8As shown, the computer device of this embodiment includes: at least one processor ( Figure 8 The diagram shows only one of the following: a memory and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on at least one processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps described in the above embodiments of the train control method based on quantum key distribution.

[0132] This computer device may include, but is not limited to, a processor and memory. Those skilled in the art will understand that... Figure 8 The examples of computer devices are merely examples and do not constitute a limitation on computer devices. Computer devices may include more or fewer components than shown, or combinations of certain components, or different components.

[0133] The processor referred to can be a CPU, but it can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0134] Memory includes readable storage media, internal memory, etc., wherein internal memory can be the RAM of a computer device, providing an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer-readable instructions stored in the readable storage media. The readable storage media can be the hard drive of a computer device, or in other embodiments, it can be an external storage device of the computer device, such as a plug-in hard drive, Smart Media Card (SMC), Secure Digital (SD) card, or Flash Card. Furthermore, memory can include both internal storage units and external storage devices of the computer device. Memory is used to store the operating system, applications, bootloader, data, and other programs, such as program code for computer programs. Memory can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.

[0135] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the above-described division of functional units and modules is used as an example. In practical applications, the functions described above can be assigned to different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The functional units and modules in the embodiments can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. Furthermore, the specific names of the functional units and modules are only for easy differentiation and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this invention. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above device can be referred to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here. If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present invention can implement all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments by instructing related hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the above method embodiments. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. A computer-readable medium can include at least: any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code, a recording medium, a computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electrical carrier signals, telecommunication signals, and software distribution media. Examples include USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks. In some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media cannot be electrical carrier signals or telecommunication signals.

[0136] The present invention can implement all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments, or it can be accomplished by a computer program product. When the computer program product is run on a computer device, the computer device executes the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0137] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0138] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this invention.

[0139] In the embodiments provided by this invention, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus / computer devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus / computer device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0140] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0141] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should all be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A train control method based on quantum key distribution, characterized in that, The method includes: Configure a corresponding quantum key distribution device for each ground device in the train control system, and generate a session key for any two ground devices based on the quantum key distribution device; The vehicle-mounted device obtains and stores an initial quantum key through a quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device it communicates with. The vehicle-mounted device then generates session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or each of the ground devices based on the initial quantum key. Based on the session key between any two devices, data transmission between the two devices is completed, and after the data transmission is completed, the session key between the two devices is discarded, and a new session key between the two devices is generated.

2. The train control method based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1, characterized in that, The session key includes a device authentication key, an encryption key, and a message authentication key.

3. The train control method based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The step of generating a session key for any two of the ground devices includes: Two quantum key distribution devices corresponding to two adjacent ground devices use quantum key distribution technology to generate a session key between the two adjacent ground devices and transmit it to the two adjacent ground devices; The first ground device among two non-adjacent ground devices randomly selects a set number of keys from the initial quantum keys provided by its corresponding quantum key distribution device as the session keys between the two non-adjacent ground devices, and transmits them to the second ground device among the two non-adjacent ground devices via other ground devices between the two non-adjacent ground devices as relays.

4. The train control method based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The vehicle-mounted device generates session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or various ground devices based on the initial quantum key, including: One device is selected from all ground devices that have never communicated directly with the current vehicle device or other vehicle devices other than the current vehicle device as the key construction target device. The ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle device randomly selects a set number of keys from the initial quantum keys provided by its corresponding quantum key distribution device as the target session key between the current vehicle device and the key construction target device. The ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle device transmits the target session key to the current vehicle device, and at the same time transmits the target session key directly or via the ground device that is connected to the key construction target device as a relay to the key construction target device. The session key between the current vehicle-mounted device and the ground device that communicates directly with it is generated by a quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle-mounted device. The generated session key is encrypted using an initial quantum key stored in the ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle-mounted device and then transmitted to the current vehicle-mounted device through the ground device that communicates directly with the current vehicle-mounted device.

5. The train control method based on quantum key distribution according to claim 2, characterized in that, The process of completing data transmission between any two devices based on a session key includes: The two devices perform bidirectional authentication based on the railway signal security communication protocol and the device authentication key in the session key between the two devices. After successful authentication, the data sender in the two devices responds to the data requester in the two devices for the required data and sends the required data to the data requester.

6. The train control method based on quantum key distribution according to claim 5, characterized in that, The data packet content of the railway signal safety communication protocol includes: header content, security field content, payload content, and integrity verification content; The payload content is encrypted using the encryption key, and the integrity verification content uses the message authentication key to calculate the message authentication code for the header content, security field content, and payload content.

7. The train control method based on quantum key distribution according to claim 1, characterized in that, The ground devices communicate with each other and with the quantum key distribution device via wired networks, the vehicle-mounted devices communicate with the ground devices via wireless mobile communication, and the quantum key distribution devices communicate with each other based on a quantum key distribution protocol.

8. A train control device based on quantum key distribution, characterized in that, The device includes: The ground equipment session key generation module is used to configure a corresponding quantum key distribution device for each ground device in the train control system, and generate a session key for any two ground devices based on the quantum key distribution device. The vehicle-mounted device session key generation module is used to enable the vehicle-mounted device to obtain and store an initial quantum key through a quantum key distribution device corresponding to the ground device with which it communicates, and the vehicle-mounted device completes the generation of session keys with other vehicle-mounted devices or each of the ground devices based on the initial quantum key; The data transmission and session key regeneration module is used to complete the data transmission between any two devices based on the session key between the two devices, and discard the session key between the two devices after the data transmission is completed, and regenerate the session key between the two devices.

9. A computer device, characterized in that, The computer device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the train control method based on quantum key distribution as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the train control method based on quantum key distribution as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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