Load side carbon trading method based on two-way bidding auction

Abstract

The invention discloses a load side carbon trading method based on two-way bidding auction. The load side carbon trading method comprises the following steps: 1) two carbon quota trading parties submit respective trading prices and trading volumes respectively; 2) drawing a supply-demand curve according to transaction information submitted by the buyer and the seller, screening transaction objects in the round, and enabling other objects to enter a candidate transaction set; 3) determining an optimal balanced price and respective trading volumes of the buyer and the seller by taking the maximum carbon market income as a target; (4) all the transaction objects in the round complete market clearing of the transaction in the round at the optimal balanced price; after clearing, entering a candidate transaction set with residual carbon quota transaction volume; if the remaining transaction volume of any one of the buyer or the seller in the candidate transaction set is zero, ending auction; otherwise, the users who do not complete the transaction participate in the next round of transaction according to the respective residual carbon quotas. The method can greatly improve the transaction efficiency and fairness of the load-side carbon market, and improves the carbon emission reduction effect of the load-side user while achieving the maximum income of the carbon market.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to carbon trading, specifically to a load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction. This method can improve the fairness and efficiency of load-side carbon trading and belongs to the field of load-side carbon trading in power systems. Background Technology

[0002] As load-side resources become increasingly important in energy systems, tapping their carbon reduction potential has become a key issue in energy management and policymaking. While existing load-side demand response methods based on carbon taxes can effectively mobilize load-side resources, penalties for excessive carbon emissions increase the economic burden on users, weakening their participation and hindering the promotion of carbon policies. In the demand response process, users "produce" carbon allowances by adjusting their energy consumption strategies, allowing them to be defined as producers and consumers in a producer-consumer model. Compared to traditional methods of levying carbon penalties on the load side, incorporating carbon emission allowances into a trading market, establishing a carbon market, allows users to obtain economic benefits from carbon allowance trading. This approach not only highlights the value of carbon allowances but also effectively solves the problem of the difficulty in large-scale implementation of traditional carbon penalty mechanisms.

[0003] Currently, scholars both domestically and internationally have proposed various trading mechanisms for load-side carbon trading, including fixed prices, supply and demand functions, and competitive auctions. Although these studies have initially established a load-side carbon market, there are still shortcomings in the mechanism design. For example, fixed carbon prices fail to reflect the changing supply and demand relationships in the carbon market, while competitive auctions are prone to collusion, leading to an imbalance between buyers and sellers and potentially even a monopoly, thus hindering the healthy operation of the carbon quota market.

[0004] Compared to traditional trading models, the two-way competitive auction mechanism allows multiple buyers and sellers to submit bids simultaneously in each round of trading, with market regulators determining the successful bidder and the transaction price based on these bids. This model not only significantly improves transaction efficiency but also effectively overcomes the imbalance of power and monopoly issues between buyers and sellers caused by collusion in traditional competitive auctions, thereby enhancing market fairness and competition.

[0005] However, despite the significant achievements of two-way auction mechanisms in other fields, research on two-way auction algorithms for the load-side carbon trading market is still relatively scarce at present. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the aforementioned shortcomings of existing technologies, the present invention aims to propose a load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction. This method can significantly improve the efficiency and fairness of load-side carbon market trading, and effectively enhance the carbon emission reduction effect of load-side users while maximizing carbon market benefits.

[0007] The technical solution of this invention is implemented as follows:

[0008] A load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction, comprising the following steps:

[0009] 1) In carbon quota trading, both buyers and sellers submit their respective trading prices and trading volumes. and α and β are the sets of buyers and sellers, respectively;

[0010] 2) Sort the buyers and sellers, with buyers arranged in descending order of bid price and sellers arranged in ascending order of bid price; at the same time, draw the supply and demand curves of the buyers and sellers on the coordinate system based on the transaction volume and transaction price submitted by the buyers and sellers, and screen the transaction objects based on the supply and demand curves; the screened transaction objects enter the current round of transactions, and the remaining objects enter the waiting set of transaction objects to wait for the next round of transactions;

[0011] 3) Based on the supply and demand situation of both buyers and sellers, determine the optimal equilibrium price P0 and the respective trading volume of both buyers and sellers with the goal of maximizing carbon market revenue;

[0012] 4) All trading parties in this round complete the market clearing of this round of trading with the optimal equilibrium price P0 determined in step 3) and the determined trading volume; after clearing, buyers or sellers with remaining carbon quota trading volume enter the waiting list for trading to participate in the next round of trading;

[0013] 5) Verify the candidate trading set; if the remaining trading volume of either the buyer or the seller in the candidate trading set is zero, the two-way bidding auction process ends; otherwise, users who have not completed the transaction shall participate in the next round of trading according to their respective remaining carbon quotas, following steps 1)-4).

[0014] Further, in step 2), the supply and demand curves for both buyers and sellers are plotted, and trading partners are selected based on these curves. Specifically,

[0015] A. Draw the supply and demand curves for buyers and sellers; draw the supply and demand curves for buyers and sellers on the coordinate system as follows: where the horizontal axis is the trading volume and the vertical axis is the trading price;

[0016] Buyers plot each buyer's transaction information from left to right according to the descending order of bids. Each buyer's transaction information corresponds to a horizontal line on the coordinate system. The length of the horizontal line corresponds to the transaction volume. The left endpoint of the leftmost horizontal line has an x-coordinate of zero. The x-coordinates of any two adjacent horizontal lines are connected end to end, meaning that the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of any buyer's horizontal line is the same as the x-coordinate of the left endpoint of the adjacent right horizontal line. The ends of adjacent horizontal lines with the same x-coordinate are connected by a vertical line. This yields the buyer demand curve.

[0017] Sellers plot their transaction information from left to right according to the ascending order of bids. Each seller's transaction corresponds to a horizontal line on the coordinate system, and the length of the horizontal line corresponds to the transaction volume. The left endpoint of the leftmost horizontal line has an x-coordinate of zero. The x-coordinates of any two adjacent horizontal lines are connected end to end, meaning that the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of any seller's horizontal line is the same as the x-coordinate of the left endpoint of the adjacent right horizontal line. The ends of adjacent horizontal lines with the same x-coordinate are connected by a vertical line. This yields the seller's supply curve.

[0018] B. Screening trading partners; the buyer's demand curve and the seller's supply curve intersect at point X; then the buyer and seller to the left of point X are the screened trading partners.

[0019] Furthermore, the optimal equilibrium price P0 and the respective transaction volumes of the buyer and seller are determined as follows:

[0020] The optimization equations and constraints with the objective of maximizing carbon market revenue are established as shown in equations (1)-(6).

[0021]

[0022] In the formula, and These represent the carbon allowance trading volumes for both the buyer and seller in the vth round of trading;

[0023] Solving the above optimization equations determines the optimal equilibrium price P0 for this round of transactions and the respective transaction volumes of the buyers and sellers.

[0024] Furthermore, in step 1), the transaction price and transaction volume for both buyers and sellers in the carbon quota trading are determined according to the following formula:

[0025]

[0026] In the formula, These are the prices quoted by producers and sellers in the carbon market, among which This indicates the selling price quoted by producers and sellers, and vice versa for buying. The volume of carbon allowances traded by producers and sellers in the carbon market; It is the marginal carbon emission reduction cost for users, which represents the cost required for producers and consumers to increase or decrease carbon emissions per unit. It is related to the excess carbon emission penalty price and its own utility function. Adjustments to carbon emissions for producers and consumers;

[0027] The constraints are as follows:

[0028]

[0029] In the formula, Carbon emissions for producers and consumers; The limit is set for producers and sellers to trade carbon allowances. When selling, the limit is set on the total amount of carbon allowances remaining for the user in this round of trading. When purchasing, the limit is set on the total amount of excess carbon emissions. The upper limit for users' carbon emissions; and p c represents the upper and lower limits of the price quoted by producers and sellers, respectively. and These are the upper and lower limits for adjusting users' carbon emissions, respectively. Carbon allowances refer to the carbon allowances. The carbon allowances minus carbon emissions equal the upper limit of carbon allowances for producers and consumers to trade.

[0030] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0031] 1. This invention determines the optimal equilibrium price for each round of trading with the goal of maximizing carbon market revenue. At the same time, each trading party adjusts its bidding strategy to maximize its own economic benefits. Therefore, while maximizing carbon market revenue, it can effectively improve the carbon emission reduction effect of load-side users, as well as improve the trading efficiency and fairness of the carbon market.

[0032] 2. This method is not limited to one trading partner per round. Multiple trading partners can complete the transaction in one round, depending on the supply and demand curves drawn from the bids of the buyers and sellers. Therefore, it can greatly improve the trading efficiency.

[0033] 3. For both buyers and sellers, the actual transaction price in each round of the present invention is better than their own bid, thus actively encouraging both parties to participate in the auction activities proposed by the present invention, which further facilitates the rapid conclusion of carbon trading.

[0034] 4. In the two-way competitive auction process of this invention, carbon trading users only need to report their own trading price and trading volume, thus protecting users' privacy information such as energy consumption behavior. Attached Figure Description

[0035] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the two-way competitive auction process of the present invention.

[0036] Figure 2 This is a supply and demand curve diagram for the two-way competitive auction of this invention.

[0037] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the load-side P2P carbon market solution algorithm of the present invention.

[0038] Figure 4 This is a chart comparing the carbon emissions of various users under different carbon trading methods.

[0039] Figure 5 A chart comparing the carbon emission costs of DSEAs under different carbon trading methods. Detailed Implementation

[0040] In economics, the term "producer-seller" describes market entities that both produce and sell carbon allowances. In the load-side carbon market, users can both "produce" carbon allowances through low-carbon demand response and trade these allowances in the market to obtain additional revenue, thus playing a dual role as producers and sellers. Based on this, this invention establishes a load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auctions, in which carbon deficit users can purchase carbon allowances from carbon surplus users, thereby transferring carbon emission responsibility and reducing carbon emission costs. Simultaneously, carbon surplus users, in order to obtain more revenue, will optimize their low-carbon demand response strategies, further tapping the carbon emission reduction potential on the load side.

[0041] In the carbon trading market, the trading price of carbon allowances influences supply and demand, and is crucial for ensuring the rational allocation of carbon emission costs. However, under the traditional competitive auction mechanism, due to the unequal market positions of buyers and sellers and limited market supervision, unfair trading behaviors such as collusion to inflate or suppress prices often occur, severely weakening the operational efficiency and profitability of the carbon market. Therefore, this invention proposes a two-way competitive auction strategy to determine the transaction price of carbon allowances in the load-side carbon market. Under this strategy, both buyers and sellers submit bids simultaneously, and the trading partners are determined by plotting supply and demand curves, with the transaction price set with the goal of maximizing carbon market profitability. Compared to traditional competitive auctions, two-way competitive auctions can prevent collusion between buyers and sellers and price manipulation by monopolistic users, ensuring fairness and transparency, while incentivizing users to participate in the market and optimize carbon allowance allocation, maximizing market benefits. The trading process based on two-way competitive auctions is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the detailed process is described below:

[0042] In this embodiment, the carbon trading center acts as the operator in the carbon trading market, responsible for collecting transaction information (including transaction prices and volumes) from both buyers and sellers, and for clearing the carbon market. The specific transaction process in the v-th round of trading is as follows:

[0043] Step 1: Carbon quota trading users, both buyers and sellers, submit their respective trading prices and trading volumes. and α and β represent the buyer and seller sets, respectively. The carbon trading center collects information and stores it as separate sets. and

[0044] Step 2: The carbon trading center sorts the buyers and sellers. Specifically, buyers are sorted in descending order of their bids, while sellers are sorted in ascending order of their bids. At the same time, the center plots supply and demand curves on a coordinate system based on the trading volume and price submitted by both parties and selects trading targets based on these curves. The selected trading targets enter the current round of trading, while the remaining targets enter the waiting list for the next round of trading.

[0045] The supply and demand curves for buyers and sellers are plotted on a coordinate system as follows: the horizontal axis represents trading volume, and the vertical axis represents trading price; see also [reference needed]. Figure 2 .

[0046] Buyers plot each buyer's transaction information from left to right according to the descending order of bids. Each buyer's transaction information corresponds to a horizontal line on the coordinate system. The length of the horizontal line corresponds to the transaction volume. The left endpoint of the leftmost horizontal line has an x-coordinate of zero. The x-coordinates of any two adjacent horizontal lines are connected end to end, meaning that the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of any buyer's horizontal line is the same as the x-coordinate of the left endpoint of the adjacent right horizontal line. The ends of adjacent horizontal lines with the same x-coordinate are connected by a vertical line. This yields the buyer demand curve.

[0047] Similarly, sellers plot each seller's transaction information from left to right according to the ascending order of bids. Each seller's transaction information corresponds to a horizontal line on the coordinate system, and the length of the horizontal line corresponds to the transaction volume. The left endpoint of the leftmost horizontal line has an x-coordinate of zero. The x-coordinates of any two adjacent horizontal lines are connected end to end, meaning that the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of any seller's horizontal line is the same as the x-coordinate of the left endpoint of the adjacent right horizontal line. The ends of adjacent horizontal lines with the same x-coordinate are connected by a vertical line. This yields the seller's supply curve.

[0048] The buyer's demand curve and the seller's supply curve intersect at point X; then the buyers and sellers to the left of point X are the selected trading partners; the total trading volume in this round is the trading volume represented by the horizontal axis corresponding to point X, and the trading volume of each buyer and seller is the trading volume corresponding to the horizontal axis of their respective horizontal lines to the left of point X.

[0049] Generally, the supply and demand curves drawn based on the sorting results are as follows: Figure 2 The two scenarios shown, where the intersection point lies on the horizontal line corresponding to the buyer (Scenario 1) and the intersection point lies on the horizontal line corresponding to the seller (Scenario 2), can be expressed by the following formula: and when and In this round of auction, the first n or n-1 buyers and m sellers participating in the transaction enter this round of transaction, while the remaining parties enter the waiting list to wait for the next round of transaction.

[0050] exist Figure 2 In scenario 1, all selected sellers are able to fully complete their trading volume, as are the top three selected buyers. The fourth buyer with the highest bid can only trade a portion of the carbon allowances (the trading volume corresponding to the horizontal line length of the buyer to the left of the intersection point), while the remaining carbon allowances (the trading volume corresponding to the horizontal line length of the buyer to the right of the intersection point) are reserved for the next round of trading.

[0051] exist Figure 2 In scenario 2, all selected buyers are able to fully complete their trading volume, as are the top three selected sellers. The fourth seller with the lowest bid can only trade a portion of the carbon allowance (the trading volume corresponding to the horizontal line length of the seller to the left of the intersection point), while the remaining carbon allowance (the trading volume corresponding to the horizontal line length of the seller to the right of the intersection point) is reserved for the next round of trading.

[0052] This strategy of selecting trading partners encourages participants who did not enter the current round of trading to improve their bidding strategies in the next round. For buyers, this typically requires raising their bids, while for sellers, it typically requires lowering their bids to position themselves to the left of the intersection of the supply and demand curves.

[0053] Step 3: The carbon trading center determines the optimal equilibrium price P0 based on the supply and demand situation of both buyers and sellers.

[0054] To determine the optimal equilibrium price P0, an optimization strategy is established with the goal of maximizing the benefits of the carbon market, as shown in the following formula.

[0055]

[0056] In the formula, and These represent the carbon allowance trading volumes for both the buyer and seller in round v.

[0057] By using the above optimization strategy, the optimal equilibrium price P0 and the trading volume of both buyers and sellers in this round of transactions can be determined. The trading volume of both buyers and sellers determined by formulas (1)-(6) is exactly the same as the trading volume determined by the supply and demand curves of both buyers and sellers.

[0058] Step 4: All trading parties in this round complete the market clearing process using the optimal equilibrium price P0 and the determined trading volumes of both buyers and sellers. After clearing, any remaining carbon allowance trading volumes will be added to the waiting list for the next round of trading.

[0059] Step 5: The carbon trading center verifies the waiting list. If the remaining trading volume for either the buyer or seller in the waiting list is zero, the two-way auction process ends. Otherwise, users who have not completed their transactions will readjust their trading strategies according to steps 1-4 based on their remaining carbon allowances and continue to participate in the next round of trading.

[0060] During the aforementioned two-way competitive auction process, carbon trading users only need to report their own trading price and trading volume, thus protecting users' privacy information such as energy consumption behavior.

[0061] In a P2P carbon market, users act as independent producers and sellers, requiring them to dynamically adjust their pricing strategies to maximize economic gains in a volatile market environment. In this market, producers and sellers adjust their energy consumption patterns through low-carbon demand response behavior, "producing" carbon allowances, which they then sell in the carbon market to generate economic benefits. However, due to differences in carbon emission intensity, emission reduction potential, and energy consumption patterns, their pricing strategies vary significantly. For example, users with high carbon emission potential may be more inclined to proactively reduce emissions to gain economic benefits, while low-carbon emission potential users rely more on purchasing cheap carbon allowances to meet their needs. Ignoring the differences in carbon emission characteristics between producers and sellers makes it impossible to accurately model their market decisions, thus failing to accurately depict the supply and demand relationship in the market. This leads to discrepancies between the theoretical models of the P2P carbon market and actual performance, failing to provide effective reference for practical applications.

[0062] Based on the above analysis, this invention constructs a P2P carbon market producer-consumer trading pricing strategy tailored to the carbon emission characteristics of producers and consumers. This strategy characterizes the decision-making behavior of carbon market producers and consumers by simulating their trading prices and volumes.

[0063] The objective function for this strategy is as follows:

[0064]

[0065] In the formula, These are the prices quoted by producers and sellers in the carbon market, among which This indicates the selling price quoted by producers and sellers, and vice versa for buying. The volume of carbon allowances traded by producers and sellers in the carbon market; It is the marginal carbon emission reduction cost for users, which represents the cost required for producers and consumers to increase or decrease carbon emissions per unit. It is related to the excess carbon emission penalty price and its own utility function. Adjustments for carbon emissions by producers and consumers.

[0066] Equation (7) characterizes the returns of users with different carbon emission characteristics in the carbon market, where Revenue from the sale of carbon allowances to producers and distributors; The costs required to adjust carbon emissions for producers and consumers.

[0067] The constraints are as follows:

[0068]

[0069] In the formula, Carbon emissions for producers and consumers; The limit is set for producers and sellers to trade carbon allowances. When selling, the limit is set on the total amount of carbon allowances remaining for the user in this round of trading. When purchasing, the limit is set on the total amount of excess carbon emissions. The upper limit for users' carbon emissions; and p c represents the upper and lower limits of the bids from producers and sellers (usually determined by the carbon trading center based on historical trading data and other factors); and These are the upper and lower limits for adjusting users' carbon emissions, respectively.

[0070] By solving formulas (7)-(13) simultaneously, the transaction price and transaction volume that the trading party intends to submit in step 1 can be determined. In this way, submitting transaction information can maximize the economic benefits of the trading party.

[0071] P2P carbon market clearing strategy

[0072] After obtaining users' carbon emissions and carbon allowance balances from the carbon trading center, carbon market clearing can proceed. Detailed procedures are as follows: Figure 3 As shown. First, the carbon trading center sets the upper and lower limits of the market clearing price based on the supply and demand of carbon quota resources, and sets an initial price (which is the initial value for iteration, but will be replaced by the equilibrium price in the first round of trading). Then, users will adjust their trading strategies based on the trading quotation strategies shown in (7)-(13), and then the carbon market trading center will adjust its trading strategies based on the market clearing price. Figure 1 The two-way bidding auction process determines the trading object for this round and determines the optimal clearing price based on optimization problems (1)-(6) until the transaction ends.

[0073] This invention uses load-side carbon emissions and remaining carbon allowances as input during power system dispatching. To fully evaluate the effectiveness of this method, the following four strategies are set as comparative examples.

[0074] Strategy 1: Conduct low-carbon scheduling only at the source side;

[0075] Strategy 2: Based on Strategy 1, implement low-carbon demand response only on the load side;

[0076] Strategy 3: Building upon Strategy 2, conduct carbon trading on the load side based on traditional competitive auctions;

[0077] Strategy 4: Based on Strategy 2, conduct carbon trading on the load side based on two-way competitive auction (this method);

[0078] By comparing strategies 1, 2, and 4, we can verify the effectiveness of carbon trading strategies based on two-way competitive auctions in carbon emission reduction; by comparing strategies 3 and 4, we can verify the improvement of two-way competitive auction strategies in terms of trading efficiency and fairness.

[0079] (1) Analysis of the carbon emission reduction effect of carbon policies on different load sides

[0080] Table 1 illustrates the carbon emissions and economic benefits on both the source and load sides of the system under different carbon trading strategies. Firstly, Strategy 1 only implements low-carbon dispatch on the source side, ignoring the carbon reduction potential on the load side, resulting in the highest carbon emissions. Strategies 2 and 4 adopt different carbon reduction policies on the load side, reducing carbon emissions by 9.06% and 19.92% respectively compared to Strategy 1. It can be seen that Strategy 2 only implements low-carbon demand response on the load side, but lacks effective incentives. Therefore, although carbon emissions decrease, load-side costs increase significantly, making it difficult to effectively motivate load-side users to reduce carbon emissions. Strategy 4 establishes a carbon market on the load side, increasing user participation in low-carbon demand response and effectively reducing carbon costs and emissions for load-side users.

[0081] Table 1 Comparison of carbon emission reduction results of different methods

[0082]

[0083] (2) Comparison of carbon emissions among users

[0084] Figure 4 The carbon emission results for each user are presented. In Strategy 2, a low-carbon demand response is implemented on the load side, resulting in a decrease in carbon emissions for all DSEAs. However, due to the lack of a clear incentive, the low-carbon demand response in Strategy 2 failed to fully motivate users to reduce emissions, leading to a relatively limited reduction in carbon emissions. In contrast, in Strategy 4, User 3 exhibits lower carbon emissions. This is because User 3, in order to release more tradable carbon allowances, enhance its competitiveness in the carbon market, and thus increase its returns, will implement more effective emission reduction measures. This demonstrates that the load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction proposed in this invention can effectively incentivize users to achieve differentiated emission reduction behaviors and promote low-carbon operation of the system.

[0085] (3) Comparison of carbon costs for each user

[0086] Figure 5 The diagram illustrates the carbon costs for various users under different carbon trading methods. Strategy 1 ignores the carbon reduction potential on the load side and does not impose constraints on load-side carbon behavior, resulting in zero carbon costs for load-side users. In Strategy 2, although the load side implements low-carbon demand response to reduce carbon emissions, the lack of external incentives forces users to bear the economic burden of carbon reduction alone, leading to a significant increase in overall carbon costs. This reliance on internal user adjustments not only increases the economic burden on users but also fails to fully motivate them. Conversely, in Strategy 4, the existence of a carbon market allows users to profit from low-carbon behavior, significantly reducing carbon costs and increasing user participation in carbon policies.

[0087] (4) Comparison of transaction efficiency

[0088] To compare the computational performance and trading results of different strategies, 1000 sets of carbon quota trading data were generated using random numbers as a test set. Simulated trading was conducted using the methods in Strategy 3 and Strategy 4 respectively. The test results are shown in Table 2.

[0089] Table 2 Calculation Results of Different Strategies

[0090]

[0091] ① Performance comparison of different strategies

[0092] Regarding efficiency, Strategy 3, using the traditional auction theory, only allows one party to submit a bid in each round, while the other party passively accepts based on demand or price range, severely impacting transaction efficiency. Strategy 4, employing the two-way auction strategy proposed in this invention, allows both buyers and sellers to participate in bidding simultaneously, thereby more effectively matching supply and demand and achieving efficient allocation of carbon quota resources.

[0093] Regarding the average solution time, Strategy 3 uses traditional auction theory, which has low transaction efficiency and a high average number of iterations, thus increasing the solution time. Strategy 4 uses two-way auction theory, which significantly reduces the number of iterations while effectively reducing the solution time.

[0094] ② Comparison of carbon market benefits under different strategies

[0095] In terms of strategy effectiveness, Strategy 3 results in lower average returns in the carbon market. In Strategy 3, the traditional auction format, where only one party participates in bidding, easily leads to an imbalance of power between buyers and sellers, creating a monopoly and thus limiting the maximization of market returns. Strategy 4, employing a two-way auction format, where the transaction price is jointly determined by both parties, effectively prevents monopolistic behavior.

[0096] In summary, the two-way competitive auction carbon market trading method proposed in this invention can maximize market returns while ensuring trading efficiency.

[0097] Finally, it should be noted that the specific examples mentioned above are only for explaining the present invention and do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of the present invention. Although the present invention has selected preferred examples and described them accordingly, those skilled in the art can make other forms of adjustments and improvements based on the above explanations. It is impossible to list all possible embodiments here. Any adjustments and improvements that fall directly or indirectly within the scope of the technical solutions of the present invention can be considered within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction, characterized in that: The steps are as follows: 1) In carbon quota trading, both buyers and sellers submit their respective trading prices and trading volumes. and α and β are the sets of buyers and sellers, respectively; 2) Sort the buyers and sellers, with buyers arranged in descending order of bid price and sellers arranged in ascending order of bid price; at the same time, draw the supply and demand curves of the buyers and sellers on the coordinate system based on the transaction volume and transaction price submitted by the buyers and sellers, and screen the transaction objects based on the supply and demand curves; the screened transaction objects enter the current round of transactions, and the remaining objects enter the waiting set of transaction objects to wait for the next round of transactions; 3) Based on the supply and demand situation of both buyers and sellers, determine the optimal equilibrium price P0 and the respective trading volume of both buyers and sellers with the goal of maximizing carbon market revenue; 4) All trading parties in this round complete the market clearing of this round of trading with the optimal equilibrium price P0 determined in step 3) and the determined trading volume; after clearing, buyers or sellers with remaining carbon quota trading volume enter the waiting list for trading to participate in the next round of trading; 5) Verify the candidate trading set; if the remaining trading volume of either the buyer or the seller in the candidate trading set is zero, the two-way bidding auction process ends; otherwise, users who have not completed the transaction shall participate in the next round of trading according to their respective remaining carbon quotas, following steps 1)-4).

2. The load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 2), supply and demand curves for both buyers and sellers are plotted, and trading partners are selected based on these curves. Specifically, A. Draw the supply and demand curves for buyers and sellers; draw the supply and demand curves for buyers and sellers on the coordinate system as follows: where the horizontal axis is the trading volume and the vertical axis is the trading price; Buyers plot each buyer's transaction information from left to right according to the descending order of bids. Each buyer's transaction information corresponds to a horizontal line on the coordinate system. The length of the horizontal line corresponds to the transaction volume. The left endpoint of the leftmost horizontal line has an x-coordinate of zero. The x-coordinates of any two adjacent horizontal lines are connected end to end, meaning that the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of any buyer's horizontal line is the same as the x-coordinate of the left endpoint of the adjacent right horizontal line. The ends of adjacent horizontal lines with the same x-coordinate are connected by a vertical line. This yields the buyer demand curve. Sellers plot their transaction information from left to right according to the ascending order of bids. Each seller's transaction corresponds to a horizontal line on the coordinate system, and the length of the horizontal line corresponds to the transaction volume. The left endpoint of the leftmost horizontal line has an x-coordinate of zero. The x-coordinates of any two adjacent horizontal lines are connected end to end, meaning that the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of any seller's horizontal line is the same as the x-coordinate of the left endpoint of the adjacent right horizontal line. The ends of adjacent horizontal lines with the same x-coordinate are connected by a vertical line. This yields the seller's supply curve. B. Screening trading partners; the buyer's demand curve and the seller's supply curve intersect at point X; then the buyer and seller to the left of point X are the screened trading partners.

3. The load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction according to claim 1, characterized in that: The optimal equilibrium price P0 and the respective trading volumes of the buyers and sellers are determined as follows: The optimization equations and constraints with the objective of maximizing carbon market revenue are established as shown in equations (1)-(6). In the formula, and These represent the carbon allowance trading volumes for both the buyer and seller in the vth round of trading; Solving the above optimization equations determines the optimal equilibrium price P0 for this round of transactions and the respective transaction volumes of the buyers and sellers.

4. The load-side carbon trading method based on two-way competitive auction according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 1), the transaction price and transaction volume for both buyers and sellers in the carbon quota trading are determined according to the following formula: In the formula, These are the prices quoted by producers and sellers in the carbon market, among which This indicates the selling price quoted by producers and sellers, and vice versa for buying. The volume of carbon allowances traded by producers and sellers in the carbon market; It is the marginal carbon emission reduction cost for users, which represents the cost required for producers and consumers to increase or decrease carbon emissions per unit. It is related to the excess carbon emission penalty price and its own utility function. Adjustments to carbon emissions for producers and consumers; The constraints are as follows: In the formula, Carbon emissions for producers and consumers; The limit is set for producers and sellers to trade carbon allowances. When selling, the limit is set on the total amount of carbon allowances remaining for the user in this round of trading. When purchasing, the limit is set on the total amount of excess carbon emissions. The upper limit for users' carbon emissions; and p c These are the upper and lower limits of the prices quoted by producers and sellers, respectively. and These are the upper and lower limits for adjusting users' carbon emissions, respectively. Carbon allowances refer to the carbon allowances. The carbon allowances minus carbon emissions equal the upper limit of carbon allowances for producers and consumers to trade.

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