Information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties

Abstract

The present application provides an information anti-forgery storage system based on microfluidic optical characteristics, and relates to the technical field of information security protection, wherein nanoparticles self-assembled to form photonic crystals are arranged in a microfluidic channel network to store original information; the fluorescence lifetime value of an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye is detected; a dynamic correlation model is constituted; high sensitivity and early warning of physical tampering behavior are realized; the fluorescence lifetime value which is extremely sensitive to microenvironment changes is used as an auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value response detection; a multimodal correlation response is performed in combination with the reflection spectrum peak wavelength of the photonic crystal; any physical intrusion must first disturb the microenvironment, causing the fluorescence lifetime to first abnormally drift, and then the photonic crystal structure is damaged, causing the reflection wavelength to change; through real-time monitoring, the intrusion intention can be determined extremely early before the information is actually tampered with; passive protection is changed to active early warning; and the security and dynamic response capability of information storage are increased.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security protection technology, specifically to an information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of information technology, the security requirements for storing sensitive data, such as financial and biometric information, are increasing. Existing information storage technologies, such as hard drives and flash memory, store data in a state of charge or magnetic domains, making them susceptible to tampering by electromagnetic interference, physical probe attacks, and other means, and lacking the ability to proactively detect and respond to physical intrusions. Although some physically unclonable function technologies utilize process variations to generate unique fingerprints, enhancing anti-cloning capabilities, they are generally unable to perform real-time, sensitive detection and graded resistance to tampering itself. Existing technologies generally present a contradiction: the self-destruct mechanism for permanently destroying data is too extreme, causing irreversible data loss once triggered, while there is a lack of intelligent proactive defense mechanisms that can preemptively implement reversible interference upon detecting potential threats, thereby achieving a balance between protecting data integrity and maintaining data availability.

[0003] The existing technology has the following technical problems when used:

[0004] When faced with physical tampering or intrusion, the response speed is not sensitive enough, and there is a lack of early detection and identification, resulting in insufficient information storage security protection and response capabilities.

[0005] Directly implementing destructive self-destruct mechanisms to address detected potential threats can easily lead to data loss, make it impossible to provide tiered responses to intrusions, and result in the loss of existing data after self-destruction. This fails to achieve a balance between data integrity and availability and does not meet the needs of intelligent security response. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: an information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties, the system comprising:

[0007] A dynamic information carrier module for writing and storing raw information includes a microfluidic chip, wherein the microfluidic chip is provided with a microfluidic channel network, the microfluidic channel network is filled with a nanoparticle suspension and an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye, and the nanoparticles in the nanoparticle suspension are used to form a photonic crystal.

[0008] A multimodal optical detection module is used to detect the optical characteristics of a dynamic information carrier module. The optical characteristics include primary modal optical characteristics for encoding the original information and auxiliary modal optical characteristics for sensing changes in the microenvironment.

[0009] The intelligent control and defense execution module, including a control unit and a defense execution unit, is used to establish a dynamic correlation model based on optical characteristics. When reading information, it compares the model with real-time optical characteristics to determine whether tampering has occurred, and performs graded active defense when tampering occurs.

[0010] Furthermore, the primary mode optical characteristic is the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal, the inner wall of the microfluidic channel network is provided with a control electrode array, and the auxiliary mode optical characteristic is the fluorescence lifetime of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye under a specific excitation light.

[0011] Furthermore, the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal is the primary mode optical characteristic signal value, and the fluorescence lifetime value of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye is the auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value. The original information is stored in the dynamic information carrier module in the form of primary mode optical characteristic signal values ​​and auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal values.

[0012] Furthermore, the establishment of a dynamic correlation model based on optical properties includes:

[0013] The primary modal optical characteristic signal value and its corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value are obtained when the original information is written and stored, forming a set of original data points;

[0014] For each set of original data points with the same main mode optical characteristic signal value, calculate the statistical distribution of the corresponding auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value, take the mean of the statistical distribution as the benchmark value, and set the permissible fluctuation range by a preset standard deviation multiple.

[0015] The main modal optical characteristic signal value, the corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value, and the permissible fluctuation range are stored in the control unit to form a dynamic correlation model.

[0016] Furthermore, in the event of tampering, a tiered proactive defense system is implemented, including:

[0017] When the control unit detects that the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value deviates from the reference value but is still within the first threshold set in the permissible fluctuation range, it determines that it is an environmental disturbance and triggers a first-level response. The first-level response includes recording an abnormal event log and sending a warning signal to an external security management center through a communication interface.

[0018] When the control unit detects that the auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value continuously deviates from and exceeds the first threshold set in the permissible fluctuation range, but the main mode optical characteristic signal value has not changed in the preset way, it is determined to be a potential tampering and triggers a secondary response. The secondary response includes the control unit controlling the defense execution unit to generate a specific electrical pulse or thermal pulse to actively interfere with the ordered arrangement period of the photonic crystal, so that the original information presents random errors or ambiguity.

[0019] When the control unit detects an irreversible drift in the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value and it exceeds the second threshold, or when the signal of the multimodal optical detection module is completely lost, it is determined to be a clear physical intrusion and a level three response is triggered. The level three response includes issuing a self-destruct command to the defense execution unit based on the control unit.

[0020] Furthermore, in the secondary response, after the initial information is randomly erroneously or obfuscated, the stored original information is reversibly recoverable. Based on the reverse recovery key pre-stored in the control unit corresponding to a specific electric pulse or thermal pulse, by applying the reverse recovery key, the defense execution unit is driven to apply a reverse electric field or temperature field, so that the interfered photonic crystal is restored to its original ordered arrangement period, the correct reflection spectrum peak wavelength is restored, and the recovered original information is obtained.

[0021] Furthermore, the defense execution unit includes a micro chemical reaction chamber integrated within the microfluidic chip. The chemical reaction chamber is isolated from the microfluidic channel network by a thin film, and the chemical reaction chamber stores a solution for the inactivation of nanoparticles and environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes.

[0022] Furthermore, the microfluidic channel network includes N amplification storage chambers for forming photonic crystals, meandering channels connecting the amplification storage chambers, and sensor channels integrating pressure sensors for detecting internal pressure changes; the control electrode array is formed on the inner wall of the channels of the microfluidic channel network through photolithography and etching processes.

[0023] Furthermore, the multimodal optical detection module includes:

[0024] The main mode detection unit is used to irradiate the microfluidic chip, receive the reflected light from the photonic crystal, perform spectral analysis, and obtain the peak wavelength of the reflected spectrum.

[0025] An auxiliary modal detection unit is used to excite fluorescence to an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye, and to measure and calculate the fluorescence lifetime decay curve of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye.

[0026] The signal processing unit amplifies, filters, and performs analog-to-digital conversion on the optical characteristics of the original information before transmitting it to the control unit.

[0027] Furthermore, the system includes a processor and a machine-readable storage medium connected to the processor. The machine-readable storage medium is used to store programs, instructions, or code, and the processor is used to execute the programs, instructions, or code in the machine-readable storage medium. The processor and the machine-readable storage medium are used to implement the contents of the above system.

[0028] This invention provides an information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties. It has the following beneficial effects:

[0029] 1. This invention uses self-assembled photonic crystal nanoparticles within a microfluidic channel network to store original information. This allows the lattice constant of the photonic crystal to change over time or under external commands, protecting the stored original data. Combined with the detection of fluorescence lifetime values ​​of environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes, a dynamic correlation model is constructed, achieving high sensitivity and early warning of physical tampering. Utilizing the fluorescence lifetime value, which is extremely sensitive to changes in the microenvironment, as an auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value for response detection, and combining it with the peak wavelength of the photonic crystal's reflection spectrum for multimodal correlation response, any physical intrusion must first disturb the microenvironment, causing abnormal drift in the fluorescence lifetime before damaging the photonic crystal structure and causing changes in the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum. Through real-time monitoring, the intrusion intent can be determined very early before the original information is actually tampered with or intruded upon, enabling tiered proactive defense, moving from passive protection to proactive early warning defense, increasing the security and dynamic response capability of information storage.

[0030] 2. This invention employs a hierarchical active defense mechanism with reversible fuzzification operation to address the problem of permanent data loss caused by overly absolute self-destruct commands and inability to distinguish threat levels in traditional anti-tampering technologies. By integrating a dynamic correlation model, it utilizes the deviation range of auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​and changes in primary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​to design a three-level early warning response, executing corresponding response commands. Upon determining potential tampering, it applies specific electrical or thermal pulses to controllably interfere with the ordered arrangement period of the photonic crystal, causing a drift in the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum. This results in random errors and reversible fuzzification of the read information, achieving temporary interference with information reading. This provides a buffer strategy under uncertain threats, effectively preventing attackers from obtaining real information while allowing authorized users to recover information using reverse recovery keys in a secure micro-environment. This achieves an intelligent balance between security and data availability, improving information storage security and realizing intelligent security response. Attached Figure Description

[0031] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to the present invention;

[0032] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the hierarchical active defense process of the information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0033] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention. Specific Implementation Example 1:

[0035] like Figures 1 to 2 As shown, an information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties includes:

[0036] A dynamic information carrier module, used for writing and storing raw information, includes a microfluidic chip. The microfluidic chip contains a microfluidic channel network, and the inner wall of the microfluidic channel network has a control electrode array. The control electrode array is formed on the inner wall of the microfluidic channel network through photolithography and etching processes, and transparent indium tin oxide electrodes are sputtered onto it. The microfluidic channel network is filled with a nanoparticle suspension and an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye, and the nanoparticles in the nanoparticle suspension are used to form a photonic crystal. Wherein:

[0037] Original information refers to any form of digital data or instructions that needs to be protected. It needs to be able to be converted into a string of binary data sequences to facilitate the writing and storage of dynamic information carrier modules, such as core keys and passwords, identity representation and biometric templates (user fingerprint feature data, DNA sequences, etc.), key instructions and confidential data, etc.

[0038] Microfluidic chips are fabricated on polydimethylsiloxane or optical glass substrates using micro-nano fabrication technologies such as soft lithography and reactive ion etching.

[0039] Microfluidic channel networks are micrometer-scale channel systems etched onto microfluidic chips, serving as containment and reaction spaces for nanoparticle suspensions and environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes. They include N amplification and storage chambers for forming photonic crystals, meandering channels connecting these chambers to increase fluid resistance and enhance stability, and sensor channels integrating pressure sensors to detect internal pressure changes.

[0040] The amplification storage chamber is a micro-cavity in a microfluidic channel network, typically cylindrical or rectangular in shape, with a size on the micrometer scale. Its smooth internal surface promotes the uniform aggregation of nanoparticles. By controlling the electrode array to apply an electric field of a specific intensity, a non-uniform electric field with an electric field gradient is generated. Dielectrophoretic force drives the nanoparticles to the central region of the amplification storage chamber, where they form an ordered periodic photonic crystal structure under the action of van der Waals forces. The amplification storage chamber provides a stable space for the nanoparticles to self-assemble into a photonic crystal under the drive of the non-uniform electric field, thereby encoding the initial information.

[0041] The meandering channel is a curved microchannel that connects each amplification storage chamber. Its internal structure is serpentine or spiral. It stabilizes the flow of nanoparticle suspension by increasing the flow path length and fluid resistance, and reduces the interference of turbulence or external disturbances on the formation of photonic crystals. When the fluid flows, the meandering shape generates high resistance to reduce the flow velocity, so that the nanoparticles are smoothly transported to the amplification storage chamber and the stability is enhanced.

[0042] The sensor channel is a straight or slightly curved channel that integrates a miniature pressure sensor. Its internal structure includes embedded piezoresistive or capacitive sensor elements for real-time monitoring of fluid pressure changes. When physical intrusion or environmental changes cause abnormal pressure, the sensor outputs an electrical signal to the control unit, triggering a defense mechanism to ensure the security of the original information storage.

[0043] Nanoparticle suspensions are colloidal suspensions of well-dispersed silica or polymer nanoparticles in deionized water. Photonic crystals are periodically ordered structures formed by the self-assembly of nanoparticles under the influence of a non-uniform electric field. Nanoparticles are spheres of uniform size (e.g., 200 nm in diameter). They self-assemble into photonic crystals under the drive of a non-uniform electric field. The structure of the photonic crystal determines the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum. Nanoparticles are the basis for the formation of photonic crystals. Photonic crystals are the physical source of the principal mode optical properties and are used to directly encode information.

[0044] Environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes are a class of organic or complex molecules whose fluorescence properties, such as intensity and lifetime, change with variations in the surrounding microenvironment (e.g., temperature, pH). Specifically, they can be temperature-sensitive rare-earth complexes or pH-sensitive fluorescein derivatives. Fluorescence lifetime is the time it takes for the fluorescence intensity of a fluorescent molecule to decay back to its initial value after excitation ceases. The time taken is an intrinsic physical parameter that is extremely sensitive to the microenvironment but is not affected by the intensity of the excitation light;

[0045] The dynamic information carrier module is used to physically encode and store raw information. It receives electrical signals or voltage sequences from the control unit and outputs optical signals through physicochemical reactions. The microstructures within the module, such as the microfluidic chip and microfluidic channel network, are extremely sensitive to physical intrusion and form the basis for preventing tampering with the raw information. The microfluidic channel network provides the module with a precise physical structure and reaction environment, enabling electrical signals to be converted into voltage control sequences via the control electrode array on the inner wall, thus generating and detecting optical signals. The electrical signals refer to specific electrical or thermal pulses sent by the control unit to drive the defense execution unit. These are typically low-current DC or AC signals, including voltage or current forms, which act as a driving source to activate the control electrode array and generate specific strong... A non-uniform electric field is formed by applying a certain degree of electric field, thereby inducing the physical movement of nanoparticles and providing the basic energy for writing the original information. The voltage control sequence is a series of voltage values ​​arranged according to a predefined encoding protocol (such as binary mapping). For example, each voltage point in the voltage control sequence corresponds to a binary bit (0 or 1). By precisely controlling the spatiotemporal voltage distribution of the electrode array, a non-uniform electric field is formed, which guides the aggregation and self-assembly process of nanoparticles in the microfluidic channel network, realizing the physical encoding of the original information. The optical signal refers to the optical characteristic signal output after the physicochemical reaction, including the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal and the fluorescence lifetime of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye. It carries encoded information and data on microenvironmental changes and is used for information reading and anti-tampering verification in multimodal detection.

[0046] When the dynamic information carrier module writes and stores raw information, it includes the following:

[0047] The original information to be stored is represented as a binary data sequence, such as 01001101. Based on the binary data sequence received by the control unit, a corresponding voltage control sequence is generated according to a predefined encoding protocol, such as 0 corresponding to low voltage and 1 corresponding to high voltage. This sequence is then applied to a control electrode array located on the inner wall of the microfluidic channel network. Each electrode in the control electrode array generates an electric field of a specific intensity according to the sequence value of the voltage control sequence, thereby forming a spatially controllable non-uniform electric field within the microchannels of the microfluidic channel network. Here, the specific intensity of the electric field refers to the electric field generated according to the binary data sequence. According to the sequence, the electric field with a definite intensity and direction in the micrometer-scale space is generated by the voltage applied to the control electrode array. The electric field intensity is directly controlled by the voltage value, and the electric field intensity directly determines the magnitude of the dielectric force acting on the nanoparticles. The formation of the non-uniform electric field is due to the patterned integration of the electrodes of the control electrode array on the inner wall of the microchannel (such as forming a pair of parallel finger electrodes). When the voltage is applied to the microscale electrodes, a very strong electric field gradient is generated at the electrode edges and gaps, thereby forming a non-uniformly distributed electric field in the local space of the chamber or channel.

[0048] Based on the non-uniform electric field, nanoparticles are driven to aggregate in a specific region by dielectric force. Different electric field regions exert attractive or repulsive forces on the nanoparticles, thereby driving the nanoparticles to move and aggregate in a specific region near the electrode. Under the combined action of dielectric force and van der Waals forces between nanoparticles, the aggregated nanoparticles self-assemble in the specific region to form a photonic crystal with a specific lattice constant and an ordered arrangement period. The lattice constant of the photonic crystal is precisely controlled by the applied electric field intensity, and the lattice constant is the period length of the crystal structure. The value of the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal is the main mode optical characteristic signal value, which completes the writing and storage of the original information. The binary data series is physically encoded as the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal. For example, the binary data series 0 corresponds to the formation of a photonic crystal with a peak wavelength of 500 nm for the reflection spectrum, and 1 corresponds to a photonic crystal with a peak wavelength of 600 nm for the reflection spectrum. The original information is stably stored in the form of a physical structure.

[0049] The specific region where nanoparticles aggregate refers to the region with the largest electric field intensity gradient inside the amplification storage chamber of the microfluidic channel network, determined by the geometric layout of the control electrode array, such as the center of the gap between a pair of parallel electrodes or directly above the electrode edge. The key condition that this region needs to meet is the existence of a sufficiently strong, spatially controllable non-uniform electric field to generate a dielectrophoretic force sufficient to overcome Brownian motion and drive and confine the nanoparticles in this region. At the same time, the physical space of this region (i.e., the chamber size) must be sufficient to accommodate the self-assembly of nanoparticles to form a photonic crystal structure with macroscopic optical properties.

[0050] The specific lattice constant refers to the spatial repeating period length of the lattice of the ordered arrangement of nanoparticles in a photonic crystal. For the most common face-centered cubic or body-centered cubic stacked structures, it is specifically manifested as the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum. The ordered arrangement period refers to the long-range ordered stacking of nanoparticles in three-dimensional space. For example, when nanoparticles spontaneously arrange themselves into a face-centered cubic structure, the nanoparticles in each layer are precisely located in the depressions of the nanoparticles in the next layer, forming a highly regular periodic structure in the entire amplification storage chamber, enabling the photonic crystal to produce strong Bragg reflection of light of a specific wavelength.

[0051] The lattice constant of a photonic crystal is precisely controlled by the applied electric field strength. The magnitude of the dielectric force determines the compactness of the nanoparticles at the aggregation point: a higher applied electric field strength generates a stronger dielectric force, driving and compressing the nanoparticles more tightly, resulting in a smaller lattice constant and a more compact structure in the self-assembled photonic crystal. The control unit linearly or non-linearly changes the electric field strength by precisely adjusting the voltage amplitude applied to the control electrode array, thereby achieving continuous or hierarchical control of the final lattice constant. For example, when encoding binary information, applying a high voltage (e.g., 10V) to write "1" generates a strong electric field, forming a photonic crystal with a smaller lattice constant and a peak wavelength in the blue band (e.g., 450nm); while applying a low voltage (e.g., 2V) to write "0" generates a weak electric field, forming a photonic crystal with a larger lattice constant and a peak wavelength in the red band (e.g., 650nm).

[0052] The peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum refers to the specific wavelength value with the greatest intensity and most obvious characteristics that appears in the reflection spectrum of a photonic crystal when a broadband white light source shines on it. It includes a center wavelength value and its spectral characteristics such as its full width at half maximum (FWHM). It is a direct manifestation of the selective Bragg scattering of light waves by the periodic structure of the photonic crystal and is used to directly encode digital information. Different peak wavelengths (such as 450nm and 650nm) are predefined as different binary values ​​(such as 1 and 0). Therefore, when reading the original information, the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum can be detected by a spectrometer, and the originally written binary data sequence can be directly decoded and restored. It is the physical carrier for storing and retrieving the original information.

[0053] The multimodal optical detection module is used to detect the optical characteristics of the dynamic information carrier module. These optical characteristics include primary modal optical characteristics for encoding the original information and auxiliary modal optical characteristics for sensing changes in the microenvironment. The primary modal optical characteristic is the peak wavelength of the photonic crystal's reflection spectrum, while the auxiliary modal optical characteristic is the fluorescence lifetime of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye under a specific excitation light. The specific excitation light refers to a beam of light with precisely selected wavelength and pulse characteristics, used to effectively excite the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye to emit fluorescence. It is typically generated by a pulsed laser, with the wavelength determined based on the maximum absorption peak of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye (e.g., if a fluorescein derivative is used, the specific excitation light wavelength is approximately 490 nm), and emitted in extremely short pulses (pulse widths on the order of nanoseconds or picoseconds). The control unit triggers the pulsed laser in the auxiliary modal detection unit to emit a laser that meets the aforementioned wavelength and pulse width requirements. Exciting the fluorescent dye with short pulses ensures a clear starting point in time, thus providing a benchmark for subsequent precise measurement of the fluorescence intensity decay curve over time (i.e., the fluorescence lifetime decay curve) using a time-correlated single-photon counter.

[0054] The multimodal optical detection module includes:

[0055] The main mode detection unit, comprising a broadband white light source, a tunable laser, and a spectrometer, is used to irradiate the microfluidic chip, receive the reflected light from the photonic crystal for spectral analysis, and obtain the peak wavelength of the reflected spectrum. The broadband white light source or tunable laser is used to irradiate the microfluidic chip, and the spectrometer is used to receive the reflected light and analyze its spectrum to obtain the peak wavelength of the reflected spectrum. In the main mode detection unit, the peak wavelength of the photonic crystal's reflected spectrum, which encodes information, is obtained by irradiating the microfluidic chip and analyzing its reflected spectrum. First, a continuous spectrum covering the visible light range is provided by the broadband white light source, or by the tunable laser... The system provides a scanning range of specific wavelengths, emits probe light, and illuminates a specific amplification storage chamber region of the microfluidic chip. Subsequently, the light selectively reflected by the photonic crystal is received by a spectrometer. The grating inside the spectrometer disperses the reflected light into a spectrum, and the light intensity at different wavelengths is recorded by a detector (such as a CCD), thus obtaining a complete reflection spectrum. Finally, the built-in or external processor of the spectrometer identifies the position of the peak wavelength in the spectrum through an algorithm, that is, obtains the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum, and transmits the value of the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum as a data point to the control unit, completing the conversion from optical signal to digital information.

[0056] The auxiliary modal detection unit includes a pulsed laser and a time-correlated single-photon counter. It is used to excite fluorescence to an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye, measure and calculate the fluorescence lifetime decay curve of the dye. The pulsed laser is used to excite fluorescence, and the time-correlated single-photon counter is used to accurately measure the fluorescence lifetime decay curve. In the auxiliary modal detection unit, the pulsed laser is a laser source capable of emitting extremely short light pulses (e.g., on the nanosecond scale), while the time-correlated single-photon counter is an ultra-high sensitivity instrument for detecting extremely weak light, capable of accurately measuring photon arrival time. Under the command of the control unit, the pulsed laser emits excitation light pulses to irradiate the microfluidic stream. The chip excites an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye to emit fluorescent photons. Simultaneously, the excitation pulse is sent as a start signal to a time-correlated single-photon counter. After receiving the start signal, the time-correlated single-photon counter begins to receive individual fluorescent photons emitted by the fluorescent dye and records the arrival time of each fluorescent photon relative to the start signal. By repeating this process thousands to millions of times, the probability distribution of fluorescent photons appearing after different time delays is statistically obtained, thereby constructing a curve of fluorescence intensity decaying with time, i.e., the fluorescence lifetime decay curve. Finally, by fitting this decay curve (usually exponential decay), the fluorescence lifetime can be calculated.

[0057] The signal processing unit amplifies, filters, and performs analog-to-digital conversion on the optical characteristic signals of the raw information before transmitting them to the control unit. The optical characteristic signals refer to the raw electrical signals output by detectors in the multimodal optical detection module (such as the CCD detector of a spectrometer and a time-correlated single-photon counter). These include analog signals representing the intensity of reflected light as a function of wavelength (from the spectrometer) and discrete digital pulse signals representing the arrival time of fluorescent photons (from the time-correlated single-photon counter). The signal processing unit first receives the weak raw electrical signals, amplifies them using a preamplifier, and then filters out high-frequency electronic noise using a low-pass filter to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. Next, the analog signals (such as spectral signals) are converted to digital signals by an analog-to-digital converter. For the discrete digital pulse signals from the time-correlated single-photon counter, time-to-digital conversion and cumulative statistical calculations are performed. The pre-processed, clean, and digitized optical characteristic data, namely the peak wavelength of the reflected spectrum and the fluorescence lifetime value, are transmitted to the control unit in real time for subsequent information decoding, dynamic correlation model comparison, and anti-tampering judgment.

[0058] The intelligent control and defense execution module, including a control unit and a defense execution unit, is used to establish a dynamic correlation model based on optical characteristics. When reading information, it compares the model with real-time optical characteristics to determine whether tampering has occurred, and performs graded active defense when tampering occurs.

[0059] The control unit is responsible for coordinating the entire process of information writing, reading, storage, and defense: when writing information, it converts the binary data sequence into a voltage control sequence to drive the control electrode array; when reading information, it receives the processed optical signal, queries the dynamic correlation model for comparison and judgment; including executing encoding / decoding algorithms, calculating the fluorescence lifetime statistical distribution, comparing the optical signal with the benchmark value of the dynamic correlation model in real time, and deciding to trigger various levels of defense response based on the deviation results, so as to realize the system's intelligent, automated, and proactive security defense.

[0060] The defense execution unit includes a micro chemical reaction chamber integrated inside the microfluidic chip. The micro chemical reaction chamber is isolated from the microfluidic channel network by a fragile thin film, and the micro chemical reaction chamber stores acidic solutions, strong oxidants, and other enzyme solutions for inactivating nanoparticles and environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes.

[0061] The microchemical reaction chamber is an independent, sealed microcavity integrated within a microfluidic chip. It is pre-stored with chemical reagents for self-destruction. When a clear physical intrusion is detected, triggering a Level 3 response, the control unit activates it, releasing the chemical reagents to permanently destroy the physical carrier of the information storage, thereby preventing the leakage of the original information. When the Level 3 response is triggered, the control unit sends a high-power electrical pulse to a microheater or micro-explosion device connected to a fragile film, causing the fragile film to rupture. This allows the deactivated solution within the microcavity to rapidly diffuse into the adjacent microfluidic channel network, achieving the highest level of active defense. The chemical process irreversibly destroys the nanoparticles and fluorescent dyes, ensuring that the original information cannot be recovered or read.

[0062] The fragile membrane is used to seal micro-chemical reaction chambers. Its mechanical strength is designed to be lower than that of the weak isolation layers in other parts of the microfluidic chip. In actual use, it can be made of ultrathin polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS), silicon nitride film, or specific metal polymer composite materials. As a passive safety mechanism, it remains intact under normal operation to isolate chemical reagents and will only break when it receives a specific self-destruct electrical signal due to physical intrusion. In a three-level response, the fragile membrane breaks under the influence of a high-power electrical pulse sent by the control unit. As a physical barrier, it ensures that chemical reagents are only released in the ultimate defense scenario, while ensuring sealing and stability in daily operation.

[0063] In practical applications, the acidic solution can be a diluted hydrochloric acid or nitric acid solution, the strong oxidant can be hydrogen peroxide or sodium hypochlorite solution, and the enzyme solution can be proteinase K (used to degrade protein dyes) or a specific nuclease (if the dye is a DNA complex). Based on the direct destruction of the physical or chemical structure of the functional substance by chemical reaction: the acidic solution dissolves silica nanoparticles or hydrolyzes and denatures polymer nanoparticles through low pH value, while quenching the pH-sensitive fluorescent dye by irreversible protonation; the strong oxidant destroys the chromophore of the fluorescent dye and the surface properties of the nanoparticles through oxidation reaction, causing them to lose optical activity, thereby achieving permanent erasure of the original information.

[0064] When establishing a dynamic association model, the following should be included:

[0065] The acquisition of the primary modal optical characteristic signal value and its corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value, measured by the multimodal optical detection module during the writing and storage of original information, is as follows: The multimodal optical detection module is activated by the control unit. The primary modal detection unit illuminates a specific amplification storage chamber area where the original information has been written with a broadband white light source. The spectrometer receives the reflected light and analyzes the spectrum. The measured peak wavelength of the reflected spectrum (e.g., 500 nm) is recorded as the primary modal optical characteristic signal value. The pulsed laser of the auxiliary modal detection unit emits an excitation light pulse of a specific wavelength to the same primary modal detection unit area to excite the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye. At the same time, the time-correlated single-photon counter starts working. By repeatedly collecting a large number of fluorescent photons and statistically analyzing their arrival time distribution, the fluorescence lifetime value at that point (e.g., 4.2 nanoseconds) is fitted and calculated, and recorded as the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value. The primary modal optical characteristic signal value and the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value (500 nm, 4.2 ns) are combined to form a set of original data points for storage.

[0066] For each set of original data points with identical or similar primary modal optical characteristic signal values, multiple measurements of auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​are performed to obtain a set of original data points for auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal values. The statistical distribution of the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​corresponding to the original data point set is calculated. The mean of the statistical distribution (e.g., mean 4.2 ns) is used as the reference value for the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value corresponding to the primary modal optical characteristic signal value. The standard deviation of the statistical distribution (e.g., 0.1 ns) is multiplied by a preset standard deviation factor, such as 3σ, to set the permissible fluctuation range (e.g., 4.2 ns ± 0.3 ns). The preset standard deviation factor (e.g., 3σ) is used to set the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value. The statistical factor for the permissible fluctuation range of the modal optical characteristic signal value is mainly set based on the principle of normal distribution and empirical rules in statistics. For example, 3σ means that 99.73% of the data points within the normal statistical fluctuation range will be included in the permissible range. The choice of the standard deviation multiple is to balance safety and false alarm rate. If the multiple is set too small (such as 1σ), the permissible range will be too narrow, and it will be easy to trigger false alarms due to normal small environmental fluctuations. If the multiple is set too large (such as 5σ), the permissible range will be too wide, reducing the sensitivity to potential micro-environmental changes and potentially causing missed detection of tampering. 3σ is an empirical value that is widely used in industrial control and anomaly detection and can better balance the risks of both.

[0067] The mapping relationship between the primary modal optical characteristic signal value, the corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value, and the permissible fluctuation range is stored in the control unit in the form of a lookup table or fitting function, forming a dynamic correlation model. The dynamic correlation model defines the correspondence that should be satisfied between the primary and auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​under the condition of no tampering.

[0068] When reading raw information, the following should be included:

[0069] The main mode detection unit and the auxiliary mode detection unit are activated synchronously by the control unit to obtain the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum at the current moment. and fluorescence lifetime value ;

[0070] Based on the control unit with fluorescence lifetime value As an index, the baseline value of the corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal is retrieved from the dynamic association model. and permitted fluctuation range ;

[0071] judge Does it fall within the interval? inside, if If the environment is deemed safe and the original information is solvable, then the control unit will... Decode the data into a binary data sequence and output it, completing the reading of the original information; if If the relationship is broken, it indicates that the microenvironment has undergone abnormal changes and may have been tampered with, immediately triggering the hierarchical active defense mechanism.

[0072] The microenvironment refers to the local physicochemical conditions within the microfluidic channel network, nanoparticles, and environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes. Core parameters include temperature, pH, ion concentration, and mechanical stress, which directly determine the fluorescence lifetime of environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes because the luminescence properties of fluorescent molecules are extremely sensitive to microenvironment parameters. Any attempt at physical intrusion (such as microprobe puncture or laser tampering) or chemical contamination (such as injecting foreign substances to change pH) will first disturb the microenvironment, causing deviations in the fluorescence lifetime value, i.e., abnormal auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal values. If the microenvironmental disturbance is large enough or continues, it will eventually destroy the ordered periodic structure of the photonic crystal, leading to changes or disappearance of the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum, i.e., abnormal primary mode optical characteristic signal values, resulting in decoding errors during reading. The dynamic correlation model monitors the correlation break that occurs in real time before the primary mode optical characteristic signal value, enabling early and sensitive detection of tampering behavior.

[0073] During the initial information reading, the control unit first synchronously activates the multimodal optical detection module, instructing the broadband white light source in the main modal detection unit to illuminate the target amplification storage chamber. The reflected light is received and analyzed by the spectrometer, and the calculated peak wavelength of the current reflection spectrum is sent to the control unit. Simultaneously, the control unit instructs the pulsed laser in the auxiliary modal detection unit to emit excitation pulses to the same area. The time-correlated single-photon counter synchronously measures fluorescence decay and calculates the current fluorescence lifetime value, which is also sent to the control unit. The control unit then uses the currently measured fluorescence lifetime value as an index to query the pre-stored dynamic correlation model in memory to obtain the auxiliary modal signal reference value and its permissible fluctuation range corresponding to the fluorescence lifetime value. Next, the control unit performs a logical judgment: if the current fluorescence lifetime value is within the permissible fluctuation range, the environment is deemed safe, and the current peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum is decoded into a binary data sequence according to a predefined encoding protocol and output. If the current fluorescence lifetime value deviates from the permissible range, it is determined that the correlation has been broken, which may indicate tampering. The normal reading process is immediately terminated, and a corresponding graded active defense mechanism is triggered according to the degree of deviation, thereby ensuring that information can only be correctly read under the premise of environmental safety.

[0074] Tiered proactive defense includes the following:

[0075] When the control unit detects that the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value deviates from its reference value but is still within the first threshold set by the permissible fluctuation range set by the dynamic correlation model, it determines that it is an environmental disturbance and triggers a first-level response. The first-level response includes recording the abnormal event log and sending a warning signal to the external security management center through the communication interface.

[0076] When the control unit detects that the auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value continuously deviates from and exceeds the first threshold set by the permissible fluctuation range, but the main mode optical characteristic signal value has not changed by a preset value, it is determined to be a potential tampering and triggers a secondary response. The secondary response includes the control unit controlling the defense execution unit to generate specific electrical pulses or thermal pulses to actively interfere with the ordered arrangement period of the photonic crystal, causing the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal to drift, resulting in errors in the read information and causing the original information to present random errors or ambiguity.

[0077] When the control unit detects a drastic and irreversible drift in the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value that exceeds the second threshold, or when the signal from the multimodal optical detection module is completely lost, it is determined to be a clear physical intrusion and triggers a level three response. The level three response includes issuing a self-destruct command to the defense execution unit based on the control unit.

[0078] In the secondary response, after the initial information is randomly erroneously or obfuscated, the stored original information is reversibly recoverable and not permanently erased. Based on the reverse recovery key pre-stored in the control unit corresponding to a specific electrical or thermal pulse, after the user's identity is verified through an independent security authentication interface, the control unit applies the reverse recovery key to drive the defense execution unit to apply a reverse electric or temperature field, so that the interfered photonic crystal is restored to its original ordered arrangement period, the correct reflection spectrum peak wavelength is restored, and the recovered original information is obtained.

[0079] like Figure 2 The diagram illustrates the judgment process for tiered active defense. When performing tiered active defense, the minimum judgment scenarios and processing methods include:

[0080] If the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value is within the permissible fluctuation range and the main modal optical characteristic signal value is normal or unchanged, it is determined that the environment is safe and in an untampered state, and normal information reading and output can be performed.

[0081] If the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value deviates from the permissible fluctuation range but does not exceed the first threshold, and the main modal optical characteristic signal value is normal or unchanged, it is judged as a slight disturbance within the normal fluctuation range. Event recording is performed, active defense is not triggered, and monitoring continues.

[0082] If the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value exceeds the first threshold, but is not continuously deviating, and the main modal optical characteristic signal value is normal or unchanged, it is determined to be a transient anomaly, which may be due to accidental interference. This triggers a level one response, records the abnormal event log, and sends an early warning signal to the outside to remind the administrator to pay attention.

[0083] If the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value continuously exceeds the first threshold but does not exceed the second threshold, and the main modal optical characteristic signal value is normal or unchanged, it is determined to be a potential tampering, the microenvironment is continuously abnormal, and it is the best time for defense. A level two response is initiated, the log is recorded and a high-level warning is sent.

[0084] If the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value continuously exceeds the first threshold but does not exceed the second threshold, and the main modal optical characteristic signal value changes by a preset value, it is determined that the tampering has been successful, the information has been physically destroyed or tampered with, it is determined to be a clear physical intrusion and a level three response is initiated.

[0085] If the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value exceeds the second threshold and a violent irreversible drift or signal loss occurs, regardless of whether the main modal optical characteristic signal value changes (it is usually abnormal or lost), it is determined to be a physical intrusion. The microenvironment is devastated, and a level three response is initiated, immediately executing a self-destruct command to permanently erase the information.

[0086] The first threshold refers to the critical deviation of the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value that triggers the secondary response from the reference value, which is the boundary of the permissible fluctuation range (e.g., reference value ±3σ). The first threshold is set based on the statistical distribution range calculated when the dynamic correlation model is established, and is used to distinguish between normal fluctuations and abnormal deviations. Generally, the first threshold is set as a statistical boundary. For example, when the fluorescence lifetime reference value is 4.2 nanoseconds and the standard deviation is 0.1 nanoseconds, the first threshold is the upper and lower limits of 4.2 ± 0.3 nanoseconds.

[0087] The Level 1 response includes recording abnormal event logs (writing information such as abnormal time, location, and deviation values ​​of auxiliary modal optical characteristic signals into the memory of the control unit) and sending early warning signals to the external security management center through communication interfaces (such as Ethernet or wireless modules). The early warning signals include the device ID, the abnormality level "Level 1 Early Warning", and brief status data.

[0088] The criterion for determining that the optical characteristic signal value of the main mode has not changed according to the preset value is: the difference between the peak wavelength of the currently measured reflection spectrum and the original written reference wavelength value stored in the dynamic correlation model is less than the preset tolerance range; the tolerance range is usually set according to the resolution of the spectrometer and the stability of the system. For example, if the resolution of the spectrometer is 1 nm and the stability of the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum is ±0.5 nm, then the tolerance range can be set to ±1 nm; the control unit compares the peak wavelength value of the reflection spectrum decoded in real time with the peak wavelength data of the reflection spectrum when the original data was written as the reference value. If the deviation is within the tolerance range, it is determined that "no preset change has occurred"; if the deviation exceeds the tolerance range, it is determined that a change has occurred; indicating that the physical tampering has not damaged the core structure of the photonic crystal.

[0089] The specific electrical or thermal pulse in the secondary response refers to a signal generated by the defense execution unit, whose parameters (such as amplitude, frequency, and duration) are pre-designed to effectively interfere with the ordered periodic arrangement of the photonic crystal without permanently destroying its structure. The electrical pulse is a high-frequency AC voltage or reverse bias applied to the control electrode array, while the thermal pulse is generated by an integrated micro heater. After determining that the secondary response has been triggered, the control unit drives the defense execution unit to call the pre-stored pulse parameters and drive the electrode array or heater to work. By applying an external field (electric or thermal), the interaction forces between nanoparticles (such as dielectric force and van der Waals force) are temporarily weakened, causing local disordering of the photonic crystal, resulting in a controllable drift or broadening of the peak wavelength of its reflection spectrum, thus causing the read information to become erroneous and blurred. The pulse parameters are determined experimentally to find the critical condition that can cause a sufficient wavelength drift, resulting in decoding errors but still recoverable through reverse operation.

[0090] The criteria for determining severe irreversible drift include: the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value far exceeds the second threshold, for example, exceeding the reference value ±10σ; after multiple consecutive measurements within a short period of time, the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value does not recover to the normal fluctuation range and exhibits continuous abnormality or complete signal disappearance, such as fluorescence quenching; accompanied by the loss of the main modal optical characteristic signal value, the multimodal optical detection module can no longer detect an effective reflection spectrum; if all these conditions are met, it is determined to be severe irreversible drift, which means that the microenvironment has been fundamentally damaged.

[0091] The second threshold is a critical value for the deviation of the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value that triggers a level 3 response, which is more stringent than the first threshold. It is much larger than the boundary value of the permissible fluctuation range (first threshold), for example, a reference value of ±10σ. It is set by distinguishing between severe anomalies and general anomalies, and is usually based on the principle of detecting extreme statistical outliers or the experimentally measured system failure critical point. The general threshold is much larger than the first threshold, for example, set to ±10σ or greater, to ensure that the highest level of self-destruct mechanism is triggered only when subjected to severe attacks, avoiding false triggering.

[0092] After the self-destruct command is issued, the control unit first cuts off the normal read / write circuit, and then sends a high-power, short-duration destructive electrical pulse to the triggering mechanism of the micro-chemical reaction chamber in the defense execution unit, such as a micro heater or an electric detonation device. The high-power electrical pulse instantly generates high temperature or mechanical impact, causing the fragile film sealing the chemical reaction chamber to rupture. The inactivated chemical reagents pre-stored in the micro-chemical reaction chamber then rapidly fill the adjacent microfluidic channel network through diffusion or microfluidic action, reacting chemically with nanoparticles and fluorescent dyes, permanently destroying their structure and optical properties, thereby achieving irreversible erasure of the original information.

[0093] The reverse electric or temperature field refers to the physical field used to reverse the effect of the interference pulse in the second-order response. For example, if a thermal pulse that causes the crystal to loosen is applied to the second-order response, the reverse field is a cooling pulse; if an electrical pulse that causes disorder is applied, the reverse field may be a specific voltage sequence used to reassemble the crystal. After independent security authentication, the control unit calls the pre-stored reverse recovery key, i.e., the specific field parameters, to drive the electrode array or temperature control element to apply the reverse field. The physical field guides the nanoparticles back to their original lowest energy state, i.e., the ordered arrangement period, to recover the blurred information. The parameters of the reverse electric or temperature field are determined experimentally during the system calibration phase. That is, after finding the parameters that can stably form the target photonic crystal, the combination of interference pulse and reverse pulse is tested to achieve reversible blurring and recovery cycles.

[0094] The verification process of the security authentication interface is as follows: First, authorized users need to connect a dedicated hardware token through a separate physical interface, such as a USB key interface or a smart card reader. Then, the control unit requires the user to input biometrics, such as a fingerprint or PIN code, for first-factor authentication. After successful authentication, the hardware token and the control unit perform a challenge-response handshake protocol based on asymmetric encryption, such as RSA, and the control unit verifies the digital signature of the token. Only after all verifications are successful does the control unit unlock access to the reverse recovery key and allow the execution of information recovery operations. This multi-factor authentication process ensures that only authorized users with extremely high privileges can perform recovery.

[0095] In this embodiment, nanoparticles that self-assemble to form photonic crystals are set in a microfluidic channel network to store the original information. This allows the lattice constant of the photonic crystal to change with time or external commands, thus protecting the stored original data. Combined with the detection of the fluorescence lifetime value of environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes, a dynamic correlation model is constructed to achieve high sensitivity and early warning of physical tampering. The fluorescence lifetime value, which is extremely sensitive to changes in the microenvironment, is used as an auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value for response detection. Combined with the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal, a multimodal correlation response is performed. Any physical intrusion must first disturb the microenvironment, causing the fluorescence lifetime to drift abnormally first, and then destroying the photonic crystal structure, resulting in a change in the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum. Through real-time monitoring, the intrusion intent can be determined very early before the original information is actually tampered with or intruded upon, and graded active defense can be carried out to achieve a shift from passive protection to active early warning defense, increasing the security and dynamic response capability of information storage.

[0096] A hierarchical active defense mechanism employing reversible fuzzification operations addresses the problem of permanent data loss caused by overly absolute self-destruct commands in traditional anti-tampering technologies, which fail to differentiate threat levels. By integrating a dynamic correlation model, it utilizes the deviation range of auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​and changes in the primary modal optical characteristic signal values ​​to design a three-level early warning response, executing corresponding response commands. Upon detecting potential tampering, it controllably interferes with the ordered arrangement period of the photonic crystal by applying specific electrical or thermal pulses, causing a shift in the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum. This results in random errors and reversible fuzzification of the read information, providing a temporary interference with information reading. This offers a buffer strategy under uncertain threats, effectively preventing attackers from obtaining real information while allowing authorized users to recover information using reverse recovery keys in a secure micro-environment. It achieves an intelligent balance between security and data availability, improving information storage security and realizing intelligent security response. Specific Implementation Example 2:

[0098] This application also provides an electronic device. The electronic device may include one or more processors and one or more memories. The memories store computer-readable code, which, when executed by the one or more processors, can perform the tamper-proof information storage system based on microfluidic optical properties as described above.

[0099] The methods or systems according to the embodiments of this application can also be implemented using the architecture of the electronic device shown in this application. The electronic device may include a bus, one or more CPUs, ROM, RAM, a communication port connected to a network, input / output, a hard disk, etc. The storage device in the electronic device, such as a ROM or hard disk, can store the tamper-proof information storage system based on microfluidic optical properties provided in this application. Furthermore, the electronic device may also include a user interface. Of course, the architecture shown in this application is merely exemplary; when implementing different devices, one or more components in the electronic device shown in this application may be omitted according to actual needs. Specific Implementation Example 3:

[0101] One embodiment of this application discloses a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-readable instructions. When the computer-readable instructions are executed by a processor, the tamper-proof information storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to the embodiment of this application, as described with reference to the above figures, can be executed. The storage medium includes, but is not limited to, volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. Volatile memory may include, for example, random access memory (RAM) and cache memory. Non-volatile memory may include, for example, read-only memory (ROM), hard disk, flash memory, etc.

[0102] Furthermore, according to embodiments of this application, the processes described in the above-referenced flowcharts can be implemented as computer software programs. For example, this application provides a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium storing machine-readable instructions that can be executed by a processor to perform instructions corresponding to the method steps provided in this application, such as an information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties. When this computer program is executed by a central processing unit (CPU), it performs the functions defined in the method of this application.

[0103] The system includes a processor, a machine-readable storage medium, and the machine-readable storage medium is connected to the processor. The machine-readable storage medium is used to store programs, instructions, or code, and the processor is used to execute the programs, instructions, or code in the machine-readable storage medium.

[0104] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used merely to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a reference structure" does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes the element.

[0105] Although embodiments of the invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties, characterized in that: The system includes: A dynamic information carrier module for writing and storing raw information includes a microfluidic chip, wherein the microfluidic chip is provided with a microfluidic channel network, the microfluidic channel network is filled with a nanoparticle suspension and an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye, and the nanoparticles in the nanoparticle suspension are used to form a photonic crystal. A multimodal optical detection module is used to detect the optical characteristics of a dynamic information carrier module. The optical characteristics include primary modal optical characteristics for encoding the original information and auxiliary modal optical characteristics for sensing changes in the microenvironment. The primary mode optical characteristic is the peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal, the inner wall of the microfluidic channel network is provided with a control electrode array, and the auxiliary mode optical characteristic is the fluorescence lifetime of an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye under a specific excitation light. The peak wavelength of the reflection spectrum of the photonic crystal is the main mode optical characteristic signal value, and the fluorescence lifetime value of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye is the auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value. The original information is stored in the dynamic information carrier module in the form of the main mode optical characteristic signal value and the auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value. The intelligent control and defense execution module includes a control unit and a defense execution unit. It is used to establish a dynamic correlation model based on optical characteristics, and when reading information, it compares it with real-time optical characteristics to determine whether tampering has occurred, and performs hierarchical active defense when tampering occurs. The dynamic correlation model based on optical properties includes: The primary modal optical characteristic signal value and its corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value are obtained when the original information is written and stored, forming a set of original data points; For each set of original data points with the same main mode optical characteristic signal value, calculate the statistical distribution of the corresponding auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value, take the mean of the statistical distribution as the benchmark value, and set the permissible fluctuation range by a preset standard deviation multiple. The main modal optical characteristic signal value, the corresponding auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value, and the permissible fluctuation range are stored in the control unit to form a dynamic correlation model; Among these measures, tiered proactive defense is implemented when tampering occurs, including: When the control unit detects that the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value deviates from the reference value but is still within the first threshold set in the permissible fluctuation range, it determines that it is an environmental disturbance and triggers a first-level response. The first-level response includes recording an abnormal event log and sending a warning signal to an external security management center through a communication interface. When the control unit detects that the auxiliary mode optical characteristic signal value continuously deviates from and exceeds the first threshold set in the permissible fluctuation range, but the main mode optical characteristic signal value has not changed in the preset way, it is determined to be a potential tampering and triggers a secondary response. The secondary response includes the control unit controlling the defense execution unit to generate a specific electrical pulse or thermal pulse to actively interfere with the ordered arrangement period of the photonic crystal, so that the original information presents random errors or ambiguity. When the control unit detects an irreversible drift in the auxiliary modal optical characteristic signal value and it exceeds the second threshold, or when the signal of the multimodal optical detection module is completely lost, it is determined to be a clear physical intrusion and a level three response is triggered. The level three response includes issuing a self-destruct command to the defense execution unit based on the control unit.

2. The information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the secondary response, after the initial information is randomly erroneously or obfuscated, the stored original information is reversibly recoverable. Based on the reverse recovery key pre-stored in the control unit corresponding to a specific electric pulse or thermal pulse, the reverse recovery key is applied to drive the defense execution unit to apply a reverse electric field or temperature field, so that the interfered photonic crystal is restored to its original ordered arrangement period, the correct reflection spectrum peak wavelength is restored, and the recovered original information is obtained.

3. The information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to claim 2, characterized in that: The defense execution unit includes a micro chemical reaction chamber integrated inside a microfluidic chip. The chemical reaction chamber is isolated from the microfluidic channel network by a thin film, and the chemical reaction chamber stores a solution for the inactivation of nanoparticles and environmentally responsive fluorescent dyes.

4. The information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to claim 1, characterized in that: The microfluidic channel network includes N amplification storage chambers for forming photonic crystals, meandering channels connecting the amplification storage chambers, and sensor channels integrating pressure sensors for detecting internal pressure changes; the control electrode array is formed on the inner wall of the channels of the microfluidic channel network through photolithography and etching processes.

5. The information anti-tampering storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to claim 1, characterized in that: The multimodal optical detection module includes: The main mode detection unit is used to irradiate the microfluidic chip, receive the reflected light from the photonic crystal, perform spectral analysis, and obtain the peak wavelength of the reflected spectrum. An auxiliary modal detection unit is used to excite fluorescence to an environmentally responsive fluorescent dye, and to measure and calculate the fluorescence lifetime decay curve of the environmentally responsive fluorescent dye. The signal processing unit amplifies, filters, and performs analog-to-digital conversion on the optical characteristics of the original information before transmitting it to the control unit.

6. The information tamper-proof storage system based on microfluidic optical properties according to any one of claims 1-5, characterized in that: The system includes a processor and a machine-readable storage medium connected to the processor. The machine-readable storage medium is used to store programs, instructions, or code, and the processor is used to execute the programs, instructions, or code in the machine-readable storage medium. The processor and the machine-readable medium are used to implement the system according to any one of claims 1-5.

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