Method and system for detecting inappropriate driving and protecting aircraft from influence

Abstract

The present invention relates to systems and methods for detecting inappropriate driving by pilots who potentially experience spatial orientation impairments related to torso gravity illusion and protecting an aircraft from effects. The method comprises: obtaining (401) flight information and status information; estimating (402) a current value of a perceived longitudinal attitude based on the flight information; calculating (403) a difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal pose and the current value of the actual longitudinal pose; and then, when the deviation is greater than or equal to a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold, determining (406) whether a driving action performed by the at least one pilot is inappropriate based on status information of the aircraft; and then activating (408) a protective measure when the performed driving action is inappropriate. Flight conditions that cause the occurrence of torso gravitational illusion, and signs of spatial orientation impairments by pilots that cause inappropriate driving of the aircraft, may be detected.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The field of the disclosure relates to protecting an aircraft from an inappropriate piloting by the flight crew, i.e. the pilots, when the flight crew can suffer from a spatial disorientation related to a “look-up” type of sensory illusion, also called a sensory illusion in the longitudinal axis, or a pitch sensory illusion or even a somatogravic illusion. More specifically, the disclosure relates to a method and a system for detecting an inappropriate piloting related to a spatial disorientation of at least one pilot and for protecting the aircraft from this inappropriate piloting in case of a potential spatial disorientation related to a somatogravic illusion. BACKGROUND

[0002] Under certain flight conditions, the pilots of an aircraft, i.e. the flying pilot and the co-pilot, suffer from a spatial disorientation and, as a consequence, pilot the aircraft inappropriately. This is the case, for example, when the aircraft acceleration can induce an inaccurate perception of the longitudinal attitude (for example, during the go-around phase, when the thrust is at its maximum).

[0003] This spatial disorientation can be induced by a sensory illusion called “vestibular” illusion, i.e. a sensory illusion related to the mechanical operation of the inner ear structures and the perception of the body movements. For example, during the “go-around” phase, the vestibular system of the pilots experiences longitudinal and vertical accelerations, which induce a “somatogravic” illusion, also called a “look-up” illusion. Then, the pilots suffer from a longitudinal spatial disorientation which leads to an illusion of climbing or descending and is wrongly interpreted as a vertical force resulting from the gravitational and inertial forces. In other words, the vestibular system of the pilots is affected by the accelerations which lead to a difference between the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft, i.e. the pitch attitude, and the longitudinal attitude perceived by the pilots.

[0004] In particular, this spatial disorientation can be more pronounced in case of loss of external visual references (for example, in the clouds or when the rain falls on the aircraft windscreen) or in case of great stress of the pilots who can be highly distracted and no longer refer to the external visual references, even if they are still available.

[0005] To limit the risks related to the spatial disorientation, the pilots are trained to not rely on their body perception but to carefully monitor and trust the information provided in the cockpit. However, aircraft incidents and accidents still occur, revealing that despite the pilots being trained, they are still affected by these sensory illusions and can pilot the aircraft based on incorrect body perception.

[0006] Moreover, in order to comply with aircraft regulatory and certification requirements, there are systems that enable performing a "reduced thrust" go-around during which the longitudinal acceleration is reduced in order to limit the occurrence of the somatogravic illusion during the "go-around" phase. However, this type of system does not currently allow taking action on the vertical acceleration which also causes the occurrence of sensory illusions (e.g. somatogravic illusion). Therefore, there is still a risk of the pilot suffering from spatial disorientation.

[0007] In another example, there is an information system for comparing the actual longitudinal attitude with the longitudinal attitude perceived by the pilot (i.e. perceived by the vestibular system of the pilot) and, based on this comparison, issuing a warning when the flight conditions can cause the pilot to suffer from spatial disorientation. Thus, it is possible to predict when the pilot can be spatially disoriented and warn them of this possibility.

[0008] However, the current systems for preventing the improper piloting of the aircraft related to the spatial disorientation of the pilot only take into account the detection of the risk of spatial disorientation, without taking into account the detection of the situation in which one or more pilots succumb to a sensory illusion (e.g. somatogravic illusion) and apply an improper piloting action (e.g. a piloting action that proves unsuitable for the current flight phase, aimed at commanding the aircraft to dive).

[0009] Therefore, it would be beneficial to overcome these drawbacks of the prior art in order to improve the situation by adding protection to the current recommendations of the agencies to comply with the new regulatory certification constraints.

[0010] In particular, it would be beneficial to provide a solution that not only detects the flight conditions that cause the occurrence of the somatogravic illusion, but also, while detecting the risk of succumbing to such somatogravic illusion, detects the situation in which the pilot actually shows signs of such succumbing to the somatogravic illusion (e.g. improperly piloting the aircraft). Moreover, it would be beneficial to provide a solution that enables correcting this improper piloting of the aircraft when one or more pilots are potentially suffering from spatial disorientation. SUMMARY

[0011] A method is proposed herein for detecting an improper piloting related to a spatial disorientation related to a somatogravic illusion experienced by at least one pilot and protecting the aircraft from said improper piloting. The method is implemented in a detection and protection system comprising an electronic circuit configured to:

[0012] - obtain flight information and state information of the aircraft;

[0013] - based on the obtained flight information, estimate a current value of a perceived longitudinal attitude (Θ perceived ) perceived by the at least one pilot according to the following formula:

[0014]

[0015] where Nx 1cockpit is a measured value of the longitudinal acceleration of the aircraft at time t in the reference frame of the aircraft, and is measured in a predefined region around the cockpit; and

[0016] where Nz 1cockpit is a measured value of the vertical acceleration of the aircraft at time t in the reference frame of the aircraft, and is measured in a predefined region around the cockpit;

[0017] - calculate the difference between the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude (Θ actual ) obtained based on the obtained flight information and the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude (Θ perceived ); and then

[0018] - when the difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude (Θ perceived ) and the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude (Θ actual ) is greater than or equal to a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold, determine whether the piloting action performed by the at least one pilot is inappropriate based on the obtained state information of the aircraft; and then

[0019] - when the piloting action performed is inappropriate, activate a protection measure against inappropriate piloting.

[0020] Thus, not only can the flight conditions leading to the appearance of a somatogravic illusion be detected, but it can also be detected whether the pilot is suffering from such a somatogravic illusion and is showing signs of a spatial disorientation leading to inappropriate piloting of the aircraft. Thus, a protection measure for protecting the aircraft from such inappropriate piloting can be activated.

[0021] According to one embodiment, the protection measure is activated when the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude (Θ actual ) is less than or equal to a predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold.

[0022] According to one embodiment, activating the protection measure comprises estimating an expected inference of the longitudinal attitude, also called dynamic longitudinal attitude (Θ dyn ), expressed by the following equation:

[0023]

[0024] where

[0025] - θ actual is the current actual longitudinal attitude;

[0026] - K is a gain for weighting the dynamic variation of the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual .

[0027] According to one embodiment, when the current value of the dynamic longitudinal attitude (θ dyn ) is greater than a predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold, the protection measure is deactivated, otherwise a control surface command is calculated to correct the inappropriate piloting action of at least one pilot.

[0028] According to one embodiment, the calculated control surface command is assigned a priority and, when after voting, said priority of the calculated control surface command is higher than the priority of at least one other different protection measure, this control surface command is transmitted to the control surface actuator of the aircraft.

[0029] According to one embodiment, when said control surface command is transmitted to said control surface actuator of the aircraft, a warning message is also transmitted to warn at least one pilot that said protection measure is activated.

[0030] There is also proposed herein a detection and protection system for detecting inappropriate piloting related to a spatial disorientation related to a somatogravic illusion experienced by at least one pilot and protecting an aircraft from said inappropriate piloting, the detection and protection system comprising an electronic circuit configured to:

[0031] - obtain flight information and state information of the aircraft;

[0032] - estimate, based on the obtained flight information, a current value of a perceived longitudinal attitude (θ perceived ) perceived by said at least one pilot according to the following formula:

[0033]

[0034] where Nx 1cockpit is a measured value of the longitudinal acceleration of the aircraft at time t in a reference frame of the aircraft and is measured in a predefined region around the cockpit; and

[0035] where Nz 1cockpit is a measured value of the vertical acceleration of the aircraft at time t in a reference frame of the aircraft and is measured in a predefined region around the cockpit;

[0036] - calculate a current value of an actual longitudinal attitude (θ actual ) obtained based on the obtained flight information and compare it to the perceived longitudinal attitude (θ perceivedthe difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude (Q

[0037] - when the difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude (Q perceived ) and the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude (Q actual ) is greater than or equal to a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold, determining whether the piloting action performed by the at least one pilot is inappropriate based on the obtained state information of the aircraft; and then

[0038] - when the piloting action performed is inappropriate, activating a protection measure against inappropriate piloting.

[0039] It is also proposed an aircraft comprising a detection and protection system as described above.

[0040] It is also proposed a computer program product comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the aforementioned method according to any one of the embodiments of the aforementioned method. It is also proposed a storage medium for storing such instructions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0041] The foregoing features of the present disclosure, as well as other features, will become more clearly apparent from the following description of at least one embodiment, provided for exemplary purposes, and made with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein:

[0042] Figure 1 schematically illustrates an aircraft equipped with a system for detecting inappropriate piloting related to a spatial orientation impairment of at least one pilot and protecting the aircraft from this inappropriate piloting, according to one embodiment;

[0043] Figure 2 schematically illustrates a system for detecting inappropriate piloting related to a spatial orientation impairment of at least one pilot and protecting the aircraft from this inappropriate piloting, according to one embodiment;

[0044] Figure 3 schematically illustrates an example of a hardware platform for implementing in electronic circuit form a system for detecting inappropriate piloting related to a spatial orientation impairment of at least one pilot and protecting the aircraft from this piloting, according to one embodiment;

[0045] Figure 4 and Figure 5 schematically illustrates the various steps of a method for detecting inappropriate piloting related to a spatial orientation impairment of at least one pilot and protecting the aircraft from this inappropriate piloting, performed by a detection and protection system, according to one embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0046] The general principles of this disclosure relate to detecting flight conditions that can cause somatic gravity illusions that lead to spatial disorientation in one or more pilots of an aircraft, and to detecting proven spatial disorientation in at least one pilot. This disclosure also relates to correcting inappropriate piloting actions when one or more pilots of an aircraft experience such spatial disorientation, for example, related to somatic gravity illusions.

[0047] Inappropriate piloting maneuvers by one or more pilots of an aircraft are understood to mean inappropriate actions taken given the necessary maneuvers (e.g., piloting maneuvers intended to command the aircraft to dive that are proven unsuitable for the current phase of flight) or actions not taken by one or more pilots of the aircraft. For example, a dive maneuver can be considered a confirmed sign of gravity illusion, just as a failed pull-up on the lateral control column can also be due to and can be considered as a result of gravity illusion.

[0048] therefore, Figure 1 A side view schematically illustrates an aircraft 100 equipped with a system 101 (hereinafter also referred to as detection and protection system 101) according to one embodiment, which is used to detect improper piloting in connection with spatial orientation obstruction of at least one pilot and to protect the aircraft 100 from such improper piloting when at least one pilot generates spatial orientation obstruction.

[0049] according to Figure 1 In some implementations, the detection and protection system 101 is an electronic device located on the aircraft 100. For example, the detection and protection system 101 forms part of the electronic circuitry of the avionics of the aircraft 100. For example, the detection and protection system 101 is integrated into a flight control computer (referred to as CCV). The flight control computer CCV is, for example, the main flight control computer.

[0050] exist Figure 2 The diagram schematically illustrates a detection and protection system 101 according to one embodiment.

[0051] The detection and protection system 101 includes:

[0052] - Module M1 (also known as monitoring module M1) is used to monitor the risk of body gravity illusion;

[0053] - The second module M2 (also known as the detection module M2) is used to detect inappropriate actions performed by at least one pilot;

[0054] - a third module M3 (also called a protection module M3) for preventing an inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100 related to a spatial orientation disorder of the pilot.

[0055] It should be noted that the term "module" can equally refer to a software component, a hardware component or a collection of hardware and software components, with the software component itself corresponding to one or more computer programs or subprograms, or more generally to any element of a program capable of implementing a function or a collection of functions.

[0056] The detection and protection system 101 is configured to receive, in real time, flight information representative of flight parameters of the aircraft 100 at a given flight time t from a set of different measurement systems, denoted SYS_MES. These flight parameters include, for example: the geographical position of the aircraft 100, its speed, its heading, its height above ground, its longitudinal attitude (i.e. the degree of pitch), its longitudinal and / or vertical accelerations in a predefined zone around the cockpit of the aircraft 100, etc. Each measurement system comprises a set of sensors configured to measure, in real time, one or more flight parameters of the aircraft 100. These sensors are, for example: accelerometers, pressure sensors, gyroscopes, etc.

[0057] The detection and protection system 101 is also configured to receive, in real time, information on the state of the aircraft 100, with the information originating from a set of various avionics systems of the aircraft 100, denoted SYS_AV. This state information is representative of state parameters of the aircraft 100 at the flight time t. These state parameters include, for example: the position of one or more control members (for example, "side sticks") enabling the pilot of the aircraft 100 (i.e. the pilot and the co-pilot of the flight) to take action on the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft, the model of the aircraft 100, its mass, the position of its center of gravity, the configuration of the flaps and slats, etc.

[0058] According to one embodiment, the detection and protection system 101 can also be configured to transmit a warning message to one or more warning and / or communication systems of the aircraft 100 (not shown in the figure), for example: a flight warning computer (FWC), a centralized monitoring system (or electronic centralized monitoring (ECAM) system), a primary flight display (PFD), etc. This warning message informs the pilot of the activation of the protection measures against an inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100 related to a potential spatial orientation disorder of the pilot. In one embodiment, the warning message also informs the pilot that corrective measures are being taken to correct the inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100. Figure 2

[0059] ​According to one embodiment, the detection and protection system 101 is further configured to calculate, as needed, control surface commands (e.g., elevator commands) for correcting inappropriate actions performed by one or more pilots, and to issue such control surface commands to the flight control controller (CCV). The flight control controller (CCV) is configured to transmit the commands via actuators ( Figure 2 (Not shown) Control surfaces of the aircraft 100, such as two elevators (denoted as GP1 and GP2), are used to move the aircraft. In one example, the flight control controller (CCV) is configured to send control surface commands calculated by the detection and protection system 101 to actuators that adjust either or both of the elevators GP1 and GP2 to a specific angle suitable for the current flight condition of the aircraft 100 (e.g., an angle suitable for performing a "go-around" phase).

[0060] Figure 3 An example of a hardware platform for implementing a detection and protection system 101 in the form of electronic circuitry, according to one embodiment, is illustrated schematically.

[0061] The hardware platform includes a processor or CPU (central processing unit) 301 connected via a communication bus 310, RAM (random access memory) 302, ROM 303 of type ROM (read-only memory) or EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable ROM) (e.g., flash memory), storage unit (e.g., hard disk drive (HDD) 304) or storage media reader (e.g., security digital card reader), and interface manager COM 305.

[0062] Interface Manager COM 305 enables Detection and Protection System 101 to interact with, for example, all measurement systems SYS_MES and all avionics systems SYS_AV of Aircraft 100. According to one implementation, Interface Manager COM 305 enables Detection and Protection System 101 to interact with warning and / or communication systems of Aircraft 100, such as FWC, ECAM, PFD, etc.

[0063] Processor 301 is capable of executing instructions loaded into random access memory 302 from read-only memory 303, external memory, storage media (e.g., SD card), or a communication network. When the hardware platform is powered on, processor 301 is capable of reading instructions from random access memory 302 and executing those instructions. These instructions form a computer program that causes processor 301 to perform all or some of the steps or methods described in this specification, or more broadly, the sequence of operations of aircraft 100.

[0064] Therefore, all or some of the steps, methods and operations described herein can be implemented in software form by using a programmable machine, such as a DSP (Digital Signal Processor) type processor or microcontroller, executing an instruction set, or in hardware form by a dedicated machine or electronic component ("chip") or a group of dedicated electronic components ("chipset"), such as an FPGA ("Field-Programmable Gate Array") or ASIC ("Application-Specific Integrated Circuit") component. Generally, the detection and protection system 101 comprises electronic circuitry adapted and configured to implement all or some of the operations, methods and steps described herein.

[0065] In association with Figure 4 is presented in the form of a diagram of steps of a method according to an embodiment (hereinafter also referred to as "detection and protection method") for detecting an inappropriate piloting related to a spatial disorientation of at least one pilot and protecting the aircraft 100 from this inappropriate piloting when the at least one pilot is potentially experiencing a spatial disorientation. All or some of this detection and protection method are implemented by the detection and protection system 101 described above.

[0066] Subsequently, by way of example, the detection and protection method is implemented in flight conditions corresponding to a "go-around" phase. Indeed, as previously described, the longitudinal and vertical acceleration conditions of the "go-around" phase lead to the appearance of a somatogravic illusion likely to generate a spatial disorientation of the pilot and, therefore, to a potential inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100. It should be noted that the detection and protection method can be implemented in flight conditions other than those corresponding to a go-around maneuver (also referred to as "go-around" phase).

[0067] From the start of the flight of the aircraft 100, i.e. as soon as the aircraft 100 is no longer in contact with the ground, during a step 401 (denoted R INFO), the detection and protection system 101 obtains, in real time, from all the measurement systems SYS M ES and all the avionics systems SYS AV of the aircraft 100, flight information and state information respectively representative of flight parameters and state parameters of the aircraft 100.

[0068] According to an embodiment, the measurement systems and the avionics systems transmit this flight information and state information of the aircraft 100 to the detection and protection system 101 at a predetermined frequency. The predetermined frequency depends on the capabilities of the probes or sensors of each aircraft. According to a specific embodiment, the predetermined frequency depends on the nature of the parameters (i.e. flight parameters or state parameters). In one example, the transmission frequency of the flight information representative of flight parameters such as longitudinal acceleration is 8 points per second.

[0069] According to one embodiment, each item of flight information or status information is filtered according to predetermined filtering criteria. For example, these filtering criteria depend on the nature of the flight parameter or status parameter. Thus, an unintentional detection of flight conditions leading to the onset of a spatial disorientation of the pilot can be avoided. Thus, it is possible to avoid activating protection measures for protecting the aircraft 100 from the effects of an inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100 at an inappropriate time.

[0070] During the phase of monitoring the flight conditions, the detection and protection system 101 detects, via the monitoring module Ml, flight conditions leading to the occurrence of a somatogravic illusion during the "go-around" phase. In particular, according to one embodiment, the detection and protection system 101 monitors the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100.

[0071] To this end, during a step 402 (denoted DET_0 p ), the detection and protection system 101 estimates, via the monitoring module Ml, a current value (i.e. at time t) of the degree (i.e. the degree of perceived pitch attitude) of the perceived longitudinal attitude of the pilot (denoted 0 perceived , hereinafter referred to as "perceived longitudinal attitude") according to the following equation EQ1:

[0072]

[0073] wherein,

[0074] - Nx 1cockpit is a measured value of the longitudinal acceleration of the aircraft 100 in the reference frame of the aircraft 100 at time t, and is measured in a predefined region around the cockpit (for example, using an accelerometer in the front of the aircraft 100 or installed in the cockpit);

[0075] - Nz 1cockpit is a measured value of the vertical acceleration of the aircraft 100 in the reference frame of the aircraft 100 at time t, and is measured in a predefined region around the cockpit (for example, using an accelerometer at the front of the aircraft 100 or installed in the cockpit).

[0076] This current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude 0 perceived corresponds to an estimated value of the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 experienced by the vestibular system of the pilot (at the location of their head).

[0077] Then, during a step 403 (denoted COMP_DIFF_S1), the detection and protection system 101 determines, via the monitoring module Ml, that the current flight conditions lead to the occurrence of a somatogravic illusion for the pilot. To this end, the detection and protection system 101 calculates the difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude 0 perceived and the actual longitudinal attitude (i.e. the degree of actual pitch attitude, denoted 0actual the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude Q actual is measured, for example, by sensors such as gyroscopes.

[0078] The current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude Q perceived is then compared with the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude Q actual This difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude Q perceived and the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude Q actual is compared with a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold value, denoted S1. The order of magnitude of this predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold value S1 is in the range between 5° and 10°. Thus, the aim in this case is to monitor the deviation between the perception of the crew of the aircraft 100 and the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100.

[0079] In a particular embodiment, this predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold value S1 depends on the height of the aircraft 100 relative to the ground at a given time, denoted time t.

[0080] Thus, if the difference between the current value of the perceived longitudinal attitude Q perceived and the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude Q actual is less than the predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold value S1 (i.e. a “No” response at the end of step 403), this step 403COMP_DIFF_S1 is repeated.

[0081] Conversely, if this difference is greater than or equal to the predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold value S1 (i.e. a “Yes” response at the end of step 403), the detection and protection system 101 performs a step 405 (denoted 403_ET_404). Thus, when the perceived longitudinal attitude Q perceived perceived by the pilot is greater than the actual longitudinal attitude Q actual (i.e. measured by one or more appropriate sensors), by more than the predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold value S1, there is a risk that the pilot will experience a spatial disorientation related to the somatogravic illusion.

[0082] During a step 404 (denoted COMP_Q r _S2) occurring synchronously or asynchronously with the step 403COMP_DIFF_S1 described above, the detection and protection system 101 compares, via the monitoring module M1, the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude Q actual with a predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold value, denoted S2. The order of magnitude of this predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold value S2 is in the range between 5° and 12°. Thus, incorrect detection of flight conditions leading to the somatogravic illusion of the pilot can be avoided.

[0083] In a particular implementation, the predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold S2 depends on the height of the aircraft 100 relative to the ground at time t.

[0084] If the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual is greater than the predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold S2 (i.e. a “No” response at the end of step 404), step 404 is repeated. Conversely, if the current value of the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual is less than or equal to the predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold S2 (i.e. a “Yes” response at the end of step 404), the detection and protection system 101 executes step 405 (denoted 403_ET_404).

[0085] During step 405 (denoted 403_ET_404), the detection and protection system 101 checks, via the monitoring module M1, that at time t, at the end of step 404 COMP_θ r _S2, the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual is less than or equal to the predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold S2 (i.e. a “Yes” response at the end of step 404), and in addition, the difference between the perceived longitudinal attitude θ perceived and the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual is greater than or equal to the predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold S1 (i.e. a “Yes” response at the end of step 403). If both conditions are met (i.e. a “Yes” response at the end of step 404 and a “Yes” response at the end of step 403), the detection and protection system 101 detects that the current flight conditions cause the pilot to experience a somatogravic illusion.

[0086] During the phase of monitoring the piloting of the aircraft 100, the detection and protection system 101 determines, via the detection module M2, whether the piloting of the aircraft 100 by the at least one pilot is inappropriate. More particularly, when a flight condition causing the pilot to experience a somatogravic illusion is detected at the end of the flight condition monitoring phase, the detection and protection system 101 determines whether the piloting of the aircraft 100 by the at least one pilot is inappropriate.

[0087] To do this, during step 406 (denoted DET_ACT_EQ), the detection and protection system 101 detects, via the detection module M2, that at least one pilot is performing a piloting action on at least one piloting component of the aircraft 100 at time t. The detection and protection system 101 then determines whether this piloting action is inappropriate (i.e. unsuitable) for the current flight phase (for example, the go-around phase).

[0088] In one example, when the aircraft 100 is in a go-around phase, the "inappropriate" piloting action is an action aiming at commanding the aircraft 100 to dive in order to reduce the longitudinal attitude (whereas the appropriate action would be to reduce the longitudinal attitude to stabilize in horizontal flight). To this end, the detection and protection system 101 receives, from one or more avionics of the aircraft 100 belonging to the set of avionics SYS_AV, state information representative of state parameters of the aircraft 100, for example the position of piloting members used to control the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100.

[0089] Thus, in this example, if the detection and protection system 101 does not detect any action by the pilot on the piloting members, or if a piloting action is detected but which is not inappropriate given the state of the aircraft 100, in particular the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft (i.e. "No" response at the end of step 406), step 406 is repeated. Conversely, if the detection and protection system 101 detects an inappropriate piloting action by at least one pilot on at least one piloting member when the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 has already been low, for example a dive (longitudinal) inappropriate action (for example, an action aiming at commanding the aircraft 100 to dive, for example using piloting members such as the side stick) (i.e. "Yes" response at the end of step 406), the detection and protection system 101 performs step 407 (denoted 403_ET_404_ET_406).

[0090] Furthermore, when an inappropriate piloting action on at least one piloting member is detected, the detection and protection system 101 implements a timer giving the pilot time to react himself and correct the inappropriate piloting action. In one example, the detection and protection system 101 changes the variable i from the value 0 to 1 by applying a delay denoted T (in seconds), which is predetermined and fixed (for example, 2s to 8s) and / or depends on the height and the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual .

[0091] At the end of the phases for monitoring the flight conditions (i.e. steps 402 to 405) and for monitoring the piloting of the aircraft 100 (i.e. step 406), during step 407 (denoted 403_ET_404_ET_406), the detection and protection system 101 checks that:

[0092] - at the end of step 404 COMP_θ r _S2, the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual is less than or equal to the predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold S2 (i.e. "Yes" response at the end of step 404); and - the perceived longitudinal attitude θ perceived is less than or equal to the perceived longitudinal attitude threshold S1 (i.e. "Yes" response at the end of step 405); and actualthe difference between the estimated longitudinal attitude (θ perceived ) of the aircraft 100 perceived by the pilot and the actual longitudinal attitude (θ actual ) of the aircraft is greater than or equal to a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold S1 (i.e. "Yes" response at the end of step 403); and

[0093] - an inappropriate piloting action is performed by the at least one pilot on at least one piloting component (i.e. "Yes" response at the end of step 406).

[0094] Therefore, when the aforementioned conditions are met (i.e. "Yes" responses at the end of steps 403, 404 and 406), the detection and protection system 101 detects that one or more pilots are potentially experiencing a spatial disorientation and are possibly, due to this spatial disorientation, improperly piloting the aircraft 100.

[0095] Therefore, it is possible to detect that the pilot is potentially suffering from a somatogravic illusion and is undoubtedly performing inappropriate piloting actions (for example, actions aimed at commanding the aircraft 100 to dive) relying only on their own senses and not on their instruments or warnings from various systems (for example, a ground proximity warning system or GPWS) by comparing the estimate of the longitudinal attitude (θ perceived ) of the aircraft 100 perceived by the pilot with the actual longitudinal attitude (θ actual ) of the aircraft.

[0096] Therefore, during step 408 (denoted as PRO_ON), the detection and protection system 101 activates, via the protection module M3, protection measures (hereinafter also referred to as "protection measures") for protecting the aircraft 100 from inappropriate piloting.

[0097] Figure 5 A step diagram of the detection and protection method after the activation of the protection measures (i.e. step 408 PRO_ON) is shown, according to one embodiment. Steps 501 and 504 described below are implemented by the detection module M3 of the detection and protection system 101.

[0098] When this protection measure is activated (i.e. step 408 PRO_ON), then, during step 501 (denoted as DET_θ d ), the detection and protection system 101 estimates the expectation of the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100, taking into account the current movement of the aircraft 100 at time t (called dynamic longitudinal attitude, denoted as θ dyn ), using the following formula EQ2:

[0099]

[0100] wherein

[0101] K is a gain for taking into account the dynamic variation of the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual .

[0102] estimating a dynamic longitudinal attitude θ dyn enables the adjustment of the protection measure. For example, if the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 is returning to a more reasonable value, there is no need to intervene as strongly as if the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 continues to decrease.

[0103] After estimating the dynamic longitudinal attitude (denoted θ dyn ), the detection and protection system 101 compares the dynamic longitudinal attitude θ dyn with a predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold (denoted S3).

[0104] In a particular embodiment, this predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3 depends on the height of the aircraft 100 relative to the ground at time t.

[0105] When the current value of the dynamic longitudinal attitude θ dyn is greater than the predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3 (i.e. a “yes” response at the end of step 501), the protection measure is deactivated during a step 502 (denoted PRO OFF). Thus, the detection and protection system 101 does not calculate any control surface command for correcting the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 in response to an inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100. Since the aircraft 100 has reached a minimum target longitudinal attitude (i.e. a predetermined threshold of the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual , the protection measure is no longer in an active state. In other words, depending on the deviation between the actual longitudinal attitude (θ actual ) and the minimum target longitudinal attitude (i.e. a predetermined threshold of the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual ), the protection measure can remain in an active state or can not remain in an active state. The protection measure remains active as long as the current value of the dynamic longitudinal attitude θ dyn remains less than or equal to the predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3.

[0106] Conversely, when the current value of the dynamic longitudinal attitude θ dyn is less than the predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3 (i.e. a “no” response at the end of step 501), the detection and protection system 101 performs a step 503 (denoted CALC GOUV). In other words, the protection measure performed by the detection and protection system 101 enables the calculation of a control surface command, as needed, which is intended to correct the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 in response to an inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100 by one or more pilots.

[0107] During a step 503 CALC_GOUV, the detection and protection system 101 calculates a control surface command intended for controlling a control surface (e.g. an elevator control surface) in response to one or more inappropriate piloting actions by the pilots of the aircraft 100 to correct the longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100.

[0108] The control surface command is calculated based on certain flight information and certain state information previously obtained during a step 401 R_INFO. In particular, the control surface command depends on the actual longitudinal attitude 0 actual the value at time t of the model type of the aircraft 100, the mass of the aircraft 100 at time t and its center of gravity, the configuration of the flaps and slats, and the values at time t of various other flight parameters and state parameters of the aircraft 100. The control surface command also depends on a predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3. In one example, the control surface command corresponds to a command to pull up the aircraft 100 to counteract at least one inappropriate dive command by the pilots until the aircraft 100 returns to a longitudinal attitude such that:

[0109] - the immediate risk of CFIT can be considered to be sufficiently reduced;

[0110] - the deviation between the actual longitudinal attitude of the aircraft 100 and the longitudinal attitude perceived by the pilots reduces the risk of suffering from a spatial disorientation.

[0111] The activation of the protection measure thus comprises:

[0112] - estimating the dynamic longitudinal attitude (0 dyn );

[0113] - checking for a deviation between the current value of the dynamic longitudinal attitude (0 dyn ) of the aircraft and the predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3;

[0114] - calculating, as needed, a control surface command (e.g. an elevator command) to correct the inappropriate piloting action (e.g. pulling up the aircraft) by at least one of the pilots.

[0115] At the end of the step 503 CALC_GOUV, the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is assigned a priority, for example by a voting module of the avionics system of the aircraft 100. This priority depends, for example, on decision criteria, for example a command intended to pull up the aircraft 100 the most will have the highest priority.

[0116] The priority of the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is then compared with other priorities assigned by various avionics protection systems of the aircraft 100 to other protection measures (for example, the protection measures described in the patent application published by the Applicant under the number FR 2986876, which describes an automatic protection measure called GCoP (abbreviation for "Ground Collision Protection") for protecting the aircraft from the risk of collision with the ground or the sea). These other protection measures also aim to transmit control surface commands for actuating the elevators control surface.

[0117] In order to select the control surface command to be applied, a voting module of the avionics system of the aircraft 100 compares, for example, the priorities of the various control surface commands calculated by the various protection measures. Thus, the control surface command having the highest priority is selected as the priority command by the voting module, and this command is applied.

[0118] If the priority of the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is higher than the priority of the other protection measures (for example, the control surface command calculated for the GCoP protection measure), the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is prioritized. Thus, during a step 504 (denoted TRANS GOUV), the detection and protection system 101 performs a correction measure for correcting the inappropriate piloting action corresponding to the transmission of the previously calculated control surface command via the flight control computer CCV to the control surface actuator (for example, the elevators of the aircraft 100). Conversely, if the priority of the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is lower than the priority of the other protection measures, this control surface command is not transmitted, and for example the control surface command of another protection measure is then transmitted to the elevators. If the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is not prioritized, this means that another more important pull-up command has already been sent by another protection system, or that the pull-up command is important but has a lower priority than the dive command (which generally remains prioritized to prevent the aircraft from potentially stalling).

[0119] According to one embodiment, the detection and protection method ends after the control surface command is transmitted.

[0120] It should be noted that the protection measures described above should not prevent the pilot from landing the aircraft 100. Indeed, as mentioned above, this protection measure is only activated in the case of a potential somatogravic illusion, and when the pilot wishes to land, the situation should not be such, since the low longitudinal acceleration of the aircraft 100 (main factor of the somatogravic illusion phenomenon) at this time is due to the reduced thrust level chosen for the landing maneuver.

[0121] Thus, by means of this protection measure implemented by the detection and protection system 101, the current systems already implemented in some aircraft and designed to limit the longitudinal acceleration during the go-around phase can be complemented. In particular, this protection measure makes it possible to apply the correction measure described above to correct the inappropriate piloting action(s) of the pilot(s) as needed.

[0122] In a particular embodiment, during the step 504 TRANS GOUV, when the control surface command calculated by the detection and protection system 101 is prioritized, the detection and protection system 101 can generate a warning message for the pilot and transmit the warning message to the warning and / or communication system of the aircraft 100. This warning message will aim to inform the pilot of the activation of the protection measure for preventing inappropriate piloting of the aircraft 100. According to a particular embodiment, the warning message will also announce the execution of the correction measure for correcting the inappropriate piloting action. The detection and protection system 101 transmits this warning message to the warning and / or communication system of the aircraft 100, for example the ECAM, the PFD or the FWC, etc., so that this warning message is displayed and / or broadcast on the human-machine interface in the cockpit of the aircraft 100. In one example, this warning message will be a visual and / or audible notification in the form of a warning or advisory alert. Thus, the activation of this protection measure and the execution of the correction measure for correcting the inappropriate piloting action, if needed, will be accompanied by the display and / or broadcast of a warning message for the pilot to warn them of the activation of this protection measure and to prompt the pilot to stop applying the inappropriate dive command, if needed.

[0123] It should be noted that experience shows that, in the case of strong stress, and in particular in the case where the pilot is experiencing a tunneling effect, a warning message alone will be useless and secondary with respect to the protection (compensation) measure. Thus, the warning message can be combined with the protection measure implemented by the detection and protection system 101, where this protection measure is thus the main means of reducing the risk of losing control of the aircraft 100.

[0124] In a particular embodiment, in addition to the predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold S3, a predetermined minimum radio altitude threshold S4 is also used. Thus, the lower the radio altitude, the faster the detection of the flight conditions leading to the appearance of the somatogravic illusion must be confirmed. Thus, this detection can be limited as a function of the altitude of the aircraft 100 at the time t.

Claims

1. A method for detecting and protecting an aircraft (100) from inappropriate piloting related to spatial disorientation, the spatial disorientation being related to a physical gravity illusion experienced by at least one pilot, the method being implemented in a detection and protection system (101) comprising electronic circuitry configured to: - Obtain the flight information and status information of the aircraft (100) as described in (401); -Based on the obtained flight information, the perceived longitudinal attitude θ perceived by the at least one pilot is estimated (402) according to the following formula. perceived Current value: in, Nx 1cockpit It is a measurement of the longitudinal acceleration of the aircraft (100) at time t in the reference frame of the aircraft (100), and is measured in a predefined area around the cockpit; as well as Among them, Nz 1cockpit It is the measurement of the vertical acceleration of the aircraft (100) in the reference frame of the aircraft (100) at time t, and is measured in the predefined area around the cockpit; - Calculate (403) the actual longitudinal attitude θ obtained based on the acquired flight information. actual The current value and the perceived longitudinal pose θ perceived The difference between the current values; and then -When the perceived longitudinal attitude θ perceived The current value and the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual When the difference between the current values ​​is greater than or equal to a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold (S1), it is determined (406) based on the obtained state information of the aircraft (100) whether the piloting action performed by the at least one pilot is inappropriate; and then - When the driving action performed is inappropriate, activate (408) the protection measures against inappropriate driving.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, When the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual The protection measure is activated when the current value is less than or equal to the predetermined actual longitudinal attitude threshold (S2).

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, Activating the protection measure includes estimating the expected inference of the longitudinal attitude, also known as the dynamic longitudinal attitude θ. dyn It is expressed by the following equation: in -θ actual This is the current actual longitudinal attitude; -K is used to determine the actual longitudinal attitude θ. actual The gain is weighted by the dynamic changes.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein, When the dynamic longitudinal attitude θ dyn If the current value is greater than the predetermined minimum longitudinal attitude threshold (S3), the protection measures are disabled; otherwise, control surface commands are calculated to correct any inappropriate piloting actions of the at least one pilot.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein, The calculated control surface commands are assigned priorities, and wherein, after a vote, the priority of the calculated control surface command is higher than the priority of at least one other different protection measure, the control surface command is transmitted to the control surface actuator of the aircraft (100).

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein, When the control surface command is transmitted to the control surface actuator of the aircraft (100), a warning message is transmitted to warn the at least one pilot that the protection measures have been activated.

7. A detection and protection system (101) for detecting and protecting an aircraft (100) from improper piloting related to spatial disorientation, the spatial disorientation being related to a physical gravity illusion experienced by at least one pilot, the detection and protection system (101) comprising electronic circuitry configured to: - Obtain the flight information and status information of the aircraft (100) as described in (401); -Based on the obtained flight information, the perceived longitudinal attitude θ perceived by the at least one pilot is estimated (402) according to the following formula. perceived Current value: in, Nx 1cockpit It is a measurement of the longitudinal acceleration of the aircraft (100) at time t in the reference frame of the aircraft (100), and is measured in a predefined area around the cockpit; as well as Among them, Nz 1cockpit It is the measurement of the vertical acceleration of the aircraft (100) in the reference frame of the aircraft (100) at time t, and is measured in the predefined area around the cockpit; -Calculate (403) the actual longitudinal attitude (θ) obtained based on the acquired flight information. actual The current value of ) and the perceived longitudinal pose θ perceived The difference between the current values; And then -When the perceived longitudinal attitude θ perceived The current value and the actual longitudinal attitude θ actual When the difference between the current values ​​is greater than or equal to a predetermined longitudinal attitude deviation threshold (S1), it is determined (406) based on the obtained state information of the aircraft (100) whether the piloting action performed by the at least one pilot is inappropriate; and - When the driving action performed is inappropriate, activate (408) the protection measures against inappropriate driving.

8. An aircraft (100) comprising the detection and protection system (101) according to claim 7.

9. A computer program product comprising instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A storage medium storing a computer program, the computer program including instructions that, when read and executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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