Wind power heat storage bilateral transaction method considering peak regulation

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of power systems, and particularly discloses a wind power heat storage bilateral transaction method considering peak regulation, and the method comprises the steps: dividing a heat storage device into an independent type and a coupled type; aiming at the independent heat storage device, taking the maximum revenue of the heat storage device and the maximum revenue of a wind power enterprise as a target, and constructing a bilateral transaction model for the independent heat storage device to participate in power grid peak regulation; according to the bilateral transaction model, a heat storage device is adopted to declare consumption of transaction electric quantity, and a wind power enterprise declarates a main-slave game model of transaction price according to the main-slave game model, so that Nash equilibrium is achieved through multiple rounds of games. The method has the advantages that the problems that pressure is brought to power grid peak regulation by large-scale new energy grid connection at the present stage and an existing transaction mechanism is difficult to effectively excite the heat storage device to participate in peak regulation are solved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of power systems, in particular to a wind power and heat storage bilateral transaction method considering peak regulation. BACKGROUND

[0002] Under the background of high proportion of new energy grid connection, the power system is facing increasing peak regulation pressure, especially in the winter heating period in the "three north" region, the "heat determines electricity" mode of thermal power units limits the wind power consumption, resulting in a large amount of wind curtailment. Therefore, China has carried out a large number of flexible transformation of thermal power units, using low load stable combustion technology on the boiler side, installing heat storage devices and low pressure cylinder cutting compensation and other measures. However, the traditional transformation means is difficult to fully adapt to the characteristics of strong volatility of new energy. The concept of producer and consumer comes from distributed energy system, which emphasizes the dual role of the subject in energy production and consumption. With its fast adjustability and flexible response characteristics, it has important potential in the power market reform, providing a new perspective for peak regulation. In this paper, the wind farm as a producer with variable output, and the independent heat storage device as a consumer that can store and release energy, form a producer and consumer alliance, through two-way interaction, collaborative peak regulation, and realize efficient allocation of resources.

[0003] At present, scholars have carried out a lot of research on the marketization transaction model of producer and consumer. However, the research is mostly concentrated in the electricity market or frequency regulation market, and the application of peak regulation market is still insufficient. Real-time dynamic competition and information asymmetry cannot effectively deal with the real challenges of wind power volatility and low return on heat storage investment. In addition, the existing peak regulation mechanism relies on centralized dispatching, lacks market-oriented incentives for producers and consumers, resulting in low participation and underutilization of flexible resources.

[0004] Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a more flexible and market-oriented bilateral transaction mechanism. Under this mechanism, producers and consumers can fully play their dual roles of production and consumption by negotiating electricity and price, optimize the allocation of peak regulation resources, and achieve dynamic balance of interests of all parties. After introducing the bilateral transaction mechanism, how to effectively solve the electricity and price in the transaction becomes a key challenge. Game theory can effectively describe the cooperation and competition between producers and consumers. Especially in the process of wind power and heat storage enterprises participating in peak regulation, as independent market subjects, their interest demands and decision strategies are different, and it is difficult to achieve fairness of income distribution and optimization of resource utilization by relying solely on centralized dispatching. Therefore, it is urgent to develop a method that can accurately describe and coordinate the interests and interaction strategies of different subjects, and provide theoretical support for the participation of producers and consumers in peak regulation. SUMMARY

[0005] The purpose of the present application is to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art and provide a wind power and heat storage bilateral transaction method considering peak regulation.

[0006] The purpose of the present application is achieved by the following technical solutions: a wind power storage bilateral transaction method considering peak regulation, the method comprising,

[0007] The heat storage device is divided into independent and coupled types;

[0008] For the independent heat storage device, a bilateral transaction model of the independent heat storage device participating in grid peak regulation is constructed, with the maximum respective benefits of the heat storage device and the wind power enterprise as the target;

[0009] The bilateral transaction model is constructed as a master-slave game model of "the heat storage device reporting the consumed transaction electricity, and the wind power enterprise reporting the transaction price accordingly", and through multiple rounds of game, Nash equilibrium is reached.

[0010] Specifically, the objective function of the bilateral transaction model is:

[0011] (1)

[0012] (2)

[0013] In the formula, , represent the bilateral transaction benefit functions of the heat storage enterprise and the wind power enterprise respectively; is the heating income of the heat storage enterprise in the bilateral transaction period; is the carbon emission reduction benefit in the bilateral transaction period; , and are the electricity purchase cost, the over-the-network fee and the regulation cost of the heat storage enterprise respectively; is the total benefit of the wind power enterprise; is the bilateral transaction benefit of the wind power enterprise; is the power generation cost of the wind power enterprise; is the penalty cost of abandoned wind power; is the penalty cost of contract electricity deviation.

[0014] Specifically, the constraint conditions of the bilateral transaction model of the independent heat storage device participating in grid peak regulation include:

[0015] Bilateral transaction price upper and lower limit constraint:

[0016] (3)

[0017] In the formula, is the planned on-grid price of the wind power enterprise; represents the unit power generation cost of the wind power enterprise; is the on-grid price of blocked wind power;

[0018] Blocked wind power consumption constraint:

[0019] (4)

[0020] wherein, is the amount of electricity produced by the wind power enterprise at the time of the blocked period t; is the amount of electricity traded by bidding;

[0021] The heat storage enterprise absorbs the blocked wind power electricity amount constraint:

[0022] (5)

[0023] wherein, is the maximum amount of wind power electricity that can be absorbed in the period;

[0024] The upper and lower limits of the electricity price constraint:

[0025] (6)

[0026] wherein, and are the blocked wind power on-grid price and the fixed over-grid fee, respectively, and are the upper and lower limits of the electricity price, respectively;

[0027] The upper and lower limits of the heat storage amount demand of the heat storage enterprise constraint:

[0028] (7)

[0029] wherein, and are the upper and lower limits of the heat storage demand of the heat storage enterprise, respectively; is the initial heat storage amount of the heat storage device; is the electricity-heat conversion efficiency, is the amount of electricity purchased by bilateral transaction, is the blocked period.

[0030] Specifically, the master-slave game model includes game participants, participant strategies, payment functions, and Stacklberg-Nash equilibrium.

[0031] The game participant set C is as follows:

[0032] (8)

[0033] wherein, is the leader heat storage enterprise, is the follower wind power enterprise;

[0034] The participant strategy set S is as follows:

[0035] (9)

[0036] In the formula, is the bidding transaction price, is the bidding transaction electricity quantity;

[0037] The payment function I is as follows:

[0038] (10)

[0039] In the formula, is the total income of the wind power enterprise; is the bidding transaction price; is the bidding transaction electricity quantity;

[0040] Stacklberg-Nash equilibrium:

[0041] (11)

[0042] In the formula, is the total electricity quantity of the bilateral transaction finally obtained, is the bilateral transaction income value of the heat storage enterprise obtained in the kth iteration at t time, is the bilateral transaction income value of the wind power enterprise obtained in the kth iteration at t time, is the bilateral transaction price finally obtained, is the expected consumption electricity quantity; is the transaction electricity price.

[0043] Specifically, the raccoon optimization algorithm is used to solve the principal-agent game model, including:

[0044] S1, initialize the basic data of the wind power enterprise and the heat storage enterprise participating in the principal-agent game transaction, and set the raccoon optimization algorithm parameters;

[0045] S2, in the wind power blocked period , the heat storage enterprise uses the raccoon optimization algorithm to generate a candidate expected consumption electricity quantity , for each candidate , the wind power enterprise calculates the transaction electricity price of the kth iteration income maximization according to its income function;

[0046] S3, the heat storage enterprise performs income accounting based on the offer of the wind power enterprise , and accordingly evaluates the fitness of each candidate , as shown in the following formula:

[0047] (12)

[0048] In the formula, is the unit power generation cost of the wind power enterprise, is the maximum consumable wind power quantity in the period, Indicates the maximum blocked electrical quantity;

[0049] S4. Using the update mechanism of the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm, generate a new round of candidates. ;

[0050] S5. Repeat S2-S4 to obtain the optimal price. ;

[0051] S6, will , Substitute the values ​​into formulas (1) and (2) in turn to obtain the respective gains of both parties;

[0052] S7. Determine the equilibrium solution. Calculate the changes in the payoffs of both sides in the current round and the previous round. If the change in payoffs of both sides is less than a certain preset threshold in several consecutive iterations, it is considered that the Nash equilibrium has been approximately reached. If not, adjust the parameters of the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm and return to S2. Otherwise, proceed to step S8.

[0053] S8, Order Repeat steps S1 to S7 to find the equilibrium solution at the next transaction time.

[0054] S9. Output the final transaction volume and transaction amount for all blocked periods to obtain the optimal decision result.

[0055] The present invention has the following advantages:

[0056] This paper presents the first systematic analysis of different power and heat receiving paths for thermal storage devices. For independent thermal storage devices, considering constraints such as the upper and lower limits of bilateral transaction electricity prices, the amount of wind power absorbed by obstructed systems, and the amount of wind power absorbed by thermal storage companies, a bilateral transaction model for thermal storage devices to participate in grid peak shaving is proposed. This model adopts a master-slave game model in which thermal storage devices declare the amount of electricity to be absorbed in the transaction, and wind power companies declare the transaction price accordingly. Through multiple rounds of game, a Nash equilibrium is reached, thereby achieving the goal of thermal storage devices participating in grid peak shaving. Attached Figure Description

[0057] Figure 1 This is a typical connection method for thermal storage devices. Detailed Implementation

[0058] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only for explaining the invention and are not intended to limit the invention; that is, the described embodiments are merely some embodiments of the invention, and not all embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0059] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the invention.

[0060] It should be noted that relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used merely to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0061] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited to the following description.

[0062] like Figure 1 As shown, a bilateral trading method for wind power and thermal energy storage considering peak shaving is proposed. This method includes,

[0063] Considering the power and heat receiving paths of thermal storage devices, they are classified into independent and coupled types based on voltage level, location, and capacity;

[0064] For independent thermal storage devices, a bilateral trading model for independent thermal storage devices to participate in grid peak shaving is constructed with the goal of maximizing the respective benefits of the thermal storage device and the wind power company.

[0065] Power and heat receiving path:

[0066] 1) The power receiving path reflects the differences in connection location and voltage level, directly determining the degree of coupling. For example... Figure 1 As shown, coupled thermal storage devices are connected to thermal power units via low-voltage plant power (node ​​A), subject to power plant dispatch constraints, and their paths are tightly coupled to the cogeneration system. They have weak producer-consumer characteristics and mainly serve internal balance. Independent thermal storage devices (such as thermal storage electric boilers or electric molten salt systems) are connected to the grid via the high-voltage side of public power (node ​​B). Their paths are relatively independent, and they have the ability to regulate themselves on the load side. They need to bear grid crossing fees, but they enhance the potential for producer-consumer market participation.

[0067] 2) The thermal energy pathway further strengthens the classification differences, reflecting the energy conversion capability. Coupled pathways are limited by the time lag of cogeneration and usually support electricity-to-heat conversion, mainly used for power plant heating. Although some coupled pathways can achieve limited electricity-to-heat-to-electricity conversion, the overall flexibility is affected by system constraints. Independent pathways support bidirectional electricity-to-heat-to-electricity conversion, which can efficiently cope with wind power fluctuations from the load side, absorb wind curtailment, and release thermal energy according to demand.

[0068] Therefore, the coupling relationship between the thermal storage device and the thermal power unit is summarized in Table 1 below, and is divided into coupled type and independent type according to the installation position of the thermal storage device.

[0069] Table 1

[0070]

[0071] The bilateral trading model is constructed as a master-slave game model in which "thermal storage devices declare the amount of electricity to be consumed in the transaction, and wind power companies declare the transaction price accordingly". Through multiple rounds of game, until Nash equilibrium is reached, the purpose of thermal storage devices participating in grid peak regulation is realized.

[0072] Consider that thermal storage companies can absorb blocked wind power by adjusting their power output during periods of wind power disruption, and meet their own electricity needs by purchasing the blocked electricity from wind power companies. In this process, the thermal storage companies' revenue includes heating income and emission reduction benefits, while their costs include electricity purchase costs, grid access fees, and regulation costs. The wind power companies' revenue comes from electricity sales, while their costs include power generation and maintenance costs, wind curtailment penalties, and contracted power volume deviation penalties. During periods of disruption, wind power companies aim to maximize their own profits.

[0073] The objective function of the bilateral transaction model is:

[0074] (1)

[0075] (2)

[0076] In the formula, , These represent the revenue functions of bilateral transactions between thermal storage companies and wind power companies, respectively. The heating revenue of thermal storage enterprises during the bilateral trading period; Carbon emission reduction revenue during bilateral trading sessions; , and These are the electricity purchase cost, grid access fee, and regulation cost for thermal storage companies, respectively. Total revenue for wind power companies; For the revenue from bilateral transactions of wind power companies; For wind power companies' power generation costs; The cost of curtailing wind power; Penalty costs for deviations from contracted electricity volume.

[0077] Furthermore, the constraints of the bilateral trading model for the independent thermal storage device participating in grid peak shaving include:

[0078] Bilateral electricity price upper and lower limits constraints:

[0079] (3)

[0080] In the formula, Planned on-grid electricity prices for wind power companies; This represents the unit power generation cost of wind power companies; For the grid connection price of obstructed wind power;

[0081] Constrained by wind power absorption capacity:

[0082] (4)

[0083] In the formula, The amount of electricity generated by the wind power company at time t during the period of disruption; For auction-based trading of electricity volume;

[0084] Thermal energy storage companies face obstacles in absorbing wind power generation.

[0085] (5)

[0086] In the formula, This represents the maximum amount of wind power that can be absorbed during this period.

[0087] Electricity price upper and lower limits constraints:

[0088] (6)

[0089] In the formula, and These are the on-grid tariff for obstructed wind power and the fixed grid access fee. and These are the upper and lower limits for electricity prices;

[0090] Upper and lower limits of heat storage demand for thermal storage enterprises:

[0091] (7)

[0092] In the formula, and These represent the upper and lower limits of the thermal storage demand for thermal storage enterprises; This represents the initial heat storage capacity of the thermal storage device. For electrothermal conversion efficiency, Purchase of electricity for bilateral transactions, This refers to the period of obstruction.

[0093] Furthermore, the master-slave game model includes game participants, participant strategies, payoff functions, and Stacklberg-Nash equilibrium;

[0094] The set of game participants C is as follows:

[0095] (8)

[0096] In the formula, For leading thermal storage companies, For follower wind power companies;

[0097] The set of strategies S for participants is as follows:

[0098] (9)

[0099] In the formula, For the auction transaction price, For auction-based trading of electricity volume;

[0100] Payment function I is as follows:

[0101] (10)

[0102] In the formula, Total revenue for wind power companies; The auction price; For auction-based trading of electricity volume;

[0103] Stacklberg-Nash equilibrium:

[0104] (11)

[0105] In the formula, To obtain the final total electricity volume of the bilateral transaction, Let $t$ be the bilateral transaction revenue value of the thermal storage enterprise obtained in the k-th iteration at time $t$. Let $t$ be the bilateral transaction revenue value of the wind power company obtained in the k-th iteration at time $t$. To obtain the final bilateral electricity price, For the expected amount of electricity consumed; The electricity price is the transaction price.

[0106] Furthermore, the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm is used to solve the master-slave game model, including:

[0107] S1. Initialize the basic data of wind power companies and thermal storage companies participating in the master-slave game transaction, and set the parameters of the Raccoon optimization algorithm;

[0108] S2, During periods of wind power disruption Thermal energy storage companies use the Raccoon optimization algorithm to generate candidate expected power consumption. For each candidate Wind power companies calculate the transaction price that maximizes their revenue in the k-th iteration based on their revenue function. ;

[0109] S3, Thermal storage companies based on wind power companies' quotations. Perform revenue calculations and evaluate each candidate accordingly. The fitness is shown in the following formula:

[0110] (12)

[0111] In the formula, The unit power generation cost for wind power companies This represents the maximum amount of wind power that can be absorbed during this period. Indicates the maximum blocked electrical quantity;

[0112] S4. Using the update mechanism of the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm, generate a new round of candidates. ;

[0113] S5. Repeat S2-S4 to obtain the optimal price. ;

[0114] S6, will , Substitute the values ​​into formulas (1) and (2) in turn to obtain the respective gains of both parties;

[0115] S7. Determine the equilibrium solution. Calculate the changes in the payoffs of both sides in the current round and the previous round. If the change in payoffs of both sides is less than a certain preset threshold in several consecutive iterations, it is considered that the Nash equilibrium has been approximately reached. If not, adjust the parameters of the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm and return to S2. Otherwise, proceed to step S8.

[0116] S8, Order Repeat steps S1 to S7 to find the equilibrium solution at the next transaction time.

[0117] S9. Output the final transaction volume and transaction amount for all blocked periods to obtain the optimal decision result.

[0118] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and does not constitute any limitation on the present invention. Any person skilled in the art can make many possible variations and modifications to the technical solution of the present invention, or modify it into equivalent embodiments, without departing from the scope of the present invention. Therefore, any modifications, equivalent changes, and alterations made to the above embodiments based on the technology of the present invention without departing from the scope of the present invention are within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A bilateral trading method for wind power and thermal energy storage considering peak shaving, characterized in that: The method includes, Thermal storage devices are classified into independent and coupled types; For independent thermal storage devices, a bilateral trading model for independent thermal storage devices to participate in grid peak shaving is constructed with the goal of maximizing the respective benefits of the thermal storage device and the wind power company. The bilateral transaction model is constructed as a master-slave game model, which involves multiple rounds of game play until a Nash equilibrium is reached.

2. The bilateral trading method for wind power and thermal energy storage considering peak shaving according to claim 1, characterized in that: The objective function of the bilateral transaction model is: （1） （2） In the formula, , These represent the revenue functions of bilateral transactions between thermal storage companies and wind power companies, respectively. The heating revenue of thermal storage enterprises during the bilateral trading period; Carbon emission reduction revenue during bilateral trading sessions; , and These are the electricity purchase cost, grid access fee, and regulation cost for thermal storage companies, respectively. Total revenue for wind power companies; For the revenue from bilateral transactions of wind power companies; For wind power companies' power generation costs; The cost of curtailing wind power; Penalty costs for deviations from contracted electricity volume.

3. The bilateral trading method for wind power and thermal energy storage considering peak shaving according to claim 2, characterized in that: The constraints of the bilateral trading model for the independent thermal storage device participating in grid peak shaving include: Bilateral electricity price upper and lower limits constraints: （3） In the formula, Planned on-grid electricity prices for wind power companies; This represents the unit power generation cost of wind power companies; For the grid connection price of obstructed wind power; Constrained by wind power absorption capacity: （4） In the formula, The amount of electricity generated by the wind power company at time t during the period of disruption; For auction-based trading of electricity volume; Thermal energy storage companies face obstacles in absorbing wind power generation. （5） In the formula, This represents the maximum amount of wind power that can be absorbed during this period. Electricity price upper and lower limits constraints: （6） In the formula, and These are the on-grid tariff for obstructed wind power and the fixed grid access fee. and These are the upper and lower limits for electricity prices; Upper and lower limits of heat storage demand for thermal storage enterprises: （7） In the formula, and These represent the upper and lower limits of the thermal storage demand for thermal storage enterprises; This represents the initial heat storage capacity of the thermal storage device. For electrothermal conversion efficiency, Purchase of electricity for bilateral transactions, This refers to the period of obstruction.

4. The bilateral trading method for wind power and thermal energy storage considering peak shaving according to claim 2, characterized in that: The master-slave game model includes game participants, participant strategies, payoff functions, and Stacklberg-Nash equilibrium; The set of game participants C is as follows: （8） In the formula, For leading thermal storage companies, For follower wind power companies; The set of strategies S for participants is as follows: （9） In the formula, For the auction transaction price, For auction-based trading of electricity volume; Payment function I is as follows: （10） In the formula, Total revenue for wind power companies; The auction price; For auction-based trading of electricity volume; Stacklberg-Nash equilibrium: （11） In the formula, To obtain the final total electricity volume of the bilateral transaction, Let $t$ be the bilateral transaction revenue value of the thermal storage enterprise obtained in the k-th iteration at time $t$. Let $t$ be the bilateral transaction revenue value of the wind power company obtained in the k-th iteration at time $t$. To obtain the final bilateral electricity price, For the expected amount of electricity consumed; The electricity price is the transaction price.

5. The bilateral trading method for wind power and thermal energy storage considering peak shaving according to claim 4, characterized in that: The Raccoon Optimization Algorithm is used to solve the master-slave game model, including: S1. Initialize the basic data of wind power companies and thermal storage companies participating in the master-slave game transaction, and set the parameters of the Raccoon optimization algorithm; S2, During periods of wind power disruption Thermal energy storage companies use the Raccoon optimization algorithm to generate candidate expected power consumption. For each candidate Wind power companies calculate the transaction price that maximizes their revenue in the k-th iteration based on their revenue function. ; S3, Thermal storage companies based on wind power companies' quotations. Perform revenue calculations and evaluate each candidate accordingly. The fitness is shown in the following formula: （12） In the formula, The unit power generation cost for wind power companies; This represents the maximum amount of wind power that can be absorbed during this period. Indicates the maximum blocked electrical quantity; S4. Using the update mechanism of the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm, generate a new round of candidates. ; S5. Repeat S2-S4 to obtain the optimal price. ; S6, will , Substitute the values ​​into formulas (1) and (2) in turn to obtain the respective gains of both parties; S7. Determine the equilibrium solution. Calculate the changes in the payoffs of both sides in the current round and the previous round. If the change in payoffs of both sides is less than a certain preset threshold in several consecutive iterations, it is considered that the Nash equilibrium has been approximately reached. If not, adjust the parameters of the Raccoon Optimization Algorithm and return to S2. Otherwise, proceed to step S8. S8, Order Repeat steps S1 to S7 to find the equilibrium solution at the next transaction time. S9. Output the final transaction volume and transaction amount for all blocked periods to obtain the optimal decision result.

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