Grounding safety measure full life cycle management and control method and system based on digital identity and state binding

Abstract

The invention discloses a grounding safety measure full life cycle management and control method and system based on digital identity and state binding, and belongs to the technical field of electric power automation safety management and control. According to the method, dynamic mapping of a grounding measure physical entity and a digital standing book is established, and a non-prompt blind test verification mechanism is executed in a work ending stage: a system generates an interactive interface hiding statistical data, and a field unreleased feedback value is forcibly required to be input; the server compares the feedback value with the number of unreleased states calculated by the background in real time; and if the comparison result is inconsistent, triggering a software interlocking logic, generating a locking control signal and physically blocking a completion message sent to the scheduling system. The method further comprises a state retention and master control right logic transfer mechanism during multi-ticket association, digital forced closed-loop management and control of the grounding measure state are achieved, and switching-on misoperation with a ground wire caused by inertia confirmation is effectively prevented.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power safety production and automation control technology, specifically to a method and system for monitoring the status, verifying the operation, and terminating control of grounding safety measures (including portable grounding wires and fixed grounding switches) throughout the entire power operation process using Internet of Things identification technology and anti-misoperation interlocking logic. Background Technology

[0002] In the inspection, maintenance, and construction of power systems, grounding safety measures are crucial technical measures to ensure the safety of workers and prevent equipment from being damaged by sudden power surges. However, current grounding management practices have the following technical shortcomings in practical applications:

[0003] 1. Lack of Mandatory Verification Mechanism for Final Confirmation: At the final stage of a work order, confirming whether all grounding wires have been removed often relies on the operator's subjective memory. Existing systems typically display "System records: Number of not removed: X groups, please confirm." This "hint-like" design leads to operator dependency, causing them to click confirm without checking the site. If this is forgotten, the lack of mandatory data comparison and physical interlocking mechanisms could result in serious misoperation accidents such as closing the circuit breaker with the grounding wire still attached.

[0004] 2. Logical conflicts in overlapping operations: When multiple work teams are working in the same area, it is common for them to share grounding measures. Existing systems struggle to automatically handle the logical handover of grounding measures between different work order IDs through algorithms, which can easily lead to confusion in status records (e.g., removing work order A causes work order B's record to become invalid).

[0005] Therefore, there is a need for a control method that can deeply bind physical identity with digital processes and implement mandatory technical lock-in based on "non-prompt blind testing" at key nodes. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method and system for full lifecycle management of grounding safety measures based on digital identity and state binding. It aims to solve the problems of misoperation risk and cross-operation logic conflict caused by inertial confirmation in the prior art through non-prompt blind test verification logic and software interlock mechanism.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, this invention provides a method for full lifecycle management of grounding security measures based on digital identity and state binding. The method is executed by a computer system and includes the following steps:

[0008] S1: Digital configuration of identity: An electronic ledger is established in the server database, which stores a unique digital identity ID with grounding security measures and a real-time status flag bit;

[0009] S2: Association Binding and Status Activation: In response to the operation task instruction associated with a specific digital work order, receive the identity recognition information for the on-site grounding safety measures collected by the mobile terminal, establish an association binding record between the digital identity ID and the digital work order ID in the database, and update the real-time status flag of the measure to "effective".

[0010] S3: Non-prompt blind test verification: When the process request of the digital work order is received to enter the terminal node, an interface rendering instruction is sent to the mobile terminal to generate a terminal confirmation interaction interface on the mobile terminal; the interaction interface is configured to hide the system statistical value of the number of grounding safety measures associated with the work order in the electronic ledger, and receive the input numerical data as "on-site unresolved feedback value" through the human-computer interaction interface.

[0011] S4: Backend logic comparison: The server calls a comparison algorithm to count the number of grounding safety measures in the database that are associated with the digital work order and whose real-time status flag is set to the preset "unreleased state", and obtains the backend calculated value; the "on-site unreleased feedback value" received in step S3 is compared with the backend calculated value;

[0012] S5: Logic interlock control: If the comparison results in step S4 are inconsistent, the server triggers software interlock logic, generates an interlock instruction to prohibit the work ticket status transition, and performs at least one of the following control operations: blocks the communication channel for sending completion confirmation messages to the external scheduling system, or prohibits the generation of the completion confirmation messages.

[0013] The present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0014] 1. A non-information-based technical verification mechanism was constructed: The system masks statistical data at the interface layer, forcing users to input on-site feedback values ​​and perform XOR comparisons in the background. This "blind testing" mechanism technically cuts off operators' habitual reliance on system data, and ensures the authenticity of the final state through physical / logical interlocking triggered by data inconsistencies.

[0015] 2. Logical decoupling of cross-operations has been achieved: By introducing the "measure retention" status flag and multi-ID association logic, the system automatically handles the transfer of grounding measure management rights when multiple shifts are working together, eliminating the ambiguity of database status records.

[0016] 3. Lockout control extends deep into the communication layer: It not only prompts errors at the application layer, but also directly blocks the underlying channels for sending messages to the scheduling system, achieving a mandatory security block. Attached Figure Description

[0017] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the method flow logic of an embodiment of the present invention.

[0018] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the modular architecture of the system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0020] Example 1: Non-prompt blind test verification and latching mechanism

[0021] This embodiment details the core control logic described in claim 1, particularly the "blind testing to prevent errors" process at the end of the work order stage.

[0022] 1. Database Definition

[0023] In the system database, define the following variables:

[0024] N_input: In step S3, the "on-site unresolved feedback value" is entered by the operator through the mobile terminal interface.

[0025] N_calc: The theoretical number of unresolved issues calculated in real time by the server backend in step S4.

[0026] State_Flag: Real-time status bit of the grounding measure, with a value set of {0: unused, 1: effective, 2: measure reserved}.

[0027] Lock_Signal: Lockout control signal, Boolean value.

[0028] 2. Blind test of UI control rendering

[0029] When the work ticket process reaches the final node, the server sends the interface configuration parameters to the mobile terminal.

[0030] Configuration parameters: {Show_System_Count = False, Input_Required = True}.

[0031] The mobile terminal renders the interface based on parameters: the text box that originally displayed "System records not removed: 3 groups" is forcibly hidden or displayed as "***". The operator must check the site and then manually enter the numbers in the input box.

[0032] 3. Verification Algorithm

[0033] The server executes the following comparison logic:

[0034] First, iterate through the related tables and calculate N_calc:

[0035] N_calc = Count( measures WHERE Ticket_ID = current_ticket AND State_Flag IN {1, 2} )

[0036] Secondly, execute the comparison function F_check:

[0037] F_check(N_input, N_calc) = {

[0038] Pass, if (N_input == N_calc)

[0039] Fail if (N_input != N_calc)

[0040] }

[0041] 4. Interlock Control

[0042] If F_check returns Fail, the system triggers a software interlock.

[0043] The interlock logic expression is:

[0044] Lock_Signal = (N_input != N_calc)

[0045] If (Lock_Signal == True) Then:

[0046] Operation 1: Set Workflow_Status = "SUSPENDED" (Suspend the work order process)

[0047] Operation 2: Call Comm_Interceptor.Block(Msg_Type="Work_Complete") (Call the communication interceptor to physically block the sending of the completion message to the scheduler)

[0048] Through the above steps, even if the operator tries to shirk responsibility, as long as the input value is inconsistent with the backend, the system will cut off the connection with the dispatch center at the physical communication level, thereby eliminating the possibility of "closing the circuit breaker with the ground wire connected".

[0049] Example 2: State Preservation Logic Based on Multi-Vote Association

[0050] This embodiment details the cross-operation control mechanism described in claims 4 and 5, resolving state conflicts when multiple shifts share a grounding wire.

[0051] Assume that two work orders, A and B, are working at the same work site at the same time and need to share a set of grounding wires, G01.

[0052] 1. Reference Counting Mechanism

[0053] The system maintains a list of relationships, List_Relations, for each grounding measure.

[0054] When ticket A is bound to G01, List_Relations = {A}, and G01 State_Flag = 1.

[0055] When ticket B is also bound to G01, List_Relations = {A, B}, and G01 State_Flag = 1.

[0056] 2. Demolition and Preservation Logic

[0057] When ticket A is completed first and an application is made to dismantle G01, the system executes the following judgment logic:

[0058] Check_Relations(G01):

[0059] Remaining_Tickets = Count(List_Relations) - 1 (Excludes currently requested ticket A)

[0060] If (Remaining_Tickets > 0) Then:

[0061] Update State_Flag = 2 (Measure reserved)

[0062] Log("Retained by Ticket B")

[0063] Remove A from List_Relations

[0064] Return "KEEP_PHYSICAL_Measure" (This command does not remove the physical entity on-site).

[0065] Else:

[0066] Update State_Flag = 0 (Unused)

[0067] Return "REMOVE_PHYSICAL_Measure" (Instruction to remove the entity on-site).

[0068] 3. State transition and termination verification

[0069] During the final verification phase of ticket A (the process described in Example 1), since the state of G01 changes to "Measure Retained" (State_Flag=2), it belongs to the "Unresolved State" by definition.

[0070] Therefore, G01 is included in the N_calc calculation for ticket A.

[0071] When the operator terminates the blind test of ticket A, they must enter the number of tickets to be retained as "1". If they enter "0" (mistakenly thinking that they have removed the tickets and that they have none left), the system will report an error and lock the system.

[0072] This mechanism forces the operator of ticket A to confirm that G01 has been transferred to ticket B, achieving a logically seamless handover.

[0073] Example 3: System Architecture

[0074] This control system mainly includes:

[0075] 1. Server: Deploys the electronic ledger management module, binding control module, blind test verification module, and interlock control module. The server is responsible for storing core data, running comparison algorithms, and managing communication interfaces with external scheduling systems.

[0076] 2. Mobile terminal: As the front end for data collection and human-computer interaction, it has the functions of collecting identity information (such as camera scanning and NFC reading) and dynamic interface rendering.

[0077] 3. Identification medium: A tag attached to the physical grounding safety measure to establish a unique mapping between the physical world and the digital world.

[0078] Through the above implementation methods, the present invention utilizes computer logic control technology to transform traditional management processes into an unavoidable technical closed loop, effectively solving the safety management problem in power operations.

Claims

1. A method for full lifecycle management of grounding security measures based on digital identity and state binding, characterized in that, The method is executed by a computer system and includes the following steps: S1: Digital configuration of identity: An electronic ledger is established in the server database, which stores a unique digital identity ID with grounding security measures and a real-time status flag bit; S2: Association Binding and Status Activation: In response to the operation task instruction associated with a specific digital work order, receive the identity recognition information for the on-site grounding safety measures collected by the mobile terminal, establish an association binding record between the digital identity ID and the digital work order ID in the database, and update the real-time status flag of the measure to "effective". S3: Non-prompt blind test verification: When the process request of the digital work order is received to enter the terminal node, an interface rendering instruction is sent to the mobile terminal to generate a terminal confirmation interactive interface on the mobile terminal; the interactive interface is configured to hide the system statistical value of the number of grounding safety measures associated with the work order in the electronic ledger, and receive the input numerical data as "on-site unresolved feedback value" through the human-computer interaction interface. S4: Backend logic comparison: The server calls a comparison algorithm to count the number of grounding safety measures in the database that are associated with the digital work order and whose real-time status flag is a preset "unreleased state", and obtains the backend calculated value; the "on-site unreleased feedback value" received in step S3 is compared with the backend calculated value; S5: Logic interlock control: If the comparison results in step S4 are inconsistent, the server triggers software interlock logic, generates an interlock instruction to prohibit the work ticket status transition, and performs at least one of the following control operations: blocks the communication channel for sending completion confirmation messages to the external scheduling system, or prohibits the generation of the completion confirmation messages.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Following step S2, the method further includes an image feature consistency verification step: Receive on-site image data uploaded by mobile terminals; The image processing algorithm is called to parse the physical identity code in the image and match it with the digital identity ID bound in step S2. If a match is found, the state is locked in the database; if a match fails, an exception alarm is generated and state updates are prohibited.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The image feature consistency verification step also includes: Feature extraction is performed on the received panoramic image containing the equipment operating mechanism; The extracted feature vectors are input into a pre-trained deep learning neural network model, which outputs the classification results of the physical location of the device. The classification result is compared with the target state of the current operation task. If they do not match, an abnormal state alarm signal is generated.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method also includes a state preservation mechanism based on multi-vote association logic: During the dismantling phase of the measures prior to the termination of the digital work order, when a request to remove a certain grounding safety measure is received, the system retrieves the associated binding records in the database; If the search results show that the digital identity ID of this measure is also associated with one or more other digital work ticket IDs whose current status is marked as "in progress", then the real-time status flag will not be updated to "unused", and the following actions will be performed instead: Update the real-time status flag to "Measures Retained"; Record the associated work ticket ID that causes the retention in the associated table; The "measures retained" flag is defined as a logical sub-state of the preset "unresolved state" and participates in the background value calculation statistics in step S4.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, Once the real-time status flag is updated to "Measures Retained", the following logical handover steps are executed: In the database, the control of this grounding safety measure is logically transferred to the associated other digital work ticket IDs; When the other digital work tickets subsequently initiate a termination process request, the verification logic of steps S3 to S5 is repeated for the measure that is in the "measure retention" flag. The real-time status flag of this measure will be updated to "unused" only after all the binding records of the digital work ticket IDs associated with this measure have been unbound.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S5, after generating the locking instruction to prohibit the work ticket status transition, unlocking logic is also included: The system suspends the current work order process and pushes a difference notification to the mobile terminal interface; Enable the unlock verification interface and receive the unlock command; The unlocking command includes an authorization command from an administrator verified by an encryption key or a biometric verification command; After successful verification, the locking command is revoked, allowing the input of the unreleased feedback value and the execution of steps S4 to S5 again.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The identity verification information is collected through at least one of the following methods: Scan the QR code or barcode located on the grounding safety device; Read radio frequency identification (RFID) tags or near field communication (NFC) chips set on grounded safety measures; Receives Bluetooth beacon signals or location information set on grounded safety measures.

8. A full lifecycle management system for grounding security measures based on digital identity and state binding, characterized in that, The system includes a server, a mobile terminal, and an identification medium installed on each grounding security measure. The server has a computer program deployed thereon, which, when executed by a processor, performs the functions of the following modules: The electronic ledger management module is used to store the digital identity ID of the measures and dynamic status flags; The binding control module is used to establish the mapping relationship between grounding safety measures and digital work tickets and update the status; The blind test verification module is used as an input interface to generate statistical data of the shielding system at the end of the work order stage. It receives the feedback value of the unreleased status on site and compares it with the number of unreleased statuses calculated in real time by the database. The interlock control module is used to respond to the comparison results of the blind test verification module; if the comparison is inconsistent, it outputs a lockout signal to prevent the work order status from changing and the completion message from being sent to the outside world.

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