Internet of Things access management method and system based on data encryption

Abstract

The invention discloses an Internet of Things access management method and system based on data encryption, and relates to the technical field of Internet of Things security, and the method comprises the steps that a root trust party generates a root key pair and a home domain public key endorsement signature, a home domain generates accumulator parameters, and a snapshot release packet is formed; obtaining permissible set member witness and revocation set non-member witness, creating a migration authorization bill plaintext, and generating an encrypted bill packet and a bill signature; the terminal submits an access request message to the immigration domain, verifies the permission set member witness and the revocation set non-member witness, verifies the bill signature and unblocks the encrypted bill packet, and negotiates to generate a session key; and the session key is used to execute authentication encryption transmission on the Internet of Things service data, the immigration domain regularly pulls the new snapshot publishing packet published by the home domain and re-verifies the active session, and the home domain updates the snapshot publishing packet or signs and issues a new encrypted bill packet according to the epochs. The cross-domain maintenance overhead is reduced, and the access credibility and the service continuity are improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of Internet of Things (IoT) security technology, and in particular to an IoT access management method and system based on data encryption. Background Technology

[0002] IoT access management typically revolves around terminal identity, access domain trust relationships, and business data confidentiality. Terminals register and receive credentials in their home domain, with credential forms including public key certificates, pre-shared keys, or tokens. The migrating domain verifies the credentials based on the trust anchor or performs password verification, establishes session keys through key negotiation, protects the confidentiality and integrity of business messages through authentication and encryption, and maintains access eligibility by combining allow or revoke lists and validity policies.

[0003] However, existing technologies still have room for improvement. On the one hand, in scenarios involving cross-domain access and frequent switching, IoT cross-domain access authentication technology based on certificate chains and revocation lists needs to carry a long credential chain or trigger online status queries, increasing the interaction load between the terminal and the edge access point. On the other hand, updates to the revocation set and permission scope need to be synchronized across domains, making it complex to achieve continuous re-verification of active sessions. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the aforementioned existing problems, the present invention is proposed.

[0005] Therefore, this invention provides an IoT access management method based on data encryption to solve the problems of high authentication and verification overhead and heavy burden of permission change synchronization and re-verification in existing technologies.

[0006] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0007] In a first aspect, the present invention provides an IoT access management method based on data encryption, comprising:

[0008] The root trust party generates a root key pair and endorses the home domain public key with a signature. The home domain generates accumulator parameters, calculates the public accumulator values ​​for the allowed set and the revocation set, generates a snapshot descriptor and signs it to form a snapshot release package. The migrating domain pulls and verifies the snapshot release package and caches the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache.

[0009] The terminal generates cross-domain aliases and prime number representations, obtains permission for set member witnesses and revokes set non-member witnesses, creates a migration authorization ticket plaintext for the home domain, generates an encrypted ticket package and ticket signature, and distributes it to the terminal.

[0010] The terminal submits an access request message to the receiving domain. The receiving domain obtains the public values ​​of the accumulators for the allowed set and the revocation set based on the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache, verifies the witnessing of members of the allowed set and the witnessing of non-members of the revocation set, verifies the ticket signature and decrypts the encrypted ticket packet, and the receiving domain negotiates with the terminal to generate a session key.

[0011] The terminal and the migrating domain use session keys to perform authenticated and encrypted transmission of IoT business data. The migrating domain periodically pulls new snapshot release packets published by the home domain and performs re-verification on active sessions. The home domain updates snapshot release packets or issues new encrypted ticket packets on an epoch basis.

[0012] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, wherein:

[0013] The root trusted party generates a root key pair and a home domain public key endorsement signature. The home domain generates accumulator parameters, calculates the accumulator public values ​​for the allowed and revocation sets, generates a snapshot descriptor, and signs it to form a snapshot release packet. The specific steps are as follows:

[0014] The root trust party generates a root key pair, receives the home domain identifier and the home domain public key, and generates a home domain public key endorsement signature.

[0015] The home domain establishes an epoch management table, generates accumulator parameters, calculates the public accumulator values ​​for allowed and unavoidable sets, generates a snapshot descriptor, issues a snapshot signature, and forms a snapshot release package.

[0016] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, wherein: the migration domain pulls and verifies the snapshot release package and caches the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache area means that the home domain releases the snapshot release package, the migration domain obtains the snapshot release package, verifies the endorsement signature of the home domain's public key, obtains the home domain's public key, verifies the snapshot signature, and the migration domain caches the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache area.

[0017] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, the terminal generates a cross-domain alias and a prime number representation, and obtains the allowed set member witness and the revocation set non-member witness. The specific steps are as follows:

[0018] The terminal generates a cross-domain alias using a cryptographic hash function, generates a prime number representation, and reports the domain to which it belongs.

[0019] The home domain receives the cross-domain alias and prime number representation from the terminal, registers them in the allowed set, calls the accumulator modulus and accumulator base, obtains the allowed set member witnesses and revokes the set non-member witnesses, and sends them to the terminal.

[0020] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, the process of the home domain creating a migration authorization ticket in plaintext, generating an encrypted ticket package and a ticket signature, and distributing it to the terminal refers to the home domain creating a migration authorization ticket in plaintext, performing key encapsulation and symmetric encryption, generating an encrypted ticket package, generating a ticket signature on the encrypted ticket package, and distributing it to the terminal.

[0021] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, the terminal submits an access request message to the receiving domain. The receiving domain obtains the accumulator public values ​​of the allowed set and the revoked set based on the snapshot descriptor in its local snapshot cache, and verifies the witnessing of allowed set members and the witnessing of revoked set non-members. The specific steps are as follows:

[0022] The terminal sends an access request message, submitting a cross-domain alias, prime number representation, permission for set member witnessing, revocation of set non-member witnessing, terminal temporary public key, terminal random number, encrypted ticket packet, and ticket signature to the receiving domain. The edge access point performs a replay check and then forwards the message to the receiving domain administrator.

[0023] The migration domain administrator obtains the home domain public key endorsement signature and snapshot release packet, verifies the home domain public key endorsement signature, verifies the snapshot signature, parses the snapshot descriptor, and obtains the accumulator public values ​​of the allowed set and the revocation set;

[0024] The domain administrator calls the large integer modular exponentiation library, uses the accumulator public values ​​of the allowed set and the revoked set to verify the allowed set member witnesses and the revoked set non-member witnesses of the terminal.

[0025] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, the steps of verifying the ticket signature and decrypting the encrypted ticket packet, and the migration domain and terminal negotiating to generate a session key, are as follows:

[0026] The receiving domain administrator uses the home domain public key to verify the ticket signature, uses the receiving domain private key to decrypt the encrypted ticket package, obtains the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket, and performs consistency verification and handshake binding verification on the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket and the access request message.

[0027] The migrated domain and the terminal computing share a secret, generate a session key through a key derivation function, and exchange authentication codes to complete two-way confirmation.

[0028] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, the terminal and the migrating domain use a session key to perform authenticated and encrypted transmission of IoT service data. The migrating domain periodically retrieves new snapshot release packets published by the home domain and re-verifies active sessions. The specific steps are as follows:

[0029] The terminal and the service endpoint in the migrated domain use session keys to perform authentication, encryption, and decryption of IoT service data, and implement replay protection.

[0030] The receiving domain periodically pulls and verifies the new snapshot release package of the home domain, performs revalidation on active sessions using the accumulator public value in the new snapshot, and performs revalidation on the validity period of the migration authorization ticket.

[0031] As a preferred embodiment of the IoT access management method based on data encryption described in this invention, the home domain updates the snapshot release packet or issues a new encrypted ticket packet according to the epoch, specifically through the following steps:

[0032] If the verification fails again or the migration authorization ticket expires, the migration domain closes the session, notifies the edge access point and securely destroys the session key, and the terminal side simultaneously clears the session key and anti-replay related caches.

[0033] The home domain can write prime number representations into the revocation set and publish a new snapshot release package, or issue a new encrypted ticket package as needed.

[0034] Secondly, the present invention provides an IoT access management system based on data encryption, comprising:

[0035] The Trust Snapshot module is used by the root trust party to generate root key pairs and home domain public key endorsement signatures, the home domain to generate accumulator parameters, calculate the public accumulator values ​​of the allowed set and the revocation set, generate snapshot descriptors and sign them to form snapshot distribution packages, the migrating domain to pull and verify the snapshot distribution packages, and cache the snapshot descriptors in the local snapshot cache area.

[0036] The voucher and ticket module is used by the terminal to generate cross-domain aliases and prime number representations, obtain permission for set member witnesses and revoke set non-member witnesses, create migration authorization tickets in plaintext for the home domain, generate encrypted ticket packages and ticket signatures, and distribute them to the terminal.

[0037] The session verification module is used by the terminal to submit an access request message to the migration domain. The migration domain obtains the public values ​​of the accumulators of the allowed set and the revocation set based on the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache, verifies the witness of the allowed set members and the witness of the revocation set non-members, verifies the ticket signature and decrypts the encrypted ticket packet, and the migration domain and the terminal negotiate to generate a session key.

[0038] The encryption maintenance module is used by the terminal and the migrating domain to perform authentication and encrypted transmission of IoT business data using session keys. The migrating domain periodically pulls the new snapshot release package published by the home domain and performs re-verification on active sessions. The home domain updates the snapshot release package or issues a new encrypted ticket package according to the epoch.

[0039] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: by pulling and verifying snapshot release packets in the migration domain, combined with the verification mechanism that allows set member witnessing and revoking set non-member witnessing, the amount of data carried in access request packets and the burden of signature verification processing are reduced; by verifying ticket signatures, decrypting encrypted ticket packets and performing consistency verification and handshake binding verification, the rapid effectiveness of device revocation and permission changes is achieved, and the re-verification of active sessions is triggered, reducing cross-domain maintenance overhead and improving access trustworthiness and business continuity. Attached Figure Description

[0040] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the following description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0041] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an IoT access management method based on data encryption.

[0042] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an IoT access management system based on data encryption.

[0043] Figure 3 A flowchart for creating a snapshot release package.

[0044] Figure 4 A flowchart for generating encrypted ticket packets and ticket signatures. Detailed Implementation

[0045] To make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more apparent and understandable, the specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0046] Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to provide a full understanding of the invention. However, the invention may also be practiced in other ways different from those described herein, and those skilled in the art can make similar extensions without departing from the spirit of the invention. Therefore, the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0047] Secondly, the term "one embodiment" or "embodiment" as used herein refers to a specific feature, structure, or characteristic that may be included in at least one implementation of the present invention. The phrase "in one embodiment" appearing in different places in this specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor is it a single or selective embodiment that is mutually exclusive with other embodiments.

[0048] Reference Figures 1-4 This is one embodiment of the present invention, which provides an IoT access management method based on data encryption, including the following steps:

[0049] S1. The root trust party generates a root key pair and endorses the home domain public key with a signature. The home domain generates accumulator parameters, calculates the public accumulator values ​​for the allowed set and the revocation set, generates a snapshot descriptor and signs it to form a snapshot release package. The migrating domain pulls and verifies the snapshot release package and caches the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache area.

[0050] The root trust party generates a root key pair, receives the home domain identifier and home domain public key, and generates a home domain public key endorsement signature; the home domain establishes an epoch management table, generates accumulator parameters, calculates the accumulator public values ​​for the allowed set and the revocation set, generates a snapshot descriptor, issues a snapshot signature, and forms a snapshot release packet.

[0051] Furthermore, the root trust party generates a root key pair in the trusted key generation environment. The root key pair includes the root trust party's private key and the root trust party's public key. The root trust party's private key is stored in a key protection carrier with access control and anti-export policies, and the root trust party's public key is released to the public in a verifiable form. Specifically, the trusted key generation environment obtains the random bit string required for generating the root key pair through random number generation technology with entropy source health detection.

[0052] The root trust receives the home domain identifier and home domain public key submitted by the home domain, and the migration domain identifier and migration domain public key submitted by the migration domain. The root trust performs encoding normalization processing on the home domain identifier and home domain public key to form a home domain data block to be signed, and performs encoding normalization processing on the migration domain identifier and migration domain public key to form a migration domain data block to be signed.

[0053] The root trust party executes a digital signature algorithm on the data block to be signed in the home domain, generating a public key endorsement signature for the home domain, and executes a digital signature algorithm on the data block to be signed in the destination domain, generating a public key endorsement signature for the destination domain.

[0054] It should be noted that the digital signature algorithm used is either elliptic curve signature or RSA digital signature algorithm. When generating the endorsement signature, the root trust party writes the signature algorithm identifier and the corresponding parameter identifier into the signature data. During the access verification phase, the migrating domain selects the corresponding verification algorithm and parameters for signature verification based on the signature algorithm identifier and parameter identifier in the signature data.

[0055] Furthermore, the root trust provides the home domain's public key endorsement signature, the migration domain's public key endorsement signature, and the root trust's public key to the home domain and the migration domain in the form of a distribution packet. Specifically, the distribution packet is transmitted through a distribution channel with integrity protection, which adopts an existing management security channel or a verification channel anchored to the root trust's public key.

[0056] Furthermore, during the access preparation phase, the migrating domain writes the root trust party's public key into the local trust anchor storage area and writes the home domain's public key endorsement signature into the local endorsement cache area. An index is built in the local endorsement cache area according to the home domain identifier, which facilitates quick retrieval by home domain identifier.

[0057] Furthermore, the home domain generates a home domain private key and a home domain public key in the key management environment, and establishes an epoch management table. The current epoch is represented by a monotonically increasing epoch identifier, which is generated by the home domain based on a unified clock source. Switching the epoch identifier triggers a snapshot update.

[0058] Furthermore, the home domain generates accumulator parameters, which include the accumulator modulus and the accumulator base. The accumulator modulus is constructed using strong prime numbers and generated in a controlled environment. Candidate numbers are generated using random number generation techniques and filtered using primality testing techniques to generate strong prime numbers. The home domain keeps the strong prime number decomposition information in a controlled environment and does not release it to the outside world.

[0059] The home domain maintains the allowed set and the revocation set according to the epoch management table. The allowed set is the set of prime numbers representing terminals that are eligible for access in the corresponding epoch, and the revocation set is the set of prime numbers representing terminals that have been revoked in the corresponding epoch. The allowed set and the revocation set are stored in a set data structure and written to persistent media. The consistency of set writing is guaranteed by a transaction mechanism.

[0060] Furthermore, the home domain calculation allows for the public values ​​of set and undo set accumulators, and calls the large integer modular exponentiation library during calculation to complete the aggregation processing of exponent multiplication. The modular exponentiation library adopts a constant-time implementation and memory erasure strategy to reduce side-channel risks.

[0061] The home domain identifier, epoch identifier, accumulator public parameters, and accumulator public values ​​of the allowed and unavoidable sets are serialized in a fixed field order to form a snapshot descriptor. The snapshot descriptor serialization uses length prefix encoding and field type identifier encoding. The snapshot descriptor is then used with the home domain private key to perform a digital signature algorithm to generate a snapshot signature. The snapshot descriptor and the snapshot signature are combined to form a snapshot release package.

[0062] The home domain publishes a snapshot release package, the destination domain obtains the snapshot release package, verifies the home domain's public key endorsement signature, obtains the home domain's public key, verifies the snapshot signature, and the destination domain caches the snapshot descriptor in its local snapshot cache.

[0063] Furthermore, the home domain writes the snapshot release package into the snapshot release storage area, establishes an index in the snapshot release storage area according to the home domain identifier and epoch identifier, pushes the snapshot release package to the distribution endpoint accessible to the migrating domain, and uses transport layer security channels or message-level signature verification to ensure the integrity of the snapshot release package on the transmission link.

[0064] A content summary is generated for each snapshot release package and written to the snapshot index table. The snapshot index table records the home domain identifier, epoch identifier, snapshot descriptor summary, snapshot signature summary, and release status flag. The migrating domain can determine whether there is an update through the snapshot index table.

[0065] Furthermore, the migrating domain pulls the snapshot release package at the distribution endpoint and performs root trust endorsement verification and snapshot signature verification. Specifically, it uses the root trust public key to verify the signature of the home domain public key endorsement, obtains the home domain public key, and uses the home domain public key to verify the snapshot signature of the snapshot descriptor. After successful verification, the accumulator public parameters, the accumulator public values ​​of the allowed set and the revocation set are written to the local snapshot cache. An index is built according to the home domain identifier and the epoch identifier, and the snapshot descriptor digest is saved, eliminating the need to pull long certificate chain materials again when the terminal accesses.

[0066] S2. The terminal generates a cross-domain alias and a prime number representation, obtains the permission for set member witnesses and the revocation of set non-member witnesses, creates a migration authorization ticket plaintext for the home domain, generates an encrypted ticket package and ticket signature, and distributes it to the terminal.

[0067] The terminal generates a cross-domain alias and a prime number representation using a cryptographic hash function, and reports it to the home domain. The home domain receives the cross-domain alias and prime number representation from the terminal, registers it in the allowed set, calls the accumulator modulus and accumulator base, obtains the allowed set member witness and the revoked set non-member witness, and sends them to the terminal.

[0068] Furthermore, the terminal stores a long-term secret in trusted storage. The long-term secret is written by the terminal at the factory or by the home domain through a secure injection process. The secure injection process uses a session encryption channel to encrypt the injected payload and uses a message authentication code to perform integrity verification. After the integrity verification is passed, the terminal's long-term secret is written.

[0069] When a terminal enters a new epoch, it reads the epoch identifier, calls an encrypted hash function, and generates a cross-domain alias. Specifically, the terminal reads its long-term secret, obtains its home domain identifier and epoch identifier, combines the long-term secret, home domain identifier, and epoch identifier into a deterministic input, calls a key-based hash function, and calculates the combined input using the long-term secret as the key. The terminal then uses the function output as the cross-domain alias for the current epoch.

[0070] The terminal uses the cross-domain alias as an externally visible identifier and does not output the terminal's real identity identifier.

[0071] Furthermore, the terminal generates prime number representatives based on the cross-domain alias. Specifically, the terminal performs a hash operation on the cross-domain alias to obtain the starting value of the candidate odd number sequence. The terminal performs primality tests on the candidate odd number sequence in sequence. The primality test uses a probabilistic primality test algorithm with a fixed number of rounds, and determines the first candidate value that passes the primality test as the prime number representative corresponding to the cross-domain alias.

[0072] Cross-domain aliases and prime number representations are written to the terminal's local secure storage area, which is provided by a secure chip or trusted execution environment. During the write operation, access control policies are used to prevent non-accessible processes from reading or exporting the data.

[0073] Furthermore, the home domain receives the cross-domain alias and prime number representation submitted by the terminal through the terminal registration interface. The terminal registration interface is located in the home domain management channel. The home domain management channel uses transport layer security technology to encrypt the link and uses two-way certificates or pre-shared keys for authentication. After successful authentication, a session key is established to protect the registration message.

[0074] The home domain performs consistency checks on cross-domain aliases and prime number representations. These consistency checks include field format checks, epoch identifier consistency checks, and duplicate entry checks. Prime number representations are written to the allow set, and cross-domain alias indexes are recorded. The write to the allow set is completed through a transaction mechanism.

[0075] Furthermore, the large integer modular exponentiation library is invoked to generate allowed set member witnesses. Specifically, the home domain reads the allowed set and accumulator parameters, performs format validation and deduplication on each element in the allowed set, removes terminal prime representations, and sequentially multiplies the remaining elements according to deterministic sorting rules to obtain the aggregate exponent. The home domain uses the accumulator base as the base and the aggregate exponent as the exponent, and invokes the large integer modular exponentiation library to perform modular exponentiation to obtain the allowed set member witness value. The home domain encapsulates the allowed set member witness value into an allowed set member witness structure. The home domain stores the allowed set member witness in association with the epoch identifier, and the member witness forms a binding record with the cross-domain alias.

[0076] The home domain sends an authorization message to the terminal through the home domain management channel. The message is encrypted using a session encryption channel and includes a message authentication code field. The terminal verifies the message authentication code, and if the verification is successful, it writes the authorization message to the terminal's local secure storage area.

[0077] The home domain generates a non-member witness for the revocation set for the terminal. Specifically, it reads the prime number representation set of the corresponding epoch of the revocation set from the revocation set maintenance table. The revocation set maintenance table is written by the home domain according to the management policy. The writing process includes recording the revocation reason, recording the effective epoch of the revocation, and writing the revocation set.

[0078] Furthermore, the home domain performs an extended Euclidean algorithm based on the terminal prime representation and the aggregate value of the undo set. The extended Euclidean algorithm generates coefficient pairs that satisfy the coprime relation constraint. These coefficient pairs are written into the non-member witness structure, and the modular exponentiation library for large integers is used to calculate the modular exponentiation components in the non-member witness structure.

[0079] The home domain will send the revocation set non-member witness to the terminal through the home domain management channel. The terminal will verify the message authentication code and parse the fields of the sent message, write the revocation set non-member witness to the terminal's local secure storage area, and bind the revocation set non-member witness to the epoch identifier for storage.

[0080] The home domain creates a migration authorization ticket in plaintext, encapsulates it with a key and performs symmetric encryption to generate an encrypted ticket package, generates a ticket signature on the encrypted ticket package, and distributes it to the terminal.

[0081] Furthermore, the home domain generates a migration authorization ticket plaintext based on the terminal's current migration requirements. The migration authorization ticket plaintext includes the home domain identifier, the destination domain identifier, the epoch identifier, the cross-domain alias, the prime number representation, the permission scope identifier, the issuance time identifier, and the expiration time identifier. Among them, the permission scope identifier is generated by the home domain according to business rules, and the permission scope identifier can be in the form of a resource set digest, a protocol set digest, or an access control label.

[0082] An elliptic curve key generation technique is used to generate a temporary public key for the terminal. A terminal random number generator outputs a terminal random number. The home domain is written into the handshake binding digest in the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket. The handshake binding digest is obtained by performing a hash operation on the following fields after concatenating them byte-level in a fixed order: the inbound domain identifier, the epoch identifier, the cross-domain alias, the terminal temporary public key, and the terminal random number. The inbound domain identifier, the epoch identifier, and the cross-domain alias are obtained from the corresponding fields in the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket, while the terminal temporary public key and the terminal random number are obtained from the corresponding fields submitted by the terminal to the home domain.

[0083] Furthermore, the home domain uses the public key of the migrating domain to execute a key encapsulation algorithm to obtain the encapsulation key and encapsulation ciphertext. The encapsulation key is used as a symmetric encryption key to execute the authentication encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket. At the same time, symmetric ciphertext and authentication tag are generated. The encapsulation ciphertext, symmetric ciphertext, initialization vector and additional authentication data are assembled to generate an encrypted ticket packet.

[0084] The home domain's private key is used to execute a digital signature algorithm on the content digest of the encrypted ticket packet to generate a ticket signature. The migrating domain uses the ticket signature to verify the origin and integrity of the encrypted ticket packet before unsealing.

[0085] The home domain sends encrypted ticket packets and ticket signatures to the terminal through the home domain management channel. The terminal verifies the message authentication code, writes the encrypted ticket packets and ticket signatures into the terminal's local secure storage area, and binds and stores the encrypted ticket packets and ticket signatures with the epoch identifier.

[0086] S3. The terminal submits an access request message to the receiving domain. The receiving domain obtains the public values ​​of the accumulators for the allowed set and the revocation set based on the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache, verifies the witnessing of members of the allowed set and the witnessing of non-members of the revocation set, verifies the ticket signature and decrypts the encrypted ticket packet, and the receiving domain negotiates with the terminal to generate a session key.

[0087] The terminal sends an access request message, submitting a cross-domain alias, prime number representation, allowed set member witness, revoked set non-member witness, terminal temporary public key, terminal random number, encrypted ticket packet, and ticket signature to the receiving domain. The edge access point performs a replay check and then forwards the message to the receiving domain administrator. The receiving domain administrator obtains the home domain public key endorsement signature and snapshot release packet, verifies the home domain public key endorsement signature, verifies the snapshot signature, parses the snapshot descriptor, and obtains the accumulator public values ​​for the allowed set and revoked set.

[0088] Furthermore, the terminal establishes an initial connection with the edge access point through the access link and sends an access request message. The access request message includes the migration domain identifier, epoch identifier, cross-domain alias, prime number representation, allow set member witnessing, revoke set non-member witnessing, encrypted ticket packet, ticket signature, terminal temporary public key, and terminal random number. The terminal performs field encoding normalization processing, and the field encoding adopts length prefix encoding and field type identifier encoding.

[0089] It should be noted that the terminal does not include the terminal's real identity identifier, the terminal's real identity identifier certificate chain, and multi-level proof materials from the home domain to the root trusted party in the access request message.

[0090] The edge access point performs replay checks, uses terminal random numbers and cross-domain aliases to generate deduplication keys, and checks for deduplication in the short-term cache table. After the deduplication check is passed, the access request message is forwarded to the migration domain administrator through the migration domain's internal security channel, which is protected by session encryption and message authentication code.

[0091] The root trust endorsement verification and snapshot signature verification are performed by the migrating domain. Specifically, the migrating domain administrator retrieves the home domain public key endorsement signature and the root trust public key from the local endorsement cache based on the home domain identifier and the epoch identifier, and retrieves the snapshot descriptor and snapshot signature for the corresponding epoch from the local snapshot cache.

[0092] Furthermore, if the corresponding epoch snapshot does not exist in the local snapshot cache, the migration domain administrator pulls the snapshot release package through the snapshot distribution endpoint and writes it to the local snapshot cache.

[0093] Furthermore, the endorsement signature of the home domain public key is verified. The verification input is a block of encoded home domain identifier and home domain public key. After the verification is successful, the home domain public key is used as the public key for subsequent snapshot signature verification. The snapshot signature is also verified. After the verification is successful, the snapshot descriptor is parsed to obtain the accumulator public parameters, allowed set and revocation set accumulator public values.

[0094] When parsing a snapshot descriptor, field integrity checks and epoch identifier consistency checks are performed. Field integrity checks include field length checks, field type checks, and checks for the existence of required fields.

[0095] After completing the endorsement verification and snapshot signature verification, the migration domain administrator will load the public values ​​of the allow set and revocation set accumulator into the input context of the short proof verification process.

[0096] The migration domain administrator calls the large integer modular exponentiation library, uses the accumulator public values ​​of the allow set and the revocation set to verify the witnessing of the allowed set members and the witnessing of the revocation set non-members of the terminal; the migration domain administrator uses the home domain public key to verify the ticket signature, uses the migration domain private key to decrypt the encrypted ticket package, obtains the migration authorization ticket plaintext, and performs consistency verification and handshake binding verification on the migration authorization ticket plaintext and the access request message;

[0097] Furthermore, the inbound domain administrator performs membership verification based on the prime number representation, allowed set member witness, and allowed set accumulator public value in the access request message. The membership verification is completed by calling the large integer modular exponentiation library, and the validity of the membership verification equation is used as the condition for the membership to pass.

[0098] The domain administrator performs non-membership verification based on the prime number representation, the non-member witness of the revocation set, and the public value of the accumulator of the revocation set in the access request message. The non-membership verification is completed by calling the large integer modular exponentiation library and performing a consistency check on the coprime constraint coefficients generated by the extended Euclidean algorithm. The non-membership verification equation being true is taken as the condition for the non-membership to pass.

[0099] It should be noted that the receiving domain administrator does not request the terminal's true identity identifier, certificate chain materials, or multi-party endorsement materials from the home domain during the short proof verification process.

[0100] The receiving domain administrator uses the home domain public key to verify the signature of the ticket. The verification input is the digest of the encrypted ticket package. After the verification is successful, the receiving domain administrator parses the encrypted ticket package to obtain the encapsulated ciphertext, symmetric ciphertext, initialization vector, and additional authentication data.

[0101] Furthermore, the receiving domain administrator uses the receiving domain's private key to perform a key decryption algorithm on the encapsulated ciphertext, obtains the encapsulation key, calls the authentication decryption algorithm using the encapsulation key, decrypts the symmetric ciphertext and verifies the authentication tag. If the authentication tag verification passes, the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket is obtained.

[0102] The plaintext of the migration authorization note is parsed and its consistency is verified. The consistency verification includes consistency verification of the inbound domain identifier, the epoch identifier, the cross-domain alias, and the prime number representation. The validity of the validity period field of the plaintext of the migration authorization note is determined. Specifically, the issuance time identifier and the expiration time identifier are parsed and aligned with the current clock source of the inbound domain to determine the validity of the validity period field.

[0103] Furthermore, the handshake binding digest in the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket is recalculated and verified. Among them, the inbound domain identifier, epoch identifier, and cross-domain alias are obtained from the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket and have completed consistency verification; the terminal temporary public key and terminal random number are obtained from the access request message; the inbound domain administrator performs byte-level concatenation and hash operation on the five fields of inbound domain identifier, epoch identifier, cross-domain alias, terminal temporary public key, and terminal random number in the same field order as when the home domain was written into the ticket, to obtain the handshake binding digest, and performs consistency verification with the handshake binding digest carried in the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket.

[0104] The migrated domain and the terminal computing share a secret, generate a session key through a key derivation function, and exchange authentication codes to complete two-way confirmation.

[0105] Furthermore, the receiving domain administrator generates a temporary key pair for the receiving domain. Specifically, the temporary key pair for the receiving domain is generated using elliptic curve key generation technology, with random input provided by the receiving domain random number generator.

[0106] The receiving domain administrator constructs a receiving domain response message, which includes the receiving domain temporary public key and the receiving domain random number.

[0107] The domain administrator calculates the shared secret based on the terminal's temporary public key and the domain's temporary private key, and then calls the key derivation function to generate the session key.

[0108] The terminal calculates the shared secret based on the temporary public key of the migrated domain and the temporary private key of the terminal, and calls the key derivation function to generate the session key.

[0109] During the two-way confirmation process, the receiving domain administrator and the terminal calculate the authentication code and verify it. The session key is used as the key input for the authentication code calculation. At the same time, the access request message digest is bound to the field of the receiving domain response message during the authentication code calculation.

[0110] Specifically, during the session key derivation phase, the domain administrator and the terminal negotiate the shared amount through elliptic curve key negotiation, perform consistent encoding, and obtain the shared secret byte string.

[0111] The domain administrator and the terminal each perform a hash operation on the snapshot descriptor byte string to obtain a snapshot descriptor digest, and perform a hash operation on the encrypted ticket packet byte string to obtain an encrypted ticket packet digest.

[0112] After the migration domain administrator and the terminal perform type identification and length encoding on the fields according to the unified standardized encoding rules, they are concatenated at the byte level to construct a derived binding vector input. The derived binding vector is calculated, and the migration domain administrator and the terminal use the derived binding vector as the context input of the key derivation function to derive the session key. The migration domain administrator writes the session key into the key storage area in the form of a key handle, and the terminal writes the session key into the terminal's local secure storage area.

[0113] Specifically, the derived binding vector is represented as:

[0114] ;

[0115] in, Indicates a derived binding vector. Represents a hash function. Indicates the identifier of the inbound domain. Indicates an era marker. Indicates a cross-domain alias. Represents prime numbers. This represents the terminal's temporary public key. This represents the temporary public key of the inbound domain. Represents a terminal random number. Represents a random number in the migration field. Represents a snapshot descriptor summary. This represents the digest of the encrypted ticket packet. Indicates the scope of permissions. Indicates byte-level join operation, subscript Indicates terminal, subscript Indicates the inbound domain, subscript Indicates a snapshot descriptor, index This indicates an encrypted ticket package.

[0116] Specifically, the session key is represented as:

[0117] ;

[0118] in, Indicates the session key. This represents the key derivation function. Indicates sharing a secret byte string. This represents the input field for the key derivation function context.

[0119] S4. The terminal and the migrating domain use session keys to perform authentication and encrypted transmission of IoT business data. The migrating domain periodically pulls the new snapshot release package published by the home domain and performs re-verification on active sessions. The home domain updates the snapshot release package or issues a new encrypted ticket package according to the epoch.

[0120] Terminals and migration domain service endpoints use session keys to perform authentication, encryption, and decryption of IoT service data, and implement replay protection. The migration domain periodically pulls and verifies the new snapshot release package of the home domain, uses the accumulator public value in the new snapshot to re-verify active sessions, and re-verifies the validity period of migration authorization tickets.

[0121] Furthermore, the terminal forms a business data payload from the IoT business data according to the application layer protocol. Before entering the encryption process, the business data payload performs field serialization and integrity pre-check. The field serialization adopts length prefix encoding and field type identifier encoding.

[0122] The terminal uses an authentication encryption algorithm to encrypt the service data payload. The authentication encryption algorithm takes the session key as the key input and the initialization vector as the random input, and outputs ciphertext and authentication tag. The initialization vector is output by the terminal random number generator or constructed by a counter combined with a random prefix. A non-repeatability constraint check is performed when the initialization vector is generated.

[0123] The terminal assembles the cross-domain alias, epoch identifier, initialization vector, ciphertext, and authentication tag into an encrypted service message and sends it to the edge access point; the edge access point forwards the encrypted service message to the service endpoint of the migrated domain.

[0124] The endpoint of the migrated domain obtains the session key handle from the session record based on the cross-domain alias and epoch identifier index, decrypts the ciphertext using the authentication decryption algorithm and verifies the authentication tag. After the authentication tag is verified, the business data payload is output and handed over to the business processing flow for further processing.

[0125] It should be noted that if the authentication tag verification fails, the service endpoint in the migrated domain will trigger session exception handling according to the session security policy. Session exception handling includes dropping packets, updating counters, and writing session renegotiation trigger conditions.

[0126] The terminal and the migrating domain suppress replay during the processing of service messages. Specifically, replay suppression is achieved by maintaining a deduplication table based on cross-domain aliases and initialization vectors, and the deduplication table is cleaned up when the session ends.

[0127] Furthermore, the migration domain administrator maintains the snapshot pull task, initiating a pull request to the snapshot distribution endpoint according to the home domain identifier and epoch identifier. The pull request is transmitted using a transport layer secure channel, and the integrity of the snapshot release packet is verified. Root trust endorsement verification and snapshot signature verification are performed, and the new snapshot is written to the local snapshot cache. The local snapshot cache retains the old snapshot when writing the new snapshot to support the transition period verification of concurrent sessions.

[0128] Furthermore, when a change in the snapshot descriptor digest of the local snapshot cache is detected, a session re-verification process is triggered. The cross-domain alias, epoch identifier, prime number representation, allowed set member witness, and revoked set non-member witness of each session record are read. The large integer modular exponentiation library is called, and the allowed set and revoked set accumulator public values ​​in the new snapshot are used to re-verify the allowed set member witness and revoked set non-member witness of the terminal.

[0129] Furthermore, the domain administrator verifies the validity period field of the migration authorization ticket plaintext. The domain administrator aligns the issuance time identifier and the expiration time identifier with the current clock source of the domain to determine the validity. The domain administrator triggers the session closure process when the validity period reaches the expiration boundary.

[0130] It should be noted that a closing buffer window is reserved before the expiration time marker recorded in the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket. The time point corresponding to the start of the closing buffer window is used as the expiration boundary. After the migration domain management completes clock source alignment, it uses the aligned current time, the issuance time marker, and the expiration time marker to determine validity. After the aligned current time enters the closing buffer window, the migration domain management stops accepting new session establishment and new service requests, and only allows existing sessions to perform closing interactions and starts session closure preparation. After the aligned current time reaches the expiration time marker, the migration domain management determines that the ticket is invalid and triggers the session closure and session key destruction process. The length of the closing buffer window is jointly determined by the upper bound of the clock alignment residual error, the upper bound of the maximum on-the-go delay of the forwarding link, and the upper bound of the anti-replay window coverage area.

[0131] If the verification fails again or the migration authorization ticket expires, the migrating domain closes the session, notifies the edge access point and securely destroys the session key, and the terminal side simultaneously clears the session key and anti-replay related caches; the home domain writes the prime number representation into the revocation set and publishes a new snapshot release package, or issues a new encrypted ticket package as needed.

[0132] Furthermore, when the session re-verification fails or the migration authorization ticket expires, the migration domain administrator marks the session record as closed and notifies the edge access point to stop forwarding service messages related to the session record. The migration domain administrator sends a session closure instruction to the edge access point. After receiving the session closure instruction, the edge access point updates its local forwarding table and deletes the forwarding context associated with the cross-domain alias.

[0133] When the session is closed, the session key handle is destroyed and the key storage area is erased. The erasure operation includes overwriting and writing the handle expiration mark. The destruction of the key handle is completed through the interface provided by the key protection carrier.

[0134] When the terminal receives a session closure notification, it deletes the session key from the terminal's local secure storage area and cleans up the session-related cache tables. The cache table cleanup includes deduplication table cleanup and initialization vector state cleanup.

[0135] It should be noted that when the terminal needs to continue accessing, it reconstructs the access request message and triggers the access verification process. When the epoch changes, the terminal regenerates the cross-domain alias and prime number representation, obtains the allowed set member witnesses and revoked set non-member witnesses of the new epoch through the home domain management channel, obtains the encrypted encapsulated migration authorization ticket for the public key of the migrating domain, and initiates the access request using the new epoch materials.

[0136] When the home domain triggers revocation due to a change in terminal state, it writes the prime number representation of the terminal in the corresponding epoch into the revocation set, updates the public value of the revocation set accumulator, generates a new snapshot descriptor, generates a new snapshot signature using the home domain's private key, writes the new snapshot release package into the snapshot release storage area, and pushes it to the snapshot distribution endpoint. The migrating domain obtains the new snapshot through the snapshot pull task and triggers the session reverification process.

[0137] When the home domain needs to adjust the permission scope identifier, it regenerates the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket, performs key encapsulation and authentication encryption, and generates a new encrypted ticket package. The home domain sends the new encrypted ticket package and ticket signature to the terminal. When the old ticket is still valid, the terminal selects the old ticket or the new ticket to initiate an access request according to the management policy. When the receiving domain unseales the ticket and verifies the permission scope identifier, it establishes a session record based on the plaintext of the migration authorization ticket.

[0138] This embodiment also provides an IoT access management system based on data encryption, including:

[0139] The Trust Snapshot module is used by the root trust party to generate root key pairs and home domain public key endorsement signatures, the home domain to generate accumulator parameters, calculate the public accumulator values ​​of the allowed set and the revocation set, generate snapshot descriptors and sign them to form snapshot distribution packages, the migrating domain to pull and verify the snapshot distribution packages, and cache the snapshot descriptors in the local snapshot cache area.

[0140] The voucher and ticket module is used by the terminal to generate cross-domain aliases and prime number representations, obtain permission for set member witnesses and revoke set non-member witnesses, create migration authorization tickets in plaintext for the home domain, generate encrypted ticket packages and ticket signatures, and distribute them to the terminal.

[0141] The session verification module is used by the terminal to submit an access request message to the migration domain. The migration domain obtains the public values ​​of the accumulators for the allowed set and the revocation set based on the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache, verifies the witnesses of the allowed set members and the witnesses of the revocation set non-members, verifies the ticket signature and decrypts the encrypted ticket packet, and the migration domain and the terminal negotiate to generate a session key.

[0142] The encryption maintenance module is used by the terminal and the migrating domain to perform authentication and encrypted transmission of IoT business data using session keys. The migrating domain periodically pulls the new snapshot release package published by the home domain and performs re-verification on active sessions. The home domain updates the snapshot release package or issues a new encrypted ticket package according to the epoch.

[0143] In summary, this invention reduces the amount of data carried in access request packets and the burden of signature verification by pulling and verifying snapshot release packets in the migration domain, combined with a verification mechanism that allows set member witnessing and revoking set non-member witnessing. By verifying ticket signatures, decrypting encrypted ticket packets, and performing consistency verification and handshake binding verification, it enables rapid effect of device revocation and permission changes, and triggers re-verification of active sessions, reducing cross-domain maintenance overhead and improving access trustworthiness and business continuity.

[0144] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can be made to the technical solutions of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, and all such modifications or substitutions should be covered within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A data encryption-based Internet of Things access management method, characterized in that: The root trust party generates a root key pair and a home domain public key endorsement signature, the home domain generates accumulator parameters, calculates accumulator public values of the allowed set and the revoked set, generates a snapshot descriptor and signs to form a snapshot release package, and the migration-in domain pulls and verifies the snapshot release package and caches the snapshot descriptor to a local snapshot cache area; The terminal generates a cross-domain alias and a prime representative, obtains allowed set member witnesses and revoked set non-member witnesses, the home domain creates a migration authorization ticket plaintext, generates an encrypted ticket package and a ticket signature, and issues the terminal; The terminal submits an access request message to the migration-in domain, the migration-in domain obtains the accumulator public values of the allowed set and the revoked set according to the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache area, verifies the allowed set member witnesses and the revoked set non-member witnesses, verifies the ticket signature and decrypts the encrypted ticket package, and the migration-in domain and the terminal negotiate to generate a session key; The terminal and the migration-in domain perform authentication and encryption transmission on the Internet of Things business data using the session key, the migration-in domain periodically pulls a new snapshot release package released by the home domain, and performs re-verification on active sessions, and the home domain updates the snapshot release package according to the epoch or issues a new encrypted ticket package. The root trust party generates a root key pair and a home domain public key endorsement signature, the home domain generates accumulator parameters, calculates accumulator public values of the allowed set and the revoked set, generates a snapshot descriptor and signs to form a snapshot release package, and the migration-in domain pulls and verifies the snapshot release package and caches the snapshot descriptor to a local snapshot cache area; 2. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 1, wherein: The root trust party generates a root key pair, receives a home domain identifier and a home domain public key, and generates a home domain public key endorsement signature; The home domain establishes an epoch management table, generates accumulator parameters, calculates accumulator public values of the allowed set and the revoked set, generates a snapshot descriptor, issues a snapshot signature, and forms a snapshot release package. The migration-in domain pulls and verifies the snapshot release package and caches the snapshot descriptor to a local snapshot cache area, which refers to that the home domain releases a snapshot release package, the migration-in domain obtains the snapshot release package, verifies the home domain public key endorsement signature, obtains the home domain public key, verifies the snapshot signature, and the migration-in domain caches the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache area.

3. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 2, wherein: The terminal generates a cross-domain alias and a prime representative, obtains allowed set member witnesses and revoked set non-member witnesses, and the specific steps are as follows:

4. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 3, wherein: The terminal generates a cross-domain alias and a prime representative, obtains allowed set member witnesses and revoked set non-member witnesses, and the specific steps are as follows: The home domain receives the cross-domain alias and the prime representative of the terminal, registers to the allowed set, calls the accumulator modulus and the accumulator base, obtains the allowed set member witnesses and the revoked set non-member witnesses, and issues them to the terminal. The terminal submits an access request message to the migration-in domain, the migration-in domain obtains the accumulator public values of the allowed set and the revoked set according to the snapshot descriptor in the local snapshot cache area, verifies the allowed set member witnesses and the revoked set non-member witnesses, verifies the ticket signature and decrypts the encrypted ticket package, and the migration-in domain and the terminal negotiate to generate a session key; 5. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 4, wherein: ​ 6. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 5, wherein: ​ The terminal sends an access request message to the migration-in domain, and submits a cross-domain alias, a prime representative, allowed set member witness, revoked set non-member witness, terminal temporary public key, terminal random number, encrypted ticket package and ticket signature to the migration-in domain. After replay check, the edge access point forwards the access request message to the migration-in domain management party; The migration-in domain management party obtains the home domain public key endorsement signature and snapshot release package, verifies the home domain public key endorsement signature, verifies the snapshot signature, analyzes the snapshot descriptor, and obtains the accumulator public value of the allowed set and the revoked set; The migration-in domain management party calls a large integer modular exponentiation library, uses the accumulator public value of the allowed set and the revoked set, and verifies the allowed set member witness and the revoked set non-member witness of the terminal.

7. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 6, wherein: The ticket signature is verified and the encrypted ticket package is decrypted, the migration-in domain and the terminal negotiate to generate a session key, and the specific steps are as follows, The migration-in domain management party verifies the ticket signature using the home domain public key, decrypts the encrypted ticket package using the migration-in domain private key, obtains the migration authorization ticket plaintext, and performs consistency verification and handshake binding verification on the migration authorization ticket plaintext and the access request message; The migration-in domain and the terminal calculate a shared secret, generate a session key through a key derivation function, and exchange authentication codes to complete bidirectional confirmation.

8. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 7, wherein: The terminal and the migration-in domain use the session key to perform authentication and encryption transmission on the Internet of Things business data, and the migration-in domain regularly pulls the new snapshot release package released by the home domain, and performs re-verification on the active session, and the specific steps are as follows, The terminal and the migration-in domain business endpoint use the session key to perform authentication and encryption and decryption on the Internet of Things business data, and implement anti-replay protection; The migration-in domain regularly pulls and verifies the new snapshot release package of the home domain, uses the accumulator public value in the new snapshot to perform re-verification on the active session, and performs re-verification on the migration authorization ticket validity period.

9. The data encryption based IoT access management method of claim 8, wherein: The home domain updates the snapshot release package according to the epoch or issues a new encrypted ticket package, and the specific steps are as follows, If the re-verification fails or the migration authorization ticket validity period is invalid, the migration-in domain closes the session, notifies the edge access point and safely destroys the session key, and the terminal side synchronously cleans up the session key and the anti-replay related cache; The home domain writes the prime representative into the revoked set and releases a new snapshot release package, or issues a new encrypted ticket package as needed.

10. A data encryption based IoT access management system based on the data encryption based IoT access management method of any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that: It comprises, A trust snapshot module is used for a root trust party to generate a root key pair and a home domain public key endorsement signature, a home domain to generate an accumulator parameter, calculate an accumulator public value of an allowed set and a revoked set, generate a snapshot descriptor and sign to form a snapshot release package, and a migration-in domain to pull and verify the snapshot release package and cache the snapshot descriptor to a local snapshot cache area; A credential ticket module is used for a terminal to generate a cross-domain alias and a prime representative, obtain an allowed set member witness and a revoked set non-member witness, a home domain to create a migration authorization ticket plaintext, generate an encrypted ticket package and a ticket signature, and issue the terminal; A verification session module is used for a terminal to submit an access request message to a migration-in domain, the migration-in domain to obtain an accumulator public value of an allowed set and a revoked set according to a snapshot descriptor in a local snapshot cache area, verify an allowed set member witness and a revoked set non-member witness, verify a ticket signature and decrypt an encrypted ticket package, and the migration-in domain to negotiate with the terminal to generate a session key. The encryption maintenance module is used for performing authentication and encryption transmission of the Internet of Things service data by the terminal and the migration-in domain using a session key, the migration-in domain periodically pulls a new snapshot release package released by the home domain, re-verification is performed on active sessions, and the home domain updates the snapshot release package according to the epoch or issues a new encryption ticket package.

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