Method for improving safety of industrial and commercial energy storage system

Abstract

The invention discloses a method for improving the safety of an industrial and commercial energy storage system, and relates to the technical field of industrial and commercial energy storage. According to the method, a real-time controller (RTC) is additionally arranged in an energy storage system, so that the RTC, an energy storage converter (PCS) and a battery management system (BMS) form a triangular communication framework, a triple safety protection mechanism is constructed, and protection functions of all parties are organically fused. The RTC serves as a third safety protection and system final safety defense line, can obtain PCS, BMS and environment related data in real time, controls the PCS to stop through a command or dry contact mode when protection is triggered, and disconnects the direct current contactor if the PCS fails. The problems that an existing energy storage system is insufficient in protection redundancy and poor in multi-device integration safety are solved, system safety redundancy is effectively improved, potential safety hazards caused by device failure are reduced, and reliable operation of the energy storage system and personnel and property safety are guaranteed.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of industrial and commercial energy storage technology, specifically a method for improving the safety of industrial and commercial energy storage systems. Background Technology

[0002] Commercial and industrial energy storage systems typically consist of key components such as batteries, battery management systems (BMS), power supply converters (PCS), and energy management systems (EMS) that control the charging and discharging of the PCS. They are integrated energy storage systems widely used in industrial production and commercial buildings. Their core characteristics are scattered distribution, relatively small individual system capacity, and limitations imposed by installation environment and management costs, often resulting in unattended operation. This operating mode makes it difficult to detect and address system failures or safety hazards in a timely manner, often requiring remedial action only after a safety incident has occurred. This significantly increases the risk of escalation, potentially leading to equipment damage or even personal injury.

[0003] More importantly, in existing industrial and commercial energy storage systems, core equipment such as EMS, PCS, and BMS are mostly standardized products from different manufacturers. Integrators typically complete system construction simply by purchasing and combining these components, lacking in-depth adaptation and collaborative optimization of the protection functions of each device. This makes it difficult to form a cohesive whole with comprehensive safety performance and redundant design. In a conventional system architecture, the PCS establishes only a single communication link with the BMS, and the information exchange between the two is the core foundation for battery charge and discharge control and safety protection. Once a communication anomaly occurs between the PCS and BMS, or the software protection function of either fails, it will directly lead to uncontrolled power output of the PCS, resulting in serious safety hazards such as battery overcharging and over-discharging. At the same time, the protection functions of the BMS itself have obvious limitations. Its protection measures such as derating requests and charge / discharge restriction requests are advisory instructions, which must rely on the correct response of power execution units such as the PCS to be effective. If the PCS does not respond in time, the protection will fail. Furthermore, the DC-side cutoff function, which is the last line of active safety defense of the BMS, also has the problem of unreasonable time delay settings in practical applications, which may lead to risks such as cell overcharging. In addition, although the PCS has DC side voltage and current detection and protection functions, it only relies on the protection logic of its own single device and lacks external independent device verification and redundant backup. In extreme cases, it is difficult to guarantee the reliability of protection, which further aggravates the safety risks of the entire energy storage system and seriously threatens the stable operation of the energy storage system and the safety of surrounding personnel and property. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the problems of non-continuous drying and carbonization, uneven carbonization, high energy consumption, unstable quality, and low level of intelligence in existing wood vacuum carbonization technologies. This invention provides a wood vacuum drying and carbonization method that uses the detection of the content and composition of volatiles in the wood inside the vacuum tank for precise parameter control, intelligent algorithm adjustment, and full-process data management. This method automates the carbonization process, improves carbonization uniformity and quality stability, and reduces energy consumption and labor costs.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention employs the following technical means:

[0006] A method for improving the security of industrial and commercial energy storage systems includes the following steps:

[0007] Step 1: Add a real-time controller (RTC) to the energy storage system, and make the RTC communicate with the energy storage converter (PCS) and the battery management system (BMS) to form a triangular system architecture; when any two parties experience a long-term communication interruption or communication failure that causes data not to be updated, the communication failure safety protection shutdown will be triggered.

[0008] Step 2: Configure a set of safety protection function parameters in the RTC to form a triple safety protection for the energy storage system. The first layer is the battery-side detection protection of the BMS, the second layer is the DC-side detection protection of the PCS, and the third layer is the comprehensive detection protection of the RTC. The protection value of the RTC is greater than the protection value of the PCS, and the protection value of the PCS is greater than the protection value of the BMS. The protection of the RTC serves as the last line of defense for the energy storage system.

[0009] Step 3: Organically integrate the first, second, and third-level safety protection functions to achieve organic integration of energy storage system safety protection and improve system safety.

[0010] Preferably, the communication anomaly safety protection shutdown in step 1 specifically includes:

[0011] Step 1.1: If the RTC detects an abnormality in communication with the BMS or PCS, it immediately shuts down the PCS via command and dry contact. If the command fails, the dry contact method is used. If the shutdown fails, the DC contactor is disconnected via command to stop charging and discharging.

[0012] Step 1.2: If the PCS detects an abnormality in communication with the RTC or BMS, it reports the fault to the RTC and immediately shuts down itself. At the same time, the RTC shuts down the PCS via command and dry contact. If the shutdown fails, the DC contactor is disconnected.

[0013] Step 1.3: If the BMS detects an abnormality in communication with the RTC or PCS, it reports the fault to the RTC. The RTC then uses commands and dry contacts to shut down the PCS and delays the disconnection of the DC contactor to stop charging and discharging.

[0014] Preferably, the protection triggering and execution methods corresponding to the RTC security protection function parameters in step 2 include:

[0015] Step 2.1: If the highest voltage of the battery cell is higher than the protection value or the lowest voltage is lower than the protection value and this continues for 3 seconds, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact method.

[0016] Step 2.2: If the highest temperature of the battery cell is higher than the protection value or the lowest temperature is lower than the protection value and this continues for 3 seconds, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact.

[0017] Step 2.3: If the DC current is detected to be higher than the protection value for 3 seconds, the PCS will be stopped via command and dry contact method.

[0018] Step 2.4: If the DC voltage is detected to be higher than the high voltage protection value or lower than the low voltage protection value for 3 seconds, the PCS will be stopped by command and dry contact method.

[0019] Step 2.5: If the abnormal power range of the PCS is detected to exceed the set protection value, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact.

[0020] Step 2.6: If the equipment is detected to have triggered the fire protection conditions, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact.

[0021] Preferably, the organic integration of the triple safety protection functions in step 3 specifically includes:

[0022] Step 3.1 When the cell voltage is over-voltage or under-voltage, the BMS executes the derating request, charge / discharge restriction request, and delayed DC side switch disconnection operation according to the degree. After the RTC triggers the corresponding protection parameters, it controls the PCS to stop. If the PCS fails to control, the DC side switch is disconnected.

[0023] Step 3.2: When the cell temperature is too high or too low, the BMS executes the derating request, charge / discharge restriction request, and DC side switch disconnection operation according to the degree. After the RTC triggers the corresponding protection parameters, it controls the PCS to stop. If the PCS is out of control, it forcibly disconnects the DC main contactor on the battery side.

[0024] Step 3.3: When there is an overcurrent on the DC side, the BMS performs protection operations according to the degree, the PCS prevents overcurrent through built-in parameters, the RTC controls the PCS to stop after triggering the corresponding protection parameters, and if the PCS fails to control, the DC main contactor is forcibly disconnected.

[0025] Step 3.4: When the DC side voltage is over-voltage or under-voltage, the BMS performs protection operations according to the degree. The PCS prevents over-voltage and under-voltage through built-in parameters. After the RTC triggers the corresponding protection parameters, it controls the PCS to stop. If the PCS is out of control, it forcibly disconnects the DC main contactor.

[0026] Step 3.5: The RTC compares the power sent to the PCS with the power monitored by the PCS. If the power is found to be out of control, the PCS is immediately shut down.

[0027] Step 3.6: When abnormal fire events such as excessive combustible gas levels or smoke and temperature alarms occur, the RTC controls the PCS to shut down, and at the same time, the fire-fighting equipment directly controls the PCS to shut down via dry contacts.

[0028] The present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0029] 1. Significantly improved communication reliability: By constructing a triangular communication architecture of RTC, PCS, and BMS to replace the traditional single communication link, the problem of data interruption caused by communication failure between two devices in the existing system is solved. Communication failure between any two parties can trigger multiple shutdown protections, blocking the path of fault escalation from the communication level and significantly reducing the security risks caused by communication failure.

[0030] 2. Significantly Enhanced Protection Redundancy: A third layer of security protection, RTC, is added, forming a progressive protection system with the existing first layer of BMS and second layer of PCS protection. The RTC protection value is set to the highest level, serving as the system's final security defense. This overcomes the shortcomings of BMS's advisory protection relying on execution unit responses and PCS's single-device protection lacking backup. Even if any one or two layers of protection fail, security can still be achieved through the remaining protection mechanisms, significantly improving the system's fault tolerance.

[0031] 3. Organic Synergy of Protection Functions: Breaking away from the current situation where protection functions of equipment from different manufacturers are independent and fragmented, RTC integrates data from BMS, PCS, and environmental monitoring to achieve deep integration of triple protection functions. For scenarios such as abnormal cell voltage, temperature, DC-side electrical parameters, power anomalies, and fire incidents, a collaborative protection logic of "tiered response + multiple verifications + mandatory intervention" is formed, avoiding blind spots in single-device protection and improving the comprehensiveness and timeliness of safety protection.

[0032] 4. Adapting to unattended operation scenarios: The protection execution mechanism is optimized. The RTC adopts a dual control method of "command + dry contact". When the command fails, it automatically switches to dry contact emergency stop. After the shutdown fails, it further disconnects the DC contactor, forming a multi-level forced intervention link. This effectively solves the problems of delayed fault detection and untimely handling in unattended operation, realizes proactive prevention and rapid handling of safety hazards, and reduces the accident rate and the degree of loss.

[0033] 5. Ensuring the safety of personnel and property: Given that commercial and industrial energy storage systems are often installed in densely populated areas with numerous buildings, redundant design and integrated protection significantly reduce the risk of fires, explosions, and other safety accidents caused by battery overcharging, over-discharging, overheating, and power runaway. This ensures the reliable operation of the energy storage system itself while preventing the spread of accidents that threaten the lives and property of surrounding personnel, thus enhancing the social safety of the system's operation. Detailed Implementation

[0034] The technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0035] A method for improving the security of industrial and commercial energy storage systems, comprising the following specific steps:

[0036] Step 1: Construct a triangular communication architecture

[0037] A Real-Time Controller (RTC) is added to the energy storage system, enabling the RTC to establish communication connections with both the PCS and BMS, forming a robust triangular system architecture. When any two parties experience prolonged communication interruptions or communication difficulties leading to data lapses, a communication anomaly safety protection shutdown is triggered. The specific operation is as follows:

[0038] After the RTC detects an abnormality in communication with the BMS or PCS, it immediately shuts down the PCS via commands and dry contact (dry contact is used when commands fail). If the shutdown fails, the RTC continues to disconnect the DC contactor via commands to stop charging and discharging.

[0039] After the PCS detects an abnormality in communication with the RTC or BMS, it reports the fault to the RTC and immediately shuts down itself; at the same time, the RTC shuts down the PCS through commands and dry contacts, and disconnects the DC contactor if the shutdown fails.

[0040] After the BMS detects an abnormality in communication with the RTC or PCS, it reports the fault to the RTC. The RTC then shuts down the PCS via commands and dry contacts, and after a delay, disconnects the DC contactor to stop charging and discharging.

[0041] Step 2: Configure RTC security protection parameters

[0042] Create a complete set of safety protection function parameters in the RTC to enable the energy storage system to form triple safety protection. When the RTC triggers protection, perform the following operations:

[0043] If the cell voltage is abnormal (the highest voltage is higher than the protection value or the lowest voltage is lower than the protection value) and lasts for 3 seconds, the RTC will shut down the PCS via command and dry contact.

[0044] If the cell temperature is abnormal (the highest temperature is higher than the protection value or the lowest temperature is lower than the protection value) and lasts for 3 seconds, the RTC will shut down the PCS via command and dry contact.

[0045] If the DC current exceeds the protection value and remains so for 3 seconds, the RTC will shut down the PCS via command and dry contact.

[0046] If the DC voltage is abnormal (higher than the high voltage protection value or lower than the low voltage protection value) and lasts for 3 seconds, the RTC will shut down the PCS via command and dry contact.

[0047] When the PCS power abnormality exceeds the set protection value, the RTC will shut down the PCS via command and dry contact.

[0048] If the device is detected to have triggered the fire protection condition, the RTC will shut down the PCS via command and dry contact.

[0049] Step 3: Organically integrate triple safety protection

[0050] The first, second, and third layers of security protection functions are organically integrated to achieve comprehensive security protection. The specific integration method is as follows:

[0051] Cell voltage overvoltage / undervoltage: The BMS performs derating, charge / discharge inactivation, and delayed DC-side switch disconnection operations according to the degree; the RTC controls the PCS to shut down after triggering the corresponding protection parameters, and disconnects the DC-side switch if the PCS fails to control it.

[0052] Cell temperature too high / too low: BMS performs derating, charge / discharge restriction, and DC side switch disconnection operations according to the degree; RTC controls PCS to stop after triggering the corresponding protection parameters; if PCS fails to control, the battery side DC main contactor is forcibly disconnected.

[0053] DC side overcurrent: BMS performs protection operation according to the degree, and PCS protects against overcurrent through built-in parameters; RTC controls PCS to stop after triggering the corresponding protection parameters, and if PCS fails to control, the DC main contactor will be forcibly disconnected.

[0054] DC side voltage overvoltage / undervoltage: BMS performs protection operation according to the degree, and PCS protects against overvoltage and undervoltage through built-in parameters; RTC controls PCS to stop after triggering the corresponding protection parameters, and if PCS fails to control, it forcibly disconnects the DC main contactor.

[0055] PCS power uncontrolled: RTC compares the transmitted power with the monitored power, and immediately controls the PCS to shut down if an anomaly is detected, reducing the risk of battery overcharging and over-discharging.

[0056] Firefighting anomaly: The RTC controls the PCS to shut down, and at the same time, the fire-fighting equipment directly controls the PCS to shut down via dry contacts to avoid potential hazards caused by RTC failure.

[0057] Working principle

[0058] The core working principle of this invention is to build a full-scenario redundant security protection system by constructing a triangular communication architecture, a triple progressive protection collaboration, and multi-dimensional data linkage verification, so as to ensure that the energy storage system can still effectively block safety hazards when one or more devices fail.

[0059] I. Fundamental Supporting Principles of Triangular Communication Architecture

[0060] As the system's main control unit, the RTC establishes independent communication links with both the PCS and BMS, forming a triangular communication network of "RTC-PCS-BMS". This architecture breaks away from the traditional single communication mode of "PCS-BMS", enabling real-time data interaction and status mutual inspection among the three parties.

[0061] When communication between any two parties is interrupted or data is abnormal, a third party can immediately detect the fault and trigger protection to avoid protection failure caused by a single link break.

[0062] Real-time synchronized operation data from three parties (such as cell parameters, DC side electrical parameters, power commands, etc.) provides multi-source data support for protection logic, reducing the risk of misjudgment of data from a single device.

[0063] II. The Collaborative Working Principle of Triple Progressive Protection

[0064] The system follows a progressive logic of "BMS basic protection → PCS autonomous protection → RTC ultimate protection," with protection parameters set in a hierarchical manner according to "RTC > PCS > BMS," ensuring that risks are intercepted at each level.

[0065] The first layer (BMS) collects data such as cell voltage, temperature and total current in real time, and performs operations such as derating, prohibiting charging and discharging and cutting off DC side according to risk level, providing basic layer protection for the battery.

[0066] The second layer (PCS): Independently detects DC side voltage and current, and adjusts the operating status in combination with its own preset parameters to avoid battery overcurrent and overvoltage, forming an autonomous protection layer at the equipment level;

[0067] The third layer (RTC) integrates BMS, PCS data, environmental monitoring (temperature, combustible gas, smoke), and fire protection system data for multi-dimensional cross-verification. When any layer of protection fails or the risk reaches the critical value, the ultimate protection is triggered, and it has the highest priority.

[0068] III. RTC Core Protection Execution Principle

[0069] As a security hub, RTC operates through a closed-loop logic of "real-time data monitoring - anomaly detection - tiered protection execution":

[0070] Real-time acquisition of multi-source data: including BMS cell parameters, PCS operating electrical parameters, and environmental and safety signals from temperature control / fire protection systems;

[0071] Anomaly detection mechanism: Compare with built-in protection parameters (such as cell voltage overvoltage threshold of 3.70V, temperature upper limit of 55℃, etc.). When the abnormal data continues for a set time (such as 3 seconds), the risk is confirmed to be effective.

[0072] The protection commands are executed in a tiered manner: the PCS is shut down first by command; if the command fails, it automatically switches to dry contact hard-wired control (physical forced shutdown); if the PCS is still out of control, a further command is issued to disconnect the DC main contactor, completely terminating the charging and discharging process, forming a three-level protection link of "software control - hardware forced shutdown - circuit disconnection".

[0073] IV. Multi-scenario Fault Adaptive Principle

[0074] The system automatically matches protection strategies to different fault types, such as communication interruption, equipment failure, and abnormal parameters.

[0075] Communication failure: Triggers a three-way mutual inspection mechanism, and the RTC directly intervenes to control the PCS to shut down, in order to avoid power runaway;

[0076] Single device failure (such as BMS temperature detection failure): The RTC acquires real data through an independent acquisition channel and skips the failed device to directly perform protection.

[0077] Fire emergency response: The RTC is linked with the fire protection system and simultaneously initiates a dual shutdown command of "self-control + direct control of fire protection equipment" to ensure reliable protection in emergency scenarios.

[0078] Example 1

[0079] Cell temperature abnormality triggers protection scenario

[0080] During the operation of an energy storage power station in a commercial park, the energy storage system with triple safety protection functions described in this invention was used. During the high-temperature period in summer, the ambient temperature in the area where the power station is located suddenly rose to 38°C. The temperature control system inside the energy storage compartment experienced a decrease in heat dissipation efficiency due to a fan malfunction. During operation, the temperature detection module of the BMS suddenly malfunctioned, failing to accurately collect the real-time temperature of the battery cells and failing to trigger derating or charge / discharge restriction protection in a timely manner. Simultaneously, due to previous configuration errors, the internal temperature protection parameters of the PCS did not respond to the rising battery cell temperature, causing the battery cell temperature to continue to increase.

[0081] When the RTC detects that the highest temperature of the battery cell reaches 58°C (exceeding the built-in protection value of 55°C) through an independent acquisition channel and lasts for 3 seconds, it immediately sends a shutdown command to the PCS. Since the PCS was stuck due to internal program lag at this time and did not respond to the command in time, the RTC automatically switched to the dry contact emergency stop mode after 3 seconds, successfully cut off the operating power supply of the PCS, and forced the charging and discharging operations to stop. Subsequent inspections confirmed that if the shutdown was not timely, the battery cell temperature would exceed the critical value within 5 minutes, triggering a thermal runaway, verifying the effectiveness of the present invention in scenarios where temperature protection fails.

[0082] Embodiment 2

[0083] Scenario of power out-of-control caused by communication interruption

[0084] During the operation of a supporting energy storage power station in an industrial plant, the triple safety protection energy storage system described in the present invention is adopted. During operation, due to construction misoperation, the communication line between the BMS and the PCS was accidentally cut off, and the communication between the two parties was completely interrupted. At this time, although the BMS detected communication anomalies and reported the fault to the RTC, the charge / discharge prohibition request sent by itself could not be transmitted to the PCS due to communication interruption; while the PCS did not detect the communication signal with the BMS, but due to the failure of its own communication fault diagnosis module, it did not perform an autonomous shutdown operation and continued to charge according to the power instruction before the interruption, resulting in continuous over-standard of the DC side current of the battery.

[0085] The RTC simultaneously detected the communication interruption between the BMS and the PCS, and the DC current exceeded the protection value of 150A and lasted for 3 seconds, and immediately activated the dual protection mechanism: on the one hand, it sent a shutdown command to the PCS, and on the other hand, it triggered a dry contact control signal. Since the PCS communication fault did not respond to the command, the dry contact signal successfully forced the PCS to shut down. At the same time, the RTC further issued an instruction to disconnect the DC main contactor, completely terminating the charge / discharge process, avoiding internal damage of the battery caused by overcurrent, and demonstrating the redundant protection ability of the present invention in scenarios of multi-device communication faults.

[0086] Embodiment 3

[0087] Scenario of abnormal fire protection interlocking protection

[0088] During the operation of a supporting energy storage power station in an office building, the energy storage system with triple safety protection functions described in the present invention is adopted. During the unattended period at night, a certain battery module in the energy storage cabin generated a small amount of combustible gas due to internal short circuit, and local smoke spread accompanied. At this time, the combustible gas sensor and the smoke sensor of the fire protection system were triggered simultaneously to send signals to the RTC; however, due to the decrease in detection accuracy caused by smoke occlusion, the BMS did not trigger the protection instruction in time, and the PCS did not receive the direct fire protection control signal and remained in the normal operation state.

[0089] Upon detecting that the fire protection conditions were met, the RTC immediately sent a shutdown command to the PCS and simultaneously initiated the fire-fighting linkage protection process. Because the PCS experienced command reception anomalies due to power module fluctuations, it failed to execute the shutdown operation. The RTC then forced the PCS to shut down within 3 seconds via a dry contact emergency stop. Simultaneously, the fire-fighting equipment was directly connected to the PCS's fire input interface via independent dry contacts, forming a double safeguard to ensure the PCS completely stopped operating, preventing the short-circuit fault from escalating and causing a fire. This verifies the reliable protection effect of the invention in fire emergency scenarios.

[0090] The examples provided in this invention are not intended to limit the implementation. Those skilled in the art will recognize that various variations or modifications can be made based on the above description. It is neither necessary nor possible to exhaustively list all possible implementations, and any obvious variations or modifications derived therefrom are still within the scope of this invention.

Claims

1. A method for improving the safety of industrial and commercial energy storage systems, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Add a real-time controller (RTC) to the energy storage system, and make the RTC communicate with the energy storage converter (PCS) and the battery management system (BMS) to form a triangular system architecture; when any two parties experience a long-term communication interruption or communication failure that causes data not to be updated, the communication failure safety protection shutdown will be triggered. Step 2: Configure a set of safety protection function parameters in the RTC to form a triple safety protection for the energy storage system. The first layer is the battery-side detection protection of the BMS, the second layer is the DC-side detection protection of the PCS, and the third layer is the comprehensive detection protection of the RTC. The protection value of the RTC is greater than the protection value of the PCS, and the protection value of the PCS is greater than the protection value of the BMS. The protection of the RTC serves as the last line of defense for the energy storage system. Step 3: Organically integrate the first, second, and third-level safety protection functions to achieve organic integration of energy storage system safety protection and improve system safety.

2. The method for improving the safety of industrial and commercial energy storage systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 1, the communication anomaly safety protection shutdown, specifically includes: Step 1.1: If the RTC detects an abnormality in communication with the BMS or PCS, it immediately shuts down the PCS via command and dry contact. If the command fails, the dry contact method is used. If the shutdown fails, the DC contactor is disconnected via command to stop charging and discharging. Step 1.2: If the PCS detects an abnormality in communication with the RTC or BMS, it reports the fault to the RTC and immediately shuts down itself. At the same time, the RTC shuts down the PCS via command and dry contact. If the shutdown fails, the DC contactor is disconnected. Step 1.3: If the BMS detects an abnormality in communication with the RTC or PCS, it reports the fault to the RTC. The RTC then uses commands and dry contacts to shut down the PCS and delays the disconnection of the DC contactor to stop charging and discharging.

3. The method for improving the safety of industrial and commercial energy storage systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, The protection triggering and execution methods corresponding to the RTC's security protection function parameters in step 2 include: Step 2.1: If the highest voltage of the battery cell is higher than the protection value or the lowest voltage is lower than the protection value and this continues for 3 seconds, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact method. Step 2.2: If the highest temperature of the battery cell is higher than the protection value or the lowest temperature is lower than the protection value and this continues for 3 seconds, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact. Step 2.3: If the DC current is detected to be higher than the protection value for 3 seconds, the PCS will be stopped via command and dry contact method. Step 2.4: If the DC voltage is detected to be higher than the high voltage protection value or lower than the low voltage protection value for 3 seconds, the PCS will be stopped by command and dry contact method. Step 2.5: If the abnormal power range of the PCS is detected to exceed the set protection value, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact. Step 2.6: If the equipment is detected to have triggered the fire protection conditions, the PCS will be shut down via command and dry contact.

4. The method for improving the safety of industrial and commercial energy storage systems according to claim 1, characterized in that, The organic integration of the three safety protection functions in step 3 specifically includes: Step 3.1 When the cell voltage is over-voltage or under-voltage, the BMS executes the derating request, charge / discharge restriction request, and delayed DC side switch disconnection operation according to the degree. After the RTC triggers the corresponding protection parameters, it controls the PCS to stop. If the PCS fails to control, the DC side switch is disconnected. Step 3.2: When the cell temperature is too high or too low, the BMS executes the derating request, charge / discharge restriction request, and DC side switch disconnection operation according to the degree. After the RTC triggers the corresponding protection parameters, it controls the PCS to stop. If the PCS is out of control, it forcibly disconnects the DC main contactor on the battery side. Step 3.3: When there is an overcurrent on the DC side, the BMS performs protection operations according to the degree, the PCS prevents overcurrent through built-in parameters, the RTC controls the PCS to stop after triggering the corresponding protection parameters, and if the PCS fails to control, the DC main contactor is forcibly disconnected. Step 3.4: When the DC side voltage is over-voltage or under-voltage, the BMS performs protection operations according to the degree. The PCS prevents over-voltage and under-voltage through built-in parameters. After the RTC triggers the corresponding protection parameters, it controls the PCS to stop. If the PCS is out of control, it forcibly disconnects the DC main contactor. Step 3.5: The RTC compares the power sent to the PCS with the power monitored by the PCS. If the power is found to be out of control, the PCS is immediately shut down. Step 3.6: When abnormal fire events such as excessive combustible gas levels or smoke and temperature alarms occur, the RTC controls the PCS to shut down, and at the same time, the fire-fighting equipment directly controls the PCS to shut down via dry contacts.