Network-group-user optimization scheduling system based on double-layer game optimization model
The grid-group-user optimization scheduling system, based on a two-layer game optimization model, optimizes the energy storage charging and discharging strategies of producers and consumers, solves the problem of increased reserve demand caused by the access of new energy sources, and achieves efficient reserve resource scheduling and improved economic efficiency of the power system.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- HUBEI ELECTRIC POWER CO JINGZHOU POWER SUPPLY CO
- Filing Date
- 2024-03-08
- Publication Date
- 2026-05-01
AI Technical Summary
The large-scale access of new energy sources such as wind and solar power has increased the uncertainty and uncontrollability of the power supply side, leading to increased backup demand and the possibility of load shedding or curtailment of wind and solar power, which increases the backup pressure and cost of the system.
A grid-group-household optimal scheduling system based on a two-level game optimization model is established. Through net load curve calculation, distribution network comprehensive cost calculation, electricity price setting, and production and consumption user decision-making modules, the energy storage charging and discharging strategies of production and consumption users are optimized to achieve optimal scheduling of electricity and the reserve market.
It alleviated the reserve pressure on the upper-level power grid, improved system operating efficiency and user economic benefits, increased the diversity and flexibility of reserve resources, and reduced investment costs.
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Figure CN121965570A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Network-Group-Household Optimization Scheduling System Based on Two-Level Game Theory Model Technical Field
[0001] This invention belongs to the field of power system optimization control, and specifically relates to a network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-level game optimization model. Background Technology
[0002] For the power system, increasing the proportion of renewable energy sources and enabling them to deeply replace traditional fossil fuels is essential for the high-carbon power system to move towards low-carbon or even zero-carbon development. However, the randomness and volatility of renewable energy output make its output difficult to predict, inevitably leading to difficulties in balancing the power supply in the system due to the large-scale integration of renewable energy. To mitigate potential imbalances between power generation and consumption, a certain amount of reserve capacity needs to be configured in the power system. The inherent uncertainty and limited predictability of renewable energy sources are driving an increasing demand for reserve capacity in the power grid, necessitating greater participation of spinning reserves in the regulation process to ensure power balance between source and load and reduce wind and solar curtailment.
[0003] The widespread use of distributed power sources such as photovoltaics and energy storage on the load side is driving traditional passive energy consumers to transform into prosumer-consumer users with dual "source-load" attributes. Prosumer-consumer users are characterized by environmental friendliness and flexibility. Their provision of reserves ensures that the system has not only traditional thermal power units and gas turbines on the generation side, but also flexible reserve resources on the load side. These diverse types of reserves can more effectively address supply-demand imbalances and improve system reliability. Including prosumer-consumer users in the system's reserve resources also allows power companies to avoid adding new units due to insufficient reserves in traditional units, reducing investment costs and improving overall system efficiency. Furthermore, prosumer-consumer users can adjust their energy storage charging and discharging strategies to choose specific times for electricity sales and reserve provision, generating revenue while avoiding high electricity prices during peak load periods, thus improving their own operational efficiency.
[0004] Therefore, given the significantly increased demand for reserve capacity in the new power system dominated by new energy sources, it is of great significance to study the participation of producers and consumers as market players in the electricity and reserve market to provide flexible reserve resources for the system. Summary of the Invention
[0005] The technical problem addressed by this invention is that the large-scale integration of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar has significantly increased the uncertainty and uncontrollability of the power supply side. On the one hand, the uncertainty of the large number of renewable energy sources and conventional loads integrated into the distribution network generates corresponding reserve requirements. On the other hand, the uncertainty of power output and load fluctuations of power generation and consumption users due to their photovoltaic installations also create certain reserve requirements. If the system's reserves are insufficient, it may lead to load shedding or curtailment of wind and solar power. Therefore, to ensure power balance, the system's demand for reserve capacity has greatly increased, which also increases the reserve pressure on the upstream power grid. The rational allocation and scheduling of reserves directly affects the economic efficiency and stability of power system operation. Under the circumstances of a significant increase in system reserve demand, the cost of increasing reserve capacity by adding power supply units is substantial.
[0006] The purpose of this invention is to address the aforementioned problems by providing a grid-group-household optimal scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model. This system taps into the potential of generating and consuming users (including rooftop photovoltaic and energy storage) on the load side to provide backup power. By further aggregating dispersed generating and consuming user resources through the generating and consuming user group, a "grid-group-household" structure is formed to jointly participate in the electricity and backup market, achieving optimal scheduling of electricity and backup power. This not only alleviates the backup pressure on the upper-level power grid and improves the system's operating efficiency, but also increases the economic benefits of electricity generating and consuming users and their groups. A two-layer game optimization model is established between the distribution network and the producer-consumer group, and between the producer-consumer group and the producer-consumer user. The upper layer of the two-layer game optimization model is a master-slave game model between the distribution network and the producer-consumer group. The distribution network aims to optimize its own operating efficiency and sets the purchase price of electricity and the prices of reserve capacity to guide the producer-consumer group to optimize producer-consumer user resources. The lower layer of the two-layer game optimization model is a master-slave game model between the producer-consumer group and the producer-consumer user. The producer-consumer group sets the purchase price of electricity and the prices of reserve capacity to incentivize each producer-consumer user to adjust its own energy storage charging and discharging strategy and the amount of electricity and reserve capacity traded with the producer-consumer group.
[0007] The technical solution of this invention is a network-group-user optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model, comprising: a net load curve calculation module: calculating the corresponding net load curves based on the predicted output curves and load consumption curves of new energy sources and producers / consumers, and determining the required reserve capacity of the distribution network and producers / consumers based on the net load curves; a distribution network comprehensive cost calculation module: establishing a distribution network comprehensive cost calculation model considering the costs of transactions between the distribution network and other market entities, the operation and maintenance costs of photovoltaic power plants and wind farms in the distribution network, and the revenue from the sale of electricity and reserves by the distribution network; a distribution network electricity price setting module: setting the electricity purchase price and reserve prices for producers / consumers based on the electricity and reserve demand of the distribution network, with the goal of minimizing the comprehensive operating cost of the distribution network, and issuing the prices to producers / consumers; and a producer / consumer group electricity price setting module: setting the electricity price based on the prices issued by the distribution network to producers / consumers. The system comprises several modules: a purchasing price module for electricity and reserve pricing for the producer-consumer user group; a purchasing price module for electricity and reserve pricing for both the producer and consumer users; a producer-consumer user decision-making module; a power and reserve information transmission module; and a distribution network module. The power purchase / sale electricity and reserve data aggregated by the producer-consumer user group are then transmitted to the distribution network to optimize its own operating efficiency.
[0008] The above-mentioned network-group-household optimized dispatching system includes the following steps: S1. Considering the new energy and conventional loads connected to the distribution network, obtain the corresponding new energy predicted output curves and load consumption curves respectively. Calculate the net load curve based on the output curves and load consumption curves, and determine the required upper and lower reserve capacity of the entire distribution network through the net load curve; S2. Considering that both rooftop photovoltaic and loads in the production and consumption users have reserve requirements, obtain the corresponding photovoltaic predicted output curves and load consumption curves respectively. Calculate the net load curve of the production and consumption users, and determine the required upper and lower reserve capacity of the entire production and consumption users through the net load curve; S3. Based on its own electricity consumption and reserve requirements, the distribution network formulates the electricity purchase price and upper and lower reserve prices for the production and consumption user group, and issues them to the production and consumption user group; S4. The production and consumption user group, according to the purchase price issued by the distribution network... The electricity price and the prices for upstream and downstream reserves are set for each producer-consumer user with the goal of maximizing their own efficiency. The electricity volume and reserve capacity traded with each producer-consumer user are also determined. S5: After receiving the electricity price and the prices for upstream and downstream reserves from the producer-consumer user group, the producer-consumer user adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of energy storage with the goal of maximizing their own efficiency, and updates the electricity volume and reserve capacity traded with the producer-consumer user group. S6: The producer-consumer user group transmits the aggregated electricity volume and reserve capacity data of the producer-consumer users to the distribution network. The distribution network updates the electricity price and the prices for upstream and downstream reserves issued to the producer-consumer user group again to optimize its own operating efficiency. S7: Steps S4-S6 are repeated for dynamic closed-loop iteration, i.e., two-layer game optimization, to finally obtain the optimal scheduling strategy for the power and reserves of the distribution network, the producer-consumer user group, and the producer-consumer users.
[0009] Furthermore, in step S3, the distribution network, acting as the leader in the upper-level master-slave game of the two-layer game optimization model, aims for optimal operating efficiency by adjusting the electricity purchase price and reserve prices for the production and consumption user groups, guiding them to optimize the aggregation of production and consumption user resources. When the distribution network trades in the electricity and reserve market, in addition to directly purchasing electricity and reserves from the upper-level grid to handle the power supply tasks for conventional loads and production and consumption users within its jurisdiction, as well as the reserve needs of connected wind and solar power, it also engages in electricity and reserve transactions with multiple production and consumption user groups. During market transactions, the overall operating cost of the distribution network consists of the cost of purchasing electricity and reserves from the upper-level grid, the cost of purchasing electricity and reserves from production and consumption user groups, the operation and maintenance costs of photovoltaic power plants and wind farms within the distribution network, and the revenue from selling electricity and reserves.
[0010] Furthermore, in step S4, the producer-consumer user group is both a follower in the upper-level master-slave game of the two-level game optimization model and a leader in the lower-level master-slave game of the two-level game optimization model.
[0011] In the upper-level master-slave game, the producer-consumer user groups respond to the price information given by the distribution network, adjust the amount of electricity traded with the distribution network and the reserve capacity, so as to maximize the operating efficiency of each producer-consumer user group; the amount of electricity traded with the distribution network and the reserve capacity also affect the operating efficiency of the distribution network, thereby affecting the distribution network's adjustment of prices.
[0012] In the lower-level master-slave game, the producer-consumer user group, as the leader, aims to maximize its own operational efficiency and sets the electricity purchase price and reserve price for producer-consumer users, incentivizing each producer-consumer user to adjust the amount of electricity traded with the producer-consumer user group and the reserve capacity.
[0013] As an intermediary link connecting the power distribution network and the consumer group, the producer-consumer group profits by taking advantage of the price difference in the electricity market and the reserve market. With the goal of maximizing its own operating efficiency, it sets and issues the purchase price and reserve price to the consumer group.
[0014] Furthermore, in step S5, after receiving the price information from the producer-consumer group, the producer-consumer user considers its own reserve needs and adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of the energy storage unit with the goal of maximizing its own efficiency, thereby updating the electricity and reserve capacity traded with the producer-consumer group.
[0015] In the lower-level master-slave game of the two-level game optimization model, the prosumer-consumer user, as a follower, adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of the energy storage unit and the ratio of traded electricity to traded reserve capacity based on the price information provided by the prosumer-consumer user group, after considering its own costs and the returns it obtains, in order to maximize its own efficiency. It then transmits the trading information of electricity and reserve capacity to the prosumer-consumer user group, which in turn updates the price sent to the prosumer-consumer user. This process iterates until the optimal trading price and the trading situation of electricity and reserve capacity between the prosumer-consumer user group and the prosumer-consumer user are finally determined.
[0016] Furthermore, in step S6, the producer-consumer user group guides the producer-consumer users to formulate the optimal energy storage charging and discharging strategy in the lower-level master-slave game, and transmits the aggregated producer-consumer user power and reserve data to the distribution network; through the upper-level master-slave game, the electricity price and reserve price issued by the distribution network to the producer-consumer user group are further optimized, while also affecting the lower-level master-slave game results, forming a closed-loop iterative optimization.
[0017] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention include: 1) The method of the present invention establishes a decision-making model for the participation of "network-group-household" in the power energy and reserve market. Based on the resource aggregation of the production and consumption user group, the power price is set for the production and consumption user group through the distribution network. The production and consumption user group then gives the corresponding price signal to the production and consumption user. This can guide the production and consumption user to adjust the optimal strategy of energy storage charging and discharging to fully tap its flexible reserve potential, determine the transaction status and clearing results of each entity participating in the power energy and reserve market, and ultimately enable each entity to achieve maximum operating efficiency, realizing the rational allocation and scheduling of flexible reserve resources within the power system.
[0018] 2) This invention solves the problems of limited individual resources of producers and consumers, difficulty in decentralized scheduling, and low participation enthusiasm. It introduces producers and consumers as aggregators of decentralized resources. By aggregating the decentralized electrical energy and backup resources of each producer and consumer, multiple producers and consumers can participate in the market efficiently and rationally arrange the system's scheduling plan.
[0019] 3) The optimized dispatching system of this invention addresses the problems of uncertainty and randomness in the output of photovoltaic power plants and wind farms, as well as the significantly increased uncertainty and uncontrollability on the power supply side of a high proportion of new energy power grids. It introduces users with photovoltaic and energy storage as market entities to participate in the electricity and reserve market, and also uses the resources on the load side as the system's reserve resources, increasing the diversity of the reserve market supply side. Multiple types of reserve resources can effectively cope with potential power imbalances in the system and improve the reliability of power system operation. By leveraging the fast response of energy storage units at producers and consumers, these units can be used as backup resources, expanding the system's reserve capacity and enhancing its flexibility. Furthermore, by utilizing the dual "source-load" characteristics of producers and consumers to provide reserves to the distribution network, the backup pressure on the upstream grid can be reduced when backup demand increases significantly. This allows power companies to avoid adding new units due to insufficient traditional backup resources, reducing investment costs and improving the system's operational economy. The surplus resources of producers and consumers can participate in the electricity market and the backup market, creating new sources of profit. Users themselves can adjust their energy storage charging and discharging strategies to choose the right time to sell electricity and provide backup, generating income while avoiding high electricity prices during peak load periods, thus improving their own economic efficiency. Attached Figure Description
[0020] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0021] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the two-layer game optimization model according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0022] The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model in the embodiment includes the following modules: Net load curve calculation module: acquires the predicted output curve of new energy sources, the load power consumption curve and the predicted output curve of photovoltaic power generation and the load power consumption curve of generating and consuming users in the distribution network, aggregates the output curve and the load power consumption curve to calculate the corresponding net load curve, and calculates and determines the reserve capacity required by the distribution network and generating and consuming users based on the net load curve.
[0023] Distribution network integrated cost calculation module: Based on the transaction process of the distribution network purchasing electricity and reserves from the upstream power grid and the production and consumption user groups, and selling electricity and reserves to production and consumption users, the module considers the costs of transactions between the distribution network and other market entities, the operation and maintenance costs of photovoltaic power plants and wind farms in the distribution network, and the revenue from the sale of electricity and reserves by the distribution network, and establishes a distribution network integrated cost calculation model.
[0024] Distribution network electricity pricing module: Based on the power and reserve demand of the distribution network, with the goal of minimizing the overall operating cost of the distribution network, the module sets the electricity purchase price and the upstream and downstream reserve prices for the production and consumption user groups, and distributes them to the production and consumption user groups.
[0025] Electricity pricing module for producer-consumer user groups: Based on the electricity purchase price and reserve prices issued to the producer-consumer user groups by the distribution network, and with the goal of maximizing the operating efficiency of the producer-consumer user groups, the module sets the electricity purchase price and reserve prices and issues them to the producer-consumer users. At the same time, it determines the amount of electricity traded with each producer-consumer user and the reserve capacity.
[0026] Producer-consumer user decision module: After receiving the electricity purchase price and reserve price from the producer-consumer user group, it adjusts the energy storage charging and discharging strategy with the goal of maximizing the operating efficiency of producer-consumer users, and updates the electricity volume and reserve capacity traded with the producer-consumer user group.
[0027] The power and reserve information transmission module: After the producer-consumer user determines the power volume and reserve capacity traded with the producer-consumer group, it transmits the power volume and reserve capacity traded by the producer-consumer user to the producer-consumer group. Then, it transmits the power purchase / sale and reserve capacity data of the producer-consumer users aggregated by the producer-consumer group to the distribution network, so that the distribution network can update the issued power purchase price and upstream and downstream reserve prices to optimize its own operating efficiency.
[0028] As shown in Figure 1, the network-group-household optimized scheduling method of the embodiment includes the following steps: S1, considering the new energy and conventional loads connected to the distribution network, the corresponding new energy predicted output curve and load power consumption curve are obtained respectively, and the two are aggregated to form an equivalent net load curve. The upper and lower reserve capacity required by the distribution network as a whole is obtained through the net load curve.
[0029] S2. Considering that both rooftop photovoltaic and load have reserve requirements among the producers and consumers, obtain the corresponding photovoltaic power output curve and load power consumption curve respectively. Aggregate the two to form an equivalent net load curve. Calculate the upper and lower reserve capacity required by the producers and consumers as a whole through the net load curve.
[0030] S3. The distribution network sets its own electricity purchase price and reserve prices based on its own electricity demand and reserve requirements, and distributes these prices to the production and consumption user groups. This includes the following steps: In the upper-level "grid-group" master-slave game model, the distribution network, as the leader, adjusts the distributed electricity purchase price and reserve prices to optimize its own operational efficiency, guiding the production and consumption user groups to optimize the aggregated production and consumption user resources. When the distribution network trades in the electricity and reserve market, in addition to directly purchasing a certain amount of electricity and reserves from the upper-level grid to handle the power supply tasks for conventional loads and production and consumption users within its jurisdiction, as well as the reserve requirements of connected wind and solar power, it also engages in electricity and reserve transactions with multiple production and consumption user groups.
[0031] In the process of market transactions, the comprehensive operating cost of the distribution network consists of the cost of purchasing electricity and reserves from the upper-level grid, the cost of purchasing electricity and reserves from the production and consumption user groups, the operation and maintenance costs of photovoltaic power plants and wind farms in the distribution network, and the revenue from selling electricity and reserves. Considering the optimal operating efficiency of the distribution network, the purchase price and reserve price are formulated. The objective function of the distribution network is as follows: In the formula: The total time period is the day before the current day, and the length of a single scheduling time period is [missing information]. ; For the operating efficiency of the power distribution network; The total cost of purchasing and storing electrical energy for the distribution network; , Photovoltaic power stations in the power distribution network and wind farm exist Output power during the time period; , These are the operation and maintenance cost coefficients for photovoltaic power plants and wind farms, respectively; I represents the number of photovoltaic power plants; and J represents the number of wind farms. For the revenue of the distribution network.
[0032] The total cost of purchasing and storing electrical energy in a distribution network is expressed as follows: In the formula: Electricity purchased by the distribution network from the superior power grid; , These refer to the upper and lower reserve capacities purchased by the distribution network from the upper-level power grid, respectively. for The electricity sales price of the upper-level power grid is determined here by dividing the peak, valley and normal periods according to the changes in all loads within the grid. , These are the prices for upper-level power grid sales of upper and lower reserves, respectively; the distribution network includes... Individual consumer groups, To the distribution network to the production and consumption user groups The cost of purchasing and storing electricity.
[0033] Distribution network to production and consumption user groups The cost expression for purchasing and storing electricity is: In the formula: For the consumer group During the period Electricity sold to the distribution network; , They are respectively the production and consumption user groups During the period The upper and lower reserve capacity sold to the distribution network; For the distribution network during the time period The set electricity purchase price; , For the distribution network in the time period The prices for upper and lower reserves are set.
[0034] The revenue generated by the distribution network from selling electricity and reserves to producers and consumers is as follows: In the formula The number of producer-consumer users in each producer-consumer user group; For producers and consumers Electricity purchased during time period t; , For each of the producer and consumer user groups Time period to producer-consumer users Upper and lower standby capacity for sale; For the consumer group The price at which electricity is sold to producers and consumers during specific time periods; the fixed time-of-use price of electricity in the distribution network. , Designated for each of the producer and consumer user groups The price for upper and lower standby services is sold to consumers during specific time periods.
[0035] The model also contains the following constraints: When thermal power units in the upper-level power grid reserve power, they are subject to constraints on the unit output, which can be expressed as: The ramp-up reserve provided by the generator set cannot exceed the generator set's ramp-up capability, as expressed in the following: ; Furthermore, considering the possibility of the backup power being called up, to further ensure that the maximum ramping power in the time periods before and after the backup power is called up does not exceed the unit's ramping capacity, the following constraints are also included: ; In the formula: For thermal power units During the period contribution; , thermal power units Upper and lower limits of force output; , thermal power units Maximum uphill climbing ability and maximum downhill climbing ability; , thermal power units During the period The provided upper rotation spare and lower rotation spare are provided.
[0036] Power balance constraints in distribution network systems: In the formula, This refers to the number of thermal power units in the upstream power grid. , These refer to the number of photovoltaic and wind turbine units connected to the distribution network, respectively. For thermal power units During the period contribution; For photovoltaic power station During the period The predicted output; For wind farm During the period The predicted output; For the consumer group During the period The power sold to the distribution network; This represents the total power demand of all loads in the distribution network.
[0037] Backup constraints in power distribution systems: ; In the formula: , For the distribution network in the time period To consumers The upper and lower standby capacity for sale; , These are the distribution network values obtained through the equivalent net load curve during the time period. The required upper and lower reserve capacity.
[0038] S4. Based on the price information issued by the distribution network, the producer-consumer group sets the purchase price and reserve / upper reserve prices for each producer-consumer user, aiming to maximize its own efficiency. It also determines the amount of electricity and reserve capacity traded with each producer-consumer user. Specifically, the producer-consumer group acts as both a follower in the upper-level "grid-group" master-slave game model and a leader in the lower-level "group-user" master-slave game model. In the upper-level model, the producer-consumer group adjusts its traded electricity and reserve capacity in response to the price information from the distribution network, maximizing the operating efficiency of each producer-consumer group. Simultaneously, its traded electricity and reserve capacity also affect the operating efficiency of the distribution network, thus influencing the network's price adjustments. In the lower-level model, the producer-consumer group, as the leader, sets the purchase price and reserve / upper reserve prices to maximize its own operating efficiency, incentivizing other producers-consumer users to adjust their traded electricity and reserve capacity.
[0039] As the intermediary connecting the distribution network and the consumer group, the producer-consumer group profits by taking advantage of price differences in the electricity market and the reserve market. It sets the purchase price and reserve price for the electricity and reserve prices distributed to the consumer group with the goal of maximizing its own operational efficiency. Its objective function is as follows: In the formula: For the consumer group Revenue from selling electricity to the distribution network and from reserves; For the consumer group The cost of purchasing electricity from producers and consumers, and the cost of backup power; The difference between the two mentioned above represents the prosumer-consumer user group. The operating efficiency.
[0040] The revenue calculation formula for the producer-consumer user group is as follows: In the formula: For the consumer group During the period Electricity sold to the distribution network; , They are respectively the production and consumption user groups During the period The upper and lower reserve capacity sold to the distribution network; For the distribution network during the time period The set electricity purchase price; , For the distribution network in the time period The prices for upper and lower reserves are set.
[0041] The cost calculation formula for the producer-consumer user group is as follows: ; In the formula, The number of prosumer users in the prosumer user group. For producers and consumers The return on selling electricity and its reserves; For the consumer group during the time period To consumers Purchased electricity volume; , For each consumer group, during different time periods The upper and lower reserve capacity purchased from the producer-consumer user n; For the consumer group During the period The set electricity sales price; , They are respectively the production and consumption user groups During the period The established upper and lower reserve prices.
[0042] S5. After receiving price information from the prosumer group, the prosumer adjusts its energy storage charging and discharging strategy to maximize efficiency while considering its own reserve needs. This updates the electricity and reserve capacity traded with the prosumer group. Specifically, in the lower-level master-slave game of the two-layer game optimization model, the prosumer, as a follower, adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of the energy storage unit and the ratio of traded electricity to traded reserve capacity based on the price information provided by the prosumer group, considering its own costs and returns, to maximize its own efficiency. The prosumer then transmits the electricity and reserve capacity trading information to the prosumer group, which in turn updates the price sent to the prosumer. This process iterates until the optimal trading price and electricity and reserve capacity trading situation between the prosumer group and the prosumer are determined.
[0043] The objective function for prosumer users is as follows: In the formula: For producers and consumers Operating efficiency; For producers and consumers The return on selling electricity and its reserves; For producers and consumers The cost of purchasing and storing electricity; For producers and consumers Rooftop solar power during the period Output active power; The unit active power cost of rooftop solar power; , Producers and consumers respectively Energy storage during the daytime The charging and discharging power; The cost of charging and discharging energy storage.
[0044] The formula for calculating the returns for prosumer users is as follows: The formula for calculating the cost of electricity purchased and reserved by producers and consumers is as follows: In the formula: For producers and consumers During the period Electricity purchased; , Producers and consumers respectively During the period Purchased upper and lower standby capacity; The electricity purchase price for producers and consumers is the time-of-use electricity price; , The prices for purchasing upper and lower backups for production and consumption users are respectively.
[0045] When producers and consumers participate in the electricity and reserve market, the following constraints apply: Producers and consumers cannot simultaneously purchase and sell electricity at the same time. Producers and consumers will not simultaneously buy or sell spare parts. ; Considering the limitations of power flow, users who generate and consume electricity cannot simultaneously purchase electricity and sell reserve power; otherwise, the power flow of electricity and the reserve power flow at the corresponding node of that user will conflict. Power balance constraints for producers and consumers: In the formula, For producers and consumers During the period Electricity purchased; For producers and consumers Rooftop solar power during the period The predicted output; , Producers and consumers respectively Energy storage during the daytime The charging and discharging power; For producers and consumers During the period The load demand power; For producers and consumers During the period Electricity sales volume.
[0046] Backup constraints for prosumer users: ; In the formula: , Separate production and consumption users Purchased upper and lower backup capacity; , Producers and consumers respectively Energy storage The available backup capacity at all times; , Producers and consumers respectively The net load corresponds to the upper and lower standby requirements; , Producers and consumers respectively exist The upper and lower backup capacity is always available for sale to the production and consumption user group.
[0047] Energy storage charge and discharge schedule constraints: ; ; ; In the formula: and Producers and consumers respectively The charging and discharging power of the energy storage device as of the date of its operation; and These are the maximum allowable charging and discharging power of energy storage, respectively. and These are the charging and discharging efficiencies of energy storage, respectively. For producers and consumers Energy storage The charging / discharging state at any given time, where 1 indicates discharging and 0 indicates charging; For producers and consumers Energy storage Always plan for remaining energy after the day's charge and discharge schedule; and These are the minimum and maximum values of the remaining energy stored; ; ; ; ; ; In the formula , Representing producer and consumer users respectively Energy storage The ability to adjust reserve capacity up or down at any time; for Real-time production and consumption users The energy storage reserve capacity status, where 1 indicates that the energy is provided for increased reserve and 0 indicates that the energy is provided for decreased reserve; For producers and consumers exist The remaining energy is always taken into account after comprehensively considering the energy storage charging and discharging plan and the reserve capacity.
[0048] S6. The producer-consumer user group transmits the aggregated producer-consumer user information to the distribution network, which then updates the issued electricity purchase price and reserve price to optimize its operating efficiency.
[0049] S7. Repeat S4-S6 to achieve a dynamic closed-loop iterative process in the two-level transaction involving the three main entities of "network-group-household", and finally obtain the optimal scheduling strategy for the electrical energy and reserves of "network-group-household".
[0050] In this embodiment, the dispersed resources of producers and consumers are aggregated by the producer-consumer user group. In the context of the electricity market, the trading of electricity and reserves is considered in the form of a "grid-group-user" structure. With the goal of optimizing the operating efficiency of each entity, the optimal scheduling strategy for electricity and reserves is finally optimized.
Claims
1. A network-group-household optimized scheduling system based on a two-layer game theory optimization model, characterized in that, The upper layer of the two-layer game optimization model is the master-slave game model between the distribution network and the production-consumption user group, and the lower layer is the master-slave game model between the production-consumption user group and the production-consumption user. The distribution network, the production-consumption user group, and the production-consumption user each aim to optimize their own operating efficiency. Based on the two-layer game optimization model, the optimal scheduling strategy for the power and reserves of the distribution network, the production-consumption user group, and the production-consumption user is obtained. The system includes: a net load curve calculation module: which aggregates and calculates the corresponding net load curves based on the predicted output curves and load consumption curves of new energy sources and power generation and consumption users, and determines the required reserve capacity of the distribution network and power generation and consumption users based on the net load curves; a distribution network comprehensive cost calculation module: which considers the costs of transactions between the distribution network and other market entities, the operation and maintenance costs of photovoltaic power plants and wind farms in the distribution network, and the revenue from the sale of electricity and reserves in the distribution network, and establishes a comprehensive cost calculation model for the distribution network; and a distribution network electricity price setting module: which sets the electricity price based on the power and reserve demand of the distribution network, with the goal of minimizing the comprehensive operating cost of the distribution network. The distribution network sets the electricity purchase price and reserve / upper-level prices for the production and consumption user groups and distributes them to these user groups. The production and consumption user group pricing module sets the purchase price and reserve / upper-level prices based on these prices and distributes them to the production and consumption users. It also determines the electricity volume and reserve capacity to be traded with each user. The production and consumption user decision-making module receives the purchase price and reserve / upper-level prices from the production and consumption user groups and adjusts the energy storage charging and discharging strategy to maximize the operating efficiency of the production and consumption users, updating the electricity volume and reserve capacity to be traded with the production and consumption user groups.
2. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game theory optimization model according to claim 1, characterized in that, The network-group-user optimized dispatch system also includes an energy and reserve information transmission module: after the producer-consumer user determines the amount of electricity and reserve capacity traded between itself and the producer-consumer user group, the electricity and reserve capacity traded between the producer-consumer user and the producer-consumer user group are transmitted to the producer-consumer user group. Then, the purchased / sold electricity and reserve capacity data of the producer-consumer user group are transmitted to the distribution network so that the distribution network can update the issued electricity purchase price and the upstream and downstream reserve prices to optimize its own operating efficiency.
3. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game theory optimization model according to claim 2, characterized in that, The objective function of the distribution network is: In the formula, The total time period is the day before the current day, and the length of a single scheduling time period is [missing information]. ; For the operating efficiency of the power distribution network; The total cost of purchasing and storing electrical energy for the distribution network; 、 Photovoltaic power stations in the power distribution network and wind farm exist Output power during the time period; 、 These are the operation and maintenance cost coefficients for photovoltaic power plants and wind farms, respectively; I represents the number of photovoltaic power plants; and J represents the number of wind farms. For the revenue of the distribution network; the total cost of purchasing and storing electrical energy in the distribution network is: In the formula: Electricity purchased by the distribution network from the superior power grid; 、 These refer to the upper and lower reserve capacities purchased by the distribution network from the upper-level power grid, respectively. for The electricity price sold by the upstream power grid at any given time; 、 These are the prices at which the upstream power grid sells its reserves and downstream reserves, respectively. To the distribution network to the production and consumption user groups The cost of purchasing and storing electricity; The number of producers and consumers; the distribution network to producers and consumers. The costs of purchasing and storing electricity are: In the formula: For the consumer group During the period Electricity sold to the distribution network; 、 They are respectively prosumer-consumer user groups During the period The upper and lower reserve capacity sold to the distribution network; For the distribution network during the time period The set electricity purchase price; 、 For the distribution network in time periods The established prices for reserve and standby power; the revenue from the distribution network selling electricity and reserves to producers and consumers is as follows: In the formula, The number of producer-consumer users in each producer-consumer user group; For producers and consumers Electricity purchased during time period t; 、 For each of the producer and consumer user groups Time period to producer-consumer users Upper and lower standby capacity for sale; For the consumer group The price at which electricity is sold to producers and consumers during a given time period; 、 Designated for each of the producer and consumer user groups The price for upper and lower standby services is sold to consumers during specific time periods.
4. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model according to claim 3, characterized in that, When thermal power units in the upstream power grid of a distribution network reserve upper and lower reserves, they are constrained by the unit's output. The ramp-up reserve provided by the generator set must not exceed the generator set's ramp-up capability. ; The maximum ramping power in the preceding and following time periods shall not exceed the ramping capacity of the unit. ; In the formula, For thermal power units During the period Output; 、 thermal power units Upper and lower limits of force output; 、 thermal power units Maximum climbing ability, both upward and downward; 、 thermal power units During the period Provided spinning reserve; power balance constraints in the distribution network system: In the formula, This refers to the number of thermal power units in the upstream power grid. 、 These refer to the number of photovoltaic and wind turbine units connected to the distribution network, respectively. For thermal power units During the period Output; For photovoltaic power station During the period The predicted output; For wind farm During the period The predicted output; For the consumer group During the period Power sold to the distribution network; The total power demand of all loads in the distribution network; distribution network system reserve constraints: ; In the formula: 、 For the distribution network in time periods To consumers The upper and lower reserve capacities for sale; 、 These are the distribution network values obtained through the equivalent net load curve during the time period. The required upper and lower reserve capacities.
5. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model according to claim 4, characterized in that, The producer-consumer user group is both a follower in the upper-level master-slave game of the two-level game optimization model and a leader in the lower-level master-slave game of the two-level game optimization model. In the upper-level master-slave game, the production and consumption user groups respond to the price information given by the distribution network, adjust the amount of electricity traded with the distribution network and the reserve capacity, so as to maximize the operating efficiency of each production and consumption user group. The amount of electricity traded with the distribution network and the reserve capacity also affect the operating efficiency of the distribution network, thereby affecting the distribution network's price adjustments; In the lower-level master-slave game, the producer-consumer user group, as the leader, aims to maximize its own operational efficiency and sets the electricity purchase price and the reserve price for producer-consumer users, incentivizing each producer-consumer user to adjust the amount of electricity traded with the producer-consumer user group and the reserve capacity. As an intermediary link connecting the power distribution network and the consumer group, the producer-consumer group profits by taking advantage of the price difference in the electricity market and the reserve market. With the goal of maximizing its own operating efficiency, it sets and issues the purchase price and reserve price to the consumer group.
6. The network-group-household optimized scheduling system according to claim 2, characterized in that, The objective function for the prosumer-consumer user group is: In the formula, For the consumer group Revenue from selling electricity to the distribution network and from reserves; For the consumer group The cost of purchasing electricity from producers and consumers, and the cost of backup power; For the consumer group The operational efficiency; the benefits to the producer-consumer user group are: In the formula, For the consumer group During the period Electricity sold to the distribution network; 、 They are respectively prosumer-consumer user groups During the period The upper and lower reserve capacity sold to the distribution network; For the distribution network during the time period The set electricity purchase price; 、 For the distribution network in time periods The established prices for upper and lower reserves; the costs for the producer-consumer user group are: ; In the formula, The number of prosumer users in the prosumer user group. For producers and consumers The return on selling electricity and its reserves; For the consumer group during the time period To consumers Purchased electricity volume; 、 For each consumer group, during different time periods The upper and lower reserve capacity purchased from the producer-consumer user n; For the consumer group During the period The set electricity sales price; 、 They are respectively prosumer-consumer user groups During the period The established upper and lower reserve prices.
7. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model according to claim 6, characterized in that, After receiving price information from the prosumer group, the prosumer-consumer (PCC) user considers its own reserve needs and adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of the energy storage unit with the goal of maximizing its own efficiency. This leads to an update of the electricity and reserve capacity traded with the PCC user group. Specifically, in the lower-level master-slave game of the two-layer game optimization model, the PCC user, as a follower, adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of the energy storage unit and the ratio of traded electricity to traded reserve capacity based on the price information provided by the PCC user group, considering its own costs and returns, in order to maximize its own efficiency. The PCC user then transmits the electricity and reserve capacity trading information to the PCC user group, which in turn updates the price sent to the PCC user. This process iterates until the optimal trading price and electricity and reserve capacity trading situation between the PCC user group and the PCC user are finally determined.
8. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model according to claim 7, characterized in that, The objective function for prosumer users is: In the formula, For producers and consumers Operating efficiency; For producers and consumers The return on selling electricity and its reserves; For producers and consumers The cost of purchasing and storing electricity; For producers and consumers Rooftop solar power during the period Output active power; The unit active power cost of rooftop solar power; 、 Producers and consumers respectively Energy storage during the daytime The charging and discharging power; The cost of charging and discharging energy storage; the return received by the producer-consumer is: ; The costs for producers and consumers to purchase and reserve electricity are: In the formula, For producers and consumers During the period Electricity purchased; 、 Producers and consumers respectively During the period Purchased upper and lower reserve capacity; The electricity purchase price for producers and consumers is the time-of-use electricity price; 、 The prices for purchasing upper and lower backups for production and consumption users are respectively.
9. The network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model according to claim 8, characterized in that, Producers and consumers are subject to the following constraints: Producers and consumers cannot purchase and sell electricity simultaneously during the same period. ; Producers and consumers will not simultaneously buy or sell spare parts. ; Considering the limitations on power flow, users who generate and consume electricity cannot simultaneously purchase electricity and sell reserve power at the same time. Power balance constraints for producers and consumers: In the formula, For producers and consumers During the period Electricity purchased; For producers and consumers Rooftop solar power during the period The predicted output; 、 Producers and consumers respectively Energy storage during the daytime The charging and discharging power; For producers and consumers During the period The load demand power; For producers and consumers During the period Electricity sales volume; reserve constraints for production and consumption users: ; In the formula: 、 Separate production and consumption users Purchased upper and lower backup capacity; 、 Producers and consumers respectively Energy storage The available backup capacity at all times; 、 Producers and consumers respectively The net load corresponds to the upper and lower standby requirements; 、 Producers and consumers respectively exist The upper and lower standby capacity to be sold to the production and consumption user group at any time; the constraints of energy storage charging and discharging plans: ; ; ; In the formula: and Producers and consumers respectively The charging and discharging power of the energy storage device as of the date of its operation; and These are the maximum allowable charging and discharging power of energy storage, respectively. and These are the charging and discharging efficiencies of energy storage, respectively. For producers and consumers Energy storage The charging / discharging state at any given time, where 1 indicates discharging and 0 indicates charging; For producers and consumers Energy storage Always plan for remaining energy after the day's charge and discharge schedule; and These are the minimum and maximum values of the remaining energy stored; ; ; ; ; ; In the formula 、 Representing producer and consumer users respectively Energy storage The ability to adjust reserve capacity up or down at any time; for Real-time production and consumption users The energy storage reserve capacity status, where 1 indicates that the energy is provided for increased reserve and 0 indicates that the energy is provided for decreased reserve; For producers and consumers exist The remaining energy is always taken into account after comprehensively considering the energy storage charging and discharging plan and the reserve capacity.
10. The method for a network-group-household optimization scheduling system based on a two-layer game optimization model as described in any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. Considering the new energy sources and conventional loads connected to the distribution network, obtain the corresponding predicted output curves of the new energy sources and the power consumption curves of the loads. Calculate the net load curve based on the output curves and the power consumption curves, and then determine the required upper and lower reserve capacity of the entire distribution network using the net load curve. S2. Considering that both rooftop photovoltaic and load users have reserve requirements, obtain the corresponding predicted output curves of the photovoltaic systems and the power consumption curves of the loads. Calculate the net load curve of the users, and then determine the required upper and lower reserve capacity of the entire users using the net load curve. S3. Based on its own power consumption and reserve requirements, the distribution network sets the electricity purchase price and the upper and lower reserve prices for the user group and distributes them to the user group. S4. Based on the electricity purchase price and the prices for upstream and downstream reserves issued by the distribution network, the producer-consumer group sets the electricity purchase price and the prices for upstream and downstream reserves for producer-consumer users with the goal of maximizing its own efficiency, and determines the amount of electricity and reserve capacity to be traded with each producer-consumer user. S5. After receiving the electricity purchase price and the reserve price from the producer-consumer group, the producer-consumer user adjusts the charging and discharging strategy of energy storage with the goal of maximizing its own efficiency, and updates the electricity and reserve capacity traded with the producer-consumer group. S6. The producer-consumer user group transmits the aggregated producer-consumer user's purchased / sold electricity and reserve capacity data to the distribution network. The distribution network then updates the electricity purchase price and upper and lower reserve prices issued to the producer-consumer user group to optimize its own operating efficiency. S7. Repeat steps S4-S6 to perform dynamic closed-loop iteration, i.e., two-layer game optimization, and finally obtain the optimal scheduling strategy for the power distribution network, the production and consumption user group, and the power and reserve of the production and consumption users.