Wireless ad hoc network routing protocol security method and system for unmanned cluster

Abstract

The invention provides a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol security method and system for an unmanned cluster, and the method comprises the steps: a sender node in a wireless ad hoc network determines a trust anchor point message in a routing message based on a working mechanism of a routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network in combination with a communication overhead and trust origin principle; and the sender node performs security field extension on the header of the trust anchor point message by using a Hash algorithm and an HMAC verification method, constructs an enhanced routing message, and broadcasts the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network, according to the method, a key routing message structure is screened out through a working mechanism of a routing protocol to serve as a trust anchor point message, and only the head of the trust anchor point message is filled with double security expansion of a Hash algorithm and HMAC. The routing information source is authenticated with the lowest communication and calculation overhead, the attack of external malicious nodes is effectively resisted, and the communication security is ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information transmission technology, specifically to a secure method and system for routing protocols in unmanned wireless ad hoc networks. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous development of collaborative control technology and swarm intelligence, the application of large-scale unmanned swarm collaborative task execution is becoming increasingly widespread. In practical applications, large-scale swarm tasks often require a large amount of frequent data transmission and interaction to achieve the desired task execution effect. For unmanned swarms, a single task application may involve multiple unmanned devices such as drones, unmanned surface vessels, and unmanned vehicles, requiring these platforms to be connected to a unified communication network. Furthermore, unmanned platform applications are often conducted outdoors, requiring a wireless ad hoc network environment. Wireless ad hoc networks are characterized by being decentralized and dynamically forming a network, offering high flexibility. However, radio signals are easily scanned by spectrum analyzers. If a co-frequency receiving device is used, it can receive signals from messages sent by various nodes in the network, and can also act as an unauthorized node to access the network, obtain and tamper with node messages, thus compromising network security.

[0003] A review of existing wireless ad hoc network security solutions reveals that most are suitable for clusters with a fixed configuration service center and a robust network structure, such as those that hide the SSID (ServiceSetIdentifier, wireless username). While wireless ad hoc networks with a fixed configuration service center and a robust network are indeed ad hoc networks, they typically operate in a controlled or semi-controlled environment, rather than being arbitrarily dynamic. The location and number of nodes are planned and authorized, and the network has an invisible center to maintain network uniformity. This approach is simple and effective in scenarios where members are fixed and frequent dynamic network formation is not required. However, it is completely unsuitable for pure ad-hoc environments where nodes can join and leave at any time and are unaware of each other (i.e., completely decentralized, self-organizing network environments with no infrastructure support and dynamically changing nodes).

[0004] However, methods for securely extending routing protocols in unmanned trunking systems within ad hoc wireless networks are rarely discussed. In recent years, unmanned trunking technology has developed rapidly and its applications have become increasingly widespread. Therefore, designing secure routing protocol extension methods to protect network nodes from interference by malicious external nodes in unmanned trunking systems within ad hoc wireless networks is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, this invention proposes a secure routing protocol method for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, comprising: In a wireless ad hoc network, the sending node determines the trust anchor message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origination. The sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message, constructs an enhanced routing message, and broadcasts the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

[0006] Optionally, the sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the security fields of the header of the trust anchor message to construct an enhanced routing message, including: Based on the sequence number and hop count in the variable fields of the trust anchor message header, and combined with the authentication location index calculation formula, the hash value of the authentication location is extracted from the pre-generated one-way hash chain, which is generated based on a hash function. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-selected key and hash function, and combined with the immutable field in the header of the trust anchor message, a hash calculation is performed to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field; The HMAC value of the immutable field and the hash value of the authentication location are filled into the header of the information anchor message to expand the security field, thus obtaining the enhanced routing message.

[0007] Optionally, the formula for calculating the authentication location index is:

[0008] In the formula, Indicates the authentication position in a one-way hash chain. Indicates the total length of the one-way hash chain. This indicates the maximum diameter in a wireless ad hoc network. Indicates the serial number. Indicates the number of jumps.

[0009] Optionally, the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-selected key and hash function, combines the immutable field in the trust anchor message header to perform hash calculation to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field, including: Based on the input length requirement of the pre-selected hash function, the key is padded to obtain the padded key; The padded key is XORed with a fixed constant to generate an inner key and an outer key; The inner key is concatenated with the immutable field of the trust anchor message header to obtain the inner combination. Based on the inner combination, a hash calculation is performed using the hash function to obtain the inner hash value. The inner hash value is combined with the outer key to obtain the outer combination. The outer combination is then combined with the hash function to perform a hash calculation to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field.

[0010] Optionally, the sending node in the wireless ad hoc network determines the trust anchor message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origination, including: In a wireless ad hoc network, the sending node analyzes the multiple message structures in the routing message that play a decisive role in path discovery and maintenance and are stable within a preset period, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network. Based on the principle of trust origination, several message structures that are closest to the root of trust are selected from multiple message structures as a candidate structure set. The message structure with the lowest communication overhead is selected from the candidate structure set and used as the trust anchor message in the routing message.

[0011] Based on the same inventive concept, this invention proposes a secure routing protocol system for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, comprising: The trust anchor point determination module is used by the sending node in the wireless ad hoc network to determine the trust anchor point message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network and in combination with communication overhead and the trust origin principle. The security extension module is used by the sending node to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message using a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method, construct an enhanced routing message, and broadcast the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

[0012] Optionally, the security extension module is specifically used for: Based on the sequence number and hop count in the variable fields of the trust anchor message header, and combined with the authentication location index calculation formula, the hash value of the authentication location is extracted from the pre-generated one-way hash chain, which is generated based on a hash function. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-selected key and hash function, and combined with the immutable field in the header of the trust anchor message, a hash calculation is performed to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field; The HMAC value of the immutable field and the hash value of the authentication location are filled into the header of the information anchor message to expand the security field, thus obtaining the enhanced routing message.

[0013] Optionally, the authentication location index calculation formula in the security extension module is:

[0014] In the formula, Indicates the authentication position in a one-way hash chain. Indicates the total length of the one-way hash chain. This indicates the maximum diameter in a wireless ad hoc network. Indicates the serial number. Indicates the number of jumps.

[0015] Optionally, the security extension module is specifically used for: Based on the input length requirement of the pre-selected hash function, the key is padded to obtain the padded key; The padded key is XORed with a fixed constant to generate an inner key and an outer key; The inner key is concatenated with the immutable field of the trust anchor message header to obtain the inner combination. Based on the inner combination, a hash calculation is performed using the hash function to obtain the inner hash value. The inner hash value is combined with the outer key to obtain the outer combination. The outer combination is then combined with the hash function to perform a hash calculation to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field.

[0016] Optionally, the trust anchor point determination module is specifically used for: In a wireless ad hoc network, the sending node analyzes the multiple message structures in the routing message that play a decisive role in path discovery and maintenance and are stable within a preset period, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network. Based on the principle of trust origination, several message structures that are closest to the root of trust are selected from multiple message structures as a candidate structure set. The message structure with the lowest communication overhead is selected from the candidate structure set and used as the trust anchor message in the routing message.

[0017] Based on the same inventive concept, this invention proposes a secure method for routing protocols in unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, comprising: In a wireless ad hoc network, the receiving node receives and parses the header message of the enhanced routing message; The receiving node calculates the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verifies the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decides whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0018] Optionally, the step of calculating the hash value and HMAC value for the header message, verifying the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and determining whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded includes: Based on the received hash value, k hash operations are performed using a hash function to obtain a result value. The result value is then compared with the endpoint value of the received one-way hash chain to obtain a hash value comparison result. The value of k is calculated based on the sequence number and metric value in the header message, combined with the authentication location index calculation formula. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-shared key and a hash function, and combined with the immutable fields extracted from the header message, a verification HMAC value is obtained. The verification HMAC value is then compared with the HMAC value of the immutable field to obtain the HMAC value comparison result. Based on the hash value comparison result and the HMAC value comparison result, it is determined whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0019] Based on the same inventive concept, this invention proposes a secure routing protocol system for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, comprising: The parsing module is used by the receiver node in a wireless ad hoc network to receive and parse the header message of the enhanced routing message; A security verification module is used by the receiving node to calculate the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verify the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decide whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0020] Optionally, the security verification module is specifically used for: Based on the received hash value, k hash operations are performed using a hash function to obtain a result value. The result value is then compared with the endpoint value of the received one-way hash chain to obtain a hash value comparison result. The value of k is calculated based on the sequence number and metric value in the header message, combined with the authentication location index calculation formula. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-shared key and a hash function, and combined with the immutable fields extracted from the header message, a verification HMAC value is obtained. The verification HMAC value is then compared with the HMAC value of the immutable field to obtain the HMAC value comparison result. Based on the hash value comparison result and the HMAC value comparison result, it is determined whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0021] Based on the same inventive concept, this invention proposes a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol security system for unmanned clusters, comprising: multiple wireless ad hoc network nodes interconnected through a wireless ad hoc network and running a routing protocol; Each of the aforementioned wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as either a sender node or a receiver node at different times; When each of the wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as a sending node, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origin, the trust anchor message in the routing message is determined; the header of the trust anchor message is extended with a security field using a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to construct an enhanced routing message, and the enhanced routing message is broadcast to the wireless ad hoc network; When each of the wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as a receiving node, it receives and parses the header message of the enhanced routing message; it calculates the hash value and HMAC value of the header message respectively, verifies the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decides whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0022] In another aspect, this application also provides an electronic device, comprising: at least one processor and a memory; the memory and the processor are connected via a bus; The memory is used to store one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the at least one processor, a secure method for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, as described above, is implemented.

[0023] Furthermore, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having an executable program stored thereon, which, when executed, implements a secure routing protocol method for an unmanned cluster wireless ad hoc network as described above.

[0024] Compared with the closest existing technology, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: This invention provides a secure method and system for routing protocols in unmanned wireless ad hoc networks. The method includes: a sending node in the wireless ad hoc network determines a trust anchor message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origin. The sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the header of the trust anchor message with security fields, constructing a reinforced routing message, and broadcasting the reinforced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network. In this invention, the key routing message structure is selected as the trust anchor message through the working mechanism of the routing protocol, and only the header is filled with the dual security extension of hash algorithm and HMAC. The verifying party only needs to successfully verify the trust anchor message to continuously trust the node and accept its ordinary routing messages. This achieves authentication of the routing information source with minimal communication and computational overhead, effectively resisting attacks from external malicious nodes and ensuring communication security. The irreversibility of the hash algorithm protects specific fields from being tampered with by malicious nodes, and HMAC verifies immutable fields in the routing message to ensure data integrity. Attached Figure Description

[0025] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a secure routing protocol method for unmanned ad hoc wireless networks provided by this invention. Figure 1 ; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of a secure routing protocol system for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks provided by the present invention. Figure 1 ; Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating a secure routing protocol method for unmanned ad hoc wireless networks provided by this invention. Figure 2 ; Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of a secure routing protocol system for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks provided by the present invention. Figure 2 ; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a secure routing protocol system for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks provided by the present invention. Figure 3 ; Figure 6 A flowchart illustrating a secure routing protocol method for unmanned ad hoc wireless networks provided by this invention. Figure 3 Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0026] The specific embodiments of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0027] Example 1 This invention provides a secure routing protocol method for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, such as... Figure 1 As shown, it includes: S1. The sending node in the wireless ad hoc network determines the trust anchor message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with the communication overhead and the principle of trust origin. S2. The sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message, constructs an enhanced routing message, and broadcasts the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

[0028] In step S1, all nodes in the wireless ad hoc network run the same routing protocol. Although there are multiple routing protocols in a wireless ad hoc network, only one protocol is used in a group of wireless ad hoc networks. This is because the routing protocol is a common language between nodes. A node using OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing) will not understand a Hello message sent by a node using AODV, and vice versa. If different protocols are mixed, nodes will not be able to exchange routing information correctly, leading to network connectivity issues and the formation of communication islands.

[0029] The reason why the routing protocol's working mechanism selects a specific type of message for adding security extension fields, namely the trust anchor message, is because different routing protocols have different trust chains and information flows.

[0030] For example, in OLSR, trust and topology information begin with neighbor relationships, so hardening Hello messages is the most efficient; in AODV, trust begins with the initiator of the route request, so hardening RREQ messages is more important than hardening periodic Hello messages; in DSR, the entire route is carried in the data packet, so what needs to be authenticated is the entire source route, not a single control message.

[0031] Simultaneously, it is necessary to combine the principles of trust origination, cost minimization, and critical control. Trust origination principle: Select messages used to establish initial trust. This is typically the first line of defense for authentication in the network, such as the Hello message used for neighbor discovery. Once verified, the sending node is considered a trusted neighbor. Cost minimization principle: Select messages with small propagation range and high frequency, prioritizing the addition of security fields to locally broadcast messages (such as Hello messages) to avoid introducing additional overhead in large messages that need to be flooded across the entire network (such as TC messages), thereby significantly reducing total communication volume. Critical control principle: Protect core signaling (such as link status and neighbor relationships) that, if tampered with, would cause errors in the entire routing topology; this is often the information carried by the Hello message.

[0032] Specifically, the sending node in the wireless ad hoc network analyzes the multiple message structures in the routing messages that play a decisive role in path discovery and maintenance and are stable within a preset period, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network. Based on the principle of trust origination, several message structures that are closest to the root of trust are selected from multiple message structures as a candidate structure set. The message structure with the lowest communication overhead is selected from the candidate structure set and used as the trust anchor message in the routing message.

[0033] In step S2, the sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message, constructs an enhanced routing message, and broadcasts the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

[0034] Traditional data networks have a stable topology with a fixed control center, and routing prioritizes stability while dynamically converging. Wireless ad hoc networks, on the other hand, have a constantly changing topology. They are distributed, decentralized structures with highly adaptive routing, and the topology is always evolving. An optimal route can be completely disrupted the next second due to the movement of a single node. Node movement includes both physical relocation and node joining or leaving the network. Route selection based on network state changes means that the routing protocol dynamically chooses the optimal path based on real-time conditions. Simultaneously, the secure transmission of routing messages must be ensured.

[0035] This scheme utilizes hash verification and HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) verification methods to securely protect the transmission of routing messages in wireless ad hoc networks. The hash verification method uses SHA256 (a 256-bit cryptographic hash algorithm), which represents data characteristics using a fixed-size hash value, essentially generating a 256-bit binary hash value. The HMAC verification method uses HMAC-SHA256 (an HMAC algorithm implemented based on the SHA256 hash algorithm), a message authentication technology based on the SHA256 hash algorithm and a shared key, used to ensure data integrity and authentication.

[0036] S2-1. Based on the sequence number and hop count in the variable field of the trust anchor message header, and combined with the authentication location index calculation formula, extract the hash value of the authentication location from the pre-generated one-way hash chain, which is generated based on a hash function.

[0037] Specifically, one-way hash chains are used to verify and protect variable fields in routing messages. These chains typically protect variable fields such as sequence numbers, metrics (general metrics for measuring path quality, such as latency and bandwidth), or (specifically) hop counts. The sequence number is a freshness tag for the route; a larger number indicates newer information. To prevent malicious rollback attacks—where a malicious node receives an old route update and rolls back the network state to the old route—it is essential to ensure the verification of sequence numbers.

[0038] A one-way hash chain is generated based on a pre-selected hash function, denoted as a list of hash values. , … ,in , For hash functions, It is a random initial value. , , and These represent the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd hash values ​​in the list, respectively. The sum of the nth and nth values, Indicates the use of the first hash value in the list of hash values The value is calculated for the first time. One value, Other nodes in the network that are assigned to receive message updates.

[0039] For subsequent route message verification, the hash value of the authentication location is extracted from the pre-generated one-way hash chain based on the sequence number and hop count in the variable fields of the trust anchor message header, combined with the authentication location index calculation formula.

[0040] Specifically, the node adds a hash value to each entry in the routing table, along with the sequence number in the variable field of the trust anchor message header. and measurement value (For example, hop count), determine the hash value based on the authentication location index calculation formula. Verify the update of the routing table entry for this sequence number. The authentication location index is calculated as follows:

[0041] In the formula, Indicates the authentication position in a one-way hash chain. This indicates the total length of the one-way hash chain, and also the position of the end point of the hash chain. This indicates the maximum diameter in a wireless ad hoc network. Indicates the serial number. Indicates the number of jumps.

[0042] During the lifetime of each serial number, the metric value (Usually the number of hops) can vary from 1 to m (the maximum possible number of hops), so each serial number needs to be prepared. Each hash value corresponds to one of the possible metrics. Authentication location. middle, This indicates the end point of the hash chain and is a public anchor point from which addresses are allocated in reverse order. Represents all serial numbers (from 1 to ... The total space reserved for the serial number; serial number 1 occupies One position, serial number 2 is occupied. Location, serial number Also occupy One location; Indicates from the end point Count backwards, skipping. After reserving space for each serial number, the current serial number is reached. The starting position of this block. Corresponding metric value. =0, but the jump number usually does not start from 0; Indicates the serial number Within that block, we move forward again. At this location, you arrive at the point specifically designated for authentication. , The exact address of this specific update. Indicates the order in the hash chain The specific hash value of the location is used as the basis for this route update. , The password credentials are sent along with the message.

[0043] The receiving node can use the received hash value... The function calculates mi-j times and compares the results with... A comparison is made to verify whether the sequence number and metric value of the received entry have been tampered with. Initial value. With hash function It is considered to be known to all legitimate nodes but not to malicious nodes.

[0044] The hash verification method is used to verify the variable fields of routing messages. The irreversibility of the one-way hash chain is used to ensure security, protect specific fields from being tampered with by malicious nodes, improve the security of the routing protocol, and thus improve the security of the network.

[0045] S2-2. Using the HMAC verification method, based on the pre-selected key and hash function, and combined with the immutable field of the trust anchor message header, a hash calculation is performed to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field.

[0046] HMAC is a message authentication code algorithm based on a hash function, used to verify message integrity and authenticate the message sender. HMAC combines a hash function and a key, generating a message authentication code by hashing the key with the message, and using the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to protect routing entries.

[0047] Specifically, choose an appropriate hash function (such as SHA-256) and a key; Based on the input length requirement of the pre-selected hash function, the key is padded to obtain the padded key; The message and the padded key are combined in a specific way, and a hash operation is performed on the combined data. Specifically, the padded key is XORed with a fixed constant to generate an inner key and an outer key; the inner key is concatenated with the immutable field of the trust anchor message header to obtain an inner combination; based on the inner combination, a hash calculation is performed using the hash function to obtain an inner hash value; the inner hash value is combined with the outer key to obtain an outer combination; the outer combination is then hashed using the hash function to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field.

[0048] After receiving the message, the receiver will also use the same key and hash function to calculate the message's HMAC value and compare it with the HMAC value sent by the sender. If the two match, the message is complete and comes from a legitimate sender; otherwise, there may be a risk that the message has been tampered with or comes from an unauthorized sender.

[0049] S2-3. The HMAC value of the immutable field and the hash value of the authentication location are filled into the header of the information anchor message to expand the security field and obtain the enhanced routing message.

[0050] The header messages of the trust anchor messages in this scheme mainly contain the following fields, as shown in the table below:

[0051] The following table shows the design of secure extended fields for header messages:

[0052] In this embodiment, taking the OLSR routing protocol as an example, a security field is added to the header of the hello message in the wireless ad hoc network routing protocol. The Hello message and the TC message are routing messages sent independently. During protocol operation, nodes periodically and separately construct and send these two types of messages. The sending node broadcasts a secure Hello message, and the receiving node verifies its security field upon receiving it. After successful verification, the receiving node trusts the sending node as a legitimate node. Subsequently, when the receiving node receives a TC message from this trusted neighbor sending node, the receiving node will accept and forward the TC message because it trusts the sending node, without needing to perform further verification.

[0053] Traditionally, for security reasons, a security field is added to the TC message. The TC message itself is larger than the hello message and propagates across the entire network, generating a large amount of communication data. Furthermore, a node may receive copies of the same TC message from multiple paths; if the source node is distant or the path is unstable, verification may fail due to packet loss or delay. This solution, by pre-determining the trusted anchor message, shifts the focus of security verification from the routing information itself to a portion of the routing messages. This eliminates the security overhead of subsequent routing update messages, reduces the amount of communication data, and improves communication efficiency.

[0054] Furthermore, this scheme employs a one-way hash chain to protect variable fields in routing messages, such as sequence numbers, metric values, or hop counts. The HMAC algorithm protects message integrity and authenticates the sender, improving the verification success rate. During the one-way hash chain verification process, any tampering with the sequence number or hop count will be immediately exposed because the correct hash value at the corresponding position on the chain cannot be provided. The one-way nature of the hash chain ensures that the old updated hash value cannot derive the new updated hash value, completely eliminating rollback attacks. The two-layer combination method in the HMAC verification algorithm constructs two derived keys related to but different from the original key, using a two-layer nested combination to form two layers of protection, resulting in higher security performance.

[0055] Example 2 Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a security system for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, such as... Figure 2 As shown, it includes: The trust anchor point determination module is used by the sending node in the wireless ad hoc network to determine the trust anchor point message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network and in combination with communication overhead and the trust origin principle. The security extension module is used by the sending node to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message using a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method, construct an enhanced routing message, and broadcast the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

[0056] In one possible implementation, the aforementioned security extension module is specifically used for: Based on the sequence number and hop count in the variable fields of the trust anchor message header, and combined with the authentication location index calculation formula, the hash value of the authentication location is extracted from the pre-generated one-way hash chain, which is generated based on a hash function. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-selected key and hash function, and combined with the immutable field in the header of the trust anchor message, a hash calculation is performed to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field; The HMAC value of the immutable field and the hash value of the authentication location are filled into the header of the information anchor message to expand the security field, thus obtaining the enhanced routing message.

[0057] In one possible implementation, the authentication location index calculation formula in the aforementioned security extension module is:

[0058] In the formula, Indicates the authentication position in a one-way hash chain. Indicates the total length of the one-way hash chain. This indicates the maximum diameter in a wireless ad hoc network. Indicates the serial number. Indicates the number of jumps.

[0059] In one possible implementation, the aforementioned security extension module is specifically used for: Based on the input length requirement of the pre-selected hash function, the key is padded to obtain the padded key; The padded key is XORed with a fixed constant to generate an inner key and an outer key; The inner key is concatenated with the immutable field of the trust anchor message header to obtain the inner combination. Based on the inner combination, a hash calculation is performed using the hash function to obtain the inner hash value. The inner hash value is combined with the outer key to obtain the outer combination. The outer combination is then combined with the hash function to perform a hash calculation to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field.

[0060] In one possible implementation, the aforementioned trust anchor point determination module is specifically used for: In a wireless ad hoc network, the sending node analyzes the multiple message structures in the routing message that play a decisive role in path discovery and maintenance and are stable within a preset period, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network. Based on the principle of trust origination, several message structures that are closest to the root of trust are selected from multiple message structures as a candidate structure set. The message structure with the lowest communication overhead is selected from the candidate structure set and used as the trust anchor message in the routing message.

[0061] Example 3 Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a secure method for routing protocols in unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, such as... Figure 3 As shown, it includes: Step 1: The receiving node in the wireless ad hoc network receives and parses the header message of the enhanced routing message; Step 2: The receiving node calculates the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verifies the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decides whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0062] In step 2, 2-1, based on the received hash value, perform k hash operations using a hash function to obtain the result value, and compare the result value with the endpoint value of the received one-way hash chain to obtain the hash value comparison result; The value of k is calculated based on the sequence number and metric value in the header message, combined with the authentication location index calculation formula.

[0063] Specifically, the data received by the receiving node includes reinforced routing messages and the last value of the one-way hash chain. Serial number and metric ( , ), and hash value , This credential needs to be verified. Indeed from A valid one-way hash chain ending at [terminal], and its position [position]. With the claimed serial number and measurement value Yes, that's correct. Specifically, perform the following steps: Based on the received serial number and measurement value Calculate the authentication location The distance to the end of the chain (how many hash calculations are required) The receiver processes the received hash value. Continuous The hash operation yields the result. The receiver then compares this result with its obtained trusted anchor. The comparison is performed. If they are equal, the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails and the message is discarded.

[0064] That is, the receiving node uses the received hash value to... Function calculation Next, and the results will be compared with A comparison is made to verify whether the sequence number and metric value of the received entry have been tampered with.

[0065] 2-2. Using the HMAC verification method, based on the pre-shared key and hash function, and combined with the immutable fields extracted from the header message, a hash calculation is performed to obtain the verification HMAC value. The verification HMAC value is then compared with the HMAC value of the immutable field to obtain the HMAC value comparison result. If both match, the message is complete and comes from a legitimate sender; otherwise, there is a risk that the message has been tampered with or comes from an unauthorized sender.

[0066] 2-3. Based on the hash value comparison result and the HMAC value comparison result, determine whether the enhanced routing message is adopted or discarded.

[0067] After comparing the hash values, if the results are inconsistent, the enhanced routing message will be discarded directly. If the results are consistent, the HMAC value comparison result will be checked. If the HMAC values ​​are consistent, the verification is successful and the routing message will be adopted. Otherwise, the verification fails and the routing message will be discarded.

[0068] Example 4 Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a security system for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, such as... Figure 4 As shown, it includes: The parsing module is used by the receiver node in a wireless ad hoc network to receive and parse the header message of the enhanced routing message; A security verification module is used by the receiving node to calculate the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verify the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decide whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0069] In one possible implementation, the aforementioned security verification module is specifically used for: Based on the received hash value, k hash operations are performed using a hash function to obtain a result value. The result value is then compared with the endpoint value of the received one-way hash chain to obtain a hash value comparison result. The value of k is calculated based on the sequence number and metric value in the header message, combined with the authentication location index calculation formula. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-shared key and a hash function, and combined with the immutable fields extracted from the header message, a verification HMAC value is obtained. The verification HMAC value is then compared with the HMAC value of the immutable field to obtain the HMAC value comparison result. Based on the hash value comparison result and the HMAC value comparison result, it is determined whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0070] Example 5 Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a security system for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, such as... Figure 5 As shown, it includes: multiple wireless ad hoc network nodes that are interconnected through a wireless ad hoc network and run routing protocols; Each of the aforementioned wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as either a sender node or a receiver node at different times; When each of the wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as a sending node, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origin, the trust anchor message in the routing message is determined; the header of the trust anchor message is extended with a security field using a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to construct an enhanced routing message, and the enhanced routing message is broadcast to the wireless ad hoc network; When each of the wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as a receiving node, it receives and parses the header message of the enhanced routing message; it calculates the hash value and HMAC value of the header message respectively, verifies the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decides whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

[0071] In this context, routing nodes can be terminal devices such as computers and development boards, running operating systems and serving as carriers of application software. They can run various routing protocols, including OLSR routing protocol, AODV (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing) routing protocol, and DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector) routing protocol.

[0072] Based on the aforementioned wireless ad hoc network routing protocol security system, a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol security method is provided, such as... Figure 6 As shown, specifically: The first step is to start and run the routing protocol.

[0073] Once the routing protocol is installed on the wireless ad hoc network node, it can function correctly on the node. When constructing the routing header message, the hash value is calculated based on the variable fields in the header message and filled into the header message; the HMAC value is calculated based on the immutable fields in the header message and filled into the header message. After constructing the routing message, it is sent to the network through the wireless network card.

[0074] The second step is for the remaining nodes to receive and parse the routing messages.

[0075] After receiving a routing message, a node parses out the routing header and calculates the hash and HMAC values ​​based on the corresponding fields. It then compares these values ​​with the parsed hash and HMAC values. Since all nodes use the same internal calculation method, if the two values ​​match, the fields in the message have not been tampered with and can proceed to the next step. If they do not match, the message may have been tampered with by a malicious node, and the routing message is discarded.

[0076] Example 6 like Figure 7 As shown, the present invention also provides an electronic device, which may be a computer device, a microcontroller device, a smart mobile device, etc. The electronic device in this embodiment may include a processor, a memory, a transceiver component, etc. The memory, processor, and transceiver component are connected via a bus; the memory can be used to store executable programs, and an exemplary executable program may include instructions; the processor is used to execute the instructions stored in the memory. The memory can also be used to store data, which can be accessed and / or modified when instructions are executed.

[0077] The processor may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or it may be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. It is the computing and control core of the terminal, and it is suitable for implementing one or more instructions. Specifically, it is suitable for loading and executing one or more instructions in the storage medium to implement the corresponding method flow or corresponding function, so as to implement the steps of the wireless ad hoc network routing protocol security method of the above embodiment.

[0078] Example 7 Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a readable storage medium, specifically an electronic device readable storage medium (Memory). This readable storage medium is a memory device within an electronic device used to store programs and data. It is understood that the storage medium here can include both built-in storage media within the electronic device and extended storage media supported by the electronic device. The storage medium provides storage space, which stores the terminal's operating system. Furthermore, this storage space also stores one or more instructions suitable for loading and execution by a processor. These instructions can be one or more executable programs (including program code). It should be noted that the storage medium here can be high-speed RAM or non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device. Loading and executing one or more instructions stored in the storage medium by the processor can implement the steps of a secure routing protocol method for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks in the above embodiments.

[0079] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0080] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0081] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0082] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0083] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit its scope of protection. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that after reading the present invention, they can still make various changes, modifications or equivalent substitutions to the specific implementation methods of the application, but these changes, modifications or equivalent substitutions are all within the scope of protection of the claims pending approval.

Claims

1. A secure routing protocol method for unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, characterized in that, include: In a wireless ad hoc network, the sending node determines the trust anchor message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origination. The sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message, constructs an enhanced routing message, and broadcasts the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The sending node uses a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to extend the security fields of the header of the trust anchor message to construct an enhanced routing message, including: Based on the sequence number and hop count in the variable fields of the trust anchor message header, and combined with the authentication location index calculation formula, the hash value of the authentication location is extracted from the pre-generated one-way hash chain, which is generated based on a hash function. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-selected key and hash function, and combined with the immutable field in the header of the trust anchor message, a hash calculation is performed to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field; The HMAC value of the immutable field and the hash value of the authentication location are filled into the header of the information anchor message to expand the security field, thus obtaining the enhanced routing message.

3. The method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The formula for calculating the authentication location index is: In the formula, Indicates the authentication position in a one-way hash chain. Indicates the total length of the one-way hash chain. This indicates the maximum diameter in a wireless ad hoc network. Indicates the serial number. Indicates the number of jumps.

4. The method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The HMAC verification method, based on a pre-selected key and hash function, performs hash calculations on the immutable field in the trust anchor message header to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field, including: Based on the input length requirement of the pre-selected hash function, the key is padded to obtain the padded key; The padded key is XORed with a fixed constant to generate an inner key and an outer key; The inner key is concatenated with the immutable field of the trust anchor message header to obtain the inner combination. Based on the inner combination, a hash calculation is performed using the hash function to obtain the inner hash value. The inner hash value is combined with the outer key to obtain the outer combination. The outer combination is then combined with the hash function to perform a hash calculation to obtain the HMAC value of the immutable field.

5. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The sending node in the wireless ad hoc network determines the trust anchor message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origination, including: In a wireless ad hoc network, the sending node analyzes the multiple message structures in the routing message that play a decisive role in path discovery and maintenance and are stable within a preset period, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network. Based on the principle of trust origination, several message structures that are closest to the root of trust are selected from multiple message structures as a candidate structure set. The message structure with the lowest communication overhead is selected from the candidate structure set and used as the trust anchor message in the routing message.

6. A security system for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, characterized in that, include: The trust anchor point determination module is used by the sending node in the wireless ad hoc network to determine the trust anchor point message in the routing message based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network and in combination with communication overhead and the trust origin principle. The security extension module is used by the sending node to extend the security field of the header of the trust anchor message using a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method, construct an enhanced routing message, and broadcast the enhanced routing message to the wireless ad hoc network.

7. A secure method for routing protocols in unmanned wireless ad hoc networks, characterized in that, include: In a wireless ad hoc network, the receiving node receives and parses the header message of the enhanced routing message; The receiving node calculates the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verifies the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decides whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

8. The method as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The step of calculating the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verifying the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and determining whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded includes: Based on the received hash value, k hash operations are performed using a hash function to obtain a result value. The result value is then compared with the endpoint value of the received one-way hash chain to obtain a hash value comparison result. The value of k is calculated based on the sequence number and metric value in the header message, combined with the authentication location index calculation formula. Using the HMAC verification method, based on a pre-shared key and a hash function, and combined with the immutable fields extracted from the header message, a verification HMAC value is obtained. The verification HMAC value is then compared with the HMAC value of the immutable field to obtain the HMAC value comparison result. Based on the hash value comparison result and the HMAC value comparison result, it is determined whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

9. A security system for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, characterized in that, include: The parsing module is used by the receiver node in a wireless ad hoc network to receive and parse the header messages of the enhanced routing message; A security verification module is used by the receiving node to calculate the hash value and HMAC value of the header message, verify the header message based on the hash value and HMAC value, and decide whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

10. A security system for a wireless ad hoc network routing protocol for unmanned clusters, characterized in that, include: Multiple wireless ad hoc network nodes that are interconnected through a wireless ad hoc network and run routing protocols; Each of the aforementioned wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as either a sender node or a receiver node at different times; When each of the wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as a sending node, based on the working mechanism of the routing protocol in the wireless ad hoc network, combined with communication overhead and the principle of trust origin, the trust anchor message in the routing message is determined; the header of the trust anchor message is extended with a security field using a hash algorithm and HMAC verification method to construct an enhanced routing message, and the enhanced routing message is broadcast to the wireless ad hoc network; When each of the aforementioned wireless ad hoc network nodes acts as a receiver node, it receives and parses the header message of the enhanced routing message; The header message is processed by calculating its hash value and HMAC value. Based on the hash value and HMAC value, the header message is verified and a decision is made on whether the enhanced routing message is accepted or discarded.

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