Train control method

Abstract

The invention relates to a train control method, and belongs to the technical field of rail transit. The autonomous sensing system comprises a sensing system and an autonomous sensing host; the axle counter is arranged in the fault parking area and is used for positioning the train in the fault parking area; when the train-ground communication system breaks down and the autonomous sensing system is effective, the train runs in a first control mode, and in the first control mode, the automatic train protection system obtains train running data based on the autonomous sensing system, carries out train positioning and mobile authorization control. The invention designs a train operation control mode under the condition of a simplified axle counter, an annunciator and a transponder, and multi-mode descending-level train operation control is realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of rail transit technology, and in particular to a train control method. Background Technology

[0002] The mainstream train control systems for urban rail transit mainly include communication-based train control systems (CBTC) and train autonomous operation systems (TACS).

[0003] The TACS system enables autonomous train operation and train-to-train communication, improving train operation efficiency. Compared to the CBTC system, although TACS simplifies the CI / ZC host at the central station in terms of logical architecture, it still requires the deployment of physical trackside equipment (such as axle counters, signals, transponders, etc.), and still suffers from high trackside equipment complexity. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the problems of complex and numerous trackside equipment layouts in existing train control systems, this application provides a train control method to simplify the configuration and control process of the train control system.

[0005] A train control method is implemented based on the train control system, the train control system comprising: An autonomous sensing system, comprising a sensing system and an autonomous sensing host; the sensing system includes an image sensor, a radar sensor, and a navigation system; the autonomous sensing host communicates with the sensing system. Axle counter: Only installed in the fault stopping area, used for the positioning of the train in the fault stopping area; Trackside markings: placed in fault parking areas and operational parking areas; Communication system: includes a vehicle-to-vehicle communication system for communication between trains and a vehicle-to-ground communication system for vehicle-to-ground communication; the autonomous sensing host is connected to the vehicle-to-ground communication system; The train automatic protection system communicates with the autonomous sensing host and is connected to the vehicle-to-ground communication system. The train control method includes: When the vehicle-to-ground communication system fails and the autonomous sensing system is effective, the train operates in a first control mode. In the first control mode, the automatic protection system acquires train operation data based on the autonomous sensing system, performs train positioning, and motion authorization control.

[0006] In some embodiments of this application, it further includes: The target controller unlocks driving resources in the faulty parking area according to the scheduling instructions; The train malfunctions and there is a communication error between the train and the ground. The train will be operated in the first control mode to the fault parking area. The position information fed back by the axle counter will be used to determine whether the train has stopped. If so, issue a downgraded route unlocking command through the automatic train monitoring system; The target controller unlocks the downgraded route based on the downgraded route unlocking command issued by the automatic train monitoring system.

[0007] In some embodiments of this application, it further includes: Based on the position information fed back by the axle counter, determine whether the faulty train has moved; If so, the target controller blocks the train operation resources in the area adjacent to the faulty train's current fault parking area, prohibits other trains from entering the blocked area, and other trains within the blocked area brake urgently and are prohibited from moving. The system sends an audible and visual alarm to the control center.

[0008] In some embodiments of this application, the train control method further includes: If the train-to-ground communication of the faulty train is abnormal, but the train-to-ground communication of the train following the faulty train is normal, the target controller will establish a degraded route for the faulty train. When the following vehicle reaches the starting end of the degraded route, control the following vehicle to run on the degraded route; During the operation of the downgraded route, the following vehicle's autonomous perception system collects route information of the downgraded route, including obstacle information; The following vehicle transmits the route information collected by its autonomous perception system to the ground system. The target controller determines the overlap between the following vehicle's travel route and the downgraded route based on the route information and unlocks the driving resources in the overlapping area.

[0009] In some embodiments of this application, the train control method further includes: When the following train reaches the starting point of the downgraded route, it is determined whether the target path of the following train is the same as the downgraded route of the current train. If so, the following vehicle is permitted to enter the downgraded route; If not, the following train is allowed to enter the downgraded route and travel to the end of the area where the target path of the following train overlaps with the downgraded route. In some embodiments of this application, the train control method further includes: If the faulty train restores train-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, the route behind the rear of the faulty train will be unlocked.

[0010] In some embodiments of this application, the train control method further includes: If the faulty train restores vehicle-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, and the number of vehicles within the downgraded route is 1, then the route within the autonomous sensing range of the rear of the faulty train, and which is free of abnormal obstacles, will be unlocked.

[0011] In some embodiments of this application, it further includes: If multiple trains malfunction within a section of track, and all malfunctioning trains experience communication failures with the ground, the automatic train protection system of each train will initiate emergency braking.

[0012] In some embodiments of this application, it further includes: If the destinations of all faulty trains are known and the autonomous sensing systems of all faulty trains are available, all faulty trains will operate in the first control mode, locking the entire train section as a fault area, and processing a downgraded route from the last faulty train.

[0013] In some embodiments of this application, the train control method further includes: When the vehicle-to-ground communication system fails and the autonomous sensing system is ineffective, the train operates in a second control mode. In the second control mode, the automatic protection system of the train only performs train speed limit control and train overspeed protection control.

[0014] The beneficial effects of the technical solutions provided in this application include at least the following: The solution proposes a simplified train operation control method under conditions of axle counting, signaling, and transponder, and realizes multiple modes of degraded train operation control.

[0015] Regarding the unlocking method for downgraded trains, the solution provides a sweeping unlocking scheme based on a communication car equipped with an autonomous sensing system, which improves the safety and efficiency of unlocking backup train routes in the system.

[0016] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of this application, it can be implemented according to the contents of the specification. In order to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this application more apparent, specific embodiments of this application are given below. Attached Figure Description

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the train onboard control system structure according to an embodiment of this application.

[0019] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the train onboard control system composition according to an embodiment of this application.

[0020] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the switching of the vehicle-mounted system in different operating modes according to an embodiment of this application.

[0021] Figure 4a This is a schematic diagram of a train operating in TACS mode according to an embodiment of this application.

[0022] Figure 4b This is a schematic diagram illustrating the train switching from TACS mode to AutoRM mode in an embodiment of this application.

[0023] Figure 4c This is a schematic diagram illustrating the train's return from AutoRM mode to TACS mode in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0024] To make the technical problems to be solved, the technical solutions, and the beneficial effects of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0025] The prefixes such as "first" and "second" used in this application embodiment are merely for distinguishing different descriptive objects and do not limit the position, order, priority, quantity, or content of the described objects. The use of ordinal numbers and other prefixes used to distinguish descriptive objects in this application embodiment does not constitute a limitation on the described objects. The description of the described objects is given in the claims or the context of the embodiments, and should not constitute unnecessary restrictions due to the use of such prefixes. Furthermore, in the description of this embodiment, unless otherwise stated, "multiple" means two or more.

[0026] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise stated, " / " means "or," for example, A / B can mean A or B; the term "and / or" in this document is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone.

[0027] In the embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0028] The mainstream train control systems for urban rail transit mainly include CBTC (Communication-Based Train Control System) and TACS (Train Autonomous Operation System).

[0029] CBTC is currently the most widely used signaling system standard in urban rail transit worldwide. Its core feature is the use of high-precision, high-capacity two-way wireless communication between the vehicle and the ground to replace traditional track circuits and achieve moving block control.

[0030] A CBTC system typically consists of the following system and equipment units: Automatic Train Control System (ATS): Located in the control center, it is responsible for the dispatching and command of trains along the entire line, timetable management, and status monitoring.

[0031] Computerized Interlocking System (CI): Located in the station / central station, it is responsible for the safety interlocking logic of trackside equipment such as switches, signals, and platform screen doors to ensure route safety.

[0032] Area Controller (ZC): Based on information such as the train's reported location, interlocking route status, and temporary speed limits, ZC calculates movement authorization (MA) for all trains within its jurisdiction and sends it to the trains via wireless communication.

[0033] Vehicle Controller (VOBC): Responsible for train positioning, speed measurement, receiving movement authorization and calculating braking curves, and performing ATP (Action Trip) and ATO (Automatic Train Operation) functions.

[0034] Data communication system (DCS): including trackside wireless access points (APs), backbone network and vehicle-mounted wireless units, providing a continuous two-way data transmission channel between vehicle and ground.

[0035] Axle counter: Used for non-CBTC train detection and section occupancy checks in downgraded mode.

[0036] Transponder: Provides an absolute position calibration point to eliminate accumulated errors.

[0037] The CBTC system works as follows: Train positioning: The train performs absolute position correction by using speed measuring motors, radar, and reading trackside transponders (beacons) to calculate its own position in real time.

[0038] Information exchange: VOBC transmits information such as train position, speed, and direction to ZC in real time through DCS.

[0039] Movement Authorization Calculation: ZC collects the positions of all trains and the route status of CI, and dynamically calculates the End of Movement Authorization (EOA) for each train, which is the safe distance behind the preceding train or behind an obstacle.

[0040] Speed ​​control: After receiving the MA, the VOBC combines the line data to generate a target distance speed control curve, which controls the train to accelerate, cruise, or brake to ensure that it does not exceed the EOA.

[0041] Functions of trackside equipment: Although CBTC does not rely on track circuits for train occupancy detection, in order to perform degraded operation (such as point-to-point mode or interlocking mode) and initial positioning, it is still necessary to install axle counters (to detect section occupancy), signals (to display ground signals) and transponders (positioning reference points) on the line.

[0042] TACS is a new generation of train operation control system. Its core concept is "train-centric". It moves the traditional ground centralized control functions (such as ZC and some CI logic) to the vehicle and uses vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology to realize the autonomous operation of the train.

[0043] The TACS system architecture is more flattened, and the TACS system consists of the following components: Automatic Train Control System (ATS): Similar in function to CBTC, it is mainly responsible for macro-level scheduling and monitoring, with reduced intervention.

[0044] Onboard Controller (OBC): The core of TACS. It not only possesses the functions of a traditional VOBC, but also integrates the movement authorization calculation function of the original ZC and some of the interlocking logic of CI. Trains communicate directly, exchanging positions and statuses.

[0045] Ground Target Controller (OC): Replaces the traditional ZC and complex CI host. Its main responsibility is to manage the status of track resources (such as switches and protected sections), respond to train resource requests, and no longer actively calculate movement authorizations.

[0046] Data communication system (DCS): In addition to vehicle-to-ground communication, it emphasizes vehicle-to-vehicle communication links and supports direct data exchange between trains.

[0047] Axle counter: Used to revert to interlocking mode when the system is downgraded (e.g., during train-to-train communication failure) and to detect unequipped trains.

[0048] Transponder: Provides an absolute position calibration point to eliminate accumulated errors.

[0049] The working principle of the TACS system is as follows: Autonomous sensing and communication: The train autonomously senses its position through onboard sensors and broadcasts its status (such as position, speed, and intention) directly to surrounding trains through vehicle-to-vehicle communication.

[0050] Independent application for resources: Trains apply directly to the ground OC for route resources (such as turnout permissions) according to the operation plan.

[0051] Mobile authorization autonomous computing: The train autonomously calculates the mobile authorization on the on-vehicle side based on the acquired resource status and the direct communication information with the preceding train, without the need for centralized calculation and distribution by the ground ZC.

[0052] Active protection: The train controls its speed and performs protection based on the MA calculated autonomously. Since the ground central processing link is removed, the safety response time is significantly shortened.

[0053] The TACS system has the capabilities of autonomous train operation and vehicle-to-vehicle communication, improving the train operation efficiency. Compared with the CBTC system, although the TACS system simplifies the CI / ZC hosts of the centralized stations in the logical architecture, it still requires the arrangement of physical trackside equipment (such as axle counters, signal lights, balises, etc.), and there are still defects such as high complexity of trackside equipment.

[0054] The configuration of the trackside equipment of the TACS system can be simplified by adding train autonomous sensing devices.

[0055] The embodiments of this application address the defects such as the large number of trackside equipment arrangements in the existing TACS system, and provide a TACS train control system and control method for streamlining trackside equipment. This method and system can achieve control methods for train operation in the main mode, train operation in the backup mode, and mixed running of trains in the main mode and backup mode under the conditions of streamlining axle counter equipment, canceling signal lights, and canceling balises.

[0056] This application provides a train control method.

[0057] Refer to Figure 2 , which is a schematic diagram of the logic structure of the train control system in the embodiments of this application, mainly including the following structural units.

[0058] The train is equipped with an autonomous sensing system, which consists of a sensor group and an autonomous sensing host. The autonomous sensing host communicates with the sensor group and the on-vehicle ATP system, and can generate speed, position, and obstacle distance information based on multi-sensor information fusion and provide it to the on-vehicle ATP system.

[0059] The sensor group includes an image sensor, a radar sensor, and a navigation system.

[0060] Among them, the image sensor can use long / short focal cameras. Cooperating with other sensor components, it can collect information such as road obstacles and roadside signs during vehicle driving, as well as perform train positioning.

[0061] The radar sensor can use millimeter-wave radar and lidar. Cooperating with other sensor components, it can achieve train positioning, speed measurement, and obstacle detection.

[0062] Navigation systems include inertial navigation systems and satellite navigation systems. They work in conjunction with other sensor components to be used for train positioning.

[0063] Specifically, based on the functions implemented, the autonomous sensing system can be divided into the following modules.

[0064] Speed ​​measurement module. Millimeter-wave radar: Directly measures the radial velocity of the train relative to the ground or the preceding vehicle using the Doppler effect. Inertial navigation system: Provides high-frequency (typically >100Hz) instantaneous acceleration and angular velocity data, calculating speed through integration. Provides continuous speed estimation when the radar signal is briefly disturbed or in a blind spot. Satellite navigation system: Provides an average speed reference based on displacement changes, used to correct for cumulative drift in the inertial navigation system, ensuring accurate speed reference during long-distance operations.

[0065] Positioning Module. LiDAR matches real-time point clouds with high-precision maps (e.g., using the ICP algorithm) to provide centimeter-level relative position correction, crucial especially in areas without satellite signals, such as tunnels. Short-focus cameras identify nearby track features, transponders, and signs for visual odometry calculations. Long-focus cameras identify distant traffic lights, kilometer markers, and special landmarks to assist in global positioning. Inertial Navigation System: Serving as the "skeleton," it provides continuous and smooth position and attitude estimation, filling the gaps in sensor sampling. Satellite Navigation System: Provides absolute geographic coordinates in open areas, eliminating long-term accumulated errors from inertial navigation and visual / radar relative positioning.

[0066] Obstacle detection module. Long and short focal length cameras: use computer vision algorithms to classify obstacles. Millimeter-wave radar: accurately measures the distance and approach speed of obstacles.

[0067] Trains are typically equipped with speed sensors. Besides the autonomous sensing system, which can detect train speed, the train's speed sensors can also collect train speed data. The ATP (Automatic Train Protection) system connects to the speed sensors, and the speed measurement information generated by the speed sensors and the autonomous sensing system is fused at the ATP level to further improve speed measurement accuracy.

[0068] The train equipped with an autonomous sensing system has constructed a multi-source fusion and redundant train environment perception and navigation architecture. This architecture achieves high-precision positioning, real-time speed measurement, and all-around obstacle detection in complex rail transit scenarios by complementing the physical characteristics of different sensors.

[0069] The train control system includes an axle counter. Unlike the steps involved in axle counters in the prior art, in this application, the axle counter is only installed in the fault stopping area for the purpose of locating the train within the fault stopping area.

[0070] Axle counters are typically used as continuous, fundamental positioning devices across the entire railway line. They are used to delineate block sections and detect track occupancy, forming the "cornerstone" of train operation safety. Specifically, there are two ways to simplify the layout of axle counters. The first way is to completely eliminate axle counters, but this increases the workload of dispatchers and drivers. For example, dispatchers and drivers need to jointly confirm the stopping position of the faulty train, and the train is not allowed to move. The system (mainly OC) cannot automatically detect the movement of the faulty train, resulting in greater safety risks and lower efficiency. The second way is to deploy axle counters only in specific fault storage areas on the main line (excluding platform areas) for confirming the location of the faulty train. Extending from the second way, other methods can be used to replace OC for detecting faulty trains, such as using UWB, passive tag identification, etc., but these technologies are less commonly used and not mature enough. In summary, deploying axle counters in specific locations to set up faulty train detection areas (axle counter deployment method: ensuring that the train can be detected to enter and leave completely, including at least 3 axle counter sections in the fault area and adjacent areas) is currently the best choice to balance efficiency, safety, and cost. Therefore, this solution is overall a way to reduce the layout of axle counters, not to completely eliminate them.

[0071] The proposed solution reduces the axle counter's function from "continuous detection across the entire line" to "fixed-point anchoring in fault scenarios." This represents an architectural change based on the principles of "on-demand deployment, cost reduction and efficiency improvement, and redundancy backup." After streamlining the axle counter layout, the OC (Operating Center) essentially lacks backup train detection capabilities for most areas, rendering the traditional axle counter-based interlocking route control logic ineffective. Therefore, a new design for backup train route management is necessary.

[0072] Trackside markings: placed in the fault parking area and the operating parking area.

[0073] To further enhance the reliability of the system's positioning, trackside signs are installed in all parking areas. These signs serve two purposes: firstly, they provide the image sensors of the autonomous sensing system with the ability to collect trackside information for train control; secondly, they act as markers for the driver to confirm the stop in the event of a failure of the autonomous sensing system. This part has already been described in the previous paragraph.

[0074] Communication systems include train-to-train communication systems for communication between trains and train-to-ground communication systems for communication between trains and ground.

[0075] The train signaling system proposed in this application eliminates the need for signal lights.

[0076] The train is equipped with an autonomous sensing system, replacing the driver's eyes. In the traditional degraded mode, signals indicate whether the route ahead is open. With signals removed, this function relies solely on pre-designed "rules" for protection. For example, a malfunctioning train must stop in designated areas on an electronic map, and then the driver and dispatcher confirm that it can continue, before the driver confirms departure in the onboard system. Compared to the traditional system, this reduces the driver's workload of continuously monitoring the train's status in backup mode, but increases the departure confirmation process, primarily addressing the safety protection issues of trains in backup mode.

[0077] The train signaling system proposed in this application eliminates the need for a transponder.

[0078] Transponders can be completely eliminated because autonomous sensing systems can complete the entire train positioning function, including initial positioning and location updates, without relying on transponders, at the same safety level.

[0079] This application further proposes functional improvements based on the Automatic Train Protection System.

[0080] Automatic train protection system: communicates with autonomous sensing host and connects with vehicle-to-ground communication system.

[0081] When the vehicle-to-ground communication system fails and the autonomous sensing system is effective, the first control mode is activated. In the first control mode, the automatic train protection system is configured to acquire train operation data based on the autonomous sensing system, perform train positioning, and control movement authorization.

[0082] When the vehicle-to-ground communication system fails and the autonomous sensing system is ineffective, the train operates in a second control mode. In the second control mode, the automatic protection system is configured to only perform train speed limit control and train overspeed protection control.

[0083] The Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system is the last line of defense for train safety. The protective functions of the onboard ATP include: overspeed protection, protection against overspeeding signals, interlocking of train doors and platform screen doors, reverse movement protection, and speed limit protection.

[0084] In this embodiment, the functions of the onboard ATP (Automatic Travel Assist) are adjusted in conjunction with the onboard autonomous sensing system. An autonomous sensing system malfunction refers to the autonomous sensing system's inability to perform any of the functions of speed, position, or obstacle detection, or a communication failure between the autonomous sensing host and the onboard ATP.

[0085] The first control mode is AutoRM mode.

[0086] Triggering condition: Vehicle-to-ground communication is interrupted (unable to obtain ground movement authorization), but the vehicle-mounted autonomous perception system is intact (LiDAR, vision, inertial navigation, autonomous perception host, etc. are working normally).

[0087] In AutoRM mode, it no longer relies on ground transponders or axle counters for calibration, but instead relies entirely on multi-sensor fusion (SLAM technology) for continuous high-precision positioning and speed measurement.

[0088] Traditional movement authorization is fixed (e.g., 25 meters ahead or the next traffic light), while AutoRM's movement authorization (MA) is dynamically generated. The onboard ATP uses a SIL4 level obstacle detection algorithm to scan the track ahead in real time. Once an obstacle is detected (e.g., a person, object, or vehicle ahead), it immediately calculates the braking curve and generates a new limit point as the end point of the movement authorization.

[0089] In AutoRM mode, the full ATP overspeed protection and overshoot protection functions are retained.

[0090] The first control mode is RM mode.

[0091] Triggering conditions: Vehicle-to-ground communication is interrupted and the autonomous sensing system fails (unable to measure speed, unable to locate, unable to detect obstacles, or communication with ATP is lost).

[0092] In RM mode, all advanced features (Dynamic MA, Precision Parking, Automatic Door Opening, etc.) are disabled. A very low, fixed speed is enforced (typically 25 km / h or lower). This speed is based on the physical limit of the driver's ability to stop within visual range. Only the most basic overspeed protection is retained. Emergency braking immediately occurs if the fixed speed limit is exceeded.

[0093] In RM mode, the responsibility for obstacle detection and confirmation of road conditions ahead is entirely transferred to the driver. The driver must manually look ahead to confirm that the path is safe.

[0094] In addition to the above modes, when the autonomous sensing system is effective and the train's automatic protection system is disabled, the train operates in a third control mode.

[0095] The third control mode is also known as the EUM mode.

[0096] Triggering condition: Driver manually disconnects / bypasses the onboard ATP system (typically used for rescue, troubleshooting, or handling extreme malfunctions).

[0097] In EUM mode, there is no mandatory protection: ATP no longer forcibly intervenes in braking (unless a separate hardline emergency braking circuit is triggered, depending on the specific design), and the train speed is entirely controlled by the driver.

[0098] If autonomous perception is effective: the HMI (Human-Machine Interface) continues to display information such as speed, position, and distance to obstacles ahead. If autonomous perception is ineffective: the HMI does not display relevant information.

[0099] In addition to the above modes, the train can also operate in a fourth control mode, which is TACS mode. In this mode, the autonomous sensing system is effective, and the vehicle-to-ground communication system is normal.

[0100] Further reference Figures 4a to 4c In AutoRM mode, if the vehicle-to-ground communication system is restored, the train will operate in TACS mode.

[0101] The train is operating in TACS mode. A green light band indicates the train's current operational resources. A train-to-ground communication failure occurs. The previously held operational resource range is reclaimed by the OC (Operating Center) and displayed as a purple light band. This purple light band represents the maximum possible operating range of the faulty train. The principle is: because the train will apply emergency braking after detecting a train-to-ground communication failure, the maximum emergency braking distance is within the train's last remaining effective operational resource range. Therefore, the OC reserves this area to prevent other communicating trains from entering this area and causing a collision risk under the condition of this train's failure. After the train stops via EB (Electronic Emergency Braking), the dispatcher and driver jointly confirm that the train has come to a complete stop, and the dispatcher processes the current fault area (…). Figure 4b The downgraded route from the purple-light zone to the destination platform (preset area on the electronic map), i.e. Figure 4c Comparison Figure 4b The purple light band extends to Station 2. After the downgraded route is successfully processed, the dispatcher issues a permission to continue instruction to the driver. The driver presses the confirmation button to confirm that the train has entered AutoRM mode, and the train control system starts the train. During train operation, the onboard system completes obstacle recognition ahead, generates movement authorization, generates EBI trigger speed, and the ATO controls the train to continue running, or the driver controls the train to continue running according to the EBI.

[0102] This application further proposes a train downgraded route unlocking method based on autonomous perception. The downgraded route unlocking method involved in this application includes four downgraded unlocking modes.

[0103] Method 1: Manual unlocking. This includes the following steps.

[0104] The target controller unlocks driving resources in the faulty parking area according to the scheduling instructions; When the train runs to the fault stopping area in the first control mode, it is determined whether the train has stopped completely based on the position information fed back by the axle counter. If so, issue a downgraded route unlocking command through the automatic train monitoring system; The target controller unlocks the downgraded route range of the faulty area where the faulty train is located, based on the downgraded route unlocking command issued by the automatic train monitoring system.

[0105] Furthermore, during the aforementioned degradation control process, the faulty train may move, and the target controller determines whether the train has moved based on the position information fed back by the axle counter. If so, the target controller locks the operating resources in the area adjacent to the fault parking area where the train is currently located.

[0106] This degraded route management mode requires the cooperation of dispatchers and drivers. The specific steps are explained in detail below.

[0107] Step S1: Establishing the downgrade path and locking resources The dispatcher issues a command through the Automatic Train Monitoring System (ATS) to the Operations Controller (OC, i.e., the Target Controller) to assign a downgraded route to the pre-defined "faulty train storage area" for the faulty train. The OC responds to the command by performing the following operations: Establish this downgrade path; Implement trackside logic locking for all turnouts and train resources within the route area; Isolate other trains from entering the route to ensure the safe and available operating path for the malfunctioning train and prevent conflicts with other trains.

[0108] Step S2: Vehicle Mode Switching and Autonomous Operation The dispatcher instructs the driver of the malfunctioning train to execute the operating instructions. The driver then confirms the instructions on the human-machine interface (HMI) at the driver's cab.

[0109] Upon receiving the confirmation command, the onboard system switches the train to the first control mode (AutoRM mode). In this mode, the train does not rely on ground-based continuous movement authorization, but instead uses environmental feature data acquired by the onboard autonomous sensing system and matching it with an electronic map to achieve autonomous positioning and operation, entering the designated "faulty train storage area." During operation, the autonomous sensing system identifies obstacles within the route, serving as the basis for the system to automatically unlock and downgrade the route.

[0110] Step S3: Arrival Confirmation and Human-Machine Verification Once the train enters the "faulty train storage area" and comes to a complete stop, the onboard system executes the following logic: Automatic identification: The onboard system uses the environmental features collected by the autonomous perception system to match the fingerprint information of the "faulty train storage area" preset in the electronic map to automatically determine the name of the current area.

[0111] Information displayed: The onboard system shows the identified area name and the train's stationary status on the HMI.

[0112] Step S4: Path unlocking and area continuous locking Once the OC detects that the train has fully entered the fault area, it will release all train resources and turnout locks in the downgraded route except for the "faulty train storage area", restoring the passage capacity of subsequent trains.

[0113] If the OC does not detect that the train has fully entered the fault area, it will keep the "faulty train storage area" and all its internal resources locked and will not unlock it.

[0114] Step S5: Anti-runaway monitoring and dynamic safety protection. While the faulty train is in the "faulty train storage area," the OC continuously executes safety monitoring logic: Location monitoring: The OC monitors the location status of the faulty train in real time based on the status information fed back by the axle counter (or equivalent occupancy detection equipment) set in the "faulty train storage area".

[0115] Movement detection and coordinated blocking: If the axle counter detects that the faulty train has moved (i.e., the train has moved out of its original occupied section or its status has changed abnormally), the OC determines that the train has moved unexpectedly.

[0116] OC immediately triggers a dynamic safety protection mechanism: automatically calculates and blocks the safety protection zone adjacent to the area where the currently faulty train is located (the range of this zone is automatically generated by OC according to the current area topology and turnout status, based on a preset safety protection distance algorithm).

[0117] Alarm and braking: The OC generates an alarm message and pushes it to the dispatcher, and sends an emergency locking command to the communication trains in the relevant area; after receiving the command, the communication train immediately triggers the emergency brake (EB) to prevent rear-end collisions or side collisions.

[0118] Manual reset: The adjacent area lock triggered by train movement is not automatically restored. It can only be restored after the dispatcher confirms safety and issues a release command manually.

[0119] Method 2: Unlock by scanning the car On the same operating section of the line, multiple trains may be running simultaneously. If some trains malfunction, it may affect the operation of the following trains. Therefore, it is necessary to solve the problem that, under the simplified axle counter architecture (i.e., no continuous axle counter equipment on the main line), when the preceding train (car 1) malfunctions and a degraded route is established, the lack of ground detection equipment to confirm the train's position in real time leads to the route not being able to unlock automatically and the line resources being occupied for a long time.

[0120] If the train in front is a faulty train and the train-to-ground communication of the faulty train is abnormal, while the train-to-ground communication of the train following the faulty train on the same operating section is normal, the target controller will establish a degraded route for the faulty train. When the following vehicle reaches the beginning of the downgraded route, control the following vehicle to run on the downgraded route; During the operation of the vehicle on the downgraded route, its autonomous perception system collects the route information of the downgraded route, including obstacle information; The following vehicle transmits the route information collected by its autonomous perception system to the ground system. The target controller determines the overlap between the following vehicle's route and the downgraded route based on the route information and unlocks the driving resources in the overlapping area.

[0121] During this process, since the following vehicle's vehicle-to-ground communication was normal, and the following vehicle was at the boundary of the downgraded route, after the dispatch driver confirmed, the driver manually entered AutoRM mode. Relying on its own autonomous perception system, the driver identified obstacles within the downgraded route, which served as the basis for the system to automatically unlock the downgraded route. In some embodiments, considering that the target travel path of the following train may completely or partially overlap with the degraded route, when the following train runs to the beginning of the degraded route, it is determined whether the target path of the following train is the same as the degraded route of the current train. If so, the following vehicle is allowed to enter the downgraded route; it can then proceed normally within the downgraded route. If not, the following vehicle is allowed to enter the downgraded route, but the furthest it can travel is to the end of the area where the target path of the following vehicle overlaps with the downgraded route.

[0122] This control method will not affect the normal operation plan of the following vehicles.

[0123] The specific steps for each execution are described below.

[0124] Step S1: Fault Scenario Construction and Route Locking Assume that there is a preceding train (hereinafter referred to as "Car 1") and a following train (hereinafter referred to as "Car 2") running on the line.

[0125] If a vehicle 1 experiences a malfunction while running in a section, the OC responds to the malfunction information and establishes a degraded route from the current location of vehicle 1 to the target parking area (such as the malfunction parking line).

[0126] The OC performs a logical lockout on the switches and track resources within the route range, creating a "fault degradation zone" that prohibits other trains from entering to prevent conflicts. At this time, since car 1 has not yet reached the target area equipped with the axle counter, the route is in a continuously locked state.

[0127] Step S2: The following vehicle approaches and stops at the boundary. Car 2, being a train with normal communication, traveled to the boundary of the aforementioned "fault degradation zone" in normal operating mode.

[0128] Limited by the Movement Authorization (MA) boundary of vehicle 1, vehicle 2 automatically stops at the beginning of the area.

[0129] Step S3: Human-machine interaction and path consistency verification After the two vehicles stopped, the human-machine interface mechanism was triggered. The dispatcher communicated with the drivers of the two vehicles to confirm.

[0130] Key verification: Confirm that the planned driving paths of vehicles 2 completely overlap with the fault downgrade path of vehicle 1.

[0131] Safety logic: If the paths are inconsistent (for example, the two trains need to pass through the siding), the end point of the overlapping area is taken as the end point of the moving obstacle authorization for the two trains. Under ATP protection, the train will travel as far as the end point of the overlapping area.

[0132] Step S4: Mode Switching and Autonomous Scanning After joint control confirmation, the drivers of the two trains operated the onboard human-machine interface (HMI) to switch the train driving mode to AutoRM mode (a degraded operation mode based on autonomous perception).

[0133] Once the two vehicles start, their onboard autonomous sensing system detects obstacles on the track ahead in real time.

[0134] ATP protection logic: If the sensing system detects an obstacle (i.e., vehicle 1 is still in place), the ATP immediately generates a restrictive movement authorization and triggers braking to keep the route locked.

[0135] If the sensing system does not detect any obstacles, ATP determines the path is safe, generates a dynamic movement authorization, and allows the train to continue.

[0136] Step S5: Location overlap determination and dynamic unlocking During operation, the two vehicles report their high-precision positioning information (based on multi-sensor fusion positioning) to the OC in real time through vehicle-to-ground communication.

[0137] After receiving the report, the OC executes the "minimum envelope unlocking algorithm": The system calculates in real time the spatial overlap between the current driving trajectory of the two vehicles and the existing "fault degradation area".

[0138] Unlocking Execution: For overlapping sections where two trains have already passed and the autonomous sensing system confirms there are no abnormalities, the OC determines that the area has been "scanned and is safe," and then automatically issues an unlocking command to release the turnouts and track resources in that section.

[0139] Step S6: Operational Recovery With both vehicles having completely passed through the fault area, the original downgraded route was fully unlocked.

[0140] The subsequent train (carriage 3) following car 2 will no longer be restricted by the faulty route and can continue to operate normally in the main mode, thereby realizing the rapid restoration of the line's traffic capacity.

[0141] In the absence of axle counters on the main line, the following vehicles were creatively used as "mobile axle counters," solving the industry problem of faulty routes not being automatically cleared.

[0142] Method 3: Automatic unlocking after fault recovery If the faulty train restores train-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, the system provides an automatic downgraded route unlocking function. If the system confirms that there is one and only one train within the downgraded route and that the information is consistent with the train before the fault, then based on the principle of unique train resources and that the driver is not driving in violation of regulations, the system can automatically unlock the route behind the rear of the train.

[0143] Specifically, if the malfunctioning train restores vehicle-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, the route behind the malfunctioning train's rear is unlocked. In some embodiments of this application, if the malfunctioning train restores vehicle-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, and the number of vehicles within the downgraded route is 1, then the route within the autonomous sensing range of the malfunctioning train's rear, provided there are no abnormal obstacles, is unlocked. This control method can reduce the impact on the operation of other vehicles.

[0144] Method 4: Multi-vehicle fault degradation management.

[0145] Under TACS-level operation, if a regional train-to-ground communication interruption occurs (such as a base station failure), multiple trains within the section will simultaneously trigger emergency braking (EB) and stop. Traditionally, dispatchers need to process downgraded routes for each train individually, which is extremely inefficient. To solve this problem, this application proposes a "batch downgraded route based on the tail of the queue" mechanism, which locks the entire fault area at once, allowing train formations to operate autonomously within the area, and automatically reconstructs resources once communication is restored.

[0146] If multiple trains malfunction within a section of track, and all malfunctioning trains experience communication failures with the ground, the automatic train protection system of each train will initiate emergency braking.

[0147] In some embodiments of this application, if the destinations of all faulty trains are known and the autonomous sensing systems of all faulty trains are available, all faulty trains operate in the first control mode, locking the entire train section as a fault area, and processing a downgraded route from the last faulty train.

[0148] The specific execution flow for each step is described below.

[0149] Step S1: Communication Interruption and Resource Freeze (Security Anchoring) When multiple trains experience a communication interruption between the train and the ground while running on the section, the onboard ATP of all affected trains immediately triggers emergency braking (EB) to stop.

[0150] The target controller automatically executes a "resource freeze" strategy. This means that all valid train resources (virtual block sections or logical segments) held by all trains before the communication interruption are retained, without being reclaimed or released.

[0151] The ATS human-machine interface displays this area as a "purple band" (or a specific fault color), indicating to the dispatcher that the area is in a special state of "communication lost but resources locked".

[0152] Step S2: Generation of batch degradation routes To address the cumbersome process of handling multiple vehicles, the system offers a "one-click batch processing" function: A "batch degradation route" covering the entire fault area is automatically generated by the system or manually processed by the dispatcher. The starting point of this route is set to the "position of the last faulty car" (i.e., the tail of the queue), and the ending point is set to the nearest target platform or safe area. The target controller locks all resources within the range of this route (starting from the tail of the last car and extending to the area occupied by all faulty cars ahead) as the "fault operation zone".

[0153] Before performing this operation, the system automatically verifies the following conditions: Destination consistency: All trains within the region must have the same destination (to prevent conflicts between trains or route discrepancies).

[0154] Sensing capability available: All downgraded trains must report that their autonomous sensing system is functioning normally and has AutoRM operation capability.

[0155] Step S3: Autonomous grouping and operation within the region The dispatcher instructs all train drivers in the area to enter AutoRM mode. Upon driver confirmation, the onboard ATP (Automatic Train Protection) system uses its autonomous sensing system (LiDAR / vision) to reacquire speed, position, and obstacle information. The onboard ATP autonomously calculates movement authorization and emergency braking intervention curves. Drivers can choose between manual driving or ATO (Automatic Train Operation) depending on the situation, and the train continues its journey towards the platform within the "batch degraded route."

[0156] During this process, trains maintain a safe distance by relying on autonomous sensing, without the need for real-time intervention from ground-based OC.

[0157] Step S4: Communication Restoration and Dynamic Resource Handover (Smooth Upgrade) When the train enters the communication coverage area or the base station is restored, a "seamless resource handover" is executed: Information synchronization: When the onboard ATP detects that the vehicle-to-ground communication has been restored, it immediately synchronizes the current precise location, speed and "batch degradation route" status to the OC.

[0158] Resource application and conversion: The vehicle's ATP applies to the OC to formally convert previously "frozen" resources or newly entered regional resources into "resources held by this vehicle".

[0159] After the OC confirms that the train's identity and location are correct, it unlocks the logic of "batch downgrade route" and transfers resource rights to the individual train.

[0160] Level Upgrade: After the resource handover is completed, the train automatically exits AutoRM mode and upgrades to TACS-level primary mode, restoring normal train-ground cooperative operation.

[0161] In some embodiments of this application, under the TACS system, when a train experiences a serious malfunction in a section, the system immediately freezes the last valid operating resources held by the malfunctioning train and marks it with a purple band on the ATS interface to prevent other trains from occupying the resources. Subsequently, the dispatcher needs to manually execute a downgraded route from the current location of the rescue train to the location of the malfunctioning train. The rescue train approaches and couples with the malfunctioning train according to the route instruction, towing or pushing it to the designated storage line. After the rescue mission is completed, the downgraded route can be unlocked through manual confirmation or automatically unlocked by a subsequent normally operating train through a "sweep" method to restore normal operation of the line.

[0162] This application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer program code. When the computer program code is run on a computer, it causes the computer to execute the train control method described in the above embodiments. This computer program can be integrated into a train control system.

[0163] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing program code that is executed by one or more processors. When the program code runs on the processor, it causes a device including one or more processors to perform the train control method described in the above embodiments. The processor running this computer-readable storage medium can be mounted in a train control system.

[0164] It should be understood that when the modules or units described herein are implemented using software, they can be implemented in whole or in part as a computer program product. A computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transferred from one computer-readable storage medium to another. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., solid-state disk (SSD)).

[0165] This application provides a chip system including a processor, or the chip system including a memory and a processor, for calling computer programs or computer instructions stored in the memory to cause the processor to execute the train control method involved in the above embodiments. The chip system can be a single chip or a chip module composed of multiple chips. This chip system can be installed in a train control system.

[0166] This application provides an electronic device including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the electronic device implements the train control method described in the above embodiments. This electronic device can be mounted on a train control system.

[0167] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the modules, units, and method steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0168] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be covered. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A train control method, characterized in that, Based on the aforementioned train control system, the train control system includes: An autonomous sensing system, comprising a sensing system and an autonomous sensing host; the sensing system includes an image sensor, a radar sensor, and a navigation system; the autonomous sensing host communicates with the sensing system. Axle counter: Only installed in the fault stopping area, used for the positioning of the train in the fault stopping area; Trackside markings: placed in fault parking areas and operational parking areas; Communication system: includes a vehicle-to-vehicle communication system for communication between trains and a vehicle-to-ground communication system for vehicle-to-ground communication; the autonomous sensing host is connected to the vehicle-to-ground communication system; The train automatic protection system communicates with the autonomous sensing host and is connected to the vehicle-to-ground communication system. The train control method includes: When the vehicle-to-ground communication system fails and the autonomous sensing system is effective, the train operates in a first control mode. In the first control mode, the automatic protection system acquires train operation data based on the autonomous sensing system, performs train positioning, and motion authorization control.

2. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: The target controller unlocks driving resources in the faulty parking area according to the scheduling instructions; The train malfunctions and there is a communication error between the train and the ground. The train will be operated in the first control mode to the fault parking area. The position information fed back by the axle counter will be used to determine whether the train has stopped. If so, issue a downgraded route unlocking command through the automatic train monitoring system; The target controller unlocks the downgraded route based on the downgraded route unlocking command issued by the automatic train monitoring system.

3. The train control method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Also includes: Based on the position information fed back by the axle counter, determine whether the faulty train has moved; If so, the target controller locks the train resources in the area adjacent to the faulty stopping area where the faulty train is currently located.

4. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The train control method also includes: If the train-to-ground communication of the faulty train is abnormal, but the train-to-ground communication of the train following the faulty train is normal, the target controller will establish a degraded route for the faulty train. When the following vehicle reaches the starting end of the degraded route, control the following vehicle to run on the degraded route; During the operation of the downgraded route, the following vehicle's autonomous perception system collects route information of the downgraded route, including obstacle information; The following vehicle transmits the route information collected by its autonomous perception system to the ground system. The target controller determines the overlap between the following vehicle's travel route and the downgraded route based on the route information and unlocks the driving resources in the overlapping area.

5. The train control method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The train control method also includes: When the following train reaches the starting point of the downgraded route, it is determined whether the target path of the following train is the same as the downgraded route of the current train. If so, the following vehicle is permitted to enter the downgraded route; If not, the following vehicle is allowed to enter the downgraded route and travel to the end of the area where the target path of the following vehicle overlaps with the downgraded route.

6. The train control method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, The train control method also includes: If the faulty train restores train-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, the route behind the rear of the faulty train will be unlocked.

7. The train control method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The train control method also includes: If the faulty train restores vehicle-to-ground communication within the downgraded route, and the number of vehicles within the downgraded route is 1, then the route within the autonomous sensing range of the rear of the faulty train, and which is free of abnormal obstacles, will be unlocked.

8. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: If multiple trains malfunction within a section of track, and all malfunctioning trains experience communication failures with the ground, the automatic train protection system of each train will initiate emergency braking.

9. The train control method according to claim 8, characterized in that, Also includes: If the destinations of all faulty trains are known and the autonomous sensing systems of all faulty trains are available, all faulty trains will operate in the first control mode, locking the entire train section as a fault area, and processing a downgraded route from the last faulty train.

10. The train control method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The train control method also includes: When the vehicle-to-ground communication system fails and the autonomous sensing system is ineffective, the train operates in a second control mode. In the second control mode, the automatic protection system of the train only performs train speed limit control and train overspeed protection control.

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