Anti-fleeing-reading management method based on RFID storage cabinet and electronic equipment

Abstract

The invention discloses an anti-fleeing-reading management method based on an RFID storage cabinet and an electronic device, the method is applied to the RFID storage cabinet, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining first cabinet grid data corresponding to a first target cabinet grid, obtaining first data corresponding to all other cabinet grids except the first target cabinet grid, and opening the first target cabinet grid; whether the first target cabinet grid is closed or not is judged, and if yes, the first target cabinet grid is scanned to obtain first scanning data; calculating first difference set data between the first scanning data and the first data; calculating second difference set data between the first cabinet grid data and the first difference set data; and displaying an access result of the first target cabinet cell according to the second difference set data. Compared with the prior art, the electronic tag channeling reading problem can be logically solved, and compared with a physical scheme for solving the channeling reading problem, physical transformation does not need to be carried out on the cabinet grids, the channeling reading problem is solved, and meanwhile the weight of the whole cabinet body can be smaller, and the cost is lower.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to counter goods management, and in particular to an anti-counterfeiting management method and electronic device based on RFID safes. Background Technology

[0002] RFID storage lockers are now widely used for storing items in various scenarios. However, there is a problem of misreading tags from other compartments when reading tags on the lockers. To ensure the accuracy of tag reading in each compartment of the RFID storage locker, related technologies usually solve the problem of cross-reading during single-compartment scanning through physical solutions, such as adding various anti-interference layers to the metal partitions of the compartments or increasing the airtightness to prevent radio frequency signals from leaking out of the compartments. However, this approach not only increases costs and the weight of the storage locker, but also makes the locker door more difficult to open due to the increased airtightness. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an anti-tampering management method and electronic device based on RFID storage cabinets to solve the problem of compartment tampering.

[0004] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: A method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based safe deposit boxes, applied to RFID safe deposit boxes, the method comprising: Obtain the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet, and obtain the first data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the first target cabinet, and open the first target cabinet; Determine whether the first target cabinet is closed; if so, scan the first target cabinet to obtain the first scan data. Calculate the first difference set data between the first scan data and the first data; Calculate the second difference set data between the first cabinet data and the first difference set data; The second difference set data shows the access results of the first target cabinet.

[0005] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, another technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: An electronic device further includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the above-described method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based safes.

[0006] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: When accessing a target cabinet, by acquiring the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet (i.e., the state before access) and acquiring the first data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the first target cabinet, the first target cabinet is scanned after being closed to obtain the first scan data. Since there is a possibility of data misreading when scanning the first target cabinet, by calculating the first difference data between the first scan data and the first data, the misread data in the first scan data can be removed, thereby obtaining the actual state of the first target cabinet after access. Then, the second difference data between the first cabinet data and the first difference data is calculated to obtain the true access state change result of the first cabinet data. This can logically solve the problem of electronic tag misreading. Compared with solving the misreading problem through physical solutions, this invention does not require physical modification of the cabinet. While solving the misreading problem, it can also make the weight of the entire cabinet smaller and the cost lower. Attached Figure Description

[0007] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of an RFID-based safekeeping cabinet anti-tampering management method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the interactive process of an anti-tampering management method based on an RFID storage cabinet according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a single-cabinet operation in an RFID-based anti-counterfeiting management method for safekeeping cabinets, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of multi-cabinet operation in an RFID-based safekeeping cabinet anti-counterfeiting management method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0008] To explain in detail the technical content, objectives, and effects of the present invention, the following description is provided in conjunction with the embodiments and accompanying drawings.

[0009] Definitions:

[0010] To address the issue of cross-reading in RFID storage lockers, related technologies typically employ physical solutions to mitigate this problem during single-cell scanning. These solutions include adding various anti-interference layers to the metal partitions of the lockers or increasing airtightness to prevent radio frequency signals from leaking out. For example, patent application number 202320279798.2 discloses a signal shielding structure for RFID smart lockers, comprising a locker body and a door. One end of the door is movably connected to one side of the locker body, shielding the interior. The door includes an aluminum profile frame, a conductive cotton assembly, and a transparent shielding assembly. The conductive cotton assembly is fixedly connected to one side of the aluminum profile frame, and the transparent shielding assembly is fixedly connected to the other side of the aluminum profile frame, shielding the locker body. Closing the door compresses the conductive cotton assembly, causing it to adhere to the locker body and form an RFID signal shield between the door and the locker body. However, this method not only increases cost and locker weight but also makes the door difficult to open due to the increased airtightness.

[0011] Alternatively, a multi-antenna array embedded in a partition can be used to precisely control the signal coverage within a single compartment, reducing magnetic field overlap between adjacent compartments. Or, a directional antenna can be used to focus the electromagnetic wave radiation direction, effectively suppressing signal spillover to non-target compartments. Combined with the shielding effect of the metal partition, this further reduces the probability of misreading. However, this approach aims to suppress signal spillover to non-target compartments but cannot completely eliminate it, thus failing to completely resolve the issue of cross-reading. It also presents problems such as increased cost and installation difficulties. Furthermore, while adding shielding materials or adjusting the structure ultimately aims to improve shielding effectiveness, it cannot completely shield electromagnetic information, therefore failing to completely eliminate the possibility of cross-reading.

[0012] In terms of software algorithms, if FDMA / TDMA hybrid anti-collision technology is used, independent frequency bands need to be allocated to different cabinets to avoid signal superposition interference from multiple readers, and reader working time slots need to be dynamically allocated to ensure that readers in adjacent cabinets are activated in a time-division manner. However, the number of cabinets is limited by the number of available frequency bands. Metal shelves may reflect cross-frequency signals, resulting in residual cross-frequency readings. Furthermore, the reflection from the metal cabinet causes signal diffraction, and residual cross-frequency interference may still activate tags in adjacent cabinets. At the same time, this solution requires increasing the reader power (e.g., from 1W to 2W) to cover the corners of the cabinets, but strong signals can penetrate the partitions and interfere with adjacent frequency bands, making it difficult to guarantee accuracy.

[0013] Meanwhile, the identification of stored or retrieved items relies on a "tunnel reader." Since the tag needs to be pulled through the "tunnel reader" to sense its direction of movement, sufficient space must be provided within the cabinet for the reader to detect it. Otherwise, if items are placed directly at the cabinet entrance and taken away immediately, the process of passing through the "tunnel reader" is skipped, leading to lower identification accuracy. Therefore, this identification method limits the storage space within the cabinets.

[0014] To address the aforementioned technical issues, this invention provides an anti-tampering management method and electronic device based on RFID storage cabinets. By standardizing the usage steps of RFID storage cabinets and combining programs and databases for calculation and data recording, the invention solves the problem of chaotic management of tagged items caused by RFID tampering, while also enabling the cabinet compartments of RFID storage cabinets to support the storage of more tags.

[0015] Please refer to Figure 1 A method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based safe deposit boxes, applied to RFID safe deposit boxes, the method comprising: Obtain the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet, and obtain the first data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the first target cabinet, and open the first target cabinet; Determine whether the first target cabinet is closed; if so, scan the first target cabinet to obtain the first scan data. Calculate the first difference set data between the first scan data and the first data; Calculate the second difference set data between the first cabinet data and the first difference set data; The second difference set data shows the access results of the first target cabinet.

[0016] As described above, the beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: When accessing a target cabinet, by acquiring the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet (i.e., the state before access) and acquiring the first data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the first target cabinet, the first target cabinet is scanned after being closed to obtain the first scan data. Since there is a possibility of data misreading when scanning the first target cabinet, by calculating the first difference between the first scan data and the first data, the misread data in the first scan data can be removed, thereby obtaining the actual state of the first target cabinet after access. Subsequently, the second difference between the first cabinet data and the first difference data is calculated to obtain the true access state change result of the first cabinet data. This can logically solve the problem of electronic tag misreading. Compared with solving the misreading problem through physical solutions, this invention does not require physical modification of the cabinet. While solving the misreading problem, it can also make the weight of the entire cabinet smaller and the cost lower. In one embodiment of this application, after calculating the second difference data between the first cabinet data and the first difference data, the method further includes: Determine whether the second difference set data is an empty set; if so, cancel the operation on the target cabinet. If not, then update the second difference set data to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet.

[0017] As described above, when the second difference set is determined to be empty, it indicates that no actual operation has been performed on the first target cabinet. By canceling the operation on the target cabinet, the storage data corresponding to the first target cabinet can be avoided. When the second difference set is determined to be not empty, it indicates that an actual operation has been performed on the target cabinet. By updating the second difference set to the data of the first cabinet corresponding to the first target cabinet, the current storage result is ensured to be updated in the first target cabinet.

[0018] In one embodiment of this application, after displaying the access result of the first target cabinet based on the second difference set data, the method further includes: Determine whether a verification pass instruction has been received. If not, re-execute the step of opening the first target cabinet.

[0019] As described above, after displaying the access result of the first target cabinet, the displayed access result is further checked against the actual operation. If the check fails, the first target cabinet is reopened. That is, the first target cabinet needs to be re-identified to avoid discrepancies between the access result and the actual operation.

[0020] In one embodiment of this application, calculating the second difference set data between the first cabinet data and the first difference set data includes: Remove the data in the first cabinet data that is the same as the first difference set data to obtain the extracted data; Remove the data in the first difference set that is the same as the data in the first cabinet to obtain the data to be stored.

[0021] As described above, by removing the data in the first cabinet that is the same as the data in the first difference set, the remaining data is the data corresponding to the currently retrieved item; by removing the data in the first difference set that is the same as the data in the first cabinet, the remaining data is the data corresponding to the currently stored item, thus automatically identifying the storage and retrieval status.

[0022] In one embodiment of this application, after displaying the access result of the first target cabinet based on the second difference set data, the method further includes: If a second target cabinet exists, then the operation is performed on the second target cabinet; otherwise, the second difference set data is updated to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet.

[0023] As described above, after completing the operation on the first target cabinet, it is further determined whether there is a second target cabinet. If there is a second target cabinet, the operation on the second target cabinet continues. If there is no second target cabinet, the operation ends and the first target cabinet is updated.

[0024] In one embodiment of this application, the operation on the second target cabinet includes: Obtain the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet, and obtain the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet, and open the second target cabinet; Determine whether the second target cabinet is closed; if so, scan the second target cabinet to obtain the second scan data. Calculate the third difference data between the second scan data and the second data; Calculate the fourth difference data between the second cabinet data and the second difference data; The access results of the second target cabinet are shown based on the fourth difference set data.

[0025] As described above, by obtaining the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet and the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet, and by calculating the third difference between the second scan data and the second data, the data read in the second scan data can be removed, thereby obtaining the actual access status of the second target cabinet.

[0026] In one embodiment of this application, obtaining the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet includes: The second data is obtained based on the second difference set data and the data of all other cabinets except the second target cabinet.

[0027] As described above, when acquiring the data corresponding to the second target cabinet, since the access results of the first target cabinet have not yet been saved, the data of all other cabinets will include the data of the first target cabinet before it was updated. Therefore, the data of all other cabinets currently acquired can be processed by the second difference set data to obtain the second data actually corresponding to all other cabinets except the second target cabinet.

[0028] In one embodiment of this application, the operation on the second target cabinet further includes: Update the second difference set data with the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet; Update the fourth difference set data to the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet.

[0029] As described above, updating the first and second target cabinets after completing the operation on the second target cabinet, i.e., after completing the operation on all cabinets, can prevent the database from being contaminated by the access results of the electronic tags in a single cabinet due to unexpected events such as power outages.

[0030] In one embodiment of this application, after displaying the access result of the second target cabinet based on the fourth difference set data, the method further includes: Determine whether the fourth difference set data is an empty set. If it is, then execute the step of displaying the access result of the first target cabinet based on the second difference set data.

[0031] As described above, when the fourth difference set data is determined to be empty, the process returns to the step of executing the storage and retrieval results of the first target cabinet based on the data from the second difference set. This allows the user to cancel the current multi-cabinet electronic tag transfer operation if they wish to return to the cabinet door step if the stored and retrieved electronic tags are inconsistent, and put back the retrieved or stored electronic tags. When entering the verification stage, if both the retrieved and stored electronic tag sets are empty, it indicates that no electronic tags have been stored or retrieved. The user can then choose to return to the verification interface of the previous cabinet and repeat the same operation until all cabinets are restored to their initial state, at which point the multi-cabinet electronic tag transfer operation can be canceled.

[0032] Another embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, which further includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the above-described method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based safes.

[0033] One embodiment of the present invention is as follows: Please refer to Figure 1 A method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based safe deposit boxes, applied to RFID safe deposit boxes, the method comprising: S1. Obtain the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet, and obtain the first data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the first target cabinet, and open the first target cabinet. S2. Determine whether the first target cabinet is closed. If so, scan the first target cabinet to obtain the first scan data. S3. Calculate the first difference set data between the first scan data and the first data; S4. Calculate the second difference set data between the first cabinet data and the first difference set data. Specifically: remove the data in the first cabinet data that is the same as the first difference set data to obtain the retrieved data; remove the data in the first difference set data that is the same as the first cabinet data to obtain the stored data.

[0034] S5. The access result of the first target cabinet is displayed based on the second difference set data. After displaying the access result, it is further determined whether a verification success instruction has been received. If not, the opening of the first target cabinet is re-executed; that is, the user can determine whether the displayed storage result is consistent with the operation. At the same time, it is further determined whether the second difference set data is an empty set. If so, the operation on the target cabinet is canceled; if not, the second difference set data is updated to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet.

[0035] S6. If a second target cabinet exists, then the second target cabinet is operated on; otherwise, the second difference set data is updated to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet. The operation on the second target cabinet includes: S61. Obtain the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet, and obtain the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet, and open the second target cabinet. Since the operation on the first target cabinet has not been updated when dealing with the second target cabinet, when obtaining the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet, it is necessary to obtain the second data based on the second difference set data and the data of all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet. The actual second data can be obtained during subsequent set calculations.

[0036] S62. Determine whether the second target cabinet is closed. If so, scan the second target cabinet to obtain the second scan data. S63. Calculate the third difference data between the second scan data and the second data; S64. Calculate the fourth difference data between the second cabinet data and the second difference data; S65. The access result of the second target cabinet is displayed according to the fourth difference set data. After the operation of the second target cabinet is completed, the user can determine whether the displayed storage result is consistent with the operation; then determine whether the fourth difference set data is an empty set. If so, the access result of the first target cabinet is displayed according to the second difference set data. Subsequently, after the operation is completed, the second difference set data is updated to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet; and the fourth difference set data is updated to the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet.

[0037] To illustrate the above steps, this embodiment provides a specific application scenario. Please refer to... Figure 2This example illustrates the storage and retrieval of electronic tags in a single cabinet and the transfer of electronic tags between two cabinets; the transfer of electronic tags in multi-cabinet cabinets is similar. Consider an RFID storage cabinet with two rows, two cabinets per row, for a total of four cabinets. Each cabinet is equipped with an RFID scanner, and each cabinet has a door with an electric lock. All electric locks are connected to a single electric lock control board. The RFID scanner and the electric lock control board are connected to a smart terminal. The smart terminal is connected to a touchscreen display mounted on the cabinet for user operation. The smart terminal contains the cabinet's main control program, a database, and a front-end display page. The front-end display page communicates with the cabinet's main control program via a local WebSocket. The database records the electronic tag data in each cabinet and the corresponding cabinet where it is stored, thus indicating which electronic tags are present in each cabinet.

[0038] Taking the example of placing 3 electronic tags in each of compartments 1 to 3, with the tags numbered sequentially from 101 to 109 (e.g., tags 101, 102, and 103 in compartment 1), as an example, the database records the current tag storage status for each compartment. Additionally, tag 110 remains unstored for future use. For ease of description, 101-1 will be used below to represent tag 101 in compartment 1, and the sets described below will be calculated using the tag numbers as elements.

[0039] Please refer to Figure 3 Taking the selection of cabinet 1 for storing and retrieving electronic tags in a single cabinet as an example, the process sequence is as follows: Step 1a: The user first selects to store electronic tags in a single cabinet on the touch screen. After the cabinet is displayed at the front, such as selecting cabinet 1.

[0040] Step 2a: The cabinet main control program retrieves the electronic tag data set A stored in cabinet 1 from the database, resulting in A{101-1, 102-1, 103-1}. It also retrieves the electronic tag data set B stored in other cabinets, resulting in B{104-2, 105-2, 106-2, 107-3, 108-3, 109-3}. After completing the data acquisition, the cabinet main control program controls cabinet 1 to open the cabinet door's electric lock, and monitors the lock's on / off status in cabinet 1 in real time. This is equivalent to executing step S1 above.

[0041] After the door of compartment 1 is opened, the user performs the operation of storing and retrieving electronic tags. For example, storing electronic tag 110 and retrieving electronic tag 101, the user then closes the door.

[0042] Step 3a: After the main control program of the cabinet detects that the lock switch of cabinet 1 is closed, it controls the RFID scanner to start the antenna module in cabinet 1 to scan and obtain the electronic tag data set C. Taking the electronic tag 104 in cabinet 2 as an example, the result is C{102-1, 103-1, 104-1, 110-1}. That is, the above-mentioned S2 is executed.

[0043] Step 4a: Calculate the difference D between set C and set B, i.e., CB, resulting in D{102-1, 103-1, 110-1}. This removes the tampered electronic tag 104 and obtains the electronic tag data currently actually stored in cabinet 1. This is equivalent to executing step S3 above.

[0044] Step 5a: Calculate the difference E between set D and set A, i.e., DA, with the result E{110-1}; simultaneously calculate the difference F between set A and the difference D, i.e., AD, with the result F{101-1}. That is, execute step S4 above.

[0045] Step 6a: Based on the calculation results of step 5a, the result of storing the electronic tag is E{110-1}, and the result of retrieving the electronic tag is F{101-1}. That is, execute step S5 above.

[0046] Step 7a: The main control program of the cabinet displays the stored electronic tags and the retrieved electronic tags on the touch screen. The user verifies and confirms them. If the verification is correct, the main control program controls the database to delete electronic tag 101-1 from cabinet set F and add electronic tag 110-1 to cabinet set E.

[0047] If the user finds the discrepancy after verification, they can choose to return to the cabinet door opening step to repeat the above subsequent procedures if the electronic tag does not match.

[0048] If a user wishes to cancel the single-cabinet electronic tag access operation, they can select the step of opening the cabinet door to return to the step of inconsistent access to electronic tags, put back the retrieved or stored electronic tags, that is, put back electronic tag 101 and take out electronic tag 110, and continue the subsequent process until the verification is displayed. At this time, the difference set E and the difference set F will both be empty sets, that is, no electronic tags have been accessed, and then the single-cabinet electronic tag access operation can be canceled.

[0049] Please refer to Figure 4 Taking the sequential selection of cabinet 1 and cabinet 2 for the transfer of electronic tags between multiple cabinets as an example, and continuing with the status after the above storage and retrieval operation is completed in cabinet 1, i.e., cabinet 1 contains 102-1, 103-1, and 110-1, the process sequence is as follows: Step 1b: The user first selects to store electronic tags in multiple cabinets on the touch screen. After the cabinets are displayed at the front, such as selecting cabinet 1.

[0050] Step 2b: The cabinet main control program retrieves the electronic tag data set G stored in cabinet 1 from the database, resulting in G{102-1, 103-1, 110-1}. It also retrieves the electronic tag data set H stored in other cabinets, resulting in H{104-2, 105-2, 106-2, 107-3, 108-3, 109-3}. After completing the data acquisition, the cabinet main control program controls cabinet 1 to open the cabinet door's electric lock, and monitors the lock's on / off status in cabinet 1 in real time. This is equivalent to executing step S1 above.

[0051] After the door is opened, the user performs the operation of storing and retrieving electronic tags. Here, we take retrieving electronic tag 110 as an example, and then closes the cabinet door.

[0052] Step 3b: After the main control program of the cabinet detects that the lock switch of cabinet 1 is closed, it scans and obtains the electronic tag data set I. Taking the electronic tag 104 of cabinet 2 as an example, the result is I{102-1, 103-1, 104-1}. That is, the above-mentioned S2 is executed.

[0053] Step 4b: Calculate the difference J between set I and set H, resulting in J{102-1, 103-1}; this removes the tampered data 104, yielding the actual electronic tag data currently stored in compartment 1. This is equivalent to executing step S3 above.

[0054] Step 5b: Calculate the difference K between set J and set G, which is empty; and calculate the difference L between set G and set J, which is J{110-1}. That is, execute S4 above.

[0055] Step 6b: Based on the calculation results of step 5a, the result of storing the electronic tag is an empty set, and the result of retrieving the electronic tag is F{110-1}, that is, electronic tag 110 is retrieved from cabinet 1.

[0056] Step 7a: Since there is currently only one cabinet 1, the statistical results of the transfer of electronic tags from all cabinets are counted. The set of retrieved electronic tags L and the set of stored electronic tags K are then displayed on the touch screen. The user verifies and confirms the data. After verification, the user proceeds to the next cabinet. If the user finds the data incorrect, they select "Inconsistent Storage and Retrieval of Electronic Tags" and return to the cabinet door opening step to repeat the above subsequent processes.

[0057] After verifying that everything is correct, the user selects "Next" and then selects the next cabinet 2 where the electronic tag transfer needs to be performed.

[0058] Step 8b: The cabinet main control program retrieves the electronic tag data set M stored in cabinet 2 from the database, resulting in M{104-2, 105-2, 106-2}, and also retrieves the electronic tag data stored in other cabinets, hereinafter referred to as set N, resulting in N{102-1, 103-1, 110-1, 107-3, 108-3, 109-3}. After completing the data acquisition, the cabinet main control program controls cabinet 2 to open the cabinet door's electric lock, and monitors the lock's on / off status in cabinet 2 in real time. This is equivalent to executing step S61 above.

[0059] After the door is opened, the user retrieves the electronic tag. Here, we take retrieving electronic tag 106 and storing it in electronic tag 110 as an example, and then closes the cabinet door.

[0060] Step 9b: After the main control program of the cabinet detects that the lock switch of cabinet 2 is closed, it scans and obtains the electronic tag data set O. Taking the electronic tag 107 of cabinet 3 as an example, the result is O{104-2, 105-2, 107-2, 110-2}. That is, the above-mentioned S62 is executed.

[0061] Step 10b: Calculate (NL)∪K to obtain set P, resulting in P{102-1, 103-1, 107-3, 108-3, 109-3}. Set P represents the electronic tag data of all cabinets except cabinet 2. Then, calculate the difference Q between set O and set P, resulting in Q{104-2, 105-2, 110-2}, thus removing the tampered data 107 and obtaining the electronic tag data currently actually stored in cabinet 2. This is equivalent to executing step S63 above.

[0062] Step 11b: Calculate the difference R between set Q and set M, resulting in R{110-2}; and calculate the difference S between set M and set Q, resulting in S{106-2}. That is, execute S64 as described above.

[0063] Step 12b: Based on the calculation structure of step 11b, the storage and retrieval results are: electronic tag 110 stored in cabinet 2, and electronic tag 106 retrieved from cabinet 2. That is, execute S65 as described above. Subsequently, the cabinet main control program displays the stored electronic tag 110 and the retrieved electronic tag 106 on the touch screen for user verification. If the user confirms that there are no errors, the statistical results of the transfer of electronic tags in all cabinets can be calculated: that is, the set T of retrieved electronic tags is S∪(LR), and the result is retrieved electronic tag 106-2; the set U of stored electronic tags is R∪K, and the result is stored electronic tag 110-2.

[0064] Then, the main control program of the cabinet controls the database to delete the electronic tag data of set F, that is, delete electronic tag 106-2, and change the electronic tag data of set E, that is, change 110-1 to 110-2. If the user finds that there is a discrepancy after verification, they can choose to return to the step of opening the cabinet door due to the inconsistency of stored and retrieved electronic tags, and repeat the above subsequent process. If the user wishes to cancel the current multi-cabinet electronic tag transfer operation, they can select "Inconsistent Storage and Retrieval of Electronic Tags" to return to the "Open Cabinet Door" step, put back the retrieved or stored electronic tags (i.e., put back electronic tag 106 and take out electronic tag 110), then close the door and continue. When entering the verification stage, both difference set T and difference set U will be empty, indicating that no electronic tags have been stored. The user can then select "Previous Operation" to return to the verification interface of the previous cabinet 1, select "Inconsistent Storage and Retrieval of Electronic Tags" to return to the "Open Cabinet Door" step, put back the retrieved or stored electronic tags (i.e., put back electronic tag 110), then close the door and continue. When entering the verification stage, both difference set L and difference set L will be empty, indicating that no electronic tags have been stored. The user can then choose to cancel the multi-cabinet electronic tag transfer operation.

[0065] The transfer logic for the electronic tags in other cabinets is the same as that for cabinet 2. After all cabinet operations are completed, the main control program controls the database to delete the final statistical set of retrieved electronic tag data, and to add or change the final statistical set of stored electronic tag data.

[0066] It is important to emphasize that the access to single-cell electronic tags cannot replace the transfer of all multi-cell electronic tags. In other words, the transfer of electronic tags between multiple cells must be broken down into multiple single-cell electronic tag storage operations. Firstly, the completion marker for single-cell electronic tag access is recording the access result in the database. The completion marker for multi-cell electronic tag transfer is recording the final electronic tag transfer result in the database. This distinction is necessary because the results of the multi-cell electronic tag transfer process—specifically, the access results of single-cell electronic tags—must not be updated in the database to ensure the consistency of the entire multi-cell electronic tag transfer process. That is, the entire multi-cell electronic tag transfer process only has two states: completed and incomplete. If completed, the final electronic tag transfer result is recorded in the database. If incomplete, the previous multi-cell electronic tag transfer operations can be restored by reversing the process. This also prevents database contamination caused by single-cell electronic tag access results in unexpected situations such as power outages. In case of unforeseen circumstances, after restarting, the original tag status of each cabinet can be restored by reversing the original process of transferring electronic tags between multiple cabinets through the storage and retrieval operation of the electronic tags in a single cabinet.

[0067] Taking the use of RFID lockers by banks to store important documents as an example: If teller A owns compartment 1 and teller B owns compartment 2, and an important document from teller A needs to be transferred to teller B for business purposes, an electronic tag transfer between multiple compartments should be performed to move the important document from compartment 1 to compartment 2. This ensures the system records the transfer of important documents between the tellers and the compartments. However, if two single-compartment transactions are performed, teller A will retrieve the important document from compartment 1, hand it to teller B in an unsupervised location, and then teller B will store it in compartment 2. This cannot be monitored by the system.

[0068] The following is an example of an unexpected situation encountered during two single-counter access transactions: After teller A retrieved an important document from counter 1 (i.e., completed the first counter operation and stored the retrieved important document data in the database), a sudden equipment failure caused the system to restart. At this time, because the previous transaction was not completed, the complete record of the important document moving from counter 1 to counter 2, and from teller A to teller B, was not recorded by the system. However, since the single-counter operation had been completed and the items stored in the counter matched the database, it was impossible to check for the missing important document. Therefore, this important document was retrieved by teller A.

[0069] Since multi-cabinet operations do not modify the database in the middle, after a sudden accident recovery, the items in the entire cabinet can be scanned and compared with the database to ensure that the items are in normal condition. If missing items are found, they can be automatically detected and the restoration process can be initiated to restore them.

[0070] Please refer to Figure 5 An electronic device, the electronic device further comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the above-described method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based safe deposit boxes.

[0071] In summary, this invention discloses an anti-cross-read management method and electronic device based on RFID storage lockers. When accessing a target locker, the method acquires the first locker data (the state before access) corresponding to the first target locker, as well as the first data corresponding to all other lockers. After the first target locker is closed, it is scanned to obtain the first scan data. Since cross-reading is possible during scanning of the first target locker, the cross-read data can be removed by calculating the first difference between the first scan data and the first data, thus obtaining the actual state of the first target locker after access. Subsequently, the second difference between the first locker data and the first difference data is calculated to obtain the true change in the access state of the first locker data. This logically solves the management chaos caused by cross-reading in RFID storage lockers and the difficulty in restoring the correct state after chaos, enabling RFID storage lockers to better support the ability of a single locker to store a large number of electronic tags. Furthermore, compared to solutions requiring multiple RFID scanners to scan whether electronic tags have been removed or returned, this invention occupies less space and weight, and has lower costs. Compared to solutions that involve adjusting the cabinet structure or adding electromagnetic signal blocking materials to the cabinet compartments, the solution of this invention results in a lighter overall cabinet, lower cost, and simpler installation.

[0072] The above description is merely an embodiment of the present invention and does not limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent modifications made based on the content of the present invention's specification and drawings, or direct or indirect applications in related technical fields, are similarly included within the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based storage cabinets, characterized in that, The method, applied to RFID safe deposit boxes, includes: Obtain the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet, and obtain the first data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the first target cabinet, and open the first target cabinet; Determine whether the first target cabinet is closed; if so, scan the first target cabinet to obtain the first scan data. Calculate the first difference set data between the first scan data and the first data; Calculate the second difference set data between the first cabinet data and the first difference set data; The second difference set data shows the access results of the first target cabinet.

2. The anti-tampering management method based on RFID storage cabinet according to claim 1, characterized in that, After calculating the second difference data between the first cabinet data and the first difference data, the method further includes: Determine whether the second difference set data is an empty set; if so, cancel the operation on the target cabinet. If not, then update the second difference set data to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet.

3. The method for preventing unauthorized reading of RFID-based storage cabinets according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of displaying the access result of the first target cabinet based on the second difference set data further includes: Determine whether a verification pass instruction has been received. If not, re-execute the step of opening the first target cabinet.

4. The anti-tampering management method based on RFID storage cabinet according to claim 1, characterized in that, The calculation of the second difference set data between the first cabinet data and the first difference set data includes: Remove the data in the first cabinet data that is the same as the first difference set data to obtain the extracted data; Remove the data in the first difference set that is the same as the data in the first cabinet to obtain the data to be stored.

5. The anti-tampering management method based on RFID storage cabinet according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of displaying the access result of the first target cabinet based on the second difference set data further includes: If a second target cabinet exists, then the operation is performed on the second target cabinet; otherwise, the second difference set data is updated to the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet.

6. The anti-tampering management method based on RFID storage cabinet according to claim 5, characterized in that, The operation on the second target cabinet includes: Obtain the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet, and obtain the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet, and open the second target cabinet; Determine whether the second target cabinet is closed; if so, scan the second target cabinet to obtain the second scan data. Calculate the third difference data between the second scan data and the second data; Calculate the fourth difference data between the second cabinet data and the second difference data; The access results of the second target cabinet are shown based on the fourth difference set data.

7. The anti-tampering management method based on RFID storage cabinet according to claim 6, characterized in that, The step of obtaining the second data corresponding to all other cabinets besides the second target cabinet includes: The second data is obtained based on the second difference set data and the data of all other cabinets except the second target cabinet.

8. The anti-counterfeiting management method for RFID-based safe deposit boxes according to claim 6, characterized in that, The operation on the second target cabinet also includes: Update the second difference set data with the first cabinet data corresponding to the first target cabinet; Update the fourth difference set data to the second cabinet data corresponding to the second target cabinet.

9. The anti-counterfeiting management method for RFID-based safe deposit boxes according to claim 6, characterized in that, The process of displaying the access result of the second target cabinet based on the fourth difference set data further includes: Determine whether the fourth difference set data is an empty set. If it is, then execute the step of displaying the access result of the first target cabinet based on the second difference set data.

10. An electronic device, the electronic device further comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements each step of the anti-tampering management method for RFID-based safe deposit boxes as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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