Microcontroller-based method for resource isolation and data security assurance of android container

Abstract

The application discloses a microcontroller-based Android container resource isolation and data security guarantee method, relates to the field of hardware-assisted embedded container security technology, and comprises the following steps: loading a special firmware to build a transparent isolation layer on a microcontroller; generating a dynamic resource configuration vector in response to an application startup request and writing the vector into a non-volatile register group, locking the physical access paths of processor cache channels, memory bandwidth and peripheral interfaces; splitting a data stream into transmission frames with encryption labels when cross-container data interaction occurs, and routing the transmission frames to target containers through a hardware bus arbitrator; monitoring the space-time correlation of container kernel instruction streams and peripheral level jumps, freezing the container clock domain when the security model is violated, and triggering a hardware interrupt to perform state snapshot forensics; and sending a specific pulse sequence to a memory particle to trigger capacitor active discharge and reset the processor branch predictor history record when the container is terminated. The application realizes the resource exclusivity, data security and threat defense capability of the Android container.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of hardware-assisted embedded container security technology, and in particular to a method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers. Background Technology

[0002] In mobile computing environments, while Android container technology can enable multiple applications to coexist on the same device through software-level isolation mechanisms, it still has fundamental shortcomings in resource management and data interaction.

[0003] First, the weakening of resource isolation is a particularly prominent issue. Currently, Android containers primarily rely on the isolation capabilities provided by the operating system kernel; however, critical hardware resources such as processor cores, memory, and storage space are still shared by multiple containers. This sharing mechanism leads to a significant performance degradation in adjacent containers when a malicious container continuously occupies processor cycles or exhausts memory bandwidth, potentially even triggering system crashes due to resource depletion. More seriously, the storage spaces between containers are not physically isolated. Malicious containers can exploit vulnerabilities in logically isolated areas to read sensitive data from other containers, posing a serious threat to user privacy and system security.

[0004] Secondly, the data interaction security mechanisms are significantly inadequate. Communication between containers primarily relies on the operating system kernel for forwarding, but the kernel itself may contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious programs, leading to unauthorized interception or tampering of data during transmission. Existing encryption schemes mostly only operate at the application layer and cannot cover scenarios involving direct memory sharing between containers, leaving core data such as keys and biometrics exposed to risks during interaction.

[0005] To address these issues, existing solutions primarily focus on software-level optimization, such as strengthening access control policies or introducing virtualization isolation technology. However, these solutions are still limited by the operating system's scheduling mechanism, making it impossible to implement fine-grained management of hardware resources such as processor instruction cycles and memory bus bandwidth, and also difficult to achieve hardware-level encryption acceleration during data interaction. Although microcontrollers possess real-time resource scheduling capabilities in industrial control, their application in mobile container scenarios still faces the challenge of adapting hardware isolation units to the Android runtime environment, while lacking a rapid response mechanism for the dynamic creation and destruction of containers.

[0006] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a solution that can deeply integrate hardware-level resource isolation and software-level security strategies to bridge the gap between Android containers in terms of resource contention defense and trusted data interaction, thereby improving the security and stability of the mobile computing environment. Summary of the Invention

[0007] In view of this, the present invention proposes a microcontroller-based method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers, in order to solve the problems of weak resource isolation and insecure data interaction in existing technologies.

[0008] The specific technical solution of this invention is as follows: The microcontroller-based Android container resource isolation and data security methods include: A transparent isolation layer is built by loading dedicated firmware on the microcontroller, enabling the Android container operating system to be aware of exclusive hardware resources; In response to the application startup request, a dynamic resource configuration vector is generated and written to the non-volatile register set, locking the processor cache channel, memory bandwidth, and physical access path of peripheral interfaces; When interacting with other containers, the data stream is split into transmission frames with encrypted tags, which are then routed to the target container via a hardware bus arbitrator and the integrity of the tags is verified. Monitor the spatiotemporal correlation between container kernel instruction stream and peripheral level transitions; freeze the container clock domain and trigger a hardware interrupt to perform state snapshot evidence when the security model is violated. When the container terminates, a specific pulse sequence is sent to the memory chips to trigger active capacitor discharge and reset the processor branch predictor history.

[0009] Specifically, building a transparent isolation layer includes: modifying the address mapping rules between the processor core and the memory controller during the physical boot phase through the microcontroller, dividing the physical memory into independent logical partitions for exclusive use by the container; and having the address remapping unit intercept container memory requests and remap them to the logical partitions to block unauthorized access paths.

[0010] Specifically, dynamic resource allocation vector generation includes: extracting the application's unique identifier, code hash value, and resource quota descriptor, and combining them with processor load status, memory distribution bitmap, peripheral bandwidth utilization, and environmental security metrics as input; generating a unique vector through a cryptographic algorithm and atomically writing it into a non-volatile register set to lock the hardware access path.

[0011] Specifically, cross-container data interaction includes intercepting the data stream and splitting it into transmission frames; embedding an encrypted tag derived from the resource configuration vector into the frame header; verifying the tag's validity through a bus arbiter and routing it to the target container; and reconstructing the data stream after the target container verifies the tag's integrity.

[0012] Specifically, monitoring and response include collecting the frequency of kernel privileged instruction calls and the timestamps of peripheral interface level transitions; calculating the co-occurrence probability of instruction streams and level transitions; freezing the container clock domain if the security model threshold is exceeded; and triggering a trusted execution environment to take a snapshot of memory and register states for evidence via physical pin interrupt signals.

[0013] Specifically, the cryptographic algorithm uses an elliptic curve key derivation function, with application identifiers and security timestamps as key materials, and generates a vector by combining the processor branch misprediction rate; the vector is divided into multiple parts and directly written into the shadow registers of the processor cache controller, memory controller and peripheral control unit.

[0014] Specifically, the bus arbiter is built into the crossbar switch of the data bus and resolves the target container identifier through the content addressable memory; it uses the Galois counter mode to generate encrypted tags for the transmission frame, and the dedicated integrated circuit completes tag verification and port switching within a nanosecond delay.

[0015] Specifically, locking the physical access path of the peripheral interface is done by disabling the physical pin level driving capability of the unauthorized peripheral interface based on the peripheral access token field in the vector.

[0016] Specifically, the specific pulse sequence is a non-standard refresh command sequence for dynamic random access memory, which accelerates capacitor discharge through overvoltage operation, causing irreversible loss of data bits; and applies a combination of programming and erasing voltages that exceed specifications to flash memory chips, inducing oxide layer damage.

[0017] Specifically, resetting the processor branch predictor history includes: clearing the historical branch target address cache and pattern history table contents, and injecting a random branch instruction sequence pollution learning algorithm into the branch predictor. The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: 1. During the physical boot phase, the microcontroller loads dedicated firmware and builds a transparent isolation layer between the processor core and the memory controller, mapping the Android container runtime environment as an independent hardware logical partition. This allows the operating system inside the container to directly perceive and exclusively use hardware resources without modifying the operating system kernel code.

[0018] 2. In response to the application startup request within the container, the microcontroller generates a dynamic resource configuration vector in real time that is associated with the application's identity characteristics and runtime context, writes it into the non-volatile register group in the isolation layer, and locks the physical access paths of the processor cache channel, memory bandwidth, and peripheral interfaces to achieve exclusive resource locking.

[0019] 3. When an application within a container initiates cross-container data interaction, the microcontroller intercepts the data stream and splits it into independent transmission frames. Each frame embeds an encrypted tag derived from the resource configuration vector. The tagged data frame is routed to the target container through a hardware-level data bus arbitrator. The target container microcontroller reconstructs the data stream based on the tag integrity verification result, ensuring secure data transmission.

[0020] 4. The microcontroller continuously monitors the abnormal instruction stream of the container kernel and the level transition sequence of peripheral interfaces, performs spatiotemporal correlation analysis, and immediately freezes the current container clock domain if a violation of the preset security model is detected. At the same time, it triggers the trusted execution environment to take a snapshot of the container state for evidence by outputting a hardware interrupt signal through a physical pin, in order to deal with hardware-level attacks and complex threats.

[0021] 5. When the container is terminated, the microcontroller sends a specific pulse sequence to the memory chip to trigger the active discharge of the capacitor in the storage cell and resets the processor branch predictor history, ensuring that the container's operation traces are physically irreversible and protecting data security. Attached Figure Description

[0022] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0023] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the microcontroller-based Android container resource isolation and data security protection method of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0024] To make the technical problems to be solved, the technical solutions, and the beneficial effects of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0025] This invention proposes a microcontroller-based method for resource isolation and data security assurance in Android containers, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the specific implementation steps are as follows: Step 1: During the physical boot phase, the microcontroller loads dedicated firmware and builds a transparent isolation layer between the processor core and the memory controller. This isolation layer maps the Android container runtime environment as an independent hardware logical partition, allowing the operating system inside the container to directly perceive its exclusive hardware resources.

[0026] This method begins with hardware-level container initialization. During the physical boot phase, the microcontroller loads proprietary firmware stored in its internal read-only memory. This firmware includes microcode for configuring the interaction logic between the processor core and the system memory controller. By modifying the address mapping rules of memory access requests issued by the processor core, a transparent isolation layer is built on the physical path between the processor core and the memory controller. This isolation layer is invisible to the upper-level operating system software, and its core mechanism lies in utilizing the microcontroller's built-in address remapping unit. This unit divides the physical memory address space into several mutually isolated logical partitions according to a predefined partitioning strategy in the firmware. One of these logical partitions is specifically allocated to the Android container runtime environment. When the operating system kernel or application within the Android container initiates a memory access request, the physical address generated by the processor core is intercepted by the address remapping unit of the transparent isolation layer. This unit remaps the address to the corresponding physical address within the independent logical partition allocated to that container, based on the container identifier to which the address belongs, while simultaneously blocking access permissions to other container partitions. This hardware-level address remapping means that when the operating system within the Android container runtime environment performs memory probing and resource enumeration, it can only perceive the portion of physical memory resources corresponding to its exclusively owned logical partitions, thus creating the illusion at the hardware level that the container exclusively owns hardware resources. This exclusive perception is direct and requires no modification to the container operating system or loading of specific drivers.

[0027] In step 1, the transparent isolation layer can be implemented using various hardware architectures. For example, in one embodiment, the isolation layer directly utilizes the input / output memory management unit (I / O memory) built into modern processors. During the early stages of system startup, the microcontroller's dedicated firmware creates independent input / output page tables for each Android container via the processor configuration interface. These page tables are exclusively managed by the microcontroller and cannot be accessed or modified by the container's operating system. The I / O page tables precisely control the physical address range that memory access requests initiated by the operating system within the container can reach, achieving hardware-level isolation. In another embodiment, the transparent isolation layer is implemented using a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) external to the microcontroller. The FPGA is located between the processor bus and the memory controller, parses bus transactions in real time, dynamically rewrites the address signals in the transactions according to the container resource mapping table issued by the microcontroller, and converts illegal access transactions into bus error responses. In the third embodiment, the transparent isolation layer is integrated into a custom system-on-a-package chip. Through a dedicated interconnect network on the silicon interposer, the memory access channels of different containers are physically separated, realizing true physical partitioning. Regardless of the architecture used, the core goal is to ensure that the operating system in the Android container can only see the processor core logic number and memory address range allocated to it through standard CPU identification instructions or memory probe instructions during startup and runtime, thus forming a recognition of exclusive hardware resources without modifying the operating system kernel code.

[0028] Step 2: In response to the application startup request within the container, the microcontroller generates a dynamic resource configuration vector in real time that is associated with the application's identity characteristics and runtime context, and writes it synchronously into the non-volatile register group in the isolation layer to lock the physical access paths of the processor cache channel, memory bandwidth, and peripheral interfaces.

[0029] When an application launch request occurs within the Android container, the microcontroller immediately performs a dynamic resource fingerprint binding operation. In response to the application launch event notification transmitted by the container management framework via dedicated hardware signal lines or specific register bits in shared memory, the microcontroller first extracts the application's identity information from the notification. This information includes at least the application's unique identifier issued by the container operating system kernel, the application code's digital certificate hash value, and the initial resource quota descriptor requested by the application. Simultaneously, the microcontroller collects runtime context information in real time during application launch. This context information includes the current processor core load status quantization, the distribution bitmap of available physical memory pages, the list of currently active peripheral interfaces and their bandwidth utilization, and the current environment security metric provided by the system security chip. The microcontroller's built-in cryptographic coprocessor or secure execution environment uses the aforementioned application identity information and runtime context information as input parameters to run a dynamically generated algorithm. The algorithm first normalizes the input parameters, such as converting identifiers and hash values ​​into fixed-length bit strings, and normalizing quantized values ​​like load status, memory bitmap, and bandwidth utilization to a preset range. Then, it applies a cryptographic hash function or lightweight encryption algorithm with a random seed to generate a fixed-length dynamic resource configuration vector. This vector mathematically uniquely represents the specific resource requirements and environmental state of the application startup instance. After generating the resource configuration vector, the microcontroller immediately writes it into a set of non-volatile configuration registers located inside the transparent isolation layer and directly managed by the microcontroller. These registers are manufactured using ferroelectric or phase-change memory technology to ensure information is not lost after power failure. The write operation is completed through the microcontroller's internal high-speed bus, ensuring atomicity and complete vector writing. Specific register bits in the non-volatile register set are directly mapped to the access control list of the processor cache controller, the bandwidth allocation unit of the memory controller, and the interface enable logic of the peripheral controller. Once the resource configuration vector is written, these hardware units immediately perform locking operations based on the information encoded in the vector. Specifically, the processor cache controller restricts the application process to access only the specific cache channels and cache paths allocated to it, the memory controller allocates a dedicated memory access channel for the application process and sets its bandwidth upper limit threshold, and the peripheral controller disables the level driving capability of the physical pins of peripheral interfaces that the application process is not authorized to access, thereby achieving exclusive locking of resources at the physical access path level.

[0030] Step 2 hinges on the dynamic resource allocation vector generation algorithm and its tight coupling with hardware locking. For example, in one embodiment, the dynamic generation algorithm employs a key derivation function based on elliptic curve cryptography, using the application identifier and the current system security timestamp (accurate to nanosecond levels) as the base key material. It combines the branch misprediction rate over the most recent 100 clock cycles read from the processor performance monitoring unit as the entropy source, deriving a unique 256-bit vector. This vector is divided into multiple parts, used to generate cache locking keys, memory bandwidth quota codes, and peripheral access tokens, respectively. The microcontroller, through its internal security bus, directly writes these parts into shadow registers located within the processor cache controller bypass, memory controller configuration space, and peripheral access control unit. These registers are hardware locked after being written until the container terminates or an explicit unlock command is issued. In another embodiment, vector generation incorporates a machine learning prediction model. The microcontroller predicts the cache capacity the application will need based on historical resource usage data and encodes the prediction into a vector, achieving more intelligent resource pre-locking.

[0031] Step 3: When an application within a container initiates cross-container data interaction, the microcontroller intercepts the data stream and splits it into independent transmission frames. Each frame embeds an encrypted tag derived from the resource configuration vector in Step 2. The tagged data frame is routed to the target container through a hardware-level data bus arbitrator. The target container microcontroller reconstructs the data stream based on the tag integrity verification result.

[0032] During the operation of an Android container, when an application within a container needs to interact with an application within another container or an external system, a cross-container data interaction is initiated, and the microcontroller implements bidirectional data stream sandboxing. The microcontroller monitors the data flow of shared memory regions or network interfaces used for inter-container communication in real time through its integrated direct memory access engine or the packet inspection engine attached to the network interface controller. Once a data packet or memory read / write sequence conforming to the characteristics of the cross-container communication protocol is detected, the microcontroller immediately intercepts the data flow. After interception, the microcontroller breaks the data flow into fixed-size independent transmission frames according to predefined rules or dynamically negotiated protocol parameters. Each transmission frame contains a frame header, payload data, and a frame trailer checksum. The frame header includes control information such as the source container identifier, the destination container identifier, and the frame sequence number. The microcontroller invokes its cryptographic coprocessor, using a specific field extracted from the dynamic resource configuration vector stored in the non-volatile register set corresponding to the current application as a key seed, or directly using a subkey derived from this vector, to perform encryption operations on the frame header or the entire frame of the current transmission frame, generating an encrypted tag. The label can be a message authentication code, a short digital signature, or an encrypted checksum.

[0033] Subsequently, the microcontroller activates its integrated hardware-level data bus arbiter, located at the core crossbar switch of the system data bus. This arbiter parses the encrypted tags and target container identifiers embedded in the tagged data frames. The arbiter first verifies the tag's format validity, and then routes the data frame from the bus port of the source container to the bus port of the target container, according to a preset routing table or a routing policy based on the tag content. This routing process is completed at the hardware level, without any software protocol stack, ensuring low latency and high security. Upon arrival at the bus port of the target container, the microcontroller associated with the target container immediately detects the frame. Its cryptographic coprocessor uses the same method as the source end to derive the corresponding key or verification public key from the locally stored resource configuration vectors associated with the source and target applications, and performs integrity verification operations on the encrypted tags in the received data frame. This may include recalculating the message authentication code and comparing it with the embedded tag, or using the public key to verify the digital signature. If the verification is successful, indicating that the data frame has not been tampered with during transmission and its source is trustworthy, the target microcontroller reassembles the multiple independent transmission frames into the original data stream in sequence based on information such as the sequence number in the frame header, and delivers it to the target application within the target container. If the verification fails, the target microcontroller immediately discards the data frame and notifies the source microcontroller through a dedicated error reporting channel, triggering a retransmission or security alert. This two-way sandboxing ensures that data is always under encrypted protection and hardware-level routing supervision when flowing across containers, and any unauthorized injection or eavesdropping will be detected and prevented.

[0034] Step 3 hinges on the efficient generation of encrypted tags and precise control of hardware-level routing. In one embodiment, the encrypted tag is generated using a lightweight Galois counter mode authentication encryption algorithm. This algorithm executes on the microcontroller's dedicated cryptographic engine, using the middle 64 bits of the resource configuration vector as the key to perform one-time authentication encryption on the entire transmission frame. The generated authentication tag is embedded as an encrypted tag in the frame header, while the frame payload is also encrypted, providing dual protection for confidentiality and integrity. Regarding routing, the hardware arbitrator is an application-specific integrated circuit module based on content-addressable memory (CNTM). It stores the mapping between container identifiers and physical bus port numbers. When a tagged data frame is detected, the arbitrator extracts the target container identifier, searches for a match in CNTM in parallel, and switches the data frame to the correct output port within nanosecond delays. In another embodiment, the routing decision part relies on the encrypted tag itself. The arbitrator embeds a small cryptographic coprocessor that can quickly verify the tag's validity. Only frames that pass verification are forwarded according to the routing information carried in the tag.

[0035] Step 4: The microcontroller continuously monitors the abnormal instruction stream of the container kernel and the level transition sequence of the peripheral interface. If the spatiotemporal correlation between the instruction stream and the level transition is detected to violate the preset security model, the current container clock domain is immediately frozen. At the same time, a hardware interrupt signal is output through the physical pin to trigger the trusted execution environment to perform container state snapshot for evidence collection.

[0036] To address potential hardware-level attacks and complex threats, the microcontroller continuously performs collaborative heterogeneous threat mitigation tasks. The microcontroller utilizes its performance monitoring unit to continuously sample the critical instruction stream executed by the container kernel, which is output in real-time through the processor core's hardware debug interface or performance counter interface. The microcontroller analyzes the statistical characteristics of the instruction stream, such as privileged instruction call frequency, system call sequence patterns, and abnormal memory access address distribution. Simultaneously, the microcontroller, through its general-purpose input / output interfaces or dedicated peripheral monitoring modules, collects in real-time level transition sequences of critical peripheral interfaces. These peripheral interfaces include, but are not limited to, debug interfaces, baseband processor interfaces, near-field communication interfaces, and memory card interfaces. The level transition sequences record the timestamps and patterns of high and low level changes on the interface signal lines. The microcontroller's internal security analysis engine performs spatiotemporal correlation analysis between instruction stream characteristics and level transition sequences. Specifically, it maps both to a unified time axis, calculates the co-occurrence probability of a specific instruction event and a specific level transition event within a time window, or analyzes the correlation coefficient between changes in instruction stream patterns and changes in level transition patterns, and compares the calculation results with a security model pre-stored in the microcontroller's secure storage area. This security model defines the statistical regularities or logical constraints that should be satisfied between instruction stream events and level transition events under normal and unintruded states. For example, the model might stipulate that the level transition events of the debug interface should be zero when no debugging operation is performed, or that the near-field communication interface should not exhibit high-frequency level transitions when the kernel executes a specific sensitive system call sequence. If the analysis engine detects that the spatiotemporal correlation between the currently collected instruction stream features and the level transition sequence violates one or more rules in the preset security model, such as detecting unexpected debug interface activity accompanied by high-frequency access to sensitive kernel regions, or detecting the simultaneous occurrence of illegal instruction sequences and abnormal wireless interface signals, the microcontroller immediately determines that an advanced persistent threat or hardware Trojan activation exists. At this time, the microcontroller sends a freeze command to the clock allocation network of the processor core where the current container resides through its clock management module. This command forcibly stops the toggling of all clock signals in that clock domain, causing the processor core to instantly stop executing any instructions. Simultaneously, the microcontroller outputs a predefined hardware interrupt signal through one or more of its physical pins. This signal is directly connected to a dedicated interrupt input pin of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) hardware module on the system motherboard, which is independent of the main processor. The triggering of a hardware interrupt signal will cause the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to immediately take over system control. The TEE first takes a snapshot of the entire running state of the frozen container, including a complete copy of its physical memory contents, processor register state, and the current configuration of the transparent isolation layer and non-volatile register groups. This state data is then encrypted and stored in a secure storage area for subsequent forensic analysis.

[0037] The effectiveness of step 4 highly depends on an accurate anomaly detection model and a fast hardware response mechanism. For example, in one embodiment, the preset security model adopts a dynamic threshold system based on behavioral baselines. During the learning phase after container startup, the microcontroller continuously monitors the normal patterns of instruction flow and level transitions to establish a statistical baseline. During the runtime phase, it calculates the deviation between the current behavior and the baseline in real time. If the deviations in multiple dimensions exceed the threshold simultaneously, an anomaly is determined. In terms of hardware response, clock freezing does not completely stop the clock, but rather instantly reduces the clock frequency to the kilohertz level, causing the processor to enter a near-stagnant but state-preserving state so that the trusted execution environment can accurately capture memory snapshots. During forensics, the trusted execution environment not only saves memory data but also reads all register and cache contents through the processor debug interface to form a complete state image.

[0038] Step 5: When the container is terminated, the microcontroller sends a specific pulse sequence to the memory chip to trigger the active discharge of the capacitor in the storage cell and resets the processor branch predictor history to ensure that the container's running traces are physically irreversible.

[0039] When an Android container terminates due to normal shutdown or forced termination, the microcontroller performs a self-destructive resource reclamation operation to ensure safety. The container termination command is transmitted to the microcontroller via a system management interrupt or a specific container management application programming interface. Upon receiving the termination command, the microcontroller first locates all memory chips and their specific memory address ranges occupied by the container in physical memory. The microcontroller then sends a pre-designed sequence of specific pulses to the specific control registers of these memory chips through its memory controller interface. This sequence consists of a series of non-standard memory bus commands. For example, in dynamic random access memory, the microcontroller may send refresh command sequences exceeding the standard operating voltage or special row-activated precharge combinations. These non-standard command sequences are designed to interfere with the normal refresh mechanism of the memory cell capacitors, causing the charge within the memory cell to leak faster through non-ideal paths in a short period of time, or even directly applying a reverse bias voltage to the selected memory cell to accelerate the active discharge process of its capacitors, causing the previously stored data bits to irreversibly lose their logical state due to charge loss. For flash memory chips based on charge trap technology, the pulse sequence may include combinations of program erase voltage pulses that exceed specifications, intentionally inducing excessive erasure or tunneling oxide layer damage to memory cells, achieving physical data annihilation. While ensuring the physical destruction of memory data, the microcontroller accesses the dedicated control registers of the branch predictor module in the processor core. The branch predictor typically stores historical branch addresses and jump mode records learned during container operation; this information could potentially leak program execution flow. The microcontroller writes a specific reset command sequence or directly writes data in an all-0s and all-1s pattern to the branch predictor's history buffer, thoroughly clearing the contents of all historical branch target address caches, pattern history tables, and global history buffers, destroying its prediction state, and eliminating potential information leakage caused by the predictor's residual state.

[0040] The physical effects of the self-destructive resource recycling in step 5 need to be rigorously verified. In one embodiment, after sending a memory discharge pulse sequence, the microcontroller reads the contents of the memory cells for self-checking to ensure that the data bits have been randomized. If a residual data pattern is detected, the pulse intensity is automatically increased and the operation is repeated until a preset demagnetization standard is reached. For branch predictor reset, in addition to clearing historical records, the microcontroller also injects a large number of random branch instructions into the predictor, completely polluting its learning algorithm. In another embodiment, the recycling operation is also extended to the processor's translation backup buffer and micro-operation cache, performing similar zeroing or scrambling operations on these cells that store prediction information to ensure no residual traces remain.

[0041] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: 1. By building a transparent isolation layer between the processor core and the memory controller, Android containers are mapped as independent hardware logical partitions, allowing the operating system within the container to directly perceive its exclusive hardware resources. This mechanism does not require modification of the operating system kernel code, significantly reducing system adaptation complexity and improving the security isolation of the container environment.

[0042] 2. In response to the application's startup request within the container, the microcontroller generates a dynamic resource configuration vector in real time, associated with the application's identity and runtime environment. This vector is written to the non-volatile register set, locking the physical access paths of the processor cache, memory bandwidth, and peripheral interfaces. This achieves real-time exclusive allocation of resources, prevents unauthorized access, and improves resource utilization efficiency and system security.

[0043] 3. During data exchange between containers, the microcontroller breaks down the data stream into independent transmission frames, embeds encrypted tags based on resource configuration vectors, and routes them to the target container via a hardware-level bus arbitrator. The target container reconstructs the data stream based on the tag verification results, ensuring that the data transmission process is free from tampering and eavesdropping, and enhancing the trustworthiness of cross-container communication.

[0044] 4. By continuously analyzing the spatiotemporal correlation between container kernel instruction streams and peripheral level transitions, once a violation of the security model is detected, the container clock domain is immediately frozen and a hardware interrupt is triggered, driving the trusted execution environment to perform state snapshot forensics. This mechanism significantly shortens the response time to advanced threats and improves the system's resistance to complex attacks.

[0045] 5. When the container terminates, the microcontroller sends a specific pulse sequence to the memory chips to accelerate the discharge of the memory cell capacitors and resets the processor branch predictor history. This operation ensures that the container's runtime traces are physically irreversible, eliminating the risk of secondary leakage due to residual sensitive data.

[0046] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers, characterized in that, include: A transparent isolation layer is built by loading dedicated firmware on the microcontroller, enabling the Android container operating system to be aware of exclusive hardware resources; In response to the application startup request, a dynamic resource configuration vector is generated and written to the non-volatile register set, locking the processor cache channel, memory bandwidth, and physical access path of peripheral interfaces; When interacting with other containers, the data stream is split into transmission frames with encrypted tags, which are then routed to the target container via a hardware bus arbitrator and the integrity of the tags is verified. Monitor the spatiotemporal correlation between container kernel instruction stream and peripheral level transitions; freeze the container clock domain and trigger a hardware interrupt to perform state snapshot evidence when the security model is violated. When the container terminates, a specific pulse sequence is sent to the memory chips to trigger active capacitor discharge and reset the processor branch predictor history.

2. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The construction of the transparent isolation layer includes: modifying the address mapping rules between the processor core and the memory controller during the physical boot phase by using a microcontroller to divide the physical memory into independent logical partitions for exclusive use by the container; and intercepting container memory requests by the address remapping unit and remapping them to the logical partitions to block unauthorized access paths.

3. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The dynamic resource configuration vector generation includes: extracting the application's unique identifier, code hash value, and resource quota descriptor, and combining them with processor load status, memory distribution bitmap, peripheral bandwidth utilization, and environmental security metrics as input; generating a unique vector through a cryptographic algorithm and atomically writing it into a non-volatile register set to lock the hardware access path.

4. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The cross-container data interaction includes intercepting the data stream and splitting it into transmission frames; embedding an encrypted tag derived from the resource configuration vector into the frame header; verifying the tag validity through a bus arbitrator and routing it to the target container; and reconstructing the data stream after the target container verifies the tag integrity.

5. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Monitoring and response include collecting the frequency of kernel privileged instruction calls and the timestamps of peripheral interface level transitions; Calculate the co-occurrence probability of the instruction stream and level transitions; If the security model threshold is exceeded, the container clock domain is frozen; a trusted execution environment is triggered via a physical pin interrupt signal to perform memory and register state snapshot forensics.

6. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The cryptographic algorithm employs an elliptic curve key derivation function, using application identifiers and security timestamps as key materials, and generates a vector by combining the processor branch misprediction rate. The vector is divided into multiple parts and directly written into the shadow registers of the processor cache controller, memory controller, and peripheral control unit.

7. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The bus arbiter is built into the crossbar switch of the data bus and parses the target container identifier through the content addressable memory; it uses the Galois counter mode to generate encrypted tags for the transmission frame, and the dedicated integrated circuit completes tag verification and port switching within a nanosecond delay.

8. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The physical access path of the peripheral interface is locked by disabling the physical pin level driving capability of the unauthorized peripheral interface based on the peripheral access token field in the vector.

9. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The specific pulse sequence is a non-standard refresh command sequence for dynamic random access memory. It accelerates capacitor discharge through overvoltage operation, causing irreversible loss of data bits. It also applies a combination of programming and erasing voltages that exceed specifications to flash memory chips, inducing oxide layer damage.

10. The method for resource isolation and data security assurance of Android containers based on microcontrollers as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The process of resetting the processor branch predictor history includes: clearing the historical branch target address cache and pattern history table contents, and injecting a random branch instruction sequence pollution learning algorithm into the branch predictor.

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