A method, apparatus, and device for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage.
By embedding a secure container in an untrusted webpage to generate a temporary proof key pair and binding it to the page evidence, the problem of binding evidence with business actions in untrusted webpages is solved, a trusted evidence chain binding is achieved, the risk of evidence transfer is reduced, and the security and compliance of business actions are ensured.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611068056.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-07-17
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-10
AI Technical Summary
On untrusted third-party web pages, there is a lack of a reliable, non-simplistic transfer, and non-simplistic replay binding mechanism between page evidence and subsequent key business actions such as code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering. This makes it difficult for service providers to confirm whether business actions come from the same controlled execution chain and makes it impossible to effectively prevent evidence transfer attacks that generate evidence on compliant pages.
By loading an embedded security container controlled by the service provider into an untrusted webpage, temporary proof key pairs are generated. When a user triggers a critical business interaction, page evidence is collected and bound. The embedded security container is used for action signature verification to ensure that business actions are performed in a controlled execution chain.
It achieves a trusted binding between page evidence and subsequent key business actions, reducing the risk of transferring evidence and business parameters across pages, browser contexts, devices, or backend links, and ensuring the security and compliance of business actions.
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Figure CN123074698A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a method, apparatus, and device for binding evidence chains on web pages. Background Technology
[0002] In internet advertising and online service subscription scenarios, service providers typically promote their services through third-party operators or agents on landing pages. After clicking on the advertisement, users are directed to the third-party landing page, where they can view product introductions, marketing benefits, pricing information, and may further enter their mobile phone number, obtain verification codes, or submit subscription or processing requests.
[0003] To ensure the compliance of third-party landing page content, existing technologies typically employ methods such as page reporting and review, front-end page evidence collection, service provider server-side log matching, short-term evidence documents, and risk rule identification for management.
[0004] The main technical problem with existing technologies is that, in untrusted third-party web pages, there is a lack of a reliable, non-easily transferable, and non-easily replayable binding mechanism between page evidence and subsequent key business actions such as code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering. The service provider's server cannot verify whether subsequent business actions actually originate from the same controlled execution chain that generated the page evidence, thus making it difficult to effectively prevent evidence transfer attacks where evidence is generated by compliant pages but used by the actual deployed pages. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This invention provides a method, apparatus, and device for binding evidence chains on web pages, solving the problem that there is a lack of a reliable binding mechanism between page evidence and subsequent key business actions such as code issuance, verification code submission, and business ordering in advertising landing pages, business promotion pages, or online ordering pages.
[0006] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the technical solution of the present invention is as follows: A method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage, applied to the front-end, includes: Obtain the page evidence collection script running on an untrusted webpage; An embedded security container controlled by the service provider is created based on the page evidence collection script; A temporary proof key pair is generated through the embedded security container, and the proof public key is registered with the service provider. Receive the page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key; When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects page evidence before submission and sends the page evidence before submission, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding statement generated based on the page evidence before submission to the service provider. When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters a controlled business processing state, and the critical business action is triggered in the embedded security container. Based on the critical business action triggered in the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered critical business action from the service provider; Receive the action challenge message sent by the service provider, sign the action challenge message according to the temporary proof private key to obtain the action signature statement, and send the action signature statement to the service provider; When the service provider verifies the binding relationship between the action signature declaration, the session state proof, and the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
[0007] The present invention also provides an apparatus for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage, comprising: The acquisition module is used to acquire page evidence collection scripts running on untrusted web pages; The processing module is configured to: create an embedded security container controlled by the service provider based on the page evidence collection script; generate a temporary proof key pair through the embedded security container and register the proof public key with the service provider; receive page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key; when a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration generated based on the pre-submission page evidence to the service provider; when a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container... The device enters a controlled business processing state, and the key business action is triggered in the embedded security container. Based on the key business action triggered in the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered key business action from the service provider. The device receives the action challenge message sent by the service provider, signs the action challenge message according to the temporary proof private key to obtain an action signature statement, and sends the action signature statement to the service provider. When the service provider verifies the action signature statement, the proof session state, and the binding relationship of the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
[0008] The present invention also provides a computing device, comprising: a processor and a memory storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, performs the method described above.
[0009] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method described above.
[0010] The above-described solution of the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects: The above-described solution of the present invention can bind page evidence and subsequent key business actions to the same controlled execution link, thereby reducing the risk that page evidence, evidence tickets, or business parameters are transferred and used across pages, browser contexts, devices, or backend links. Attached Figure Description
[0011] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a system architecture and communication diagram of the method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a general flowchart of the method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of binding evidence and proof session on a webpage before submission, according to an embodiment of the present invention, for the method of binding a chain of evidence on a webpage. Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating the key business actions of the method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage according to an embodiment of the present invention: a challenge signature. Figure 6 This is a sequential interaction diagram of the method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 7 This is a structural diagram of a device for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0012] Exemplary embodiments of the invention will now be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. While exemplary embodiments of the invention are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the invention may be implemented in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this invention will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art.
[0013] like Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention proposes a method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage, applied to the front-end, including: Step 11: Obtain the page evidence collection script running on the untrusted webpage; Here, untrusted web pages refer to web pages that are not directly controlled by the service provider, but are controlled by third-party operators, agents, advertisers, or their affiliates.
[0014] In this webpage, the page HTML, CSS, JavaScript, redirection logic, form fields, displayed content, parent page messages, and backend parameters may all be modified, forged, hidden, or selectively displayed by third parties. Therefore, this invention does not implicitly trust the page content, phone number, redirection parameters, business parameters, or supporting documents provided by this webpage.
[0015] The page evidence collection script refers to a script program provided by the service provider and loaded into an untrusted third-party webpage. It is used to collect page information, including page loading data, user input on the page, page screenshots, page URLs, page sources, environmental information, mobile phone number summaries, activity identifiers, agent identifiers, etc., and uploads the collected results to the service provider's server. The page evidence collection script includes, but is not limited to, JavaScript SDKs, front-end tracking scripts, webpage forensics scripts, or equivalent collection programs running within a webpage.
[0016] Step 12: Create an embedded security container controlled by the service provider based on the page evidence collection script. The embedded security container refers to an independent webpage execution unit controlled by the service provider and embedded within the untrusted webpage. This embedded security container loads pages or programs under the service provider's domain name, can generate temporary proof keys, communicate with the service provider's server, display a controlled business interface, and sign key business actions during its lifecycle. The embedded security container includes, but is not limited to, iframes, embedded WebViews, embedded webpage components, pop-up pages, controlled front-end containers, or other execution units that can load service provider code within the untrusted webpage.
[0017] Step 13: Generate a temporary proof key pair using the embedded secure container and register the proof public key with the service provider. The temporary proof key pair refers to an asymmetric key pair generated by the embedded secure container during its lifecycle, including a temporary proof private key and a proof public key. The temporary proof private key is stored in the embedded secure container's runtime environment and used to sign challenge messages sent by the service provider's server. The proof public key is uploaded to the service provider's server for verifying subsequent action signatures. The signature algorithm can be ECDSA, EDDSA, RSA-PSS, or other asymmetric signature algorithms.
[0018] The temporary proof private key is a temporary, non-exportable proof private key, configured to not be exported through the standard key export interface. This private key is used to sign the challenge message for key actions in the proof session and becomes ineffective when the secure container is destroyed, refreshed, expires, or times out. "Non-exportable" means it cannot be exported in plaintext form under normal browser cryptographic interfaces or runtime interfaces; it does not imply hardware-level anti-attack capabilities.
[0019] The proof public key refers to the public key corresponding to the temporary proof private key. The service provider's server stores this proof public key and uses it to verify the action signature statement submitted by the embedded secure container. The proof public key itself can be public and does not need to be kept secret. Its purpose is to allow the service provider's server to confirm that an action was indeed initiated by the secure container holding the corresponding temporary proof private key.
[0020] Step 14: Receive page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key. The proof session refers to a temporary session created by the service provider's server based on an embedded secure container initialization process. This proof session includes at least a proof session identifier, proof public key, third-party page source, agent identifier, activity identifier, page evidence binding status, user identifier digest, risk status, and expiration time. The proof session is the core data object of the entire scheme and serves as the binding carrier between page evidence, temporary keys, and business actions.
[0021] Step 15: When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding statement generated based on the pre-submission page evidence to the service provider. Here, the pre-submission page evidence refers to page evidence collected before and after a user enters their mobile phone number, clicks the order button, triggers the code issuance pre-action, or other key business interactions. Its purpose is to prove what page content the user saw when submitting their mobile phone number or triggering the order intention. Page evidence refers to verifiable records of a page at a specific point in time or during a specific user interaction phase. Page evidence may include page screenshots, page DOM summaries, page URLs, page sources, collection time, user environment information, agent identifiers, activity identifiers, user identifier summaries, page phase identifiers, and evidence identifiers generated by the service provider's server. Page evidence is not simply equivalent to screenshots. Screenshots are only one form of page evidence; it may also include DOM hashes, resource hashes, text summaries, screen recording clips, page watermarks, and delivery parameters.
[0022] Step 16: When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters the controlled business processing state, and the critical business action is triggered in the embedded security container. The controlled business processing state is the state after the embedded security container enters the business processing stage. In the controlled business processing state, the embedded security container can display business interfaces controlled by the service provider, such as code issuance, verification code input, and order confirmation, to the user.
[0023] Step 17: Based on the triggered critical business action in the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered critical business action from the service provider. The critical business action refers to a key operation requiring security verification during user access, mobile number submission, code issuance, verification code input, order confirmation, payment confirmation, or business processing. The critical business actions include: code issuance, verification code submission, and order submission. These critical business actions are triggered by the user interface within the service provider's embedded security container, and not directly by untrusted third-party pages or backends. The code issuance action refers to the service provider sending a verification code, confirmation code, dynamic password, or other verification information to the mobile number or communication address corresponding to the user's identifier digest. In a specific implementation, this is an SMS verification code. The order submission action refers to the user submitting a request to the service provider for business ordering, business activation, business processing, payment confirmation, or a similar request after passing the verification code or other verification methods.
[0024] The action challenge message refers to a message to be signed generated by the service provider's server for a specific key business action. This message includes at least the proof session identifier, business action type, business action identifier, one-time random challenge factor, user identifier digest, activity identifier, container session identifier, and issuance time.
[0025] The types of business actions may include: verification confirmation actions, code issuance actions, verification code submission actions, order submission actions, payment confirmation actions, and other high-risk business actions.
[0026] Step 18: Receive the action challenge message sent by the service provider, sign the action challenge message using the temporary proof private key to obtain an action signature statement, and send the action signature statement to the service provider. Here, the action signature statement refers to the proof material submitted to the service provider's server after the embedded secure container signs the action challenge message using the temporary proof private key. The service provider's server verifies the signature statement using the proof public key stored in the proof session. Each action must be proven once.
[0027] Step 19: When the service provider verifies the binding relationship between the action signature declaration, the session state proof, and the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
[0028] This embodiment is applicable to scenarios that require page verification and business action verification on third-party web pages, such as internet advertising, third-party business promotion, online business ordering, SMS verification code processing, number acquisition, rights acquisition, online account opening, and online payment confirmation.
[0029] In a typical use case, the service provider promotes its business through third-party operators, agents, or advertisers. After clicking on the advertisement, the user is redirected to a third-party webpage, which displays product information, marketing benefits, pricing details, and application portals. On this webpage, the user may enter their mobile phone number, click the order button, obtain a verification code, enter the verification code, and submit a service order request.
[0030] Since third-party web pages are controlled by third-party operators, service providers cannot implicitly trust the content displayed on these web pages, page parameters, redirection paths, mobile phone number transmission parameters, evidence tickets, code issuance requests, or order requests. This invention loads a service provider's page evidence collection script into the third-party web page, and this script creates an embedded secure container controlled by the service provider, enabling a verifiable chain of evidence binding between page evidence, user identifier digests, proof sessions, and subsequent key business actions.
[0031] The system involved in the above-described method of the present invention may include the entities or modules shown in Table 1 below.
[0032] Table 1, System Entities
[0033] The communication connections between the entities are as follows: the user terminal accesses a third-party webpage; the third-party webpage loads the service provider's page evidence collection script; the page evidence collection script creates an embedded secure container controlled by the service provider; the page evidence collection script uploads page evidence to the service provider's page evidence storage service; the embedded secure container registers a proof session with the service provider's evidence chain binding service; the embedded secure container requests an action challenge message from the service provider's evidence chain binding service; the embedded secure container signs the action challenge message; the service provider's evidence chain binding service verifies the signature and binding relationship; the service provider's business service executes or refuses business actions such as issuing codes, verifying codes, and ordering based on the verification results; the service provider's risk control service makes risk decisions based on the above data.
[0034] The system architecture and communication relationships of this invention are as follows: Figure 2 As shown, the page evidence collection script communicates with the service provider's server, and the embedded security container communicates with the service provider's server, all via HTTPS. Third-party parent pages can create and display the embedded security container, but they must not obtain the temporary proof private key inside the embedded security container, nor directly trigger code issuance, verification code submission, or ordering actions within the embedded security container. The front-end software architecture of this invention is shown in Table 2 below.
[0035] Table 2, Front-end Architecture
[0036] The server-side software architecture of this invention is shown in Table 3 below.
[0037] Table 3, Server-side Architecture
[0038] In this embodiment of the invention, in an untrusted third-party webpage, the page evidence is bound to the same controlled execution link through an embedded security container controlled by the service provider, a temporary proof key, a proof session, binding during page evidence generation, and a key business action verification mechanism.
[0039] This invention establishes the following binding relationships: the proof public key is bound to the proof session; the pre-submission page evidence is bound to the proof session; the user identifier digest, agent identifier, and activity identifier are bound to the proof session; the action challenge message is bound to the proof session, page evidence, and business action type; the action signature declaration is bound to the embedded secure container holding the temporary proof private key; and key business actions such as issuing codes, submitting verification codes, and ordering are bound to the proof session and page evidence.
[0040] Through the above binding relationship, when processing key business actions, the service provider's server no longer only judges whether a certain page evidence or evidence ticket exists, but comprehensively judges: whether the page evidence belongs to the current proof session; whether the business action references the page evidence bound to the current proof session; whether the action signature is generated by the temporary proof private key corresponding to the current proof session; whether the action challenge message is one-time, not expired and not used; and whether the user identifier digest, agent identifier and activity identifier are consistent.
[0041] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 11, a page evidence collection script running on an untrusted webpage is obtained, thus establishing an entry point for collecting page evidence.
[0042] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 12, an embedded security container controlled by the service provider is created according to the page evidence collection script; this container loads pages or programs under the service provider's domain name and forms a trust boundary with the third-party page. The purpose of this step is to establish a service provider-controlled front-end execution environment in an untrusted third-party webpage.
[0043] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, step 13, generating a temporary proof key pair through the embedded security container and registering the proof public key with the service provider, may include: Step 131: Generate a temporary proof key pair through the browser cryptographic interface via the embedded security container. The temporary proof key pair includes the proof public key and the temporary proof private key. Upload the proof public key to the service provider and keep the temporary proof private key inside the embedded security container, without exposing it to third-party pages or third-party backends. This binds the proof capability of subsequent business actions to the current lifecycle of the embedded security container.
[0044] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 14, the page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key are received; Here, after receiving the proof public key, the service provider's server creates a proof session, generates a proof session identifier, and records the page source, agent identifier, activity identifier, container instance information, proof session validity period, and risk status. It then returns the page evidence collection binding parameters to the front end. This step provides a unified service provider binding carrier for page evidence and subsequent business actions.
[0045] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 15, when a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration generated based on the pre-submission page evidence to the service provider, which may include: Step 151: When a user triggers a key business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and generates a page evidence summary based on the pre-submission page evidence. Here, the key business interactions include users entering their mobile phone number, clicking to obtain a verification code, and clicking the order button. The pre-submission page evidence may include page screenshots, page URLs, page sources, collection time, page stage identifiers, agent identifiers, activity identifiers, user identifier summaries, and binding parameters related to the proof session.
[0046] Step 152: Send the page evidence summary and page evidence collection binding parameters to the embedded security container; Step 153: The embedded security container signs the page evidence digest and the page evidence collection binding parameters using the temporary proof private key to obtain the page evidence binding statement; Step 154: The page evidence collection script sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration to the service provider. Here, when uploading the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection script carries the page evidence collection binding parameters generated by the service provider for the current proof session, effectively preventing the pre-submission page evidence from being arbitrarily bound to other proof sessions after its generation.
[0047] This embodiment can be used to prevent third-party operators from generating page evidence on a compliance reporting page first, and then transferring the page evidence identifier to another actual deployment page or another business link for use. Since the page evidence carries the collection binding parameters of the current proof session when it is generated before submission, and the page evidence digest can be signed by the embedded security container using a temporary proof private key, the service provider's server can verify whether the page evidence belongs to the current proof session.
[0048] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 16, when a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters a controlled business processing state. The triggering of the critical business action within the embedded security container may include: Step 161: When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script requests the embedded security container to switch from a hidden state, a semi-hidden state, or an embedded state to a visible state, a pop-up state, or a full-screen state. The embedded security container then displays a business processing interface controlled by the service provider to the user. Step 162: The critical business action is triggered in the business processing interface of the embedded security container.
[0049] In this embodiment, the key business actions include user-triggered code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering. When a user triggers a key business action, the same embedded security container can switch from an initialization state, a hidden state, or an embedded state to a visible state, a pop-up state, or a full-screen state, displaying a service provider-controlled business processing interface to the user. The key business actions are triggered by the user interface within the container or by program logic controlled by the service provider; third-party pages must not directly trigger code issuance, verification code submission, or ordering actions. This ensures that the page evidence binding process and subsequent business processing are kept within the same controlled execution chain as much as possible.
[0050] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 17, based on the key business action triggered in the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered key business action from the service provider; Here, when a user triggers critical business actions such as issuing codes, submitting verification codes, or ordering within the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message from the service provider's server. The service provider's server generates an action challenge message containing a session verification identifier, business action type, business action identifier, one-time random challenge factor, user identifier digest, pre-submission page evidence identifier, agent identifier, activity identifier, issuance time, and expiration time. The one-time random challenge factor refers to a random value generated by the service provider's server for a specific action challenge message. This random value is valid for a limited time and expires after use, preventing the action signature from being replayed. Each critical business action corresponds to a different one-time random challenge factor. Step 17 generates a one-time, non-reusable signature object for each critical business action.
[0051] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 18, an action challenge message sent by the service provider is received, and the action challenge message is signed according to the temporary proof private key to obtain an action signature statement, and the action signature statement is sent to the service provider; Here, after receiving the action challenge message, the embedded secure container signs the message using the temporary proof private key it holds throughout its lifecycle, forming an action signature declaration, and submits it to the service provider's server. This step serves to prove that the critical business action was initiated by the embedded secure container holding the temporary proof private key corresponding to the current proof session.
[0052] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, in step 19, when the service provider verifies the binding relationship between the action signature declaration, the session state proof, and the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
[0053] Here, the service provider uses the public key stored in the proof session to verify the action signature statement and further verifies the proof session state, the page evidence binding relationship before submission, the user identifier digest, the agent identifier, the activity identifier, the action type, the validity period of the action challenge message, and the usage status. If the verification passes, the service provider allows the execution of the business action; if the verification fails, the service provider rejects the business action or enters the risk handling process. The purpose of this step is to complete the evidence chain binding verification before the issuance of codes, submission of verification codes, or ordering actions occur. The evidence chain binding described in this invention refers to the process by which the service provider associates page evidence with subsequent business actions such as issuance of codes, submission of verification codes, and ordering into the same controlled execution context through session identifier, one-time random challenge factor, temporary proof key, page evidence identifier, user identifier digest, and business action identifier. The purpose of evidence chain binding is not merely to prove that a page has been accessed, but to prove that there is a common execution chain relationship between subsequent key business actions and the page evidence.
[0054] In an optional embodiment of the present invention, the method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage further includes: Step 20: After the page evidence collection script provided by the service provider is loaded on the untrusted webpage, or after the service provider creates a proof session based on the proof public key, the page evidence collection script collects initial page evidence and uploads the initial page evidence to the service provider; this enables the service provider to generate an initial page evidence identifier based on the initial page evidence and bind the initial page evidence identifier to the proof session.
[0055] In this embodiment, the initial page evidence refers to the page evidence collected during the initial page display phase after the user enters a third-party webpage or the page evidence collection script completes its initialization. Its purpose is to prove what content was displayed on the page when the user entered it. The initial page evidence identifier is a unique identifier generated by the service provider's server after receiving and saving the page evidence. This identifier is used to reference the corresponding page evidence in subsequent session verification, code issuance, ordering, and risk control decisions.
[0056] Embodiments of the present invention also provide a method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage, applied on the server side, including: Step 21: Receive the proof public key sent by the embedded security container; Step 22: Create a proof session based on the proof public key and bind the proof session to the proof public key. Here, after receiving the proof public key, the service provider's server creates a proof session, generates a proof session identifier, and records the page source, agent identifier, activity identifier, container instance information, proof session validity period, and risk status. The purpose of this step is to provide a unified service provider binding carrier for page evidence and subsequent business actions.
[0057] Step 23: Generate a proof session identifier and page evidence collection binding parameters based on the proof session, and send the proof session identifier and page evidence collection binding parameters to the embedded security container; Step 24: When a user triggers a critical business interaction on an untrusted webpage, receive the pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration sent by the page evidence collection script; Step 25 involves verifying the pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection and binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration to obtain the verification result; specifically, step 25 may include: Step 251: Verify whether the page evidence collection binding parameters are valid, verify whether the page evidence binding declaration is verified by the proof public key corresponding to the current proof session, and verify the stage of the page evidence before submission to obtain the verification result.
[0058] Step 26: Generate a pre-submission page evidence identifier based on the verification result, and bind the pre-submission page identifier to the proof session; thereby preventing the page evidence from being arbitrarily transferred, spliced, or rebound by a third party after generation.
[0059] Step 27: When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, receive an action challenge message request sent by the embedded security container; Step 28: Generate an action challenge message corresponding to the key business action, and send the action challenge message to the embedded security container; Step 29: Receive the action signature statement sent by the embedded security container, verify the action signature statement, the session state proof, and the binding relationship between the page evidence before submission, and obtain the verification result; Step 210: Based on the verification result, execute the business action and send the execution result to the user.
[0060] It should be noted that the service provider's server executes or rejects corresponding business actions based on the verification results, and performs risk decisions and audit logs. For requests that pass verification, the service provider's server executes the corresponding business action, such as sending a verification code, verifying the verification code, or submitting an order. For requests that fail verification, the service provider's server may intercept code issuance, intercept orders, issue alerts, conduct manual review, limit traffic, or take other risk measures. The service provider's server saves evidence sessions, page evidence, action challenge messages, action signature statements, business processing results, and risk decision results, forming audit logs. This enables business processing and subsequent audit traceability.
[0061] It should be noted that the steps in the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the overall implementation flow of the present invention in one embodiment, and do not mean that all steps must be executed in exactly the same chronological order in any embodiment. The following sequential relationship is an important logical constraint of the present invention: Embedded secure containers should first generate a temporary proof key, and then use the temporary proof private key to sign actions; The service provider's server should first create a proof session, and then bind the pre-submission page evidence to that proof session; The evidence submitted on the page should be bound before the release of key business actions; The service provider should first generate an action challenge message, and then the embedded security container should sign the action challenge message. The service provider's server should first complete the action signature declaration and the verification of the evidence chain binding relationship before executing business actions such as issuing codes, submitting verification codes, or ordering.
[0062] In addition to the necessary logical constraints mentioned above, some steps can be adjusted, merged, executed asynchronously, or executed in parallel depending on the business scenario. For example, the collection of initial page evidence can be carried out before or after the creation of the proof session; risk signal collection can run through the entire process of page access, evidence upload, action challenge issuance, action signature verification, and business handling; code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering actions can be executed separately according to specific business processes, or they can be merged in some scenarios.
[0063] This invention does not rely solely on reproducible and transferable string-type evidence tickets as the basis for trust. Instead, it binds page evidence and key business actions to the same controlled execution chain through proof sessions, temporary proof keys, page evidence binding, and action-by-action challenge signatures.
[0064] Through the above embodiments of the present invention, it is possible to bind pre-submission page evidence, user identifier digest, agent identifier, activity identifier, and subsequent key business actions such as code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering to the same proof session and the same controlled execution link. Compared with existing methods that rely solely on page screenshots, short-term evidence tickets, mobile phone number digests, IP addresses, user agents, or time windows for association, the present invention can reduce the risk of page evidence or evidence tickets being transferred and used across pages, browser contexts, devices, or backend links, and can perform real-time verification and risk handling before key business actions occur.
[0065] like Figure 3 As shown, the technical solution of the present invention will be further described below with reference to Embodiment 1.
[0066] Example 1 illustrates a method for binding the code issuance and subscription evidence chain based on the lifecycle of an embedded secure container, using an SMS code issuance and subscription scenario in a third-party advertising landing page as an example. In this example, the embedded secure container is implemented using an iframe, the page evidence collection script is implemented using a JavaScript SDK, and the temporary proof key pair is generated using a browser cryptographic interface.
[0067] It should be noted that iframe, JavaScript SDK, and browser cryptography interface are only one implementation method in this embodiment and do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention.
[0068] Step 1: The user visits a third-party webpage, and the page loads the evidence collection script; Execution entities: third-party web pages, user terminals, and page evidence collection scripts.
[0069] Triggering condition: Users are directed to a third-party webpage after clicking on an advertisement, promotional link, QR code, SMS link, or other entry point.
[0070] Processing Action: The third-party webpage loads the page evidence collection script provided by the service provider. After initialization, the page evidence collection script reads or generates the following information: page URL, page source, agent identifier, activity identifier, page load time, user terminal environment information, SDK instance identifier, and page stage identifier.
[0071] The agent identifier and activity identifier can come from parameters pre-assigned by the service provider or from parameters passed in from a third-party webpage. Since third-party webpages are untrusted, these parameters need to be verified by the service provider's server in conjunction with session verification, page evidence, and business actions, and cannot be used as a reliable basis on their own.
[0072] Processing result: The page evidence collection script has completed initialization, forming a page access instance.
[0073] Purpose: This step is used to establish a page evidence collection entry point, enabling service providers to collect page evidence from third-party web pages and providing basic information for the subsequent creation of embedded secure containers.
[0074] The page evidence collection script can be a JavaScript SDK, or an equivalent collection program running in WebView, Mini Program WebView, browser extensions, or embedded front-end components.
[0075] Step 2: The page evidence collection script creates an embedded secure container; Execution entities: Page evidence collection script, embedded security container.
[0076] Triggering conditions: After the page evidence collection script completes initialization, or before the user is about to trigger the actions of entering a mobile phone number, sending a code, or ordering.
[0077] Processing Action: The page evidence collection script creates an embedded security container controlled by the service provider within a third-party webpage. This container loads pages or programs from the service provider's domain.
[0078] In one implementation, the page evidence collection script creates a hidden or semi-hidden iframe whose address belongs to the service provider's domain. For example: third-party webpage domain: agent.example.com; service provider container domain: secure.service.example.com; During the initialization phase, the iframe can be in a hidden state, a zero-height state, a state at the bottom of the page, or a non-interactive state. The purpose is to pre-establish an execution environment controlled by the service provider and generate a temporary verification key within that environment.
[0079] The embedded secure container and the third-party parent page can initiate communication via a restricted messaging mechanism. Permitted information may include: page URL, agent identifier, activity identifier, SDK instance identifier, container size status, page evidence digest, and container display request.
[0080] Result: An embedded security container controlled by the service provider is created within the third-party webpage. This container establishes a trust boundary with the third-party parent page.
[0081] Purpose: This step is used to establish a service provider-controlled execution environment on an untrusted third-party webpage, so that subsequent proof key generation, action signing, and business processing can be carried out in this controlled environment.
[0082] The embedded security container is not limited to iframe, but can also be: embedded WebView, pop-up page controlled by the service provider, embedded web page component controlled by the service provider, service provider-controlled business page opened in a browser, or other front-end execution unit that can run service provider code on the user terminal.
[0083] Step 3: The embedded secure container generates a temporary proof key pair; Execution subject: Embedded security container.
[0084] Triggering condition: After the embedded security container has finished loading and the current instance has been confirmed to be available.
[0085] Processing action: The embedded security container generates a temporary proof key pair in its runtime environment, including a temporary proof private key and a proof public key.
[0086] In one implementation, an asymmetric key pair can be generated via a browser cryptographic interface, and the private key can be configured to not be exported through standard interfaces. The temporary proof private key is only used for signing actions within the current embedded secure container's lifecycle and is not exposed to third-party parent pages, third-party backends, or other pages.
[0087] When generating a key pair, you can specify the following parameters: key algorithm, key purpose, whether the key is exportable, key validity period, container instance identifier, and generation time.
[0088] For example, in one implementation, ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA-PSS, or other asymmetric signature algorithms can be used. The specific algorithm can be selected based on browser compatibility and the service provider's security policy.
[0089] Processing result: The embedded secure container obtains a temporary proof private key and a proof public key. The temporary proof private key is stored inside the embedded secure container, while the proof public key is prepared to be uploaded to the service provider's server.
[0090] Function: To bind the proof capability of subsequent key business actions to the current embedded security container lifecycle, rather than to a copyable and transferable string-type evidence document.
[0091] The temporary proof key can be generated by an embedded secure container or, if permitted by the security policy, by other controlled components in the user terminal. The key can be stored in memory or, in a specific security implementation, in a browser-non-exportable key object, a system key management module, or other controlled key storage mechanisms.
[0092] Step 4: The service provider's server creates a proof session; Execution entities: embedded security container, evidence chain binding service.
[0093] Triggering condition: After the embedded security container generates a temporary proof key pair.
[0094] Processing action: The embedded security container sends the proof public key and initialization information to the service provider's evidence chain binding service, requesting the creation of a proof session.
[0095] The request may include the following fields: public key verification, key algorithm, container instance identifier, SDK instance identifier, page URL, page source, parent page source, agent identifier, activity identifier, user terminal environment summary, and container creation time.
[0096] After receiving the above request, the evidence chain binding service performs the following processing: Verify the public key format, verify the basic legitimacy of the agent and activity identifiers, record the page URL, parent page source and container instance information, create a proof session, generate a proof session identifier, set the proof session validity period, initialize the page evidence binding status, and initialize the risk status.
[0097] The service provider's server can return the following information to the embedded security container: This includes proving the session identifier, session validity period, page evidence collection binding parameters, server-side signature parameters, allowed business action types, and risk policy version.
[0098] Processing result: The service provider creates a proof session and binds the proof public key to the proof session identifier.
[0099] Purpose: The proof session is used to carry the relationship between page evidence, proof public key, user identifier digest, agent identifier, activity identifier, action challenge, and risk control status. Subsequent page evidence binding and business action signing are all verified based on this proof session.
[0100] The proof session can be managed independently by the evidence chain binding service, or jointly by the business service, risk control service, or unified session service. The proof session identifier can be a random identifier, the service provider's server signature identifier, or other unpredictable identifiers.
[0101] Step 5: Collect initial page evidence; Execution entities: Page evidence collection script and page evidence storage service.
[0102] Triggering conditions: After the page evidence collection script is initialized, or after the proof session is created.
[0103] Processing action: The page evidence collection script collects initial page evidence. Initial page evidence may include: Page screenshot, page URL, page title, page source, page DOM summary, page text summary, key resource summary, collection time, page stage identifier, agent identifier, activity identifier, user terminal environment information, proof session identifier or its bound parameters.
[0104] The page evidence collection script uploads initial page evidence to the page evidence storage service. Upon receiving the evidence, the service provider's server generates an initial page evidence identifier and establishes a weak or pre-binding relationship between it and the proof session.
[0105] Processing result: The service provider's server saves the initial page evidence and records its relationship with the proof session, agent identifier, and activity identifier.
[0106] Purpose: Initial page evidence is used to record the display when a user enters the page, providing basic evidence for subsequent audits, complaint reviews, and risk identification.
[0107] The initial page evidence can be a screenshot, or it can be a DOM summary, page text summary, resource hash, page screen recording clip, page watermark record, or other forms of evidence that can reflect the content displayed on the page.
[0108] Step Six: Collect evidence from the page before submission and bind it to the proof session; Execution entities: page evidence collection script, embedded security container, page evidence storage service, and evidence chain binding service.
[0109] Triggering conditions: When a user enters their mobile phone number, clicks the order button, clicks the get verification code button, checks the agreement, enters the code issuance pre-process, or other key business interactions occur.
[0110] Processing actions: such as Figure 4 As shown, the page evidence collection script collects page evidence before submission. This pre-submission page evidence reflects the actual page content seen by the user before and after triggering the code issuance or order placement intent.
[0111] Pre-submission page evidence may include: a screenshot of the page before submission, the page URL, the page source, the collection time, the page stage identifier, the mobile phone number summary or user identifier summary, the agent identifier, the activity identifier, the proof session identifier, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence summary.
[0112] In a preferred embodiment, in order to prevent the pre-submission page evidence from being arbitrarily bound to other proof sessions after its generation, the page evidence collection script needs to carry the page evidence collection binding parameters generated by the service provider's server for the current proof session when uploading the pre-submission page evidence.
[0113] Furthermore, the page evidence collection script can send a digest of the page evidence to be uploaded to the embedded secure container. The embedded secure container uses a temporary proof private key to sign the following: proof session identifier, page evidence stage, page evidence digest, user identifier digest, agent identifier, activity identifier, collection time, and server-side collection random factor.
[0114] This signature can be called the page evidence binding statement. The page evidence collection script uploads both the page evidence and the page evidence binding statement to the service provider's server before submission.
[0115] Upon receiving the data, the service provider's server performs the following processing: verifies whether the page evidence binding parameters are valid; verifies whether the page evidence binding statement has been verified by the public key corresponding to the current proof session; verifies whether the page evidence stage is the pre-submission page evidence; verifies whether the user identifier digest, agent identifier, and activity identifier are consistent with the proof session; generates the pre-submission page evidence identifier; binds the pre-submission page evidence identifier with the proof session identifier; and records the page evidence binding status.
[0116] Processing result: The service provider generates a pre-submission page evidence identifier and binds this page evidence identifier with the proof session, user identifier summary, agent identifier, and activity identifier.
[0117] Purpose: To ensure that the page evidence is assigned to a specific proof session when it is generated before submission, thus preventing third-party operators from generating page evidence on a compliant page first and then transferring the page evidence identifier to another actual delivery page or another business link for use.
[0118] The page evidence binding declaration can be implemented using a temporary proof private key signature method, or it can be implemented using a server-side signature collection token, a one-time collection random factor, a dynamic page watermark, DOM random tags, a server-side timestamp, or a combination of multiple methods. Any implementation that enables a verifiable binding relationship between the page evidence and the proof session at the time of generation is a viable alternative implementation of this invention.
[0119] Step 7: The embedded secure container enters the controlled business processing state; Execution entities: page evidence collection script, embedded security container, user terminal.
[0120] Triggering conditions: The user clicks to get the verification code, clicks to order now, enters the business confirmation process, or the evidence binding on the pre-submission page is completed.
[0121] Processing Action: The page evidence collection script requests the embedded security container to switch from a hidden, semi-hidden, or embedded state to a visible, pop-up, or full-screen state. The embedded security container displays a business processing interface controlled by the service provider to the user.
[0122] The business processing interface may include: mobile number confirmation interface, get verification code button, verification code input box, order confirmation content, tariff and agreement confirmation content, submit order button, and risk warning information.
[0123] Critical business operations can only be triggered by the user interface or service-controlled program logic within the embedded secure container. Third-party pages must not directly trigger the following actions via postMessage, URL parameters, script calls, or backend interfaces: code issuance, verification code submission, order submission, payment confirmation, and action signature generation.
[0124] Result: The user enters the service provider's controlled business processing flow. Subsequent critical business actions are triggered internally by the embedded secure container.
[0125] Function: Reduce trust in third-party pages and keep the page evidence binding process and business processing process within the same embedded security container lifecycle as much as possible.
[0126] The embedded security container can switch from a hidden state to a full-screen iframe, or it can switch to a pop-up, a drawer-style component, an independent controlled page, a controlled area within a WebView, or a business processing interface controlled by other service providers.
[0127] Step 8: Generate an action challenge message for the code-issuing action; Execution entities: embedded security container, evidence chain binding service, and business service.
[0128] Triggering condition: The user clicks the "Get Verification Code" button inside the embedded secure container.
[0129] Processing Action: The embedded secure container requests a code-issuing action challenge message from the evidence chain binding service. The request may include: proof session identifier, business action type (e.g., code-issuing action), user identifier digest, pre-submission page evidence identifier, agent identifier, activity identifier, container instance identifier, and request time.
[0130] Upon receiving a request, the evidence chain binding service performs the following checks: whether the proof session exists, whether the proof session has not expired, whether the proof session has been bound to the evidence from the page before submission, whether the evidence from the page before submission belongs to the current proof session, whether the user identifier digest is consistent with the binding relationship of the page evidence, whether the agent identifier and the activity identifier are consistent, and whether the business action is allowed to be executed.
[0131] After successful verification, the service provider's server generates a code issuance challenge message. This challenge message may include: proof session identifier, business action type, business action identifier, one-time random challenge factor, user identifier summary, pre-submission page evidence identifier, agent identifier, activity identifier, issuance time, expiration time, and service provider's server-side policy version.
[0132] The service provider's server records the status of this action challenge message as "issued, not used".
[0133] Processing result: The embedded security container receives the code issuance challenge message.
[0134] Function: To ensure that the code issuance action is not triggered solely by page parameters or evidence tickets, but must first be issued by the service provider's server based on the current proof session and the binding relationship between the page evidence.
[0135] The action challenge message can be generated by the evidence chain binding service, or it can be generated by the business service and then registered by the evidence chain binding service. The one-time random challenge factor can be a random number, a time-related random value, the service provider's server signature value, or other unpredictable values.
[0136] Step 9: The embedded secure container signs the code-issuing challenge message; Execution subject: Embedded security container.
[0137] Triggering condition: The embedded secure container receives a code-issuing challenge message.
[0138] Processing action: The embedded secure container uses the temporary proof private key held during its lifecycle to sign the code issuance challenge message and generate a code issuance signature statement.
[0139] The signature declaration for the code issuance action may include: proof session identifier, business action identifier, business action type, action challenge message digest, signature value, signature algorithm, container instance identifier, and signature time.
[0140] The embedded security container submits the code issuance action signature declaration to the evidence chain binding service or business service.
[0141] Processing result: The service provider's server received the signature declaration for the code issuance action.
[0142] Function: The proof issuance action is initiated by an embedded secure container that holds the temporary proof private key corresponding to the current proof session, rather than being constructed separately by a third-party parent page, a third-party backend, or other pages.
[0143] The signature algorithm can be selected according to implementation needs. The signature object can be the complete action challenge message, or the normalized serialization result of the action challenge message, hash digest, or the string to be signed specified by the server.
[0144] Step 10: The server verifies the signature declaration of the code issuance action and executes the code issuance; Execution entities: Evidence chain binding service, business service, and risk control service.
[0145] Triggering condition: The server receives the signature declaration of the code issuance action.
[0146] Processing Actions: The evidence chain binding service performs the following verifications: verifying that the proof session exists and has not expired; verifying the signature value based on the proof public key in the proof session; verifying that the business action identifier exists; verifying that the business action type is a code issuance action; verifying that the action challenge message has not expired; verifying that the one-time random challenge factor has not been used; verifying that the page evidence before submission has been bound to the current proof session; verifying that the user identifier digest, agent identifier, and activity identifier are consistent; and verifying that the risk status allows code issuance.
[0147] If the verification passes, the service provider marks the code issuance challenge message as "used" and calls the business service to send the verification code to the mobile phone number or communication address corresponding to the user's identifier digest.
[0148] If the verification fails, the service provider's server can refuse to issue the code and output the risk result according to the reason for the exception, such as: the proof session does not exist, the proof session has expired, the signature verification failed, the page evidence is not bound, the page evidence does not belong to the current proof session, the action challenge message has expired, the action challenge message is reused, the user identifier digest is inconsistent, or the agent identifier or activity identifier is inconsistent.
[0149] Processing result: The code issuance action is either allowed or rejected. The service provider's server saves the code issuance action verification result and risk decision result.
[0150] Purpose: To complete the evidence chain binding and verification before sending the verification code, reducing the risk of abnormal code issuance, code issuance through evidence transfer, and code issuance abuse by third-party pages.
[0151] If the business scenario is not SMS verification code, this step can be replaced with sending voice verification code, email verification code, in-app verification code, dynamic password generation, or other verification information.
[0152] Step 11: Perform challenge signature verification and server-side verification for the CAPTCHA submission action; Execution entities: embedded security container, evidence chain binding service, and business service.
[0153] Triggering condition: The user enters the verification code and clicks confirm inside the embedded security container.
[0154] Processing Action: The embedded secure container requests a verification code from the service provider's server and submits an action challenge message. The service provider generates a one-time verification code and submits the action challenge message. The embedded secure container signs the challenge message using a temporary proof private key and submits the verification code, action signature statement, and proof session identifier.
[0155] The service provider performs the following checks: whether the verification session is valid, whether the signature of the verification code submission action is valid, whether the verification code submission action challenge message has not expired and has not been used, whether the verification code is correct, whether the verification code corresponds to the aforementioned code issuance action, whether the user identifier digest is consistent, and whether the page evidence before submission is still bound to the verification session.
[0156] Processing result: The verification code submission was either allowed or rejected.
[0157] Purpose: To prevent third parties from bypassing the chain of evidence binding simply by obtaining the verification code or reusing the code issuance status. The verification code submission action still requires signature verification by an embedded secure container holding the temporary proof private key.
[0158] In some business scenarios, the verification code submission action and the order submission action can be combined into one action, or the verification code submission action can be used as a prerequisite for the order submission action.
[0159] Step 12: Perform a challenge signature and server-side verification for the order submission action; Execution entities: Embedded security container, evidence chain binding service, business service, and risk control service.
[0160] Triggering condition: After the user completes the verification code verification, agreement confirmation, or fee confirmation inside the embedded security container, they click the submit order button.
[0161] Processing actions: such as Figure 5 As shown, the embedded secure container requests an order submission challenge message from the evidence chain binding service. The request may include: a proof session identifier, a business action type (e.g., an order submission action), a user identifier digest, a pre-submission page evidence identifier, a verification code verification status, an agent identifier, an activity identifier, a container instance identifier, and the request time.
[0162] After verifying the session and prior business status, the service provider generates an order submission challenge message. The embedded security container then signs this challenge message using a temporary proof private key to generate an order submission signature statement.
[0163] After receiving the order submission action signature declaration, the service provider's server performs the following verifications: whether the proof session exists and has not expired, whether the order submission action signature has passed verification, whether the order submission action challenge message has not expired and has not been used, whether the page evidence before submission exists, whether the page evidence before submission belongs to the current proof session, whether the user identifier digest is consistent, whether the agent identifier and activity identifier are consistent, whether the verification code verification status is valid, whether the code issuance action, the verification code submission action and the order submission action belong to the same proof session, and whether the risk status allows ordering.
[0164] If the verification passes, the business service will submit the order. If the verification fails, the business service will reject the order and record the reason for the risk.
[0165] Processing result: The order is approved or rejected, and the service provider saves the order verification result on the server.
[0166] Purpose: To ensure that the final order action not only has the verification code result, but also is consistent with the pre-submission page evidence, the proof session, and the temporary proof private key holding context.
[0167] The order submission action can be replaced with a business activation action, payment confirmation action, rights claim action, online account opening action, contract signing action, or other high-risk business actions that require page evidence binding.
[0168] Step Thirteen: The service provider's server-side performs risk decisions and audit records; Implementing entities: risk control services, audit storage module, and business services.
[0169] Triggering conditions: When the following actions occur: uploading page evidence, creating a proof session, issuing an action challenge, verifying an action signature, issuing a code, submitting a verification code, or ordering.
[0170] Handling Actions: The service provider's server makes risk decisions based on the following risk signals: missing page evidence, missing page evidence before submission, missing proof session, expired proof session, signature verification failure, expired action challenge message, reuse of action challenge message, page evidence not belonging to the current proof session, inconsistent user identifier digest, inconsistent agent identifier or activity identifier, page evidence collection script not running at the top level, embedded security container loading failure, abnormal user agent, abnormal IP address, high frequency of proof sessions generated by the same device or agent within a short period of time, and abnormal ratio of page evidence quantity to order quantity.
[0171] Based on the risk assessment results, the service provider's server can make the following decisions: allow, record, issue an alert, initiate manual review, block code issuance, block verification code submission, block ordering, restrict agent activities, and increase the verification strength of subsequent actions.
[0172] The service provider's server stores the following audit data: proof session record, proof public key, page evidence identifier, page evidence digest, user identifier digest, action challenge message, action signature statement, signature verification result, business action result, risk decision result, timestamp, agent identifier, and activity identifier.
[0173] Processing result: The service provider's server completed the business action processing and audit record keeping.
[0174] Purpose: This step is used to further form a complete chain of audit evidence based on prior verification, and to support subsequent complaint handling, agent management, and risk model optimization.
[0175] like Figure 6 The diagram shown illustrates the sequential interaction of this embodiment, where a strong binding is formed between page evidence and business actions. Before submission, page evidence is bound to the proof session upon generation. Subsequent actions such as issuing codes, submitting verification codes, and ordering all require the same proof session to execute action challenge signatures, reducing the problem of weak association between page evidence and business actions. This reduces the risk of evidence transfer; even if a third-party operator generates page evidence on a compliant page, it is difficult to transfer the evidence to the actual delivery page for continued use simply by copying the page evidence identifier, short-term ticket, or business parameters. It also reduces the risk of misuse of copyable tickets. This invention does not use transferable string-type evidence tickets as the sole basis for trust, but requires key business actions to be signed action-by-action by an embedded secure container holding a temporary proof private key. Furthermore, it reduces the risk of third-party page triggering. Since the actions of issuing codes, submitting verification codes, and ordering are triggered internally by the embedded secure container, third-party pages cannot directly trigger key business actions on behalf of the user through messages, parameters, or script calls. Finally, it improves real-time interception capabilities before issuing codes and ordering. The service provider's server can complete proof session verification, page evidence binding verification, and action signature verification before sending verification codes and submitting orders, thereby moving risk handling forward. To enhance audit capabilities, the service provider's server-side storage of page evidence, proof sessions, action challenges, action signatures, and risk control decision results can form a complete chain of evidence in subsequent complaints, reviews, or agent governance.
[0176] The technical solution of this invention establishes a relatively trusted business execution environment within an untrusted third-party webpage through an embedded secure container controlled by the service provider. This prevents the third-party page from directly obtaining the temporary proof private key or directly triggering critical business actions such as code issuance, verification code submission, or ordering on behalf of the user. The embedded secure container generates a temporary proof key pair during its lifecycle and registers the proof public key with the service provider's server. The service provider's server then creates a proof session, enabling subsequent business actions to be associated with the same controlled execution context holding the temporary proof private key. Before submission, when generating page evidence, the page evidence is bound to information such as the proof session, user identifier digest, agent identifier, and activity identifier, preventing the page evidence identifier from being arbitrarily transferred or recombined by the third party in subsequent business processes. For critical business actions such as code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering, the service provider's server generates a one-time action challenge message, which is signed by the embedded secure container using the temporary proof private key. The service provider's server verifies the message based on the proof public key, the page evidence binding relationship, and the action challenge status. This invention does not rely solely on transferable string-type evidence tickets as the basis for trust. Instead, it binds page evidence and subsequent key business actions to the same controlled execution chain through a method of "proof session + temporary proof key + page evidence binding + action-by-action challenge signature".
[0177] The technical solution of this invention solves the problem of the lack of strong binding between page evidence and subsequent business actions. Existing page evidence collection schemes can usually only prove that a certain page has displayed specific content, but it is difficult to prove that subsequent actions such as issuing codes, submitting verification codes, or ordering actually come from the same user access link corresponding to that page evidence. This invention establishes a verifiable binding relationship between page evidence and subsequent key business actions through session proof, temporary proof keys, page evidence binding, and action challenge signatures. It also solves the problem that evidence tickets can be copied, transferred, or replayed. In existing schemes based on short-lived evidence tickets, the evidence tickets are usually string-type credentials, which can be copied, transferred, or replayed once obtained by a third-party page, third-party backend, or automated program. This invention, through temporary proof private keys and action-by-action challenge signature mechanisms, ensures that subsequent business actions not only need to reference page evidence, but also require signature proof by an embedded secure container holding the corresponding temporary proof private key, thereby reducing the risk of misuse of transferable evidence tickets. This invention further addresses the issues of parameter forgery and action triggering caused by untrusted third-party pages. In third-party web pages, the parent page is controlled by the third-party operator, which may forge business parameters, transfer page evidence, concatenate phone numbers, reuse activity identifiers, or attempt to directly trigger the service provider's code issuance and ordering interfaces. This invention uses an embedded secure container controlled by the service provider to carry critical business actions and restricts these actions to be triggered internally, reducing reliance on the parameter passing and triggering logic of the third-party parent page. It also solves the problem of weak binding and post-event judgment caused by relying solely on log matching and risk control rules. Existing service provider server-side log matching and risk control rules typically rely on fields such as phone number digests, IP addresses, user agents, activity identifiers, and time windows for association, which constitutes weak binding or post-event judgment. This invention performs real-time verification before code issuance, verification code submission, or ordering actions occur, by proving the session, page evidence binding relationship, and action signature declaration, thereby moving risk identification and handling forward to before the execution of critical business actions. This invention addresses the issue of transferring evidence across pages, browser contexts, or backend links. In scenarios where the reported page differs from the actual deployment page, third-party operators might generate page evidence on the compliant page and then transfer this evidence to the actual deployment page or other business links. This invention binds page evidence and subsequent business actions to the same embedded secure container lifecycle and its corresponding proof session. This enables the service provider's server to identify whether page evidence and business actions belong to the same controlled execution link, thereby reducing the risks associated with transferring evidence across pages, browser contexts, devices, or backend links.
[0178] The technical solution of this invention can achieve the following technical effects: It improves the trustworthy binding capability between page evidence and business actions. The service provider's server can not only confirm the existence of page evidence, but also verify whether subsequent code issuance, verification code submission, or ordering actions are in the same proof session and the same controlled execution chain as the page evidence. It reduces the risk of compliant page evidence being transferred for use. Even if a third-party operator generates page evidence on a compliant page, it is difficult to transfer the evidence to the actual deployment page for continued use simply by copying the page evidence identifier, short-term ticket, or business parameters. It reduces the risk of transferable string-type credentials being abused. This invention does not use reproducible evidence tickets as the sole basis for trust, but requires key business actions to sign the service provider's one-time challenge message using a temporary proof private key, thereby improving resistance to copying, transfer, and replay. It improves the real-time risk control capability of code issuance, verification code submission, and ordering actions. The service provider's server can complete proof session verification, page evidence binding verification, and action signature verification before executing code issuance or ordering actions, thereby reducing reliance on post-event review, complaint handling, or manual review. It reduces trust dependence on third-party pages. Because critical business actions are carried out within an embedded secure container controlled by the service provider, and action signing is completed within the container, even if a third-party page controls the page's HTML, JavaScript, or backend parameters, it is difficult to directly forge a complete chain of evidence binding relationships. This improves the applicability of the solution in third-party browser webpage environments. This invention strives to keep page evidence binding and business processing flows within the same embedded secure container's lifecycle, reducing reliance on third-party persistent storage, cross-page state recovery, and relay parameters between third-party pages, thereby improving stability in complex browser environments. It also enhances the service provider's ability to identify abnormal landing pages, abnormal agents, and abnormal ordering chains. By comprehensively judging the session state, page evidence state, action signature state, and risk signals, the service provider can alert, review, intercept code issuance, or intercept orders for abnormal chains.
[0179] Based on the above preferred embodiments, the present invention can further employ dynamic page watermarking or DOM random marking methods to enhance the binding relationship between page evidence and proof session.
[0180] After the proof session is created, the service provider's server generates dynamic page marker parameters for that proof session. These dynamic page marker parameters may include: proof session identifier, service provider's server-side random factor, page stage, agent identifier, activity identifier, issuance time, expiration time, and service provider's server-side signature.
[0181] After receiving the dynamic page tag parameter, the page evidence collection script adds the page tag to the third-party webpage. This page tag can take one of the following forms: visible watermark, semi-transparent watermark, hidden DOM node, data attribute, CSS pseudo-element, page badge, random text fragment, invisible tag that can be collected by DOM digest, or a page evidence collection identifier specified by the service provider.
[0182] When the page evidence collection script collects initial page evidence or page evidence before submission, it also collects the dynamic page tag. After receiving the page evidence, the service provider's server verifies whether the page evidence contains the dynamic page tag corresponding to the proof session.
[0183] In a further enhanced approach, the page evidence collection script can also calculate a page evidence digest containing dynamic page tags and request the embedded security container to sign the digest. The service provider simultaneously verifies: whether the page evidence contains dynamic page tags, whether the dynamic page tags were issued by the service provider, whether the dynamic page tags belong to the current proof session, whether the page evidence digest matches the embedded security container's signature, and whether the page evidence was bound to the current proof session before submission.
[0184] The entities responsible for implementing this expansion plan include: Evidence chain binding service: Generates dynamic page tag parameters; Page Evidence Collection Script: Writes dynamic page tags into the page and collects page evidence; Embedded secure container: Signs the page evidence digest; Page Evidence Storage Service: Saves page evidence; Evidence chain binding service: Verify dynamic page tags and signature declarations.
[0185] The logical relationship is as follows: proof session creation, the service provider generates dynamic page tag parameters, the page evidence collection script adds the dynamic page tag to the page, the dynamic page tag is recorded when collecting page evidence, the embedded security container signs the page evidence digest, the service provider verifies the dynamic page tag, proof session and signature declaration, and the page evidence and proof session complete the enhanced binding.
[0186] This extension can further enhance the binding strength between page evidence and proof session.
[0187] First, dynamic page tagging allows page evidence to contain random information generated by the service provider's server for the current proof session, reducing the risk that third-party operators may use historical screenshots, static screenshots, or other page evidence to impersonate previous proof session page evidence.
[0188] Second, the combination of dynamic page tagging and page evidence digest signature enables the service provider to simultaneously verify the relationship between "page evidence content" and "proof of session private key holding context".
[0189] Third, even if a third-party operator attempts to reuse old page evidence, the service provider's server can identify anomalies by the issuance time, expiration time, and session identifier marked on the dynamic page.
[0190] Fourth, this extended approach does not rely on a single form of evidence. Regardless of whether the page evidence is a screenshot, DOM digest, text digest, resource digest, or screen recording clip, as long as it contains or is associated with dynamic page tags, it can be used to strengthen the evidence chain.
[0191] like Figure 7 As shown, embodiments of the present invention also provide an apparatus 70 for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage, comprising: Module 71 is used to acquire page evidence collection scripts running on untrusted web pages; Processing module 72 is configured to create an embedded security container controlled by the service provider based on the page evidence collection script; generate a temporary proof key pair through the embedded security container and register the proof public key with the service provider; receive page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key; when a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration generated based on the pre-submission page evidence to the service provider; when a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security... The container enters a controlled business processing state, and the key business action is triggered in the embedded secure container. Based on the key business action triggered in the embedded secure container, the embedded secure container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered key business action from the service provider. The container receives the action challenge message sent by the service provider, signs the action challenge message according to the temporary proof private key to obtain an action signature declaration, and sends the action signature declaration to the service provider. When the service provider verifies the action signature declaration, the proof session state, and the binding relationship of the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
[0192] Optionally, a temporary proof key pair is generated through the embedded security container, and the proof public key is registered with the service provider, including: The embedded security container generates a temporary proof key pair through the browser cryptographic interface. The temporary proof key pair includes the proof public key and the temporary proof private key. The proof public key is uploaded to the service provider, and the temporary proof private key is stored inside the embedded security container.
[0193] Optionally, when a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration generated based on the pre-submission page evidence to the service provider, including: When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects page evidence before submission and generates a page evidence summary based on the page evidence before submission. The page evidence summary and page evidence collection binding parameters are sent to the embedded security container; The embedded security container signs the page evidence digest and page evidence collection binding parameters using the temporary proof private key to obtain the page evidence binding statement; The page evidence collection script sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration to the service provider.
[0194] Optionally, when a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters a controlled business processing state, and the critical business action is triggered within the embedded security container, including: When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script requests the embedded security container to switch from a hidden state, a semi-hidden state, or an embedded state to a visible state, a pop-up state, or a full-screen state. The embedded security container then displays a business processing interface controlled by the service provider to the user. The critical business action is triggered in the business processing interface of the embedded security container.
[0195] Optionally, methods for establishing a chain of evidence on a webpage also include: Once the page evidence collection script provided by the service provider is loaded on the untrusted webpage, or after the service provider creates a proof session based on the proof public key, the page evidence collection script collects initial page evidence and uploads the initial page evidence to the service provider; this enables the service provider to generate an initial page evidence identifier based on the initial page evidence and bind the initial page evidence identifier to the proof session.
[0196] This invention also provides a method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage, applied on the server side, including: Receive the proof public key sent by the embedded security container; A proof session is created based on the proof public key, and the proof session is bound to the proof public key; A proof session identifier and page evidence collection binding parameters are generated based on the proof session, and the proof session identifier and page evidence collection binding parameters are sent to the embedded security container; When a user triggers a critical business interaction on an untrusted webpage, the system receives pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration sent by the page evidence collection script. The pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection and binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration are verified to obtain the verification results. Based on the verification result, a pre-submission page evidence identifier is generated, and the pre-submission page identifier is bound to the proof session; When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the system receives an action challenge message request sent by the embedded security container. Generate an action challenge message corresponding to the key business action, and send the action challenge message to the embedded security container; Receive the action signature statement sent by the embedded security container, verify the action signature statement, the proof session state and the binding relationship of the pre-submission page evidence, and obtain the verification result; Based on the verification results, the execution result is sent to the user after the business action is performed.
[0197] Optionally, the pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection and binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration are validated to obtain validation results, including: Verify whether the page evidence collection binding parameters are valid, verify whether the page evidence binding declaration is verified by the proof public key corresponding to the current proof session, and verify the stage of the page evidence before submission to obtain the verification result.
[0198] It should be noted that this device is the same as the method described above. All implementations in the above method embodiments are applicable to the embodiments of this device and can achieve the same technical effect.
[0199] Embodiments of the present invention also provide a computing device, including: a processor and a memory storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, performs the method as described above. All implementations in the above method embodiments are applicable to this embodiment and can achieve the same technical effects.
[0200] Embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method as described above. All implementations in the above method embodiments are applicable to this embodiment and can achieve the same technical effects.
[0201] The above description represents the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various improvements and modifications without departing from the principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage, characterized in that, Applied to the front-end, including: Obtain the page evidence collection script running on an untrusted webpage; An embedded security container controlled by the service provider is created based on the page evidence collection script; A temporary proof key pair is generated through the embedded security container, and the proof public key is registered with the service provider. Receive the page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key; When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects page evidence before submission and sends the page evidence before submission, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding statement generated based on the page evidence before submission to the service provider. When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters a controlled business processing state, and the critical business action is triggered in the embedded security container. Based on the critical business action triggered in the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered critical business action from the service provider; Receive the action challenge message sent by the service provider, sign the action challenge message according to the temporary proof private key to obtain the action signature statement, and send the action signature statement to the service provider; When the service provider verifies the binding relationship between the action signature declaration, the session state proof, and the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
2. The method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage according to claim 1, characterized in that, Generating a temporary proof key pair through the embedded security container and registering the proof public key with the service provider includes: The embedded security container generates a temporary proof key pair through the browser cryptographic interface. The temporary proof key pair includes the proof public key and the temporary proof private key. The proof public key is uploaded to the service provider, and the temporary proof private key is stored inside the embedded security container.
3. The method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage according to claim 1, characterized in that, When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects pre-submission page evidence and sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration generated based on the pre-submission page evidence to the service provider, including: When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects page evidence before submission and generates a page evidence summary based on the page evidence before submission. The page evidence summary and page evidence collection binding parameters are sent to the embedded security container; The embedded security container signs the page evidence digest and page evidence collection binding parameters using the temporary proof private key to obtain the page evidence binding statement; The page evidence collection script sends the pre-submission page evidence, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration to the service provider.
4. The method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage according to claim 1, characterized in that, When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters a controlled business processing state. The critical business action is triggered within the embedded security container, including: When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script requests the embedded security container to switch from a hidden state, a semi-hidden state, or an embedded state to a visible state, a pop-up state, or a full-screen state. The embedded security container then displays a business processing interface controlled by the service provider to the user. The critical business action is triggered in the business processing interface of the embedded security container.
5. The method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: Once the page evidence collection script provided by the service provider is loaded on the untrusted webpage, or after the service provider creates a proof session based on the proof public key, the page evidence collection script collects initial page evidence and uploads the initial page evidence to the service provider. This enables the service provider to generate an initial page evidence identifier based on the initial page evidence, and bind the initial page evidence identifier to the proof session.
6. A method for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage, characterized in that, Applied to the server side, including: Receive the proof public key sent by the embedded security container; A proof session is created based on the proof public key, and the proof session is bound to the proof public key; A proof session identifier and page evidence collection binding parameters are generated based on the proof session, and the proof session identifier and page evidence collection binding parameters are sent to the embedded security container; When a user triggers a critical business interaction on an untrusted webpage, the system receives pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration sent by the page evidence collection script. The pre-submission page evidence, page evidence collection and binding parameters, and page evidence binding declaration are verified to obtain the verification results. Based on the verification result, a pre-submission page evidence identifier is generated, and the pre-submission page identifier is bound to the proof session; When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the system receives an action challenge message request sent by the embedded security container. Generate an action challenge message corresponding to the key business action, and send the action challenge message to the embedded security container; Receive the action signature statement sent by the embedded security container, verify the action signature statement, the proof session state and the binding relationship of the pre-submission page evidence, and obtain the verification result; Based on the verification results, the execution result is sent to the user after the business action is performed.
7. The method for binding a chain of evidence in a webpage according to claim 6, characterized in that, The page evidence submitted before submission, the page evidence collection and binding parameters, and the page evidence binding declaration are validated to obtain the validation results, including: Verify whether the page evidence collection binding parameters are valid, verify whether the page evidence binding declaration is verified by the proof public key corresponding to the current proof session, and verify the stage of the page evidence before submission to obtain the verification result.
8. A device for binding a chain of evidence on a webpage, characterized in that, include: The acquisition module is used to acquire page evidence collection scripts running on untrusted web pages; The processing module is used to create an embedded security container controlled by the service provider based on the page evidence collection script. A temporary proof key pair is generated through the embedded security container, and the proof public key is registered with the service provider. Receive the page evidence collection binding parameters sent by the service provider after creating a proof session based on the proof public key; When a user triggers a critical business interaction on the untrusted webpage, the page evidence collection script collects page evidence before submission and sends the page evidence before submission, the page evidence collection binding parameters, and the page evidence binding statement generated based on the page evidence before submission to the service provider. When a user triggers a critical business action on the untrusted webpage, the embedded security container enters a controlled business processing state, and the critical business action is triggered in the embedded security container. Based on the critical business action triggered in the embedded security container, the embedded security container requests an action challenge message corresponding to the triggered critical business action from the service provider; The system receives an action challenge message from the service provider, signs the action challenge message using a temporary proof private key to obtain an action signature statement, and sends the action signature statement to the service provider. When the service provider verifies the action signature statement, the proof session state, and the binding relationship of the pre-submission page evidence, the service provider executes the key business action and sends the execution result to the user.
9. A computing device, characterized in that, include: A processor, a memory storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, performs the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, A storage instruction that, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
