A matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification
By embedding tracking tags into the encryption key during the key generation stage and introducing a tracking verification component, the shortcomings of key tracking and consistency checks in existing matching attribute-based encryption methods are addressed, enabling trusted data transmission and accountability tracking in cloud computing environments.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611360981.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-03
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-10
AI Technical Summary
Existing matching attribute-based encryption methods lack traceability mechanisms and consistency checks for encryption keys in cloud computing environments, making it difficult to pinpoint responsibility for forgery and protect against key abuse. Furthermore, two-way access control mechanisms can be bypassed.
During the key generation phase, a tracking tag is embedded in the encryption key, and the tracking table is maintained by the key generation center. A tracking verification component is introduced to perform consistency checks through public parameters and encryption key structure, ensuring that the sender's identity is bound to the key and that the key is traceable.
It enables the location and accountability of abnormal keys, reducing the risk of data forgery and denial-of-service attacks, while retaining the original access control mechanism to achieve privacy protection and accountability for the sender.
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Figure CN123074709A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, specifically to data encryption and access control technology in cloud computing and fog computing environments, and particularly to a matching attribute-based encryption method that supports sender tracking and ciphertext verification. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development of cloud computing and fog computing, more and more IoT devices and terminals are uploading data to the cloud and edge nodes to achieve data sharing, remote collaboration, and intelligent analysis. However, in the cloud-fog-device three-layer architecture, data faces security risks from multiple untrusted entities (such as cloud servers and fog nodes) during transmission and storage, including data leakage, identity forgery, and malicious data injection.
[0003] To ensure data confidentiality in outsourced environments, traditional methods typically employ Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) to protect data, ensuring that only users meeting a specific set of attributes can decrypt it. However, standard ABE primarily addresses "receiver access control," failing to effectively constrain the data sender or efficiently identify the data source. Against this backdrop, researchers further proposed the concept of Matchmaking Encryption (ME), and on this basis, developed Matchmaking Attribute-Based Encryption (MABE). Specifically, the sender binds its own set of attributes and access policies when encrypting data, while the receiver not only needs to meet the decryption policy but can also filter the ciphertext by source, thus filtering out invalid data that does not meet the conditions before decryption.
[0004] While existing MABE schemes have improved the controllability and availability of encrypted data to some extent, they still face many challenges in ensuring security in cloud computing environments, specifically in the following three aspects:
[0005] (1) The lack of a traceable mechanism for encryption keys makes it difficult to pinpoint responsibility for forgery. (2) The lack of an encryption key consistency check mechanism makes it difficult to detect tampered or illegally constructed keys. (3) When both the sender's key and the receiver's private key are leaked, the two-way access control mechanism may be bypassed entirely.
[0006] In summary, the core challenge of the aforementioned issues lies in how to introduce a traceable and verifiable mechanism for encryption keys without compromising the existing MABE two-way access control and sender privacy protection capabilities. This requires not only establishing a secure binding between the encryption key and the sender's identity during the key generation stage, but also achieving the necessary traceability capabilities without exposing the sender's true identity. Summary of the Invention
[0007] To address the aforementioned issues, this invention discloses a matching attribute-based encryption method that supports sender tracking and ciphertext verification. This method effectively overcomes the shortcomings of existing solutions that rely solely on attribute matching for data source identification, enhances the system's resistance to forgery attacks, key abuse attacks, and fake data stream attacks, and provides stronger security support for trusted data transmission in scenarios such as cloud computing, IoT data sharing, and industrial automation. It has high theoretical research value and practical application prospects.
[0008] A matching attribute-based encryption method that supports sender tracking and ciphertext verification specifically includes the following steps:
[0009] Step 1: System initialization. The key generation center generates public parameters and master key based on security parameters, and initializes the tracking table.
[0010] Step 2: Encryption key generation. The key generation center generates an encryption key based on the sender attribute set, assigns a unique tracking tag to the encryption key, and records the mapping relationship between the tracking tag and the sender's identity in the tracking table.
[0011] Step 3: Decryption key generation, the key generation center generates a decryption key based on the receiver's access structure;
[0012] Step 4: Data encryption. The data sender uses the encryption key to encrypt the message according to the receiver attribute set and the sender attribute subset, generating a complete ciphertext containing the verification component.
[0013] Step 5: Ciphertext verification and filtering. Fog nodes perform verification on the complete ciphertext according to the sender access policy submitted by the receiver. If the verification passes, the ciphertext is retained; otherwise, it is discarded.
[0014] Step 6: Data decryption. The data receiver uses the decryption key to decrypt the verified ciphertext and recover the original message.
[0015] Step 7: Key tracking and verification. The key generation center performs a legality check on the encryption key to be detected. If it passes the check, it queries the tracking table based on the tracking tag and outputs the corresponding sender identity.
[0016] The beneficial effects of this invention are:
[0017] (1) During the key generation stage, a tracking tag is embedded in the sender's encryption key, and the key generation center maintains the tracking table to realize the mapping between the tracking tag and the sender's identity. When abnormal ciphertext or key abuse occurs, the source of the corresponding key can be located according to the tracking tag, thereby enhancing the system's ability to trace responsibility.
[0018] (2) By introducing a tracking verification component into the public parameters and encryption key structure, the property component, randomization component and tracking tag in the encryption key are checked for consistency, and abnormal keys that have been tampered with, spliced or illegally constructed are identified.
[0019] (3) Binding the ciphertext generation process to a verifiable encryption key enables the system to not only determine whether the sender's attributes meet the access policy, but also to verify the source of the encryption key when necessary, thereby reducing the risk of forged data, data flooding and denial-of-service attacks.
[0020] (4) The original scheme retains the sender access control, receiver access control, and fog node outsourced ciphertext filtering mechanism, enabling fog nodes to filter irrelevant ciphertext before decryption, and the receiver to restore plaintext only when the access conditions are met. At the same time, the newly added tracing process is triggered as an anomaly audit module on demand, without affecting the normal encryption, verification, and decryption process.
[0021] (5) The tracking table is only stored by the key generation center. During normal data sharing, the sender’s real identity is not exposed to fog nodes, cloud servers or receivers. The ciphertext is filtered only by the sender’s attributes. However, in the event of key abuse or data forgery, the trusted key generation center can locate the actual sender based on the tracking tag, thereby achieving both sender privacy protection and accountable tracking. Attached Figure Description
[0022] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a matching attribute-based encryption system architecture that supports sender tracking and ciphertext verification, provided by an embodiment of the present invention;
[0023] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of implementing the method of the present invention;
[0024] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of encrypted text verification and filtering provided in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0025] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the key tracking and inspection mechanism provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0026] The main entities involved in the diagram include:
[0027] Key Generation Center (KGC): Responsible for system initialization, key generation and distribution, and maintaining the tracking table;
[0028] Data sender (ED): Collects data and generates ciphertext using an encryption key containing tracking tags;
[0029] Data Receiver (DU): Submits the desired sender access policy and recovers the plaintext using the decryption key;
[0030] Fog Node (FN): Performs Verify filtering, caches and forwards ciphertext from authorized senders;
[0031] Cloud Server (CSP): Stores long-term encrypted data and responds to encrypted retrieval requests from fog nodes. Detailed Implementation
[0032] The present invention will be further illustrated below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. It should be understood that the following specific embodiments are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. It should be noted that the terms "front," "rear," "left," "right," "up," and "down" used in the following description refer to directions in the accompanying drawings, and the terms "inner" and "outer" refer to directions toward or away from the geometric center of a specific component, respectively.
[0033] Example 1: Medical Data Sharing System
[0034] This embodiment proposes a bidirectional, fine-grained attribute access control encryption system that supports sender traceability, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the system includes a Key Generation Center (KGC), a Data Sender (ED), a Cloud Server (CSP), a Fog Node (FN), and a Data Receiver (DU). It can be widely applied in scenarios such as medical data sharing, enterprise sensitive data hosting, IoT terminal data uploading, and cloud-fog collaborative data access control. The following detailed description of this embodiment, combined with illustrations and operational procedures, further illustrates the concept.
[0035] The application of this invention in a medical data sharing system includes the following steps, such as: Figure 2 As shown:
[0036] Step 1: System Initialization
[0037] The Key Generation Center (KGC) first determines the security parameters. Run the bilinear group generator to generate the bilinear group structure:
[0038]
[0039] in, and For prime numbers of order 1 cyclic group For the group generator, It is a bilinear mapping. yes multiplication group ={1,2,…,p−1}, then KGC randomly selects the master key parameters. And select the system tracking parameters used for the tracking mechanism. .
[0040] At the same time, KGC defines three hash functions:
[0041]
[0042] in, Used to process sender attributes. Used to handle receiver attributes This is a collision-resistant hash function used to bind key components of the ciphertext to the sender's encryption key, thereby preventing attackers from replacing or forging the ciphertext content or attribute information. KGC further adds the public component corresponding to the tracking parameters to the master public key for subsequent ciphermer tracking and key consistency checks.
[0043] Finally, KGC outputs the master public key:
[0044]
[0045] And the master private key:
[0046]
[0047] And initialize the tracking table:
[0048]
[0049] Used to record the mapping relationship between the sender's tracking tag and the sender's real identity.
[0050] Step 2: Generating the sender's encryption key
[0051] When a data owner (ED) in a healthcare institution requests system access, KGC first obtains their identity identifier. And the sender's attribute set:
[0052]
[0053] For example, in a medical data sharing scenario, the sender attribute set of a data owner can be represented as:
[0054]
[0055] KGC randomly selects sender tracking tags and random numbers And based on the master private key and attribute set Execute encryption key generation algorithm For each sender attribute KGC according to Calculate the corresponding attribute key components and generate the sender's encryption key:
[0056]
[0057] in, For tracking tags used to identify the sender, Components for key consistency checks related to tracking tags.
[0058] Meanwhile, KGC in the tracking table Chinese record:
[0059]
[0060] That is, to establish tracking tags With the sender's identity The mapping relationship between them. This tracking table is only stored by KGC. Fog nodes, cloud servers, and ordinary receivers cannot directly know the sender's true identity from the encrypted text, thus protecting the sender's privacy during normal access.
[0061] Step 3: Recipient decryption key generation
[0062] When the receiving DU requests data access permissions, the KGC generates a corresponding personalized decryption key based on its access eligibility. The receiving DU access structure is denoted as follows:
[0063]
[0064] in, To access the linear secret shared matrix corresponding to the structure, This is a mapping function from matrix rows to receiver attributes. For example, in a medical data sharing scenario, the receiver access structure can be represented as:
[0065]
[0066] In other words, only recipients with the attributes of "medical institution" and "authorized subject", or recipients with the attribute of "regulatory agency", can meet the access structure.
[0067] KGC randomly selects vectors:
[0068]
[0069] And according to the access matrix Calculate the secret share:
[0070]
[0071] For each attribute row in the access structure, KGC randomly selects a corresponding random number and, based on... Generate the decryption key component. Finally, output the receiver's decryption key:
[0072]
[0073] The decryption key is bound to the receiver access structure. The receiver can only successfully recover the original message if the set of receiver attributes set in the ciphertext satisfies the access structure.
[0074] Step 4: Data Encryption and Upload
[0075] Medical data owner ED is preparing to upload patient medical data. First, determine the set of recipient attributes that are allowed to access the data:
[0076]
[0077] For example:
[0078]
[0079] At the same time, the sender uses its own attribute set Select the subset of attributes to be used for this encryption:
[0080]
[0081] For example:
[0082]
[0083] The sender obtains the encryption key. Chinese parsing tracking tags And randomly select an encrypted random number. The sender then executes the encryption algorithm:
[0084]
[0085] Generate ciphertext:
[0086]
[0087] in, Used to hide the original message , Used for receiver access control. Used for sender attribute validation and ciphertext integrity binding. Specifically, the sender generates... Introducing collision-resistant hash functions By hashing key components of the ciphertext, attackers cannot replace the ciphertext content or forge sender attributes without breaking the verification equation.
[0088] After generating the ciphertext, the sender will send the ciphertext. Upload to the cloud server CSP or a nearby fog node FN. The cloud server is mainly responsible for long-term storage of the encrypted text, while the fog node is mainly responsible for subsequent ciphertext filtering and forwarding.
[0089] Step 5: Fog Node Ciphertext Verification and Filtering
[0090] When the receiver DU needs to retrieve medical data that meets the conditions, it first submits the sender access policy to the fog node FN:
[0091]
[0092] in, The linear secret sharing matrix corresponding to the sender access structure. This is a mapping function for matrix rows to sender attributes. For example, if the receiver wants to obtain data from the cardiology department of a legitimate medical institution, the sender access policy can be set as follows:
[0093]
[0094] Fog node FN obtains a set of candidate ciphertexts from local cache or cloud server CSP:
[0095]
[0096] Subsequently, the fog nodes perform a verification algorithm for each candidate ciphertext:
[0097]
[0098] Fog nodes (FNs) retrieve a set of candidate ciphertexts from their local cache or cloud server (CSP). Then, the fog node performs a verification algorithm on each candidate ciphertext, such as... Figure 3 As shown.
[0099] Specifically, fog nodes parse a subset of sender attributes from the ciphertext. And related verification components, and according to the access policy Find the set of attribute indices that satisfy the policy. If the sender's attributes in the ciphertext satisfy the access policy specified by the receiver, the verification algorithm outputs 1, and the fog node adds the ciphertext to the matching result set; otherwise, it outputs 0, and the fog node discards the ciphertext.
[0100] Step Six: Recipient Decrypts
[0101] The fog node returns the filtered matching ciphertext to the receiver DU. The receiver then obtains the ciphertext. Then, using its own decryption key Execute the decryption algorithm:
[0102]
[0103] The receiver first checks the set of receiver attributes set in the ciphertext. Does it satisfy the access structure corresponding to its decryption key? If satisfied, the receiver accesses the set of attribute indices that meet the conditions within the access structure. The corresponding reconstruction coefficients are obtained, and bilinear pairing operations are performed on the decryption key component and the ciphertext component to finally eliminate the random mask term and restore the original medical data. If the receiver's attributes do not satisfy the access structure, or if the ciphertext is tampered with, causing the pairing relationship to be invalid, the decryption algorithm will output an error symbol: This indicates that decryption failed.
[0104] Step 7: Sender Tracking in Dispute Scenario
[0105] like Figure 4 As shown, when disputes occur in the system such as ciphertext forgery, sender denial, key leakage, or illegal data upload, the regulator or recipient can submit the encryption key to be tested to KGC. Or key material related to disputed ciphertext. KGC execution tracing algorithm:
[0106]
[0107] KGC first parses the tracking tag in the encryption key to be detected. The key structure and its attributes are checked, and a key validity check is performed. If the key structure is incomplete, the trace components are inconsistent, or any attribute key component fails the validity check, the KGC outputs: This indicates that the key is invalid or cannot be traced.
[0108] If all key validity checks pass, KGC will proceed based on the tracking tag. Query Tracking Table :
[0109]
[0110] If a corresponding entry exists in the tracking table, output the sender's true identity. This allows for the determination of responsibility in disputed scenarios; if no corresponding entry exists in the tracking table, then output... This indicates that the tracking failed.
[0111] Through the above process, this embodiment does not expose the sender's true identity to fog nodes, cloud servers, or receivers during normal data sharing, and only completes ciphertext filtering through sender attributes; while in the event of key abuse or data forgery, the trusted KGC can locate the actual sender based on the tracking tag, thereby simultaneously achieving sender privacy protection and accountable tracking.
[0112] Example 2: Enterprise Document Management System.
[0113] Within an enterprise's internal information system, employees from different departments need to access, upload, or retrieve various documents stored in the cloud, such as contract documents, design plans, financial statements, audit materials, personnel files, and project data. To ensure secure access to sensitive documents, granular authorization, encrypted document screening, and accountability, the encryption system proposed in this invention is adaptable to the following business processes.
[0114] Step 1: System Initialization
[0115] Enterprise Information Center as When deploying the system, first, based on security parameters Run the bilinear group generator to generate the bilinear group structure:
[0116]
[0117] in, and For prime numbers of order 1 cyclic group For the group generator, It is a bilinear mapping. yes multiplication group ={1,2,…,p−1}, then Randomly select master key parameters:
[0118]
[0119] And additionally select tracking parameters:
[0120]
[0121] Used for subsequent verification of encryption key validity and traceability of the sender's identity.
[0122] at the same time, Define three hash functions:
[0123]
[0124] in, Used to map sender attributes, such as "Finance Department", "Contract Administrator", "Project A Member", etc. Used to map recipient attributes, such as "department manager", "auditor", "legal personnel", etc. It is a collision-resistant hash function used to bind key components of ciphertext to the sender's encryption key, preventing attackers from tampering with the ciphertext or forging the sender's attributes.
[0125] After system initialization, Output the master public key:
[0126]
[0127] And the master private key:
[0128]
[0129] And initialize the internal enterprise tracking form:
[0130]
[0131] This tracking table is used to record the mapping relationship between subsequent sender tracking tags and the real identities of company employees.
[0132] Step 2: Generating the sender's encryption key
[0133] When an employee registers for the system for the first time and applies for document upload permissions... Obtain the employee's identification:
[0134]
[0135] And its sender attribute set:
[0136]
[0137] For example, if an employee belongs to the finance department and has contract filing permissions and project A participation permissions, then their attribute set can be represented as:
[0138]
[0139] Subsequently, Randomly select sender tracking tags:
[0140]
[0141] And random numbers:
[0142]
[0143] And based on the master private key and sender attribute set Execute the encryption key generation algorithm:
[0144]
[0145] For each sender attribute , Calculate the corresponding attribute key components to generate the sender's encryption key:
[0146]
[0147] in, For sender tracking tags, Components for key consistency checks related to tracking tags.
[0148] at the same time, In the tracking table Chinese record:
[0149]
[0150] That is, to establish tracking tags The true identity of company employees The mapping relationship between them. This mapping relationship is only stored by the enterprise information center. Cloud servers, fog nodes, and ordinary recipients cannot directly identify the true identity of the document uploader based solely on the encrypted text.
[0151] Step 3: Recipient decryption key generation
[0152] When company employees, department heads, legal personnel, or auditors need to access company documents A personalized decryption key is generated based on the recipient's position, department, project permissions, and approval level. The recipient's access structure is denoted as follows:
[0153]
[0154] in, For a linear secret sharing matrix, This is a mapping function from matrix rows to receiver attributes.
[0155] For example, in an enterprise document management system, the access structure for a certain type of contract file can be set as follows:
[0156]
[0157] This indicates that only users with both "Legal Department" and "Contract Review Authority" permissions, or users with both "Finance Department" and "Department Manager" permissions, can decrypt this type of contract document.
[0158] Randomly select vectors:
[0159]
[0160] And according to the access matrix Calculate the secret share:
[0161]
[0162] For each attribute row in the access structure Randomly select a corresponding random number and combine it with a hash function. Generate the decryption key components. Finally, Output the receiver's personalized decryption key:
[0163]
[0164] This key can only decrypt ciphertext that meets the corresponding access structure, thereby enabling fine-grained access control of enterprise documents.
[0165] Step 4: Enterprise Document Encryption and Upload
[0166] When the sender Preparing to upload company documents First, based on the document type, set the set of recipient attributes that are allowed to access the document:
[0167]
[0168] For example, for a budget approval document for project A, the recipient attribute set can be set as follows:
[0169]
[0170] At the same time, the sender uses its own attribute set Select the subset of sender attributes used in this encryption:
[0171]
[0172] For example:
[0173]
[0174] Subsequently, the sender obtains its encryption key. Chinese parsing tracking tags Randomly select an encrypted random number:
[0175]
[0176] And execute the encryption algorithm:
[0177]
[0178] Generate ciphertext:
[0179]
[0180] in, Used to hide plaintext corporate documents , and Used for receiver access control. , and Used for sender attribute verification and ciphertext integrity binding.
[0181] During the ciphertext generation process, the sender uses a collision-resistant hash function. By binding key components of the ciphertext, attackers can make it difficult to replace document content, tamper with access attributes, or impersonate legitimate senders to generate new ciphertexts, even if they obtain historical ciphertexts.
[0182] After the ciphertext is generated, the sender will: Uploaded to enterprise cloud document server Alternatively, upload to fog nodes such as enterprise gateways and edge servers first. Then, the fog nodes forward the documents to the cloud server based on the document type and storage policy.
[0183] Step 5: Fog Node Ciphertext Verification and Filtering
[0184] When the receiver When retrieving enterprise documents, first search the fog node. Submit sender access policy:
[0185]
[0186] in, The linear secret sharing matrix corresponding to the sender access structure. This is a mapping function from matrix rows to sender attributes.
[0187] For example, if a department manager wants to retrieve "contract documents uploaded by the finance department and held by a contract administrator," the sender access policy can be set as follows:
[0188]
[0189] Fog Node Based on this access policy, access can be made from local cache or cloud server. Obtain the candidate ciphertext set:
[0190]
[0191] Subsequently, the fog nodes perform a verification algorithm for each candidate ciphertext:
[0192]
[0193] If the sender attribute subset in the ciphertext Satisfy access policy ,but If the output is 1, the fog node adds the ciphertext to the matching result set; if the match is not found, the output is 0, and the fog node filters the ciphertext.
[0194] Through this process, fog nodes can complete sender attribute verification and ciphertext filtering without decrypting document content, preventing the receiver from downloading and attempting to decrypt a large number of irrelevant documents, thereby reducing the computing and network transmission overhead of enterprise terminal devices.
[0195] Step Six: The recipient decrypts the document.
[0196] The fog node returns the filtered matching ciphertext to the receiver. The recipient obtains the encrypted message. Then, using its own decryption key Execute the decryption algorithm:
[0197]
[0198] The receiver first checks the set of receiver attributes set in the ciphertext. Does it satisfy the access structure corresponding to its decryption key? If satisfied, the receiver uses the attribute index set that satisfies the access structure. Calculate the reconstruction coefficients and perform bilinear pairing operations on the ciphertext components and decryption key components to eliminate the encryption random mask and recover the plaintext of the enterprise document: If the receiver lacks sufficient permissions, its attributes do not meet the access structure, or the ciphertext is tampered with during transmission or storage, the decryption algorithm outputs: This indicates that decryption failed or access was denied.
[0199] Step 7: Sender Tracking in Dispute Scenario
[0200] When disputes arise within an enterprise, such as document forgery, unauthorized uploads, key leaks, employee denials of uploads, or abuse of privileges, the enterprise's audit department or system administrator can contact the relevant authorities. Submit the encryption key to be tested Disputed encrypted information or suspicious upload records.
[0201] Execution tracing algorithm:
[0202]
[0203] first, Parsing the tracking tag in the encryption key to be detected:
[0204]
[0205] And the corresponding attribute key components. Then... Perform validity checks on the key structure, tracking component, and attribute component. If an incomplete key structure, inconsistent tracking tags, or an attribute key component fails verification, output the following: This indicates that the key is invalid or cannot be traced.
[0206] If all legality checks pass Query tracking table:
[0207]
[0208] If a corresponding record exists in the tracking table, output the identity of the actual sender:
[0209]
[0210] This allows you to locate employees who have uploaded content improperly or misused security keys. If no corresponding record is found in the tracking table, the following output will be displayed: This indicates that the tracking failed.
[0211] Through the above process, this embodiment can achieve the following effects in enterprise document management scenarios: During normal document sharing, the cloud server and fog nodes cannot know the plaintext content of the document, and the recipient cannot directly identify the sender's true identity; During access control, the system can simultaneously constrain "who can upload approved documents" and "who can decrypt and access documents"; During retrieval, fog nodes can outsource the screening of encrypted text to improve document retrieval efficiency; In the event of a dispute, the enterprise information center can locate the actual uploader based on tracking tags and tracking tables, achieving a balance between privacy protection and accountability.
[0212] The technical means disclosed in this invention are not limited to those disclosed in the above embodiments, but also include technical solutions composed of any combination of the above technical features.
Claims
1. A matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification, characterized in that, Specifically, the steps include the following: Step 1: System initialization. The key generation center generates public parameters and a master key based on security parameters, and initializes the tracking table. The tracking table is maintained only by the key generation center. Step 2: Encryption key generation. The key generation center generates an encryption key based on the sender attribute set, assigns a unique tracking tag to the encryption key, and records the mapping relationship between the tracking tag and the sender's identity in the tracking table. Step 3: Decryption key generation, the key generation center generates a decryption key based on the receiver's access structure; Step 4: Data encryption. The data sender uses the encryption key to encrypt the message according to the receiver attribute set and the sender attribute subset, generating a complete ciphertext containing the verification component. Step 5: Ciphertext Verification and Filtering. Fog nodes perform verification without decrypting the ciphertext. Fog nodes verify the complete ciphertext according to the sender access policy submitted by the receiver. If the verification passes, the ciphertext is retained; otherwise, it is discarded. Step 6: Data decryption. The data receiver uses the decryption key to decrypt the verified ciphertext and recover the original message. Step 7: Key tracking and verification. The key generation center performs a legality check on the encryption key to be detected. If it passes the check, it queries the tracking table based on the tracking tag and outputs the corresponding sender identity.
2. The matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step 1 specifically includes the following steps: Step 11: The Key Generation Center (KGC) first determines the security parameters... Run the bilinear group generator to generate the bilinear group structure. ;in, and For prime numbers of order 1 cyclic group For the group generator, It is a bilinear mapping. yes multiplication group ={1,2,…,p−1}, randomly select the master key parameters. And select the system tracking parameters used for the tracking mechanism. ; Step 12: Define three hash functions: ; ; ; in, Used to process sender attributes. Used to handle receiver attributes A collision-resistant hash function is used to bind key components of the ciphertext to the sender's encryption key; finally, KGC outputs the master public key: ; and the master private key: ; Step 13: Initialize the tracking table It is used to record the mapping relationship between the sender's tracking tag and the sender's real identity.
3. The matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2 specifically includes the following: Step 21: Randomly select sender tracking tags , and random numbers , ; Step 22: , It is a tracking tag used to identify the sender; Step 22: For the sender attribute set For each attribute in the dataset, calculate: ; ; ; Step 24: Output: Encryption Key ; Step 25: The key generation center records the mapping relationship in the tracking table. Establish the correspondence between the tracking tags and the sender's identity.
4. The matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 3 specifically includes the following: Step 31: Parse the receiver's access structure: ,in: It is a linear secret sharing matrix. ∈{0,1,2,…,p−1}, The number of rows in the matrix represents the total number of accessed structure fragments. Number of columns in a matrix It is a mapping function used to map matrix row indices to receiver attributes. Step 32: Randomly select a vector: And calculate the secret share vector: ; Step 33: For each row The algorithm selects randomly: And calculate: ; Step 34: Decrypt the key .
5. A matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 4 specifically includes the following: Step 41: Encryption Key Chinese parsing tracking tags Select the set of receiver attributes and the subset of sender attributes used in this encryption. ,in ; Step 42: Random selection: ,for ,calculate: , , ; Step 43 Calculation: , , , ; Step 44: Let Represents the following binary string: ; Step 45: For According to the encryption key The corresponding attribute key component ,calculate: ; ; Step 46: Output the ciphertext: 。 6. The matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 5 specifically includes the following: Step 51: Parse the sender access structure submitted by the receiver. ,in: It is a linear secret sharing matrix. It is a mapping function used to map matrix row indices to sender attributes. Step 52: Randomly select vectors for verification. The algorithm randomly selects: And calculate: ,make To satisfy the sender's access structure index set; and find a set , so that: ; Step 53: Verify whether the following equation is true: If true, add the ciphertext to the candidate ciphertext set; otherwise, discard the ciphertext. Output the set of candidate ciphertexts that have passed the verification.
7. A matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 6 specifically includes the following: Step 61: Let To satisfy the decryption algorithm of the index set of the receiver's access structure, a set is selected. , so that: ;; Step 62: Calculation: , Restoring plaintext ,in It is an attribute In the receiver's attribute set The index in, and satisfying: .
8. A matching attribute-based encryption method supporting sender tracking and ciphertext verification according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 7 specifically includes: Step 71: The tracing algorithm parses the encryption key to be detected. ; Step 72: Perform a key validity check; like Not valid, or If not true, output ; Subsequent checks: ; and for all examine: ; If any of the above equations are false, then output ; Step 73: If all checks pass, proceed according to the tracking sheet. Query Corresponding sender identity and output: If the entry does not exist in the tracking table, output the following: .
