A decentralized identity management method that is resistant to collusion and can be monitored

By using masked XOR, threshold secret sharing, and zero-knowledge proof techniques, a hidden identity is generated and a signature key is distributed, which solves the problem of conspiracy attacks in decentralized identity management systems, achieves a balance between the security and privacy of identity information, and enhances the robustness and auditability of the system.

CN123122799APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17XIDIAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611138191.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-07-29
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing decentralized identity management systems cannot effectively prevent multiple malicious parties from forging credentials or leaking user information when facing collusion attacks. They also lack auditability and user anonymity, and cannot ensure that each real identity corresponds to a valid credential while protecting user privacy.

Method used

Employing masked XOR, threshold secret sharing, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof techniques, users generate hidden identities and share them secretly. Through secure multi-party computation and commitment value verification, a unique signature key pair is generated, supporting the generation of unlinkable pseudonyms in different contexts, thus achieving decentralized key distribution and anonymous signatures.

Benefits of technology

It enhances the ability to resist collusion attacks, ensures the consistency and accuracy of user identity information across different issuers, achieves a balance between security and privacy, prevents users from forging multiple false identities, supports legitimate regulatory traceability, and enhances the robustness and security of the system.

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Abstract

This invention discloses a decentralized identity management method that is resistant to collusion and can be monitored, relating to the fields of cryptography and information security. The method includes: a user generating a hidden identity by XORing a randomly generated mask value with their real identity; the user secretly sharing the hidden identity, generating a commitment value, and broadcasting it to the issuer; the user generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based on the commitment value and multiple hidden identity shares, and anonymously sending it to the corresponding issuer; each issuer verifying the received commitment value and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof; if the verification passes, each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation and sends it to the user; after receiving multiple signature key shares from all issuers, the user aggregates the multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair; the user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and context. This invention can improve the ability to resist collusion attacks.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of cryptography and information security, specifically relating to a decentralized identity management method that is anti-collusion and can be monitored. Background Technology

[0002] The most prominent feature of our time is "digitalization." With the development of the digital economy, the demand for digital identity management in scenarios such as finance, government affairs, healthcare, and social networking is constantly increasing. Digital identity has undergone a transformation from centralized identity to consortium identity to decentralized identity. Decentralized identity management mechanisms allow users to manage their identities autonomously, without needing a trusted central authority to access services requiring identity verification. However, under decentralized identity, collusion attacks are a significant and unavoidable problem. This refers to multiple malicious parties holding different, legitimate identity credentials colluding and sharing information to forge credentials or personal information that should not be possessed.

[0003] Existing identity management systems either lack any oversight mechanism or rely on a single centralized oversight entity, resulting in a lack of auditability. Most existing systems depend on a centralized issuer or a single authoritative node; if this node is attacked or malfunctions, the system will cease to function properly, and user privacy will be completely exposed to the central node. While some solutions introduce distributed components, they still exhibit centralized tendencies and fail to achieve fully decentralized issuance services. To resist Sybil attacks, existing identity management systems typically require users to provide their real identity information, severely compromising user anonymity. Furthermore, to maintain anonymity, they cannot effectively prevent the same user from forging multiple identities. In other words, it is difficult to protect user privacy while ensuring that each real identity corresponds to only one valid credential. Additionally, existing identity management methods do not consider the collusion problem caused by multiple nodes. If issuers or authentication nodes collude, they can reconstruct sensitive user identity information or forge credentials. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention aims to at least solve the aforementioned technical problems existing in the prior art. To this end, this invention provides a decentralized identity management method that is anti-collusion and capable of being monitored, the method comprising: Users generate a hidden identity by XORing a randomly generated mask value with their real identity. Users secretly share their hidden identities, generate commitment values, and broadcast them to the issuer. The user generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based on the commitment value and multiple hidden identity shares, and anonymously sends it to the corresponding issuer; the hidden identity shares are obtained by splitting the hidden identity through secret sharing; Each issuer verifies the received commitment value and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. If the verification passes, each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation and sends it to the user. After receiving multiple signature key shares from all issuers, the user aggregates the multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair. The user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context.

[0005] Optionally, before generating the user's hidden identity by XORing a randomly generated mask value with their real identity, the method further includes: Activate all issuers participating in the generation of signature key pairs, and generate a signature secret key, a verification key, and a public verification key for each issuer using threshold secret sharing; Verify the legitimacy of the issuer set and the real identities of users.

[0006] Optionally, each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation, including: The issuer generates a first and second intermediate value for the user's signature key based on the selected random number, the issuer's signature secret key, and the user's hidden identity, and invokes a secure multi-party multiplication protocol. A secure multi-party computation check is performed. If the check passes, the first intermediate value and the second intermediate value are exponentialized based on random numbers to obtain the signature key share.

[0007] Optionally, the security multi-party computation check includes: Check whether the verification key of each issuer can be uniquely derived from the signature secret key through exponentiation of the group generator; Check whether the hidden identity share of each issuer matches the promised value; Check that the sets of public keys and commitment values ​​provided by all issuers are completely consistent.

[0008] Optionally, the step of aggregating multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair includes: Users aggregate the signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain signature key pairs; Verify the validity of the secret key in the signature key pair; If the verification result is valid, the user records the signature key pair.

[0009] Optionally, verifying the validity of the secret key in the signature key pair includes: Verify whether the secret keys in the signature key pair are matched; Verify whether the relationship between the verification key in the signature key pair, the issuer's verification key, and the user's hidden identity is correct.

[0010] Optionally, the user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context, including: The user receives a message from the environment; the message includes context. The user checks whether the signature key pair and the verification keys of all issuers have been recorded. If they have been recorded, the user calls a hash function to map the context to elements in group G. The user generates a pseudonym using the secret key and context in the signature key pair.

[0011] Optionally, after the user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context, the method further includes: The user encrypts the signature key pair to obtain a first encryption component and a second encryption component; Users generate evidence of the binding between the pseudonym, the signature key pair, the first encryption component, the second encryption component, and the secret key in the signature key pair and the issuer's verification key using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The user generates a signature for the message based on the evidence and the zero-knowledge proof statement.

[0012] The present invention has at least the following beneficial effects: 1. This invention, based on mask XOR, threshold secret sharing, commitment, and zero-knowledge proofs, ensures that even if more than a threshold number of issuers collude, they can only obtain the identity hidden by a random mask, and cannot obtain the real identity, thus improving the ability to resist collusion attacks. Simultaneously, commitment and zero-knowledge proofs guarantee the consistency and correctness of user identity information across different issuers. 2. This invention maps the hidden identity to a unique signature key pair, and generates a unique pseudonym for each scenario through the signature key pair. This invention can effectively prevent users from forging multiple fake identities, and also ensure that pseudonyms generated by the same user in different contexts cannot be linked, thus achieving a balance between security and privacy. 3. This invention uses threshold secret sharing to distribute the global key to multiple independent issuer nodes, thereby achieving decentralization. Attacks or failures of any single node will not affect the operation of the system, and user privacy is no longer exposed to a single issuer, thus improving the robustness and security of the system. Attached Figure Description

[0013] Figure 1 This is a process of a decentralized identity management method that is anti-collusion and capable of being monitored, provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 ; Figure 2 This is a process of a decentralized identity management method that is anti-collusion and capable of being monitored, provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 ; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a decentralized identity management system that is anti-collusion and can be monitored, provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0014] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments, but the implementation of the present invention is not limited thereto.

[0015] This invention can be applied to threshold issuance and regulated anonymous signature scenarios in the field of digital identity management, realizing decentralized credential issuance based on threshold secret sharing and context-bound signatures to meet users' needs for compliant identity authentication while protecting their privacy. Current internet applications across various fields increasingly demand user privacy protection, and user identity information is often deeply linked to their financial assets, behavioral records, and social relationships, leading to a continuously rising risk of identity leakage. This invention aims to protect the privacy of users' real identity information while enabling anonymous authentication and supporting legitimate regulatory traceability. This invention employs threshold secret sharing, mask XOR, and zero-knowledge proof technologies for identity concealment and issuance verification, possessing stronger anti-collusion capabilities and thus achieving higher system security. Since users need to interact with different issuers in different application scenarios and may face key loss, secure issuance and verification of identity credentials are required. This invention implements decentralized issuance based on a distributed key generation protocol and supports users in generating unlinkable pseudonyms in different contexts, thereby achieving a balance between anonymity and auditability.

[0016] This invention provides a decentralized identity management method that is anti-collusion and capable of oversight, such as... Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, it includes the following steps: Step 101: The user generates a hidden identity by XORing the randomly generated mask value with the real identity.

[0017] In one possible implementation, before the user generates a hidden identity by XORing a randomly generated mask value with their real identity, the method further includes: Activate all issuers participating in the generation of signature key pairs, and generate a signature secret key, a verification key, and a public verification key for each issuer using threshold secret sharing; Verify the legitimacy of the issuer set and the real identities of users.

[0018] This invention also provides a collusion-resistant and oversight-compliant decentralized identity management system. This system model is compatible with distributed ledgers, edge computing nodes, and terminal devices, exhibiting strong scalability and feasibility. (Refer to...) Figure 3 The system includes users, multiple issuers, and validators.

[0019] User: After verifying the legitimacy of their identity, the user randomly generates a mask value, XORs it with their real identity to generate a hidden identity. They then commit to the mask value and generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. If a regulatory body subsequently requests the user to disclose their identity information, the user can send this zero-knowledge proof to that body to disclose their identity. Next, the user secretly shares the hidden identity and generates a commitment value, which is broadcast to the issuer. Based on the commitment value and the hidden identity share, the user generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and anonymously sends it to the issuer via an anonymous channel. After receiving the key share from the issuer, the user aggregates it and calculates the key value used to generate pseudonyms. Then, the user generates different pseudonyms for different scenarios, ensuring that pseudonyms in different scenarios are not linked and that pseudonyms in the same scenario are identical, thus resisting Sybil attacks. To avoid directly exposing the key value, the user selects a random number to encrypt the key value and generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. The signature is set as a zero-knowledge proof and statement to prove the legitimacy of the signature parameters to the verifier.

[0020] Issuer: After joining the key generation set, the issuer uses a threshold distributed key to generate its own verification key and signing private key. Upon receiving the user's broadcast commitment value, the public information of the commitment sent via an anonymous channel, and the zero-knowledge proof, the issuer verifies the correctness of the commitment and the zero-knowledge proof provided by the user, ensuring the correctness of parameters such as the user's share and commitment. Then, it collaborates with other issuers to aggregate the private key and the user's hidden identity, using a secure multi-party multiplication protocol to generate a key share and send it back to the user.

[0021] Verifier: After receiving the user's signature, the verifier will verify it in three ways: verify whether the ivk carried in the signature is equal to the input key to be verified, ivk'; query whether the environment Z' returned by the calculation is equal to the environment Z in the signature; and call zero-knowledge proof to verify whether the signature is valid.

[0022] The method in this embodiment of the invention is applied to the above-described system. Specifically, it first requires key generation, including: activating the issuers participating in key generation; and invoking a distributed key generation protocol, i.e., threshold secret sharing, to generate the signature secret key, verification key, and public verification key required by each issuer. Signature secret key: Verification key: .in, Let be the share of the signature secret key for the i-th issuer. To generate random values ​​for the distributed key generation protocol output. For the i-th issuer in the second source group The verification key in The second source group of the asymmetric Type-III bilinear pairing group The standard generator.

[0023] After key generation, the threshold issuance initiation phase begins, which first requires verifying the set of issuers. And the legitimacy of the user's real identity s. After the user receives the session request from the environment, the session is parsed, and after obtaining the set of legitimate issuers, the following verification is initiated: 1. Determine if the set of issuers is a subset of a valid set; 2. Determine whether the number of members in the selected issuer set has reached the threshold t; 3. Determine whether the identity information submitted by the user this time is consistent with the identity information in the historical records; 4. Determine whether the user's identity information meets the personality relationship verification requirements.

[0024] After completing the above verification, a mask value is randomly generated: ,in, This indicates uniform random sampling, meaning that an element is randomly selected from a specified set with equal probability. For mask value, Let {1,2,…,p} be the multiplicative group modulo p. 1}, where p is the prime order of the bilinear group.

[0025] Then, the mask value is XORed with the real identity to generate the hidden identity. .

[0026] This invention also makes a commitment to the mask value and generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, which mainly proves the following: 1. The commitment value was indeed generated from a valid mask value: .in, and Let G be two distinct generators of the first source group G. A randomly selected commitment random number, This is the committed value; 2. The hidden identity is generated by XORing the real identity and the mask; 3. If a regulatory body subsequently requires the user to disclose their identity information, the user can send the zero-knowledge proof to the regulatory body to disclose their identity.

[0027] Step 102: The user secretly shares the hidden identity, generates a commitment value, and broadcasts it to the issuer.

[0028] Step 103: The user generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based on the commitment value and multiple hidden identity shares, and anonymously sends it to the corresponding issuer; the hidden identity shares are obtained by splitting the hidden identity through secret sharing.

[0029] Specifically, users generate non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs based on commitment values ​​and hidden identity shares, and anonymously send them to the issuer. The zero-knowledge proofs mainly prove the following: 1. Prove the set of commitments for broadcasting It was legally generated: ,in, The commitment random number is randomly selected, where i is the i-th issuer; 2. Proof of the shares received by the issuer It is the original secret, that is, the hidden identity. Effective share of secret sharing: ,, This represents the Shamir secret sharing aggregation algorithm with parameters (n,t), where any t issuers can reconstruct the secret; 3. Prove the establishment of a legal relationship.

[0030] Step 104: Each issuer verifies the received commitment value and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. If the verification is successful, each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation and sends it to the user.

[0031] Specifically, in the threshold issuance verification phase, the issuer receives information from both the broadcast channel and the anonymous channel; then it verifies the user's commitment value and zero-knowledge proof.

[0032] In one possible implementation, each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation, including: The issuer generates a first and second intermediate value for the user's signature key based on the selected random number, the issuer's signature secret key, and the user's hidden identity, and invokes a secure multi-party multiplication protocol. A secure multi-party computation check is performed. If the check passes, the first intermediate value and the second intermediate value are exponentialized based on random numbers to obtain the signature key share.

[0033] After successful verification, the issuer uses secure multi-party computation to generate a share of the user's signature key and sends it back to the user, as follows: 1. Select a random number: , It is the set of integers modulo p; 2. Reconstructing random numbers using Lagrange interpolation Global private key , mask identity The secure multi-party multiplication protocol is invoked to generate an intermediate value, i.e., the first intermediate value, for the user's signature key. Second intermediate value ,in, To aggregate random numbers from all issuers , To aggregate the resources obtained by all issuers , To aggregate the resources obtained by all issuers ; 3. Safety multi-party calculation and inspection; 4. If the security multi-party calculation check is passed, for and Generate random numbers Indexation yields the share of the user's signing key. and and utilize the channel Send it back to the user.

[0034] In one possible implementation, the security multi-party computation check includes: Check whether the verification key of each issuer can be uniquely derived from the signature secret key through exponentiation of the group generator; Check whether the hidden identity share of each issuer matches the promised value; Check that the sets of public keys and commitment values ​​provided by all issuers are completely consistent.

[0035] Specifically, examine the signature secret key of each issuer. With verification key Does it satisfy the following relationship: ; Check each issuer's Whether or not it is related to the promise Matching, i.e., whether the following relationship is satisfied: ; Check all (t) sets of public keys provided by issuers and commitment set Are they completely identical?

[0036] Step 105: After receiving multiple signature key shares from all issuers, the user aggregates the multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair.

[0037] In one possible implementation, the step of aggregating multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair includes: Users aggregate the signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain signature key pairs; Verify the validity of the secret key in the signature key pair; If the verification result is valid, the user records the signature key pair.

[0038] In one possible implementation, verifying the legitimacy of the secret key in the signature key pair includes: Verify whether the secret keys in the signature key pair are matched; Verify whether the relationship between the verification key in the signature key pair, the issuer's verification key, and the user's hidden identity is correct.

[0039] Upon entering the threshold issuance completion phase, the user aggregates the intermediate parameters returned by the issuer to generate a signature key pair. Specifically, users first share a portion of all signing keys by using a threshold secret sharing mechanism. and Obtain the signing key: and , and ,in, For all aggregation, For all The aggregation; then the user verifies the validity of the secret key through bilinear verification, and after confirming its validity, the user records their key pair. .

[0040] Bilinear verification includes: or Here, e() is a bilinear mapping that pairs elements from two groups and calculates the operation for an element in a third group. If any inequality holds, it is ignored and reported to the environment. A failure signal is sent. This includes the verification of inequality one. and Whether they are correctly paired, i.e., whether they correspond to the same index. This check prevents users from receiving inconsistent partial results, such as an incorrect result returned by a malicious publisher. and This led to the reconstruction No pairing. Inequality 2 verifies... The issuer's public key (i.e., the verification key, ivk) and the user's hidden identity. Is the relationship correct? Ensure that the user's private key, or secret key, is indeed jointly issued by the issuer and is truly associated with the user's identity.

[0041] Step 106: The user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context.

[0042] In one possible implementation, the user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context, including: The user receives a message from the environment; the message includes context. The user checks whether the signature key pair and the verification keys of all issuers have been recorded. If they have been recorded, the user calls a hash function to map the context to elements in group G. The user generates a pseudonym using the secret key and context in the signature key pair.

[0043] Specifically, in the signature generation stage, the user selects from the environment... Receive message , The information transmitted to the user, ctx is the context; check if the user has recorded their secret key pair. If the issuer's public key ivk is already recorded, execution continues; then, a hash function is called to map the context ctx to an element Z=h(ctx) in group G. The user uses their own signing secret key to pair the message. Generate kana The pseudonym T will be publicly displayed as part of the signature. For the same user under the same CTX, Z is fixed. If T is fixed, then T is fixed; if Z is different under different ctx, then T is random and indistinguishable.

[0044] In one possible implementation, after the user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context, the method further includes: The user encrypts the signature key pair to obtain a first encryption component and a second encryption component; Users generate evidence of the binding between the pseudonym, the signature key pair, the first encryption component, the second encryption component, and the secret key in the signature key pair and the issuer's verification key using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The user generates a signature for the message based on the evidence and the zero-knowledge proof statement.

[0045] Specifically, the user then encrypts the signing key: , , Where C represents the pair ElGamal encrypted ciphertext, To ElGamal encrypted ciphertext, For the randomized component of ciphertext C, For the encrypted component of ciphertext C, Hidden under a randomization mask, It is a random number. It is a random number. For ciphertext randomized components, For ciphertext The encrypted component, W, is the ElGamal public key in the first source group. The public key is ElGamal from the second source group. The user uses a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof on the pseudonym T and the signing key pair. Encryption components and as well as and and Binding evidence generation User-generated message signatures , where x is a statement of zero-knowledge proof.

[0046] Among them, evidence The specific proof is as follows: 1. This proves that the pseudonym T is legitimate and does not reveal the user's signing key. Where Z is the group element in the first source group G mapped to the context ctx via a hash function, and e() is a bilinear mapping.

[0047] 2. ,prove and These are the user's legitimate signature key pair; the two are bound together and are not forged. Among them, It is the inverse of g.

[0048] 3. Proof of user signing key Verify key with issuer It is bound to the record and is not counterfeit.

[0049] 4. , Prove the encryption component and It was legally generated.

[0050] After the message signature is generated, the signature verification phase begins. The verifier receives a verification request containing: what the verifier believes to be the issuer's public key. ,information User signature The verifier will parse the signature as ,in .

[0051] Then verify the following three items: 1. Compare the issuer verification key within the signature. The verification key obtained from the verification request To ensure consistency and prevent signatures generated by invalid verification keys from passing verification; 2. Compare the group elements within the signature. The group element obtained by the context ctx computed by the validator Check for consistency to ensure the signature was generated for the target CTX; 3. Call the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof NIZK to verify the proof. Does it support the legitimacy of statement x?

[0052] If the verification passes, extract the pseudonym. .

[0053] In summary, in this embodiment of the invention, based on mask XOR, threshold secret sharing, and commitment and zero-knowledge proof, even if more than a threshold number of issuers collude, they can only obtain the identity hidden by a random mask, and cannot obtain the real identity. This overcomes the shortcomings of existing technologies where collusion by some issuers can recover the user's real identity information and cannot resist collusion attacks, thus improving the ability to resist collusion attacks and protecting user identity privacy. At the same time, commitment and zero-knowledge proof ensure the consistency and correctness of user identity information across different issuers.

[0054] This invention employs a two-layer verifiable pseudo-random function (VRF) structure. The first layer maps the hidden identity to a unique signature key pair, and the second layer generates a unique pseudonym for each scenario using the signature key pair. This allows the invention to effectively prevent users from forging multiple fake identities while ensuring that pseudonyms generated by the same user in different contexts are not linked, achieving a balance between security and privacy. It overcomes the shortcomings of existing technologies in simultaneously resisting Sybil attacks and ensuring anonymity.

[0055] This invention hides the user's real identity by randomly masking it, and makes a commitment to the mask value and generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. This allows the invention to hide identity information while supporting necessary identity disclosure. Regulators can verify whether a user has violated regulations through the commitment and zero-knowledge proof. This overcomes the shortcomings of existing technologies that cannot monitor user behavior due to the hiding of user identity.

[0056] The embodiments of the present invention use threshold secret sharing to distribute the global key to multiple independent issuer nodes, thereby achieving decentralization. The attack or failure of any single node will not affect the operation of the system, and user privacy is no longer exposed to a single issuer, which improves the robustness and security of the system. It overcomes the defects of single point of failure risk and excessive concentration of trust in a single authoritative institution in the prior art.

[0057] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of this invention, "a plurality of" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0058] The above description, in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, provides a further detailed explanation of the present invention. It should not be construed that the specific implementation of the present invention is limited to these descriptions. For those skilled in the art, various simple deductions or substitutions can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and all such modifications and substitutions should be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A decentralized identity management method that is resistant to collusion and capable of oversight, characterized in that, include: Users generate a hidden identity by XORing a randomly generated mask value with their real identity. Users secretly share their hidden identities, generate commitment values, and broadcast them to the issuer. The user generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based on the commitment value and multiple hidden identity shares, and anonymously sends it to the corresponding issuer; The hidden identity share is obtained by splitting the hidden identity through secret sharing; Each issuer verifies the received commitment value and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. If the verification passes, each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation and sends it to the user. After receiving multiple signature key shares from all issuers, the user aggregates the multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair. The user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context.

2. The anti-collusion and monitorable decentralized identity management method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the user generates their hidden identity by XORing a randomly generated mask value with their real identity, the method further includes: Activate all issuers participating in the generation of signature key pairs, and generate a signature secret key, a verification key, and a public verification key for each issuer using threshold secret sharing; Verify the legitimacy of the issuer set and the real identities of users.

3. The anti-collusion and monitorable decentralized identity management method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Each issuer generates a signature key share based on secure multi-party computation, including: The issuer generates a first and second intermediate value for the user's signature key based on the selected random number, the issuer's signature secret key, and the user's hidden identity, and invokes a secure multi-party multiplication protocol. A secure multi-party computation check is performed. If the check passes, the first intermediate value and the second intermediate value are exponentialized based on random numbers to obtain the signature key share.

4. The anti-collusion and monitorable decentralized identity management method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The security multi-party computation check includes: Check whether the verification key of each issuer can be uniquely derived from the signature secret key through exponentiation of the group generator; Check whether the hidden identity share of each issuer matches the promised value; Check that the sets of public keys and commitment values ​​provided by all issuers are completely consistent.

5. The anti-collusion and superviseable decentralized identity management method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of aggregating multiple signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain a signature key pair includes: Users aggregate the signature key shares using threshold secret sharing to obtain signature key pairs; Verify the validity of the secret key in the signature key pair; If the verification result is valid, the user records the signature key pair.

6. The anti-collusion and monitorable decentralized identity management method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The verification of the validity of the secret key in the signature key pair includes: Verify whether the secret keys in the signature key pair are matched; Verify whether the relationship between the verification key in the signature key pair, the issuer's verification key, and the user's hidden identity is correct.

7. The anti-collusion and superviseable decentralized identity management method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context, including: The user receives a message from the environment; the message includes context. The user checks whether the signature key pair and the verification keys of all issuers have been recorded. If they have been recorded, the user calls a hash function to map the context to elements in group G. The user generates a pseudonym using the secret key and context in the signature key pair.

8. The anti-collusion and superviseable decentralized identity management method according to claim 7, characterized in that, After the user generates a pseudonym based on the signature key pair and the context, the method further includes: The user encrypts the signature key pair to obtain a first encryption component and a second encryption component. Users generate evidence of the binding between the pseudonym, the signature key pair, the first encryption component, the second encryption component, and the secret key in the signature key pair and the issuer's verification key using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The user generates a signature for the message based on the evidence and the zero-knowledge proof statement.