Quantum key distribution methods, devices, equipment, media, and software products
By determining key resources based on security level identifiers in the quantum key distribution network and switching key sources across domains in case of anomalies, the problems of single key resources and insufficient cross-domain continuity in existing technologies are solved, and the stability of key resource matching and key distribution for services with different security levels is achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611398948.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-09
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In existing quantum key distribution networks, the scheduling of key management nodes and quantum routers is independent of each other, making it difficult to simultaneously meet the key protection requirements of services with different security levels and the continuity of cross-domain key distribution. Furthermore, key resources are fixed and singular, failing to adapt to the service requirements of different security levels.
By acquiring the key status information of the target business and target node to be distributed with the key, the key resources, including hardware isolated key domains and shared key pools, are determined according to the security level identifier. When the key status is abnormal, the key source is switched to the second key management node in a different security domain, thereby realizing adaptive scheduling of key sources across security domains.
It enables key resource matching for services with different security levels, improves key resource utilization efficiency, ensures the continuity and security of key distribution, and solves the risk of data interruption in cross-domain scenarios for high-security services.
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Figure CN123122820A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of quantum communication and information security technology, and in particular to a quantum key distribution method, apparatus, device, medium and program product. Background Technology
[0002] With the iterative maturation and large-scale industrial application of quantum communication technology, the construction of quantum leased line infrastructure by telecom operators continues to accelerate. Quantum key distribution networks interconnecting multiple regions and security domains within a single operator are being deployed on a large scale. Quantum key distribution devices can generate quantum keys with information theory security properties. Key management nodes are used to store, schedule, and distribute keys, while quantum routers are used to achieve cross-domain, multi-hop key relay transmission within the operator's intranet to meet the key distribution needs of concurrent services across security domains.
[0003] In related technologies, quantum key distribution networks typically adopt a centralized management and control approach, with the key management node uniformly completing the storage, scheduling, and distribution of quantum keys. All services share a unified key pool, and the routing and scheduling systems of the key management node and the quantum router are independent of each other. The key management node only passively distributes keys to the quantum router.
[0004] Thus, in the process of implementing the above scheme, all services share the same key resources, the key source is fixed and singular, and the scheduling of key management nodes and quantum routers is disconnected, making it difficult to take into account the key protection needs of services with different security levels and the continuity of cross-domain key distribution. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This application provides a quantum key distribution method, apparatus, device, medium, and program product to improve the continuity and security of key distribution.
[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a quantum key distribution method, the method comprising:
[0007] Obtain the target service for which the key to be distributed is to be obtained, the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information of the first key management node. The target service has a corresponding security level identifier.
[0008] Based on the security level identifier, the key resources corresponding to the target service are determined, and the key resources include hardware-isolated key domains and shared key pools;
[0009] When the key status information indicates that the first key management node has insufficient key supply or there is a security risk, the key source of the target service is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node, so that the second key management node distributes the key to the target node. The first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains.
[0010] The technical solution provided in this application brings at least the following beneficial effects:
[0011] The quantum key distribution method provided in this application first obtains the key status information of the target service to be distributed, the target node carrying the target service, and the first key management node. Then, it determines the corresponding key resources based on the security level identifier of the target service. The key resources include hardware-isolated key domains and shared key pools, enabling services with different security levels to obtain key protection that matches their security requirements and improving the utilization efficiency of key resources. When the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, the key source of the target service is switched from the first key management node to a second key management node belonging to a different security domain. The second key management node continues to distribute keys to the target node, ensuring the continuity of key distribution when the local key supply is interrupted or there is a security risk. This achieves adaptive scheduling of key sources across security domains, thereby taking into account both the key protection strength and the continuity of key distribution for services with different security levels.
[0012] One possible implementation is that the security level identifier includes a first security level identifier, a second security level identifier, and a third security level identifier arranged in descending order of security level;
[0013] The step of determining the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier includes:
[0014] When the security level identifier is the first security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the hardware isolation key domain, and the key in the hardware isolation key domain is generated by quantum key distribution;
[0015] If the security level identifier is the second security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the hardware isolation key domain or the shared key pool;
[0016] When the security level identifier is the third security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the shared key pool, and the keys in the shared key pool are generated by quantum random numbers.
[0017] Another possible implementation is that the hardware isolation key domain is carried by multiple virtual functions, each of which has an independent processing core, power supply circuit, on-chip cache, bus and electromagnetic shielding structure.
[0018] Another possible implementation is that the key distributed by the second key management node to the target node is a protected key, which is obtained by the second key management node performing cryptographic operations on the key of the target service;
[0019] The virtual function has side-channel protection, which includes at least one of second-order random masking, random scrambling of the operation process, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection. The cryptographic operation is performed by only a single virtual function at any given time.
[0020] Another possible implementation is that the key status information includes the key inventory, link eavesdropping alarm status, side channel alarm status, and hardware load status of the first key management node.
[0021] Another possible implementation, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, further includes:
[0022] Based on the hop count priority principle and preset screening conditions, the second key management node is determined from other key management nodes that belong to different security domains than the first key management node;
[0023] The preset screening conditions include: the key inventory of the key resources corresponding to the target service is higher than a preset inventory threshold, there is no eavesdropping alarm on the connection link, the hardware load is lower than a preset load threshold, and there is no side channel intrusion alarm.
[0024] Another possible implementation, wherein switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, includes:
[0025] Initiate a key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-cache the keys distributed by the second key management node;
[0026] Based on the pre-cached key, the key source for the target service is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node;
[0027] The key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source is replanned, and the key message carrying the key to be distributed to the target node is allocated to a high-priority forwarding queue that is independent of ordinary service traffic.
[0028] Another possible implementation, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, further includes:
[0029] The load status is periodically reported to the network operation and maintenance management platform. The load status includes at least one of key forwarding service volume, computing power consumption, and cache load, so that the network operation and maintenance management platform can determine the rotating monitoring node and issue appointment instructions based on the load status reported by the quantum routers of the entire network.
[0030] In response to the appointment instruction, as the rotating monitoring node, the key forwarding service it carries will be migrated to the adjacent quantum router;
[0031] The rotating monitoring nodes collect routing dimension data across the entire network and generate scheduling policies based on the routing dimension data, which are then distributed to each of the quantum routers. The routing dimension data includes at least one of the following: link latency, packet loss, and key transmission audit logs.
[0032] The scheduling strategy is used to modify the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path.
[0033] Another possible implementation, after obtaining the key status information of the first key management node, further includes:
[0034] Based on the key status information of the neighboring key management nodes of the first key management node, the key management node that is closest to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset filtering conditions is determined among the neighboring key management nodes and is taken as the nearest key management node.
[0035] The target transmission path is determined from the single-hop transmission path from the nearest key management node to the target node;
[0036] The key is transmitted from the nearest key management node to the target node via the target transmission path.
[0037] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a quantum key distribution device, comprising:
[0038] The acquisition module is used to acquire the target service for which the key to be distributed is to be acquired, the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information of the first key management node. The target service has a corresponding security level identifier.
[0039] The determination module is used to determine the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier, wherein the key resources include a hardware-isolated key domain and a shared key pool;
[0040] The switching module is used to switch the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node when the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, so that the second key management node distributes the key to the target node. The first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains.
[0041] One possible implementation is that the security level identifier includes a first security level identifier, a second security level identifier, and a third security level identifier arranged in descending order of security level;
[0042] The determining module is specifically used for:
[0043] When the security level identifier is the first security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the hardware isolation key domain, and the key in the hardware isolation key domain is generated by quantum key distribution;
[0044] If the security level identifier is the second security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the hardware isolation key domain or the shared key pool;
[0045] When the security level identifier is the third security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the shared key pool, and the keys in the shared key pool are generated by quantum random numbers.
[0046] Another possible implementation is that the hardware isolation key domain is carried by multiple virtual functions, each of which has an independent processing core, power supply circuit, on-chip cache, bus and electromagnetic shielding structure.
[0047] Another possible implementation is that the key distributed by the second key management node to the target node is a protected key, which is obtained by the second key management node performing cryptographic operations on the key of the target service;
[0048] The virtual function has side-channel protection, which includes at least one of second-order random masking, random scrambling of the operation process, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection. The cryptographic operation is performed by only a single virtual function at any given time.
[0049] Another possible implementation is that the key status information includes the key inventory, link eavesdropping alarm status, side channel alarm status, and hardware load status of the first key management node.
[0050] In another possible implementation, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, the determining module is further configured to:
[0051] Based on the hop count priority principle and preset screening conditions, the second key management node is determined from other key management nodes that belong to different security domains than the first key management node;
[0052] The preset screening conditions include: the key inventory of the key resources corresponding to the target service is higher than a preset inventory threshold, there is no eavesdropping alarm on the connection link, the hardware load is lower than a preset load threshold, and there is no side channel intrusion alarm.
[0053] Another possible implementation is that the switching module is specifically used for:
[0054] Initiate a key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-cache the keys distributed by the second key management node;
[0055] Based on the pre-cached key, the key source for the target service is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node;
[0056] The key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source is replanned, and the key message carrying the key to be distributed to the target node is allocated to a high-priority forwarding queue that is independent of ordinary service traffic.
[0057] In another possible implementation, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, the acquisition module is further configured to:
[0058] The load status is periodically reported to the network operation and maintenance management platform. The load status includes at least one of key forwarding service volume, computing power consumption, and cache load, so that the network operation and maintenance management platform can determine the rotating monitoring node and issue appointment instructions based on the load status reported by the quantum routers of the entire network.
[0059] The determining module is further configured to:
[0060] In response to the appointment instruction, as the rotating monitoring node, the key forwarding service it carries will be migrated to the adjacent quantum router;
[0061] The rotating monitoring nodes collect routing dimension data across the entire network and generate scheduling policies based on the routing dimension data, which are then distributed to each of the quantum routers. The routing dimension data includes at least one of the following: link latency, packet loss, and key transmission audit logs.
[0062] The scheduling strategy is used to modify the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path.
[0063] In another possible implementation, after obtaining the key status information of the first key management node, the determining module is further configured to:
[0064] Based on the key status information of the neighboring key management nodes of the first key management node, the key management node that is closest to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset filtering conditions is determined among the neighboring key management nodes and is taken as the nearest key management node.
[0065] The target transmission path is determined from the single-hop transmission path from the nearest key management node to the target node;
[0066] The key is transmitted from the nearest key management node to the target node via the target transmission path.
[0067] Thirdly, this application provides an electronic device comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory stores a program or instructions executable on the processor, wherein the program or instructions, when executed by the processor, implement the method of the first aspect described above.
[0068] Fourthly, this application provides a readable storage medium on which a program or instructions are stored, which, when executed by a computer, implement the method of the first aspect described above.
[0069] Fifthly, this application provides a computer program product that is stored in a storage medium and implements the method of the first aspect described above when the computer program product is executed by a computer.
[0070] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of this application provide a chip including a processor and a communication interface, wherein the communication interface is coupled to the processor, and the processor is used to run programs or instructions to implement the method described in the first aspect.
[0071] The beneficial effects of the second to sixth aspects mentioned above are described in the corresponding description of the first aspect and will not be repeated here. Attached Figure Description
[0072] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the network architecture for an application of a quantum key distribution method provided in this application embodiment.
[0073] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a quantum key distribution method provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0074] Figure 3This is a schematic diagram of a key source switching process provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0075] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a shift monitoring process provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0076] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a local key distribution process provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0077] Figure 6 This is an overall flowchart of a cross-domain quantum key distribution method provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0078] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of an integrated framework for a quantum key distribution device provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0079] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a hierarchical control architecture for a network operation and maintenance management platform provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0080] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of a quantum key distribution device provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0081] Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0082] The quantum key distribution method, apparatus, device, medium, and program products provided in this application will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0083] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this application are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0084] The terms "first," "second," etc., used in the specification and claims of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and not to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such use of data can be interchanged where appropriate so that embodiments of this application can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein, and the objects distinguished by "first," "second," etc., are generally of the same class and the number of objects is not limited; for example, a first object can be one or more. Furthermore, in the specification and claims, "and / or" indicates at least one of the connected objects, and the character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following objects are in an "or" relationship.
[0085] The terms "at least one," "at least one of," etc., used in the specification and claims of this application refer to any one, any two, or a combination of two or more of the included items. For example, at least one of a, b, and c can mean: "a," "b," "c," "a and b," "a and c," "b and c," and "a, b, and c," where a, b, and c can be single or multiple. Similarly, "at least two" refers to two or more items, and its meaning is similar to that of "at least one."
[0086] In the description of this application, unless otherwise stated, "a plurality of" means two or more.
[0087] The embodiments of this application provide a quantum key distribution method, apparatus, device, medium, and program product that can be applied to multi-security domain quantum key distribution scenarios for operators.
[0088] The technical solutions provided in this application can be applied to Quantum Distribution Networks (QDNs). QDN, as defined in this application, is a multi-security domain quantum key distribution network for operators. Unlike traditional Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDNs), which can only perform quantum key negotiation and generation between two points, QDN can uniformly realize key scheduling, cross-domain distribution, and full-domain auditing, adapting to the differentiated security needs of multiple security domains and multi-tenants. The methods, apparatus, devices, media, and program products provided in this application can be applied to cross-domain quantum key distribution scenarios in QDNs.
[0089] In existing cross-domain networking schemes for quantum key distribution networks, the following technical problems exist: Quantum key distribution between multiple security domains within a single operator lacks a hierarchical key resource matching mechanism tied to the service security level. Key Managers (KMs) generally adopt a unified key pool supply method for services of different security levels, failing to provide independent hardware-isolated key domains for highly secure, classified services. Simultaneously, in multi-tenant scenarios, KMs often employ software logical partitioning based on Single Root I / O Virtualization (SR-IOV), leading to potential side-channel signal crosstalk issues related to power consumption, electromagnetic interference, and timing when multiple virtual functions operate concurrently. Furthermore, traditional schemes, when encountering anomalies such as insufficient key supply or side-channel alarms at the KM, can only passively wait for resource recovery within their own domain, lacking the ability to autonomously switch to backup key sources across security domains, resulting in the risk of service interruption for highly classified services.
[0090] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides a quantum key distribution method, apparatus, device, medium, and program product. The quantum key distribution method provided by this application first obtains the key status information of the target service to be distributed, the target node carrying the target service, and the first key management node. Then, it determines the corresponding key resources based on the security level identifier of the target service. The key resources include hardware-isolated key domains and a shared key pool, enabling services of different security levels to obtain key protection matching their security requirements and improving the utilization efficiency of key resources. When the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, the key source of the target service is switched from the first key management node to a second key management node belonging to a different security domain. The second key management node continues to distribute keys to the target node, ensuring the continuity of key distribution when the local key supply is interrupted or there is a security risk. This achieves adaptive scheduling of key sources across security domains, thereby balancing the key protection strength and key distribution continuity for services of different security levels.
[0091] The quantum key distribution method, apparatus, equipment, medium, and program products provided in this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0092] Figure 1 Figure 1 illustrates a network architecture diagram of a quantum key distribution method application provided in this application. As shown in Figure 1, the network architecture includes a quantum key distribution device 101 and a terminal device 102. The quantum key distribution device 101 and the terminal device 102 are interconnected.
[0093] In some embodiments, the quantum key distribution device 101 may be a server, a computer, or a processor or processing unit within a server or computer. The server may be a single server or a server cluster comprising multiple servers. It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the specific device form of the quantum key distribution device 101. Figure 1 The quantum key distribution device 101 is used as an example of a single server.
[0094] In some embodiments, the terminal device 102 may be a mobile phone, tablet computer, laptop computer, handheld computer, in-vehicle electronic device, mobile internet device (MID), augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) device, robot, wearable device, personal computer (PC), ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), netbook, or personal digital assistant (PDA), etc. The embodiments of this application do not impose specific limitations. Figure 1 The example shown is a mobile phone, with terminal device 102 as an example.
[0095] It should be noted that, in this embodiment of the application, the terminal device 102 can specifically be a business access device that initiates key distribution services, such as a business terminal that carries out security services involving classified information, finance, government affairs, etc. Figure 1 The embodiments of this application only show one example of a mobile phone as a terminal device 102, and its specific form is not limited.
[0096] In some embodiments, the quantum key distribution device 101 is used to execute the cross-domain quantum key distribution method provided in the embodiments of this application. As an example, the quantum key distribution device 101 can be a quantum router with built-in intelligent agents, or a network device with quantum key forwarding and scheduling capabilities. The embodiments of this application do not limit its specific form.
[0097] In some embodiments, terminal device 102 (e.g., a service access device carrying a target service) sends a key distribution request to quantum key distribution device 101. This request carries information such as the security level identifier of the target service for which the key is to be distributed and the target node carrying the target service. Upon receiving the key distribution request, quantum key distribution device 101 obtains the target service for which the key is to be distributed and the target node carrying the target service, and also obtains the key status information of the first key management node. Subsequently, based on the security level identifier of the target service, quantum key distribution device 101 determines the key resources corresponding to the target service. These key resources include a hardware-isolated key domain and a shared key pool. If the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, quantum key distribution device 101 switches the key source of the target service from the first key management node to a second key management node, so that the second key management node distributes the key to the target node. The first and second key management nodes belong to different security domains. Thus, a quantum key distribution process is completed between terminal device 102 and quantum key distribution device 101.
[0098] It should be noted that the above-described interaction process is merely an illustrative example and is not intended to limit the scope of this application. For example, the quantum key distribution device 101 and the terminal device 102 may also interact through intermediate nodes such as quantum routers and key management nodes. This application does not limit the specific implementation of the interaction.
[0099] See Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a quantum key distribution method provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 2 As shown, the quantum key distribution method provided in this application embodiment can be implemented by the above-mentioned quantum key distribution device, specifically including the following steps 201 to 203.
[0100] Step 201: The quantum key distribution device obtains the target service to be distributed, the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information of the first key management node. The target service has a corresponding security level identifier.
[0101] Step 202: The quantum key distribution device determines the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier. The key resources include hardware-isolated key domains and shared key pools.
[0102] Step 203: If the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, the quantum key distribution device switches the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, so that the second key management node distributes the key to the target node. The first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains.
[0103] First, the quantum key distribution device obtains the target service for which the key to be distributed is to be obtained, the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information of the first key management node.
[0104] In this embodiment, the target service for which the key is to be distributed can refer to a service that requires encrypted communication based on quantum keys, such as classified services, financial services, government services, or general services; the target node is the node that carries the target service, i.e., the destination of the key distribution; the security level identifier is used to identify the security level of the target service and can serve as the basis for key resource matching and routing scheduling. The key status information is used to characterize the key supply and security status of the first key management node, and may include at least one of the following: key inventory, link eavesdropping alarm status, side channel alarm status, hardware load status, etc.
[0105] The quantum key distribution device can receive target service information reported by the service access device to obtain the target service and target node, and receive key status information periodically pushed by the first key management node, or actively query the first key management node for key status information. This application embodiment does not limit the method of obtaining key status information. The first key management node can be a key management node within the same security domain that provides keys for the target service, for example, it can be a domain key management node that interfaces with the quantum key distribution device.
[0106] It should be noted that the encapsulation method of the security level identifier is not limited in the embodiments of this application. For example, when a service access device connects a target service to the network, it can automatically complete the service type identification and standardized key-value pair marking, encapsulate a unique security level identifier key-value pair for the target service, and synchronously report the service traffic carrying the security level identifier to the key management node and quantum key distribution device in the region. This enables all network devices to accurately identify the service security level and automatically match the corresponding key allocation rules and forwarding scheduling rules. As the core carrier label of the service security level, this security level identifier can run through the entire process of key management and intelligent agent scheduling, thereby providing a standardized identification basis for all network devices.
[0107] Then, the quantum key distribution device determines the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier.
[0108] In this embodiment, the key resources include a hardware-isolated key domain and a shared key pool. The hardware-isolated key domain is an independent key storage and computation space provided for high-security services through hardware resource isolation. For example, it can be carried by multiple virtual functions (VFs) divided by the SR-IOV post-quantum cryptography (PQC) chip in the key management node. The shared key pool is a key storage space shared by multiple services.
[0109] A quantum key distribution device can determine the key resources corresponding to a target service based on the mapping relationship between security level identifiers and key resource types, and coordinate with the key management node to perform the corresponding key resource allocation. This application embodiment does not limit the specific setting method of the security level identifier or the specific implementation method of the mapping relationship. By determining key resources according to the security level identifier, accurate matching between service security level and key protection resources can be achieved.
[0110] Then, if the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, the key source of the target service will be switched from the first key management node to the second key management node.
[0111] In this embodiment, the quantum key distribution device can acquire the key status information of the first key management node in real time or periodically, and determine the key status information. For example, when the key inventory of the first key management node is lower than a preset inventory threshold, or when there are security risks such as link eavesdropping alarms or side-channel intrusion alarms, it can be determined that the first key management node cannot continue to provide a secure and sufficient key supply for the target service. At this time, a cross-domain key source switching process is initiated to determine a second key management node from another security domain, and the key source of the target service is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node. The second key management node and the first key management node belong to different security domains, thus ensuring the key supply for the target service even when local key resources are abnormal.
[0112] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the method for determining insufficient key supply. In one implementation, the determination of insufficient key supply can be completed locally by the first key management node. For example, the first key management node can deploy dual threshold verification logic for key inventory and quantum key distribution coding rate locally: when it is determined that the supply of high-level keys in this domain is insufficient, or when a virtual function side channel intrusion risk is detected, the first key management node pushes a risk alarm flag to the quantum key distribution device, and the quantum key distribution device initiates the cross-security domain backup key management node scheduling process. Among them, the quantum key distribution coding rate and the key generation queue length are only private statistical parameters within the key management node and are not synchronized externally, thereby ensuring the timeliness of cross-domain scheduling while protecting the security of key production capacity data.
[0113] Finally, the key is distributed to the target node through the second key management node.
[0114] In this embodiment, after the key source switch is completed, the key required by the target service is supplied by the second key management node. The second key management node can then distribute the key to the target node, thereby completing key distribution across security domains. Since the first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains, this embodiment utilizes key resources from other security domains to supply keys when the local key source is abnormal, ensuring the continuity and stability of key transmission for high-level services in cross-domain scenarios.
[0115] Through the above method, the embodiments of this application realize differentiated matching of key resources under the drive of business security level identifier, and realize automatic switching of key sources across security domains when the key source is abnormal, thereby taking into account both the security protection of high-security services and the continuity of key supply, and solving the problems of mismatch between business security level and protection resources and easy interruption of high-level services when the key source is abnormal in the prior art.
[0116] In an optional embodiment, to further achieve accurate matching between business security levels and key protection resources, this application provides a business-tiered key matching scheme. In this embodiment, the security level identifier includes a first security level identifier, a second security level identifier, and a third security level identifier arranged in descending order of security level.
[0117] When the security level identifier is set to the first security level, the quantum key distribution device determines that the key resource corresponding to the target service is a hardware-isolated key domain, and the key in the hardware-isolated key domain is generated by quantum key distribution.
[0118] In this embodiment, the first security level identifier corresponds to the highest security level service, i.e., the service involving the highest level of classified information. In this embodiment, the first security level identifier can be...<A,jg1> Standardized key-value pairs are used to identify high-security scenarios such as core military business and classified government business. For this level of business, the quantum key distribution device determines the key resources corresponding to the target business as a hardware-isolated key domain. The keys in the hardware-isolated key domain are generated in real time through quantum key distribution (QKD) links, and an independent hardware-isolated virtual functional key domain with complete side-channel protection is allocated to the business. The plaintext of the key is stored in a dedicated VF independent secure storage and computing channel throughout the process, and is not shared across domains, thereby ensuring the physical isolation and quantum and side-channel security of high-security business.
[0119] Furthermore, for the highest security level of classified services corresponding to this first security level identifier, the service's identity authentication can be compatible with post-quantum signature algorithms, such as lattice-based digital signature algorithms (e.g., ML-DSA), to resist quantum computer cracking and physical side-channel theft; at the same time, the keys of this level of service can support full lifecycle traceability, that is, the entire process from key generation, distribution to destruction can be recorded and audited, thereby meeting the requirements for full lifecycle security management of keys.
[0120] When the security level identifier is the second security level identifier, the quantum key distribution device determines that the key resource corresponding to the target service is a hardware-isolated key domain or a shared key pool.
[0121] In this embodiment, the second security level identifier corresponds to medium-high security level services, i.e., medium-high security level services. In this embodiment, the second security level identifier can be...<B,db3+> Standardized key-value pair identifiers correspond to scenarios such as core financial transactions, power grid dispatching, core encryption services for telecom operators, and core services at or above Level 3 of government security compliance. For services at this level, the key resources corresponding to the target service can be flexibly determined as either hardware-isolated key domains or shared key pools, depending on the business scenario. For example, in high-security scenarios, the key resources can be determined as hardware-isolated VF key pools with side-channel protection, while in conventional scenarios, the key resources can be determined as globally shared key pools. This supports mixed scheduling of QKD keys and traditional symmetric keys, thereby balancing security and hardware resource utilization.
[0122] When the security level is identified as the third security level, the quantum key distribution device determines that the key resource corresponding to the target service is a shared key pool, and the keys in the shared key pool are generated by quantum random numbers.
[0123] In this embodiment, the third security level identifier corresponds to a general low-security-level service. In this embodiment, the third security level identifier can be...<C,pyfw> Standardized key-value pairs are used to identify scenarios such as park monitoring, general IoT data transmission, enterprise daily office work, and general government information disclosure. For this level of business, the key resource corresponding to the target business is identified as a shared key pool. The keys in the shared key pool are generated by quantum random numbers, that is, the key source can use quantum random number generators (QRNGs), eliminating the need for independent hardware isolation partitions, thereby reducing hardware deployment costs and adapting to lightweight cross-domain business requirements.
[0124] Through the above scheme, the embodiments of this application realize differentiated matching of key resources based on the business security level identifier. High-security services have exclusive hardware-isolated key resources, while low-security services share key resources. This reduces the hardware deployment cost of low-security services while ensuring the physical security of high-security services, and achieves accurate matching between business security level and key protection resources.
[0125] In an optional embodiment, to further ensure the physical isolation security of the hardware isolation key domain, the hardware isolation key domain is carried by multiple virtual functions, each virtual function having an independent computing core, power supply circuit, on-chip cache, bus and electromagnetic shielding structure.
[0126] In this embodiment, virtual functions (VFs) can be partitioned by the SR-IOV PQC security chip in the key management node, with multiple VFs each carrying a hardware-isolated key domain. Each VF has its own dedicated secure random access memory (RAM), an independent PQC cryptographic hardware core, an independent bus, a dedicated power supply circuit, and an on-chip shielding layer. The hardware buses between VFs are completely isolated, thereby physically avoiding power consumption, electromagnetic interference, and timing signal cross-leakage issues during the concurrent scheduling of multiple VFs. The device physical function (PF) management module only undertakes global control functions such as firmware security verification, global intrusion detection, and security policy distribution. It locks permissions through hardware registers to prevent physical functions from reading the plaintext of quantum keys and intermediate values of computation from each VF, effectively preventing administrators from unauthorized access to tenant keys.
[0127] The aforementioned multi-virtual-function physical isolation architecture, along with side-channel protection mechanisms such as second-order random masking, random scrambling of computation flow, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection, meets the physical security requirements of cryptographic modules and can support the secure isolation deployment of multi-security-domain tenants.
[0128] For example, the key management node may include a key source access unit, an SR-IOV hardware isolation unit, a side-channel security protection unit, a hierarchical key storage and distribution unit, and a key status interaction output unit. Specifically, the key source access unit is used to access multiple quantum key distribution links and quantum random number generator chips in parallel to obtain the original quantum key; the SR-IOV hardware isolation unit is used to divide multiple independent virtual functional key domains; the side-channel security protection unit is used to implement protection mechanisms such as second-order random masking, random scrambling of the computation flow, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection; the hierarchical key storage and distribution unit is used to distribute the quantum key to the corresponding virtual functional key domain or the global shared key pool according to the service security level identifier; and the key status interaction output unit is used to periodically push status information such as key inventory, link eavesdropping alarms, side-channel alarms, and hardware load to the quantum key distribution device.
[0129] It is understood that there are various ways to carry the hardware isolation key domain, such as through SR-IOV virtualization, virtual machine isolation, or container isolation. This application does not limit this method. Through the above scheme, each virtual function is physically isolated from each other, blocking the leakage channels of power consumption, electromagnetic, and timing signals between virtual functions from the physical layer, effectively preventing key leakage across virtual functions.
[0130] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the key source access method of the key management node. For example, the key management node can connect to multiple quantum key distribution links and quantum random number generator chips in parallel, and write quantum keys to the corresponding virtual functions according to the service security level to realize multi-key source fusion scheduling; furthermore, hardware bus isolation switches can be deployed between different virtual functions to prevent cross-virtual function memory out-of-bounds access and direct memory access (DMA) key theft attacks, further improving the key storage and computing security in multi-tenant scenarios.
[0131] In an optional embodiment, to further ensure the side-channel security of the key during the cryptographic operation process, the key distributed by the second key management node to the target node is a protected key, which is obtained by the second key management node performing cryptographic operations on the key of the target service; wherein, the virtual function has side-channel protection, which includes at least one of second-order random masking, random scrambling of the operation process, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection, and the cryptographic operation is performed by only a single virtual function at any given time.
[0132] In this embodiment, the cryptographic operation can be a post-quantum cryptographic operation such as key encapsulation operation or digital signature operation. For example, it can be implemented based on post-quantum cryptographic algorithms such as Module Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) or Module Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA). This application embodiment does not limit the specific algorithm implementation of the cryptographic operation.
[0133] During cryptographic operations, virtual functions randomize the key operation format using a second-order random mask, randomize the operation timing by randomly shuffling the operation flow, and mask the physical characteristics of hardware operation through clock jitter control and dynamic voltage noise injection. This weakens the correlation between the key and physical leakage signals such as power consumption and timing, thus avoiding various physical side-channel information leakage risks. Simultaneously, the PQC chip's hardware scheduler incorporates time slot random allocation logic, allowing only a single virtual function to occupy the cryptographic operation path and perform cryptographic operations at any given time. Other virtual functions only perform non-sensitive operations such as key storage and status queries. This scheduling mechanism avoids cross-virtual function side-channel crosstalk caused by multiple virtual functions performing simultaneous cryptographic operations.
[0134] Furthermore, when performing post-quantum cryptography operations, the hardware implementation of constant-time post-quantum cryptography can be combined to randomize the key operation format and timing, further masking the physical characteristics of hardware operation and weakening the correlation between the key and physical leakage signals, thereby avoiding various risks of physical side-channel information leakage.
[0135] It should be noted that the embodiments of this application do not limit the handling method of side-channel intrusion. For example, each virtual function has at least one of the following built-in voltage, temperature, electromagnetic, and laser detection sensors. When a side-channel injection attack is detected by the above sensors, the independent power supply of the attacked virtual function can be cut off instantly, the local domain secure storage can be shut down, all quantum keys can be erased, only the current tenant's service can be isolated, the keys and operating status of other virtual functions will not be disturbed, and an intrusion alarm log will be reported to the global monitoring router to retain an unalterable evidence record.
[0136] In one optional embodiment, the key status information includes the key inventory of the first key management node, the link eavesdropping alarm status, the side channel alarm status, and the hardware load status.
[0137] In this embodiment, the key inventory is the number of keys currently available to the first key management node, which is used to characterize the key supply capacity; the link eavesdropping alarm status is used to characterize whether there is a risk of the first key management node's docking link being eavesdropped; the side channel alarm status is used to characterize whether each virtual function has a side channel intrusion alarm; and the hardware load status is used to characterize the hardware resource usage of the first key management node.
[0138] Key status information can be periodically pushed to the quantum key distribution device by the first key management node. The quantum key distribution device determines whether the first key management node has insufficient key supply or whether there is a security risk based on the key status information.
[0139] It should be noted that the first key management node can only push the aforementioned shareable key status information to the quantum key distribution device, while keeping private parameters such as quantum key distribution coding rate and key generation queue length locally as the basis for its own capacity control, without synchronizing them externally. This protects the private data security of the key management node while supporting cross-domain scheduling of the quantum key distribution device, and avoids leakage of sensitive information such as key capacity.
[0140] In an optional embodiment, to further accurately determine the available second key management node, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, this application provides a second key management node determination scheme: based on the hop count priority principle and preset screening conditions, the second key management node is determined from other key management nodes belonging to different security domains than the first key management node. The preset screening conditions include: the key inventory of the key resources corresponding to the target service is higher than a preset inventory threshold; there are no eavesdropping alarms on the connection link; the hardware load is lower than a preset load threshold; and there are no side-channel intrusion alarms.
[0141] In this embodiment, the hop count priority principle refers to prioritizing key management nodes with fewer hops to the quantum key distribution device (e.g., fewer relay nodes) to reduce key transmission latency and path complexity. Preset screening conditions are used to filter out nodes with insufficient key supply or security risks from the candidate key management nodes. The quantum key distribution device can construct a neighborhood key resource view based on the key status information reported by neighboring key management nodes. Following the hop count priority principle and combined with preset screening conditions, it selects key management nodes from other key management nodes belonging to different security domains than the first key management node. These nodes have a key inventory higher than a preset inventory threshold, no eavesdropping alarms on the connection link, a hardware load lower than a preset load threshold, and no side-channel intrusion alarms, and are selected as the second key management node. The preset inventory threshold, preset load threshold, and other parameters can be set according to actual needs; this embodiment does not limit their settings.
[0142] Using the above method, this application embodiment automatically determines a secure and sufficient backup key source before cross-domain switching by prioritizing the number of hops and using preset filtering conditions, thereby ensuring the quality and security of key supply for the target service during key source switching.
[0143] In an optional embodiment, in order to further achieve seamless switching of key sources, this application provides a key source switching scheme.
[0144] See Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a key source switching process provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 As shown, switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node includes the following steps 301 to 303.
[0145] Step 301: The quantum key distribution device initiates a key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-caches the key distributed by the second key management node.
[0146] Step 302: The quantum key distribution device switches the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node based on the pre-cached key.
[0147] Step 303: The quantum key distribution device re-plans the key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source, and allocates the key message carrying the key to be distributed to the target node to a high-priority forwarding queue that is independent of ordinary service traffic.
[0148] First, the quantum key distribution device initiates a key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-caches the key distributed by the second key management node.
[0149] In this embodiment, after determining the second key management node, the quantum key distribution device can initiate a key pre-request to the second key management node before the formal key source switch. In response to the key pre-request, the second key management node distributes a key to the quantum key distribution device. The quantum key distribution device pre-caches the key distributed by the second key management node in its local secure storage. By pre-caching the key, the cached key can be directly used during the switchover process to ensure business continuity, achieving a seamless transition between the old and new keys.
[0150] Subsequently, the quantum key distribution device switches the key source for the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node based on the pre-cached key.
[0151] In this embodiment, after the quantum key distribution device caches the key distributed by the second key management node locally, it switches the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node based on the pre-cached key, so that the target service can still obtain a continuous key supply during the key source switching, avoiding service interruption caused by the key source switching.
[0152] Then, the quantum key distribution device re-plans the key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source and allocates the key messages to a high-priority forwarding queue that is independent of ordinary service traffic.
[0153] In this embodiment, the quantum key distribution device uses the selected second key management node as the key source end and re-solves the optimal multi-hop transmission path to the target node to adapt to the new key source location. At the same time, it configures a high-priority forwarding queue independent of ordinary service traffic for the key message carrying the key to be distributed to the target node, so as to realize the transmission logic isolation between key traffic and ordinary service traffic, suppress the queuing delay of key message, and ensure the priority transmission of high-level service keys.
[0154] Through the above methods, this application embodiment achieves seamless switching of cross-domain key sources by pre-applying for keys, pre-caching, smooth switching, and path replanning and isolation from high-priority queues, ensuring uninterrupted transmission of high-level services when key sources are abnormal.
[0155] In an optional embodiment, to further achieve global collaborative optimization of network-wide key scheduling, this application embodiment provides a rotation monitoring scheme before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node. See also Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a shift monitoring process provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 4 As shown, the method may further include steps 401 to 403.
[0156] Step 401: The quantum key distribution device periodically reports the load status to the network operation and maintenance management platform. The load status includes at least one of key forwarding traffic, computing power usage, and cache load, so that the network operation and maintenance management platform can determine the rotating monitoring node based on the load status reported by the quantum routers of the entire network and issue the appointment instruction.
[0157] In step 402, the quantum key distribution device, in response to the appointment instruction, acts as a rotating monitoring node and migrates the key forwarding service it carries to the adjacent quantum router.
[0158] Step 403: The quantum key distribution device collects routing dimension data of the entire network through the rotating monitoring node, and generates a scheduling policy based on the routing dimension data and distributes it to each quantum router. The routing dimension data includes at least one of the following: link latency, packet loss, and key transmission audit log.
[0159] The scheduling strategy is used to correct the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path.
[0160] First, the load status is periodically reported to the network operation and maintenance management platform.
[0161] In this embodiment, each quantum router can periodically and unilaterally report its own load status to the network operation and maintenance management platform (a logically centralized operation and maintenance interface) through an independent operation and maintenance channel. The load status can include at least one of key forwarding traffic, computing power usage, and cache load, which is used to characterize the operating load of each quantum router. Reporting the load status through an independent operation and maintenance channel can avoid occupying service forwarding links, thereby avoiding the preemption of service bandwidth.
[0162] The network operation and maintenance management platform integrates the load status reported by each quantum router and automatically selects the quantum router with the lowest load (e.g., lowest service load, sufficient computing power margin, and normal operation) as the rotating monitoring node for this round. The platform then issues the appointment instruction and monitoring permissions via the operation and maintenance channel. The quantum key distribution device executing this method receives this appointment instruction when it is identified as the rotating monitoring node and subsequently initiates service migration. By dynamically electing the quantum router with the lowest load as the rotating monitoring node, the system eliminates the need for a fixed dedicated monitoring node, thereby saving on the deployment of a dedicated management server and reducing hardware investment and the risk of single points of failure.
[0163] Subsequently, in response to the appointment instruction, as a rotating monitoring node, it migrated the key forwarding service it was carrying to the adjacent quantum router.
[0164] In this embodiment, the selected rotating monitoring node initiates a traffic migration strategy, which schedules the local key forwarding service to an idle quantum router in the adjacent security domain based on link latency and load conditions, thereby completing a smooth traffic switch and releasing the bandwidth and computing resources of the rotating monitoring node so that it can be dedicated to the task of monitoring the entire network.
[0165] Subsequently, routing dimension data of the entire network is collected through rotating monitoring nodes, and scheduling policies are generated and distributed to each quantum router based on the routing dimension data. The routing dimension data includes at least one of the following: link latency, packet loss, and key transmission audit logs.
[0166] In this embodiment, the rotating monitoring node is dedicated to collecting routing dimension information such as link latency, packet loss, device operating status, and key transmission audit logs of all quantum routers in the network. It also collects tamper-proof operation logs and periodically generates scheduling strategies such as routing load balancing policies, link risk assessments, and service transmission quality analysis reports. These strategies are then uploaded to the network operation and maintenance management platform for archiving through the Data Communication Network (DCN) operation and maintenance channel. Simultaneously, the global load balancing and side-channel risk handling strategies are distributed to the built-in agents of each quantum router as weight correction parameters for local key resource screening, multi-hop path planning, and abnormal virtual function isolation.
[0167] It should be noted that the rotating monitoring nodes only collect routing-level data and do not acquire or intervene in key-related information of the key management nodes. This ensures key data security while achieving unified auditing and risk assessment across the entire network. The scheduling strategy is used to modify the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path. For example, it can modify the weight of key resource selection, the weight of hop count priority, and the weight of path selection, thereby achieving coordinated action between local autonomous scheduling and global load balancing, preventing all nodes in the network from competing for the same key management node or high-quality transmission links.
[0168] Through the above method, this application embodiment achieves global collaborative optimization of network-wide key scheduling via a rotating monitoring mechanism without fixed dedicated monitoring nodes, while reducing operation and maintenance costs and improving system robustness. It is understood that when the term of a rotating monitoring node expires or a rotating monitoring node fails, the quantum router with the lowest load from the entire network can be re-elected as the new rotating monitoring node, realizing the rotation of monitoring tasks and self-healing from faults, ensuring the continuous and uninterrupted operation of network-wide monitoring, auditing, and risk management functions. This application embodiment does not limit the election cycle and rotation strategy of the rotating monitoring nodes.
[0169] In an optional embodiment, to further achieve proximity key scheduling and reduce key transmission latency, after obtaining the key status information of the first key management node, this application embodiment provides a proximity key distribution method. See also Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a local key distribution process provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 5 As shown, the method may further include steps 501 to 503.
[0170] Step 501: The quantum key distribution device determines the nearest key management node to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset screening conditions based on the key status information of the neighboring key management nodes of the first key management node, and uses it as the nearest key management node.
[0171] Step 502: The quantum key distribution device determines the target transmission path from the single-hop transmission path from the nearest key management node to the target node.
[0172] Step 503: The quantum key distribution device transmits the key from the nearest key management node to the target node through the target transmission path.
[0173] First, based on the key status information of the neighboring key management nodes of the first key management node, the key management node that is closest to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset filtering conditions is determined from the neighboring key management nodes and is taken as the nearest key management node.
[0174] In this embodiment, the neighboring key management node is a key management node within the neighborhood of the first key management node and within a one-hop reachable range of the quantum key distribution device. The quantum key distribution device can obtain the key status information reported by the neighboring key management nodes, and determine the key management node that is closest to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset screening conditions, as the nearest key management node. Here, "closest to the target node" can refer to the fewest hops between the target node or the shortest transmission path length; this embodiment does not limit this. The preset screening conditions can be consistent with the preset screening conditions in the aforementioned embodiments, such as including key inventory exceeding a preset inventory threshold, no eavesdropping alarms on the connection link, hardware load below a preset load threshold, and no side-channel intrusion alarms.
[0175] Then, the target transmission path is determined from the single-hop transmission path from the nearest key management node to the target node.
[0176] In this embodiment, the path between the nearest key management node and the target node may include one or more single-hop transmission paths. The quantum key distribution device can determine the target transmission path from the single-hop transmission paths based on the link situation between the nearest key management node and the target node. For example, a transmission path with low link latency and no eavesdropping alarm can be selected as the target transmission path. This application embodiment does not limit the method of determining the target transmission path.
[0177] Then, the key is transmitted from the nearest key management node to the target node via the target transmission path.
[0178] In this embodiment, the nearest key management node transmits the key to the target node through the target transmission path, achieving rapid key supply from the nearest location. Because the nearest key management node is closest to the target node and has the fewest hops, key transmission latency can be effectively reduced, and key distribution efficiency improved.
[0179] Through the above method, after obtaining the key status information of the first key management node, this embodiment of the application determines the nearest key management node and transmits the key to the target node based on a single-hop target transmission path, thereby achieving efficient local autonomous layer key scheduling and ensuring low latency and high efficiency of key transmission.
[0180] To more intuitively demonstrate the application of the technical solution of this application in real-world scenarios, the following explanation will be based on a specific application scenario.
[0181] See Figure 6 This is an overall flowchart of a cross-domain quantum key distribution provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0182] Suppose an operator has deployed a quantum key secure distribution network consisting of multiple security domains. Security domain A and security domain B have key management nodes KM1 and KM2 respectively. Quantum router R1 is located in security domain A, and service access devices are connected to quantum router R1 in security domain A.
[0183] Deployment and implementation process:
[0184] First, the service access device connects the target service to the network. Since the target service is a confidential service with the highest security level, it automatically encapsulates a security level identifier.<A,jg1> The quantum router R1 is synchronized with the target service and the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information pushed by the key management node KM1 of this domain is also obtained.
[0185] Afterwards, the quantum router R1, based on the security level identifier...<A,jg1> The key resources corresponding to the target service are determined to be hardware-isolated key domains, and the keys in these hardware-isolated key domains are generated in real time through QKD link negotiation.
[0186] Then, the quantum router R1 periodically determines the key status information of KM1. When the high-level key inventory of KM1 is lower than the preset inventory threshold, or when a side channel intrusion alarm is detected in KM1, it determines that the key supply of KM1 is insufficient or there is a security risk, and initiates the cross-domain key source switching process.
[0187] Subsequently, following the hop count priority principle and combined with preset screening conditions, the quantum router R1 selected KM2 from other key management nodes belonging to different security domains than KM1. KM2 had sufficient key reserves, no eavesdropping alarms on the connection link, idle hardware load, and no side channel intrusion alarms, and was selected as the second key management node.
[0188] Subsequently, the quantum router R1 initiates a key pre-request to KM2 and pre-caches the key distributed by KM2; based on the pre-cached key, the key source for the target service is switched from KM1 to KM2; the multi-hop transmission path with KM2 as the key source is replanned, and the key message is allocated to a high-priority forwarding queue independent of ordinary service traffic; KM2 distributes the key to the target node.
[0189] During subsequent business operations, the rotating monitoring mechanism periodically selects the quantum router with the lowest load from all quantum routers in the network as the rotating monitoring node, collects routing dimension data such as network link latency, packet loss, and key transmission audit logs, generates scheduling policies and distributes them to each quantum router, corrects the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path, and realizes global collaborative optimization of key scheduling across the entire network.
[0190] As can be seen from the above application scenarios, the technical solution of this application embodiment can achieve automatic switching and continuous supply of key sources across security domains when the key source is abnormal, ensuring the continuity of key transmission for high-level services, and is applicable to scenarios such as commercial quantum networking with multiple security domains for operators. It should be noted that the parameters in the above application scenarios are only illustrative examples. For example, the specific values of parameters such as preset stock threshold and preset load threshold can be set according to actual needs, and this application embodiment does not limit them.
[0191] In an optional embodiment, this application also provides an integrated framework for a quantum key distribution device. See also Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of an integrated framework for a quantum key distribution device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 7 As shown, the quantum key distribution device (hereinafter referred to as quantum router) may include a QDN secure distribution unit and a network management auxiliary rotating monitoring unit. The quantum key distribution device connects the cross-domain business encryption access node and the key management node of each security domain through the business plane, and connects to the network operation and maintenance management platform through the control plane. It distinguishes between the business plane and the control plane and works together to complete cross-domain key scheduling and network-wide rotating monitoring.
[0192] The cross-domain QDN secure distribution unit can perform the following operations in sequence: neighboring key management node shared status awareness, i.e., periodically collecting shared key status information such as key inventory, link eavesdropping alarm status, side channel alarm status, and hardware load status reported by each key management node within a one-hop reachable range; key supply insufficiency or security risk determination, i.e., based on the collected shared key status information, determining whether the local master key management node has insufficient key supply or security risks; and screening cross-domain second key management nodes, i.e., in the case of determining insufficient key supply or security risks, following the hop count priority principle and combining it with preset screening... Select criteria to filter second key management nodes belonging to different security domains from the local master key management node; switch key sources, i.e., initiate key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-cache the key, and switch the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node; plan transmission paths, i.e., replan the key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source, and allocate the key message carrying the key to be distributed to the target node to a high-priority forwarding queue independent of ordinary service traffic; perform multi-level service differentiated scheduling, i.e., combine the security level identifier carried by the target service to perform differentiated cross-domain forwarding scheduling.
[0193] The network management-assisted rotating monitoring unit can perform the following operations in sequence: load status reporting, whereby each quantum router periodically reports its own load status through the DCN operation and maintenance channel, the load status including at least one of key forwarding service volume, computing power occupancy, and cache load; rotating monitoring node election, whereby the network operation and maintenance management platform determines the quantum router with the lowest load among all quantum routers in the network as the rotating monitoring node based on the load status; key forwarding service migration, whereby the key forwarding service carried on the rotating monitoring node is migrated to an adjacent quantum router; network-wide routing dimension data collection, whereby the rotating monitoring node is dedicated to collecting network-wide link latency, packet loss, key transmission audit logs, and other routing dimension data; scheduling policy generation and distribution, whereby a scheduling policy is generated based on the routing dimension data and distributed to each quantum router, the scheduling policy being used to correct the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path; and rotating monitoring node re-election, whereby, in the event that the monitoring term of the rotating monitoring node expires or the rotating monitoring node fails, the quantum router with the lowest load is re-elected as the new rotating monitoring node.
[0194] Through the aforementioned integrated framework, the quantum key distribution device integrates two major functional units: cross-domain key security distribution and rotation monitoring. It distinguishes between the business plane and the management plane, ensuring autonomous decision-making for cross-domain key scheduling while achieving unified monitoring and auditing across the entire network. This eliminates the need for a dedicated management server, reducing hardware deployment costs and cross-domain operation and maintenance complexity.
[0195] In an optional embodiment, this application also provides a hierarchical control architecture for a network operation and maintenance management platform. See also Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a hierarchical control architecture for a network operation and maintenance management platform provided in an embodiment of this application.
[0196] like Figure 8 As shown, the network operation and maintenance management platform can be deployed on the management plane and connected to the quantum key distribution devices in each security domain through the DCN operation and maintenance channel. It is used to uniformly receive the load status periodically reported by each quantum key distribution device and the routing dimension data collected by the rotating monitoring nodes. Based on the load status reported by each quantum key distribution device, it determines the rotating monitoring nodes, issues appointment instructions and monitoring permissions to the rotating monitoring nodes, and issues operation and maintenance configuration instructions to each quantum key distribution device. The scheduling strategy is generated by the rotating monitoring nodes and distributed to each quantum key distribution device. Each quantum key distribution device in each security domain is connected to the key management node of the corresponding security domain, thus forming a hierarchical control structure of "network operation and maintenance management platform—quantum key distribution device—key management node".
[0197] Through the aforementioned hierarchical management architecture, the operational status of all quantum key distribution devices and key management nodes across the network can be aggregated level by level to the network operation and maintenance management platform. Operation and maintenance configuration commands can also be distributed level by level along this hierarchical structure, achieving logically centralized operation and maintenance control. Simultaneously, since there is no need to deploy a dedicated management server for each security domain, the network operation and maintenance management platform can flexibly divide management units according to security domains, thereby reducing cross-domain operation and maintenance costs and mitigating the risk of single points of failure through multi-level redundancy. It should be noted that this application does not limit the deployment method of the network operation and maintenance management platform or its connection relationship with each quantum key distribution device and key management node.
[0198] As can be seen, the above mainly describes the solutions provided by the embodiments of this application from a methodological perspective. To achieve the above functions, the embodiments of this application provide corresponding hardware structures and / or software modules for executing each function. Those skilled in the art should readily recognize that, in conjunction with the modules and algorithm steps of the various examples described in the embodiments disclosed herein, the embodiments of this application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in hardware or by computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0199] This application embodiment can divide the quantum key distribution device into functional modules according to the above method example. For example, each function can be divided into a separate functional module, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The integrated module can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional module. Optionally, the module division in this application embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division; other division methods may be used in actual implementation.
[0200] In some embodiments, this application also provides a quantum key distribution device. This quantum key distribution device may include one or more functional modules for implementing the quantum key distribution method of the above method embodiments.
[0201] For example, Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of a quantum key distribution device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 9 As shown, the quantum key distribution device 900 includes: an acquisition module 901, a determination module 902, and a switching module 903.
[0202] The acquisition module 901 is used to acquire the target service to be distributed key and the target node carrying the target service, as well as the key status information of the first key management node. The target service has a corresponding security level identifier.
[0203] The determination module 902 is used to determine the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier. The key resources include hardware-isolated key domains and shared key pools.
[0204] The switching module 903 is used to switch the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node when the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, so that the second key management node can distribute the key to the target node. The first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains.
[0205] In one optional embodiment, the security level identifier includes a first security level identifier, a second security level identifier, and a third security level identifier arranged in descending order of security level;
[0206] Module 902 is specifically used for:
[0207] When the security level identifier is the first security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be a hardware-isolated key domain, and the key in the hardware-isolated key domain is generated by quantum key distribution;
[0208] When the security level identifier is the second security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be a hardware isolated key domain or a shared key pool;
[0209] When the security level is identified as the third security level, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be a shared key pool, and the keys in the shared key pool are generated by quantum random numbers.
[0210] In one optional embodiment, the hardware isolation key domain is carried by multiple virtual functions, each virtual function having an independent processing core, power supply circuit, on-chip cache, bus, and electromagnetic shielding structure.
[0211] In an optional embodiment, the key distributed by the second key management node to the target node is a protected key, which is obtained by the second key management node performing cryptographic operations on the key of the target service.
[0212] The virtual function has side-channel protection, which includes at least one of the following: second-order random masking, random scrambling of the operation process, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection. The cryptographic operation is performed by only a single virtual function at any given time.
[0213] In one optional embodiment, the key status information includes the key inventory of the first key management node, the link eavesdropping alarm status, the side channel alarm status, and the hardware load status.
[0214] In an optional embodiment, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, the determining module 902 is further configured to:
[0215] Based on the principle of prioritizing hop count and preset screening conditions, the second key management node is determined from other key management nodes that belong to different security domains than the first key management node;
[0216] The preset screening criteria include: the key inventory of the key resources corresponding to the target service is higher than the preset inventory threshold, there are no eavesdropping alarms on the connection link, the hardware load is lower than the preset load threshold, and there are no side channel intrusion alarms.
[0217] In an optional embodiment, the switching module 903 is specifically used for:
[0218] Initiate a key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-cache the keys distributed by the second key management node;
[0219] Based on the pre-cached keys, the key source for the target business is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node;
[0220] The key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source is redesigned, and the key messages carrying the keys to be distributed to the target nodes are allocated to a high-priority forwarding queue that is independent of ordinary business traffic.
[0221] In an optional embodiment, before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, the acquisition module 901 is further configured to:
[0222] The load status is periodically reported to the network operation and maintenance management platform. The load status includes at least one of key forwarding traffic, computing power usage, and cache load, so that the network operation and maintenance management platform can determine the rotating monitoring node and issue the appointment instruction based on the load status reported by the quantum routers of the entire network.
[0223] Module 902 is also used for:
[0224] In response to the appointment order, as a rotating monitoring node, it will migrate the key forwarding service it carries to the adjacent quantum router;
[0225] The routing dimension data of the entire network is collected by the rotating monitoring nodes, and the scheduling policy is generated and distributed to each quantum router based on the routing dimension data. The routing dimension data includes at least one of the following: link latency, packet loss and key transmission audit logs.
[0226] The scheduling strategy is used to correct the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path.
[0227] In an optional embodiment, after obtaining the key status information of the first key management node, the determining module 902 is further configured to:
[0228] Based on the key status information of the neighboring key management nodes of the first key management node, the key management node that is closest to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset filtering conditions is determined among the neighboring key management nodes and is taken as the nearest key management node.
[0229] Determine the target transmission path from the single-hop transmission path from the nearest key management node to the target node;
[0230] The key is transmitted from the nearest key management node to the target node via the target transmission path.
[0231] It should be noted that the quantum key distribution device can implement all the processes implemented in the above method embodiments and achieve the same beneficial effects. To avoid repetition, it will not be described again here.
[0232] In the case where the functions of the integrated modules described above are implemented in hardware, this application provides a possible structural schematic diagram of the electronic device involved in the above embodiments. For example... Figure 10 As shown, the electronic device 1000 includes: a processor 1002, a communication interface 1003, and a bus 1004. Optionally, the electronic device 1000 may also include a memory 1001.
[0233] Processor 1002 may implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. Processor 1002 may be a central processing unit, a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. It may implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules, and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. Processor 1002 may also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as including one or more microprocessor combinations, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, etc.
[0234] Communication interface 1003 is used to connect with other devices via a communication network. This communication network can be Ethernet, wireless access network, wireless local area network (WLAN), etc.
[0235] The memory 1001 may be a read-only memory (ROM) or other type of static storage device capable of storing static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM) or other type of dynamic storage device capable of storing information and instructions, or electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium capable of carrying or storing desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and accessible by a computer, but is not limited thereto.
[0236] As one possible implementation, the memory 1001 can exist independently of the processor 1002. The memory 1001 can be connected to the processor 1002 via a bus 1004 and is used to store instructions or program code. When the processor 1002 calls and executes the instructions or program code stored in the memory 1001, it can implement the quantum key distribution method provided in the embodiments of this application.
[0237] In another possible implementation, the memory 1001 can also be integrated with the processor 1002.
[0238] Bus 1004 can be an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. Bus 1004 can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 10 The bus is represented by a single thick line, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
[0239] Through the above description of the implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, only the division of the above functional modules is used as an example. In practical applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the quantum key distribution device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.
[0240] This application embodiment also provides a chip, which includes a processor and a communication interface. The communication interface is coupled to the processor. The processor is used to run programs or instructions to implement the various processes of the above-described quantum key distribution method embodiments and can achieve the same technical effect. To avoid repetition, it will not be described again here.
[0241] It should be understood that the chip mentioned in the embodiments of this application may also be referred to as a system-on-a-chip, system chip, chip system, or system-on-a-chip, etc.
[0242] This application also provides a readable storage medium storing a program or instructions that, when executed by a computer, implement the quantum key distribution method provided in the above embodiments. It is understood that all or part of the processes in the above method embodiments can be executed by computer instructions instructing related hardware; the readable storage medium can be any of the foregoing embodiments or memory; the readable storage medium can also be an external storage device of the quantum key distribution device, such as a plug-in hard drive, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, etc., equipped on the quantum key distribution device. Further, the readable storage medium can include both internal storage units and external storage devices of the quantum key distribution device. The readable storage medium is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by the quantum key distribution device. The readable storage medium can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.
[0243] This application also provides a computer program product, which is stored in a storage medium and implements the quantum key distribution method provided in the above embodiments when executed by a computer.
[0244] It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes that element. Furthermore, it should be noted that the scope of the methods and apparatuses in the embodiments of this application is not limited to performing functions in the order shown or discussed, but may also include performing functions substantially simultaneously or in the reverse order, depending on the functions involved. For example, the described methods may be performed in a different order than described, and various steps may be added, omitted, or combined. Additionally, features described with reference to certain examples may be combined in other examples.
[0245] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms. Of course, they can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a computer software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk) and includes several instructions to cause a terminal (which may be a mobile phone, computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments of this application.
[0246] The embodiments of this application have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, this application is not limited to the specific embodiments described above. The specific embodiments described above are merely illustrative and not restrictive. Those skilled in the art can make many other forms under the guidance of this application without departing from the spirit and scope of the claims, and all of these forms are within the protection scope of this application.
Claims
1. A quantum key distribution method, characterized in that, include: Obtain the target service for which the key to be distributed is to be obtained, the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information of the first key management node. The target service has a corresponding security level identifier. Based on the security level identifier, the key resources corresponding to the target service are determined, and the key resources include hardware-isolated key domains and shared key pools; When the key status information indicates that the first key management node has insufficient key supply or there is a security risk, the key source of the target service is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node, so that the second key management node distributes the key to the target node. The first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security level identifiers include a first security level identifier, a second security level identifier, and a third security level identifier, arranged in descending order of security level; The step of determining the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier includes: When the security level identifier is the first security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the hardware isolation key domain, and the key in the hardware isolation key domain is generated by quantum key distribution; If the security level identifier is the second security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the hardware isolation key domain or the shared key pool; When the security level identifier is the third security level identifier, the key resource corresponding to the target service is determined to be the shared key pool, and the keys in the shared key pool are generated by quantum random numbers.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The hardware isolation key domain is carried by multiple virtual functions, each of which has an independent processing core, power supply circuit, on-chip cache, bus and electromagnetic shielding structure.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The key distributed by the second key management node to the target node is a protected key, which is obtained by the second key management node performing cryptographic operations on the key of the target service. The virtual function has side-channel protection, which includes at least one of second-order random masking, random scrambling of the operation process, clock jitter control, and dynamic voltage noise injection. The cryptographic operation is performed by only a single virtual function at any given time.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The key status information includes the key inventory of the first key management node, the link eavesdropping alarm status, the side channel alarm status, and the hardware load status.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, the method further includes: Based on the hop count priority principle and preset screening conditions, the second key management node is determined from other key management nodes that belong to different security domains than the first key management node; The preset screening conditions include: the key inventory of the key resources corresponding to the target service is higher than a preset inventory threshold, there is no eavesdropping alarm on the connection link, the hardware load is lower than a preset load threshold, and there is no side channel intrusion alarm.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node includes: Initiate a key pre-request to the second key management node and pre-cache the keys distributed by the second key management node; Based on the pre-cached key, the key source for the target service is switched from the first key management node to the second key management node; The key transmission path with the second key management node as the key source is replanned, and the key message carrying the key to be distributed to the target node is allocated to a high-priority forwarding queue that is independent of ordinary service traffic.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before switching the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node, the method further includes: The load status is periodically reported to the network operation and maintenance management platform. The load status includes at least one of key forwarding service volume, computing power consumption, and cache load, so that the network operation and maintenance management platform can determine the rotating monitoring node and issue appointment instructions based on the load status reported by the quantum routers of the entire network. In response to the appointment instruction, as the rotating monitoring node, the key forwarding service it carries will be migrated to the adjacent quantum router; The rotating monitoring nodes collect routing dimension data across the entire network and generate scheduling policies based on the routing dimension data, which are then distributed to each of the quantum routers. The routing dimension data includes at least one of the following: link latency, packet loss, and key transmission audit logs. The scheduling strategy is used to modify the determination conditions of the second key management node and the key transmission path.
9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, After obtaining the key status information of the first key management node, the method further includes: Based on the key status information of the neighboring key management nodes of the first key management node, the key management node that is closest to the target node and whose key status information meets the preset filtering conditions is determined among the neighboring key management nodes and is taken as the nearest key management node. The target transmission path is determined from the single-hop transmission path from the nearest key management node to the target node; The key is transmitted from the nearest key management node to the target node via the target transmission path.
10. A quantum key distribution device, characterized in that, include: The acquisition module is used to acquire the target service for which the key to be distributed is to be acquired, the target node carrying the target service, and the key status information of the first key management node. The target service has a corresponding security level identifier. The determination module is used to determine the key resources corresponding to the target service based on the security level identifier, wherein the key resources include a hardware-isolated key domain and a shared key pool; The switching module is used to switch the key source of the target service from the first key management node to the second key management node when the key status information indicates that the key supply of the first key management node is insufficient or there is a security risk, so that the second key management node distributes the key to the target node. The first key management node and the second key management node belong to different security domains.
11. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory, the memory storing a program or instructions that can run on the processor, the program or instructions being executed by the processor to implement the quantum key distribution method as described in any one of claims 1-9.
12. A readable storage medium, characterized in that, The readable storage medium stores a program or instructions that, when executed by a computer, implement the quantum key distribution method as described in any one of claims 1-9.
13. A computer program product, characterized in that, The computer program product is stored in a storage medium, and when executed by a computer, the computer program product implements the quantum key distribution method as described in any one of claims 1-9.
