A method, device, equipment, and medium for defending against unauthorized secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network.
By decapsulating AP uplink tunnel packets on the AC, periodically detecting the TTL value offset of TCP SYN packets and actively probing, the problem of being unable to identify and defend against illegal secondary NAT routers in existing technologies is solved, achieving accurate risk assessment and continuous defense measures.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611319134.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-28
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing technical solutions cannot effectively identify and defend against illegal secondary NAT routers connected in series under APs. They lack proactive detection mechanisms and differentiated risk level assessments, resulting in insufficient identification accuracy and inappropriate defense measures.
The AC obtains and decapsulates the uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets from the AP, periodically detects the TTL value offset of the IP header of the original uplink TCP SYN packets of the terminal, verifies whether the terminal is connected to an illegal secondary NAT router through active probing operations, and coordinates with the AP to implement defense measures according to the risk level.
It enables direct TTL offset detection on the AC, simplifies system deployment, accurately identifies illegal secondary NAT routers, avoids false positives, continuously monitors terminal behavior, and ensures the accuracy and continuity of defense.
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Figure CN123122925A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method, apparatus, device, and medium for defending against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network. Background Technology
[0002] With the widespread adoption of enterprise wireless networks, the centralized forwarding networking architecture of AC (Access Controller) plus thin AP (Access Point) has become the mainstream deployment method for large and medium-sized campus networks. In this architecture, the AC manages all APs uniformly. Terminal internet access data is encapsulated via CAPWAP (Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points) tunneling by the APs before being uploaded to the AC. The AC then decapsulates the data and forwards it to the internal network or the internet. As the centralized aggregation point for network traffic, the AC can obtain the original service packets of the terminals and identify the AP to which the terminal belongs, possessing a natural advantage in implementing terminal behavior detection and security policies.
[0003] To ensure internal network security, enterprises typically deploy unauthorized NAT (Network Address Translation) router detection mechanisms to identify terminal devices that are illegally accessing the network and sharing internet access. Existing detection solutions mostly employ detection techniques based on the IP packet header's TTL (Time to Live) field. They determine the presence of intermediate routing devices by comparing the packet's TTL value with the default initial TTL value of a standard operating system (e.g., 128 for Windows, 64 for Linux / Android). Some solutions utilize traffic sampling techniques such as sFlow (Sampled Flow) to collect data packets on network devices like switches or firewalls and analyze TTL changes to identify hosts that may be sharing internet access via NAT.
[0004] Existing technical solutions cannot effectively identify and defend against illegal secondary NAT routers connected in series under the AP. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This application provides a method, apparatus, device, and medium for defending against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, which can effectively identify and defend against illegal secondary NAT routers connected in series under the AP.
[0006] To achieve the above objectives, this application adopts the following technical solution: In a first aspect, the present application provides a defense method for an illegal secondary NAT router under a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service networking, comprising: Obtain an AP upstream centralized forwarding service tunnel packet, perform decapsulation processing on the AP upstream centralized forwarding service tunnel packet, to obtain the original upstream service packet of the terminal under the AP; the original upstream service packet includes an original upstream DNS query packet, an original upstream TCP SYN packet, and other original upstream packets; Based on the original upstream TCP SYN packet, periodically detect whether the TTL value in the IP header of the original upstream TCP SYN packet of the terminal is offset, and perform K detections within each detection cycle; Determine a risk level or determine whether to perform an active detection operation on the terminal according to the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset within the same detection cycle; When performing the active detection operation on the terminal, suspend the periodic detection, perform the active detection operation according to the DNS query packet corresponding to the detection domain name and the corresponding TCP SYN packet, and re-determine the risk level according to the result of the active detection operation; In linkage with the AP, execute a defense measure corresponding to the risk level on the terminal according to the risk level; After the active detection operation is completed, restart the periodic detection.
[0007] Optionally, the step of determining a risk level or determining whether to perform an active detection operation on the terminal according to the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset within the same detection cycle comprises: If the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset within the detection cycle is equal to 0, determining that the risk level is no risk; If 1≤n<K, determining that the risk level is category A risk; If n=K, determining to perform the active detection operation on the terminal.
[0008] Optionally, the performing the active detection operation on the terminal comprises: Obtain downstream service packets belonging to the same terminal as the original upstream service packet, perform session quintuple matching on the original upstream service packet and the downstream service packets, to generate a session set of the terminal; the session set includes an HTTP session set and a non-HTTP session set; When the number of sessions in the HTTP session set is less than 3, continue to generate the session set of the terminal; When the HTTP session set is greater than or equal to 3, 3 HTTP sessions in the HTTP session set are selected, and an HTTP 302 response is sent to the HTTP session of the terminal. The Location field of the HTTP 302 response contains the probe domain name. The HTTP 302 response is used to instruct the terminal to initiate an HTTP connection to the probe domain name. The terminal performs a DNS lookup on the probe domain name before initiating the HTTP connection. DNS hijacking is performed on the DNS query messages initiated by the terminal for the probe domain name, resolving the probe domain name to the probe IP; Within a preset observation period, the number of DNS queries made by the terminal to the probe domain name is counted, and the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message generated when the terminal initiates a TCP connection to the probe IP are detected. The risk level is determined based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message.
[0009] Optionally, determining the risk level based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the original uplink DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the original uplink TCP SYN message includes: When the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class B risk. When the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCPSYN message has an offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message are other combinations, the risk level is determined to be Class A risk. Among them, the suspicion level of the type B risk is higher than that of the type A risk, and the suspicion level of the type C risk is higher than that of the type B risk.
[0010] Optionally, the step of linking the AP to perform defensive measures corresponding to the risk level on the terminal includes: When the risk level is Class A, the first log record information is generated; When the risk level is Class B, a second log record and a second alarm message are generated. When the risk level is Class C, a third log record and a third alarm are generated, and the AP connected to the terminal is linked to reject the terminal's services.
[0011] Optionally, the AP accessed by the linked terminal may reject terminal services, including: A filtering instruction carrying the terminal's service MAC address is sent to the AP to which the terminal is connected. The filtering instruction is used to instruct the AP to add the terminal's service MAC address to its local filtering list and discard all uplink packets from the terminal.
[0012] Optionally, the second alarm information includes the terminal service MAC address, risk level, access AP identifier, and suspected identifier; the third alarm information includes the terminal service MAC address, risk level, access AP identifier, and highly suspected identifier; wherein, the suspected identifier is used to indicate the degree of suspicion that there is an illegal secondary NAT router between the terminal and the AP is suspected, and the highly suspected identifier is used to indicate the degree of suspicion that there is an illegal secondary NAT router between the terminal and the AP is highly suspected; The first log record information, the second log record information, and the third log record information all include the terminal service MAC address, risk level, and AP identifier.
[0013] Secondly, this application provides a defense device against unauthorized secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, comprising: The acquisition module is used to acquire the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets, decapsulate the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets, and obtain the original uplink service packets of the terminal under the AP; the original uplink service packets include the original uplink DNS query packets, the original uplink TCP SYN packets, and other original uplink packets; The processing module is configured to periodically detect, based on the original uplink TCP SYN packets, whether the TTL value of the IP header of the terminal's original uplink TCP SYN packets has deviated, performing K checks within each detection period; determining the risk level or whether to perform an active probing operation on the terminal based on the number of times n the IP header TTL value deviates within the same detection period; when performing an active probing operation on the terminal, pausing the periodic detection, and performing an active probing operation based on the DNS query packet and corresponding TCP SYN packet of the probe domain name, and re-determining the risk level based on the result of the active probing operation; The defense module is used to coordinate with the AP to perform defense measures corresponding to the risk level on the terminal; after the active detection operation is completed, the periodic detection is restarted.
[0014] Thirdly, this application provides a computing device, including a memory and a processor; The memory stores one or more computer programs, the one or more computer programs including instructions; when the instructions are executed by the processor, the computing device performs the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
[0015] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program for performing the method as described in any one of the first aspects.
[0016] As can be seen from the above technical solution, this application has at least the following beneficial effects: This application obtains the terminal's original uplink service packets by acquiring and decapsulating the AP's uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets on the AC, enabling TTL offset detection to be performed directly on the AC based on the terminal's original uplink service packets. This eliminates the need for additional traffic sampling devices on switches or firewalls, simplifying the deployment architecture of the detection system. By periodically detecting whether the IP header TTL value of the terminal's original uplink TCP SYN packets has shifted based on the original uplink TCP SYN packets, performing K checks per detection period, it can continuously track the terminal's TTL behavior, effectively distinguishing between occasional TTL anomalies and persistent illegal NAT devices, avoiding false positives or false negatives from single detections. The risk level or the need for active probing operations on the terminal is determined by the number of times (n) the IP header TTL value shift is detected within the same detection period, linking the number of TTL offsets to the risk level, thus providing a quantitative basis for risk assessment. When active probing operations are performed on the terminal, periodic detection is paused, and the DNS query packets and corresponding TCP lookups based on the probed domain name are performed. The SYN packet performs an active probe operation, which can proactively verify whether the terminal has indeed connected to an unauthorized secondary NAT router, and re-determine the risk level based on the results of the active probe operation, making the risk assessment more accurate. Based on the risk level, the AP is linked to execute the corresponding defense measures for the terminal, so that detection and defense are linked, solving the problem that existing detection schemes cannot directly execute defense measures. After the active probe operation is completed, the periodic detection restarts, so that the system can continuously monitor the subsequent behavior of the terminal and maintain the continuity of defense.
[0017] It should be understood that the descriptions of technical features, technical solutions, beneficial effects, or similar language in this application do not imply that all features and advantages can be achieved in any single embodiment. Rather, it is understood that the description of a feature or beneficial effect means that a specific technical feature, technical solution, or beneficial effect is included in at least one embodiment. Therefore, the descriptions of technical features, technical solutions, or beneficial effects in this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the technical features, technical solutions, and beneficial effects described in this embodiment can be combined in any suitable manner. Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments can be implemented without one or more specific technical features, technical solutions, or beneficial effects of a particular embodiment. In other embodiments, additional technical features and beneficial effects may be identified in specific embodiments that do not embody all embodiments. Attached Figure Description
[0018] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating an application scenario provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2A flowchart illustrating a method for defending against unauthorized secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, as provided in this application embodiment; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a defense device against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network provided in this application embodiment; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a computing device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0019] The terms "first," "second," and "third," etc., used in this application specification and accompanying drawings are used to distinguish different objects, not to limit a specific order.
[0020] In the embodiments of this application, the terms "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate that something is an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design that is described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the embodiments of this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design. Specifically, the use of the terms "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.
[0021] An unauthorized secondary NAT router refers to a routing device that is connected in series between a terminal and an access point (AP) and performs NAT forwarding on the terminal's traffic without authorization from the network administrator.
[0022] Existing technical solutions cannot effectively identify and defend against illegal secondary NAT routers connected in series with APs. The fundamental reason is that: there is a lack of an active detection mechanism to further confirm whether the terminal is indeed connected to an illegal NAT router, resulting in insufficient accuracy of identification; existing solutions lack differentiated risk level assessment and corresponding handling strategies, and use the same processing method regardless of the risk level, and cannot implement differentiated defense measures according to the actual risk level.
[0023] In view of this, this application provides a method for defending against illegal secondary NAT routers under a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, which can be executed by the AC.
[0024] To address the issue that existing technologies cannot effectively identify and defend against illegal secondary NAT routers connected to APs, an AC centralized forwarding network architecture is adopted. The AC acts as the central aggregation point for all AP traffic, directly acquiring and decapsulating the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets to obtain the original uplink service packets from the terminals. Then, based on the original uplink TCP SYN packets, the TTL value of the IP header of the terminal's original uplink TCP SYN packets is periodically checked for offsets, K times per detection period. The risk level is determined based on the number of TTL value offsets (n) within the same detection period, or whether to perform active probing on the terminal. When active probing is performed, periodic detection is paused, and the terminal is actively probed to confirm whether it is indeed connected to an illegal secondary NAT router based on the DNS query packets and corresponding TCP SYN packets corresponding to the probed domain name. The risk level is then re-determined based on the active probing results. Based on the risk level, the AP is coordinated to implement corresponding defensive measures for the terminal. After the active probing is completed, periodic detection restarts, thereby effectively identifying and defending against illegal secondary NAT routers connected to APs.
[0025] To make the technical solution of this application clearer and easier to understand, the application scenarios of the technical solution of this application are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Figure 1 As shown in the figure, this figure is a schematic diagram of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of this application.
[0026] In this application scenario, the AP and AC establish a CAPWAP tunnel. The terminal connects to the AP via Wi-Fi or wired connection. The AP encapsulates the terminal's service packets into AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets through the CAPWAP tunnel and uploads them to the AC. The AC decapsulates the tunnel packets to obtain the terminal's original uplink service packets. The original uplink service packets include original uplink DNS query packets, original uplink TCP SYN packets, and other original uplink packets.
[0027] The Access Control (AC) periodically checks the IP header TTL value of the original uplink TCP SYN packets from the terminal for any deviation, performing K checks per period. Based on the number of times (n) the IP header TTL value deviation is detected within the same period, the AC determines the risk level or whether to perform active probing on the terminal. When active probing is performed, the AC pauses periodic checks and performs active probing based on the DNS query packet and corresponding TCP SYN packet for the probed domain name. The risk level is then reassessed based on the results of the active probing. Based on the risk level, the AC coordinates with the Access Point (AP) to implement corresponding defensive measures for the terminal. After the active probing is completed, the AC resumes periodic checks.
[0028] The AC is the core control device in the centralized forwarding service network, used to uniformly manage all APs and decapsulate CAPWAP tunnel packets; the AP is used to provide access services to the terminal and upload the terminal's service data to the AC after encapsulation through the CAPWAP tunnel; the terminal is the user equipment that accesses the AP, and there may be an illegal secondary NAT router connected between the terminal and the AP.
[0029] To make the technical solution of this application clearer and easier to understand, the following describes a method for defending against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, based on the above application scenarios. For example... Figure 2 As shown, this figure is a flowchart of a method for defending against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, according to an embodiment of this application. In this embodiment, the method includes: S201. The AC obtains the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel message, decapsulates the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel message, and obtains the original uplink service message of the terminal under the AP. The original uplink service message includes the original uplink DNS query message, the original uplink TCP SYN message, and other original uplink messages.
[0030] The AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel message is an uplink data packet sent by the AP to the AC after encapsulating the terminal's service packets using the CAPWAP protocol. This message consists of two parts: a CAPWAP header and the original service packet. The CAPWAP header is used for tunnel transmission control, and the original service packet is the original IP packet sent by the terminal. Decapsulation is the reverse encapsulation operation performed by the AC on the CAPWAP tunnel message, i.e., removing the CAPWAP header to restore the original service packet sent by the terminal. The original uplink service packet is the original IP packet sent by the terminal, encapsulated and uploaded by the AP, and decapsulated and restored by the AC. It includes the original uplink DNS query message, the original uplink TCP SYN message, and other original uplink messages. The original uplink DNS query message is a DNS (Domain Name System) query request message sent by the terminal, used to resolve domain names to IP addresses. The original uplink TCP SYN message is a TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connection establishment request message sent by the terminal, whose IP header contains a TTL field. Other raw uplink packets are terminal raw uplink service packets other than DNS query packets and TCP SYN packets, such as TCP ACK packets, TCP data packets, UDP data packets, ICMP packets, etc.
[0031] The AC receives uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets sent by the AP through the CAPWAP tunnel, performs decapsulation processing on the tunnel packets, that is, strips off the CAPWAP tunnel header, restores the original uplink service packets sent by the terminal, and distinguishes them according to packet type as original uplink DNS query packets, original uplink TCP SYN packets, and original uplink other packets.
[0032] S202 and AC periodically check whether the TTL value of the IP header of the original uplink TCP SYN packet of the terminal has shifted based on the original uplink TCP SYN packet. The check is performed K times in each detection period.
[0033] The Time-to-Live (TTL) value is the Time to Live field in the IP header, representing the maximum number of hops a packet is allowed to traverse in the network. The TTL value is decremented by 1 for each router the packet passes through. Different operating systems have different default initial TTL values (e.g., 128 for Windows, 64 for Linux / Android). If a packet sent by a terminal passes through an unauthorized secondary NAT router, the TTL value will be decremented by 1 by the router, resulting in a fixed offset between the TTL value of the packet received by the AC and the operating system's default initial TTL value.
[0034] The AC performs TTL offset checks K times on the same terminal within each detection period. During each check, the AC extracts the IP header TTL value from the original uplink TCP SYN packet sent by the terminal and compares it with the closest operating system default initial TTL value. If they are inconsistent (i.e., the IP header TTL value is less than the closest operating system default initial TTL value), it is determined that the IP header TTL value of the terminal's original uplink TCP SYN packet has shifted in that detection. The AC repeats this detection process K times and records the results each time. The AC obtains the number of times the TTL value shifted in the K checks within the same detection period; this number represents the frequency of TTL shifts for the terminal within that detection period.
[0035] S203 and AC determine the risk level or whether to perform active probing operations on the terminal based on the number of times n that the IP packet header TTL value is detected to be offset within the same detection cycle.
[0036] The offset count 'n' represents the number of times the AC detects an offset in the TTL value of the IP header of the terminal's original uplink TCP SYN packet within the same detection period. The risk level is the terminal's risk grade determined by the AC based on the terminal's TTL offset count 'n'. Active probing is the process by which the AC sends probe packets to the terminal and analyzes the terminal's response packets to confirm whether the terminal has indeed connected to an unauthorized secondary NAT router.
[0037] In some embodiments, if the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset within the detection period is 0, it is determined that the risk level is no risk; if 1≤n<K, it is determined that the risk level is category A risk; if n=K, it is determined to perform an active probing operation on the terminal.
[0038] When the offset count n is equal to 0, it indicates that no TTL offset occurs in all TCP SYN packets of the terminal within the detection period, and the AC determines that the risk level is no risk, and does not perform the active probing operation. When the offset count n is greater than or equal to 1 and less than K, it indicates that TTL offset occurs in part of the TCP SYN packets of the terminal within the detection period, and the offset count does not reach K times in total, the AC determines that the risk level is category A risk, and does not perform the active probing operation. When the offset count n is equal to K, it indicates that offset occurs in all K TTL detections of the terminal within the detection period, and the TTL offset is persistent, and the AC determines to perform the active probing operation on the terminal. The AC obtains a risk level or determines whether to perform the active probing operation, where the risk level characterizes the severity of the TTL offset of the terminal, and the determination to perform the active probing operation characterizes the judgment result that there is a persistent TTL offset in the terminal and it is necessary to further verify whether an illegal secondary NAT router exists.
[0039] S204: When the active probing operation is performed on the terminal, suspend periodic detection, perform the active probing operation according to the DNS query packet corresponding to the probing domain name and the corresponding TCP SYN packet, and re-determine the risk level according to the result of the active probing operation.
[0040] In some embodiments, the AC acquires downlink service packets belonging to the same terminal as the original uplink service packets, performs session 5-tuple matching between the original uplink service packets and the downlink service packets, and generates a session set for the terminal. The session set includes an HTTP session set and a non-HTTP session set. When the HTTP session set is less than 3, the terminal continues to generate a session set. When the HTTP session set is greater than or equal to 3, 3 HTTP sessions are selected from the HTTP session set, and an HTTP 302 response is sent to the terminal's HTTP session proxy. The Location field of the HTTP 302 response contains the probe domain name, and the HTTP 302 response is used to instruct the terminal to initiate an HTTP connection to the probe domain name. Before initiating the HTTP connection, the terminal performs a DNS query on the probe domain name. DNS hijacking is performed on the DNS query packets initiated by the terminal for the probe domain name, resolving the probe domain name to the probe IP. Within a preset observation period, the number of DNS queries performed by the terminal on the probe domain name is counted, and the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query packets and the TCP connection generated when the terminal initiates a TCP connection to the probe IP are detected. The TTL value of the IP header of the SYN packet; the risk level is determined based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query packet, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN packet.
[0041] Downlink service packets are downlink IP packets received by the AC from the internal network or the Internet and forwarded to the terminal by the AP. A session 5-tuple consists of five elements: source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destination port number, and protocol type, used to uniquely identify a network session. An HTTP session is a network session based on the HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) protocol, including the terminal's HTTP requests and corresponding HTTP responses. An HTTP 302 response is a temporary redirect response defined in the HTTP protocol, with a status code of 302. Its Location field contains the redirection target address, used to instruct the terminal to initiate a request to the new address. The probe domain name is a specific domain name used by the AC for active probing; it is dynamically generated by the AC, and the terminal cannot pre-cache its IP address. It is sent to the terminal via the Location field of the HTTP 302 response, and the terminal initiates a DNS lookup and HTTP connection to that probe domain name. The preset observation duration is the maximum time window for the AC to wait for the terminal's response to the active probe packets, used for statistical analysis of the probing results.
[0042] The Access Control (AC) acquires downlink service packets belonging to the same terminal as the original uplink service packet. The AC performs a session 5-tuple match between the acquired uplink and downlink service packets, comparing the source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, and transport layer protocol. If they match, the two packets are determined to belong to the same communication connection. The AC summarizes all successfully matched communication connections to generate a session set for the terminal. This session set includes an HTTP session set, where an HTTP session refers to a web browsing connection made by the terminal through TCP port 80.
[0043] When the AC determines that the terminal has three or more HTTP sessions in its set, the AC selects three of them and responds to the HTTP requests initiated by the terminal in each session. In other words, the AC simulates an HTTP server and returns an HTTP 302 response message to the terminal. The Location field of this HTTP 302 response message contains a specific probe domain name, which is pre-constructed by the AC for active probing. The purpose of this HTTP 302 response message is to trigger the terminal to initiate a new HTTP connection to that probe domain name.
[0044] After receiving the HTTP 302 response message from the AC (Access Controller), the terminal automatically initiates an HTTP connection request for the probe domain according to the HTTP protocol specification. Before initiating this HTTP connection, the terminal needs to obtain the IP address corresponding to the probe domain. Therefore, the terminal sends a DNS query message to the DNS server to query the IP address corresponding to the probe domain.
[0045] The AC is pre-configured with a DNS hijacking and proxy answering policy for this probe domain. When the AC detects a DNS query message initiated by the terminal for this probe domain, the AC intercepts the DNS query message and does not forward it to the DNS server. Instead, the AC directly simulates a DNS server and returns a DNS response message to the terminal. In this DNS response message, the probe domain is resolved to a probe IP (which is pre-set by the AC). After receiving the DNS response message, the terminal obtains the probe IP and then initiates a TCP connection to the probe IP, generating a TCP SYN packet.
[0046] Within a preset observation period, the AC performs the following three statistical and detection operations: First, it counts the number of DNS queries performed by the terminal on the probe domain name, which is equal to the number of DNS query packets sent by the terminal for the probe domain name; Second, it detects the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query packets sent by the terminal for the probe domain name, and determines whether the TTL value has shifted relative to the default initial TTL value of the operating system; Third, it detects the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN packet generated when the terminal initiates a TCP connection to the probe IP, and determines whether the TTL value has shifted relative to the default initial TTL value of the operating system.
[0047] The AC determines the risk level based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message.
[0048] Specifically, when the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, it indicates that there may be an illegal secondary NAT router behind the terminal. The secondary NAT router has not enabled DNS proxy and may only carry a single terminal, and the risk level is determined to be Class B risk. When the number of DNS queries equals 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, it indicates that there may be an illegal secondary NAT router behind the terminal. The secondary NAT router has DNS proxy enabled, which may be for single or multiple users, and the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, it is generally characterized that there may be an illegal secondary NAT router behind the terminal. The illegal secondary NAT router has DNS proxy enabled and may be carrying multiple terminals, and the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, it is comprehensively characterized that there may be an illegal secondary NAT router behind the terminal, the illegal secondary NAT router has not enabled DNS proxy and may carry multiple terminals, and the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message are other combinations, the risk level is determined to be Class A risk; among them, the suspicion level of Class B risk is higher than that of Class A risk, and the suspicion level of Class C risk is higher than that of Class B risk.
[0049] Based on the risk level, S205 and AC work in conjunction with AP to implement defense measures corresponding to the risk level of the terminal. After the active detection operation is completed, the periodic detection will restart.
[0050] In some embodiments, when the risk level is Class A risk, the first log record information is generated; When the risk level is Class B, a second log entry and a second alarm will be generated. When the risk level is Class C, a third log record and a third alarm are generated, and the AP connected to the terminal is linked to reject the terminal's services.
[0051] The second alarm information includes the terminal's service MAC address, risk level, access point (AP) identifier, and suspected identifier; the third alarm information includes the terminal's service MAC address, risk level, access point (AP) identifier, and highly suspected identifier. The suspected identifier indicates a suspected level of involvement between the terminal and the AP, while the highly suspected identifier indicates a highly suspected level of involvement. The first, second, and third log entries all include the terminal's service MAC address, risk level, and access point (AP) identifier. The terminal's service MAC address is the original MAC address of the terminal's original uplink service packets.
[0052] Based on the determined risk level, the AC sends control commands corresponding to that risk level to the AP connected to the terminal via the CAPWAP protocol, and the AP executes the corresponding defensive measures. After the active detection operation is completed, the AC restarts the periodic TTL offset detection of the terminal.
[0053] Category A risk represents the lowest level of suspicion, indicating that the terminal exhibits occasional TTL offsets, but proactive probing failed to further confirm the existence of an unauthorized secondary NAT router. When the risk level is Category A, the AC generates a first log entry, recording the terminal's service MAC address, Category A risk level, and the access point identifier as the first log entry to retain the risk event record for that terminal, without performing any blocking operations.
[0054] Category B risk represents a moderate level of suspicion, indicating that proactive detection results suggest the possible presence of an unauthorized secondary NAT router under the terminal. When the risk level is Category B, the AC generates a second log entry and a second alarm. When constructing the second log entry, the AC includes the terminal's MAC address, the Category B risk level, and the identifier of the connected AP. When constructing the second alarm, the AC includes the terminal's MAC address, the Category B risk level, the identifier of the connected AP, and the suspected identifier, and sends this second alarm to the network management system to alert the network administrator that the terminal may be connected to an unauthorized secondary NAT router.
[0055] Category C risk represents the highest level of suspicion, indicating that proactive detection results consistently point to the presence of an unauthorized secondary NAT router connected to the terminal. When the risk level is Category C, the AC generates third-level log entries and a third-level alarm, and coordinates with the AP connected to the terminal to deny the terminal's services. When constructing the third-level log entry, the AC includes the terminal's MAC address, the Category C risk level, and the AP's identifier. When constructing the third-level alarm, the AC includes the terminal's MAC address, the Category C risk level, the AP's identifier, and a highly suspected identifier, and sends this alarm to the network management system to alert the network administrator that the terminal is highly suspected of having an unauthorized secondary NAT router connected. The AC sends an access denial command to the AP connected to the terminal via the CAPWAP protocol. Upon receiving this command, the AP rejects all subsequent access requests from the terminal, thereby blocking the terminal and its connected devices from accessing the network.
[0056] After the active detection operation is completed, the AC restarts the periodic TTL offset detection of the terminal, that is, restarts the periodic detection process to continuously monitor whether the terminal still has a TTL offset, thereby realizing continuous monitoring of the terminal behavior.
[0057] The access point (AP) connected to the linked terminal rejects the terminal's services, specifically: A filtering instruction carrying the terminal's service MAC address is sent to the AP to which the terminal is connected. The filtering instruction is used to instruct the AP to add the terminal's service MAC address to its local filtering list and discard all uplink packets from the terminal.
[0058] Filtering commands are control commands issued by the AC to the AP, instructing the AP to add the specified terminal's service MAC address to its local filtering list and discard all uplink packets from that terminal. The local filtering list is a list of MAC addresses maintained locally by the AP; service packets from terminals listed in this list will be discarded by the AP.
[0059] The AC sends a filtering command carrying the terminal's service MAC address to the AP to which the terminal is connected. Upon receiving the filtering command, the AP extracts the terminal's service MAC address from the command and adds it to its local filtering list. Subsequently, the AP discards all uplink packets received from this terminal, preventing them from being encapsulated through a CAPWAP tunnel and uploaded to the AC. In this way, the AC blocks and defends against terminal MAC addresses that are highly suspected of being from unauthorized secondary NAT routers connected to the AP.
[0060] Based on the above description, this application has the following beneficial effects: This application obtains the terminal's original uplink service packets by acquiring and decapsulating the AP's uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets on the AC, enabling TTL offset detection to be performed directly on the AC based on the terminal's original uplink service packets. This eliminates the need for additional traffic sampling devices on switches or firewalls, simplifying the deployment architecture of the detection system. By periodically detecting whether the IP header TTL value of the terminal's original uplink TCP SYN packets has shifted based on the original uplink TCP SYN packets, performing K checks per detection period, it can continuously track the terminal's TTL behavior, effectively distinguishing between occasional TTL anomalies and persistent illegal NAT devices, avoiding false positives or false negatives from single detections. The risk level or the need for active probing operations on the terminal is determined by the number of times (n) the IP header TTL value shift is detected within the same detection period, linking the number of TTL offsets to the risk level, thus providing a quantitative basis for risk assessment. When active probing operations are performed on the terminal, periodic detection is paused, and the DNS query packets and corresponding TCP lookups based on the probed domain name are performed. The SYN packet performs an active probing operation, which can proactively verify the suspiciousness of the terminal connecting to an unauthorized secondary NAT router, minimizing false positives caused by the terminal's VPN client software or terminal security software modifying the TTL. Based on the results of the active probing operation, the risk level is re-determined, making the risk assessment more accurate. According to the risk level, the AP is linked to execute the corresponding defensive measures for the terminal, so that detection and defense are linked, solving the problem that existing detection schemes cannot directly execute defensive measures. After the active probing operation is completed, the periodic detection restarts, enabling the system to continuously monitor the subsequent behavior of the terminal and maintain the continuity of defense.
[0061] The above text combined Figures 1 to 2 This application provides a detailed description of the defense method against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network. The apparatus and devices provided in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0062] like Figure 3As shown in the figure, this figure is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for defending against an illegal secondary NAT router under a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network provided by an embodiment of the present application, and the apparatus includes: An obtaining module 301, configured to obtain an AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packet, decapsulate the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packet, and obtain an original uplink service packet of a terminal under the AP; the original uplink service packet includes an original uplink DNS query packet, an original uplink TCP SYN packet, and other original uplink packets; A processing module 302, configured to periodically detect, based on the original uplink TCP SYN packet, whether the TTL value in the IP header of the original uplink TCP SYN packet of the terminal deviates, and perform K detections in each detection cycle; determine a risk level or determine whether to perform an active detection operation on the terminal according to the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to deviate within the same detection cycle; when performing the active detection operation on the terminal, suspend the periodic detection, perform the active detection operation according to the DNS query packet corresponding to the detection domain name and the corresponding TCP SYN packet, and re-determine the risk level according to the result of the active detection operation; A defense module 303, configured to perform a defense measure corresponding to the risk level on the terminal in linkage with the AP according to the risk level; after the active detection operation is completed, restart the periodic detection.
[0063] Optionally, the processing module 302 is specifically configured to determine that the risk level is no risk if the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to deviate within the detection cycle is n=0; If 1≤n<K, determine that the risk level is class A risk; If n=K, determine to perform the active detection operation on the terminal.
[0064] Optionally, the processing module 302 is specifically configured to obtain a downlink service packet belonging to the same terminal as the original uplink service packet, perform session quintuple matching on the original uplink service packet and the downlink service packet, and generate a session set of the terminal; the session set includes an HTTP session set and a non-HTTP session set; when the HTTP session set has fewer than 3 sessions, continue to generate the session set of the terminal; When the HTTP session set has 3 or more sessions, select 3 HTTP sessions from the HTTP session set, and reply with an HTTP 302 response to the HTTP session of the terminal, where the Location field of the HTTP 302 response contains a detection domain name, and the HTTP 302 response is used to instruct the terminal to initiate an HTTP connection to the detection domain name; wherein the terminal performs a DNS query on the detection domain name before initiating the HTTP connection; DNS hijacking is performed on the DNS query messages initiated by the terminal for the probe domain name, resolving the probe domain name to the probe IP; Within a preset observation period, the number of DNS queries made by the terminal to the probe domain name is counted, and the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message generated when the terminal initiates a TCP connection to the probe IP are detected. The risk level is determined based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message.
[0065] Optionally, the processing module 302 is specifically used to determine the risk level as Class B risk when the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset. When the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCPSYN message has an offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message are other combinations, the risk level is determined to be Class A risk. Among them, the suspicion level of the type B risk is higher than that of the type A risk, and the suspicion level of the type C risk is higher than that of the type B risk.
[0066] Optionally, the defense module 303 is specifically used to generate first log record information when the risk level is Class A risk; When the risk level is Class B, a second log record and a second alarm message are generated. When the risk level is Class C, a third log record and a third alarm are generated, and the AP connected to the terminal is linked to reject the terminal's services.
[0067] Optionally, the defense module 303 is specifically used to send a filtering instruction carrying the terminal's service MAC address to the AP to which the terminal is connected. The filtering instruction is used to instruct the AP to add the terminal's service MAC address to its local filtering list and discard all uplink packets from the terminal.
[0068] The defense device for illegal secondary NAT routers under CAPWAP centralized forwarding service networking according to the embodiments of this application can correspondingly execute the method described in the embodiments of this application, and the other operations and / or functions of each module / unit of the defense device for illegal secondary NAT routers under CAPWAP centralized forwarding service networking are respectively for implementing Figure 2 For the sake of brevity, the corresponding processes of each method in the illustrated embodiments will not be described in detail here.
[0069] This application also provides a computing device. For example... Figure 4 As shown in the figure, this is a schematic diagram of a computing device provided in an embodiment of this application. The computing device 400 includes a bus 401, a processor 402, a communication interface 403, and a memory 404. The processor 402, the memory 404, and the communication interface 403 communicate with each other via the bus 401.
[0070] Bus 401 can be a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. Buses can be categorized as address buses, data buses, control buses, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 4 The bus is represented by a single thick line, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
[0071] Processor 402 can be any one or more of the following processors: central processing unit (CPU), graphics processing unit (GPU), microprocessor (MP), or digital signal processor (DSP).
[0072] Communication interface 403 is used for communication with external devices.
[0073] Memory 404 may include volatile memory, such as random access memory (RAM). Memory 404 may also include non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, hard disk drive (HDD), or solid state drive (SSD).
[0074] The memory 404 stores executable code, and the processor 402 executes the executable code to perform the aforementioned defense method against illegal secondary NAT routers under the CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network.
[0075] Specifically, in achieving Figure 3 In the case of the illustrated embodiment, and Figure 3 When the modules or units of the defense device against illegal secondary NAT routers under the CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network described in the embodiment are implemented through software, the execution... Figure 3 The software or program code required for the functions of each module / unit can be partially or wholly stored in the memory 404. The processor 402 executes the program code corresponding to each unit stored in the memory 404, and executes the aforementioned defense method against illegal secondary NAT routers under the CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network.
[0076] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computing device can store, or a data storage device such as a data center containing one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., solid-state drive). The computer-readable storage medium includes instructions that instruct the computing device to execute the aforementioned method for defending against unauthorized secondary NAT routers under a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network.
[0077] This application also provides a computer program product comprising one or more computer instructions. When the computer instructions are loaded and executed on a computing device, all or part of the processes or functions described in this application are generated.
[0078] The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, or data center to another website, computer, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means.
[0079] When the computer program product is executed by a computer, the computer executes any of the methods described above for defending against unauthorized secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network. The computer program product can be a software installation package; when any of the methods described above for defending against unauthorized secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network is required, the computer program product can be downloaded and executed on the computer.
[0080] The descriptions of the processes or structures corresponding to the above figures each have their own emphasis. For parts of a process or structure that are not described in detail, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other processes or structures.
[0081] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be covered within the scope of protection of this application.
Claims
1. A method for defending against unauthorized secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, characterized in that, applied to a wireless controller AC, the method comprising: obtaining an AP upstream centralized forwarding service tunnel packet, and performing decapsulation processing on the AP upstream centralized forwarding service tunnel packet to obtain an original upstream service packet of a terminal under the AP; wherein the original upstream service packet comprises an original upstream DNS query packet, an original upstream TCP SYN packet and other original upstream packets; based on the original upstream TCP SYN packet, periodically detecting whether the TTL value in the IP header of the original upstream TCP SYN packet of the terminal is offset, and performing detection K times in each detection cycle; wherein K is a positive integer greater than or equal to 3; determining a risk level or determining whether to perform an active detection operation on the terminal according to the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset in the same detection cycle; when the active detection operation is performed on the terminal, suspending the periodic detection, performing the active detection operation according to the DNS query packet corresponding to the detection domain name and the corresponding TCP SYN packet, and re-determining the risk level according to the result of the active detection operation; performing, in linkage with the AP, a defense measure corresponding to the risk level on the terminal according to the risk level; after the active detection operation is completed, restarting the periodic detection.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, the step of determining a risk level or determining whether to perform an active detection operation on the terminal according to the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset in the same detection cycle comprises: when the TTL value in the IP header is less than the closest default initial TTL value of an operating system, determining that the TTL value in the IP header is offset; if the number n of times that the TTL value in the IP header is detected to be offset in the detection cycle is equal to 0, determining that the risk level is no risk; if 1≤n<K, determining that the risk level is class A risk; if n=K, determining to perform the active detection operation on the terminal.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, the performing the active detection operation on the terminal comprises: obtaining downstream service packets belonging to the same terminal as the original upstream service packet, performing session quintuple matching on the original upstream service packet and the downstream service packets, and generating a session set of the terminal; wherein the session set comprises an HTTP session set and a non-HTTP session set; when the number of HTTP sessions in the HTTP session set is less than 3, continuing to generate the session set of the terminal; when the number of HTTP sessions in the HTTP session set is greater than or equal to 3, selecting 3 HTTP sessions from the HTTP session set, and replying with an HTTP 302 response for the HTTP sessions of the terminal, wherein the Location field of the HTTP 302 response contains a detection domain name, and the HTTP 302 response is used to instruct the terminal to initiate an HTTP connection to the detection domain name; wherein the terminal performs a DNS query on the detection domain name before initiating the HTTP connection; performing DNS hijacking reply on the DNS query packet initiated by the terminal for the detection domain name, and resolving the detection domain name to a detection IP. Within a preset observation period, the number of DNS queries made by the terminal to the probe domain name is counted, and the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message generated when the terminal initiates a TCP connection to the probe IP are detected. The risk level is determined based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The risk level is determined based on the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message, including: When the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCPSYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class B risk. When the number of DNS queries is equal to 1, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message has an offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is normal, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCPSYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries is greater than or equal to 2, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message is offset, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message is offset, the risk level is determined to be Class C risk. When the number of DNS queries, the TTL value of the IP header of the DNS query message, and the TTL value of the IP header of the TCP SYN message are other combinations, the risk level is determined to be Class A risk. Among them, the suspicion level of the type B risk is higher than that of the type A risk, and the suspicion level of the type C risk is higher than that of the type B risk.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of linking the AP to perform defense measures corresponding to the risk level on the terminal includes: When the risk level is Class A, the first log record information is generated; When the risk level is Class B, a second log record and a second alarm message are generated. When the risk level is Class C, a third log record and a third alarm are generated, and the AP connected to the terminal is linked to reject the terminal's services.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The AP accessed by the linked terminal rejects terminal services, including: A filtering instruction carrying the terminal's service MAC address is sent to the AP to which the terminal is connected. The filtering instruction is used to instruct the AP to add the terminal's service MAC address to its local filtering list and discard all uplink packets from the terminal.
7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The second alarm information includes the terminal service MAC address, risk level, access point (AP) identifier, and suspected identifier; the third alarm information includes the terminal service MAC address, risk level, access point (AP) identifier, and highly suspected identifier; wherein, the suspected identifier indicates the degree of suspicion that there is an illegal secondary NAT router between the terminal and the AP is suspected, and the highly suspected identifier indicates the degree of suspicion that there is an illegal secondary NAT router between the terminal and the AP is highly suspected. The first log record information, the second log record information, and the third log record information all include the terminal service MAC address, risk level, and AP identifier.
8. A defense device against illegal secondary NAT routers in a CAPWAP centralized forwarding service network, characterized in that, The device includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets, decapsulate the AP uplink centralized forwarding service tunnel packets, and obtain the original uplink service packets of the terminal under the AP; the original uplink service packets include the original uplink DNS query packets, the original uplink TCP SYN packets, and other original uplink packets; The processing module is configured to periodically detect whether the TTL value of the IP header of the original uplink TCP SYN packet of the terminal has deviated based on the original uplink TCP SYN packet, and perform K checks in each detection period; determine the risk level or determine whether to perform an active probing operation on the terminal based on the number of times n the IP header TTL value has deviated in the same detection period; when an active probing operation is performed on the terminal, the periodic detection is paused, and an active probing operation is performed based on the DNS query packet and the corresponding TCP SYN packet of the probe domain name, and the risk level is determined again based on the result of the active probing operation; The defense module is used to coordinate with the AP to perform defense measures corresponding to the risk level on the terminal; after the active detection operation is completed, the periodic detection is restarted.
9. A computing device, characterized in that, Including memory and processor; The memory stores one or more computer programs, the one or more computer programs including instructions; when the instructions are executed by the processor, the computing device performs the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium is used to store a computer program for performing the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
