Fault detection and safety decision control methods and systems for on-orbit focusing of space optical cameras
By using intelligent safety control methods to monitor hardware status in real time, set focusing travel boundaries, and interpret focusing commands in stages, the system solves the problems of insufficient autonomous risk perception and safety mechanisms in the on-orbit focusing system of space optical cameras. This enables early warning of faults and differentiated responses, thereby improving the reliability and mission availability of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611330759.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-31
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
The existing on-orbit focusing control system of space optical cameras lacks autonomous risk perception and early warning capabilities. Its safety mechanism is too simple and crude, resulting in insufficient tolerance for anomalies and making it difficult to balance safety and mission availability.
By adopting an intelligent safety control method, the system acquires safety parameters, monitors hardware status in real time, sets focusing stroke boundaries, interprets focusing commands in stages, and performs dynamic monitoring. Combined with dual protection from encoders and Hall limit switches, it achieves early warning of faults and differentiated responses.
It improves the maintainability and reliability of the on-orbit focusing system, supports flexible intervention of ground commands, has the ability to degrade operation in case of failure, avoids the spread of single-point failures, and improves the overall mission reliability.
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Figure CN123123725A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of aerospace optical remote sensing camera control technology, specifically to a fault detection and safety decision control method and system for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera. Background Technology
[0002] Space optical cameras are typically the core payload of spaceborne remote sensing missions, and their image quality directly determines the application value of remote sensing data. During satellite launch and on-orbit operation, factors such as mechanical vibration and changes in the thermal vacuum environment can cause the optimal image plane position of the camera's optical system to shift, resulting in defocusing. Implementing on-orbit focusing to recalibrate the focal plane to the optimal image plane position is a key means to ensure that space optical cameras acquire the best image quality.
[0003] Currently, on-orbit focusing generally adopts a mechanical focusing method, which is a controller that drives a motor to change the axial position of the mirror in the optical system or move the focal plane assembly through a precision transmission mechanism such as a lead screw, cam, or worm gear screw to compensate for the defocusing amount.
[0004] Although mechanical focusing technology is relatively mature, it still has significant shortcomings in terms of safety design: Firstly, there is a lack of autonomous risk perception and early warning capabilities. Existing focusing control systems mostly drive directly according to preset targets, lacking the ability to monitor their own operating status in real time and identify anomalies. In the space environment, space radiation effects such as high-energy particle radiation and single-event upsets may cause abnormal encoder readings; mechanical transmission components may experience stalling or jamming after extreme temperature changes; and the focusing target position parameters injected from the ground may exceed the physical boundaries of the focusing mechanism. Under these abnormal conditions, conventional control methods cannot autonomously perceive the risks and may still drive the motor according to the original preset targets, leading to burnout of drive components, overload damage to precision optical mechanisms, or even complete failure of the entire camera.
[0005] Secondly, the safety mechanisms are too simplistic and crude, with insufficient tolerance for anomalies. While existing systems have hardware protection thresholds or interlocking logic, these mechanisms have fixed trigger conditions and lack intelligent judgment capabilities. Once a single fault occurs, such as an excessive output from a Hall position sensor, an encoder signal abnormality due to ambient radiation or contamination, or a temperature or current feedback triggering a protection alarm, the system often directly locks the focusing operation, or even permanently disables motor drive. This "one-size-fits-all" protection strategy treats occasional signal anomalies the same as catastrophic hardware failures, excessively amplifying the impact of a single fault. This causes the focusing function to fail entirely due to errors in local components, severely weakening the system's availability and fault recovery capabilities.
[0006] In summary, existing technologies lack an intelligent focusing control scheme that can autonomously sense risks during the focusing process, respond to anomalies in stages, and support flexible intervention from ground commands, making it difficult to balance the dual requirements of safety and mission availability. Summary of the Invention
[0007] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, such as the lack of autonomous risk perception and early warning capabilities, overly simplistic and crude safety mechanisms, and insufficient tolerance for anomalies, this invention provides an intelligent safety control method and system for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera.
[0008] A smart and safe control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera, which is implemented by the following steps: Step 1: Obtain the security parameters adapted to the current device and store them in non-volatile memory. After the system is powered on, load the security parameters and start the protection function for the security parameters. Step 2: Collect encoder position data, warning codes and error codes and complete CRC verification to identify various encoder faults, and simultaneously monitor power supply voltage and drive current; Step 3: Determine the focusing stroke boundary based on the encoder position data and the Hall limit element; Step 4: The main controller receives the ground focusing command, performs focusing status determination and focusing parameter legality verification. After the verification is passed, it distinguishes between open-loop and closed-loop focusing modes and outputs the focusing drive signal. Step 5: During the focusing process, the system identifies operational faults through three checks: direction determination, stalling and loss of synchronization, and focusing time limit. If any fault or abnormality occurs, the system will automatically stop and record the risk information. Step 6: After focusing is completed, write the focusing stop type code into the status register and upload the telemetry data to the satellite service platform.
[0009] The present invention also provides an intelligent safety control system for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera. The system is used to execute the control method. The system includes an initialization and reconfiguration module integrated into the main controller, a hardware status real-time monitoring module, a travel boundary range definition module, a focusing command parsing and interpretation module, a focusing execution dynamic monitoring module, and a system status telemetry output module. The initialization and reconfiguration module is used to deploy security parameters; The hardware status real-time monitoring module performs real-time monitoring and hierarchical judgment of encoder communication quality, data validity and power supply status. The travel boundary range defining module adopts a dual protection strategy that combines encoder software limit and Hall element physical limit to define and monitor the operating range of the focusing mechanism. The focusing command parsing and interpretation module reviews the commands step by step from two dimensions: system operating conditions and parameter legality. The focusing execution dynamic monitoring module is used to continuously monitor the operating status of the focusing motor during the focusing process through a three-level anomaly identification mechanism of direction determination, cycle stroke determination, and time limit determination. The system status telemetry output module is used to summarize the operating status and safety decision information after focusing stops and upload it to the satellite service platform to provide status monitoring and diagnosis basis for the ground.
[0010] The beneficial effects of the method of the present invention are as follows: 1. The control method described in this invention has good on-orbit maintainability, supports the configuration and updating of safety policies through ground commands, does not require program uploading operations, facilitates policy adjustment, and is adaptable to the needs of complex on-orbit tasks.
[0011] 2. The method described in this invention clearly divides the functional modules and security decision logic, and can perform single-point cutting and elimination for security decision conditions that are not supported by the hardware, which can be adapted to different hardware platforms and has good portability.
[0012] 3. The control system described in this invention can accurately determine the operating conditions of the focusing system, identify potential system defects, provide early warning of faults, support the pre-emptive handling of on-orbit faults, and enable differentiated responses to fault events.
[0013] 4. The control system described in this invention has the ability to operate in a fault-degraded manner, which can suppress the spread of single-point faults, ensure the normal operation of focusing business as much as possible under the condition of abnormality of local components, avoid the overall lock-up of focusing function, and improve the reliability of the whole machine task. Attached Figure Description
[0014] Figure 1 This is a block diagram illustrating the principle of the focusing device in the intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to the present invention. Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the on-orbit focusing data flow. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the functional modules and security decision-making architecture. Detailed Implementation
[0015] Specific Implementation Method 1: Combination Figure 1 and Figure 2 This embodiment describes an intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera. This method is implemented through six steps: initialization configuration, hardware status monitoring, focusing travel boundary range definition, command parsing and interpretation, execution dynamic monitoring, and telemetry output. This forms a closed-loop safety decision-making process of configuration—perception—decision—execution—feedback. The method is implemented through the following steps: Step 1. Preset and initialize security parameters; Safety parameters adapted to the current equipment are obtained through pre-shipment testing and stored in the non-volatile memory of the optical camera control unit, driven by the main controller. After the system starts up on track, the main controller reads the preset safety parameter data from the non-volatile memory and loads it into the corresponding configuration register, activating the relevant protective functions. The safety parameters include, but are not limited to: encoder center point coordinates, encoder coordinate range, encoder delay compensation value, encoder timeout time, encoder warning code and error code verification enable, encoder readout tolerance number, encoder and stepper motor power supply voltage and current thresholds, Hall element limit enable and compensation value, focusing status judgment enable, upper and lower limits for focusing parameter legality judgment, focusing parameter range limit value, stepper motor step speed, focusing timeout threshold, and focusing stall judgment threshold.
[0016] In this embodiment, the encoder read anomaly tolerance count in the safety parameters is used to set the consecutive allowable number of times for three types of anomalies: CRC check, error code, and warning code, to distinguish between transient interference and persistent hard faults. The enable status of each safety parameter is configured through an independent enable flag. The ground can individually enable or disable any protection function via safety commands. The modified configuration state can be saved to non-volatile memory. The currently saved configuration state can be directly loaded upon the next system startup without re-injection.
[0017] Step 2: Real-time monitoring of hardware operating status; The main controller communicates with the encoder via the BISS protocol, triggering encoder acquisition at a fixed frequency to obtain encoder position data, error codes, and warning codes. It performs CRC checks on the acquired encoder data, comparing the calculated checksum with the encoder's output checksum. If they match, the data is considered valid and saved; otherwise, it is discarded and the error status is recorded. The controller acquires encoder output error codes and warning codes in real time, classifying fault levels based on the error codes, including optical sensor faults, magnetic field detection faults, internal voltage faults, and internal temperature faults. It monitors the encoder power supply voltage, motor drive power supply voltage, and motor drive current in real time via AD acquisition. When the power supply voltage exceeds a preset range or the drive current exceeds a current threshold and persists for a preset time, it determines a power supply abnormality or motor overload, triggering protection actions.
[0018] Step 3: Define the focusing travel boundary range; Based on the collected encoder position data, combined with the preset encoder center point coordinates and encoder coordinate range, the current allowable focusing range is dynamically calculated and defined. Upper and lower protection values for focusing are set. When the encoder position data reaches the upper or lower protection value, the main controller stops sending stepping signals to the focusing circuit, and the focusing motor immediately stops operating to prevent over-focusing. Simultaneously, a Hall element is installed at both the upper and lower limits of the focusing track as a physical limit indicator. The output signal of the Hall element is read in real time. When the focusing assembly moves to the upper or lower limit position, the corresponding Hall element triggers a warning signal. Under normal operating conditions, the stroke is determined based on the encoder position data. When the encoder malfunctions, the Hall warning signal serves as a vague position guide, limiting the focusing motor to drive only in a safe direction. The trigger threshold of the Hall element is dynamically corrected using pre-calibrated compensation parameters on the ground to overcome the influence of installation distance, ambient temperature, and changes in the spatial magnetic field on the Hall sensing range.
[0019] Step 4: Focusing command parsing and safety interpretation; The satellite platform forwards focusing commands injected by the ground command center to the main controller of the optical camera. The main controller processes these commands, which include a focusing mode identifier and focusing parameters. First, a focusing status determination is performed: the system status register is read to determine if the focusing conditions are met, including imaging status lock, energy status constraints, encoder validity and the matching relationship with closed-loop focusing, and focusing command mutual exclusion. If any condition is not met, execution is rejected and an alarm is reported. After the focusing status is verified, the validity of the focusing parameters is checked: the number of motor rotation steps in open-loop mode and the encoder target position in closed-loop mode are verified to check if they are within the preset allowable range. If the limit is exceeded, the command is intercepted and an alarm is reported. After the focusing parameter validity is verified, the focusing mode identifier is checked. If it is an open-loop focusing mode, the focusing parameters are converted into the number of motor rotation steps and direction; if it is a closed-loop focusing mode, the focusing parameters are converted into the encoder target position value and the motor rotation direction. Before the focusing target is achieved, the main controller sends a focusing drive signal based on the focusing motor stepping frequency.
[0020] Step 5: Dynamic monitoring during the focusing process; During the focusing drive execution, position data from the encoder is acquired in real time using high-frequency acquisition, and a three-level anomaly judgment is performed. Direction judgment: The actual movement direction fed back by the encoder is compared with the expected direction of the command. If they are opposite and this continues for more than a preset judgment period, a direction error is judged, triggering a stall stop. Cycle travel judgment: Within each preset monitoring cycle, the actual focusing displacement is calculated against the expected travel. If the actual displacement is consistently lower than a preset proportion of the expected travel, a stall or step loss is judged, triggering a stall stop. Time limit judgment: At the start of focusing, the theoretical focusing time is pre-calculated based on the focusing distance and stepper motor speed. A timeout threshold is set and a timer is started. If the target focusing position is not reached within the preset timeout period, a focusing timeout anomaly is judged, triggering a timeout stop. If any of the above judgments is abnormal, an autonomous protection action is triggered, immediately stopping the focusing drive and generating risk feedback information including the anomaly type and occurrence time.
[0021] Step 6: System status telemetry output; After focusing stops, the stop type code is written to the status register, and the telemetry data is uploaded to the satellite platform via the communication interface. The telemetry data includes: the status of the enable flags for each safety decision condition; the encoder CRC check status, error code and warning code parsing results, power supply voltage and drive current monitoring values, focusing timeout and stall monitoring results, and the anomaly types and occurrence times triggered by each module; the encoder center point coordinates, encoder coordinate range upper and lower limits, delay compensation value, timeout time, anomaly tolerance count, voltage and current thresholds, focusing motor step speed, and other currently loaded parameter configuration values; the command parameters for this focusing operation, the encoder acquisition position values, and the actual execution time.
[0022] This embodiment also includes a security decision over-control response; When a certain safety decision condition triggers the autonomous protection action, the system locks the focusing state to a protected state, prohibiting motor drive. If the ground determines that the focusing operation must continue, the current protection restriction can be lifted by injecting a safety decision over-control command, restoring the focusing drive capability. The over-control command includes an over-control enable flag. After receiving and parsing the flag, the main controller releases the protection lock of the corresponding module if it is valid, allowing the focusing operation to continue. In over-control mode, all protection functions that are still enabled continue to work, and are only unrestricted when the relevant protection function has been disabled by the ground. The validity period of the over-control command is limited to a single focusing operation. After each focusing operation, the system automatically clears the over-control enable flag and returns to the autonomous protection mode. This mechanism retains an emergency intervention channel for the ground while avoiding the safety hazards caused by long-term bypass protection.
[0023] like Figure 2As shown, the ground control center analyzes on-orbit requirements, generates and issues remote control commands. After data processing to complete command parsing and preprocessing, the commands are transmitted to the satellite service platform, which then forwards them to the remote control parsing module for command type identification. When a safety decision condition injection command is identified, the remote control parsing module writes the safety decision conditions into flash memory for permanent storage. After the stored conditions are loaded by the safety decision reload module, the relevant status is stored in the telemetry packet data. When a focusing command is identified, the remote control parsing module triggers the focusing action, driving the focusing component to complete focusing, and the focusing status is fed back to the telemetry packet module. In the next polling cycle, the telemetry packet module transmits all data back to the satellite service platform, forming a closed-loop control logic.
[0024] Specific Implementation Method Two: Combination Figure 3 This embodiment describes the intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera as described in Specific Embodiment 1. Figure 1 As shown, the system's hardware structure consists of a main controller, a focusing circuit, a focusing assembly, and a focal plane information feedback channel. The space platform and the main controller achieve bidirectional communication and interaction, completing the issuance of control commands and the transmission of status information. The main controller outputs control signals to the focusing circuit, which internally includes a motor power driver and power switching devices, responsible for power conversion and drive amplification of the control signals. The drive signals are then output to the focusing assembly. The focusing assembly integrates a focusing motor, an encoder, and a Hall element. The focusing motor performs focusing actions according to the drive signal. The encoder and Hall element collect the position status information of the focusing mechanism in real time. The collected position information is sent back to the main controller via the focal plane information feedback channel, forming a closed-loop control loop. The main controller continuously adjusts the output control commands based on the feedback information to achieve precise closed-loop adjustment of the focusing mechanism.
[0025] like Figure 2 As shown, the system described in this embodiment includes six program function modules integrated into the main controller. The six modules have clearly defined responsibilities and interfaces, and are sequentially connected in terms of data flow and control logic. The output of the preceding module provides input support for the following module. Specifically, the function modules include an initialization and reconfiguration module, a real-time hardware status monitoring module, a travel boundary range definition module, a focusing command parsing and interpretation module, a focusing execution dynamic monitoring module, and a system status telemetry output module. The initialization and reconfiguration module pre-deploys safety parameters, providing a unified configuration basis and strategy for other modules. The real-time hardware status monitoring module and the travel boundary range definition module work in parallel, providing environmental perception and constraints from two dimensions: device health status and physical motion boundaries, respectively. The focusing command parsing and interpretation module serves as a decision-making gate before execution, reviewing and adjudicating ground commands based on the status information provided by the above modules. The focusing execution dynamic monitoring module continuously identifies operational anomalies during the drive process, forming two lines of defense with the pre-execution review. The system status telemetry output summarizes the entire process information and transmits it back to the ground, providing a data closed loop for system strategy adjustment and parameter optimization. Each module is functionally independent and has clearly defined interfaces. Any safety decision condition can be selectively removed based on the hardware configuration. If the hardware platform does not support a certain monitoring function, only the corresponding module needs to be shut down or the relevant judgment condition needs to be disabled, without affecting the normal operation of other modules. This architecture enables the system to quickly adapt to different hardware platforms without reconstructing the overall control logic, and has good portability and on-orbit maintainability.
[0026] In this embodiment, the initialization and reconfiguration module serves as the unified management center for all system safety parameters. It is responsible for loading, dynamically configuring, and persistently storing safety parameters, providing a unified parameter service interface for each functional unit. The management scope covers dimensions such as encoder baselines, communication timing, data quality assessment, anomaly tolerance thresholds, and power supply monitoring. Ground commands can independently enable or disable each sub-function, and can also modify various threshold parameters, which are then fixed to non-volatile memory. This module has a built-in factory parameter recovery mechanism, with an independent protection partition in the non-volatile memory for storing the initial safety parameter set calibrated by the ground. After the ground injects a recovery command, the module automatically reads the factory values from the protection partition, overwrites the current configuration, updates the registers, and records the recovery event to telemetry. This mechanism enables rapid reset of the safety configuration after on-orbit parameter misadjustment or anomaly injection. Furthermore, this module undertakes the over-control response function for safety decisions. After the system triggers autonomous protection lockout, the ground can temporarily lift the protection restriction and restore focusing drive capability by injecting a single valid over-control command. After focusing is completed, the system automatically clears the over-control flag and returns to autonomous protection mode. This module serves as the configuration data source, status recovery baseline, and over-control response center for the entire system, ensuring that all safety parameters are consistent, controllable, and traceable, providing basic support and emergency intervention channels for the closed-loop safety control system.
[0027] The real-time hardware status monitoring module monitors and classifies encoder communication quality, data validity, and power supply status in real time. This module is the fundamental data source for autonomous risk perception in the closed-loop safety control system, responsible for continuous status monitoring and classification assessment of key components in the focusing system. Regarding encoder monitoring, this module comprehensively judges BISS protocol communication timeouts, CRC data validity checks, and error and warning code parsing. CRC checks are used to verify data transmission integrity; error codes respond to abnormal events such as optical sensor failures, magnetic field detection failures, internal voltage failures, and internal temperature failures; and warning codes provide early warning of signal quality degradation. By setting the number of tolerance periods for abnormalities, transient interference and persistent hard faults can be distinguished. Delay compensation is used to correct inherent delays caused by communication and logic processing, ensuring the real-time accuracy of position data.
[0028] For power supply status monitoring, the module monitors the encoder power supply voltage, motor drive voltage, and drive current in real time, with each voltage and current threshold preset by safety parameters. Protection is triggered if voltage exceeds limits or current overload persists for more than 200ms. The module implements a tiered response to anomalies: minor anomalies such as single CRC errors and occasional warning codes are only recorded via telemetry and operation continues; serious anomalies such as consecutive failures reaching the tolerance limit, power supply exceeding limits, or current overload trigger autonomous protection actions, immediately stopping the focusing drive. Each sub-function can be independently started and stopped via ground commands, allowing the system to degrade even when local components malfunction. The power supply monitoring link is independent of the encoder data channel, allowing it to operate independently even if the encoder completely fails. The monitoring results from this module are transmitted in real time to the system status telemetry output module, providing ground-based fault diagnosis and handling information.
[0029] The travel boundary range definition module is the main implementer of the dual protection strategy of encoder software limit and Hall physical limit, responsible for defining and monitoring the allowable operating range of the focusing mechanism. At the encoder level, the focusing interval is translated on the track using the center point coordinates, and the upper and lower limits of the allowable travel are defined according to the coordinate range. When the limit is reached, the main controller stops sending stepping signals and prohibits the motor from continuing to drive in the corresponding direction. At the Hall element level, a Hall element is set at each end of the track as a physical limit indicator. When the focusing component moves to the boundary, the corresponding Hall element triggers a warning signal. Under normal operating conditions, the travel is determined based on the encoder position data; when the encoder malfunctions, the Hall warning signal serves as a fuzzy position guide, limiting the focusing motor to drive only in a safe direction and preventing the mechanism from going out of the physical boundary in the event of encoder failure.
[0030] The Hall limit compensation function dynamically corrects the Hall response distance using a pre-calibrated offset on the ground to overcome the influence of installation distance, ambient temperature, and changes in the spatial magnetic field on the sensing range. The encoder coordinate range and the Hall element provide redundant protection; the encoder provides precise software limits, while the Hall element provides physical backup protection. If either function malfunctions, the corresponding protection channel can be independently shut down via ground command. If a Hall element failure causes frequent false triggers, the ground can independently shut down Hall monitoring without affecting the normal operation of the encoder limit. If the encoder fails, its related judgments can also be shut down, relying on Hall guidance to perform limited open-loop focusing, preventing the focusing function from being completely locked down due to a single device failure. All sub-functions support independent start / stop via ground command.
[0031] The focusing command parsing and interpretation module performs a step-by-step review of commands from two dimensions: system operating conditions and parameter legality. This module is the first line of defense against abnormal commands entering the execution stage, completing two levels of review before the command is sent to the execution stage. The focusing status interpretation comprehensively assesses the system operating conditions, including imaging status lock, energy status constraints, the matching relationship between encoder validity and closed-loop focusing, and command mutual exclusion conditions. If any condition is not met, execution is refused and an alarm is reported. Imaging status lock means that if the camera is in imaging mode, focusing will change the optical path position, directly affecting image quality, thus focusing is prohibited. Energy status constraints mean that when the overall energy is low, the focusing motor consumes extra power, which may affect the power supply of other critical equipment on the platform, thus focusing is prohibited. The matching relationship between encoder validity and closed-loop focusing means that closed-loop focusing is prohibited when the encoder fails; open-loop focusing is only allowed after the risk is confirmed on the ground. Command mutual exclusion means that new command inputs are locked during focusing to prevent new focusing parameters from affecting the current focusing status. After the status check passes, the system proceeds to parameter validity check, verifying the upper limit of motor rotation steps in open-loop mode and the encoder target position boundary in closed-loop mode. Exceeding these limits results in interception and an alarm report. The focusing parameter range limitation function allows ground control to modify the allowable upper and lower limits of validity check on-orbit via safety commands. The open-loop step range can be expanded or the closed-loop target boundary adjusted based on on-orbit optical calibration results. The modified range is saved to non-volatile memory and used as the basis for subsequent checks. This function allows the system to flexibly adapt to mission requirements without altering the underlying protection thresholds. The above two levels of review are independent of each other; failure at either stage terminates the process and sends back a rejection code. Each function can be started and stopped independently.
[0032] The focusing execution dynamic monitoring module is responsible for the motion safety of the focusing process. During the focusing drive execution, it continuously monitors the motor operation status through a three-level anomaly identification mechanism: direction determination, cycle travel determination, and time limit determination, and immediately identifies and responds to anomalies. Direction determination compares the actual movement direction fed back by the encoder with the expected direction of the command. If the two are opposite and continue for more than a preset determination period, a direction error is determined, triggering a stall stop. Cycle travel determination calculates the actual focusing displacement and expected travel within each preset monitoring cycle. If the actual displacement is consistently lower than a preset proportion of the expected travel, a stall or loss of steps is determined, triggering a stall stop. Time limit determination pre-calculates the theoretical focusing time based on the focusing distance and stepper motor speed at the start of focusing, sets an overtime threshold, and starts a timer. If the target focusing position is not reached within the preset overtime period, a focusing timeout anomaly is determined, triggering a timeout stop. Upon triggering any anomaly, the system immediately stops the focusing drive and generates risk feedback information including the anomaly type and occurrence time. The stepper motor's step speed parameters are preset with a drive frequency that takes into account the optimal torque strategy under extreme conditions and serves as the calculation benchmark for timeout prediction, supporting on-orbit adjustments. Cyclic stroke determination automatically fails when the encoder fails, but timeout determination is unaffected by encoder data quality. Focusing timeout monitoring and power supply current monitoring can still independently ensure safety. Of the three levels of determination mentioned above, direction determination and cyclic stroke determination rely on encoder feedback, while timeout determination is independent of encoder operation. Each of the three covers different fault modes: incorrect direction reflects control logic or drive-level abnormalities, insufficient cyclic displacement reflects mechanical stall or loss of steps, and timeout serves as the final protection measure when the first two levels of determination fail. Each function can be independently started and stopped via ground safety commands.
[0033] The system status telemetry output module serves as the information window for interaction with the ground command center. It is responsible for summarizing operational status and safety decision information after focusing stops and uploading it to the satellite service platform, providing ground-based status monitoring and diagnostics. Telemetry data covers four aspects: the status of enable flags for each safety decision condition, real-time judgment results and anomaly records, currently loaded key parameter configuration values, and the command parameters and execution results for this focusing operation. Simultaneously, the stop type code is written to the status register. This module, together with the initialization and reconfiguration module, forms a closed loop. The ground uses telemetry feedback to determine the rationality of current safety parameters and the system's health status, deciding whether to adjust protection thresholds, disable specific protection functions, or inject over-control commands. After restoring event records to the telemetry system, the ground can confirm whether the rollback operation was successfully executed. This closed-loop mechanism enables dynamic optimization of the on-orbit focusing system's safety strategy and rapid recovery from abnormal states.
[0034] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.
[0035] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementations of the present invention, and while the descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these all fall within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of this invention patent should be determined by the appended claims.
Claims
1. An intelligent and safe control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera, characterized by: This method is implemented by the following steps: Step 1: Obtain the security parameters adapted to the current device and store them in non-volatile memory. After the system is powered on, load the security parameters and start the protection function for the security parameters. Step 2: Collect encoder position data, warning codes and error codes and complete CRC verification to identify various encoder faults, and simultaneously monitor power supply voltage and drive current; Step 3: Determine the focusing stroke boundary based on the encoder position data and the Hall limit element; Step 4: The main controller receives the ground focusing command, performs focusing status determination and focusing parameter legality verification. After the verification is passed, it distinguishes between open-loop and closed-loop focusing modes and outputs the focusing drive signal. Step 5: During the focusing process, the system identifies operational faults through three checks: direction determination, stalling and loss of synchronization, and focusing time limit. If any fault or abnormality occurs, the system will automatically stop and record the risk information. Step 6: After focusing is completed, write the focusing stop type code into the status register and upload the telemetry data to the satellite service platform.
2. The intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to claim 1, characterized in that: It also includes step seven: after the system triggers autonomous protection, it locks the focusing state; the ground command center releases the protection restriction by injecting a safety decision over-control command. The over-control command is valid for one focusing operation, and automatically restores the autonomous protection mode after completion.
3. The intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step one, the safety parameters include encoder center point coordinates, encoder coordinate range, encoder delay compensation value, encoder timeout time, encoder warning code and error code verification enable, encoder read abnormality tolerance number, encoder and stepper motor power supply voltage and current thresholds, Hall element limit enable and compensation value, focusing status judgment enable, focusing parameter legality judgment upper and lower limits, focusing parameter range limit value, stepper motor step speed, focusing timeout threshold, and focusing stall judgment threshold.
4. The intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to claim 3, characterized in that: The enabling status of each safety parameter is configured through an independent enabling flag. The ground command center can individually enable or disable any protection function and safety parameter through safety commands, and the modified parameter configuration status is saved to non-volatile memory.
5. The intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step three involves determining the focusing travel boundary as follows: Based on the collected encoder position data, and according to the set encoder center point coordinates and encoder coordinate range, the current allowable focusing range is dynamically calculated and determined. An upper and lower limit protection value for focusing is set. When the encoder position data reaches the upper or lower limit protection value, the main controller stops sending stepping signals to the focusing circuit, and the focusing motor stops moving. At the same time, a Hall element is set at the upper and lower limit positions of the focusing track, and the output signal of the Hall element is read in real time. When the focusing component moves to the upper or lower limit position, the corresponding Hall element triggers a warning signal. Under normal operating conditions, the stroke is determined based on the encoder position data. When the encoder malfunctions, the warning signal is used as a fuzzy position guide to restrict the focusing motor from driving in a safe direction.
6. The intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific implementation process of step four is as follows: The satellite platform forwards focusing instructions injected by the ground command center to the optical camera, which are then processed by the main controller. The focusing instructions include a focusing mode identifier and focusing parameters. Perform focusing status determination: Read the system status register to determine whether the current focusing conditions are met, including imaging status lock, energy status constraint, encoder validity and closed-loop focusing matching relationship, and focusing command mutual exclusion determination. If any condition is not met, execution is refused and an alarm is reported. After the focusing status is verified, the legality of the focusing parameters is determined: the number of rotation steps of the focusing motor in open-loop mode and the target position of the encoder in closed-loop mode are checked to see if they are within the preset allowable range. After the focus parameters pass the validity check, the focus mode identifier is checked. If it is an open-loop focus mode, the focus parameters are converted into the number of steps and direction of the focus motor rotation as the output focus drive signal. If it is a closed-loop focusing mode, the focusing parameters are converted into the encoder target position value and the rotation direction of the focusing motor as the output focusing drive signal.
7. The intelligent safety control method for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step five, the direction determination is as follows: the actual movement direction fed back by the encoder is compared with the expected direction of the command. If the two are opposite and continue to exceed the preset determination period, the direction is determined to be wrong, and a stall stop is triggered. Cycle travel determination: Within each preset monitoring cycle, the actual focusing displacement and the expected travel are calculated. If the displacement is continuously lower than the preset ratio of the expected travel, it is determined that there is stall or loss of synchronization, and stall stop is triggered. Time limit determination: When focusing starts, the theoretical focusing time is pre-calculated based on the focusing distance and the step speed of the focusing motor. An overtime threshold is set and the timer is started. If the target focusing position is not reached within the preset overtime time, the focusing timeout is determined to be abnormal and the timeout stop is triggered.
8. An intelligent safety control system for on-orbit focusing of a space optical camera, characterized by: This system is used to implement the intelligent safety control method as described in any one of claims 1-7. The intelligent safety control system includes an initialization and reconfiguration module, a real-time hardware status monitoring module, a travel boundary range definition module, a focus command parsing and interpretation module, a focus execution dynamic monitoring module, and a system status telemetry output module integrated into the main controller. The initialization and reconfiguration module is used to deploy security parameters; The hardware status real-time monitoring module performs real-time monitoring and hierarchical judgment of encoder communication quality, data validity and power supply status. The travel boundary range defining module adopts a dual protection strategy that combines encoder software limit and Hall element physical limit to define and monitor the operating range of the focusing mechanism. The focusing command parsing and interpretation module reviews the commands step by step from two dimensions: system operating conditions and parameter legality. The focusing execution dynamic monitoring module is used to continuously monitor the operating status of the focusing motor during the focusing process through a three-level anomaly identification mechanism of direction determination, cycle stroke determination, and time limit determination. The system status telemetry output module is used to summarize the operating status and safety decision information after focusing stops and upload it to the satellite service platform to provide status monitoring and diagnosis basis for the ground.
