Methods and devices for selectively exposing user attributes

By generating anonymous credentials using the BBS+ protocol and employing anonymized public keys and signatures, the issues of user privacy protection and computational power limitations are resolved. This enables the validity verification of selectively disclosed anonymous credential attributes and user access control.

CN123125831APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17ORANGE SA
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202580024828.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2024-04-08
Filing Date
2025-04-07
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing digital identity management solutions, user privacy is difficult to protect, and service providers and identity providers can track verifiable representations of users. User private keys are easily leaked, and computing power is limited, making it impossible to selectively disclose anonymous credential attributes.

Method used

Anonymous credentials are generated using the BBS+ protocol. User attributes are authenticated by the identity provider. Anonymous public keys and anonymized signatures are used. Only the attributes required for access are disclosed to the service provider. The user device calculates the knowledge proof of the anonymized signature and private key. The service provider verifies the validity of the credentials to authorize access.

Benefits of technology

It achieves user privacy protection, prevents service providers and identity providers from tracking users, ensures user private key security, reduces computational load, supports selective disclosure of anonymous credential attributes, and is compatible with the existing standard ISO/IEC 18013-5.

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Abstract

This invention proposes a method for generating credentials implemented by an identity provider, the credentials being associated with at least one attribute of a user, the method comprising the following steps: - authenticating the user (I8); - obtaining (I10) at least one cryptographic representation of the user's attribute (); - obtaining (I12) a signature calculated using the identity provider's private key and at least regarding: (a) the at least one cryptographic representation; and (b) the user's public key; - calculating (I14) a proof of the validity of the credentials, the credentials comprising at least: (i) the signature, (ii) the user's public key; and (iii) the at least one cryptographic representation; and - sending (I18) the proof and the credentials to the user.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of digital identity management. More specifically, this invention relates to a method for digital identity management that, while protecting user privacy, enables users to disclose only attributes necessary for a specific purpose, such as identity data, to third parties. Background Technology

[0002] Many service providers require users to provide attributes or identity elements before offering their services.

[0003] Traditionally, in the non-digital world, these identity elements are provided by (physical) documents issued by official agencies (ID cards, driver's licenses, etc.) or by certificates issued by recognized third-party certification bodies (electricity bills, telecommunications bills, medical certificates, etc.).

[0004] The development of services accessible via the Internet requires the implementation of specialized tools to digitize the elements on the aforementioned carriers, digitize them in a structured manner where applicable, and allow these elements to be shared with the service provider with the user's consent.

[0005] To date, major players in the internet have structured the digital identity management field according to their business models. For example, they have developed a scheme through the OIDC (OpenID Connect) protocol that centrally manages a user's identity elements and, under the user's control, authorizes services to access all or part of the user's identity elements after the user identifies / authenticates and consents. One of the main problems with this architecture, known as "Federated identity," is that whenever a user uses one of their services, the identity provider knows when the operation occurs and which identity elements the user is sharing with the service providers they are accessing.

[0006] Figure 1 Known joint identity mechanisms are shown: User U sends a request for Rq_Id to identity provider FI, enabling the identity provider to authenticate one or more attributes of the user after authenticating the user. User U sends a request Rq_AS to service provider FS to access the service. Identity provider FI provides user U with a token TOK. User U sends the token TOK to the service provider FS, enabling the service provider to authorize the user to access the service.

[0007] Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is another approach to digital identity that gives users complete control over their identity elements: users can submit these elements when accessing services to prove their identity or one of their qualifications. During the identity element sharing phase, only the service provider interacts with the user.

[0008] According to the scheme, users hold identity elements associated with them, which are provided and authenticated by one or more trusted entities, such as identity providers who provide and authenticate them using digital signatures.

[0009] In this digital identity model, a credential (Verifiable Credential, VC) is a personal proof that enables the holder to convince a third party (such as a service provider) that they possess a certain authorization or qualification. Degree certificates, student IDs, or driver's licenses are examples of common credentials used in everyday life.

[0010] To establish trust between users and services, users can use Verifiable Presentations (VPs) to present identity elements authenticated by an identity provider (whom the service provider trusts). It should be noted that a Verifiable Presentation is a combination of verifiable references arranged in a format to be presented to third parties. The Verifiable Presentation is signed using the holder's cryptographic key.

[0011] In a self-identity scheme, users (after consenting) control the propagation of their identity elements to the service provider and protect their privacy relative to the identity provider by excluding the identity provider from their relationship with the service provider. The protocol is entirely asynchronous.

[0012] However, the standard digital signature mechanism used by identity providers requires disclosure of the full content of the signed / authenticated data, even if it is only to prove the authenticity of a portion of it.

[0013] To protect their privacy, users are expected to disclose only attributes or identity data that are strictly necessary for the requested service to the service provider. This feature is known as selective disclosure of identity data or attributes.

[0014] In the physical world, selective disclosure of attributes can be easily achieved. For example, information on an identification document can be obscured using a black felt-tip pen, making only certain identity data visible.

[0015] The standard ISO / IEC 18013-5 describes how to adapt this manual masking technique for digital identity documents. More specifically, ISO / IEC 18013-5 is an international standard relating to the design of paperless mobile driver's licenses (mDLs) via native mobile phone applications. This standard further defines a data model that can be extended to any other paperless identity document over mobile communications, and a protocol that allows for the selective disclosure of identity data associated with the document.

[0016] The operating principle of the selective disclosure method used in standard ISO / IEC 18013-5 will now be described.

[0017] Identification documents issued in accordance with standard ISO / IEC 18013-5

[0018] The identity provider has a pair of keys, namely the private key ( ) and public key ( ( ), and digital signature algorithms such as ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm).

[0019] Users also have a pair of keys for the digital signature algorithm, namely the private key ( ) and public key ( The user will use this key pair to authenticate their verifiable representation (VP), and the identity provider must pre-authenticate this key pair while authenticating a set of attributes (sovereign or non-sovereign) associated with their driver's license. These attributes are denoted as... .

[0020] During the VC (credential issuance) phase, after user authentication, the identity provider randomly selects... A public value, denoted as Then, a summary (password hash) is calculated for each attribute, totaling... A summary.

[0021] this Each of the summaries is denoted as A unique summary identifier is used to identify each attribute. A summary of each attribute (denoted as...) Based on its profile identifier ( ), the identifier of the attribute (denoted as The value of this attribute ( And the secret key generated when creating the identity certificate and associated with that attribute is used to calculate: ) ,in, Represents a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256); symbol Used to represent strings and Serial connection.

[0022] Then, the identity provider uses its private key. For users' public keys and Summary We use a data structure to compute digital signatures. We denote this as... And record the signature of the identity provider as The signature is for .

[0023] Then, the identity provider will sign. and key Send to the user.

[0024] A user's credentials (or digital identity document) VC (or, in the terminology of standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, a Secure Mobile Object (MSO)) are constituted by their public key. ,summary And certificates for this data composition: .

[0025] The secret data associated with this digital identity document (VC) is the user's private key. and a randomly selected secret key .

[0026] Verifiable representation of digital identity documents with selective disclosure in accordance with standard ISO / IEC 18013-5

[0027] In the remainder of the text, This represents a list of indexes for the attributes requested by the service provider. For example, This indicates that the service provider wants users to disclose attributes to them. , and .

[0028] The user connects anonymously to the service provider's website. The service provider sends the access conditions for its website (i.e., a list of required attributes). And a session-specific random value (nonce) to avoid replaying verifiable representations.

[0029] Users use their private keys Calculate a signature for a set of data ( This set of data is referred to as "DeviceAuthenticationBytes" in the standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, and is denoted as […] in the remainder of the text. DeviceAuthenticationBytes includes the nonce (or any other equivalent element that is specific to the ongoing session with the service provider and prevents replay of the verifiable representation), the set of data exposed to the service provider where applicable, and other contextual data: = .

[0030] Verifiable representation The public key of the identity provider User's public key ,summary The data disclosed to the service provider ( ), and signature and composition: , , ).

[0031] The user will be able to verify the representation. Send to the service provider.

[0032] The service provider first targets each calculate ).

[0033] Then, the service provider verifies: 1) For each , = ; 2) It is aimed at A valid signature that uses the identity provider's public key. ; 3) It uses a public key authenticated by the identity provider. against A valid signature (that the service provider can reconstruct the data).

[0034] The service provider will allow users to access its services only if these three conditions are verified.

[0035] illustrate1: Signature Able to authenticate all publicly disclosed identity data of users ( and public key At the same time, signature. This enables the service provider to be confident that the verifiable representation indeed originates from the credential. The holder of, and therefore not a replay of a previously verifiable representation.

[0036] illustrate 2: Included in the summary The public key in the computation This is designed to prevent brute-force attacks on undisclosed attributes. Without these keys, brute-force attacks would easily compromise attributes with low entropy, such as those related to a user's "date of birth" or "ID document serial number." Specifically, if Calculated as follows: No key Then by testing all possible values ​​( (until the correct value is obtained, i.e., verify the equation) It will be very easy to find the attribute "date of birth" ( )(data and (Public data that is accessible to everyone).

[0037] Disadvantages of standard ISO / IEC 18013-5

[0038] The solution proposed by standard ISO / IEC 18013-5 has several drawbacks. Specifically: From a personal data protection perspective, users can be tracked by service providers (and also by identity providers). Specifically, all verifiable representations of the user will systematically include a signature. and public key This indicates that these verifiable representations were generated by the same user. More seriously, if the service provider and identity provider cross-reference their information, they will be able to identify the user from whom the verifiable representation originated, because the identity provider knows that it has already signed the representation. To whom it was submitted, and therefore, to whose author can be identified if a verifiable representation exists.

[0039] ii / User's private key (Users will sign) The private key used to authenticate its verifiable representation is an extremely sensitive key and therefore must be properly protected; this is because if the key is compromised, the user's identity will be impersonated. For this purpose, the standard ISO / IEC 18013-5 recommends storing the key in a "hardware secure element with appropriate authentication." However, such a device (secure element or SE) has limited computing power and does not support all the mathematical operations implemented by some common digital signature algorithms (especially algorithms like BBS+ that involve bilinear pairing when generating and / or verifying signatures). This constraint greatly limits the implementation of signature issuance... and / or verify signature The types of digital signature algorithms.

[0040] This invention relates to a solution that allows selective disclosure of anonymous credential attributes without the aforementioned drawbacks. Summary of the Invention

[0041] Therefore, according to the first aspect, this disclosure relates to a method for generating credentials associated with at least one attribute of a user. A method, implemented by the identity provider, includes the following steps: - Authenticate users; - Obtain at least one cryptographic representation of the user's attributes. ; - Obtain a signature using the private key of the identity provider and at least the following: : (a) the at least one cryptographic representation; and for (b) The user's public key ; - Calculate vouchers Proof of validity The credentials include at least: (i) The signature , (ii) The user's public key ; (iii) the at least one cryptographic representation ;as well as - Send the proof to the user and the certificate .

[0042] Accordingly, this disclosure relates to a method for generating credentials associated with at least one attribute of a user. The device, the device comprising: - A module used for user authentication; - At least one cryptographic representation used to obtain user attributes The module; - Used to obtain a signature calculated using the private key of the identity provider and at least regarding the following: Modules: (a) the at least one cryptographic representation; and for (b) The user's public key ; - Used for calculating vouchers Proof of validity The module, wherein the credential includes at least: (i) The signature , (ii) The user's public key ; (iii) the at least one cryptographic representation ;as well as - Used to send the proof and credentials to the user. The module.

[0043] Therefore, in general, this disclosure involves three entities: 1. At least one Identity Provider The identity provider, after authenticating a user, provides the user with anonymous credentials (hereinafter referred to as credentials) associated with one or more of their attributes. As detailed below, in one embodiment, the identity provider uses the BBS+ protocol to authenticate the user's attributes.

[0044] 2. At least one Service Provider Before providing services to users, service providers verify certain user attributes and ensure these attributes are authenticated. In other words, service providers verify whether a user's attributes meet the conditions for accessing their services. For example, in order to access a website containing adult content, a service provider has a legal obligation to ensure that the user is a minor. Therefore, the user must provide proof of their age through a verifiable representation based on credentials issued by an identity provider trusted by the service provider, authenticating their age.

[0045] (3) At least A user The user has a set of credentials that enable them to prove their identity or at least certain attributes (adulthood, qualifications, degree certificates, etc.) to the service provider in order to access the service, and only disclose the attributes required to access the service.

[0046] In one embodiment, the signature conforms to the BBS+ protocol described in the document “The BBS Signature Scheme, published 31 January 2024: The BBS Signature Scheme (identity.foundation)”.

[0047] In one embodiment, the at least one cryptographic representation is a summary obtained through a hash function.

[0048] In one embodiment, the summary conforms to standard ISO / IEC 18013-5:2021. Specifically, this disclosure is fully compatible with the data model and disclosure model defined in that standard.

[0049] In the sense of this disclosure, the credential VC is, for example, a digital identity document, or a Mobile Security Object (MSO) in the terminology of standard ISO / IEC 18013-5.

[0050] With a great advantage, by implementing this disclosure, users disclose only the attributes that are strictly necessary to access the service to the service provider.

[0051] According to the second aspect, this disclosure relates to a method implemented by a user's device for requesting access to a service provided by a service provider, the method comprising the following steps: - Verify the user with the identity provider; - Receive credentials from the identity provider and vouchers Proof of validity The certificate At least including: (i) Cryptographic representation of user attributes

[0052] (ii) The user's public key ;as well as

[0053] (iii) Calculate a signature using the identity provider's private key and at least regarding the following: : (a) the at least one cryptographic representation ,as well as (b) The user's public key , - Verify the proof ; - Receive a list of at least one attribute to be disclosed to the service provider in order to access the service; - Based on the public key Calculate the user's anonymized public key And based on signature Calculate anonymized signatures ; - Calculate the anonymized public key Knowledge proof of the anonymized private key of the associated user

[0054] - Sending a selectively disclosed verifiable representation to the service provider, the verifiable representation including at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider. (bb) User's anonymized public key , (cc) At least one attribute to be disclosed in order to access the service, (dd) Cryptographic representation of at least one attribute to be disclosed , (ee) the anonymized signature ,as well as (ff) The proof .

[0055] Accordingly, this disclosure relates to an apparatus for requesting access to a service provided by a service provider, the apparatus comprising: - A module used to authenticate the user of the device to the identity provider; - Used to obtain credentials from the identity provider and the voucher Proof of validity The module, the credential At least including: (i) Cryptographic representation of user attributes

[0056] (ii) The user's public key ;as well as

[0057] (iii) Calculate a signature using the identity provider's private key and at least regarding the following: : (a) the at least one cryptographic representation ,as well as (b) The user's public key, - Used to verify the proof The module; - A module for receiving a list of at least one attribute to be disclosed to the service provider in order to access the service. - Used to calculate the user's anonymized public key based on the public key. And used for signature-based Calculate anonymized signatures Components; - Used to calculate the anonymized public key Knowledge proof of associated user private key Components - A module for sending a selectively disclosed verifiable representation to the service provider, the verifiable representation comprising at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider. (bb) User's anonymized public key , (cc) At least one attribute to be disclosed in order to access the service, (dd) Cryptographic representation of at least one attribute to be disclosed , (ee) the anonymized signature ,as well as (ff) The proof .

[0058] Advantageously, by using anonymized public keys and anonymized signatures, this invention ensures that neither the service provider nor the identity provider alone, or both together, can trace a user when the user uses their credentials.

[0059] According to a third aspect, the present invention relates to a method for controlling user access to a service, the method being implemented by a service provider and comprising the following steps: - Obtain a verifiable representation with selective disclosure, the verifiable representation comprising at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider. (bb) Based on the user's public key Obtain the user's anonymized public key , (cc) At least one attribute of the user to be disclosed in order to access the service. (dd) Cryptographic representation of at least one attribute to be disclosed , (ee) Based on a signature issued by the service provider and relating to at least the following: Obtained Anonymous Signature : (a) At least one cryptographic representation of a user's attributes ,as well as (b) The user's anonymized public key ,as well as (ff) Prove that the user is aware of the anonymized public key. Proof of the associated anonymized public key ; - Calculate the cryptographic representation of the desired attribute ; - verify: (i) Cryptographic representation of the required attributes ; (ii) Proof that the user is aware of the anonymized private key as well as (iii) Verify the anonymized signature using the public key of the identity provider (FI). ; - A positive result from the verification is a necessary condition for authorizing users to access the service.

[0060] Accordingly, this disclosure relates to an apparatus for controlling user access to a service, the apparatus comprising: - A module for obtaining a verifiable representation with selective disclosure, the verifiable representation comprising at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider. (bb) Based on the user's public key Obtain the user's anonymized public key , (cc) At least one attribute of the user to be disclosed in order to access the service. (dd) Cryptographic representation of at least one attribute to be disclosed , (ee) Based on a signature issued by the service provider and relating to at least the following: Obtained Anonymous Signature : (a) At least one cryptographic representation of a user's attributes ,as well as (b) The user's anonymized public key ,as well as (ff) Prove that the user is aware of the anonymized public key. Proof of the associated anonymized private key ; - Used to calculate the desired attribute ( cryptographic representation of ) The module; - Module (M-CRY2) used to verify (S44, S440) the following: (i) Cryptographic representation of the required attributes

[0061] (ii) Proof that the user is aware of the anonymized private key ,as well as

[0062] (iii) Verify the anonymized signature using the identity provider's public key. ; - A module configured to authorize users to access the service at least when the verification is positive.

[0063] In one embodiment, the user obtains the anonymized signature from an identity provider. Proof of validity Furthermore, the verifiable representation selectively disclosed by the user and sent to the service provider includes proof of its validity. .

[0064] In this embodiment, and as described in detail below, the service provider anonymizes the signature. The verification includes proof of its validity. Verification.

[0065] This embodiment of the invention is advantageously related to the reference. Figure 1 The described federated identity mechanism is compatible, in particular, with the following mode of standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, in which a user, after authenticating themselves with a service provider, receives a token from the service provider proving that they indeed meet the conditions for accessing the provider's services.

[0066] In one embodiment, the method for requesting access includes: - Knowledge proof of calculating the user's private key from the secure element of the user terminal ; - The proof and It is calculated jointly by the security element (and the application of the terminal).

[0067] The embodiment described in detail below is highly advantageous when the secure element used in the terminal is limited to highly predetermined tasks and thus cannot perform certain cryptographic calculations (such as anonymization tasks or certain signature calculations).

[0068] In this solution, the secure element does not need to perform bilinear pairing, and in order to generate a signature... Only one elliptic curve scalar multiplication is required (in contrast, the original BBS+ version standardized by ETFs, referenced to "The BBS Signature Scheme, published 31 January 2024: The BBS Signature Scheme (identity.foundation)"). The linear quantity in (the text). For some versions of BBS+ (Jan Camenisch, ManuDrijvers, Anja Lehmann:

[0069] Anonymous Attestation Using the Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption Revisited. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2016: 663 (2016)), the user's secure device for generating signatures. Only a constant number of elliptic curve scalar multiplications are required, but on the other hand, the signature must be computed by interacting with the mobile application several times.

[0070] The present invention also relates to a computer program comprising instructions for performing a method of generating at least one credential when the program is executed by a computer.

[0071] The present invention also relates to a computer program comprising instructions for performing a method of requesting access to a service when the program is executed by a computer.

[0072] The present invention also relates to a computer program comprising instructions for performing steps of a method for controlling access to a service when the program is executed by a computer.

[0073] These programs can use any programming language and can take the form of source code, object code, or intermediate code between source code and object code, such as partially compiled form, or any other desired form.

[0074] The present invention also relates to a computer-readable information medium comprising instructions of the aforementioned computer program. The information medium can be any entity or device capable of storing the program. For example, the medium may include storage components such as ROM, non-volatile memory of the flash memory type, or magnetic recording components such as a hard disk. Furthermore, the information medium can be a transmissible medium such as electrical or optical signals, which can be transmitted via cables or optical fibers, by radio, or otherwise. The program according to the invention can be downloaded, in particular, via a network of the Internet type. Alternatively, the information medium may be an integrated circuit in which the program is incorporated, the circuit being adapted to perform the method or to be used when performing the discussed method. Attached Figure Description

[0075] Other features and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following description with reference to the accompanying drawings, which illustrate non-limiting exemplary embodiments of the invention. In the drawings: [ Figure 1 [Already described] Figure 1 Known joint identity mechanisms are shown; [ Figure 2 ] Figure 2 A system according to a specific embodiment of the present disclosure is shown, the system including a device for generating credentials, a device for a user to request access, and a device for controlling access to a service; [ Figure 3 ] Figure 3 The steps of a method for generating credentials according to a specific embodiment of this disclosure are illustrated in the form of a flowchart; [ Figure 4 ] Figure 4 The steps of a method for requesting access to a service and a method for controlling access to a service, according to specific embodiments of the present disclosure, are illustrated in flowchart form. [ Figure 5 ] Figure 5 The steps of a method for requesting access to a service and a method for controlling access to a service, according to another specific embodiment of this disclosure, are illustrated in flowchart form. [ Figure 6 ] Figure 6 A flowchart illustrating a specific embodiment according to this disclosure is provided. Figure 5 One step of the method; [ Figure 7 ] Figure 7 Specific embodiments according to this disclosure are shown. Figure 1 The hardware architecture of the device.

[0076] First, a hint about the cryptographic tools used in this disclosure will now be given.

[0077] Commitment Plan

[0078] Making a commitment to a value is a cryptographic method that allows a sender to make a commitment to a value (such as a secret) to the receiver without initially revealing that value to the receiver, and that the commitment cannot be modified afterward. The sender can then reveal the value if necessary.

[0079] Therefore, the recipient can be confident that once a commitment is made, the sender cannot change its decision regarding the value contained in that commitment. A commitment can be figuratively understood as delivering a sealed safe containing secrets to the recipient, and then providing them with a combination of keys to open that safe.

[0080] In one particular embodiment, this disclosure may use the commitment scheme proposed by Pedersen in 1992 (Torben P. Pedersen. Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In Joan Feigenbaum, editor, CRYPTO'91, volume 576 of LNCS, pages 129–140. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1992), which has the property of generating completely indistinguishable commitments (perfectly hidden).

[0081] Zero-knowledge proof

[0082] It should be noted that Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) is an interactive protocol that enables a verifier to be confident that a prover truly knows that a given predicate is satisfied. The secret Meanwhile, this proof, besides being secret Indeed satisfies the given assertion Beyond this fact, no information related to the secret is disclosed to the verifier. In the remainder of the text, to represent zero-knowledge proofs, the commonly used notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler (Jan Camenisch, Markus Stadler: Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract). CRYPTO 1997: 410-424) is sometimes used. In this context, the Greek letters correspond to the secrets known to the prover. For example, PoK{ : = } indicates (common value) In (public) databases The proof of the knowledge of discrete logarithms.

[0083] In one particular embodiment, a non-interactive version of zero-knowledge proof (also known as a "knowledge signature") is used, which is obtained through, for example, a heuristic transformation of Fiat-Shamir (Amos Fiat, Adi Shamir: How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems. CRYPTO 1986:186-194). More specifically, a "knowledge signature" refers to a non-interactive protocol that enables a prover to assure a third party that they know an assertion is satisfied. The secret On the other hand, it ensures that it is a message. m The author is identified, and the integrity of the message is ensured. A given assertion is validated and the message is authenticated. The signature of this secret value knowledge ( The following is denoted as: SoK{ :about The assertion} ( ), where the Greek letters correspond to the secrets known to the prover, and Corresponding to the authenticated message.

[0084] For example, SoK{ : = }( ) indicates (common value) In (public) databases The signature of the knowledge of discrete logarithms and the authentication message. Regarding the news The knowledge signature has the same characteristics as the digital signature: it simultaneously guarantees the authenticity and integrity of the message. Detailed Implementation

[0085] The following symbols will be used in the remainder of the text. , ,…, , ,…, To represent the satisfaction relation elements , … Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPK) of knowledge. Therefore, for the public RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm) module... The proof of the knowledge of the two prime factors can be written as: , Similarly, the following symbols will be used in the remainder of the text. , ,…, , ,…, To represent the satisfaction relation And authenticate the message elements , … The signature of knowledge (ZKPK). Let the set {0, 1, 2, …,} be represented. -1}, where It is a prime integer, and Represents the set {1, 2, …, -1}.

[0086] The cryptographic mechanism disclosed herein is implemented using bilinear pairing. It should be noted that, denoted as... e Bilinear pairing is from set to the set The mapping, where , and Indicates order as cyclic group It is a prime number. This application... It satisfies the following properties: 1. (Bilinear) , as well as , .

[0087] 2. (Non-degenerate) For and , .

[0088] 3. (Calculateable) , There exists a method for calculation Highly efficient algorithms.

[0089] In practice, the selection group , and , making and There is no computationally efficient isomorphism between them. Such pairings are referred to by those skilled in the art as Type 3 pairings.

[0090] The security of some of the cryptographic mechanisms used in this disclosure is partly based on the assumption that these problems are difficult. In other words, if an attacker can compromise the security of these mechanisms, then that attacker can also solve these problems, which are considered "difficult".

[0091] q-SDH problem: Let For the order of The cyclic group, and the elements ∈ Given The q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem includes computation of the form . Yes, that's right.

[0092] In a particular embodiment of the invention, the Pedersen commitment scheme (Torben P. Pedersen: Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing. CRYPTO 1991: 129-140) is used.

[0093] In this plan, it is believed that It is the first order cyclic group, and and yes Any two generators of . Assume by The discrete logarithm with base is unknown. To determine the selected message... The sender makes a commitment and selects a random value. ,calculate And send it to the recipient. The sender may disclose the value to the recipient as needed (open phase). and This makes the receiver verify the equation: .

[0094] Figure 2 The system SYS is shown, which includes: a device D-FI implemented by the identity provider FI for generating anonymous credentials; a device D-FS implemented by the service provider FS for controlling access to the service; and a device D-USR implemented by the user U for requesting access to the service.

[0095] For the sake of simplicity, the device D-FI used to manage anonymous credentials will sometimes be referred to as "D-FI of Identity Provider FI".

[0096] Similarly, the device D-FS used to control access to services is sometimes referred to as the "device D-FS for providing services".

[0097] Similarly, the device D-USR used to request access to services is sometimes referred to as "User Equipment D-USR".

[0098] Similarly, we can simply say "X" instead of "Device DX". In other words, Service Provider FS can represent Device D-FS, Identity Provider FI can represent Device D-FI used to manage anonymous credentials, and User U can represent Device D-USR used to request access to the service.

[0099] The device D-FI, used to manage anonymous credentials, has a pair of public keys. and the associated private key .

[0100] The user's device D-USR has a pair of public and private keys. This allows it to authenticate with the identity provider FI. In the embodiments described herein, these keys are stored in the secure element SE.

[0101] The device D-FI used to generate credentials is configured to obtain the user's attributes after authenticating user U. at least one cryptographic representation And obtain the private key used by the identity provider. Calculate and at least with respect to at least one cryptographic representation of (a) ; and (b) users public key signature .

[0102] Then, the device D-FI sends credentials to user U. The credentials include at least: (i) the signature (ii) User public key ; and (iii) at least one cryptographic representation .

[0103] In the embodiments described herein, the user's device D-USR includes a module M-AUTH for authenticating the user to the device D-FI used to generate credentials.

[0104] In the described embodiment, the user U's device D-USR includes: a secure element for storing cryptographic data (e.g., a secret private key); and a cryptographic module WAL, such as an electronic identity wallet, configured to store at least one anonymously verifiable credential provided by the identity provider FI. Generate anonymized signatures (e.g., signatures) It also generates a verifiable representation that will be presented to the service provider FS to access the service while protecting the confidentiality of its attributes.

[0105] In one embodiment, the security element SE is configured to compute proof of knowledge of the user's private key. .

[0106] In the embodiments described herein, the device D-FI for generating anonymous verifiable credentials includes a communication module COM1. This module can be used by the device D-FI to communicate with the user D-USR in order to authenticate the user and send credentials to them. .

[0107] In the embodiments described herein, the device D-FI includes a cryptographic module M-CRY1. This module can be used in particular for authenticating users and calculating summaries, signatures, and proofs.

[0108] In the embodiments described herein, the device D-FS for controlling user access to a service includes a module M-LS that determines which user attributes must be verified before authorizing a user to access the service, verifies whether the obtained attributes actually satisfy the logic of the service, and, where applicable, authorizes access to the service after proof of the validity of at least one authentication credential verifying the attributes.

[0109] In the embodiments described herein, the device D-FS includes a communication module COM2. This module can be used by the device to request attributes from a user, obtain information items that enable or allow the user to obtain such attributes, obtain a verifiable representation including user attribute credentials, and send messages to the user to notify them of whether they have been granted or denied access to the service.

[0110] In the embodiments described herein, the device D-FS includes a cryptographic module M-CRY2, which is specifically configured to compute summaries and verify proofs and signatures.

[0111] Figure 2 The main steps of the method for issuing verifiable credentials implemented by the identity provider FI are illustrated in flowchart form.

[0112] During step I2, the identity provider FI defines the public parameters of the signature system: ,in: - in, It consists of three cyclic groups of order p, and it is assumed that the q-SDH problem is difficult. yes Bilinear pairing in .

[0113] - It represents a group prime integers of order 1

[0114] - It is the number of attributes to be certified.

[0115] - Represents a randomly selected group of +3 generators (such that no one knows the discrete logarithm of one of these generators relative to the other). Each Associated with a specific attribute type (e.g., It will be associated with the attribute "surname". Associated with the attribute "name", Associated with the attribute "age", (Associated with the attribute "gender", etc.). This distinguishes the attributes from each other and avoids any ambiguity.

[0116] - express One of the generators.

[0117] group of +3 generators are randomly selected such that no one knows the discrete logarithm of one of these generators relative to the other of these generators.

[0118] In the embodiments described herein, each Associated with a specific attribute type (e.g., It will be associated with the attribute "surname". Associated with the attribute "name", Associated with the attribute "age", (Associated with the attribute "gender", etc.)

[0119] In the remainder of the text, all calculations related to the exponent are performed modulo... (mod) )conduct.

[0120] During step I4, the identity provider FI defines public data specific to the credential type (such as a digital identity document).

[0121] In the embodiments described herein, this public data includes: for The public key for each of the attribute types ,Right now These public keys are intended to be used for all credentials (VC) issued by the identity provider (FI). from Randomly selected integers , for Summary identifier for each of the attribute types ,Right now ,as well as For the identifier of each attribute type ,Right now .

[0122] During step I6, the identity provider FI generates a private key. and the associated public key ( ).

[0123] In the embodiments described herein, the private key belong And the associated public key is ( ),in and .

[0124] In the embodiments described herein, the identity provider FI also generates zero-knowledge proofs. = PoK To prove its key pair ( It has indeed been generated.

[0125] Now suppose identity provider FI wants to target users Attributes Generate vouchers .

[0126] The user's private / public key pair is recorded as ( , ).

[0127] In the embodiments described herein, the private key It is stored in the security element SE.

[0128] During step I8, the identity provider FI provides the user with... Send a challenge (message) .

[0129] user Knowledge proof for generating its private key SoK{ : =}( This certification inquiry .

[0130] In the embodiments described herein, it is demonstrated that The algorithm known as ESCchnorr (Claus-Peter Schnorr: Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards (Abstract). EUROCRYPT 1989: 688-689) is used for calculation. Other algorithms can also be used, such as the ECDSA algorithm (ANSI X9.62-1998, Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)).

[0131] user Send its public key (PK) and proof to the identity provider FI .

[0132] In the embodiments described herein, if the identity provider FI does not authenticate the user U based on this information, the result of test I9 is ​​negative, and the method stops.

[0133] If authentication is successful, during step I10, the identity provider FI uses a cryptographic hash function. For each attribute calculate cryptographic representation in .

[0134] In the pattern described here, the cryptography is represented by a function The calculated hash, for example, calculated according to the SHA-256 protocol.

[0135] In the embodiments described herein, attributes cryptographic representation More specifically based on summary identifiers Attribute identifiers The value of this attribute and the public key associated with this attribute type during the creation of identity verification. To calculate: ) This representation conforms to standard ISO / IEC 18013-5. Other representations may be used in other embodiments of this disclosure.

[0136] During step I12, the identity provider FI uses its private key. For users' public keys and Summary Data Structures Calculate digital signature It stores the signature. .

[0137]

[0138] In the embodiments described herein, the signature scheme used conforms to the BBS+ protocol.

[0139] = ,in: Is A value randomly selected from the data, and

[0140] By order , ,therefore .

[0141] One person recorded as .

[0142] For more information on the BBS+ protocol, those skilled in the art can refer to the standard itself (https: / / identity.foundation / bbs-signature / draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.html) or the document "Barki, A., Brunet, S., Desmoulins, N., and J. Traore, "Improved AlgebraicMACs and Practical Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials", In International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, 1016.<https: / / link.springer.com / chapter / 10.1007 / 978-3-319-69453-5_20> .

[0143] During step I14, the identity provider FI generates a zero-knowledge disclosure proof. To prove that they know and satisfy of .

[0144] = PoK

[0145] In the embodiment described herein, the credential VC is obtained from the user's public key (step I16). ,summary And signatures for this data composition: .

[0146] The secret data associated with this credential VC is the user private key .

[0147] During step I18, the identity provider FI provides the user with... Send credentials and proof .

[0148] During step U20, the user calculate , And verify and prove The validity of the proof. If the proof passes verification, the user... Storing its attributes in its digital identity wallet WAL is particularly relevant. and its public key VC credentials.

[0149] In one embodiment, the user already knows their attributes, so the identity provider does not need to send these attributes back to the user.

[0150] In one variation, the identity provider sends these attributes back to the user so that the user can verify that they do indeed share the same information with the identity provider (i.e., verify that the identity provider has not misspelled their last name).

[0151] Figure 4 The flowchart illustrates the main steps of the method for requesting access to the service implemented by user U and the main steps of the method for controlling access implemented by service provider FS.

[0152] According to this disclosure, for this purpose, user U uses a verifiable representation VP generated based on one or more credentials VC generated by at least one identity provider FI.

[0153] For simplicity, it is assumed that a verifiable representation VP consists of only one credential VC.

[0154] We This indicates the attribute requested by the service provider (FS). The index list. In this example, we assume that the validation of the conditions for service access involves three attributes. , , And therefore .

[0155] In the embodiments described herein, for those not belonging to Each attribute of the user Value will be sent to the service provider FS. .

[0156] During step U20, user U anonymously connects to service provider FS.

[0157] During step S22, the service provider sends user U a list of attributes that must be authenticated to be allowed access to its service. And a session-specific nonce to avoid replaying verifiable representations.

[0158] In a preferred embodiment, the request is authenticated, in other words, signed by the service provider (FS).

[0159] During step U24, the user uses their public key Calculate the anonymized public key This prevents both the service provider FS and the identity provider FI from tracking the user based on their public keys.

[0160] For this purpose, users exist Randomly select an integer And calculate its private key. Pedersen's commitment: .

[0161] During step U26, the user Based on the signature of its credential VC Calculate anonymized signatures This also prevents service provider FS or identity provider FI from tracking users based on the signature element and "adapting" the signature to involve anonymized public keys. and (instead of) and attribute summary ).

[0162] For this purpose, in the embodiments described herein, the user choose Then calculate:

[0163]

[0164] =

[0165]

[0166] = PoK : .

[0167] The proof As is known to those skilled in the art (see, for example, Stefan Brands: Rapid Demonstration of Linear Relations Connected by Boolean Operators. EUROCRYPT 1997: 318-333), it will not be described in detail here. The result is obtained from the following two equations: ;as well as

[0168] Then one person sets it up.

[0169] During step U38, the user Use random numbers and its private key Signature of knowledge calculated for a set of data This set of data is referred to as "DeviceAuthenticationBytes" in the standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, and is denoted as […] in the remainder of the text. :

[0170] In the standard ISO / IEC 18013, DeviceAuthenticationBytes include nonce (or any other equivalent element that is specific to the ongoing session with the service provider FS and is able to prevent replay of the verifiable representation VP, and, where applicable, specific to the set of data disclosed to the service provider and other contextual data).

[0171] sign Yes In the database The signature of the knowledge of discrete logarithms.

[0172] In one particular embodiment, the signature uses the ECSchnorr algorithm. Any other method that can prove knowledge of the private key may also be implemented. The algorithm, especially the implementation of the ECDSA algorithm in the context of SSI autonomous identity mechanism.

[0173] In one embodiment of this disclosure, the safety element SE may not: - Anonymize your public key yourself (step U24) (e.g., calculate) ) and / or; - Anonymize your private key yourself (step U26) (e.g., calculate) = ); and / or - Calculate your own anonymized private key (step U38) The proof of knowledge, that is, the proof of knowledge. In the database The signature of knowledge of discrete logarithms in .

[0174] The following explains how a secure element (SE) and its associated mobile application (WAL) can jointly access the public key. Anonymize and calculate signature .

[0175] It should be noted that in the embodiments described herein, only the security element (SE) knows the user's public key. The associated private key sk.

[0176] Assume that the secure element SE supports the standard digital signature algorithm ECSchnorr, which is also known as ECSDSA in standard ISO / IEC 14888-3.

[0177] sign The calculation can be performed as follows: a / Safety Element SE Calculation In the database Discrete logarithm (i.e., private key) in The signature of knowledge (denoted as) ): .

[0178] In one embodiment, to compute the signature, the ECSDSA algorithm can be implemented as follows: Security element SE: i / Generate random numbers

[0179] ii / Calculation , ,as well as

[0180] iii / Calculation (mod) )

[0181] in, This represents a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256).

[0182] sign From the pair ( , )composition: .

[0183] if If the signature is valid, it is valid; otherwise, it is invalid.

[0184] b / Apply WAL: i / Select random number

[0185] ii / Calculation ,as well as

[0186] iii / Calculation = = (mod) ).

[0187] sign It is relative to the public key. against A valid ECSDSA signature.

[0188] In this embodiment, the security element SE calculates proof of knowledge about the user's private key. ,prove and The calculation is performed jointly by the security element SE and the application WAL of the terminal.

[0189] Therefore, the secure element SE performs simple operations (requiring no bilinear pairing and only one elliptic curve scalar multiplication), while the signature... It is calculated by WAL, a dedicated mobile application for its mobile phones.

[0190] Verifiable representation with selective disclosure The identity provider FI's public key and the user's anonymized public key , The data set disclosed to the service provider FS ( Cryptographic representation and signature and Composition (step U40).

[0191] , , ).

[0192] During step U42, the user will verify the representation. Send to the service provider FS.

[0193] During step S44, the service provider FS targets each calculate ).

[0194] Then, its verification: i / For each , = ; ii / It is aimed at A valid signature; in other words, the service provider (FS) can use the public key authenticated by the identity provider (FI). Reconstruct the signature. Used to verify the SoK (SoK). The ECSchnorr algorithm is known to those skilled in the art and will not be described in detail here.

[0195] iii / It uses the FI public key to target , and The signature value. To do this, it must first ensure that the following equation is satisfied: ( , ) = ( , Secondly, ensure Valid. This proof is valid. The verification algorithm is known to those skilled in the art.

[0196] If all these conditions are verified, then the requested attribute has been proven. It has indeed been verified by the identity provider FI, and it can be confirmed that the VP truly originated from them. The attribute is the requested attribute. Users. Service provider FS allows users. Access to its services (step S46). If at least one condition is not verified, the provider FS refuses access to its services (step S48).

[0197] The above mechanism is very advantageous because neither the service provider (FS) nor the identity provider (FI) can track users. .

[0198] Furthermore, this selective disclosure method conforms to the method described in standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, but that standard has the following drawback: in the event of collusion between the service provider FS and the identity provider FI, the usage of their common customers can be traced.

[0199] In the previously described embodiments, the user Verifiable representations (VPs) can be generated without an internet connection. Similarly, service providers (FS) can independently verify verifiable representations (VPs) without an internet connection. In this sense, this mode, which can be called offline (HL), corresponds to the VP verification mode specifically proposed by standard ISO / IEC 18013-5.

[0200] The standard ISO / IEC 18013-5 specifies a second mode, which may be referred to as the "semi-offline mode" or "synchronous" mode. This mode requires at least one of the two participants to be networked and is similar to the reference mode. Figure 1 The described joint identity model.

[0201] In the SHL mode of standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, compared with reference Figure 1 Similar to the described federated identity synchronization mode, users Receive a token from the identity provider that proves they indeed meet the conditions for accessing the service provider (FS).

[0202] As mentioned earlier, the problem with federated identity is a major drawback because the identity provider knows which service providers U is using its token with and is therefore able to track its usage.

[0203] A specific embodiment of this disclosure will now be described, which is compatible with the SHL mode of standard ISO / IEC 18013-5, but in this embodiment, the identity provider FI cannot identify the user. Which service provider (FS) is using its token with?

[0204] Consider the following scenario: User As referenced Figure 3 Receive credentials from the service provider as described .

[0205] Reference Figure 5 ,user Based on its public key Calculate the anonymization key And calculate the signature of its credential VC. Anonymized value These steps are similar to those described in the reference. Figure 4 Steps U24 and U26 are described.

[0206] During step U28, the user Attempt to obtain proof of identity (SoK) from the identity provider (FI) by contacting them directly. ,prove = ,in .

[0207] In one particular embodiment, the proof is obtained blindly, meaning that although the identity provider FI participated in the generation of the proof (only it is aware of it). However, such proof exists. At that time, it will be unable to determine which user the certificate was generated for.

[0208] In one embodiment, and as referenced Figure 6 The proof described It can be obtained using the Chaum-Pedersen blind signature protocol (David Chaum, Torben P. Pedersen: Wallet Databases with Observers. CRYPTO 1992: 89-105).

[0209] In a similar reference Figure 4 During step U38, as already described, the user Use random numbers and its private key For data groups Signatures of computational knowledge .

[0210]

[0211] Verifiable representation The identity provider FI's public key and the user's anonymized public key , The data set disclosed to the service provider FS ( Cryptographic representation ,sign and and proof Composition (step U400).

[0212] , , , ).

[0213] During step U420, the user sends the verifiable representation VP to the service provider FS.

[0214] During step S440, the service provider FS targets each calculate ).

[0215] Then, its verification: i / For each , = ; ii / It is aimed at Valid signature iii / It uses the FI public key to target , and A valid signature. Therefore, it must first ensure the proof. Valid and proven efficient.

[0216] If all conditions are verified, the service provider FS allows the user to... Access to its services (step S46). If at least one condition is not verified, the service provider FS refuses access to its services (step S48).

[0217] This solution has the advantage of not requiring any bilinear pairings, making it far more efficient than schemes that implement cryptographic tools. Furthermore, its security relies on mathematical problems that are generally considered more difficult by the scientific community.

[0218] Figure 6 The flowchart shows the process in the user A protocol implemented between the identity provider FI and the identity provider FI, through which the identity provider FI can identify users Provide proof (SoK) π_EQ, the proof = ,in .

[0219] In other words, the figure illustrates in detail a specific embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 5 Step U28.

[0220] It should be noted that the identity provider FI was aware of the user's identity in step I12. public key and attributes Calculated signature .

[0221] During step I50, similar to step I8, the identity provider FI provides the user with... Send a challenge (message) .

[0222] user Proof of knowledge for generating its private key SoK{ : = }( This certification inquiry For example, using an algorithm called ECSchnorr or ECDSA.

[0223] user Send its public key (PK) and proof to the identity provider FI .

[0224] In the embodiments described herein, if the identity provider FI does not authenticate the user U based on this information, the result of test I51 is negative, and the method stops.

[0225] If authentication is successful, during step I52, the identity provider FI will authenticate the user. The attributes of calculate cryptographic representation in This step is similar to step I10.

[0226] )

[0227] make ,get .

[0228] One person recorded as .

[0229] During step I54, the identity provider FI from Randomly selected value and calculate and calculation .

[0230] Identity provider FI to users Send value and (Step I56).

[0231] During step U58, the user from Two values ​​are randomly selected from the data. And calculate:

[0232]

[0233]

[0234] (mod ) During step U60, the user will input the value Send to the identity provider FI.

[0235] During step I62, the identity provider FI calculates... and value Send to user .

[0236] During step U64, the user calculate: (mod ) prove equal: .

[0237] This is for a message if the following conditions are met. Valid proof (SoK):

[0238] Each of the previously described devices, D-USR, D-FI, and D-FS, can be implemented by a computer ORD, with a hardware architecture as follows: Figure 7 As shown.

[0239] The computer ORD specifically includes a processor 10, a random access memory 11, a read-only memory 12, and a communication component 13.

[0240] The read-only memory 12 constitutes a recording medium as understood in this invention. It includes the computer program PG-X according to the invention.

[0241] For device D-USR, the computer program PG-X is program PG-USR, which includes functions for executing the previously referenced... Figure 2 and Figure 3 The instructions describe the steps of requesting access to the service. The PG-USR program specifically defines the following modules for the device D-USR: module M-AUTH for authentication, module WAL for obtaining credentials, module WAL for calculating keys and signatures, and module COM-3 for communication.

[0242] For device D-FI, the computer program PG-X is program PG-FI, which includes the functions for executing the previously referenced... Figure 2 and Figure 3 The instructions describe the steps of a method for generating credentials. The PG-FI program specifically defines module M-CRY1 for authentication, digest calculation, signing, and credential acquisition, and module COM1 for device D-FI. The PG-FI program specifically defines module M-CRY1 for authentication, digest calculation, signing, and credential acquisition, and module COM1 for device D-FI.

[0243] For device D-FS, the computer program PG-X is the program PG-FS, which includes the functions for executing the previously referenced... Figure 2 and Figure 3 The instructions describe the steps for controlling access to the service. The program PG-FS specifically defines module M-CRY2 for calculating summaries, proofs, and signatures, and module COM2 for communicating with device D-FS.

Claims

1. A method for generating vouchers The method, wherein the credential and user The method is related to at least one attribute, and is implemented by an identity provider (FI) and includes the following steps: - For the user Perform authentication (I8); - Obtain the attributes of the user (I10) At least one cryptographic representation of ) ; - Obtain (I12) the private key of the identity provider ( Calculate and at least the signatures of the following items : (a) the at least one cryptographic representation ; And targeting (b) The user public key ; - Calculate (I14) voucher Proof of validity ( The credentials include at least: (i) The signature , (ii) The user public key ; as well as (iii) the at least one cryptographic representation ;as well as - Send the proof (I18) to the user and the certificate .

2. The generation method according to claim 1, wherein: - The signature conforms to the BBS+ protocol; and - The at least one cryptographic representation is a summary conforming to standard ISO / IEC 18013-5.

3. A method for requesting access, provided by the user. The device implementation for requesting access to a service provided by a service provider (FS) includes the following steps: - Authenticate the user (I8) with the Identity Provider (FI) ; - Receive (I18) credentials from the Identity Provider (FI) and the certificate Proof of validity The certificate At least including: (i) The user's attributes ( Cryptographic representation of ) ; (ii) The user public key ;as well as (iii) Using the private key of the identity provider ( Calculate and at least the signatures of the following items : (a) the at least one cryptographic representation ,as well as (b) The user The public key , - Verify the proof ; - Receive (S22) a list of at least one attribute to be disclosed to the service provider (FS) in order to access the service. ) - Based on the public key Calculate (U24) the user Anonymized public key and based on the signature Computing (U26) Anonymized Signatures ; - Calculate (U38) and the anonymized public key Proof of knowledge of the associated anonymous private key of the user - Send (U42, U420) a verifiable representation with selective disclosure to the service provider (FS), the verifiable representation including at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider (FI), (bb) The user's anonymized public key , (cc) At least one attribute to be disclosed in order to access the service ( ), (dd) at least one attribute to be disclosed ( Cryptographic representation of ) , (ee) the anonymized signature ,as well as (ff) The proof .

4. The request access method according to claim 3 further includes obtaining the anonymized signature provided by the identity provider (FI). Proof of validity Step (U28), the verifiable representation with selective disclosure further includes proof of the validity. .

5. The request access method according to claim 3 or 4, comprising: - Proof of the knowledge that the user's private key is calculated by the security element (SE) of the user terminal. ; - The proof and proof It is calculated jointly by the security element (SE) and the application (WAL) of the terminal.

6. A device for controlling users A method for accessing a service, implemented by the service provider (FS) and including the following steps: - Obtain (U42, U420) a verifiable representation with selective disclosure, the verifiable representation comprising at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider (FI), (bb) Based on the user's public key The anonymous public key obtained from the user , (cc) At least one attribute of the user to be disclosed in order to access the service. ), (dd) at least one attribute to be disclosed ( Cryptographic representation of ) , (ee) Based on a signature issued by the service provider and relating to at least the following: Obtained Anonymous Signature : (a) The user's attributes ( At least one cryptographic representation of ) ,as well as (b) The user Anonymized public key ,as well as (ff) The user is aware of the anonymized public key. Proof of the associated anonymized private key ; - Calculate the required properties (S44, S440) Cryptographic representation of ) ; - Verification (S44, S440): (i) Cryptographic representation of the required attribute (ii) Proof that the user is aware of the anonymized private key as well as (iii) The anonymized signature verified using the public key of the identity provider (FI). ; - The positive result of the verification (S44, S440) is authorization (S46) of the user. The necessary conditions for accessing the service.

7. The access control method according to claim 6, wherein, The verifiable representation with selective disclosure ( It also includes the anonymized signature calculated by the service provider (FI). Proof of validity ( ), for the anonymized signature Verification includes the verification of the proof ( ) verification.

8. A method for generating vouchers The device (D-FI) contains the credentials and the user The device includes at least one attribute related to: - Used for the user The module that performs the authentication (M-CRY1); - Used to obtain the user's attributes ( At least one cryptographic representation of ) Module (M-CRY1); - Used to obtain the private key used by the identity provider ( Calculate and at least the signatures of the following items Module (M-CRY1): (a) the at least one cryptographic representation ; And targeting (b) The user public key ; - Used to calculate (I14) vouchers Proof of validity The module (M-CRY1) of the certificate includes at least: (i) The signature , (ii) The user public key ;as well as (iii) the at least one cryptographic representation ;as well as - Used to send the proof to the user and the certificate The module (COM1).

9. A device (D-USR) for requesting access to a service provided by a service provider (FS), the device comprising: - Used to authenticate the device (D-USR) to the Identity Provider (FI). The module (M-AUTH); - Used to obtain credentials from the identity provider (FI) and proof The module (COM3), the proof is the credential. Proof of the validity of the certificate At least including: (i) The user's attributes ( Cryptographic representation of ) ; (ii) The user public key ;as well as (iii) Using the private key of the identity provider ( Calculate and at least the signatures of the following items : (a) the at least one cryptographic representation ,as well as (b) The user The public key , - Used to verify the proof Module (WAL); - For receiving (S22) a list of at least one attribute to be disclosed to the service provider (FS) in order to access the service ( ) module (COM3) - Used based on the public key Calculate the user Anonymized public key and based on the signature Calculate anonymized signatures Components; - Used to calculate the anonymized public key Proof of knowledge of the associated user's private key Component (SE) - A module (COM3) for sending a selectively disclosed verifiable representation to the service provider (FS), the verifiable representation comprising at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider (FI), (bb) The user's anonymized public key , (cc) At least one attribute to be disclosed in order to access the service ( ), (dd) at least one attribute to be disclosed ( Cryptographic representation of ) , (ee) the anonymized signature ,as well as (ff) The proof .

10. A device for controlling users Device for accessing services (D-FS), the device comprising: - A module (COM2) for obtaining a verifiable representation with selective disclosure, the verifiable representation comprising at least: (aa) The public key of the identity provider (FI), (bb) Based on the user's public key The anonymous public key obtained from the user , (cc) At least one attribute of the user to be disclosed in order to access the service. ), (dd) at least one attribute to be disclosed ( Cryptographic representation of ) , (ee) Based on a signature issued by the service provider and relating to at least the following: Obtained Anonymous Signature :: (a) The user's attributes ( At least one cryptographic representation of ) as well as (b) The user Anonymized public key ,as well as (ff) The user is aware of the anonymized public key. Proof of the associated anonymized private key ; - Used to calculate the desired attribute ( Cryptographic representation of ) The module (M-CRY2); - Used for verifying modules (M-CRY2) below (S44, S440): (i) Cryptographic representation of the required attribute (ii) Proof that the user is aware of the anonymized private key as well as (iii) The anonymized signature verified using the public key of the identity provider (FI). ; - A module (COM2) configured to authorize (S46) the user (U) to access the service at least when the verification (S44, S440) is positive.

11. A computer program (PG-USR, PG-FS, PG-FI) comprising instructions that, when the program is executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform: - A method for generating credentials according to any one of claims 1 or 2; or - The method for requesting access to a service according to claims 3 to 5; or - The method for controlling access to a service as described in claim 6 or 7.

12. A computer-readable recording medium having a computer program as claimed in claim 11 recorded thereon.