Methods, apparatus, and computer programs for managing secret keys used for group and individual privacy.
By sharing a secret key and a pseudo-random function to generate an enhanced data privacy key in wireless communication, the problem of eavesdropping on user privacy protection in wireless communication is solved, and privacy parameter management for individuals and groups is realized, thereby improving communication security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202580029167.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2024-04-24
- Filing Date
- 2025-04-23
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In existing wireless communication standards, user privacy protection measures are insufficient to effectively prevent eavesdroppers from identifying individual or group identification information, especially MAC addresses and other plaintext transmission parameters, and there is a lack of mechanisms for generating shared private encryption keys.
By sharing secret keys among sites in the basic service set, using pseudo-random functions to generate enhanced data privacy keys, modifying the values of privacy parameters, and changing the time, privacy protection for individuals or groups can be ensured.
It enables reliable and efficient management of privacy parameters for individuals and groups in wireless communication, avoiding eavesdropper identification and improving communication security.
Smart Images

Figure CN123125836A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This disclosure relates to wireless communications, and more specifically to user privacy during wireless communications. Background Technology
[0002] The methods described in this section can be implemented, but are not necessarily methods previously conceived or implemented. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated herein, the methods described in this section are not prior art as claimed in this application, and are not admitted to be prior art by virtue of their inclusion in this section. Furthermore, all embodiments are not necessarily intended to solve all or even any of the problems raised in this section.
[0003] Wireless communication networks are widely deployed to provide a variety of communication services, such as voice, video, packet data, messaging, and broadcasting. These wireless networks can be multiple access networks capable of supporting multiple users by sharing available network resources. Examples of such multiple access networks include Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) networks, Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) networks, Orthogonal FDMA (OFDMA) networks, and Single Carrier FDMA (SC-FDMA) networks. The 802.11 family of standards adopted by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE-RTM) provides a large number of mechanisms for wireless communication between stations.
[0004] Today, the evolution of wireless systems, driven by user demands and the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), has brought forward cutting-edge privacy issues. While continuing to improve wireless services and user experience, the global wireless industry faces a growing need to protect users' personally identifiable information from increasingly sophisticated user tracking and profile-building activities.
[0005] Personally identifiable information (PII) corresponds to any data that identifies an individual or from which an individual's identifier or contact information can be derived. A device's Media Access Control (MAC) address is an example of a PII.
[0006] In 2019, a dedicated task group, 802.11bi, was initiated to address these privacy issues. Its purpose was to specify Enhanced Data Privacy (EDP) features to be added to the current standard to increase privacy. Some EDP features relate to the obfuscation of multiple identified PIIs (hereinafter referred to as EDP parameters or privacy parameters) contained in frames exchanged in plaintext by stations (STAs). These PIIs would allow eavesdroppers to fingerprint the device. Among these EDP parameters, identifiers such as MAC addresses or Association Identifiers (AIDs) are of course the most important, but other parameters such as sequence numbers (SNs) or packet numbers (PNs) present in the unencrypted portion of the data frame are also listed. The obfuscation is achieved by the station simultaneously changing the transmitted EDP parameters (which are transmitted in plaintext within the frame) to new values unrelated to the previous values without any connection loss.
[0007] This change relies on the concept of an EDP epoch, which corresponds to a finite period of time during which the irrelevant values of EDP parameters remain constant. An EDP epoch can be an individual EDP epoch or a group EDP epoch. More precisely, an individual EDP epoch is a time window in which a single non-access point (non-AP) STA applies a set of EDP parameters that are valid during the duration of that individual EDP epoch. It is initiated by a single non-AP station through an individual EDP epoch sequence request. A group EDP epoch is a time window in which individual non-AP STAs within a set of non-AP STAs apply a set of EDP parameters that are valid during the duration of that group EDP epoch. For example, it is initiated by an access point (AP) STA by advertising EDP epoch parameters to the set of non-AP STAs. The individual non-AP STAs in the set of non-AP STAs apply the EDP epoch parameters of the advertised group EDP epoch to determine the same start time for one or more EDP epochs. The key challenge is that these EDP epoch start times need to be easily determined by both the AP station and the set of non-AP stations (one, several, or all non-AP stations associated with the AP station), but not easily determined by an eavesdropper. To this end, the generation of these EDP epoch start times is based on a shared function as a pseudo-random function (PRF), which is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STAs and the EDP AP using a shared private encryption key. Depending on the type of EDP epoch (individual or group), the shared private encryption key may be specific to the EDP non-AP STA, or common to all EDP non-AP STAs associated with the EDP AP.
[0008] Similarly, to generate new, irrelevant values for EDP parameters, the changes are also based on a shared function as a PRF, which is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STAs and the EDP AP using a shared private encryption key without explicit exchange over the air. Depending on whether the EDP parameter is intended for individual privacy (meaning the value is specific and applies only to a single non-AP STA) or group privacy (meaning the same new value applies to a group of EDP non-AP STAs), the shared private encryption key may also be specific to the EDP non-AP STA, or common to all EDP non-AP STAs associated with the EDP AP.
[0009] In the current stage of standard 802.11bi, the generation of the aforementioned shared private encryption key is not specified. Summary of the Invention
[0010] A broad aspect of this disclosure is providing methods, apparatus, and computer programs for managing secret keys used for group and individual privacy.
[0011] According to the first aspect, a method for improving communication privacy is provided, comprising: at the stations of a Basic Station Set (BSS),
[0012] Obtain a secret key shared with at least another station of the BSS;
[0013] The obtained shared secret key and a pseudo-random function shared by at least one other station are used to generate an enhanced data privacy (EDP) key, and
[0014] Modify at least one privacy parameter based on the EDP key.
[0015] Therefore, the method of the present invention enables the use of a simple and efficient mechanism that ensures reliability to improve communication privacy.
[0016] According to a specific embodiment, the EDP key is generated using the obtained shared secret key, the identifier of the BSS, and the pseudo-random function.
[0017] According to a particular embodiment, the value of the at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the EDP key. The timing for when the new value should be used can be determined similarly or dissimilarly.
[0018] According to a particular embodiment, the value of the at least one privacy parameter is unique for both the station and the other station, thereby enabling individual secret key management.
[0019] According to a specific embodiment, the obtained secret key is a first secret key, the generated EDP key is a first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is a first pseudo-random function. The method further includes:
[0020] Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station;
[0021] A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and
[0022] The value of another privacy parameter, which differs from the at least one privacy parameter, is modified based on the second EDP key. The value of the other privacy parameter is common to several stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the stated station and the other station.
[0023] Therefore, this method enables the management of individual or group secret keys for changing the values of EDP parameters.
[0024] According to a specific embodiment, the obtained secret key is a first secret key, the generated EDP key is a first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is a first pseudo-random function. The method further includes:
[0025] Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station;
[0026] A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and
[0027] The start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter is determined based on the second EDP key.
[0028] Therefore, this method enables key management for modifying EDP parameter values and determining when changes should occur.
[0029] According to a specific embodiment, the start time is common to several stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the stated station and the other station. Therefore, this method enables key management for modifying EDP parameter values and determining the time when changes should occur for multiple EDP stations.
[0030] According to a specific embodiment, the start time is unique for both the station and the other station, thereby enabling individual secret key management.
[0031] According to a particular embodiment, the method further includes:
[0032] Obtain a third secret key shared with at least one other station;
[0033] A third EDP key is generated using the shared third secret key and a third pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and
[0034] The start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter and the other privacy parameter is determined based on the third EDP key.
[0035] According to a particular embodiment, the method further includes: determining a start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter and the other privacy parameter, the start time being determined based on the second EDP key.
[0036] According to a specific embodiment, the start time is common to all stations in the BSS's station set.
[0037] According to a particular embodiment, the method further includes: determining a start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter, the start time being determined based on the EDP key.
[0038] According to a particular embodiment, the value of the at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the EDP key.
[0039] According to a specific embodiment, the obtained secret key is a first secret key, the generated EDP key is a first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is a first pseudo-random function. The method further includes:
[0040] Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station;
[0041] A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and
[0042] The value of another privacy parameter, which differs from the at least one privacy parameter, is modified based on the second EDP key. The value of the other privacy parameter is common to all stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the stated station and the other station. The value of the at least one privacy parameter is unique to both the stated station and the other station.
[0043] According to a specific embodiment, the obtained secret key is a first secret key, the generated EDP key is a first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is a first pseudo-random function. The method further includes:
[0044] Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station;
[0045] A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and
[0046] The value of at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the second EDP key.
[0047] The value of the at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the second EDP key.
[0048] According to a specific embodiment, the start time is common to several stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the station and the other station.
[0049] According to a particular embodiment, the start time is unique for both the station and the other station.
[0050] According to a second aspect, a communication device is provided, comprising a processing unit configured to perform the steps of the method described above. The advantages of this communication device are similar to those of the method itself.
[0051] At least a portion of the methods according to this disclosure may be computer-implemented. Therefore, this disclosure may take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment (including firmware, resident software, microcode, etc.), or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects, which may generally be referred to herein as a “circuit,” “module,” or “system.” Furthermore, this disclosure may take the form of a computer program product embodied in any tangible medium having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
[0052] Because this disclosure can be implemented in software, it can be embodied as computer-readable code for provision to a programmable device on any suitable carrier medium. Tangible non-transient carrier media may include storage media such as floppy disks, CD-ROMs, hard disk drives, magnetic tape devices, or solid-state storage devices. Transient carrier media may include signals such as electrical signals, electronic signals, optical signals, acoustic signals, magnetic signals, or electromagnetic signals (e.g., microwave or RF signals). Attached Figure Description
[0053] Embodiments of this disclosure will now be described by way of example only and with reference to the following figures, in which:
[0054] Figure 1 Examples of network systems that can implement some embodiments of this disclosure are shown;
[0055] Figure 2 Examples of steps performed by both the EDP STA AP and the non-AP STA when a non-AP STA is added to the EDP group epoch sequence according to some embodiments of the present disclosure are shown.
[0056] Figure 3 Examples of steps performed by both the EDPSTA (AP) and the non-AP STA when a non-AP STA initiates an EDP group individual sequence are shown according to some embodiments of the present disclosure;
[0057] Figure 4 This shows information elements containing group epoch parameters;
[0058] Figure 5 An example is shown that enables non-AP stations to change the frame format of information elements related to their AID; and
[0059] Figure 6 An example of a communication device configured to implement at least some embodiments of the present disclosure is illustrated schematically. Detailed Implementation
[0060] According to some embodiments, a shared secret key is used to determine when the value of an EDP parameter should be changed in an EDP station within an EDP station group. This shared secret key is determined based on a master shared secret key, for example, based on a group temporary key (GTK) key and a KDF-Hash function (which may be a key derivation function (KDF)) as defined in IEEE P802.11-REVme / D5.0 12.7.1.6.2). The shared secret key used to determine when the value of an EDP parameter should be changed can also be determined based on the identifier of the BSS. Similarly, the shared secret key used to determine the new value of the EDP parameter can be determined in an EDP station within an EDP station group based on the master shared secret key (e.g., based on the GTK key) and a KDF-Hash function. The shared secret key used to determine when the value of an EDP parameter should be changed and the shared secret key used to determine the new value of the EDP parameter can be the same shared secret key or can be different shared secret keys. Furthermore, the shared secret key used to determine the new value of the EDP parameter can be determined in both EDP non-AP stations and EDP AP stations based on the master shared secret key (e.g., a key derived from a key (KDK) that forms a subpart of a pairwise temporary key (PTK)) and the KDF-Hash function.
[0061] According to some embodiments, a shared secret key is used to determine when the value of an EDP parameter should be changed in both EDP non-AP stations and EDP AP stations. This shared secret key is determined based on a master shared secret key, for example, based on a group temporary key (GTK) key and a KDF-Hash function (which may be a key derivation function (KDF)) as defined in IEEE P802.11-REVme / D5.0 12.7.1.6.2). The shared secret key used to determine when the value of an EDP parameter should be changed can also be determined based on the identifier of the BSS. Similarly, the shared secret key used to determine the new value of the EDP parameter can be determined in the EDP station of the EDP station group based on the master shared secret key (e.g., based on the GTK key) and the KDF-Hash function. Furthermore, the shared secret key used to determine the new value of the EDP parameter can be determined in both EDP non-AP stations and EDP AP stations based on the master shared secret key (e.g., based on a key derivation key (KDK) forming a sub-part of a pairwise temporary key (PTK)) and the KDF-Hash function. The shared secret key used to determine when the value of an EDP parameter should be changed in both EDP non-AP stations and EDP AP stations, and the shared secret key used to determine the new value of the EDP parameter, can be the same shared secret key or can be different shared secret keys.
[0062] According to some embodiments, a station can request the creation of an EDP epoch sequence, which can later be joined by other stations. Thus, the "individual" sequence becomes a group EDP epoch.
[0063] In the following text, an enhanced data privacy access point station is referred to as an EDP AP STA, AP STA, or AP, and an enhanced data privacy non-access point station is referred to as an EDP non-AP STA, non-AP STA, or non-AP.
[0064] Figure 1 Examples of network systems that can implement some embodiments of this disclosure are shown.
[0065] For the sake of explanation, Figure 1This represents an 802.11 network (i.e., Wi-Fi network) system 100 comprising four wireless devices: an access point station (AP) 105 and three non-AP stations (STAs) 110a, 110b, and 110c. The AP and non-AP stations can be AP multilink devices (MLDs) and non-AP MLDs, respectively. Of course, the number of non-AP stations 110a, 110b, and 110c can be more than three. AP station 105 provides wireless connectivity between the non-AP stations 110a, 110b, and 110c and a wider network, such as the Internet (not shown). A connection from one of the non-AP stations 110a, 110b, and 110c to AP 105 can be established through a standardized process known as association. Once a non-AP station is associated with an AP station, it can send and receive data from the network through the AP station.
[0066] AP station 105 may include, be implemented as, or be referred to as Node B, Radio Network Controller (RNC), Evolved Node B (eNB), 5G Next Generation Base Station (gNB), Base Station Controller (BSC), Base Transceiver Station (BTS), Base Station (BS), Transceiver Function (TF), Radio Router, Radio Transceiver, Basic Service Set (BSS), Extended Service Set (ESS), Radio Base Station (RBS), or any other term. AP station 105 may be a standalone product, or it may be integrated into an apparatus, such as an integrated Broadband Remote Access Server (BRAS).
[0067] Non-AP stations 110a, 110b, and / or 110c may include, be implemented as, or be referred to as a subscriber station, subscriber unit, mobile station (MS), remote station, remote terminal, user terminal (UT), user agent, user device, user equipment (UE), subscriber station (STA), or some other term. In some implementations, a non-AP station may be or may include a cellular phone, cordless phone, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, Wireless Local Loop (WLL) station, personal digital assistant (PDA), handheld device with wireless connectivity, or some other suitable processing device connected to a wireless modem. Accordingly, one or more aspects of the teachings herein may be incorporated into a telephone (e.g., a cellular phone or smartphone), a computer (e.g., a laptop computer), a tablet computer, a portable communication device, a portable computing device (e.g., a personal data assistant), an entertainment device (e.g., a music or video device, or a satellite radio), a Global Positioning System (GPS) device, or any other suitable device configured to communicate via wireless or wired media. In some respects, some of the non-AP stations 110a, 110b, and 110c can be wireless nodes. Such wireless nodes can provide connectivity to or from a network (e.g., a wide area network such as the Internet or a cellular network) via wired or wireless communication links.
[0068] AP station 105 manages a set of stations that collectively organize their access to the wireless medium for communication purposes. All stations (AP station 105 and non-AP stations 110a, 110b, and 110c) form a service set, which may be referred to as a Basic Service Set (BSS) (although other terms may be used). Note that AP station 105 can manage more than one BSS: each BSS is therefore uniquely identified by a specific Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID) and managed by separate virtual AP stations implemented within the physical AP station 105.
[0069] Figure 2 Examples of steps performed by both an EDP STA AP and a non-AP STA when a non-AP STA is added to an EDP group epoch sequence according to some embodiments of the present disclosure are shown. The EDP group epoch sequence is a sequence of EDP group epochs used by a set of EDP non-AP STAs associated with the same EDP AP to simultaneously change the values of EDP parameters.
[0070] According to some embodiments, a group EDP epoch sequence is initiated by an EDP AP (an AP that has indicated its support for EDP features) through the transmission of a group EDP epoch instruction action frame on any enabled link or by advertising the EDP epoch sequence parameter element in any management frame.
[0071] When an EDP epoch sequence parameter element is received via a group EDP epoch instruction action frame or in any management frame, the EDP epoch sequence parameter advertised by a non-AP STA application that has indicated support for EDP features and is referred to as an EDP non-AP STA determines the start time of the group EDP epoch sequence and the start time of subsequent group EDP epochs of the group EDP epoch sequence.
[0072] Therefore, in step 200, both the EDP non-AP STA and EDP AP retrieve the value marked GT0 indicated in the start time field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element, the value marked RandTR indicated in the time range field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element, and the value marked GEI indicated in the interval field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element, such as... Figure 4 As shown.
[0073] Next, at step 210, the EDP non-AP STA determines the current group epoch iteration n of the group EDP epoch sequence, for example as follows:
[0074]
[0075] TSF stands for timed synchronization function or TSF time.
[0076] According to some embodiments, the EDP AP does not perform step 210 because the EDP AP directly knows the current group epoch iteration.
[0077] Next, at step 220, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP calculate the start time of the (n+1)th EDP group epoch, marked GETn+1, from the shared function, which is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP station and the EDP AP using a shared private encryption key marked EDP-G-Epoch-Key.
[0078] According to some embodiments, the shared function is a pseudo-random function (PRF) as specified in section 12.7.1.2 of the standard IEEE Std 802.11-2020. Alternatively, any other PRF or block cipher algorithm that allows encryption of blocks with similar input parameters (a shared private encryption key and shared parameters having values that change over time) can be used. For ease of illustration, the following description focuses primarily on PRFs. However, similar considerations can be made for any block cipher algorithm.
[0079] According to some implementations, the start time GETn+1 is calculated as follows:
[0080] GETn+1 = GTn+1 + ΔIT
[0081] in,
[0082] ΔIT = PRF-128\64 (EDP-G-Epoch-Key, “EDP”, GTn+1) mod (RandTR)
[0083] And among them,
[0084] GTn+1 = GTn + GEI
[0085] Or one of them,
[0086]
[0087] GTn+1 =GT0 + (n+1) x GEI
[0088] in:
[0089] n is the current iteration of the sequence calculated at step 210;
[0090] PRF-Length-M / L is a pseudo-random function that generates a sequence of M random bits, from which only the leftmost L bits are extracted.
[0091] TSF is the current value of the internal TSF counter of the non-AP STA receive link;
[0092] GT0 is the value indicated in the start time field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element retrieved at step 200;
[0093] RandTR is the value indicated in the time range field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element retrieved at step 200;
[0094] GTn is the start time of the current iteration n of the sequence;
[0095] GEI is the value indicated in the interval field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element retrieved at step 200; and
[0096] EDP-G-Epoch-Key is a shared private cryptographic key involved in the process of generating the uncorrelated start time of the EDP epoch.
[0097] According to some embodiments, the EDP-G-Epoch-Key is a key derived from the group temporary key (GTK, which is a key provided by the AP to non-AP stations during association and is known to all stations associated with the AP) as follows:
[0098] EDP-G-Epoch-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (GTK, "EDP", BSSID)
[0099] in,
[0100] KDF-Hash-Length is the key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) defined in 12.7.1.6.2.
[0101] GTK is the current GTK for the EDP AP.
[0102] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key-derived function; this is given only as an example and can be any other string, as well as...
[0103] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP.
[0104] Next, at step 230, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP compute new irrelevant values of the EDP parameters for individual use in the (n+1)th EDP group epoch from the shared function, wherein the shared function is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA using a shared private encryption key marked as EDP-I-Param-Key.
[0105] Depending on the EDP parameter under consideration, the new irrelevant value can be achieved by: resetting the EDP parameter itself (reset-based obfuscation), which is the transport (OTA) EDP parameter included in the exchanged 802.11 frame; or encoding the EDP parameter to generate an encoded EDP parameter (mask-based obfuscation), which is used as the new value of the corresponding transport (OTA) EDP parameter included in the exchanged 802.11 frame. The encoding operation can take the local current value of the EDP parameter under consideration and the encoding parameters shared by the encoder and decoder as input. The encoding operation can be simply masking, in which case the shared encoding parameters are a shared mask with the same binary length as the EDP parameter under consideration. Alternatives to masking (e.g., XOR) include binary addition or offset, both of which are based on the shared encoding parameters.
[0106] EDP parameters can be used for individual or group privacy purposes. Individual privacy purposes for EDP parameters mean that the value or obfuscation mask is specific to non-AP STAs. Typically, EDP parameters used as MAC addresses, sequence numbers, and packet numbers have individual privacy purposes.
[0107] Group privacy usage of EDP parameters means that the same value or the same obfuscation mask is used for EDP non-AP STA groups. AIDs can also have group privacy usage, which involves generating only one mask to obfuscate AIDs for non-AP STA groups involved in the group EDP epoch.
[0108] An AID can be a locally unique 16-bit identifier. This means that two stations associated with two different Basic Service Sets (BSS) of an AP station can have the same AID value, but two stations associated with the same BSS do not share the same AID value.
[0109] AID was initially introduced to reduce signaling overhead when an AP STA wanted to identify a station for delivering buffered frames, with power saving enabled. AID is advantageously used to replace the MAC address (which is 48 bits long) when an AP STA indicates in a traffic indication message that it has some traffic waiting to be transmitted to a station in power-saving mode. Note that the range of values that can be selected for AID is much shorter. Additionally, in the IEEE 802.11 series, a station's AID is limited to a subrange of 11-bit identifiers [1; 2007] (instead of 2045 possible values), with other values reserved to identify certain station groups or specific signaling (unallocated resources, resources for random access, etc.).
[0110] Because AIDs fall within a finite range of values, random selection can lead to conflicts between multiple AID values across different stations. This is why applying the same offset value (called the group offset value) to AIDs (but not limited to AIDs), to EDP non-AP STA groups, or using the same obfuscation mask helps avoid conflicts. However, adding the same offset to the AIDs in that group only shifts the AID assignment pattern by a fixed value, and after some iterations, an eavesdropper might be able to identify the pattern and subsequently associate the old value with the new one.
[0111] A solution to the side effects of applying the same group offset value of a privacy parameter (such as AID) to stations in that group can be to assign a selected number of stations in that group a privacy parameter value that is different from the value obtained by applying the group offset. In other words, for a subgroup of one or more stations, for example, a frame indicating an updated value of the privacy parameter is sent to those stations. The updated value can be a new, secure (unique across all STAs) value to be applied by each receiving station to modify its privacy parameter. Alternatively, the updated value can be a specific offset value that is common to all stations in the subgroup, or different for each station in the subgroup. The updated value is preferably calculated by the AP STA. This allows, for example, in the case of AID, to guarantee that each resulting AID, whether directly assigned or obtained by applying a specific offset, is unique within the BSS. The updated value (e.g., a new AID value or a new offset) is applied by the receiving station upon reception, or in the AID switching counter field 520 (…). Figure 5 (If it exists) is applied upon expiration. If an update value corresponding to a specific offset is received, the subgroup station may apply only the specific offset value, or, depending on a variation, both the group offset and the specific offset value may be applied cumulatively.
[0112] It is important to note that the selected subgroups of stations can be dynamic, meaning that the selected stations and their number can change over time. This results in greater diversity and provides AP STA with flexibility to adjust the methodology (modified timing and / or selected stations) based, for example, on the current status of the BSS.
[0113] The proposed solution advantageously allows AP STAs to avoid any identifiable patterns when privacy parameters are modified, thus improving security. For example, with AID, the proposed solution breaks the AID assignment pattern, making it impossible to associate using pattern recognition.
[0114] Since AP STA does not need to send a new AID value to each station at each epoch, this solution also has the advantage of avoiding large frame switching overhead.
[0115] In one embodiment, the new AID value calculated by the AP is obtained by means of a unicast encrypted frame (e.g., ...). Figure 5The dedicated protected action frame shown is transmitted. Therefore, according to some embodiments, a method is provided for modifying one or more EDP parameters of one or more EDP non-AP STAs in an EDP group, wherein the one or more EDP parameters are provided within an EDP parameter allocation mode, the method comprising: for each of the one or more EDP non-AP STAs, transmitting a new value for the one or more EDP parameters. Also according to some embodiments, the same offset value or the same obfuscation mask is applied to all EDP parameters in the EDP parameter allocation mode except for one or more modified EDP parameters or one or more EDP parameters to be modified. Also according to some embodiments, one or more EDP parameters to be modified are AIDs, and the allocation mode is an AID allocation mode.
[0116] To perform these obfuscation operations, a shared function can be executed to generate a new reset value and a new mask (or more generally, new shared encoding parameter values). The shared function is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA using a shared encryption key to generate the same new reset value and new mask on both sides without exchanging them in plaintext.
[0117] Preferably, the same single execution of the shared function simultaneously generates one or more new reset values for one or more EDP parameters to be obfuscated (hereinafter referred to herein as reset-based EDP parameters), and one or more new masks (or more generally, encoded parameter values) for one or more EDP parameters to be obfuscated by encoding or masking (hereinafter referred to herein as mask-based EDP parameters).
[0118] According to some embodiments, the shared function is a pseudo-random function (PRF) as specified in section 12.7.1.2 of the standard IEEE Std 802.11-2020. Alternatively, any other PRF or block cipher algorithm that allows encryption of blocks with similar input parameters (a shared private encryption key and shared parameters having values that change over time) can be used. For ease of illustration, the following description focuses primarily on PRFs. However, similar considerations can be made for any block cipher algorithm.
[0119] Returning to step 230, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA calculate, for example, new, irrelevant values of the EDP parameters for individual privacy purposes in the (n+1)th EDP group epoch from the PRF, which is then executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP using a shared private encryption key labeled EDP-I-Param-Key:
[0120] I_EDP_PARAM (n+1) = PRF-M / L (EDP-I-Param-Key, “EDP Param”, GTn+1)
[0121] in,
[0122] I_EDP_PARAM (n+1) corresponds to the sum of the lengths of the EDP parameters for individual privacy purposes in the (n+1)th EDP group epoch. It is divided into predetermined blocks, each block corresponding to a new reset value for each reset-based EDP parameter or a new shared coding parameter value for each mask-based EDP parameter;
[0123] PRF-M / L is a pseudo-random function that generates a sequence of M random bits, from which only the leftmost L bits are extracted.
[0124] EDP-I-Param-Key is a shared private encryption key used in the process of generating new reset values for each reset-based EDP parameter or new shared encoded parameter values for each mask-based EDP parameter.
[0125] "EDP Param" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key-derived function. This is given as an example only, and any other string can be used.
[0126] GTn+1 is the start time of the (n+1)th EDP epoch.
[0127] According to some embodiments, the EDP-I-Param-Key is, for example, a key derived from a Key Derived Key (KDK) that forms a sub-part of a pairwise temporary key PTK agreed between two stations:
[0128] EDP-I-Param-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (KDK, "EDP", BSSID)
[0129] in,
[0130] KDF-Hash-Length can be a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) as defined in 12.7.1.6.2;
[0131] KDK is the KDK portion of the current PTK for the EDP non-AP STA specified in 12.14.8.3.4 (PTKSA export using EDPKE certification);
[0132] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key-derived function; this is given only as an example and can be any other string, as well as...
[0133] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP.
[0134] Next, at step 240, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA calculate, for example, new irrelevant values of the EDP parameters for group privacy purposes in the (n+1)th EDP group epoch from the PRF, wherein the PRF is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP APSTA using a shared private encryption key labeled EDP-G-Param-Key:
[0135] G_EDP_PARAM (n+1) = PRF-M / L (EDP-G-Param-Key, “Client ERCM”, GTn+1)
[0136] in,
[0137] G_EDP_PARAM (n+1) corresponds to the sum of the lengths of the EDP parameters for group use in the (n+1)th EDP group epoch. It is divided into predetermined blocks, each block corresponding to a new reset value for each reset-based EDP parameter or a new shared coding parameter value for each mask-based EDP parameter;
[0138] EDP-G-Param-Key is a shared private encryption key used in the process of generating new reset values for each reset-based EDP parameter or new shared encoded parameter values for each mask-based EDP parameter.
[0139] PRF-M / L is a pseudo-random function that generates a sequence of M random bits, from which only the leftmost L bits are extracted.
[0140] EDP-G-Param-Key is a shared private encryption key used in the process of generating new reset values for each reset-based EDP parameter or new shared encoded parameter values for each mask-based EDP parameter.
[0141] "Client ERCM" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key export function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0142] GTn+1 is the start time of the (n+1)th EDP epoch.
[0143] According to some implementations, the EDP-G-Param-Key is a key derived from GTK as follows:
[0144] EDP-G-Param-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (GTK, "EDP", BSSID)
[0145] in,
[0146] KDF-Hash-Length is a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) as defined in 12.7.1.6.2;
[0147] GTK is the current GTK for EDP AP STA;
[0148] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key derivation function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0149] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP STA.
[0150] According to some embodiments, EDP-G-Epoch-Key is different from EDP-G-Param-Key.
[0151] According to other embodiments, EDP-G-Epoch-Key is the same secret key as EDP-G-Param-Key. In this case, for example, the parameter ΔIT in step 220 and G_EDP_PARAM (n+1) related to the EDP parameters for group privacy purposes in step 240 are generated simultaneously by performing the same and single execution of the shared function, for example:
[0152] [A, B] = PRF-M' / L' (EDP-G-Param-Key, “Client ERCM”, GTn+1)
[0153] in,
[0154] G_EDP_PARAM (n+1) = A, and
[0155] ΔIT = B mod (RandTR).
[0156] Figure 3 Examples of steps performed by both the EDP APSTA and the non-AP STA when an EDP individual sequence is initiated by a non-AP STA, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure, are shown. The EDP individual epoch sequence is a sequence of EDP individual epochs.
[0157] During a multi-link (ML) setup or reset process, if the AP has indicated support for EDP features, a non-AP STA can initiate individual EDP epoch sequence negotiation by including the EDP epoch sequence parameter element in the association request frame or reassociation request frame. Otherwise, a non-AP STA should not include the EDP epoch sequence parameter element in the association request frame or reassociation request frame.
[0158] After successful ML (re)setting, in order to negotiate the individual EDP epoch sequence, the initiating EDP nonAP STA should send an individual EDP epoch sequence request to the responding EDP AP that has indicated support for EDP features via the attached nonAP STA on any enabled link.
[0159] Once the EDP non-AP STA has successfully negotiated the individual EDP epoch sequence with the EDP AP STA, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA should initiate the negotiation of the individual EDP epoch by calculating the start time (IET) of the individual EDP epoch sequence.
[0160] Once the EDP non-AP STA has successfully negotiated an individual EDP epoch sequence with the EDP AP STA, at step 300, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA retrieve the value IT0 indicated in the start time field of the negotiated EDP epoch sequence parameter element, the value RandTR indicated in the time range field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element, and the value IEI indicated in the interval field of the advertised EDP epoch sequence parameter element.
[0161] Next, at step 310, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP calculate the initial start time of the EDP individual epoch sequence and the initial start time of the nth subsequent individual EDP epoch from the shared function, wherein the shared function is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA using a shared private encryption key labeled EDP-I-Epoch-Key.
[0162] According to some embodiments, the shared function is a pseudo-random function (PRF) as specified in section 12.7.1.2 of the standard IEEE Std 802.11-2020. Alternatively, any other PRF or block cipher algorithm that allows encryption of blocks with similar input parameters (a shared private encryption key and shared parameters having values that change over time) can be used. For ease of illustration, the following description focuses primarily on PRFs. However, similar considerations can be made for any block cipher algorithm.
[0163] The initial start time (denoted as IET) of the EDP individual epoch sequence can be calculated as follows:
[0164] IET = IT0 + ΔIT
[0165] in,
[0166] ΔIT = PRF-128\64 (EDP-I-Epoch-Key, “EDP”, IT0) mod (RandTR)
[0167] in,
[0168] PRF-Length-M / L is a pseudo-random function that generates a sequence of M random bits, from which only the leftmost L bits are extracted.
[0169] EDP-I-Epoch-Key is the key used to generate the start time;
[0170] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key derivation function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0171] IT0 is the value indicated in the start time field of the negotiated EDP epoch sequence parameter element; and
[0172] RandTR is the value indicated in the time range field of the negotiated EDP epoch sequence parameter element.
[0173] According to some embodiments, the EDP-I-Epoch-Key is a key derived from the KDK of the generated PTK, for example, as follows:
[0174] EDP-I-Epoch-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (KDK, “EDP Epoch Sequence”, BSSID)
[0175] in,
[0176] KDF-Hash-Length is a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) as defined in 12.7.1.6.2;
[0177] KDK is the KDK portion of the current PTK for the EDP non-AP STA specified in 12.14.8.3.4 (PTKSA export using EDPKE certification);
[0178] "EDP Epoch Sequence" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key-derived function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0179] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP STA.
[0180] Similarly, the start time IETn of the nth subsequent individual EDP epoch in the individual EDP epoch sequence can be calculated as follows:
[0181] IETn = IT + ΔIT
[0182] in,
[0183]
[0184] IT = IT0 + nx IEI
[0185] ΔIT = PRF-128\64 (EDP-I-Epoch-Key, “EDP Epoch Sequence”, IT) mod(RandTR)
[0186] in,
[0187] n corresponds to the current iteration of the sequence;
[0188] TSF is the local TSF counter value of EDP non-AP stations;
[0189] IET0 is the value indicated in the start time field of the negotiated EDP epoch sequence parameter element;
[0190] RandTR is the value indicated in the time range field of the negotiated EDP epoch sequence parameter element; and
[0191] IEI is the value indicated in the interval field of the negotiated EDP epoch sequence parameter element.
[0192] According to some embodiments, the EDP-I-Epoch-Key is a key derived from the KDK of the current PTK of the EDP non-AP STA as specified above:
[0193] EDP-I-Epoch-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (KDK, “EDP Epoch Sequence”, BSSID)
[0194] in,
[0195] KDF-Hash-Length is a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) as defined in 12.7.1.6.2;
[0196] KDK is the KDK portion of the current PTK for the EDP non-AP STA as specified in standard 802.11bi 12.14.8.3.4 (PTKSA export using EDPKE certification);
[0197] "EDP Epoch Sequence" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key-derived function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0198] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP STA.
[0199] Next, at step 320, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA compute new irrelevant values of the EDP parameters for individual privacy purposes in the EDP individual epoch from the shared function, wherein the shared function is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA using a shared private encryption key labeled EDP-I-Param-Key.
[0200] Depending on the EDP parameter under consideration, the new irrelevant value can be achieved by: resetting the EDP parameter itself (reset-based obfuscation), which is the transport (OTA) EDP parameter included in the exchanged 802.11 frame; or encoding the EDP parameter to generate an encoded EDP parameter (mask-based obfuscation), which is used as the new value of the corresponding transport (OTA) EDP parameter included in the exchanged 802.11 frame. The encoding operation can take the local current value of the EDP parameter under consideration and the encoding parameters shared by the encoder and decoder as input. The encoding operation can be simply masking, in which case the shared encoding parameters are a shared mask with the same binary length as the EDP parameter under consideration. Alternatives to masking (e.g., XOR) include binary addition or offset, both of which are based on the shared encoding parameters.
[0201] To perform these obfuscation operations, a shared function can be executed to generate a new reset value and a new mask (or more generally, new shared encoding parameter values). The shared function can be executed in parallel by both an EDP non-AP STA and an EDP AP STA using a shared encryption key to generate the same new reset value and new mask on both sides without exchanging them in plaintext.
[0202] According to some embodiments, the same and single execution of the shared function simultaneously generates one or more new reset values for one or more EDP parameters to be obfuscated (hereinafter referred to herein as reset-based EDP parameters), and one or more new masks (or more generally, encoded parameter values) for one or more EDP parameters to be obfuscated by encoding or masking (hereinafter referred to herein as mask-based EDP parameters).
[0203] According to some embodiments, the shared function is a pseudo-random function (PRF) as specified in section 12.7.1.2 of the standard IEEE Std 802.11-2020. Alternatively, any other PRF or block cipher algorithm that allows encryption of blocks with similar input parameters (a shared private encryption key and shared parameters having values that change over time) can be used. For ease of illustration, the following description focuses primarily on PRFs. However, similar considerations can be made for any block cipher algorithm.
[0204] Returning to step 320, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA calculate new, uncorrelated values of the EDP parameters for individual privacy purposes in the EDP individual epoch from the PRF, for example, as follows, wherein the PRF is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA using a shared private encryption key labeled EDP-I-Param-Key:
[0205] I_EDP_PARAM (n) = PRF-M / L (EDP-I-Param-Key, “EDP”, IT)
[0206] in,
[0207] I_EDP_PARAM(n) corresponds to the sum of the lengths of the individual EDP parameters for the nth EDP individual epoch. It is divided into predetermined blocks, each block corresponding to a new reset value for each reset-based EDP parameter or a new shared coding parameter value for each mask-based EDP parameter;
[0208] PRF-M / L is a pseudo-random function that generates a sequence of M random bits, from which only the leftmost L bits are extracted.
[0209] EDP-I-Param-Key is a shared private encryption key used in the process of generating new reset values for each reset-based EDP parameter or new shared encoded parameter values for each mask-based EDP parameter.
[0210] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key derivation function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0211] IT is the value calculated at step 310.
[0212] According to some embodiments, the EDP-I-Param-Key is a key derived from the KDK from which the PTK can be generated, as follows:
[0213] EDP-I-Param-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (KDK, "EDP", BSSID)
[0214] in,
[0215] KDF-Hash-Length is a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) as defined in 12.7.1.6.2;
[0216] KDK is the KDK portion of the current PTK for the EDP non-AP STA specified in 12.14.8.3.4 (PTKSA export using EDPKE certification);
[0217] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key derivation function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0218] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP STA.
[0219] Next, at step 330, both the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA calculate, for example, a new irrelevant value for the EDP parameter for group privacy purposes of the nth EDP individual from the PRF, wherein the PRF is executed in parallel by the EDP non-AP STA and the EDP AP STA using a shared private encryption key labeled EDP-G-Param-Key:
[0220] G_EDP_PARAM (n) = PRF-M / L (EDP-G-Param-Key, “Client ERCM”, IT)
[0221] in,
[0222] G_EDP_PARAM(n) corresponds to the sum of the lengths of the group-use EDP parameters for the nth EDP individual epoch. It is divided into predetermined blocks, each block corresponding to a new reset value for each reset-based EDP parameter or a new shared coding parameter value for each mask-based EDP parameter;
[0223] PRF-M / L is a pseudo-random function that generates a sequence of M random bits, from which only the leftmost L bits are extracted.
[0224] EDP-G-Param-Key is a shared private encryption key used in the process of generating new reset values for each reset-based EDP parameter or new shared encoded parameter values for each mask-based EDP parameter.
[0225] "Client ERCM" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key export function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0226] IT is the value calculated at step 310.
[0227] According to some implementations, the EDP-G-Param-Key is a key derived from GTK as follows:
[0228] EDP-G-Param-Key = KDF-Hash-256 (GTK, "EDP", BSSID)
[0229] in,
[0230] KDF-Hash-Length is a key derivation function (Key Derivation Function (KDF)) as defined in 12.7.1.6.2;
[0231] GTK is the current GTK for EDP AP STA;
[0232] "EDP" is a string that identifies the context used to execute the key derivation function; this is given only as an example and any other string can be used.
[0233] BSSID is the BSS identifier for EDP AP STA.
[0234] According to some embodiments, EDP-I-Epoch-Key is different from EDP-I-Param-Key.
[0235] According to other embodiments, the EDP-I-Epoch-Key is the same secret key as the EDP-I-Param-Key. In this case, for example, the parameter ΔIT in step 310 and the I_EDP_PARAM (n+1) related to the EDP parameters for individual privacy purposes in step 320 are generated simultaneously by initiating the same and single execution of the shared function, for example:
[0236] [A, B] = PRF-M' / L' (EDP-I-Param-Key, “Client ERCM”, IT),
[0237] in,
[0238] I_EDP_PARAM (n+1) = A, and
[0239] ΔIT = B mod (RandTR).
[0240] Figure 4 An example of an Information Element (IE) 400 containing group epoch parameters is shown. The Information Element (IE) 400 conforms to section 9.4.2 of the IEEE 802.11-2020 standard, and the element identifier and length fields 405 and 410, respectively, representing the IE, are fields defined in that standard specification.
[0241] The Group ID field 415 may contain an identifier. In one embodiment, this identifier may allow for future modifications to the group epoch sequence by sending a broadcast frame containing an IE with values for new parameters, for example, in a beacon frame, a probe response frame, an association response frame, or a group epoch indication frame. In another embodiment, the identifier may have a special value (e.g., 0) when the IE 400 is used to request the creation of a group by a non-APSTA. In yet another embodiment, a non-AP station uses the identifier 415 to request joining an existing group.
[0242] Strategy field 420 can provide some information about the group epoch sequence, such as the following:
[0243] - The group epoch sequence is optional for receiving non-AP stations, meaning that the AP establishes the group epoch sequence, but non-AP stations can decide to ignore it. In this case, non-AP stations should follow the group epoch sequence until they successfully negotiate an individual epoch sequence with an exclusive strategy;
[0244] - The group epoch sequence is mandatory for receiving non-AP stations, which means that non-AP stations should follow the group epoch sequence, but non-AP stations can also negotiate a non-exclusive individual epoch sequence with the AP;
[0245] - The group epoch sequence is exclusive to receiving non-AP stations, which means that non-AP stations must follow the group epoch sequence and cannot request individual epoch sequences;
[0246] - The group epoch sequence is global, meaning that all client privacy enhancement parameters (CPE parameters) on different links of MLD non-AP sites change simultaneously; and
[0247] - The group epoch sequence is local, which means that only the CPE parameters associated with the link used to receive frames are changed.
[0248] For the sake of illustration, field policy 420 can be encoded as a bitmap, with each bit indicating one of the different parameters of the policy (optional / mandatory, exclusive / non-exclusive, global / local).
[0249] The start time field 425 indicates the reference time T0 of the group epoch sequence.
[0250] The interval 430 indicates the group epoch interval (GEI) of the group epoch sequence.
[0251] The Duration field 435 indicates the duration of the group epoch sequence. For illustrative purposes, a special value for this field (e.g., the maximum value this field can take) can indicate that there is no time limit for the sequence. The duration can be indicated in the number of iterations, in multiples of the Time Unit (TU) value, beacon intervals, or in any other time indication unit. A special value for this field (e.g., 0) can indicate that the sender of the frame requests to leave the group. Alternatively or additionally, a special value for this field (e.g., 0) can indicate that the receiver of the frame must leave the group. This can be sent, for example, before canceling the group. Another special value (e.g., 1) can indicate a request for a change to the parameters (without establishing a sequence). In another embodiment, this field only supports special values, thereby reducing the required size of the field to, for example, 2 bits.
[0252] In the case of a multi-link device, LinkId 440 indicates the link identifier of the link used as a time reference for the expression of reference time T0.
[0253] The time range 445 indicates the selectable range of values for the randomly varying ΔT.
[0254] Figure 5 An example of a frame format that enables a non-AP station to change its AID to a new information element is shown. It can correspond to the information element (IE) specified in section 9.4.2 of the IEEE 802.11-2020 standard.
[0255] A dedicated IE can be designated for AID value modification procedures and is referred to as an AID IE, such as AID IE 500. As shown, an IE can be identified by an element ID (e.g., element ID 505). AID IE 500 also includes a length field marked 510, which indicates the number of octet bytes in IE 500 excluding the element ID field 505 and the length field 510.
[0256] AID IE 500 also includes an AID field 515 indicating the new value of the AID and an AID toggle counter field 520.
[0257] The AID switching counter field indicates the duration to wait before a valid change of the AID occurs. In some embodiments, this duration indicates the number of beacons (TBTTs) to wait for or the number of EDP epochs to wait for. Other embodiments are possible.
[0258] Figure 6An example of a communication device configured to implement at least some embodiments of the present disclosure is illustrated schematically. This communication device may correspond to reference [reference]. Figure 1 Any station described. The communication device designated 600 may preferably be a device such as a microcomputer, workstation, or portable device. Communication device 600 may include a communication bus 613, which may be connected to:
[0259] - The central processing unit 601, labeled as CPU, such as a processor, etc.;
[0260] - A memory 603, labeled MEM, is used to store executable code of a method or method step according to embodiments of the present disclosure, and registers suitable for recording variables and parameters required to implement the method; and
[0261] - At least two communication interfaces 602 and 602' are connected to a wireless communication network, such as a communication network according to one of the IEEE 802.11 standard families, via a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna 604 and 1004', respectively.
[0262] Preferably, the communication bus 613 can provide communication and interoperability between various elements included in or connected to the communication device 600. The representation of the bus is not limiting, and in particular, the central processing unit is operable to instruct any element of the communication device 600 to communicate directly or by means of another element of the communication device 600.
[0263] The executable code can be stored in memory, which can be a read-only hard disk or a removable digital medium (e.g., a disk). According to an alternative variation, the executable code of the program can be received via interface 602 or 602' through a communication network to be stored in memory 603 of communication device 600 before being executed.
[0264] According to some embodiments, the communication device 600 may be a programmable device that uses software to implement embodiments of the present disclosure. However, alternatively, some embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented wholly or partially in hardware (e.g., in the form of an application-specific integrated circuit or ASIC).
[0265] The embodiments disclosed herein (one or more) can also be implemented by a computer that reads and executes computer-executable instructions (e.g., one or more programs) recorded on a storage medium (which may also be more fully referred to as a "non-transitory computer-readable storage medium") to perform the functions of one or more of the above embodiments and / or includes one or more circuits (e.g., application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs)) for performing the functions of one or more of the above embodiments, and by a method performed by a computer of the system or device, for example, reading and executing computer-executable instructions from a storage medium to perform the functions of one or more of the above embodiments and / or controlling one or more circuits to perform the functions of one or more of the above embodiments. The computer may include one or more processors (e.g., a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor unit (MPU)) and may include a network of separate computers or separate processors for reading and executing the computer-executable instructions. The computer-executable instructions may be provided to the computer, for example, from a network or a storage medium. Storage media may include one or more of the following: hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), storage device for distributed computing systems, optical discs (such as compact discs (CDs), digital multifunction discs (DVDs), etc.), flash memory devices, and memory cards.
[0266] When interpreting the specification and its related claims, expressions such as “comprising,” “containing,” “incorporating,” “including,” “is,” and “having” shall be interpreted in a non-exclusive manner, meaning that they are understood to allow for the presence of other items or components not explicitly defined. References to the singular shall also be interpreted as references to the plural, and vice versa.
[0267] Those skilled in the art will readily understand that the various parameters disclosed in the specification can be modified and the various embodiments disclosed can be combined without departing from the scope of this disclosure.
Claims
1. A method for improving communication privacy, comprising: At the site of the basic site set, i.e., the BSS site, Obtain a secret key shared with at least another station of the BSS; The obtained shared secret key and a pseudo-random function shared by at least one other station are used to generate an enhanced data privacy key, i.e., an EDP key. Modify at least one privacy parameter based on the EDP key.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, The EDP key is generated using the obtained shared secret key, the identifier of the BSS, and the pseudo-random function.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein, The value of at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the EDP key.
4. The method according to claim 3, wherein, The value of at least one privacy parameter is unique for both the station and the other station.
5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein, The obtained secret key is the first secret key, the generated EDP key is the first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is the first pseudo-random function. The method further includes: Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station; A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and The value of another privacy parameter, which differs from the at least one privacy parameter, is modified based on the second EDP key. The value of the other privacy parameter is common to several stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the stated station and the other station.
6. The method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein, The obtained secret key is the first secret key, the generated EDP key is the first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is the first pseudo-random function. The method further includes: Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station; A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and The start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter is determined based on the second EDP key.
7. The method according to claim 6, wherein, The start time is common to several stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the station and the other station.
8. The method according to claim 6, wherein, The start time is unique for both the station and the other station.
9. The method according to claim 5, further comprising: Obtain a third secret key shared with at least one other station; A third EDP key is generated using the shared third secret key and a third pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and The start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter and the other privacy parameter is determined based on the third EDP key.
10. The method of claim 5, further comprising: The start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter and the other privacy parameter is determined based on the second EDP key.
11. The method according to claim 9 or claim 10, which is dependent on claim 9, wherein, The start time is common to all stations in the BSS's station set.
12. The method according to claim 1 or 2, further comprising: The start time for modifying the at least one privacy parameter is determined based on the EDP key.
13. The method according to claim 12, wherein, The value of at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the EDP key.
14. The method according to claim 13, wherein, The obtained secret key is the first secret key, the generated EDP key is the first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is the first pseudo-random function. The method further includes: Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station; A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and The value of another privacy parameter, which differs from the at least one privacy parameter, is modified based on the second EDP key. The value of the other privacy parameter is common to all stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the stated station and the other station. The value of the at least one privacy parameter is unique to both the stated station and the other station.
15. The method according to claim 12, wherein, The obtained secret key is the first secret key, the generated EDP key is the first EDP key, and the pseudo-random function is the first pseudo-random function. The method further includes: Obtain a second secret key shared with at least one other station; A second EDP key is generated using the shared second secret key and a second pseudo-random function shared by the at least one other station, and The value of at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the second EDP key. The value of the at least one privacy parameter is modified based on the second EDP key.
16. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 15, wherein, The start time is common to several stations in the BSS's station set, which includes the station and the other station.
17. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 15, wherein, The start time is unique for both the station and the other station.
18. A method for improving communication privacy, comprising: At the access point (AP) station of the basic station set, i.e., the BSS, Send a group offset value to a group of non-AP stations so that the non-AP stations can use the group offset value to modify the corresponding privacy parameters; as well as An update value is sent to one or more subgroups of non-AP stations in the group, so that the subgroups of non-AP stations can use the update value to modify the corresponding privacy parameters of the non-AP stations in the subgroup.
19. A method for improving communication privacy, comprising: At the non-access point (AP) sites of the basic site set, i.e., the BSS. Receive update values from AP stations, the update values being specific to a subgroup of non-AP stations that includes one or more of the non-AP stations; The start time for modifying privacy parameters is determined based on the Enhanced Data Privacy (EDP) key. as well as Use the updated value to modify the privacy parameter.
20. The method according to claim 19, wherein, The updated value corresponds to a specific value of the privacy parameter.
21. The method according to claim 19, wherein, The updated value corresponds to the specific offset value to be applied to the non-AP stations in the subgroup.
22. The method according to any one of claims 19 to 21, wherein, The EDP key is generated using a secret key and a pseudo-random function, which are shared between the non-AP station and the AP station.
23. The method according to any one of claims 18 to 22, wherein, The privacy parameter is the association identifier, or AID.
24. A computer program product for a programmable device, the computer program product comprising a sequence of instructions configured to implement, when loaded into and executed by the programmable device, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 23.
25. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions for a computer program that implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 23.
26. A communication apparatus comprising a processing unit configured to perform the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 23.
