Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs

Abstract

A robot-assisted security cell for ATMs is characterized by the fact that the ATM, including its operating area, is sealed off from the outside world by boundary walls. Within these walls, a robot operates the ATM. The security cell provides preventative protection against a wide range of attacks, is standardized, and compatible. It can be installed on new ATMs. Retrofitting existing ATMs is also straightforward and requires no specialized knowledge.

Description

[0001] The invention relates to a robot-assisted security cell for ATMs ( Fig. 1) It consists of a preferably transparent enclosure that completely and securely surrounds the operator side of the ATM. This security concept significantly reduces the likelihood of an illegal attack on the ATM.

[0002] In Germany alone, there are approximately 50,000 ATMs located in various places, with different designs and security standards. ATMs are targeted by criminals in a variety of ways. In 2023, there were more than 450 attempted and successful bombings. These illegal attacks are of particular concern, as these brutal acts can endanger people's lives. Furthermore, fraudulent manipulation of ATMs, both inside and outside the machine, as well as manipulation of machine processes, is also a known issue.

[0003] Experts distinguish between direct and indirect attacks on ATMs. Direct attacks include: ▪ Blowing up the ATM to gain direct access to the cash cassettes. ▪ Attacks using thermal and mechanical tools to gain direct access to the cash boxes. ▪ Total theft of the ATM in order to later gain access to the cash cassettes in a low-risk environment.

[0004] Indirect attacks primarily target the manipulation of the machines or their environment. These include, among other things: ▪ Skimming, i.e., reading account data from the magnetic stripe while simultaneously fraudulently obtaining the associated PIN. ▪ Cash trapping, or the physical interception of cash during withdrawal transactions. ▪ Eavesdropping, i.e., eavesdropping on map data during transmission. ▪ Shimming - attacks on the chip interface of the bank card. ▪ Reversal fraud, i.e., aborting transactions in order to repeat them. ▪ Jackpotting or the manipulation of the hardware and software of the ATM to provoke unauthorized payouts or even the total emptying of the machine.

[0005] Explosions, in particular, usually lead to the complete destruction of the ATM, resulting in damages of approximately €30,000. Collateral damage to buildings and equipment quickly reaches six figures in euros in each incident. The total annual economic damage is difficult to quantify. However, considering all the aforementioned ATM-related crimes, a figure in the billions of euros is more than likely.

[0006] Banks and insurance companies have formulated specific security measures for ATMs. However, implementing these sustainably and comprehensively remains difficult. There are three main reasons for this: ▪ The ATMs in use in Germany vary in age and meet different security standards, e.g. in their resistance to explosions. ▪ The installation locations include bank branches as well as third-party locations in public buildings or in containers and pavilions; sometimes wall-mounted or freestanding. ▪ The designs differ significantly. For cash refills, a distinction must be made between front-loading and rear-loading machines, which, due to their design, are already significantly more vulnerable to attacks.

[0007] In summary, it can be stated that the widely varying histories, designs and locations of ATMs make the standardized introduction of a sustainable crime prevention measure difficult.

[0008] The state of the art describes methods and devices that are useful for securing ATMs.

[0009] [DE 10 2019 125 601 A1] discloses a method for securing valuables within a safe, in particular an ATM, against gas attacks. A reservoir filled with a foamable plastic is kept ready. Upon receipt of a trigger signal, the foamable plastic is introduced from the reservoir into the interior of the safe and displaces any gas that may be present. The resulting foam bonds both the items inside the safe and the components of the safe together.

[0010] [DE 10 2018 009 303 A1] describes a method for protecting banknotes and coins in ATMs, in which the means of payment are destroyed upon mechanical impact on the ATM. The destruction is preferably effected by an acid. This acid is arranged in a shatterproof glass container above the banknotes and coins located in a cash cassette.

[0011] [DE 20 2022 000 103 U1] secures the ATM with internal protective devices. A potential gas attack is detected by a gas detector. An actuator then starts a pipe fan, through which the introduced gas mixture is vented to the outside via an installed pipe. In addition, explosion vents are installed on the ATM, which, equipped with predetermined breaking points, shear off in the event of an explosion. This ensures the rapid release of the explosion pressure and thus prevents major damage to the ATM.

[0012] [DE 20 2023 103 213 U1] (57) describes a device for preventing major damage during the illegal explosion of ATMs. It is characterized by the fact that a combination of contact detectors, motion detectors and / or gas detectors is installed in the ATM. During the illegal preparation of an ATM explosion, a controlled explosion is triggered early, before the amount of gas sufficient for an explosion that would destroy the ATM is reached.

[0013] [DE 10 2019 125 601 A1], [DE 10 2018 009 303 A1] and [DE 20 2023 103 213 U1] initiate destructive measures in the event of an attack on the ATM. In addition to the risk to life and limb, significant damage is also likely to be caused. Furthermore, the question of the proposed sensors' ability to correctly detect an attack remains open. Therefore, there is a high risk of the ATM being triggered and destroyed, and of significant endangerment to people, based on a false alarm. [DE 20 2022 000 103 U1] also reacts, but does not use destructive measures. The proposed extraction device and the proposed explosive flaps require modifications to the ATM itself. Furthermore, the question remains whether the proposed sensors will reliably trigger in the event of an attack.

[0014] All previously cited disclosures describe reactive measures initiated during an illegal attack. Furthermore, all previously cited disclosures address the potential for blowing up an ATM. The aforementioned further details of direct and indirect attacks are largely not addressed. Moreover, the proposed measures require intervention in the ATM's system. This is not standardizable due to the varying designs of ATMs. Additionally, intervention in the ATM's system will necessitate changes to the hardware and software, as well as the subsequent approval processes. Finally, the proposed solutions are absolutely unfeasible if the risk to individuals cannot be reliably ruled out.

[0015] In addition to the methods and devices for securing ATMs shown above, the state of the art also describes the use of robots inside ATMs.

[0016] [US 7,438,222 B2] describes an automated ATM system with a centrally controlled robotic arm that can serve multiple customer stations simultaneously, perform a variety of transactions, and be flexibly expanded or maintained. The current state of the art in automated ATMs is characterized by limited functionality, restricted expandability, and the fact that they can generally only be operated by one user at a time. Expanding functionality typically requires the use of multiple devices, resulting in high redundancy, large space requirements, and high costs.

[0017] The object of the invention in [US 7,438,222 B2] is therefore to provide an automated ATM system that is compact, efficient, flexibly expandable, and capable of serving multiple customers simultaneously. Furthermore, the system should enable the exchange of items with a remote service provider and be easy to maintain.

[0018] The solution lies in a modular ATM system with a common housing that incorporates multiple customer stations. Inside the housing is a centrally controlled robotic arm capable of moving transaction items such as cash, receipts, or documents between the transaction functions and the customer stations. The transaction functions, e.g., printers, cash dispensers, cash acceptors, scanners, or pneumatic tube systems, are compactly arranged within the housing and can be flexibly added or replaced via standardized interfaces. The system is controlled by one or more computers that manage all transactions, optimize their processing, and enable the parallel operation of multiple stations. The preferred embodiment includes at least one robotic arm with at least three axes of movement and grippers that grasp and position items and pass them on to customers via pass-through mechanisms.This also enables communication with remote service providers via video or audio connections or means of transport such as pneumatic tube systems.

[0019] This architecture allows the machine to efficiently execute more versatile and parallelized transactions in a compact system, thus representing a significant improvement over conventional automated ATMs.

[0020] [WO 2016 / 137354 A1] describes a modular, robot-assisted banking system that uses autonomous robots to automatically perform a variety of banking and service functions without personnel in a protected, mobile unit. Despite increasing digitalization, the state of the art described here shows that cash circulation remains high in many regions. Conventional ATMs or terminals are mostly stationary, limited to a few functions such as cash withdrawal or deposit, and can only serve individual customers sequentially. The effort required for transporting, counting, and authenticating cash is high, inefficient, and poses a security risk. Flexible, rapidly deployable systems for automated banking services that can serve multiple customers simultaneously are not yet available.

[0021] The object of the invention in [WO 2016 / 137354 A1] is therefore to provide an autonomous, multifunctional, mobile, and quickly deployable device that performs banking services efficiently, securely, and without personnel in high-traffic areas (e.g., train stations, shopping centers). Processes such as cash acceptance, cash dispensing, cash counting, authentication, document printing, service requests, and even postal and vending services are to be automated. Cash deposited by customers is to be counted and verified in the device and immediately made available for dispensing. This avoids lengthy processes and distances associated with collecting and centrally counting cash at a bank branch.

[0022] The described solution comprises a robot-assisted banking system with an tamper-proof housing, multiple customer windows with transfer windows, and at least one integrated robot with a gripper. Inside are modules for receiving, dispensing, counting, and authenticating banknotes, printing receipts, and processing data. All components are interconnected via a central control unit. The gripper moves between the modules and the customer windows, repeatedly performing banknote operations according to control commands. In the preferred embodiment, the device has a modular design: individual, interconnectable cells form the housing. Each cell can contain workstations, robot arms, storage compartments (e.g., for gold bars, documents), and interfaces for customer interaction.The robotic arms interact with each other, move between workstations and transfer points, and efficiently perform the services. The system is mobile, has autonomous power supply, security cameras, and offers a wide range of service functions – from banking transactions to selling lottery tickets.

[0023] [US 7,438,222 B2] and [WO 2016 / 137354 A1] describe the use of robots within ATMs. In both publications, these robots are used to expand and increase the flexibility of the services provided by the ATM. However, neither publication describes the complete hermetic sealing of an ATM, including its user interface, from the outside world. Therefore, neither publication provides any indication of a preventive security measure against physical and electronic attacks on ATMs.

[0024] The described situation gives rise to the objects of the invention. The main object is to provide a preventive and human-safe protection for ATMs that wards off or prevents the vast majority of the aforementioned direct and indirect attacks. A secondary object of the invention is to create a largely standardized solution that requires no intervention in the ATM's system and is applicable to all known designs and installation locations.

[0025] The problems of the invention are solved by the features of claim 1. Preferred embodiments are described by the further claims. For better explanation of the invention, features are illustrated in the figures.

[0026] They show: Fig. 1: Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in a schematic 2D view. Fig. 2: Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in closed state (3D view). Fig. 3: Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs with missing side wall (right hand from the operator's side). Fig. 4: Implementation of the robot-assisted security cell with the ATM in the front section. Fig. 5: Implementation of the robot-assisted security cell with the ATM in niche installation. Fig. 6: Implementation of the robot-assisted security cell with the ATM in a "through-the-wall" installation. Fig. 7: Design of the robot-assisted safety cell with the smallest possible depth dimension L4 and optional door hinges.

[0027] In a preferred embodiment, the robot-assisted safety cell is positively connected to the wall (111) in a way that allows for detachment. Furthermore, sealing elements ensure a hermetic seal between the cell elements (106-109) and the wall and floor. Contact sensors in the joints between the wall and floor trigger an alarm if the width of the joint changes, i.e., if the safety cell is to be forcibly removed.

[0028] Key elements of the robot-assisted security cell are the robot (102), a container with a tabletop (103), the secured drawer interface (104), and the customer control unit (105). Furthermore, the security elements (106-109), together with the wall (111) and floor (110), form a hermetically sealed cell around the ATM (101), the robot (102), and the container with the tabletop (103). The only interface for the transfer of bank cards and cash is the drawer interface (104). Its specially designed function prevents unauthorized access to the interior of the security cell.

[0029] Within the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs, a programmable, multi-axis drive, preferably a robot (102), is arranged. On the operator side of the security cell (107), a numeric keypad and a screen are arranged in combination (105). The screen is preferably equipped with a touchscreen.

[0030] The keypad and touchscreen on the user side of the security booth offer the same functions as the keypad and touchscreen on the ATM itself. Bank customers will therefore find the same familiar functions on the user side of the security booth. This is primarily to avoid compatibility issues during use.

[0031] The bank cards are handed over by the customers to the security cell at the secure drawer interface (104), gripped by the robot (102), and inserted into the ATM. The PIN code is then entered via the keypad (105) located on the operator side of the security cell. The PIN code is transmitted to the robot inside the security cell and entered by its gripper at the ATM itself. The process is the same for other desired functions. For example, the customer enters the desired amount of money on the touchscreen of the security cell, which is then transmitted to the robot. The robot then transmits this information to the ATM in the usual way.

[0032] After completing the banking transaction, the robotic gripper removes the bank card and the cash. Both are returned to the secure drawer interface (104) and can be retrieved by the customer.

[0033] The robot in the enclosed security cell takes over the operating tasks that customers would otherwise perform directly at the ATM. Customers and other individuals thus avoid physical contact with the ATM, significantly contributing to its protection against illegal attacks. The protective function is enhanced when the boundary walls (106-109) are made of transparent safety glass (USG, ESH). This allows irregularities and foreign objects inside to be easily detected visually. Overall, the described arrangement of the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs acts preventively against attacks. ▪ Blasting ▪ Attack with thermal tools ▪ Attack with mechanical tools ▪ Total theft of the ATM ▪ Cash trapping ▪ Jackpotting and in extended embodiments against the attacks: ▪ Skimming

[0034] In a further preferred embodiment, the boundary walls (106 - 109) are provided with a special coating, a so-called skimming blocker. ▪ Eavesdropping

[0035] In a further preferred embodiment, the boundary walls (106 - 109) are provided with a special coating, a so-called skimming blocker. ▪ Reversal Fraud

[0036] In a further preferred embodiment, the robot is programmed to cease functioning after an unusual and unexpected command routine.

[0037] Fig. Figure 2 shows the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in its closed state. Sealing elements are inserted into the joints to the floor (202) and the wall (201) for hermetic sealing. Preferably, positive-locking fastening elements (203) are integrated into the joint to the wall. Sensors are also integrated to detect changes in the dimensions of the joints and subsequently trigger an alarm.

[0038] In Fig. 3. The right-hand side boundary wall is eliminated, so that the interior becomes visible.

[0039] Fig. 4 shows a relative to Fig. 3. Rotated view with an even clearer view of the interior. The ATM (101) shows a large extension into the depth (L1), which indicates a projection in front of the closed wall.

[0040] Fig. Figure 5 shows a version of the ATM (101a) installed in a niche. The depth of the ATM in front of the wall is less than in the configuration in Fig. 4, so that the entire cell can be listed at a smaller depth (L2).

[0041] Fig. Figure 6 shows a "through-the-wall installation". The ATM has no depth extension in front of the wall, so that the entire unit is compact and has very small dimensions orthogonal to the wall (L3).

[0042] Fig. Figures 4 to 6 illustrate that the described robot-assisted security cell is compatible with all installation situations and designs of ATMs. The functions remain the same. Only the dimensions of the boundary walls differ. Robots or CNC drives with different reach may also be used. The proposed solution can be implemented without specialized knowledge of ATM technology, primarily because neither hardware nor software modifications to the ATM are required.

[0043] In another embodiment, the robot-assisted safety cell is located in the floor area (202, Fig. 2) equipped with a base plate that is also mounted on wheels. Furthermore, a rechargeable battery is integrated into the container with the tabletop (103). In this way, the security cell can be operated flexibly and independently. For example, in a bank, the ATM can be operated without the security cell during business hours. After business hours, i.e., shortly before closing time, the security cell is wheeled into position and hermetically seals the ATM overnight. The ATM's functions remain unaffected.

[0044] In another embodiment, a security door or security flap is integrated into a boundary wall. This access is particularly necessary when the ATMs in question are so-called "front-loading" machines and are filled with cash on the operator side.

[0045] In another embodiment, the safety cell is equipped with two robots. The redundant function increases the reliability of the system.

[0046] In the last embodiment described here, the robot-assisted safety cell is built as small and compact as possible. Fig. Figures 4 to 6 already show how the depth of the security cell decreases perpendicular to the wall depending on the installation method of the ATM. The smallest depth is achieved with the so-called "through-the-wall installation" in Fig. 6 achieved (L1 > L2 > L3). If the dimensions of the elements contained in the safety cell, essentially the robot (102), the container with tabletop (103) and the secured drawer interface (104), are minimized, a safety cell with a significantly smaller depth dimension (L4, Fig.7) can be designed. The very compact design then allows the installation of hinges (701). These enable the security cell to take on the shape and dimensions of a security door.

[0047] The described embodiments are exemplary and describe the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in detail, but not exhaustively. Further combinations of individual functions are conceivable, but do not alter the fundamental concept of the invention.

Claims

[1] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs characterized by , that an ATM, including its operating area, is sealed off from the outside world by boundary walls, and that inside the boundary walls next to the ATM there is a robot that operates the ATM. [2] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the robot's design is an articulated arm device. [3] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the embodiment of the robot is a Cartesian device. [4] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the security cell has hinges and can be opened like a door. [5] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized bythat the cell has a self-sufficient power supply and can be operated independently of the power grid. [6] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the boundary walls are made of safety glass. [7] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the boundary walls are coated with a skimming blocker. [8] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the security cell was retrofitted to an existing ATM. [9] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the security cell is already integrated upon delivery and is therefore part of the original equipment of the ATM. [10] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized by that the security cell is on wheels.

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