Programming language for the safety-verified control of physical systems ("NAVA")
NAVA addresses the lack of integrated security verification in existing languages by ensuring compile-time safety checks, preventing errors through physical types and safety contracts, and generating a safety report, enhancing system reliability.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Utility models
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-11-06
- Publication Date
- 2026-03-05
AI Technical Summary
Existing programming languages lack integrated security verification at the voice level, leading to potential hazards due to faulty physical parameters or incomplete safety checks in systems like drones, robots, and vehicles.
NAVA is a novel programming language that ensures physical, semantic, and organizational security by integrating safety verification during compilation, using physical types, safety contracts, and generating a compile-time safety report, with a mission-oriented syntax and contract-driven compilation.
Prevents incorrect behavior in real systems by automatically detecting impermissible operations and generating a structured safety report, ensuring transparent and testable software creation.
Abstract
Description
1. Technical field
[0001] The invention relates to the field of software development, in particular programming languages for controlling physical systems such as drones, robots, machines or vehicles.
[0002] NAVA is a novel, security-oriented programming language that integrates physical, semantic, and organizational security mechanisms at the language level. 2. State of the art
[0003] While well-known programming languages such as C++, Python, or Rust allow for precise control of technical systems, they do not include integrated security verification at the language level.
[0004] Security checks are currently mostly carried out through external tests or manual validations.
[0005] Faulty physical parameters, incomplete safety checks, or inconsistent units can cause real dangers or damage in such systems.
[0006] A language that enforces technical security as an integral part of its grammar is not known to exist. 3. Object of the invention
[0007] The object of the invention is to create a programming language that integratively guarantees physical, semantic, and organizational safety. The system should ensure, even during compilation, that all safety-relevant conditions are met, documented, and verifiable in order to prevent malfunctions in real-world systems. 4. Solution to the task
[0008] The invention solves this problem through a novel language architecture with the following main features: - Physical types: Variables contain physical units (e.g., meter, second, newton). The compiler automatically detects invalid operations. - Safety Contracts: Every instruction contains a mandatory safety condition ("ensure"). Without this condition, the code will not be compiled. - Compile-Time Safety Report: After each compilation process, a structured safety report is generated that documents commands, conditions, and risks. - Mission-Oriented Syntax: The code describes real mission sequences instead of abstract functions, enabling clear communication between humans and machines. - Hardware neutrality: The language describes what should be done, not how - this allows the same code to be applied to different devices. - Contract-Driven Compilation: The compiler only translates code that is secured by defined security contracts. 5. Description of the embodiment
[0009] The NAVA compiler is an integral part of the invention and ensures a safety-oriented translation of the mission logic.
[0010] For the initial implementation, existing infrastructure can only serve as a technical environment.
[0011] The core logic, security architecture, and semantic processing are original components of NAVA and form the basis for further extensions.
[0012] The compilation process includes the following steps: 1. Mission syntax parsing, 2. Review of all Safety Contracts, 3. Validation of physical types and units, 4. Generation of a safety and audit report, 5. Generation of a binary code with a digital signature.
[0013] Each compilation process generates traceable documentation that records both technical and security-related decisions. 6. Advantages of the invention - Avoiding physical and logical errors even before execution, - Automatic generation of safety certificates for operators and authorities, - A unified language for documentation, simulation, and real-world control, - Transparent, verifiable and audit-proof software development. 7. Summary
[0014] NAVA represents a new class of programming languages: a security-verified mission language that enforces technical accountability, understands physical reality, and builds trust between humans and machines.
[0015] The language is modular and can be gradually expanded to include additional security and planning functions.
[0016] The principles presented in this description can be used as a standalone programming language. as well as being implemented as an extension of existing compiler technologies.
Claims
[1] Programming language for the safety-verified control of physical systems, characterized by : a) a syntax with physical types (e.g. meter, second, newton, volt), b) an integrated translation and security architecture with mandatory safety contracts, c) a structural design for the automatic generation of security-relevant information, d) a mission-oriented program structure, e) and a hardware-independent implementation description. [2] Programming language according to claim 1, characterized by that every verbal command is linked to at least one associated safety condition. [3] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by , that physical types contain units whose invalid combinations within the language structure are automatically detected. [4] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the language architecture has an internal security representation which maps security-relevant conditions and their fulfillment status. [5] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by , that the translation architecture is designed in such a way that an executable binary representation is only provided if security contracts are fulfilled. [6] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the architecture is modular and allows for extensions for security-relevant speech and analysis functions. [7] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that it has a translation architecture which integrates and processes mission-oriented structures, security agreements, and physical types. [8] Programming language according to claim 7, characterized bythat the translation architecture generates an audit and documentation representation that maps security-relevant properties of the program description. [9] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the generated execution representation is bound to defined security and device conditions. [10] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that it has an independent semantic layer between logical description and physical execution, which internally transports safety-relevant information. [11] Programming language according to one of the preceding claims, characterized by that the language architecture models physical execution assumptions and integrates these into the internal security assessment.