METHOD FOR ANONYMITY AUTHENTICATION AND MESSAGE EXCHANGE IN A CLOUD
Patent Information
- Application Number
- DE602021022584
- Authority / Receiving Office
- DE · DE
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-11-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-27
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-11-29
AI Technical Summary
Existing authentication and message exchange protocols in cloud environments fail to adequately protect user privacy, as they often reveal identification information, compromising security and anonymity.
A method employing a ring signature and passive key exchange to establish a secure communication channel, using a client device to compute a session key based on a public server key and hash values from neighboring devices, ensuring encryption and anonymity without disclosing party IDs or other identifying information.
This approach provides enhanced security and privacy protection by maintaining anonymity during authentication and message exchange, ensuring confidentiality and integrity while avoiding the disclosure of identification information, thus improving compatibility and integration environments.
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The disclosure relates to authentication and accesses, more particularly, the disclosure relates to methods and devices for anonymity authentication and message exchange in a cloud with improved security and privacy protection. The disclosure relates to a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server. The disclosure is also related to a method of receiving the encrypted message from the client device by the server. The disclosure is also related to a client device and to a server. Further, the disclosure is related to computer programs to perform the aforementioned methods.BACKGROUND
[0002] Anonymity authentication is a process of confirming a right to access one or more data or to perform one or more services. Normally, an authentication requires user credentials such as a username and a password, where the anonymity authentication confirms rights to access the one or more data or to perform the one or more services without exposing their actual identity of the user. The anonymity of communication parties needs to remain hidden in a successful protocol for privacy protection requirements of authentication and message exchange scenarios. Further, the protocol has to protect user privacy including access to sensitive web-service, an investment web-service, personal financial information uploaded to a cloud server, a device's location information uploaded to the cloud server.
[0003] FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram that illustrates authentication of one or more parties 104A-N according to the prior art. The block diagram includes a cloud 102 and the one or more parties 104A-N that are communicatively connected to the cloud 102. Each of the one or more parties 104A-N includes a secret key and a public key. The one or more parties 104A-N enables a secure channel establishment process with any of a Transport Layer Security, TLS, an Internet Protocol Security, IPSec, an Authenticated Key Exchange, AKE, or an Advanced Configurable Crypto Environment, ACCE, protocol, that enables sending of information with identification information, the public key and the secret key, associated with the one or more parties 104A-N. Even with the secure channel establishment between the one or more parties 104A-N and the cloud 102, there is a chance of leakage of privacy of one or more parties 104A-N, which sending and receiving the information. As the identification information is also sent with the information, attackers may get the message along with the identification information.
[0004] Currently, there are several known solutions are available, including the AKE, ACCE protocols, TLS, and IPSec, that provide the authentication, integrity, and confidentiality for exchanging messages, but those solutions expose the identification information (i.e. an identity of the user). The cloud 102 may obtain the user's privacy behavior based on the user's identity information and data, resulting in revealing the user's privacy. Another existing solution is a Broadcast Encryption based solution, that enables a sender to encrypt the message directly with all group members public keys and sends ciphertexts to all group members. Only a receiver with a matching private key can decrypt the message, while other receivers fail to decrypt the ciphertexts. The existing solutions disclose the identification information of the one or more parties 104A-N to the attackers, that are in communication. The solutions like TLS 1.3, a Quick UDP Internet Connection, QUIC, IPsec Internet Key Exchange, IKE and Secure Shell, SSH protects the messages in the protocol including identity-related data such as identities, public keys, or digital signatures, that may also reveal the user's privacy. The document LIN X ET AL: "ASRPAKE: An Anonymous Secure Routing Protocol with Authenticated Key Exchange for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks", PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2007 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC 2007), 24-28 JUNE 2007, GLASGOW, UK, IEEE, PISCATAWAY, NJ, USA, 1 June 2007 (2007-06-01), pages 1247-1253, XPO31125844, ISBN: 978-1-4244-0353-0, describes an anonymous secure routing protocol (ASRPAKE) for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) focused on maintaining security and anonymity through authenticated key exchange mechanisms embedded within the routing algorithm. The document BUTTNER CARSTEN ET AL: "A novel anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol for vehicular ad hoc networks", 2015 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY AND PRIVACY (ICISSP), SCITEPRESS, 9 February 2015 (2015-02-09), pages 259-269, XP032923714, describes a novel anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol designed for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), leveraging the combination of Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with ring signatures.
[0005] Therefore, the present invention aims to improve the security and privacy protection of existing systems or technologies in anonymity authentication and message exchange.SUMMARY
[0006] It is an object of the disclosure to provide a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server, and a method of receiving the encrypted message from the client device by the server with improved security on anonymity authentication and message exchange, and privacy protection while avoiding one or more disadvantages of prior art approaches. A client device, a server, and a computer program are also provided.
[0007] This object is achieved by the features of the independent claims. Further implementations are apparent from the dependent claims, the description, and the figures. In the following, parts of the description and drawings referring to embodiments which are not covered by the claims are not presented as embodiments of the invention, but as examples useful for understanding the invention.
[0008] The disclosure provides a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server and a method of receiving the encrypted message from the client device by the server. According to a first aspect, there is provided a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server. The method includes selecting a subgroup of neighbouring devices by the client device. The method includes computing, by the client device, a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device, a hash value generated by the client device, and a public key of each neighbouring device. The method includes calculating a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value by the client device. The method includes encrypting a message using the session key and sending the encrypted message to the server with the generated hash value and the ring signature.
[0009] This method uses a passive key exchange and the ring signature that builds a privacy-preserving authenticated key agreement solution during this entire process. The method enables the one or more parties including the client device to establish a secure communication channel for secure message exchange, thereby providing anonymity authentication and secure message exchange for communication partners. The method provides secure communication with message authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. The method provides privacy protection and does not disclose any identification information of the one or more parties that are in communication, e.g. party ID, Domain Name, and the like. The method improves security on anonymity authentication and message exchange. The method provides better compatibility and a friendly integration environment.
[0010] The one or more parties may add the identification information and a public key for any type of message, and send it to any client device in the one or more parties through the server, thereby providing a privacy-preserving authentication and secure data exchange. The method shows the message as an anonymous ID and the public key belonging to the one or more parties. The method does not involve any trusted third party in the one or more parties. The method does not require any knowledge, consent, or assistance of other parties to build a subgroup. The method does not include any pre-defined group, a manager, a group public key, a setup for registration or revocation procedures.
[0011] The method includes security properties of an authentication for the client device and the server, a secure channel establishment, data upload or data download confidentiality and integrity, and anonymity of the client device. The method provides high performance in securing the channel establishment in the client device and the server.
[0012] Optionally, the client device and each neighbouring device receive the public key from the server.
[0013] Optionally, the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
[0014] Optionally, the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and the public key of each neighbouring device.
[0015] Optionally, the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
[0016] Optionally, the method includes encrypting the message includes using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
[0017] According to a second aspect, there is provided a method of receiving an encrypted message from a client device by a server. The method includes receiving, by the server, an encrypted message from a client device, the encrypted message including a hash value generated by the client device and a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and a public key of each neighbouring device in a subgroup of neighbouring devices selected by the client device. The method includes verifying, by the server, the ring signature using the public key of each neighbouring device in the subgroup. The method includes calculating, by the server, a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash key value received from the client device.
[0018] This method uses a passive key exchange and the ring signature that builds a privacy-preserving authenticated key agreement solution during this entire process. The method enables the one or more parties including the client device to establish a secure communication channel for secure message exchange, thereby providing anonymity authentication and secure message exchange for communication partners. The method provides secure communication with message authentication, integrity and confidentiality. The method provides privacy protection and does not disclose any identification information of the one or more parties that are in communication, e.g. party ID, Domain Name, and the like. The method improves security on anonymity authentication and message exchange. The method provides better compatibility and a friendly integration environment.
[0019] The one or more parties may add the identification information and a public key for any type of message, and send it to any client device in the one or more parties through the server, thereby providing a privacy preserving authentication and secure data exchange. The method shows the message as an anonymous ID and the public key belonging to the one or more parties. The method does not involve any trusted third party in the one or more parties. The method does not require any knowledge, consent, or assistance of other parties to build a subgroup. The method does not include any pre-defined group, a manager, a group public key, a setup for registration or revocation procedures.
[0020] The method includes security properties of an authentication for the client device and the server, a secure channel establishment, data upload or data download confidentiality and integrity, an anonymity of the client device. The method provides high performance in securing the channel establishment in the client device and the server.
[0021] Optionally, the public key of the client device and each neighbouring device are sent by the server.
[0022] Optionally, the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
[0023] Optionally, the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and the public key of each neighbouring device.
[0024] Optionally, the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
[0025] Optionally, the method includes encrypting the message includes using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
[0026] According to a third aspect, there is provided a client device. The client device is configured to: select a subgroup of neighbouring devices; compute a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device, a hash value generated by the client device, and a public key of each neighbouring device; calculate a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value; and encrypt a message using the session key and send the encrypted message to the server with the generated hash value and the ring signature.
[0027] According to a fourth aspect, there is provided a server. The server is configured to: receive the encrypted message from the client device, the encrypted message including a hash value generated by the client device and a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and a public key of each neighbouring device in a subgroup of neighbouring devices selected by the client device; verify the ring signature using the public key of each neighbouring device in the subgroup; and calculate a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value received from the client device.
[0028] According to a fifth aspect, there is provided a computer program. The computer program comprises instructions which, when the program is executed by a processor, cause the processor to carry out the method according to the first aspect or the second aspect.
[0029] Therefore, in contradistinction to the prior art, according to the methods, establish a secure communication channel for secure message exchange, and provide anonymity authentication and secure message exchange between the one or more parties. The method improves security on the anonymity authentication and message exchange and provides privacy protection with better compatibility and a friendly integration environment.
[0030] These and other aspects of the disclosure will be apparent from the implementations described below.BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
[0031] Implementations of the disclosure will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which: FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram that illustrates authentication of one or more parties according to the prior art; FIG. 2 is a block diagram that illustrates sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server and receiving an encrypted message from the client device by the server in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure; FIG. 3 is a block diagram for an anonymity authentication and message exchange in a cloud in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure; FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a structure for anonymity authentication and message exchange in a cloud in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure; FIG. 5 is a block diagram of one or more parties obtaining public information in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure; FIG. 6 is a flow diagram that illustrates a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure; FIG. 7 is a flow diagram that illustrates a method of receiving an encrypted message from a client device by a server in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure; and FIG. 8 is an illustration of a system in which the various architectures and functionalities of the various previous implementations may be implemented. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0032] Implementations of the disclosure provide a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server, and a method of receiving the encrypted message from the client device by the server, with improved security on anonymity authentication and message exchange, and privacy protection.
[0033] To make solutions of the disclosure more comprehensible for a person skilled in the art, the following implementations of the disclosure are described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0034] Terms such as "a first", "a second", "a third", and "a fourth" (if any) in the summary, claims, and foregoing accompanying drawings of the disclosure are used to distinguish between similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific sequence or order. It should be understood that the terms so used are interchangeable under appropriate circumstances, so that the implementations of the disclosure described herein are, for example, capable of being implemented in sequences other than the sequences illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "include" and "have" and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, a method, a system, a product, or a device that includes a series of steps or units, is not necessarily limited to expressly listed steps or units but may include other steps or units that are not expressly listed or that are inherent to such process, method, product, or device.
[0035] FIG. 2 is a block diagram 200 that illustrates sending an encrypted message from a client device 202 to a server 204 and receiving an encrypted message from the client device 202 by the server 204 in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure. The block diagram 200 includes the client device 202, the server 204, and one or more subgroup of neighbouring devices 206AN. The client device 202 selects a subgroup of neighbouring devices to send the encrypted message to the server 204. The subgroup of neighbouring devices may be at least one of the one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N. The client device 202 computes a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device 202, a hash value generated by the client device 202, and a public key of each neighbouring device of the selected subgroup of the neighbouring devices. The client device 202 calculates a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the hash value generated by the client device 202. The client device 202 encrypts a message using the session key and sends the encrypted message to the server 204 with the generated hash value and the ring signature.
[0036] Optionally, the client device 202 and each neighbouring device receive the public key from the server.
[0037] Optionally, the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
[0038] Optionally, the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device 202, the hash value generated by the client device 202, and the public key of each neighbouring device.
[0039] Optionally, the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
[0040] Optionally, the client device 202 encrypts the message using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
[0041] The server 204 receives the encrypted message from the client device 202. The server 204 verifies the ring signature using the public key of each subgroup of the neighbouring devices. The server 204 calculates the session key based on the concatenation of the public key server and the generated hash value received from the client device 202. The server 204 sends the encrypted message along with the session key to the selected subgroup of the neighbouring devices. The client device 202 decrypts the encrypted message using the session key.
[0042] Optionally, the public key of the client device 202 and each neighbouring device are sent by the server.
[0043] Optionally, the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
[0044] Optionally, the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device 202, the hash value generated by the client device 202, and the public key of each neighbouring device.
[0045] Optionally, the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
[0046] Optionally, the server 204 encrypts the message using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
[0047] The client device 202 uses a passive key exchange and the ring signature that builds a privacy-preserving authenticated key agreement solution during this entire process. The server 204 enables the one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N including the client device 202 to establish a secure communication channel for secure message exchange, thereby providing anonymity authentication and secure message exchange for communication partners. The server 204 provides secure communication with message authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. The server 204 provides privacy protection and does not disclose any identification information of the one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N that are in communication, e.g. party ID, Domain Name, and the like. The server 204 improves security on anonymity authentication and message exchange. The server 204 provides better compatibility and a friendly integration environment.
[0048] The one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N may add the identification information and a public key for any type of message, and send it to any client device in the one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N through the server 204, thereby providing a privacy preserving authentication and secure data exchange. The server 204 shows the message as an anonymous ID and the public key belonging to the one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N. The server 204 does not involve any trusted third party in the one or more neighbouring devices 206A-N. The server 204 does not require any knowledge, consent, or assistance of other neighbouring devices to build a subgroup. The server 204 does not include any pre-defined group, a manager, a group public key, a setup for registration or revocation procedures.
[0049] The server 204 includes security properties of an authentication for the client device 202 with the server 204, a secure channel establishment, data upload or data download confidentiality and integrity, an anonymity of the client device 202. The server 204 provides high performance in securing the channel establishment in the client device 202 with the server 204.
[0050] FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram 300 for an anonymity authentication and message exchange in a cloud 302 in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure. The block diagram 300 includes the cloud 302, and one or more subgroup of neighbouring devices 304A-N. The one or more subgroup of neighbouring devices 304A-N includes a first subgroup of neighbouring devices 304A, and a Nth subgroup of neighbouring devices 304N. The first subgroup 304A includes one or more first parties 306AA-AN, and one or more second parties 306BA-BN. The Nth subgroup 304N includes one or more third parties 306CA-CN, and one or more fourth parties 306DA-DN. Optionally, at least one of any of the one or more first parties 306AA-AN, the one or more second parties 306BA-BN, the one or more third parties 306CA-CN, and the one or more fourth parties 306DA-DN is a client device. Optionally, the cloud 302 is a server.
[0051] The client device selects a subgroup of the neighbouring devices and may perform a passive key exchange protocol to send an encrypted message to the cloud 302.
[0052] The client device computes a ring signature with one or more keys. The one or more keys may include a secret key (sk) and a public key (pk). The one or more subgroup of neighbouring devices 304A-N may obtain the public keys over a public network. The ring signature is a digital signature computed by the client device with the one or more keys. The ring signature may be similar to group signatures. The client device encrypts a message and sends the encrypted message to the cloud 302. The client device may upload the encrypted message to the cloud 302 with C = ENC (K, plaintext).
[0053] The cloud 302 sends the encrypted message to the selected subgroup of the neighbouring devices. Optionally, the selected subgroup of the neighbouring devices includes any of the one or more first parties 306AA-AN, the one or more second parties 306BA-BN, the one or more third parties 306CA-CN, and the one or more fourth parties 306DA-DN.
[0054] One or more parties in the selected subgroup of the neighbouring devices decrypt the encrypted message. The selected subgroup of the neighbouring devices may be the Nth subgroup of neighbouring devices 304N with the one or more third parties 306CA-CN and the one or more fourth parties 306DA-DN. Optionally, the one or more third parties 306CA-CN and the one or more fourth parties 306DA-DN in the Nth subgroup of neighbouring devices 304N download the encrypted message from the cloud 302 with C = ENC (K, plaintext).
[0055] FIG. 4 is a block diagram 400 of a structure for anonymity authentication and message exchange in a server 404 in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure. The block diagram 400 includes a party 402, a server 404, a key exchange protocol 406, a ring signature component 408, and an authenticated channel 410. The party 402 sends a message to the server 404 with the key exchange protocol 406. Optionally, the party 402 is a client device. The party 402 selects a subgroup of neighbouring devices that includes one or more parties. The party 402 may include an identification number with one or more keys. The one or more keys include at least one of a secret key, and a public key. The public key may be obtained over a public network. The key exchange protocol 406 enables the party 402 to perform a passive key exchange. Optionally, the key exchange protocol 406 enables the one or more parties in the subgroup of neighbouring devices to perform the passive key exchange.
[0056] The party 402 executes a ring signature on the message based on the passive key exchange. The party 402 may execute the ring signature with the ring signature component 408. Optionally, the ring signature component 408 includes any of scheme or algorithms to execute the ring signature. The ring signature component 308 may include a Rivest & Shamir & Tauman, RST ring signature scheme. The ring signature enables the party 402 to generate one or more keys, sign the message, and verify a signature of the message. The RST ring signature scheme may add only one modular multiplication and one symmetric encryption per ring member to generate and verify the signature. Optionally, the signature is computed by using a long-term key. Optionally, the ring signature component 408 encrypts the message by executing the ring signature. The ring signature component 408 may encrypt the message with the secret key, which can be used for any of upload or download.
[0057] The authenticated channel 410 provides a session key for authentication of the server 404 and the neighbouring devices in the selected subgroup, and secure communication of the message. Optionally, the authenticated channel 410 provides the session key with ENC (K, m). The authenticated channel 410 provides an authenticated secure channel with anonymity. The structure for anonymity authentication and message exchange may not leak identification information of the one or more parties, the party 402, and the neighbouring devices in the selected subgroup, during protocol processing i.e. during the passive key exchange. Optionally, a generic structure for anonymity authentication and message exchange includes Passive Key Exchange + Generic Ring Signature Scheme = Authentication and Secure Message communication with Perfect Anonymity.
[0058] The key exchange protocol 406 sends the encrypted message to the server 404 along with the secret key. The server 404 decrypts the encrypted message with the secret key. Optionally, the server 404 sends the encrypted message to the neighbouring devices in the selected subgroup by the party 402.
[0059] Optionally, the ring signature is cryptographic signature algorithm, that provides only the ring signature of identity information i.e. RingSign (ski, X) to active attackers in the public network. The cryptographic signature algorithms may not enable the active attackers to extract the identity information without a negligible probability. The Ringsign() is a secure cryptographic algorithm for Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Turing (PPT), that may not break anonymity property and extract the identity information.
[0060] Optionally, the session keys are assured by a cryptographic Key Derivation Function, KDF, Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data, AEAD scheme, passive static Diffie-Hellman, DH key exchange protocol, and cryptographic signature scheme. The passive static DH and KDF assure randomness of the key, and the signature scheme assures the authentication of the message exchange. The active attackers may get only the ciphertext of key-related information as the AEAD, KDF, passive static DH, and signature scheme are cryptographic encryption algorithms and protocols. The active attackers may not extract the plaintext of session keys without the negligible probability. Optionally, the structure includes a reduction algorithm to break the cryptographic algorithms.
[0061] FIG. 5 is a block diagram of one or more parties 504A-N obtaining public information in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure. The block diagram includes the one or more parties 504A-N including a first party 504A, a second party 504B, and a Nth party 504N, and a cloud 502. The one or more parties 504A-N may include a client device. The cloud 502 may be a server in a public network. The one or more parties 504A-N retrieves the public information over the public network. Optionally, the public information includes any of an identification information or a long-term public key certificate.
[0062] Optionally, the one or more parties 504A-N include the client device that uploads a message to the cloud 502 without leaking the identification information of the client device to the cloud 502. The client device selects a subgroup with neighbouring devices. For example, the client device selects a subgroup R with r members, where 1<r=<n, where the subgroup R = {1,...,r}, R_PK = {pk1,..., pkr}, R_ID = {ID 1 ,..., IDr};
[0063] The client device may generate random x, compute x = g^x, compute ring signature: S_i = RingSig (ski, R_PK, x), compute session key and ciphertext of m: K = KDF(pk_s^x, pk_s||x| |string "ENC") ; C = AEAD (K, m) and send (X, S_i, C) to the cloud 402. Optionally, the client device sends (X, S_i, C) to the cloud 402 along with a public key and a secret key.
[0064] Optionally, the cloud 502 verifies S_i using {R_PK}. The cloud 502 may compute a session key if the verification is correct. Optionally, the cloud 502 decrypts the cipher c: K = KDF (X^sk_s, pk_s ||x|| string "ENC" ; m = AEAD (K, C). The cloud 502 may compute the session key and decrypt the cipher with a zero round trip time.
[0065] FIG. 6 is a flow diagram that illustrates a method of sending an encrypted message from a client device to a server in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure. At a step 602, a subgroup of neighbouring devices is selected by the client device. At a step 604, a ring signature is computed by the client device based on a secret key of the client device, a hash value generated by the client device, and a public key of each neighbouring device. At a step 606, a session key is calculated by the client device based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value. At a step 608, a message is encrypted by the client device using the session key and the encrypted message is sent to the server with the generated hash value and the ring signature.
[0066] This method uses a passive key exchange and the ring signature that builds a privacy-preserving authenticated key agreement solution during this entire process. The method enables the one or more parties include the client device to establish a secure communication channel for secure message exchange, thereby providing anonymity authentication and secure message exchange for communication partners. The method provides secure communication with message authentication, integrity and confidentiality. The method provides privacy protection and does not disclose any identification information of the one or more parties that are in communication, e.g. party ID, Domain Name, and the like. The method improves security on the anonymity authentication and message exchange. The method provides better compatibility and a friendly integration environment.
[0067] The one or more parties may add the identification information and a public key for any type of messages, and send it to any client device in the one or more parties through the server, thereby providing a privacy preserving authentication and secure data exchange. The method shows the message as an anonymous ID and the public key belonging to the one or more parties. The method does not involve any trusted third party in the one or more parties. The method does not require any knowledge, consent, or assistance of other parties to build a subgroup. The method does not include any pre-defined group, a manager, a group public key, a setup for registration or revocation procedures.
[0068] The method includes security properties of an authentication for the client device and the server, a secure channel establishment, data upload or data download confidentiality and integrity, an anonymity of the client device. The method provides high performance in securing the channel establishment in the client device and the server.
[0069] Optionally, the client device and each neighbouring device receive the public key from the server.
[0070] Optionally, the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
[0071] Optionally, the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and the public key of each neighbouring device.
[0072] Optionally, the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
[0073] Optionally, the method includes encrypting the message includes using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
[0074] FIG. 7 is a flow diagram that illustrates a method of receiving an encrypted message from a client device by a server in accordance with an implementation of the disclosure. At a step 702, an encrypted message is received by the server from the client device. The encrypted message includes a hash value generated by the client device and a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and a public key of each neighbouring device in a subgroup of neighbouring devices selected by the client device. At a step 704, the ring signature is verified by the server using the public key of each neighbouring device in the subgroup. At a step 706, a session key is calculated by the server based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value received from the client device. At a step 708, the encrypted message is decrypted by the client device using the session key.
[0075] This method uses a passive key exchange and the ring signature that builds a privacy-preserving authenticated key agreement solution during this entire process. The method enables the one or more parties including the client device to establish a secure communication channel for secure message exchange, thereby providing anonymity authentication and secure message exchange for communication partners. The method provides secure communication with message authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. The method provides privacy protection and does not disclose any identification information of the one or more parties that are in communication, e.g. party ID, Domain Name, and the like. The method improves security on the anonymity authentication and message exchange. The method provides better compatibility and a friendly integration environment.
[0076] The one or more parties may add the identification information and a public key for any type of messages, and send it to any client device in the one or more parties through the server, thereby providing a privacy preserving authentication and secure data exchange. The method shows the message as an anonymous ID and the public key belonging to the one or more parties. The method does not involve any trusted third party in the one or more parties. The method does not require any knowledge, consent, or assistance of other parties to build a subgroup. The method does not include any pre-defined group, a manager, a group public key, a setup for registration or revocation procedures.
[0077] The method includes security properties of an authentication for the client device and the server, a secure channel establishment, data upload or data download confidentiality and integrity, an anonymity of the client device. The method provides high performance in securing the channel establishment in the client device and the server.
[0078] Optionally, the public key of the client device and each neighbouring device are sent by the server.
[0079] Optionally, the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
[0080] Optionally, the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device, the hash value generated by the client device, and the public key of each neighbouring device.
[0081] Optionally, the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
[0082] Optionally, the method includes encrypting the message includes using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
[0083] FIG. 8 is an illustration of a system 800 (e.g. a client device) in which the various architectures and functionalities of the various previous embodiments may be implemented. As shown, the system 800 includes at least one processor 804 that is connected to a sending device 802, wherein the system 800 may be implemented using any suitable protocol, such as Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), PCI-Express, AGP (Accelerated Graphics Port), Hyper-Transport, or any other bus or point-to-point communication protocol (s). The system 800 also includes a memory 806.
[0084] Control logic (software) and data are stored in the memory 806 which may take a form of random-access memory (RAM). In the disclosure, a single semiconductor platform may refer to a sole unitary semiconductor-based integrated circuit or chip. It should be noted that the term single semiconductor platform may also refer to multi-chip modules with increased connectivity which simulate on-chip modules with increased connectivity which simulate on-chip operation, and make substantial improvements over utilizing a conventional central processing unit (CPU) and bus embodiment. Of course, the various modules may also be situated separately or in various combinations of semiconductor platforms.
[0085] The system 800 may also include a secondary storage 810. The secondary storage 810 includes, for example, a hard disk drive and a removable storage drive, representing a floppy disk drive, a magnetic tape drive, a compact disk drive, digital versatile disk (DVD) drive, recording device, universal serial bus (USB) flash memory. The removable storage drive at least one of reads from and writes to a removable storage unit in a well-known manner.
[0086] Computer programs, or computer control logic algorithms, may be stored in at least one of the memory 806 and the secondary storage 810. Such computer programs, when executed, enable the system 800 to perform various functions as described in the foregoing. The memory 806, the secondary storage 810, and any other storage are possible examples of computer-readable media.
[0087] In an implementation, the architectures and functionalities depicted in the various previous figures may be implemented in the context of the processor 804, a graphics processor coupled to a communication interface 812, an integrated circuit (not shown) that is capable of at least a portion of the capabilities of both the processor 804 and a graphics processor, a chipset (namely, a group of integrated circuits designed to work and sold as a unit for performing related functions, and so forth).
[0088] Furthermore, the architectures and functionalities depicted in the various previous-described figures may be implemented in a context of a general computer system, a circuit board system, a game console system dedicated for entertainment purposes, an application-specific system. For example, the system 800 may take the form of a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a server, a workstation, a game console, an embedded system.
[0089] Furthermore, the system 800 may take the form of various other devices including, but not limited to a personal digital assistant (PDA) device, a mobile phone device, a smart phone, a television, and so forth. Additionally, although not shown, the system 800 may be coupled to a network (for example, a telecommunications network, a local area network (LAN), a wireless network, a wide area network (WAN) such as the Internet, a peer-to-peer network, a cable network, or the like) for communication purposes through an I / O interface 808.
[0090] It should be understood that the arrangement of components illustrated in the figures described are exemplary and that other arrangement may be possible. It should also be understood that the various system components (and means) defined by the claims, described below, and illustrated in the various block diagrams represent components in some systems configured according to the subject matter disclosed herein. For example, one or more of these system components (and means) may be realized, in whole or in part, by at least some of the components illustrated in the arrangements illustrated in the described figures.
[0091] In addition, while at least one of these components are implemented at least partially as an electronic hardware component, and therefore constitutes a machine, the other components may be implemented in software that when included in an execution environment constitutes a machine, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware.
[0092] Although the disclosure and its advantages have been described in detail, it should be understood that various changes, substitutions, and alterations can be made herein without departing from the scope of the disclosure as defined by the appended claims
Claims
1. A method of sending an encrypted message from a client device (202) to a server (204, 404), the method comprising: selecting, by the client device (202), a subgroup of neighbouring devices (206A-N, 304A-N); computing, by the client device (202), a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device (202), a hash value generated by the client device (202), and a public key of each neighbouring device; calculating, by the client device (202), a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value; and encrypting, by the client device (202), a message using the session key and sending the encrypted message to the server (204, 404) with the generated hash value and the ring signature.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the client device (202) and each neighbouring device receives the public key from the server (204, 404).
3. The method of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
4. The method of any preceding claim, wherein the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device (202), the hash value generated by the client device (202), and the public key of each neighbouring device5. The method of any preceding claim, wherein the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
6. The method of any preceding claim, wherein encrypting the message includes using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
7. A method of receiving an encrypted message from a client device (202) by a server (204, 404), the method comprising: receiving, by the server (204, 404), the encrypted message from the client device (202), the encrypted message including a hash value generated by the client device (202) and a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device (202), the hash value generated by the client device (202), and a public key of each neighbouring device in a subgroup of neighbouring devices (206A-N, 304A-N) selected by the client device (202); verifying, by the server (204, 404), the ring signature using the public key of each neighbouring device in the subgroup; and calculating, by the server (204, 404), a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value received from the client device (202).
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the public key of the client device (202) and each neighbouring device are sent by the server (204, 404).
9. The method of claim 7 or claim 8, wherein the hash value is generated from a random number using a hash function.
10. The method of any one of claims 7 to 9, wherein the ring signature is based on a concatenation of the secret key of the client device (202), the hash value generated by the client device (202), and the public key of each neighbouring device11. The method of any one of claims 7 to 10, wherein the session key is calculated using a key derivation function including a pseudorandom function.
12. The method of any one of claims 7 to 11, wherein encrypting the message includes using an authenticate encryption with associated data.
13. A client device (202) configured to: select a subgroup of neighbouring devices (206A-N, 304A-N); compute a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device (202), a hash value generated by the client device (202), and a public key of each neighbouring device; calculate a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value; and encrypt a message using the session key and send the encrypted message to a server (204, 404) with the generated hash value and the ring signature.
14. A server (204, 404) configured to: receive the encrypted message from the client device (202), the encrypted message including a hash value generated by the client device (202) and a ring signature based on a secret key of the client device (202), the hash value generated by the client device (202), and a public key of each neighbouring device in a subgroup of neighbouring devices (206A-N, 304A-N) selected by the client device (202); verify the ring signature using the public key of each neighbouring device in the subgroup (206A-N, 304A-N); and calculate a session key based on a concatenation of a public server key and the generated hash value received from the client device (202).
15. A computer program comprising instructions which, when the program is executed by a processor, cause the processor to carry out the method according to claims 1-6 or the method according to claims 7-12.
