Authentication process
A multi-step authentication process with distinct functions and encryption keys addresses the reliability issues in existing methods, enhancing security and protecting data integrity in electronic device communications.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- FR2021003602
- Authority / Receiving Office
- FR · FR
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-04-08
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-04-08
AI Technical Summary
Existing authentication methods for electronic devices are not sufficiently reliable, particularly in Verifier/Prover type processes, making them vulnerable to unauthorized access and data breaches.
A multi-step authentication process involving successive verification operations with distinct functions and encryption keys, including identification, data generation, and encrypted data exchange, to enhance security and complexity.
The proposed method significantly enhances authentication reliability by increasing complexity and reducing the risk of unauthorized access, while protecting sensitive data through encryption and dynamic key management.
Smart Images

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Abstract
Description
Title of the invention: Authentication method Technical field
[0001] The present description relates generally to electronic devices or circuits. The present description applies more particularly to a method of authentication between two electronic devices or circuits preceding, for example, a method of communication between these two devices or circuits. Prior art
[0002] Communication between two electronic devices, or circuits, is often preceded by an authentication phase. During this phase, an authentication process, implemented by the two devices, makes it possible to verify whether the two devices are authorized to communicate with each other.
[0003] Authentication methods are often used during communications between a terminal-type device, such as a computer, a printer, or a payment terminal, and peripheral-type electronic equipment or device, for example a consumable or an accessory. In this case, the authentication method makes it possible to validate the access of the peripheral-type device to the data and / or to functionalities of the terminal-type device. The authentication method is a first means of protection against malicious devices attempting to access data and / or to functionalities of other devices.
[0004] A common example of an authentication method used, for example between a computer and a user, is the use of an identifier and a password.
[0005] It would be desirable to be able to improve, at least in part, the known authentication methods of electronic devices. Summary of the invention
[0006] There is a need for more reliable authentication methods.
[0007] There is a particular need for more reliable Verifier / Prover type authentication methods.
[0008] One embodiment overcomes all or part of the drawbacks of known authentication methods, and more particularly all or part of the drawbacks of known Verifier / Candidate (from the English Verify / Prover) type authentication methods.
[0009] One embodiment provides a method for authenticating a first device to a second device, comprising at least two successive verification operations, each operation comprising the following successive steps: - the second device generates a first data by applying a first function taking as input a second data, and sends said first data to the first device; - the first device generates a third data item and a fourth data item used by the following verification operation, by applying a second function taking as input at least the first data item received from the second device, and sends the third data item to the second device; - the second device verifies the third data item using a third function taking as input the first data item and the third data item and providing as output information, indicating whether the verification was successful or not, said second data item corresponding, for the first operation, to a fifth data item and being, for the other operations, generated at the previous verification operation; and said second function also taking as input, for the first operation, a sixth data item and, for the other operations, the fourth data item generated in the previous verification operation, the first device being authenticated with the second device if: - for each verification operation, the information indicates that the verification was successful; and - if the fourth data of the first device and the second data of the second device of the last verification operation are correct.
[0010] According to one embodiment, for each verification operation, the first function further takes said fifth data item as input, and - for each verification operation, the second function also takes the sixth data as input.
[0011] According to one embodiment, the fifth data is different for each verification operation, and the sixth data is different for each verification operation.
[0012] According to one embodiment, the method further comprises an identification operation preceding said at least two verification operations, in which the first and second devices exchange identification numbers, if each first, second device recognizes the identification number of the other device then said at least two verification operations are not implemented, and the first device is authenticated with the second device, otherwise said at least two verification operations are implemented.
[0013] According to one embodiment, at least one first function of said at least two verification operations is different from at least one first function of another of said at least two verification operations.
[0014] According to one embodiment, at least one second function of said at least two verification operations is different from at least one second function of another of said at least two verification operations.
[0015] According to one embodiment, the first and second devices send data to each other in encrypted form.
[0016] According to one embodiment, during the implementation of each of said at least two verification operations, the first and second devices send data to each other in encrypted form using a first encryption key.
[0017] According to one embodiment, said first encryption key is different for each implementation of each of said at least two verification operations.
[0018] According to one embodiment, said first encryption key depends on said first encryption key of said previous verification operations.
[0019] According to one embodiment, among said at least two verification operations, there is at least one first verification operation in which the application of the second function further generates a seventh data item which is sent to the second device, and among said at least two verification operations there is at least one second verification operation, successive to the first verification operation, in which: - the second device further generates an eighth data item by applying the first function to the seventh data item and sends the eighth data item to the first device; - the first device decrypts a ninth data item using the eighth data item to generate the third data item.
[0020] According to one embodiment, the first device uses the eighth data to decrypt a ninth data, and the second function further takes, as input, the ninth data to generate the third data.
[0021] Another embodiment provides a device adapted to implement the method described above as a first device.
[0022] According to one embodiment, the device comprises a memory in which data representing the first, second, third and fourth data and the information are stored.
[0023] Another embodiment provides a device adapted to implement the method described above as a second device.
[0024] According to one embodiment, the device comprises a memory in which data representing the first, second, third and fourth data and the information are stored. Brief description of the drawings
[0025] These characteristics and advantages, as well as others, will be explained in detail in the following description of particular embodiments given without limitation in relation to the attached figures among which:
[0026] [Fig.l] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, an electronic device to which the embodiments described below can be applied;
[0027] [Fig.2] schematically represents two electronic devices to which the embodiments described below can be applied;
[0028] [Fig.3] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, an example of an authentication method;
[0029] [Fig.4] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, a mode of implementation of an authentication method;
[0030] [Fig.5] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, another mode of implementation of an authentication method;
[0031] [Fig.6] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, another mode of implementation of an authentication method; and
[0032] [Fig.7] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, another mode of implementation of an authentication method. Description of the embodiments
[0033] The same elements have been designated by the same references in the different figures. In particular, the structural and / or functional elements common to the different embodiments may have the same references and may have identical structural, dimensional and material properties.
[0034] For the sake of clarity, only the steps and elements useful for understanding the described embodiments have been shown and are detailed. In particular, this authentication method can be adapted to standard communication methods.
[0035] Unless otherwise specified, when referring to two elements connected to each other, this means directly connected without intermediate elements other than conductors, and when referring to two elements connected (in English "coupled") to each other, this means that these two elements can be connected or be connected by means of one or more other elements.
[0036] In the following description, when reference is made to absolute position qualifiers, such as the terms "front", "back", "top", "bottom", "left", "right", etc., or relative position qualifiers, such as the terms "above", "below", "upper", "lower", etc., or to orientation qualifiers, such as the terms "horizontal", "vertical", etc., reference is made unless otherwise specified to the orientation of the figures.
[0037] Unless otherwise specified, the expressions "about", "approximately", "substantially", and "of the order of" mean to within 10%, preferably to within 5%.
[0038] [Fig.l] represents, very schematically and in the form of blocks, an example of architecture of an electronic device 10.
[0039] The electronic device 10 comprises a processor 11 (CPU) adapted to implement different instructions for processing data stored in memories of the and / or supplied by other circuits to the device 10.
[0040] The electronic device 10 further comprises different types of memories, including a non-volatile memory 12 (NVM), a volatile memory 13 (RAM), and / or a read-only memory 14 (ROM). Each memory is adapted to store different types of data. According to a variant, the device 10 may have one or more memories of these different types, and / or have memories of only one or two of these types.
[0041] The electronic device 10 further comprises different circuits 15 (FCT) adapted to perform different functions. For example, the circuits 15 may comprise measurement circuits, data conversion circuits, encryption circuits, etc.
[0042] The electronic device 10 may further comprise interface circuits 16 (IN / OUT) adapted to send and / or receive data from outside the device 10. The interface circuits 16 may further be adapted to implement a data display, for example, a display screen. The electronic device 10 is, moreover, particularly adapted to communicate with other electronic devices, and to implement an authentication method to authorize such communication.
[0043] The electronic device 10 further comprises one or more data buses 17 adapted to transfer data between its various components. The bus 17 makes it possible, in particular, to transfer data stored in the memories 12 to 14 to the processor 11, to the circuits 15 and / or to the interface circuits 16.
[0044] [Fig. 2] represents, schematically and in the form of blocks, a communication between two devices 21 and 22 of the type of device 10 described in relation to [Fig. 1]
[0045] The devices 21 and 22 are devices of the type of the device 10 described in relation to [Fig. 1]. The device 21 is a terminal type device. In [Fig. 2], the device 21 is, for example, a printer. The device 22 is a peripheral type device, and more particularly the device 22 is a consumable suitable for use by the device 21. In [Fig. 2], the device 22 is, for example, an ink cartridge suitable for use by the device 21.
[0046] Upon installation of the device 22 in the device 21, the devices 21 and 22 implement an authentication method to verify that they are authorized to be used together. According to one example, this authentication method may make it possible to verify the hardware and / or software compatibility of the devices 21 and 22. According to another example, this authentication method can prevent a malicious device from having access to secret data stored in the devices 21 and 22.
[0047] An example of implementation and modes of implementation of the authentication method are described in relation to Figures 3 to 7.
[0048] [Fig. 3] illustrates, schematically and in block form, an example of implementation of a method for authenticating a device P of the type of device 22 described in relation to [Fig. 2] with an electronic device V of the type of device 21 described in relation to [Fig. 2].
[0049] The example described here is a Verifier / Prover type authentication method in which a verifier device, here the V device, sends data to the prover device, here the P device, so that it can apply a transformation to it. The prover device then returns the result of said transformation to the verifier device so that it can verify it. If the result of the verification is correct, then the prover device is authenticated to the verifier device. The example authentication method is described in more detail below.
[0050] [Fig.3] is divided in two lengthwise by a dotted line, the left part of [Fig.3] concerns device V, and the right part of [Fig.3] concerns device P.
[0051] The authentication method may begin with an optional identification operation ID, during which the devices V and P exchange identification information. Indeed, the devices V and P each have one or more identification information, for example at least one identification information v for the device V, and at least one identification information p for the device P. According to one example, the information v and p are binary words representing identification numbers.
[0052] Each device V, P then implements a function 101 ("ID Check" block) allowing them to know if they have already communicated with the other device P, V based on the identification information p, v received. According to one example, the function 101 is a search function in a memory space storing the identification information of all the electronic devices with which the device V or P has already communicated, i.e. the electronic devices with which the authentication method has already been successfully implemented. According to one example, this memory space can be emptied regularly. If the function 101 indicates that the devices V and P have already communicated together recently, the devices V and P may not implement the authentication method and start communicating (not shown in [Fig. 3]). However, if the function 101 indicates that the devices V and P have never communicated together, then the rest of the method authentication is implemented.
[0053] The authentication method further comprises a GEN operation, following the identification operation, during which the devices V and P use the same function 102 (block "Data Gen") to generate, respectively, a DataVO data item and a DataPO data item. The devices V and P do not communicate with each other to generate the DataVO and DataPO data. According to one embodiment, if the devices V and P are intended to communicate with each other, then they are adapted to generate DataVO and DataPO data that are identical or affiliated with each other. According to one example, if the authentication method uses a symmetric encryption key as DataVO and DataPO data, the DataVO and DataPO data are identical. However, if the authentication method uses an asymmetric encryption key as DataVO and DataPO data, the DataVO and DataPO data are not identical but are affiliated with each other.Function 102 may be a function for searching for DataVO and DataPO data in memory spaces of devices V and P.
[0054] The GEN operation is directly followed by a verification operation VP0 during which the devices V and P exchange transformed data. The VP0 operation comprises the following steps: - the device V implements a function 103 (block "fCO") taking as input the data DataVO, and optionally the identification information v and p, to generate a data C0; - device V sends data C0 to device P; - the device V implements a function 104 (block "fRO") taking as input the data C0 and the data DataPO, and optionally the identification information v and p, to generate a data R0 and a secret data sPO; - device P sends data R0 to device V; and - the device V implements a function 105 (block "fVO") taking as input the data C0 and R0, and optionally the identification information v and p, and the data DataVO, to generate a result data vfO and a secret data sVO.
[0055] The verification operation VP0 is followed by a final operation F during which the devices V and P decide whether they can communicate with each other or not. In this operation, the device V implements a function 106 (block "Paired?") taking as input the identification data v and p, the result data vfO and the secret data sVO. The device P implements, for its part, a function 107 (block "Paired?") taking as input the identification data v and p, and the secret data sPO. The purpose of function 106 is to verify the result data vfO and the secret data sVO. The purpose of function 107 is to verify the secret data sPO. In addition, and optionally, the functions 106 and 107 can use the identification information v and p. If the functions 106 and 107 consider the verifications successful then the devices V and P can communicate with each other, their identification information can be recorded. Otherwise, no communication is started between the devices V and P.
[0056] [Fig.4] illustrates, schematically and in block form, a mode of implementation of a method of authenticating a device of the type of device 22 described in relation to [Fig.2] with an electronic device of the type of device 21 described in relation to [Fig.2].
[0057] The method of [Fig. 4] includes elements in common with the method described in relation to [Fig. 3]. The common elements are not described again, and only the differences between the methods of Figures 3 and 4 are highlighted.
[0058] Like the method of [Fig.3], the method of [Fig.4] comprises the following successive operations: - the ID operation during which the devices V and P exchange their identification information v and p, and implement the function 101 to check whether they have not already been authenticated to each other; - the GEN operation during which the devices V and P implement the function 102 to generate the DataVO and DataPO data; - the verification operation VP0 during which the devices V and P implement the functions 103, 104 and 105, to generate and / or exchange the data C0, R0, sVO, sPO and vfO; and - operation F during which devices V and P implement functions 106 and 107 to conclude whether they can communicate together or not.
[0059] Unlike the method of [Fig.3], the method of [Fig.4] does not include a single VP0 verification operation, but includes N+1 successive VP0, VP1, ..., VPN verification operations, N being a natural integer greater than 1.
[0060] Each operation VPi, for i being a natural integer varying from 1 to N, is similar to the verification operation VP0 described in relation to [Fig.3], and comprises the following successive steps: - the device V implements a function 203-i (block "fCi"), similar to the function 103, taking as input the data DataVO, optionally the identification information v and p, and the secret data sVi-1 from the previous verification operation VPi-1, to generate a data Ci; - device V sends data Ci to device P; - the device V implements a function 204-i (block "fRi"), similar to the function 104, taking as input the data Ci and the data DataPO, optionally the identification information v and p, and the secret data sPi-1 from the previous verification operation VPi-1, to generate a data Ri and a secret data sPi; - device P sends data Ri to device V; and - device V implements a function 205-i (block "fVi"), similar to the function 105, taking as input the data Ci and Ri, optionally the identification information v and p, and the secret data sVi-1, to generate a result data vfi and a secret data sVi.
[0061] According to one embodiment, the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N are data generation functions, for example, random data generation functions. According to one example, the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N may, for example, also be encryption functions using the data DataVO as an encryption key to encrypt random data. According to one variant, the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N are functions that fetch data from memories of the devices V and P. According to another variant, the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N may also be verification functions for validating that the data received from the previous verification operation, in this case, the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N are, for example, signature functions.
[0062] According to one embodiment, the functions 104, 204-1, ..., 204-N are encryption functions, for example permutations, using the data DataPO as an encryption key. According to another example, the functions 104, 204-1, ..., 204-N are signature functions.
[0063] According to one embodiment, the functions 105, 205-1, ..., 205-N provide, as output, data vfO, ..., vfN representative of the result of the comparison of the data C0, ..., CN with the corresponding data R0, ..., RN. The data vfO, ..., vfN are, for example, flags comprising a True state and a False state. The True state means that the verification has worked and the False state means the opposite. According to one embodiment, the secret data sVO, ..., sVN is used as a decryption key by the function 105, 205-1, ..., 205-N. The device V decrypts the data R0, ..., RN with the secret data sVO, ..., sVN, then checks whether it conforms to the expected data. According to another example, functions 105, 205-1, ..., 205-N do not require decryption of data R0, ..., RN.
[0064] According to an exemplary implementation, the secret data sVi, respectively sPi, are all dependent on the secret data sVO, ..., sVi-1, respectively on the secret data sPO, ..., sPi-1 generated in the preceding operations VP0, ..., VPi-1. Thus the result of the functions 205-1, ..., 205-N always depend on the preceding verification operations, and an electronic device which manages to evade one or more verification operations, could not carry out the following verification operations.
[0065] According to an exemplary implementation, at least one of the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N is different from the others, and, preferably, the functions 103, 203-1, ..., 203-N are all different from each other. Similarly, at least one of the functions 104, 204-1, ..., 204-N is different from the others, and, preferably, the functions 104, 204-1, 204-N are all different from each other. Similarly, at least one of the functions 105, 205-1, ..., 205-N is different from the others, and, preferably, the functions 105, 205-1, ..., 205-N are all different from each other.
[0066] An advantage of this mode of implementation is that it makes it possible to complicate the authentication process and therefore make it more difficult to copy.
[0067] Another advantage of this mode of implementation is that it also makes it possible to reduce the exposure of secret data from subsequent verification operations, if the device P (or V) which participates in the exchange is not authentic.
[0068] [Fig.5] illustrates, schematically and in the form of blocks, another mode of implementation implementing a method for authenticating a device of the type of device 22 described in relation to [Fig.2] with an electronic device of the type of device 21 described in relation to [Fig.2].
[0069] The method of [Fig. 5] includes elements in common with the method described in relation to [Fig. 4]. The common elements are not described again and only the differences between the methods of Figures 4 and 5 are highlighted.
[0070] The method of [Fig.5] differs from the method of [Fig.4] in that, during the implementation of the verification operations VP0, ..., VPN, all data exchanges between the devices V and P are carried out in an encrypted manner. In [Fig.5], all data exchanges of the verification operations VP0, ..., VPN are carried out in an encrypted manner, but, as a variant, at least one verification operation VPi has its data exchanges carried out in an encrypted manner. Thus each operation VPi, for i varying from 0 to N, comprises the following successive steps: - device V implements function 103 or 203-i to generate data Ci; - the device V sends the data Ci to the device P in encrypted form as described below; - the device V implements the function 104 or 204-i to generate the data Ri and the secret data sPi; - the device P sends the data Ri to the device V in encrypted form as described below; and - the device V implements the function 105 or 205-i to generate the result data vfi and the secret data sVi.
[0071] To exchange data in encrypted form, the device V implements encryption and decryption functions 308-i (block "EVi"), and the device P implements encryption and decryption functions 309-i (block "EVi").
[0072] The 308-i functions use a pskVi encryption and decryption key, and are suitable for: - encrypt the data Ci for sending to the device P, using the key pskVi as the encryption key, the encrypted data Ci is noted EVi(Ci); and - decrypt the data sent by the device P, using the pskVi key as the decryption key.
[0073] Similarly, the 309-i functions use a pskPi encryption and decryption key, and are suitable for: - decrypt the data sent by device V, using the pskPi key as the decryption key; and - encrypt the data Ri for sending to the device V, using the key pskPi as the encryption key, the encrypted data Ri is noted EPi(Ri).
[0074] The functions 308-i, respectively the functions 309-i, are, furthermore, adapted to provide the encryption and decryption key pskVi+1, respectively the encryption and decryption key pskPi+1, used during the following verification operation VPi+1. According to a preferred embodiment, the functions 308-i, respectively the functions 309-i, generate the encryption and decryption key pskVi+1, respectively the encryption and decryption key pskPi+1, using the encryption and decryption key pskVi, respectively the encryption and decryption key pskPi. Thus, all encryption and decryption keys pskVO, ..., pskVN, respectively encryption and decryption keys pskPO, ..., pskPN, are dependent on each other.
[0075] According to an exemplary embodiment, the encryption functions 308-i and 309-i implement a symmetric encryption algorithm, in which the encryption key is identical to the decryption key. In this case, if the devices V and P are adapted to communicate with each other then the keys pskVi and pskPi are therefore identical for each implementation of a verification operation VPi.
[0076] According to an alternative embodiment, the encryption functions 308-i and 309-i implement an asymmetric encryption algorithm, in which the encryption key is different from the decryption key. In this case, the keys pskVi and pskPi are therefore different for each implementation of a verification operation VPi.
[0077] The method of [Fig. 5] further differs from the method of [Fig. 4] in that its identification operation Id is followed by a GEN' operation similar to the GEN operation described in relation to FIGS. 3 and 4. As during the GEN operation, during the GEN' operation, the devices V and P use the same function 102 (block "Data Gen") to generate, respectively, the data item DataVO and the data item DataPO. However, during the GEN' operation, the devices V and P also implement, independently of each other, a function 302 (block "START") for generating the encryption and decryption key pskVO and pskPO. The function 302 takes as input the data item DataVO, respectively the data item DataPO, and, operationally, the identification data v and p, and provides as output the key pskVO, respectively the key pskPO.
[0078] An advantage of this embodiment is that it makes it possible to protect the data exchanged by the devices V and P. A device capable of intercepting this data will not be able to implement the method without also having access to the encryption and decryption keys which are never exchanged.
[0079] Another advantage of this mode of implementation is that it also makes it possible to reduce the exposure of secret data exchanged or generated during the VPi operation to a device which would not have carried out the previous VPO, VPI, ..VPi-1 operations.
[0080] [Fig.6] illustrates, schematically and in block form, another mode of implementation of a method of authenticating a device of the type of device 22 described in relation to [Fig.2] with an electronic device of the type of device 21 described in relation to [Fig.2].
[0081] The method of [Fig. 6] includes elements in common with the method described in relation to [Fig. 4]. The common elements are not described again and only the differences between the methods of Figures 4 and 6 are highlighted.
[0082] The method of [Fig.6] differs from the method of [Fig.4] in that, among the N+1 verification operations VPO, ..., VPN, at least one pair of verification operations are linked. In [Fig.6], it is considered that the operations VPI and VPN form a pair of linked verification operations, but the person skilled in the art will know how to adapt the implementation mode described to another pair of linked verification operations. In addition, a mode of implementation of an authentication method may comprise more than one pair of linked verification operations. It should be noted, moreover, that the method described in relation to [Fig.6] is compatible with the method described in relation to [Fig.5], but that they have not been combined so as not to impair the clarity of [Fig.6].
[0083] As stated previously, in the authentication method of [Fig.6], the VPI and VPN verification operations are linked. More particularly, during the implementation of the VPI verification operation, data A is generated by the device P, then is stored in the device V to be used only for the VPN authentication operation.
[0084] More precisely, during the implementation of the VPI verification operation, the function 304-1 (block "fRl") of the device P is adapted to generate, not only the data item RI and the secret data item sPl, but also to generate a data item A. The data item A is then sent to the device V at the same time as the data item RL. The device V stores the data item A. In the VPN verification operation, the function 203-N (block "fCN") takes as input the data item DataVO, optionally the identification information v and p, the secret data item sVN-1, and the data item A, to provide as output the data item CN and a data item B. The data item CN and B are sent to the device P. The device P is adapted to implement a function 410-N (block "GB") taking as input the data item B to provide as output a data item D used by the function 204-N. According to one example, function 410-N is an encryption function using data B to decrypt data D.
[0085] According to an alternative embodiment not shown, the data A can be generated by another function implemented by the device P. The data B can be generated by another function implemented by the device V.
[0086] An advantage of this embodiment is that it makes it possible to prevent a device that can evade one or more verification operations from implementing the authentication method.
[0087] [Fig.7] illustrates, schematically and in block form, another mode of implementation of a method of authenticating a device of the type of device 22 described in relation to [Fig.2] with an electronic device of the type of device 21 described in relation to [Fig.2].
[0088] The method of [Fig.7] includes elements in common with the method described in relation to [Fig.4]. The common elements are not described again and only the differences between the methods of Figures 4 and 7 are highlighted.
[0089] The method of [Fig.7] differs from the method of [Fig.4] in that the GEN operation described in relation to [Fig.4] is replaced by a GEN operation during which the devices V and P implement a function 502 (block "Data Gen'"). The function 502 is similar to the function 102 but differs in that the function 502 is adapted to provide as much, respectively, data DataVi and DataPi, i varying from 0 to N, as verification operations implemented in the authentication method. The devices V and P do not communicate with each other to generate the data DataVi and DataPi. According to one embodiment, if the devices V and P are intended to communicate with each other, then they are adapted to generate DataVi data identical or affiliated with the data DataPi. The function 502 can be a function for searching for the data DataVO, ..., Data VN, and the data DataPO, ..., DataPN in memory spaces of V and P devices, such as secure memory spaces of V and P devices. .
[0090] Thus, each function 103, 203-0, ..., 203-N is adapted to receive, respectively, the data DataVO, ..., Data VN, and each function 104, 204-0, ..., 204-N is adapted to receive, respectively, the data DataPO, ..., DataPN.
[0091] It should be noted, moreover, that the method described in relation to [Fig.7] is compatible with the methods described in relation to figures 5 and 6, but that they have not been combined so as not to harm the clarity of [Fig.7].
[0092] An advantage of this mode of implementation of the authentication method is that the use of DataVi and DataPi data is different for each verification operation, making it more difficult to copy this authentication method for an electronic device that is not adapted to implement it.
[0093] Various embodiments and variations have been described. Those skilled in the art will understand that certain features of these various embodiments and variations could be combined, and other variations will occur to those skilled in the art. The embodiments of Figures 4 to 7 may all be combined with each other. In particular, a preferred embodiment of an authentication method comprising the combination of all these methods is covered by the present description.
[0094] Furthermore, the present description also relates to devices comprising memories in which are stored data sets making it possible to simulate the implementation of the methods described in relation to figures 4 to 7. More particularly, these devices may comprise data sets representing at least the following data: - CO, ..., CN data; - RO, ..., RN data; - secret data sVO, ..., sVN; - the secret data sPO, ..., sPN; and - vfO, ..., vfN information.
[0095] These data sets may further comprise data representing the encryption and decryption keys pskVO, ..., pskVN, and pskPO, ..., pskPN, or the encrypted data EV0(C0), ..., EVN(CN), and EP0(R0), ..., EPN(RN).
[0096] Finally, the practical implementation of the embodiments and variants described is within the reach of those skilled in the art from the functional indications given above.
Claims
Claims
1. Method for authenticating a first device (P) with a second device (V), comprising at least two successive verification operations (VPO, VPN), each operation comprising the following successive steps: - the second device (V) generates a first data item (CO, Cl, ..., CN) by applying a first function (103, 203-1, ..., 203-N) taking as input a second data item (v, sVl, ..., sVN), and sends said first data item (CO, Cl, ..., CN) to the first device (P); - the first device (P) generates a third data item (RO, RI, ..., RN) and a fourth data item (sPO, sPl, ..., sPN) used by the following verification operation, by applying a second function (104, 204-1, ..., 204-N) taking as input at least the first data item (CO, Cl, ..., CN) received from the second device (V), and sends the third data item (RO, RI, ..., RN) to the second device (V); - the second device (V) verifies the third data item (RO, RI, ..., RN) using a third function (105, 205-1,..., 205-N) taking as input the first data item (C0, Cl, ..., CN) and the third data item (R0, RI, ..., RN) and providing as output information (vfO, vfl, ..., vfN), indicating whether the verification was successful or not, said second data item corresponding, for the first operation, to a fifth data item (DataVO) and being, for the other operations, generated at the previous verification operation; and said second function further taking as input, for the first operation, a sixth data item (DataPO) and, for the other operations, the fourth data item (sPO, sPl, ..., sPN) generated at the previous verification operation, the first device (P) being authenticated to the second device if: - for each verification operation, the information (vfO, vfl, ..., vfN) indicates that the verification was successful; and - if the fourth data (sPO, sPl, ..., sPN) of the first device (P) and the second data (sVO, sVl, ..., sVN) of the second device (V) of the last verification operation are correct, in which the first and second devices (V, P) send each other data in encrypted form, and during the implementation of each of said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN), the first and second devices (V, P) send each other data in an encrypted manner using a first encryption key (pskVO, ..pskVN, pskPO, ..pskPN), said first encryption key (pskVO, ..pskVN, pskPO, ..pskPN) being different for each implementation of each of said at least two verification operations (VPO, VPN).
2. Method according to claim 1, in which: - for each verification operation (VPO, ..VPN), the first function (103, 203-1, ..., 203-N) further takes as input said fifth data (DataVO), and - for each verification operation (VPO, ..., VPN), the second function (104, 204-1, ..., 204-N) further takes as input the sixth data (DataPO).
3. Method according to claim 2, in which the fifth data (DataVO, ..., Data VN) is different for each verification operation (VPO, ..., VPN), and the sixth data (DataPO, ..., DataPN) is different for each verification operation (VPO, ..., VPN).
4. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, further comprising an identification operation (ID) preceding said at least two verification operations, in which the first and second devices (P, V) exchange identification numbers (p, v), if each first, second device (P, V) recognizes the identification number (v, p) of the other device (V, P) then said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN) are not implemented, and the first device (P) is authenticated with the second device (V), otherwise said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN) are implemented.
5. A method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein at least one first function (103, 203-1, ..., 203-N) of said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN) is different from at least one first function (103, 203-1, ..., 203-N) of another of said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN).
6. A method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein at least one second function (104, 204-1, ..., 204-N) of said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN) is different from at least one second function (104, 204-1, ..., 204-N) of another of said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN).
7. A method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein said first encryption key (pskVO, ..., pskVN, pskPO, ..., pskPN) depends on said first encryption key (pskVO, .. pskVN, pskPO, ..pskPN) of said previous verification operations (VPO, .. VPN).
8. Method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein, among said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN), there is at least one first verification operation (VPO, ..., VPN) in which the application of the second function (104, 204-1, ..., 204-N) further generates a seventh data item (A) which is sent to the second device (V), and among said at least two verification operations (VPO, ..., VPN) there is at least one second verification operation (VPO, ..., VPN), successive to the first verification operation (VPO, ..., VPN), in which: - the second device (V) further generates an eighth data item (B) by applying the first function (103, 203-1, ..., 203-N) to the seventh data item (A) and sends the eighth data item (B) to the first device (P); - the first device (P) decrypts a ninth data (D) using the eighth data (B) to generate the third data (R0, RI, ..., RN).
9. Method according to claim 8, in which the first device (P) uses the eighth data (B) to decrypt a ninth data (D), and the second function (104, 204-0,..., 204-N) further takes as input the ninth data (D) to generate the third data (R0, RI,...,RN).
10. Device adapted to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 as a first device (P).
11. Device according to claim 10, comprising a memory in which are stored data representing the first, second, third and fourth data (Cl, ..., CN, sVl, ..., sVN, RI, ..., RN, sPl, ..., sPN) and the information (vfl, ..., vfN).
12. Device adapted to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 as a second device (V).
13. Device according to claim 12, comprising a memory in which are stored data representing the first, second, third and fourth data (Cl, ..., CN, sVl, ..., sVN, RI, ..., RN, sPl, ..., sPN) and the information (vfl, ..., vfN).
