Method and apparatus for increasing blockchain entropy using blinded outcome diversification
The Blinded Outcome Diversification method in blockchain transactions uses nested encryption and random node selection to obscure address associations, enhancing security and privacy by increasing entropy and thwarting monitoring node tracing.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024131271
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2017-09-15
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-07
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2038-09-11
AI Technical Summary
Existing blockchain technologies face security vulnerabilities due to publicly visible transaction addresses, allowing monitoring nodes to trace associations between input and output addresses, compromising privacy and security through data mining and machine learning.
The implementation of a Blinded Outcome Diversification (BOD) method that involves multiple participating nodes generating and diversifying ciphertexts using nested encryption and random selection of nodes as selectors and propagators to increase entropy and obscure address associations.
The BOD method enhances security by reducing the probability of monitoring nodes identifying links between input and output addresses, thereby increasing the entropy of blockchain transactions and limiting pattern inference.
Smart Images

Figure 2024156938000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present invention relates generally to blockchain transactions, and more particularly to methods and apparatus for enhancing security of blockchain implemented transactions. [Background technology]
[0002] In this document, the term "blockchain" is used to include all forms of electronic, computer-based, distributed ledgers. These include, but are not limited to, consensus-based blockchain and transaction chain technologies, permissioned and permissionless ledgers, shared ledgers, and variations thereof. The most widely known application of blockchain technology is the Bitcoin ledger, although other blockchain implementations have been proposed and developed. For convenience and illustrative purposes, this document may refer to Bitcoin, but it should be noted that the invention is not limited to use with the Bitcoin blockchain, and alternative blockchain implementations and protocols are within the scope of the invention.
[0003] A blockchain is a consensus-based electronic ledger implemented as a computer-based decentralized distributed system composed of blocks, which in turn are composed of transactions. Each transaction (Tx) is a data structure that encodes the transfer of control of a digital asset or value between participants in the blockchain system, and contains at least one input and at least one output. Each block contains a hash of the previous block, so that blocks are chained together to create a permanent and immutable record of all transactions written to the blockchain since its inception. Transactions contain small programs, known as scripts, embedded in their inputs and outputs that specify how and by whom the transaction's outputs can be accessed. In the Bitcoin platform, these scripts are written using a stack-based scripting language.
[0004] A network node that receives a new transaction will immediately attempt to push that transaction to other nodes in the network. Before a new transaction can be sent to other nodes, it may be "validated", that is, checked against a set of criteria to ensure that it meets the basic requirements for a valid transaction according to the applicable blockchain protocol.
[0005] For a transaction to be written to the blockchain, it is assembled into a block. This is done by mining nodes ("miners"), which are designed to collect transactions and form them into blocks. Miners then attempt to complete a "proof of work" for the block (specifically the block header). Miners throughout the blockchain network race to first assemble a block of transactions and complete the associated proof of work for that block. Successful miners add their verified block to the blockchain, which is then propagated through the network so other nodes that maintain copies of the blockchain can update their records. Nodes that receive a block also "verify" the block and all transactions within it to ensure that the block follows the formal requirements of the protocol.
[0006] As described, a blockchain transaction may have one or more inputs and one or more outputs. Script embedded in the inputs and outputs specifies how and by whom the transaction output can be accessed. A transaction output may be an address to which a token value may be transferred as a result of that transaction. That token value may then be associated with that output address as an unspent transaction output. Subsequent transactions may then reference that address as an input to spend or distribute that value.
[0007] One of the perceived advantages of blockchain transactions is the ability to transfer token value by associating it with one or more addresses. However, these addresses are publicly displayed on the blockchain ledger, and therefore there is a risk that information about unspent transaction outputs may be observed by nodes that may or may not have participated in the blockchain transaction.
[0008] For example, the development of coin mix services for blockchain ledgers has focused on preventing monitoring nodes from identifying links between input and output addresses. However, while such coin mix operations may make it more difficult to identify or trace token movements between addresses, monitoring nodes may still be able to perform data mining and machine learning operations on publicly available data to determine associations between inputs and outputs for blockchain transactions, and thus trace associations between token values and addresses. The fact that some coin mix operations involve coin mixes creates additional security vulnerabilities in which third-party coordinators may be compromised, resulting in the exposure of more data from the blockchain than would otherwise be publicly available.
[0009] Even if the third-party coordinator is not necessarily compromised, the publicly available information on the blockchain may provide a monitoring node with enough data to detect a pattern that can be attributed to a specific source associated with a set of addresses, allowing the monitoring node to determine that a particular set of addresses involved in transaction mixing are associated with a common owner. This potential pattern information in the public blockchain data may be identifiable through big data analysis using machine learning algorithms, etc. This represents a security and privacy vulnerability of existing blockchain technology, even when coin or value mixing operations are used to enhance security and privacy.
[0010] The entropy of a system may refer to the disorder or uncertainty in the system and may relate to the probability that a monitoring node can infer information about a transaction address after observing several blockchain transactions. The maximum entropy of a system may be given by the logarithm to the base 2 of the number of participants N:
number
number
[0011] Since blockchain transactions can be submitted to a public ledger, monitoring nodes can attribute different probabilities to specific nodes in the system by transaction traffic analysis or timing analysis. The degree of anonymity, d, may be related to the information known by the monitoring nodes and may be measured as the normalized change in entropy:
number
[0012] It would be advantageous to provide a method and apparatus for increasing the entropy of a system to improve security and privacy and reduce the probability of exposing latent patterns in data from multiple transactions. [Means for solving the problem]
[0013] Such an improved method and apparatus for distributing token value via blockchain implemented transactions has now been devised.
[0014] The methods described herein relate to the operation of Blinded Outcome Diversification (BOD) methods to ameliorate some of the challenges and shortcomings described herein. In some implementations, the operation of the BOD methods may increase security by reducing the probability that a monitoring node may determine a link between an input address and an output address in a value-mixed transaction. The methods increase the entropy of the system so that the monitoring node is less able to determine associations between addresses and identify patterns in the data of multiple transactions. The methods may be implemented in participant nodes that participate in a blockchain transaction. Each participant node in the multiple participant nodes may generate or generate a cryptogram based on a common transaction option and a transaction value. A dealer node may randomly designate a selector node from the multiple participant nodes, and the selector node may select one of the transaction options to include in the blockchain transaction. A selector node may be randomly selected from the participating nodes to select transaction options for inclusion in said blockchain transaction for a particular transaction, and since the number of output addresses for inclusion in a blockchain transaction may exceed the number of input addresses, the entropy of the system increases and the ability of the monitoring nodes to successfully identify associations between addresses decreases.
[0015] Thus, in accordance with the present invention there is provided a method and apparatus as defined in the appended claims.
[0016] In one aspect, the present application may describe a computer-implemented method for increasing security of blockchain-implemented transactions involving participation from multiple participating nodes. Each participating node may have its own public key and private key. Each participating node may participate as a message originator, selector, and propagator. The method may include receiving a ciphertext from a predecessor node; determining whether the participating node is a selector node for the ciphertext received from the predecessor node; if the participating node is a selector node for the ciphertext: selecting a subset of the ciphertext and decrypting the selected subset of the ciphertext using the private key of the participating node to provide a selected ciphertext for propagation to a next node; transmitting the selected ciphertext to the next node; if the participating node is other than a selector node for the ciphertext: decrypting the ciphertext received from the predecessor node using the private key of the participating node; and transmitting the decrypted ciphertext to the next node.
[0017] In some implementations, if a participating node is a selector node, the ciphertext may include two or more encrypted messages, and selecting a subset of the ciphertext may include selecting one of the two or more encrypted messages.
[0018] In some implementations, the application may provide an operation for generating a ciphertext, which may include: generating at least two messages including a first message having an output address to which the transaction is to assign a first value and a second message having two output addresses to which the transaction is to assign a second value and a third value to each output address, where a sum of the second value and the third value is the first value; encrypting each of the at least two messages to provide a ciphertext, where each of the at least two messages is a transaction option; and sending the ciphertext to a next node.
[0019] In some implementations, the application may provide that encrypting each of the at least two messages to provide a ciphertext includes: receiving a transaction public key and an ordered list of public keys from a dealer node, where the ordered list of public keys includes a public key associated with each participating node in the plurality of nodes, where the ordered list of public keys is in descending order with the public key associated with the next node being the last public key in the ordered list of public keys; and encrypting each of the at least two messages with the transaction public key and then with the ordered list of public keys, where each encrypted message is a nested encryption of that message.
[0020] In some implementations, the application may provide that each of a plurality of participating nodes may generate transaction options having at least one specified format and at least one specified transaction value.
[0021] In some implementations, the application may provide for operations of receiving an indication from a dealer node that the participating node is a propagator node for a cryptogram originating from another node in the plurality of participating nodes; generating a transaction public key and a transaction private key; and transmitting the transaction public key to the dealer node for transmission to the other node originating the cryptogram.
[0022] In some implementations, if the participating node is a propagator node for the ciphertext, after decrypting the ciphertext using the private key of the participating node, the application may describe subsequent operations of: decrypting the decrypted ciphertext using a transaction private key to provide an unencrypted selected message corresponding to the selected ciphertext provided by a selector node associated with the selected ciphertext; if the unencrypted selected message includes a first output address, encrypting the first output address and an associated first transaction value with the public key of the participating node to provide a propagator output; if the unencrypted selected message includes a second output address and a third output address, encrypting each of the second output address and the third output address together with the associated second transaction value and third transaction value, respectively, with the public key of the participating node to provide the propagator output; and forwarding the propagator output to a successor node for mixing propagator outputs from each of the plurality of participating nodes.
[0023] In some implementations, the application may provide for receiving an indication from a dealer node that the participant node is a selector node for a ciphertext originating from another participant node, where the participant node is randomly designated as the selector node by the dealer node.
[0024] In some implementations, the present application may provide a dealer node that designates one of the plurality of participating nodes as a propagator node and one of the plurality of participating nodes as a selector node associated with the ciphertext, wherein the propagator node, the selector node, and the participating node that originates the ciphertext are different participating nodes in the plurality of participating nodes.
[0025] In some implementations, the present application may describe a dealer node that designates each of the plurality of participating nodes as a propagator node for one other participating node in the plurality of participating nodes.
[0026] In some implementations, the present application may provide that the plurality of participating nodes includes at least four participating nodes.
[0027] In some implementations, the present application may provide that each participating node may simultaneously participate as a message sender, a selector, and a propagator for an associated ciphertext, and that each participating node in the plurality of participating nodes provides a propagator output for an associated ciphertext for which the participating node is designated as a propagator node.
[0028] Features described above in relation to one aspect or implementation may be used in combination with any other aspect or implementation. For each implementation of the method, a corresponding computing device configured to implement the method is provided. Features described in relation to an implementation of the method are also applicable to the corresponding computing device and vice versa.
[0029] In additional or alternative aspects, the present application may provide a non-transitory processor-readable medium storing processor-executable instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform any one or more of the methods described herein for enhancing security of blockchain implemented transactions.
[0030] These and other aspects of the invention will be apparent from and elucidated with reference to the embodiments described hereinafter, embodiments of the invention will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which: [Brief description of the drawings]
[0031] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a block diagram from an example blockchain network relating to a blockchain. [Diagram 2] 1 illustrates a node from an exemplary cycle Ci for implementing the method described herein. [Diagram 3] 4 illustrates an example of an exemplary message that may be generated by a participating node. [Figure 4] FIG. 3 illustrates nested encryption of two or more messages, respectively. [Diagram 5] 1 illustrates an exemplary implementation of nested decryption of ciphertext and selection of transaction options for cycle Ci according to the present application. [Figure 6] 1 illustrates, in flow chart form, an exemplary method implemented in a participant node participating in a blockchain transaction in accordance with the present application. [Figure 7] 1 illustrates, in flow chart form, an exemplary method implemented in a participating node that may be designated as a propagator, in accordance with the present application. [Figure 8] 13 illustrates an example propagator output from a participating node designated as a propagator for cycle C1 in accordance with the present application. [Figure 9]FIG. 1 shows nodes participating in a blockchain transaction according to the present application, with each participating node providing a propagator output from its respective cycle Ci. [Figure 10] 1 illustrates the encryption phase of a propagator node output based on an exemplary coin mixing method according to the present application. [Figure 11] 11 illustrates a decryption phase for the exemplary coin mixing method of FIG. 10 in accordance with the present application. [Figure 12] 13 illustrates a distribution of the number of output address combinations as a function of the number of participating nodes following operation of the method described herein in accordance with the present application. [Figure 13] 1 illustrates, in block diagram form, a simplified example of a participating node in accordance with the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0032] In this application, the term "and / or" is intended to cover all possible combinations and subcombinations of the listed elements, including any one of the listed elements alone, any subcombination, or all of the listed elements, and does not necessarily exclude additional elements.
[0033] As used herein, the phrase "at least one of...or..." is intended to cover any one or more of the listed elements, including any one of the listed elements alone, any subcombination, or all of the listed elements, and does not necessarily exclude additional elements, nor does it necessarily require all elements.
[0034] Reference is now made to FIG. 1, which illustrates in block diagram form an example of a blockchain-related blockchain network 100. The blockchain network 100 is a peer-to-peer open membership network in which anyone may join without an invitation or consent from other members. Distributed electronic devices running an instance of the blockchain protocol under which the blockchain network 100 operates may join the blockchain network 100. Such distributed electronic devices may be referred to as nodes 102. The blockchain protocol may be, for example, the Bitcoin protocol or other cryptocurrency protocol.
[0035] The nodes 102 that may execute the blockchain protocol and the nodes 102 of the blockchain network 100 may be of various types, including, for example, computers, such as desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, servers, mobile devices such as smartphones, wearable computers such as smart watches, or other electronic devices.
[0036] The nodes 102 of the blockchain network 100 may be coupled to one another using any suitable communication technology, which may include wired or wireless communication technology. In some cases, the blockchain network 100 may be implemented at least in part over the Internet, with some of the individual nodes 102 located in geographically distributed locations.
[0037] Nodes 102 may maintain a general ledger of all transactions on the blockchain. The global ledger may be a distributed ledger, and each node 102 may store a full or partial copy of the global ledger. Transactions that affect the global ledger may be verified by other nodes 102 to ensure that the validity of the global ledger is maintained. The details of implementing and operating a blockchain network, such as one that uses the Bitcoin protocol, will be understood by those skilled in the art.
[0038] Each transaction may have one or more inputs and one or more outputs. Scripts embedded in the inputs and outputs specify how and who can access the transaction's output. A transaction output may be an address to which value is transferred as a result of the transaction. That value may then be associated with that output address as an unspent transaction output. Subsequent transactions may then reference that address as an input to spend or distribute that value.
[0039] Although transactions may be pseudo-anonymous in the sense that no personal information is included in transactions on a blockchain ledger, it may theoretically be possible for a monitoring device to track or associate transfers of value in a chain of transactions and, in some cases, use external data to associate the transferred value with a particular entity. External data may include information extracted, for example, from internet blog sites, social media, or other third-party systems, about a particular user associated with a participating node. Development of coin mixing services for blockchain ledgers has focused on preventing monitoring devices from easily associating transaction input and output addresses to associate transfers of digital assets from one entity to another. For example, a coin mixing system may include a set of devices that pool assets (e.g., bitcoins) together and then distribute the pooled assets to alternative device addresses. These coin mixing systems may increase the difficulty for monitoring devices to associate transaction input and output addresses.
[0040] As described, some coin mixing systems may utilize a shuffling operation to disassociate input addresses from output addresses for a blockchain transaction. However, a typical shuffling operation may utilize a pseudorandom process to shuffle the order of addresses, which may be derived from mathematical operations that are inherently deterministic. Thus, a monitoring device may attempt a "brute force" type attack to infer information about one or more participating nodes in a blockchain transaction.
[0041] In this specification, the expressions "participating node" and its "output address" may be used. References to the "output address" of a participating node are not intended to refer to the network address of a physical node, but rather the "output address" is an address specified in a transaction on the blockchain that has unspent value. A physical node can claim ownership of that unspent value by having a key corresponding to a signature on that transaction. In this sense, the "output address" is not the address of the participating node, but the blockchain transaction output address associated with the participating node. Any references to the "output address" of a participating node in this specification should be understood as such.
[0042] The present application may describe methods performed by multiple participants. For example, the multiple participant nodes may include at least four participant nodes. Many more participant nodes may participate in the blockchain transactions described herein.
[0043] Each participating node may be a computing device that participates in a blockchain transaction. A computing device may participate as a message originator that generates a message and then encrypts the message. A computing device may also participate as a selector that selects a subset of ciphertexts, where the subset may have been generated by another participating node in the plurality of participating nodes. A computing device may also participate as a propagator for ciphertexts that may have been originated from yet another participating node in the plurality of participating nodes.
[0044] This application describes a dealer node for distributing public and private keys. In some implementations, the dealer node may be a node other than a participant node, and the dealer node may transfer public keys from one participant node to another. In addition, the dealer node may assign specific roles to the participant nodes. For example, each participant node may be a message originator. In addition, the dealer node may assign each participant node as a selector for ciphertexts originating from other participant nodes and as a propagator for ciphertexts originating from yet other participant nodes. The respective operations of the originator, selector, and propagator are described later in this document.
[0045] Reference is now made to FIG. 2, which illustrates an exemplary cycle C according to the present application. i The subset of participating nodes for cycle C is shown diagrammatically. i may generally be defined by the operations performed by multiple participant nodes for a given blockchain transaction. The dealer node 210 may randomly designate certain participant nodes as selector nodes and certain participant nodes as propagator nodes.
[0046] Dealer Node 210 is also a Cycle i Each participating node may be associated with a public key and a private key, and the public key of each participating node may be shared with each of the other participating nodes. In some example implementations, the dealer node 210 (1) specifies the order or position of each participating node and (2) determines the order or position of each participating node in the cycle C. i The node may send an ordered list of public keys to each participating node based on the order or position of each participating node with respect to cycle C. i The order or position of each participating node among the participating nodes for may be determined randomly or in any other manner.
[0047] The dealer node 210 may designate one of the multiple participant nodes as a propagator node and one of the multiple participant nodes as a selector node. That is, the dealer node 210 may designate a selector 230 and a propagator 240 to select and prepare messages from the sender 220, respectively. i In the cycle C, the sender 220, the selector 230, and the propagator 240 each i For example, cycle C1 may show BOD operations performed by multiple participating nodes, where a message may be generated by node U1 and a transaction option may be generated by node U2. j The selected transaction option may be selected by node U. n may be propagated by, n may represent the number of participating nodes, and 1 <j<nである。
[0048] The dealer node 210 may designate the propagator 240 to decrypt messages originating from the originator 220. The decrypted message may be a transaction to be included in a blockchain transaction. In some examples, the blockchain transaction may be a transaction for a coin mixing operation. The propagator 240 may be a Cycle C i Transaction public / private key (P i D / V i D In some implementations, before the originator 220 generates and encrypts a message, the propagator 240 generates a transaction public key (P i D ) to the dealer node 210, which then receives its transaction public key (P i D ) may be sent to the sender 220. iFor each transaction, the dealer node 210 generates a public transaction key (P i D ) to the sender 220.
[0049] The dealer node 210 may randomly designate a selector 230, which may be any of a number of participating nodes. As described below, the selector 230 receives the ciphertexts from the preceding participating nodes, selects a subset of the received ciphertexts, and decrypts the selected subset of the ciphertexts using the private key of the selector 230 to generate cycle C. i The selector 230 may provide a selected ciphertext for propagation to the next node in the chain. As will be evident from the methods described herein, the selector 230 may be selected randomly by the dealer node 210, and since the selection mechanisms from each of the participating nodes may be different, the distribution of token values by blockchain transactions may be provided in a less deterministic manner to ameliorate some of the security shortcomings described herein.
[0050] Reference is now made to FIG. 3. FIG. 3 diagrammatically illustrates exemplary messages that may be generated by any participating node. When a participating node may be designated as an originator 220 (FIG. 2) that originates a cryptogram, the participating node may generate at least two messages including a first message having one output address to which the transaction should assign a first value and a second message having two output addresses to which the transaction should assign a second value and a third value to the respective output addresses. The sum of the second value and the third value may be equal to the first value. Further, the participating node may encrypt each of the at least two messages to provide a cryptogram, and each of the at least two messages may be a transaction option. The participating node may then transmit the generated cryptogram to the next node.
[0051] To illustrate, the originator 220 may generate a first message (r1) 350 and a second message (r2) 360. The first message 350 may include a first output address 356. The second message 360 may include a second output address 366 and a third output address 368. In this example, the originator 220 generates two transaction options including (i) an option to split an input value for the transaction (e.g., 10 Bitcoins) into two identical values (e.g., 5 Bitcoins), each of which may be associated with a respective output address, or (ii) an option to send the entire input value (e.g., 10 Bitcoins) to a single output address. The selection of one of the two message options may be made by a randomly designated selector 230 (FIG. 2). The selector 230 may select an option without knowing who the originator is. As described below, each of the message options undergoes nested encryption with the transaction public key and the public keys of multiple participating nodes, so that the selection of one of two or more message options may be made by selector 230 without any knowledge of the message contents (e.g., token value and output address).
[0052] Message options format cycle C i and each participating node that performs the operation of transmitting a ciphertext may define its cycle C iThat is, in some implementations, each of a plurality of participating nodes may generate transaction options having at least one specified format and at least one specified transaction value. For example, in FIG. 3, the specified message option format may include a first message 350 having a first transaction value 352 (e.g., 10 Bitcoins) and a first output address 356. The message option format may also be specified to include a second message 360 having a second transaction value 362 (e.g., 5 Bitcoins) and a third transaction value 364 (e.g., 5 Bitcoins), where the second transaction value 362 may be associated with a second output address 366 and the third transaction value 364 may be associated with a third output address 368. Each of these message options may be associated with a second message 360 having a third transaction value 362 (e.g., 5 Bitcoins) and a third output address 368. i This could be a transaction option.
[0053] The originator 220 may encrypt those message options to provide the ciphertext. For example, the originator 220 may receive a transaction public key and an ordered list of public keys from the dealer node 210. The ordered list of public keys may include a public key associated with each participating node in the plurality of participating nodes. The ordered list of public keys may be in reverse or descending order, with the public key associated with the next node being the last public key in the ordered list of public keys. Additionally, the originator 220 may encrypt each message option with the transaction key and then with the ordered list of public keys. Each encrypted message is a nested encryption of that message.
[0054] In the above example, a participating node may generate the second message with two output addresses, but in some implementations the second message may include three or more output addresses where the transaction assigns a value to each output address, and the sum of the assigned values may equal the first value. For example, the second message may include three output addresses where the transaction assigns a second value, a third value, and a fourth value to each output address, and the sum of the second value, the third value, and the fourth value may equal the first value. That is, in some implementations the second message may include any number of output addresses for associating with values.
[0055] Reference is now made to FIG. 4. FIG. 4 shows cycle C i Cycle C i and an ordered list of the public keys of the participating nodes in descending order for i, j, i and k, j.
[0056] Specifically, FIG. 4 illustrates a nested encryption 450 of a first message (r1) 350 (FIG. 3). The originator 220 (1) obtains a transaction public key (e.g., provided by the dealer node 210 and whose cycle C i 3) (generated by the propagator 240 for r1), and then (2) encrypt a first message (r1) 350 using the ordered list of public keys in reverse order.
[0057] For example, cycle C i includes five participating nodes, the originator 220 may (1) encrypt a first message (r1) using the transaction public key, and then (2) sequentially encrypt it using public keys associated with the fifth participating node, the fourth participating node, the third participating node, and the second participating node.
[0058] Similarly, Figure 4 also illustrates a nested encryption 460 of a second message (r2) 360 (Figure 3). The originator 220 may (1) encrypt the second message (r2) using the transaction public key, and then (2) sequentially encrypt it using the public keys associated with the fifth participating node, the fourth participating node, the third participating node, and the second participating node. The combination of the nested encryption of the first message (r1) and the second message (r2) is called the cycle C. i 3 and 4 includes two message or transaction options (e.g., a first message (r1) and a second message (r2)), but in some example implementations, the sender 220 may send a ciphertext associated with the sender 220 for cycle C. i For example, you may generate three or more transaction options.
[0059] The nested encryption of the first message (r1) and the second message (r2) is performed in cycle C according to the order specified by the dealer node 210. i The nested encryption of the first message (r1) and the second message (r2) are successively decrypted as each successive participating node uses its private key to decrypt the received ciphertext. The ciphertext is finally passed to the propagator 240 (e.g., i When the ciphertext is sent to the participating nodes for cycle C (the last node for cycle C), the propagator 240 may decrypt the ciphertext using the propagator 240's private key and then decrypt the resulting ciphertext using the transaction private key. i The transaction public key may correspond to a transaction public key that the propagator 240 previously sent to the dealer node 210 for transmission to the originator 220 of the transaction.
[0060] Reference is now made to FIG. 5. FIG. 5 shows cycle C i Diagrammatically shows nested decryption of ciphertext and selection of transaction options for Cycle C. i In general, cycle C may be defined by the operations performed by multiple participating nodes. i Cycle C may have eight participating nodes 502. For ease of illustration, the individual participating nodes 502 may be identified as "U1," "U2," "U3," "U4," "U5," "U6," "U7," and "U8." Although the participating nodes for the cycle shown in FIG. 5 include eight participating nodes, any number of nodes may participate in cycle C. i In some implementations, the number of participating nodes may be any number greater than three. Figure 5 illustrates cycle C1, in which node U1 may originate a message and generate a ciphertext. Additionally, the dealer node may designate node U6 as a selector node and node U8 as a propagator node.
[0061] A dealer node may specify a node order or node position. In FIG. 5, the dealer node may specify a node order according to an ascending node identifier order such as U1 to U8. However, in some examples, the dealer node may specify a node order in any other manner, and the node order may not follow an ascending node identifier order.
[0062] In general, the sender 220 (FIG. 2) i The propagator 240 may be the first participating node for the last participating node U n The selector 230 may select the intermediately located participant U jIt may be the case that, where n is the number of participating nodes and 1 < j < n. The dealer node may designate node U6 as selector node 230 (Figure 2). Thus, in Figure 5, the sender 220 may be node U1, the selector 230 may be node U6, and the propagator 240 (Figure 2) may be node U8. Node U6 is designated as selector 230, but selector 230 may be any other node that is not the sender or the propagator. In Figure 5, the dealer node may also randomly designate any one of node U2, node U3, node U4, node U5, or node U7 as selector 230.
[0063] Before executing the operation of cycle C1, node U8 may receive an indication from dealer node 210 that node U8 is the propagator 240 for the ciphertext transmitted from sender 220. It should be understood that in some implementations, propagator 240 may not need to know which participating node is sender 220. Further, propagator 240 may not need to know which participating node is sender 220. Propagator 240 only needs to know that it can execute the operation of a propagator for ciphertext transmitted from another participating node at a plurality of participating nodes. Node U8 may generate a transaction public key and a transaction private key, and may transmit the transaction public key to dealer node 210 for transmission to sender 220.
[0064] The dealer node may also transmit an ordered list of public keys to the originator 220. In the example of FIG. 5, the dealer node 210 may transmit an ordered list of public keys (e.g., public keys associated with nodes U8, U7, U6, U5, U4, U3, U2). The order of the transmitted public keys may be based on a participating node order specified by the dealer node 210. In the example of FIG. 5, the ordered list of public keys may be a descending ordered list of public keys, i.e., public keys associated with nodes U8, U7, U6, ..., U3, U2. As is apparent from the description herein, when node U1 generates a message option and encrypts the message option using nested encryption operations to provide a ciphertext, the ciphertext is transmitted sequentially to the next node in the ordered participating nodes and is thus decrypted sequentially using the respective private keys associated with each "next node."
[0065] In FIG. 5, node U1 may generate at least two messages including a first message and a second message. The first message may be a first message option including a first output address to which the transaction assigns a first value. The second message may be a second message option including a second output address to which the transaction assigns a second value and a third output address to which the transaction assigns a third value. When these two messages are provided for cycle C1, node U1 may encrypt the first message (r1) and the second message (r2), respectively, using the nested encryption operation briefly described with reference to FIG. 4. The combination of the nested encrypted first message (r1) and the nested encrypted second message (r2) may be a ciphertext, and node U1 may transmit the ciphertext to node U2.
[0066] Reference is now made simultaneously to FIG. 6, which illustrates in flow chart form an exemplary method 600 implemented in a participant node participating in a blockchain transaction in accordance with the present application. Method 600 may include operations that may be performed by one or more processors at one of the participant nodes of the blockchain transaction. This implementation assumes that the participant node performing the operations is not the originator of the received cryptogram.
[0067] To illustrate, consider a participating node performing the operations of method 600 of Figure 6 as node U2. At operation 610, a processor may receive a ciphertext from a predecessor node. In this example, the predecessor node may be node U1, and the ciphertext may include a combination of a nested encrypted first message (r1) and a nested encrypted second message (r2). The combination of the nested encrypted messages may be the ciphertext.
[0068] At operation 620, the processor may determine whether the participating node is a selector node for the ciphertext received from a previous node. In FIG. 5, node U6 may be the designated selector node. At operation 620, the processor may determine that node U2 is not a selector node for the ciphertext received from node U1. That is, a participating node is other than a selector node for the ciphertext received from node U1.
[0069] If the processor determines that the participating node is other than the selector node for the received ciphertext, then the processor may decrypt the received ciphertext using the private key of the participating node (e.g., node U2) in operation 660. Because node U1 (the originator) performed the operation of generating a nested encrypted message using the set of public keys corresponding to the specified node order, node U2 may decrypt the "current" state of the ciphertext 504 received from node U1.
[0070] The processor may then send the decrypted ciphertext to the next participating node (e.g., node U3). Once node U2 decrypts the "current state" of the ciphertext 504 using node U2's private key, the originally generated first message (r1) and the originally generated second message (r2) are decrypted, and the "subsequent current state" of the ciphertext (shown in FIG. 5 as reference numeral 506) is such that fewer public keys may be required to provide an unencrypted version of the ciphertext. As shown in FIG. 5, once node U2 decrypts the "current" state of the ciphertext 504, the decrypted ciphertext may be a nested encryption that requires a remaining list of public keys to be used to provide an unencrypted version of the ciphertext.
[0071] If, in operation 620, the processor determines that the participant node is a selector node for the ciphertext, then, in operation 630, the processor may select the subset of the ciphertext. To illustrate, assume that the participant node performing the operations of method 600 of FIG. 6 is node U6. The dealer node may have designated node U6 as a selector, so that, in operation 630, the processor may select one of the nested encrypted first message (r1) and the nested encrypted second message (r2). If the participant node performing the operations is node U6, the ciphertext received from the predecessor node is shown as the ciphertext identified by reference numeral 508 in FIG. 5. This ciphertext includes both the first message (r1) and the second message (r2) encrypted with the transaction public key and the private keys associated with nodes U8, U7, and U6, respectively. In FIG. 6, the selector node may select the nested encrypted second message (r2) as the subset of the ciphertext. In some implementations, the selection of the first message (r1) or the second message (r2) may be based on input received at a selector node, although the selection may be made in any other manner.
[0072] At operation 640, the processor may decrypt the selected subset of the ciphertexts using a private key associated with node U6 to provide selected ciphertext. For example, the processor may decrypt a nested encrypted second message (r2) using the private key of node U6 to provide selected ciphertext 510.
[0073] In operation 650, the processor may transmit the selected ciphertext 510 to the next participating node. As shown in FIG. 5, node U6 propagates the selected ciphertext 510 to node U7. Because the processor did not select the nested encrypted ciphertext corresponding to the first message (r1), the first message (m1) may not be propagated to any subsequent participating nodes for cycle C1. That is, the nested encrypted ciphertext corresponding to the first message (r1) may never be received at the propagator node U8.
[0074] In some example implementations, even if the nested encrypted ciphertext corresponding to the first message (r1) is eventually propagated to node U7, subsequent participating nodes may not be able to successfully decrypt the nested encrypted ciphertext according to the nested order of encryption / decryption because node U6 does not use its private key to decrypt the non-selected ciphertext associated with the first message (r1).
[0075] To further illustrate, consider a participating node performing the operations of method 600 of FIG. 6 as node U7. At operation 610, a processor may receive a ciphertext from node U6. In this example, the received ciphertext may be the selected ciphertext 510. The selected ciphertext 510 may be the "current state" of the ciphertext, which may be a second message (r2) encrypted with the transaction public key and public keys associated with the eighth and seventh participating nodes.
[0076] In operation 620, the processor may determine that the participating node, node U7, is other than the selector node for the received ciphertext. In the first cycle C1, the selector node may be node U6, and node U7 may be positioned subsequent to node U6.
[0077] At operation 660, the processor may decrypt the received selected ciphertext 510 using a private key associated with node U7 to provide a decrypted ciphertext for propagation to node U8. In this example, the decrypted ciphertext may be a second message (r2) encrypted with the transaction public key and a public key associated with node U8. That is, the decrypted ciphertext may be the pre-propagator ciphertext 512, as shown in FIG. 5. Thus, at operation 660, the processor may send the pre-propagator ciphertext 512 to the propagator node, node U8.
[0078] Reference is now made to FIG. 7, which illustrates in flow chart form an exemplary method 700 implemented at a participant node in accordance with the present application. A participant node may be (1) other than a selector 230 (FIG. 2) or (2) one designated by a dealer as a propagator 240 (FIG. 2). i In some implementations, the participating nodes performing the operations may include operations that may be performed by one or more processors at one of the participating nodes of a blockchain transaction in cycle C. i is not the source node of the received ciphertext for
[0079] At operation 760, the processor may decrypt the received ciphertext using the participating node's private key to provide a decrypted ciphertext. Operation 760 shown in Figure 7 may correspond to operation 660 shown in Figure 6.
[0080] In operation 710, the processor may determine whether the participating node is a propagator 240 (FIG. 2). If the participating node is not a propagator 240, the processor may transmit the decrypted ciphertext to the next node in operation 750. To illustrate, assume that the current participating node is a participating node other than the selector and a participating node other than the propagator. For example, assume that the participating node is the second participating node, node U2, in FIG. 5. In operation 750, the processor may transmit the decrypted ciphertext 506 to the next node in cycle C. i may be transmitted to the next participating node, for example node U3.
[0081] At operation 710, the processor determines whether the participating node is in cycle C. i If the processor determines that the selected message is a propagator 240 for the transaction, then in operation 720, the processor may decrypt the decrypted ciphertext using the transaction private key to provide an unencrypted selected message that corresponds to the selected ciphertext provided by the selector node.
[0082] To illustrate, assume that a participating node performing the operations of method 700 of FIG. 7 is node U8. In operation 760, the processor may decrypt the received ciphertext using a private key of node U8 to provide a decrypted ciphertext. Further, in operation 720, if the participating node is a propagator node for the decrypted ciphertext, the processor may decrypt the decrypted ciphertext using a transaction private key to provide an unencrypted selected message corresponding to the selected ciphertext provided by a selector node associated with the selected ciphertext. The operations described herein may be performed for a given cycle C iFor any participating node (e.g., acting in parallel as a monitoring node), it may be necessary to perform the decryption using: (1) the private key associated with that propagator node, and (2) the transaction private key, so that the propagator (and thus the propagator output(s)) can be associated with the originator in cycle C. i Inferring a chain of participating nodes between multiple participating nodes for can be more difficult.
[0083] In cycle C1 of the present example of FIG. 5, the selector, node U6, selected a subset of ciphertext originating from node U1. The selected subset of ciphertext included a nested encrypted second message. Recall that the second message (r2) 360 (FIG. 3) may include a second output address 366 (FIG. 3) associated with a second transaction value 362 (e.g., 5 Bitcoins) and a third output address 368 (FIG. 3) associated with a third transaction value 364 (e.g., 5 Bitcoins). Because the unencrypted selected message includes two output addresses, in operation 740, the processor may encrypt each of the unencrypted output addresses and associated values with a public key of a participating node (e.g., node U8) to provide a propagator node output.
[0084] However, if the selected subset of ciphertexts included a nested encrypted first message (not shown in FIG. 5), then in operation 730, the processor may encrypt the unencrypted output address and associated value using the public key of the participating node (e.g., node U8) to provide a propagator node output.
[0085] In the method described herein, the sender 220 receives the cycle C iThe originator 220 may have knowledge of the ordering of the participant nodes for the cycle C. However, the originator 220 may not have knowledge of which participant nodes may be selectors 230. The originator 220 may have knowledge of which participant nodes are propagators 240, but because the transaction public key is transmitted to the originator 220 through the dealer node 210, the propagators 240 may not have knowledge of which participant nodes are originators 220. The originator 220 may have knowledge of which participant nodes are propagators 240 and could request the transaction private key from the propagators 240, but doing so would negate the advantages provided by the methods described herein. That is, the originator 220 may not have knowledge of which participant nodes may be selectors 230 for the cycle C described herein. i If one were to attempt to bypass the operation on , the benefits realized by removing the selection process from certain participating nodes would be negated.
[0086] Reference is now made to Figure 8, which illustrates possible propagator node outputs from node U8 in accordance with the present application. To illustrate the possible propagator node outputs from each of operations 730 or 740, Figure 8 graphically illustrates the possible propagator node outputs from node U8 for cycle C1 shown in Figure 5.
[0087] If the selector (e.g., node 6) selects a subset of ciphertexts that includes a nested encrypted first message (r1) (not shown in FIG. 5), then in operation 720 (FIG. 7), the processor may provide a first unencrypted selected message (r1) 880, shown in FIG. 8.
[0088] If the selector (e.g., node 6) selects a subset of the ciphertext that includes a nested encrypted second message (r2), then in operation 720 (FIG. 7), the processor may provide a second unencrypted selected message (r2) 890, shown in FIG. 8.
[0089] In operation 730, if the unencrypted selected message includes the first output address, the processor may encrypt the first output address and the associated first transaction value with the public key of node U8 to provide a propagator output. That is, the first unencrypted selected message (r1) 880 may include an output address associated with a transaction value. In operation 730, the propagator output may be the first propagator output 885.
[0090] In operation 740, if the unencrypted selected message includes a second output address and a third output address, the processor may encrypt the second output address and the associated second transaction value with the public key of node U8 and may encrypt the third output address and the associated third transaction value with the public key of node U8 to provide a propagator output. That is, the second unencrypted selected message (r2) 890 may include two output addresses, each associated with a transaction value. In operation 740, the propagator output may be a second propagator output 895 that includes two outputs. Each output may represent a split transaction value. For example, if the selector (e.g., node 6) selects a subset of ciphertext associated with splitting a transaction output into two outputs (e.g., splitting 10 bitcoins into two 5 bitcoin messages), in operation 740, the propagator will include two outputs.
[0091] Therefore, cycle C iAt the end of the cycle, depending on the message option selection made by the selector node, the propagator may generate either a one-line propagator output having one output address, or two one-line propagator outputs having two output addresses. As described, in the example cycle C1 shown in Figure 5, the propagator (e.g., node U8) provides two one-line propagator outputs, such as the second propagator output 895 shown in Figure 8.
[0092] In addition to the first cycle C1 shown in FIG. i An operation associated with may be performed by the participating nodes. For example, cycle C2 may be generated, where node U2 may be the originator, and the dealer node may randomly designate the selector and propagator for cycle C2. Similarly, cycles C3, C4, ..., and C8 may be generated, where nodes U3, U4, ..., and U8 may be the originators, respectively, and the dealer node may randomly designate the selector and propagator for each cycle. The dealer node may then generate a cycle C3, C4, ..., and C8, where nodes U3, U4, ..., and U8 are the originators, respectively, and the dealer node may randomly designate the selector and propagator for each cycle. i For each cycle C, the selector node may be randomly selected among the participating nodes. i Because the selector nodes for are randomly assigned, the methods described herein may increasingly limit the possibilities for the monitoring nodes to infer decision patterns.
[0093] The methods described herein contemplate that a monitoring node may be interested in associating one or more output addresses with a particular entity so that token transfers can be tracked. However, the only output addresses that may be known to a participating node may be those for which the node is a propagator. In the methods described herein, a propagator may be the i The monitoring node may not have knowledge of the sender for a given cycle C iTo limit the possibilities of guessing which participating node may be a selector in a cycle, the dealer node may randomly designate a participating node as a selector, where the random designation in one cycle is independent of any designation of that participating node for another cycle. According to the method described herein, a first participating node may be a selector for some cycles. i The second participating node may be designated as the selector in any cycle of C i It is not necessary for the selector to be specified in
[0094] In some implementations, each participating node in the plurality of participating nodes may be designated as a propagator for at most one cycle. For example, once node U8 is designated as a propagator for cycle C1 (e.g., node 1 is the sender), node U8 cannot be a propagator for any other cycle (e.g., node U8 may not be a propagator for cycles C2, C3, ..., or C8).
[0095] In some implementations, with N participating nodes, there may be N cycles. The N cycles may be run in parallel, provided that the dealer node(s) designate certain participating nodes as selectors and propagators for each of the N cycles, and public transaction keys and participant node public keys are exchanged a priori (e.g., see Figure 2).
[0096] Reference is now made to Figure 9, which diagrammatically illustrates a propagator node output 904 after operations performed by participating nodes 902 over N cycles may be completed in accordance with the present application. In the illustrated example of Figure 9, there may be eight participating nodes participating in a blockchain transaction. Thus, there may be eight cycles (e.g., cycles C1, C2, ... and C8).
[0097] In FIG. 9, each of the participant nodes may be designated as a propagator for ciphertext originating from a sender. The sender may be a different participant node than the designated propagator. In FIG. 9, each participant node Ui may be a propagator and may provide either one line propagator output or two one line propagator outputs based on messages originated by other participant nodes Uj.
[0098] To illustrate, if node U8 is designated as the propagator of a message originating from node U1 (e.g., cycle C1 shown in Figure 5), node U8 will output the propagator output r 1α and r 1β Such a 1-line propagator may provide two outputs.
[0099] In another example, if node U1 is designated as a propagator for messages originating from node U7, node U1 will have a propagator output r 7α and r 7β Such a 1-line propagator may provide two outputs.
[0100] In another example, if node U2 is designated as a propagator for a message originating from node U6, node U2 will receive the propagator output r 6α Such as, 1 line propagator output may be provided.
[0101] In the example implementation described herein, at the end of the N cycles, each participating node may provide a propagator output. The number of provided propagator outputs for the N cycles may be greater than the number of participating nodes because it may be statistically unlikely that the selector for each of the N cycles would select a transaction option that does not split the input value (e.g., splitting 10 bitcoins into two 5 bitcoin message outputs in the example described herein).
[0102] Thus, to construct a blockchain transaction that may involve multiple participant nodes, a shuffling technique may be performed to merge the propagator outputs such that the propagator node outputs are assembled in a random order. In a scenario where a selector may select a transaction option to split an input value (e.g., splitting 10 Bitcoins into two 5 Bitcoin message outputs in the example described herein), after the propagator outputs are shuffled and merged, the two output addresses associated with the split input values (e.g., 5 Bitcoins each) may no longer be adjacent in the shuffled / merged propagator output set.
[0103] To illustrate operations for shuffling and merging propagator output values, reference is now made to Figures 10 and 11, which diagrammatically show an exemplary CircleShuffle operation for shuffling and merging the propagator node outputs of participating nodes into blockchain transactions as described herein. The CircleShuffle operation may be one example of shuffling and merging output addresses, although any other coin mixing method or operation may be used in combination with the BOD operations described herein.
[0104] Figure 10 illustrates the encryption phase for a CircleShuffle operation. Figure 11 illustrates the decryption phase for a CircleShuffle operation. For ease of explanation, the exemplary CircleShuffle operation described with reference to Figures 10 and 11 assumes a group of four participating nodes, although more than four participating nodes may be desired to realize the advantages of the operations described herein.
[0105] The encryption phase for the CircleShuffle operation of FIG. 10 includes four participating nodes 1002. For ease of exposition, the individual participating nodes may be identified as “U1”, “U2”, “U3”, and “U4”. In particular, node U1 may be the designated propagator of node U3’s transactions in which the token value may not be split. Node U2 may be the designated propagator of node U1’s transactions in which the token value may not be split. Node U3 may be the designated propagator of node U4’s transactions in which the token value may be split. Node U4 may be the designated propagator of node U2’s transactions in which the token value may be split. As an illustrative example, the input value may be 10 Bitcoins, and if the participating nodes choose to split the input value, two 5 Bitcoin values may each be associated with the output value. If the input value may be split, selector 230 (FIG. 2) may select a message option to provide two one-line propagator outputs. That is, the two one-line propagator outputs may be two output addresses, and each output address may be associated with a transaction value (see, for example, second message (r2) 360 in FIG. 3).
[0106] In FIG. 10, each participating node 1002 may encrypt a set of shuffled options (SSO) 1004 with the public key of the next node. To illustrate, node U1 may encrypt its propagator output (e.g., r 3α ) using the public key associated with node U1, and the shuffled set of options (e.g., the encrypted propagator output r 3α(including the transaction value) may be encrypted with the public key of node U2. In some implementations, the propagator output may be associated with a transaction value and an output address associated with the transaction value. Node U1 may encrypt the SSO with the public key of node U2. Then, when the encrypted SSO is sent to node U2, node U2 may decrypt the SSO. That is, a node that does not have the private key associated with node U2 may not be able to decrypt the SSO.
[0107] When node U2 receives the encrypted SSO from node U1, node U2 may (i) decrypt the received encrypted SSO; (ii) encrypt U2's propagator outputs using node U2's public key; and (iii) shuffle the order of the encrypted propagator outputs included in the SSO. Once the encrypted propagator outputs have been shuffled, the shuffled SSO may be encrypted using the public key associated with node U3. Node U2 may forward the updated, encrypted SSO to the next node.
[0108] In some implementations, participating nodes may utilize any suitable pseudo-random process when performing operations to shuffle the order of encrypted addresses within an SSO, and it may be appreciated that the pseudo-random process for shuffling addresses may be generated by any mathematical procedure that is inherently deterministic.
[0109] Node U3, upon receiving the encrypted shuffled SSO from node U2, may perform a similar operation and may similarly encrypt the updated shuffled SSO with the public key of node U4. Node U3 may forward the updated encrypted SSO to the next node, node U4. Similarly, node U4, upon receiving the encrypted shuffled SSO from node U3, may perform an operation and may similarly encrypt the updated shuffled SSO with the public key of node U1. Node U4 may forward the updated encrypted SSO to the next node, node U1.
[0110] Following the encryption / shuffle operation shown in FIG. 10, in FIG. 11, node U1 receives the set of shuffled outputs. Node U1 may decrypt the received SSO using node U1's private key and look up node U1's encrypted output address in the SSO. When node U1 obtains node U1's encrypted propagator output, node U1 may decrypt the propagator output using node U1's private key and then re-encrypt the propagator output using node U1's public key. Node U1 may encrypt the updated SSO with the public key associated with the next available participating node, node Ui. The next available participating node, node Ui, does not necessarily have to be node U2, but can be another one of the participating nodes.
[0111] Node Ui may then perform similar operations to decrypt the received encrypted updated SSO, look up the propagator output associated with node Ui, decrypt the propagator output using the private key associated with node Ui, and re-encrypt the address with the public key of node U1. Node Ui may also encrypt the updated SSO with the public key of another participating node (e.g., a participating node in the set {U1, U2, ..., Un}).
[0112] Once each participating node looks up its encrypted propagator output in the received SSO, (i) replaces the header with its corresponding decrypted value, and re-encrypts the output addresses with node U1's public key, the final updated encrypted SSO may be sent to node U1. In an exemplary implementation, the final updated encrypted SSO may include the output addresses encrypted with node U1's public key.
[0113] Once node U1 receives the final updated encrypted SSO, node U1 may decrypt the SSO using a private key associated with node U1 to provide the output addresses. Permutation of the output addresses in the final SSO may correspond to the final ordering of the outputs included in the targeted blockchain transaction.
[0114] In some implementations, node U1 may generate a blockchain transaction with the output addresses from the final updated SSO. The input from node U1 may be added to the blockchain transaction using the SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY signature script, and any other participating nodes may iteratively add inputs to the transaction. Node U1 may send the transaction to the next participating node, which may check that the corresponding output information of the node is correct, add its own input, sign the transaction, and forward the transaction to the next participating node. Similar operations are performed by any number of remaining participating nodes until the last of the participating nodes signs the transaction and submits it to the blockchain.
[0115] It can be appreciated that when generating a blockchain transaction for N participating nodes to transfer value having the same value (e.g., each of the N participating nodes transferring 10 bitcoins associated with one or more output addresses), a monitoring node can observe the input and output addresses over time and attempt to correctly associate the transfer of value with a particular transaction address.
[0116] However, when generating a blockchain transaction using a coin mixing operation in combination with the BOD operation described herein for N participant nodes, m participant nodes may choose to transfer value to multiple output addresses. The probability that the monitoring node correctly associates an input address with the corresponding correct combination of output addresses (or a single output address) based on data mining and machine learning operations may decrease as the number of propagator outputs increases. For example, if m participant nodes may choose to transfer tokens to multiple output addresses via a blockchain transaction, Nm participant nodes may transfer value to a single output address, and m participant nodes may split the value into k amounts. Thus, the number of output addresses included in the coin mixing transaction may be:
number
number
[0117] If the transfer of value can be divided evenly, then the number of possible combinations among m participants that divide the value being transferred into k amounts may be given by:
number
number
[0118] In some implementations, the probability that a monitoring node will correctly associate one or more output addresses with a participating device may be given as follows: If the transferred value associated with a certain output address is equal to the input (maximum) amount, then the probability may be given by: Pa=1 / (Nm) If the transferred value associated with an output address can be less than the input (or maximum) amount, then the probability of associating that output with an input address may be given by: P1=1 / (km) If the transferred value associated with some output address can be less than the input (or maximum) amount, the probability of associating some output addresses such that the sum of the transferred values is equal to the input (maximum) amount may be given by: Pk=1 / (nC) Thus, in some implementations, the probability that a monitoring node will correctly associate a single output address with a single input address may be given by:
number
number
[0119] Thus, when the BOD operations described herein are performed, the number of combinations of output addresses for transferring tokens may be greater than if the coin mixing method could be performed by itself. That is, when the BOD operations described herein are performed, the probability that the monitoring node can correctly associate one or more output addresses with input addresses may be lower than if the coin mixing method could be performed by itself. Thus, the methods described herein are directed to distributing token values in a less deterministic manner to increase the overall entropy of the system and decrease the probability of associating an input address with an output address.
[0120] To illustrate, consider 10 participating nodes and two scenarios: (a) when an equal split of the value may be transferred, and (b) when an odd split (e.g., an unequal split) of the value may be transferred. If the propagator output for five of the participating nodes results in a split of the token value into two output addresses (e.g., k=2) (e.g., splitting 10 Bitcoins into two 5 Bitcoin output addresses), and the propagator output for the remaining five participating nodes does not result in a split of the token value, then the number of combinations for N=10, m=5, and k=2 may be given as follows: (a) Where an equal division of value may be transferred:
number
number
[0121] In both instances, the number of combinations may be greater than if the transaction option were not used, and the probability that the monitoring node will correctly associate one or more output addresses with the input addresses may be lower compared to the behavior of known coin mixing methods performed by themselves.
[0122] Reference is now made to FIG. 12, which illustrates in the form of a graph the number of possible combinations of output addresses as a function of the number of participants for even or odd splits, when m=N / 2, for various values of k. It can be seen that the greater the number of combinations, the smaller the probability that a monitoring node can make the correct association. That is, in some implementations, the probability of correctly associating one or more output addresses with an input address may be given as the inverse of the distribution shown in FIG. 12. It can be seen that the odd split case may provide fewer possible combinations than the even split case, but each case may provide more combinations than are provided when performing the operation of the known coin mixing system by itself.
[0123] In Fig. 12, a first curve 1210 shows the number of possible combinations of output addresses as a function of the number of participants while performing the operation of the known coin mixing method. A second curve 1220 shows the number of possible combinations of output addresses when an odd split of the transferred value is implemented and the transferred value can be divided into two amounts (e.g., k=2). A third curve 1230 shows the number of possible combinations of output addresses when an odd split of the transferred value is implemented and the transferred value can be divided into three amounts (e.g., k=3).
[0124] Additionally, a fourth curve 1240 illustrates the number of possible combinations of output addresses when an even division of the transferred value is implemented and the transferred value can be divided into two amounts (e.g., k=2). A fifth curve 1250 illustrates the number of possible combinations of output addresses when an even division of the transferred value is implemented and the transferred value can be divided into three amounts (e.g., k=3).
[0125] The operation of the Blinded Outcome Diversification (BOD) method described herein may mitigate some of the drawbacks or security risks associated with distributing token values on a public ledger. The operations described herein do not rely on any centralized entity. In particular, the operations described herein are not intended to be used in conjunction with Cycle C. i The propagator output is provided for each cycle by the participating nodes for i By randomly designating participating nodes as selectors for the blockchain, the operation of the BOD method may increase the entropy of the system and make any node-specific biases more randomly distributed, thereby reducing the probability that a monitoring node may utilize machine learning operations to infer a pattern across multiple transactions that reveals an association between an input address and an output address. It may be appreciated that in some implementations, the operation of the BOD method may require that the format of possible message options and token splitting values may need to be specified prior to the initiation of operations for N cycles between participating nodes in a blockchain transaction.
[0126] In some implementations, the monitoring node may perform cycle C in accordance with the methods and computing apparatus described herein. iFor example, a monitoring node may be a participating node for a blockchain transaction and may perform operations according to the methods described herein, or may simply observe messages or ciphertexts sent from participating node to participating node. Additionally, a monitoring node may be a blockchain node, which may be a participating node in cycle C. i However, before the propagator output can be added to the blockchain transaction for submission to the blockchain, each participant node may sign the transaction to verify whether the output corresponding to the generated message is correct. Thus, unless each participant node in the multiple participant nodes signs the transaction, the transaction may not be verified for submission to the blockchain. The impact of a monitoring node performing operations and / or observing messages / ciphertexts may be that operations performed according to each cycle may be wasted. In some implementations, to counter participants acting as monitoring nodes, participant nodes may periodically change their input and output addresses.
[0127] Reference is now made to FIG. 13, which illustrates a simplified example of a participating node 1300 in block diagram form. The participating node 1300 may include a processor 1302, a network interface 1304, and a memory 1306. The participating node 1300 may be implemented using any suitable computing hardware having network connectivity and sufficient processing and memory resources to perform the functions described herein. The participating node may include processor-executable instructions for implementing the functions described herein. In some implementations, the processor-executable instructions may be referred to as a blockchain application 1320, although it will be understood that the instructions may be implemented in one or more modules, applications, scripts, or other programming structures, depending on the hardware and operating system. The processor 1302 may include a processor, a multi-core processor, and / or multiple processors. The memory 1306 may store data, including data for the operations described herein in this example implementation.
[0128] It will be understood that the apparatus and processes described herein, as well as any modules, routines, processes, threads, applications, or other software components implementing the described methods / processes for participating in blockchain transactions, may be implemented using standard computer programming techniques and languages, and the application is not limited to any particular processor, computer language, computer programming conventions, data structures, or other such implementation details.
[0129] It should be noted that the above-described embodiments illustrate, rather than limit, the invention, and that those skilled in the art could design many alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the invention, which is defined by the appended claims. In the claims, any reference signs placed between parentheses shall not be construed as limiting the claims. The words "comprise" and "having" and the like do not exclude the presence of elements or steps other than those listed in any claim or the specification as a whole. In this specification, "comprise" means "comprises or consists of...", and "having" means "comprises or consists of...". The singular reference of an element does not exclude the plural reference of such elements and vice versa. The invention can be implemented by means of hardware comprising several distinct elements, and by means of a suitably programmed computer. In a device claim enumerating several means, several of these means may be embodied by one and the same item of hardware. The mere fact that certain measures are recited in mutually different dependent claims does not indicate that a combination of these measures cannot be used to advantage.
Claims
1. 1. A computer-implemented method for increasing security of blockchain implemented transactions, in a network including a plurality of participant nodes and dealer nodes, each having its own public and private key, the method comprising: For each cycle of the plurality of cycles, at the dealer node: ordering the participating nodes such that there is a cycle node order; designating the first node in the node order as the message originator and the last node as the propagator; By designating one of the remaining participating nodes as the selector. obtaining a set of output addresses, where each node is not the message originator in more than one cyclic node order and where each node is not the propagator in more than one cyclic order, and designating one of the participating nodes as a selector node; generating, at the message originator, a ciphertext including two nested encrypted messages and sending the ciphertext to a next participating node in the node order, each message including one or more transaction details; transmitting the ciphertext from node to node in the cyclic node order, each node decrypting the ciphertext before transmitting it, the selector further removing one of the nested encrypted messages from the ciphertext before transmitting; decrypting, at the propagator, the single remaining message to obtain the one or more transaction details contained in the message; generating a shuffled order of the transaction details obtained from all cycles at every node designated as a propagator; generating blockchain transactions, each output of the transaction being based on one of the transaction details, the outputs being ordered according to the shuffled order; method.
2. Each transaction details includes the transaction amount and the output address.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein for each cycle, the sum of the transaction amounts in the first messages is equal to the sum of the transaction amounts in the second messages.
3. The step of generating a shuffled order comprises: in each of said propagators, encrypting each transaction detail obtained in each cycle using its public key and adding it to a shuffled collection of encrypted transaction details, and shuffling the collection; The method of claim 1.
4. further comprising, in each of said propagators other than the last, encrypting the shuffled set with the public key of another propagator and transmitting the encrypted set to that propagator. The method according to claim 3.
5. After the step of generating a shuffled order is completed on the shuffled set of encrypted transaction details: In each of said propagators: Identifying the shared public key; attempting to decrypt all transaction details in the shuffled set using the private key to obtain one or more decrypted transaction details; and encrypting the decrypted transaction details with the temporary public key. The method according to claim 3.
6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the shared public key is the public key of one of the propagators.
7. After the blockchain transaction is generated: and adding an input to the blockchain transaction at each of a plurality of the participating nodes. The method of claim 1.
8. For each cycle, the step of generating ciphertext at each message originator comprises: generating the first message and the second message; Sequentially encrypting each message using the transaction public key for that cycle and the ordered list of public keys of the other participating nodes to generate two nested encrypted messages. The method of claim 1.
9. and for each cycle, at the dealer node, providing the ordered list of the transaction public keys and node public keys for that cycle to the message originator, the ordered list being in reverse order with respect to the cycle node order. The method according to claim 8.
10. and for each cycle, generating, at the propagator node, a transaction public key for that cycle and a corresponding transaction private key for that cycle, and transmitting the transaction public key to the dealer node.
10. The method of claim 9.
11. 11. The method of claim 10, wherein for each cycle, at the propagator, the step of decrypting the nested message includes decrypting with the private key of the propagator and then decrypting with the transaction private key for that cycle.
12. A network of computing devices, each computing device being one of a plurality of participant nodes or dealer nodes, each computing device comprising: a network interface providing network connectivity to at least one other participating node in the plurality of participating nodes; A processor; and a memory storing non-transitory computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 11. network.
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