Image device, computer device, and computer network system
A blockchain-based authentication system using block numbers for TOTP generation addresses the limitations of hardware tokens by enabling dynamic password updates and secure access control for encrypted content and systems.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024150413
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-01
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-21
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
Existing hardware TOTP tokens require battery replacement and key information cannot be updated by the service provider, and there are limited methods for viewing encrypted content such as books or using OTP tokens for login tickets, ticket gates, and locking/unlocking systems.
A blockchain-based authentication system using block numbers as time variables in TOTP generation, allowing dynamic password generation and key updates without battery replacement, and incorporating smart contracts to manage OTP tokens securely.
The system provides secure, battery-free dynamic password generation, reduces network traffic, and enables secure access control for both online and offline environments, with features like transfer restrictions and token removal to prevent unauthorized use.
Smart Images

Figure 2024163176000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical Field]
[0001] The present invention relates to an image authentication system, an access control system, and an authentication device. As an example of the method, we will explain its application to a distributed ledger system. (This application is a divisional application of Japanese Patent Application No. 2021-111232.) The drawings described in this invention are as in the original application. This invention is similar to known face recognition technology that uses facial images captured by a visible light camera, and is intended to use information from the eyes of the wearer of a head-mounted display for biometric authentication when rights to use content such as audio, video, and e-books are granted using distributed ledger technology and viewing is restricted to the field of view of authorized users using a head-mounted display. When a user wears a goggle-type head-mounted display, the area around the user's eyes is hidden by the device, making it dark and potentially interfering with the capture of their face using visible light. However, the infrared radiation emitted by the human body, which has body temperature, can be detected and captured using an imaging element, making it possible to sense that a living body is wearing the device. Furthermore, the present invention intends to record an image of the distribution of infrared radiation from the body as a physical characteristic unique to the wearer and use this for biometric authentication in the same way as known face recognition. <Background Art and Prior Art Literature> This invention is similar to face recognition technology using a visible light camera, and uses an infrared temperature sensor and an infrared camera or thermography device to detect a person's physical or biological characteristics based on temperature distribution or image information of the temperature distribution, thereby performing biometric authentication. <Prior art documents> No prior art documents are listed because the addition of new matter is prohibited. <Summary of the Invention> <Problem to be solved by the invention> To confirm the presence of the wearer, with due consideration given to privacy. To confirm whether a real living being is wearing the device. <Means for solving the problem> The temperature distribution around the wearer's eyes and thermography of the face around the eyes are measured and used as simple biometric authentication information and presence confirmation information that respects privacy. The biometric authentication sensor 1443A is a sensor when the terminal 1A has an image sensor such as a camera or thermography and performs authentication based on the structure of the face using the image sensor, a fingerprint sensor that performs fingerprint authentication using a scanner, a sensor that performs authentication based on the structure of the ear, or a sensor that performs authentication using motion or pressure signals sensed by the terminal worn when walking, etc. Known methods can be used for biometric authentication. When head mounted display 453A is worn, biometric authentication functions such as facial recognition, iris recognition, authentication based on the structure of the ear, an illuminance sensor or light sensor, and a thermographic image of body temperature distribution may be performed using sensor 4530A of head mounted display 453A. The primary purpose of the authentication functions is to confirm whether 453A is worn by an actual living body, and it is also possible to acquire personal biometric information and perform biometric authentication. The biometric authentication device 4530A may measure body temperature using a temperature sensor. Point, one-dimensional, or two-dimensional thermography may be obtained from the head or eyes of the wearer of 4530A to detect the presence of a person wearing the device and the characteristics of the person wearing the device. Authentication based on the shape of the face of the head, biometric authentication based on the eyes, biometric authentication based on the structure of the ear, biometric authentication based on the shape of the head, or biometric authentication based on blinking may also be used. A biometric authentication sensor (4530A) attached to the HMD of terminal 4A. 4530A measures multiple biometric information of the wearer (facial structure, body temperature or thermography, eye structure, blinking, voice, ear structure, hand structure, eye vein patterns, etc.) and performs biometric authentication and confirms the presence of the wearer. 4530A may share functions with the sensor described in 4443A. Here, the sensor of 4530A is an input device that assists 453A. It is a sensor for confirming the presence of the wearer, and the biometric authentication function is an accessory to the presence confirmation function. In this invention, the purpose is not authentication but to confirm the presence of the wearer, and it is assumed that body temperature measurements and thermographic images around the eyes of the HMD wearer will be used to protect privacy. Body temperature is measured by installing an infrared temperature sensor inside the HMD to measure the temperature of the wearer's eyes and the skin around the eyes. The sensor can measure at a single point, or the sensors can be arranged two-dimensionally to measure in the form of a line or image. The 4530A sensor measures the temperature distribution around the wearer's eyes and thermography of the face around the eyes, and uses this information as simple biometric authentication and presence confirmation information that respects privacy. If the wearer allows it, the temperature and hash values detected by the HMD sensor may be notified to the service server to detect unauthorized access to the private key. <Effects of the Invention> It is also possible to check whether the device is being worn, obtain personal biometric information, and use this information to perform biometric authentication. <Brief description of the drawings> <Figure 1> Representative diagram. <Fig. 2A> An explanatory diagram of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. <Fig. 2AA> An example of the present invention. An explanatory diagram of a terminal. This is the same as the explanatory diagram of the form used as the access control technology for content and services described in the original application. <Fig. 4A> An example of allowing authorized individuals to view content while controlling access using the present invention. This is the same as the explanatory diagram of the form used as an access control technology using an HMD described in the original application. <Mode for Carrying Out the Invention> The biometric authentication device 4530A may measure body temperature using a temperature sensor, and obtain point, one-dimensional, or two-dimensional thermography from the head or eyes of the person wearing the device 4530A to detect the presence of a person wearing the device and the characteristics of the person wearing the device. The primary purpose of the authentication function is to confirm whether 453A is being worn by a real living body, and it can also be used to obtain personal biometric information and perform biometric authentication. In this invention, the purpose is not authentication but to confirm the presence of the wearer, and to take privacy into consideration, measurements of body temperature around the eyes of the HMD wearer and thermographic images are used. Body temperature is measured by installing an infrared temperature sensor inside the HMD to measure the temperature of the wearer's eyes and the skin around the eyes. The sensor can measure at a single point, or the sensors can be arranged two-dimensionally to measure in the form of a line or image. The 4530A sensor measures the temperature distribution around the wearer's eyes and thermography of the face around the eyes, and uses this information as simple biometric authentication and presence confirmation information that respects privacy. Example 1 In the first embodiment, the biometric authentication sensor 4530A is provided as 1443A in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2AA or 4443A in Fig. 4A. In Fig. 4A, a head mounted display 453A of the output device has a biometric authentication sensor 4530A. 1443A in Figures 1 and 2AA or Figure 4 is an explanatory diagram of a form used as an access control technology for content and services described in Patent Application No. 2021-004788. 4530A measures multiple pieces of biometric information of the wearer (facial structure, body temperature or thermography, eye structure, blinking, voice, ear structure, hand structure, eye vein patterns, etc.) to confirm the presence of the wearer and perform biometric authentication. 4530A may share functions with the sensor described in 4443A. (Here, the sensor of 4530A is an input device that assists 453A. It is a sensor for confirming the presence of the wearer, and the biometric authentication function is an accessory to the presence confirmation function.) This invention is similar to face recognition technology using a visible light camera, and uses an infrared temperature sensor and an infrared camera or thermography device 4530A to detect a person's physical or biological characteristics based on temperature distribution or image information of the temperature distribution, thereby performing biometric authentication. Regarding the management of personal information used in the authentication system of the present invention, it is expected that protection of personal information will be required in accordance with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In the embodiment, a function can be used to request consent from the owner of the terminal when the value of sensor 444A of input device 44A of a personal terminal is stored in the terminal. In this invention, in order to detect unauthorized access while protecting personal information, the values of the terminal's sensors are anonymized (irreversibly preventing identification; processing such as hashing or cutting out part of the hash value after hashing) or pseudonymized (when reversibly pseudonymized data and a key to decrypt it are used; personal information is encrypted and stored) and the information can be recorded and used. Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described, these embodiments are presented as examples and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention. These novel embodiments can be implemented in various other forms, and various omissions, substitutions, and modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the invention. <Industrial Applicability> Similar to facial recognition technology using a visible light camera, an infrared temperature sensor and an infrared camera or thermography device are used to detect a person's physical or biological characteristics based on temperature distribution or image information of the temperature distribution, and biometric authentication is performed to obtain a facial image including the temperature distribution of the face due to body temperature, which can be used as image data for authentication. In Japan, personal identification cards, driver's licenses, and other cards have a visible light photograph printed on them. The face of the card is sometimes scanned and used for identity verification, with the data stored by organizations. Since a visible light photograph is a representation of the person, the photograph data must be managed to prevent unauthorized disclosure. Managing personal information requires costs, reliable equipment, personnel, and qualifications. Some users may desire alternative authentication methods out of fear that their visible light photographs may be leaked by organizations. Therefore, in this invention, we have considered using temperature distribution based on human body temperature rather than visible light for authentication. (In this invention, a person with specific access rights wears a head-mounted display and is authenticated based on the temperature distribution of their face, and if the authentication result is correct, content and services are provided.) By obtaining a facial photograph based on the user's temperature distribution rather than a visible light facial photograph, the facial photograph is compared with registered personal facial data in the temperature range of the body, and the individual is authenticated. It is also possible to determine whether an object or human body in the temperature range is attempting authentication with this authentication system. Considering the possibility that known facial recognition methods may be broken using a mask or head model that imitates a visible light image of a human face or three-dimensional shape and depth information of the face, it is possible to add this invention to known facial recognition technology and attempt authentication using multi-element biometric information by combining a visible light image of a human face, body temperature distribution, three-dimensional shape and depth information, etc. <Explanation of symbols> 1443A Biometric Sensor Biometric sensor included with the 4530A head-mounted display [Background technology]
[0002] <The following is a description of the specification in the original application for reference. In the specification of the original application, the authentication system of the present application using a biological body temperature and temperature distribution image is described as a biometric authentication method when viewing content on a head-mounted display, using an OTP token for access in a distributed ledger.> With the spread of the Internet, it has become possible to conduct real-world services in the digital space using computers and networks, from commercial transactions to e-commerce, and from face-to-face banking to internet banking (net banking).Web services that require authentication to log in are expanding, including viewing email, browsing video and music sites, social networking services, online banking, and logging in to e-commerce sites. When providing services to customers on a website using Internet services, customers who register for the service are asked to register a phone number or user ID (or user nickname), email address and password to log in to the website. After logging in to the website, more valuable data may be manipulated. For example, when transferring money to another person's bank account via internet banking, it is necessary to use a different authentication method than the password used to log in to verify that the person logging in is the actual user. If passwords alone are used, and that information is leaked and misused by others, unauthorized access to the internet banking account may be possible, leading to the transfer of assets and the theft of those assets by malicious individuals.
[0003] Therefore, it is necessary to combine methods other than passwords to verify the user's identity. There are three main ways to verify and authenticate a person: 1. knowledge the person knows, 2. possessions the person has, and 3. biometric characteristics of the person. Examples include the following: 1. The knowledge that the person knows includes a secret phrase, password, or four-digit PIN number. Passwords are static. It is possible that an attacker may obtain a password illegally or perform a password brute force attack. To protect against password brute force attacks, the user must periodically update their password at different times to make it dynamic. For 4-digit PINs, it is possible that a brute force attack will be carried out by entering every possible PIN between 0000 and 9999. To counter this, a method is taken in which the number of times authentication fails is recorded, and authentication is not allowed if authentication fails three to five times in a row.It is possible to record the number of times authentication using a PIN is performed, and if it is successful, the number is reset to zero, and if the number of times exceeds a certain number, authentication itself is not allowed.For example, in the case of the personal identification number card used in Japan, if the PIN is entered incorrectly three to five times, use is suspended. 2. Possessions held by the individual include a dynamic password generator, an IC cash card, and an individual number card. (Outside of the field of electronic computers, keys and seals made of wood or metal are also considered possessions used for authentication.) In this invention, when a password is long and random enough that an ordinary person cannot remember it, for example, when 256-bit private key data is used for public key encryption, the private key is considered to be in possession because it is printed on paper or recorded on a digital device for use. Also, among IC cards, the personal number card contains data for an electronic certificate, and the private key data and information recorded on the IC chip of the personal number card cannot be extracted to the outside, so it is also considered to be in possession. It is generally believed that the number of numbers or letters that a human can remember is 7 plus or minus 2 (Note 1). Numbers greater than 7, such as a 32-byte private key that can express a number of 2 to the 256th power in 256 bits, or a 2048-bit private key used in personal identification number cards, cannot be memorized by humans, and the private key data (private key information) must be printed on paper or engraved on a plate, or recorded on a record or magnetic tape, or stored in a digital device such as an optical disk, magnetic disk, or semiconductor memory, and is therefore something that the individual possesses rather than being their own knowledge. Like seals and metal keys, private keys are at risk of being duplicated if the data representing them is leaked. On the other hand, unlike biometric authentication information, private keys are not immutable, and upon the user's request, the use of a private key that is being misused can be suspended, and a new private key can be assigned to the user, associated, and the private key can be switched. Private key information does not have to be determined as a single entity. To improve security, private keys and dynamic password generators can be updated periodically between users and service providers. Dynamic password generators and private keys are updated by individuals or corporations that provide authentication methods for the corresponding services. In addition to dynamic passwords, there are also authentication methods that send customers a number table and check whether they can enter the correct numeric characters according to the table on the website after logging in. In these methods, it is important that consensus is continually formed between the service provider (such as a bank) and the user, and digital authentication means, including this invention, are used to help with consensus formation. This invention is merely a tool, like a TOTP token, a valuable paper leaf, or a metal key, and whether or not a service can be received using such a tool is based on the agreement between the user and the service provider and the laws of each country. (Note 1) Miller, GA (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63( 2 ), 81 - 97. 3. A person's biometric characteristics include physical information such as fingerprints, face, iris, voice, vein pattern information, and genetic information, as well as behavioral characteristics such as handwriting, gait, and speaker authentication. Since biometric authentication uses information stored by the user, the key information for authentication remains with the user as long as the user is healthy, and is less likely to be lost than a metal key, etc. This characteristic is used for easy login in software on computer terminal devices, etc. On the other hand, it is difficult to change biometric information. If biometric information is leaked, it is difficult to change it like a metal key or password. It is also possible to replicate false biometric characteristics based on the biometric data that serves as the key for biometric authentication, and misidentify it as a key to the authentication sensing device, thereby breaking through the authentication. Furthermore, fingerprints and other methods can unlock devices even if the user does not intend to log in. In other words, there is a risk that an attacker could use the user's body to forcibly authenticate the user when the user's intention is unclear. Biometric authentication only proves that the individual's data has been transmitted to the authenticating device, but further factors are required to determine whether it was transmitted intentionally. Therefore, when using biometric characteristics for authentication, it is preferable to combine them with knowledge or possession authentication to create multi-factor authentication. When handling assets, such as internet banking services provided by banks, biometric authentication is used instead of login passwords, and in addition, a method of using the individual's possessions for authentication (password generator) is also used in combination to perform multi-factor, multi-stage authentication, thereby increasing security.
[0004] One method for using a person's possessions for authentication is a hardware dynamic password generator. The RFC6238 standard is known as an algorithm for generating dynamic passwords. The RFC6238 standard uses a one-time password that is generated dynamically and changes based on the time of day. Such a one-time disposable password that changes over time is called a time-based one-time password (TOTP, Time-Based One-Time Password). TOTP can be used in both hardware and software one-time password display devices. TOTP changes at set intervals. The 7- to 6-digit password displayed on the one-time password (OTP, One-Time-Password) display sent to the individual using TOTP is entered into an internet banking website or smartphone app, etc., and TOTP authentication is performed. By performing operations on the website, the individual's identity is considered to have been verified, and the instructed program is run to perform important processes such as transferring money to another person's bank account at another bank. Two-factor authentication can be achieved by combining a one-time password generator that the user has with a password that the user knows, thereby improving security.
[0005] On the other hand, existing one-time password generators also have their own issues. For example, with existing hardware one-time password display devices (hardware TOTP tokens) used for services such as internet banking, it is necessary to synchronize the time between the bank's server terminal and the password display device, and the battery used to maintain the clock function of the hardware TOTP token and synchronize the time wears out, necessitating periodic battery replacement. Furthermore, when updating a one-time password, a new hardware TOTP token must be mailed or delivered to the customer, which incurs shipping costs. (However, because hardware TOTP tokens are personal objects like seals and are not connected to the network, it is expected that the secret key information used to calculate TOTP will be less likely to be leaked via the network.) According to the RFC6238 standard (Non-Patent Document 3), a password is hashed using time T as an argument to a hash function and key information K (seed value K or secret variable K) that must be kept secret, but if information about K is leaked, all of the user's hardware TOTP tokens must be updated. Therefore, security can be maintained by periodically updating K for each token when the battery is replaced, regardless of whether it has been leaked or not. Also, while the displayed integer for authentication passwords on known hardware TOTP tokens is six to seven digits, the inventors thought that if the processing power of computers performing brute force attacks on one-time password (OTP) tokens increases, it may be possible to increase the number of digits in the displayed integer and update and change it to 12 digits, and that it may also be good if the time displayed could be updated and changed. (The inventors thought that it would be good if the number of digits displayed on OTP tokens and the display time could be increased or decreased in order to counter brute force attacks by computer terminals with processing power that surpasses known computers in the future.)
[0006] The inventor was also searching for a way to use an encrypted file to log in to a website using an OTP token. He thought that if he could encrypt a plaintext data file that he wanted to send to a specific individual, corporation, or organization, and decrypt it using a key that would give him access rights, it would be very useful for distributing confidential information or content. While it is common to use a fixed password to view encrypted files, we wanted to use TOTP to decrypt and decrypt files so that they can be viewed, executed, and used, and to exchange the viewing rights, which are the key to decrypting the encryption, in the form of a hardware token, and provide a device equipped with software to decrypt, view, and use confidential information transactions, information within a community, e-books, office processing software, etc. We also thought it was necessary to enable content to be viewed offline, such as in the event of a disaster. In addition to file browsing, we also needed a login system for websites such as online banking sites, a ticket reader system for the real world, a lock unlocking system, and a start-up system for vehicles, devices, and computer terminals. We wanted to be able to use an access control system that can be used in both the real world, web services, and the digital world.
[0007] Here, a technology called smart contracts (contracts) has become available, which uses a distributed ledger system (DLS) that has a blockchain-type or directed acyclic graph-type data structure and is difficult to tamper with between distributed terminals, as in Non-Patent Document 1 and Non-Patent Document 2, to record the issuance and transfer transactions of cryptocurrencies, and record program code in transactions on the DLS, which is stored and operated in a data structure that is difficult to tamper with, such as a blockchain. Patent Document 1 is an example of the use of blockchain or distributed ledger technology (DLT) in relation to music rights, and Patent Document 2 is an example of a system that manages information from multiple file management systems with a single distributed ledger contract. Using contracts, program information such as variables and functions belonging to the contract is recorded in the distributed ledger without being tampered with, and terminals that become nodes via a network can be distributed all over the world. Distributed ledger technology and distributed ledger systems are characterized by the fact that programs called contracts can be deployed worldwide in the distributed ledger system DLS, which is made up of the above-mentioned nodes, allowing services to be provided across borders. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0008] [Patent Document 1] Patent No. 6757042 [Patent Document 2] Patent Publication No. 2020-144586 [Non-patent literature]
[0009] [Non-Patent Document 1] Vitalik Buterin, "Ethereum White Paper A NEXT GENERATION SMART CONTRACT & DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION PLATFORM," [online], [Retrieved November 16, 2020], Internet <URL: https: / / cryptorating.eu / whitepapers / Ethereum / Ethereum_white_paper.pdf> [Non-patent document 2] IOTA Foundation, "Differences between the Tangle and blockchain," [online], [Retrieved November 16, 2020], Internet <URL: https: / / docs.iota.org / docs / getting-started / 1.1 / the-tangle / tangle-vs-blockchain [Non-patent document 3] Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm," [online], [Retrieved November 16, 2020], Internet〈URL:https: / / tools.ietf.org / html / rfc6238〉 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0010] The problem that this technology aims to solve is that existing hardware TOTP tokens require battery replacement, and the token's key information K cannot be updated by service providers or token administrators. Another problem is that there are few ways to use OTPs to view encrypted content such as books. Furthermore, there are no OTP tokens that solve these problems, such as those used for website login tickets, ticket gates, entrance tickets to movie theaters, or locking and unlocking systems for facilities and buildings. [Means for solving the problem]
[0011] A major feature of the present invention is that when generating a TOTP, the value of T is primarily the block number Bn of the blockchain in a distributed ledger system, or dynamic passwords can be generated by having the administrator of the smart contract change K or T in a distributed ledger system such as a blockchain. The value of T is a value Tm or TB that changes at a certain time, and the difference is whether Tm uses a block number Bn that changes automatically due to time changes (time changes) in the distributed ledger system, or whether the smart contract (contract) administrator manually changes and updates Tm or K by sending a transaction to the distributed ledger system to change the data value. Changing and updating K by the contract administrator manually sending a transaction to the distributed ledger system leads to updating the K of the TOTP token, and is therefore a necessary element in the present invention. (In this invention, the contract administrator manually executes the transaction in a decentralized manner. It is assumed that the K value is changed and updated by sending it to the ledger system, but in some cases, the K value of TOTP can also be changed using data values set by the user who owns the OTP token and sent in transactions by users who are not the owner of the OTP token.
[0012] This invention will now be explained. This invention focuses on the block number of a blockchain. For the sake of explanation, the block number will be referred to as the block number Bn in this invention. The invention has devised the use of the block number Bn as the time-dependent numerical value T used in TOTP. This invention refers to this method and the one-time password as BnTOTP. (In this embodiment of the invention, Ethereum, a distributed ledger system that uses a blockchain-type data structure, is used, and in Ethereum, the block number Bn is referred to as the block number.) This name is called BnTOTP because TOTP operates using the number Bn when the blockchain is at the Bnth block counting from the first block data (when the block number is 0) as the variable Bn that represents the time or change in time. Note that Bn is the number that forms the basis of the calculation of BnTOTP, and a processed value (a variable that changes depending on Bn by calculating a hash value using a hash function based on Bn) can also be used to generate BnTOTP. In addition to generating dynamic one-time password (OTP) tokens based on time like TOTP, we have focused on the fact that dynamic passwords, OWP (Owner Password), can be used by accessing the blockchain at any time and changing the key information K among the variables of the contract that calculates the OTP deployed on the blockchain, thereby updating the seed value of the OTP token without using information based on time T, and have devised and implemented an authentication system that uses both TOTP (BnTOTP) and OWP. In this invention, OWP does not use information about the latest time of the blockchain, such as the block number, but the contract administrator who manages the contracts on the blockchain of the authentication system rewrites the state of the internal variables of the contract at any time, thereby updating the password generation values of all OWP-type OTP tokens belonging to the contract. This dynamic password method is called OWP. In both TOTP (BnTOTP) and OWP, the internal variables of the contract are not limited to a single contract and may be called from different contracts. BnTOTP uses the fact that the block number Bn changes automatically as the clock moves on the blockchain for calculations, while OWP uses the fact that variables on the blockchain can be changed by administrators or general users accessing and rewriting them at any time. In OWP, when an administrator user can update the seed value by periodically sending a signed transaction to the blockchain on the user device, OWP can be operated in the same way as BnTOTP or TOTP. However, while BnTOTP does not require a transaction to change the seed value, OWP does. If OWP and BnTOTP are used as a password generator that is updated every 60 seconds, for example, OWP requires that transaction data be sent manually or automatically every 60 seconds, resulting in a larger amount of data being stored on the blockchain than BnTOTP and occupying storage space on the device that serves as a blockchain node. For this reason, this invention uses BnTOTP and OWP depending on the application. BnTOTP is used for web services connected to a network that require updating the BnTOTP value every few tens of seconds over the network, while OWP is used for web services that can accept the same OWP value even when disconnected from the network or for long periods of time (several months to several years), as well as for applications such as unlocking valuable paper documents or locks using paper or NFC tags.
[0013] In this invention, we have devised and implemented an authentication system that uses an OTP token and its contract to generate and authenticate BnTOTP or OWP using a blockchain and smart contract using Ethereum (Non-Patent Document 1), which is one of the blockchain platforms. The present invention was developed based on Ethereum, and some of the explanations of the terminals that serve as nodes constituting the blockchain and the user terminal are as explained in Non-Patent Document 1, and the details are not described in this patent application. The explanations and diagrams in this patent application are based on a platform that can use Ethereum, and do not include all of the explanations necessary for execution on Ethereum. Regarding the operation of Ethereum as a distributed ledger system, the explanation is primarily based on the known Non-Patent Document 1. Figure 9A explains the operation of the contract of the present invention on the Ethereum blockchain. Figure 9B is an explanatory diagram of the operation of the present invention in a directed acyclic graph-type distributed ledger system. In Figures 9A and 9B, OWP-type passwords can be operated from a smart contract. In Figure 9A, the blockchain contains information derived from the block number and block data of the latest data block, which can be used to calculate TOTP. In Figure 9B, a directed acyclic graph-type distributed ledger system also records hash values and timestamps in each data block (chunk), and if time information can be obtained from the latest data chunk or if the distributed ledger system can store time information, BnTOTP-type or TOTP-type passwords can be generated. The main feature of this invention is the use of OWP-type passwords. By changing K inside the OTP token contract on the blockchain, it is possible to change all passwords displayed on tokens issued by that OTP token contract. By changing the OWP-type password periodically, a pseudo-TOTP can be realized. On the other hand, with OWP passwords, transactions must be sent to a distributed ledger system. To implement TOTP on a distributed ledger, contract administrators and others must send transactions to the distributed ledger system, which can increase network traffic. Furthermore, the transaction data increases, which can require an increased amount of storage capacity on node terminals. Therefore, by using an OWP-type password that allows the contract administrator to change the K value when necessary or when updating the OWP (once every few weeks, months, or years), and a BnTOTP-type password that mainly uses a block number for TOTP applications where the password needs to be updated frequently, such as every 60 seconds, and a BnTOTP-type password that combines a BnTOTP-type password with an OWP-type password that allows the K value to be changed, dynamic password generation and authentication helps reduce network traffic and the amount of space used in the blockchain section of the storage device. Therefore, the present invention is characterized by using either or both of the BnTOTP-type and OWP-type formats.
[0014] The most important feature of this invention is that it is an authentication system that uses a software TOTP token based on the blockchain and its network rather than a hardware TOTP token, so that service providers can update the token's key information without the need to replace the battery, and in which the variable that changes in block data on the blockchain at a certain time is the time-based variable Tm, rather than the time-varying variable T in the RFC6238 standard. Furthermore, a key feature of this authentication system is that it uses the block number variable Bn for the latest block data on the blockchain as the time-varying variable T in the RFC6238 standard for TOTP tokens.
[0015] The main feature of the present invention is that it provides variables that can be accessed and changed at any time by only the token administrator for part or all of the key information K of the RFC6238 standard, and a means such as a function that can change the variables, thereby allowing the administrator to update the key information K. Here, in the case where the key information K can be changed by an administrator, even if the variable T in the RFC6238 standard is not set or is a constant that does not change with time, the value K that the administrator specifies and changes at any time may be used as the variable T. (In the present invention, it is preferable that the one who can update the key information K is the administrator, but a user who is not the administrator may also change K in a contract on the blockchain. Even if all users involved in the token input their specified values into the blockchain at any time and vote, the authentication system of the present invention can operate as a dynamic password generation token according to the values voted by the users.)
[0016] Its main features are that it is an authentication system and access control system that uses a software password generator token (OTP token) and authentication system that uses a distributed ledger system such as blockchain, and issues a blockchain-based token (OTP token) to a user. The OTP token can be used, for example, as a token that serves as a key to decrypt encrypted data, for logging into websites, as an admission ticket for ticket gates and movie theaters, as a pass for entering and exiting venues, as valuable paper sheets and as NFC tags, and for locking and unlocking facilities and buildings.
[0017] In addition, this invention allows the owner of an OTP token to be changed on the blockchain, and allows the OTP token to be transferred between different users. It is also possible to transfer an OTP token that allows the decryption of encrypted data in a certain text, book, audio, video, or software content between different users. However, in the present invention, the OTP token contract may have a function to restrict the transfer function, and the main feature is that it is an authentication system using an OTP token that has a control unit that enables or disables the transfer of the OTP token at any time depending on the desires of the contract administrator. The function to restrict the transfer function provided in the OTP token contract is intended to be used in cases where the rights holder of the content obtained when the encrypted data is decrypted wants to control the distribution of information, and also to prohibit transfer itself, such as tickets with transfer restrictions or hardware one-time password cards for bank internet banking. A transfer restriction function can be incorporated into the OTP token contract program to prevent OTP tokens from being transferred in violation of the service terms of use. The present invention is characterized by having a function that allows a control unit to be set that restricts transfer, and that restricts the transfer of OTP tokens at any time (current time) depending on the desires of the service provider who is the user of the present invention, making the transfer impossible or allowing the transfer. Also, the present invention allows a control unit to be set that restricts transfer, and that allows the transfer of OTP tokens at any time depending on the desires of the service provider who is the user of the present invention, eliminating the control unit.
[0018] In addition to restricting transfer, this invention is also characterized by its use in an authentication system with a control unit that can forcibly remove the association between the token of a user who violates the service provider's terms and conditions and the user's identifier on the blockchain, and remove the one-time password token from the user. However, this function is a known technology that can be realized in the Ethereum ERC721 standard. In addition, this OTP token removal function allows the contract administrator to forcibly remove an OTP token with a certain token number that belongs to a user identifier calculated from a certain user's private key, so it requires agreement between the user and the service provider / OTP token contract administrator and is not normally expected to be used. By restricting the transfer of OTP tokens between users and issuing and removing OTP tokens to a certain user, the user can generate and authenticate the OTP of the present invention using the OTP token, while the contract administrator will be responsible for storing, managing, and distributing the actual ownership of the OTP token.It is expected to be used for purposes such as OTP token storage and transfer by a third party qualified to store OTP tokens. The concept of custody transfer is similar to the concept of centralized storage of securities and name change at the Securities Depository Center and may be a known concept, but we believe that one way to realize it on the blockchain using the ERC721 standard is to combine transfer restrictions with the issuance and removal of tokens, and we have decided that this can be adopted in this invention. [Effects of the Invention]
[0019] The authentication system of the present invention stores software one-time password token information in a distributed manner by connecting blockchain units built on server terminals (terminal 3A in FIG. 3A and terminal 3B in FIG. 3B) that can be installed around the world via network 20. Because a distributed ledger is used, even if a disaster occurs in one region, data can be disseminated from server terminals in other regions around the world. It may also enable the distribution of services compatible with the OTP token authentication system around the world. The smart contract, which is the one-time password program of the present invention, is sent in the form of bytecode or the like as a transaction from the terminal of the contract administrator to a distributed ledger system such as a blockchain, where it is stored in certain block data of the blockchain and linked to the blockchain, which is a concatenation of past block data.Due to the characteristics of the blockchain, it is difficult to tamper with and is immutable, which has the advantage that it is difficult for attackers to tamper with the one-time password program (contract), the correspondence between the OTP token belonging to the contract and the user identifier for the token number of the OTP token, and the ownership status of the OTP token.
[0020] In addition, OTP tokens are difficult to lose as long as the user and user device have the private key used for access and the blockchain node terminal (the network to which the node terminal is connected). This makes them harder to lose than hardware tokens or software tokens that are installed on existing computers or smartphones, and has the advantage of being accessible worldwide and being able to manage node terminals in a decentralized manner.
[0021] Hardware tokens require a battery to synchronize the time, and as the battery power decreases, the time becomes out of sync, requiring the user to adjust the time. In contrast, the blockchain used in this invention operates with servers distributed around the world acting as nodes that synchronize the time, which has the advantage of eliminating the need for time synchronization. The passage of time in a blockchain corresponds to blocks containing new transactions being linked to the original blockchain at regular intervals, and time synchronization is not required by using information Tm that reflects the time of the most recent linked block as the seed variable T used to calculate the TOTP of the TFC6238 standard.
[0022] Furthermore, while it is difficult to change the seed value K in a hardware token, and the entire device is disposable, the password generator using the blockchain of this invention has the advantage of being able to update K. By sending a transaction to the blockchain to update K, the K values of all OTP tokens related to that K can be rewritten and updated. Updating K changes the seed value used for OTP calculation, completely changing the way future OTP calculation results are generated.
[0023] This invention allows OTP tokens to be transferred if permitted by the service provider that corresponds to the OTP token. It is also possible to prohibit or permit transfer of OTP tokens included in the contract between users. Encrypted content and the tokens that can be used to decrypt and view it can be sent domestically and internationally. This may make it easier to sell data such as books, audio / video, membership sites, and software overseas while restricting their transfer. Even with the transfer restriction function, users can own digital books and sell the rights to them, or the books themselves, between users.
[0024] In addition to the transfer restriction function, if a token removal function is implemented, it will be possible to control and manage tokens to prevent illegal resale or transfer to countries where sales should be restricted. Also, if the private key is lost or leaked and the token can no longer be used normally, the user can notify the token administrator and a token transfer will be performed, in which the token is assigned to a user identifier calculated from the new user's private key. (This invention describes transfer restrictions and token removal functions because it makes it easy to transfer content and tokens from within the country to outside the country. It is preferable that these functions be used when the token administrator and token user agree on the token terms of use, etc.) [Brief explanation of the drawings]
[0025] [Figure 1] Figure 1 is an explanatory diagram showing how one-time passwords are generated and authenticated using blockchain. [Figure 1A] FIG. 1A is an explanatory diagram showing the concept of using the method for generating and authenticating one-time passwords (OTPs) using the blockchain of the present invention in a server terminal. [Figure 1B] FIG. 1B is an explanatory diagram showing the concept of a method for decrypting encrypted data through the OTP authentication system using the blockchain of the present invention. [Figure 2A] FIG. 2A is an explanatory diagram of a terminal DA of a user UA who is authenticated using the authentication system of the present invention. [Figure 2AA] FIG. 2AA is an explanatory diagram of a memory unit (storage device), a control unit (control device), an input / output device, etc. of a terminal DA of a user who is authenticated using the authentication system of the present invention. [Figure 2B] 2B is an explanatory diagram of the terminal DB of user UB, which is different from that of FIG. 2A. The functions of terminal DA and terminal DB are equivalent. The private key information is different. [Figure 2C] Figure 2C is an explanatory diagram of the terminal DC of user UC, which deploys and manages contracts in the blockchain section. The functions of terminal DA and terminal DC are equivalent. The private key information is different. [Figure 3A] FIG. 3A is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal 3A that has a blockchain unit that constitutes the distributed ledger system DLS and serves as a blockchain node connected to the network 20. [Figure 3AA] FIG. 3AA is an explanatory diagram of the control unit and memory unit of terminal 3A in FIG. 3A and the smart contract (contract) of the blockchain unit recorded in the memory unit. [Figure 3AB] Figure 3AB is an explanatory diagram of a contract of the blockchain section recorded in the memory section of terminal 3A in Figure 3A. [Figure 3AC] Figure 3AC is an explanatory diagram of a specific example of a contract in the blockchain section that can change the transfer restriction function, the number of characters and digits of the OTP, and the OTP authentication standby time recorded in the memory section of terminal 3A in Figure 3A. [Figure 3B] FIG. 3B is an explanatory diagram of a terminal 3B that has the same blockchain unit as server P (3A) in FIG. 3A and serves as a node that constitutes the distributed ledger system DLS on network 20. [Figure 3C] FIG. 3C is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal 3C that provides a service when performing authentication of the present invention when logging in to a website (web page, web application), etc. [Figure 3D] FIG. 3D is an explanatory diagram of a terminal 3D that reads a valuable paper sheet or key that has recorded thereon the authentication information of the present invention recorded on a printed matter, a display screen, or an NFC tag, performs authentication, and provides a service. [Figure 3DA] FIG. 3DA is an explanatory diagram of the storage unit (storage device, 30D) and input / output devices (34D, 35D) of the server SVLog (terminal 3D) shown in FIG. 3D. [Figure 3E] FIG. 3E is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal 3E that provides services for purchasing OTP tokens or outputting OTP authentication information to paper and NFC tags to issue tickets, valuable paper sheets, keys, etc. [Figure 3F] FIG. 3F is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal 3F that searches, monitors, and notifies user terminals of transaction information and OTP token information from the blockchain information recorded in the server P (3A). [Figure 4A] FIG. 4A is an explanatory diagram of a terminal (4A) that decrypts encrypted data using the authentication system of the present invention and browses, listens to, or uses the data. [Figure 4B] FIG. 4B is an explanatory diagram (embodiment example) of a storage device of a terminal (4A) that decrypts encrypted data using the authentication system of the present invention and then views, listens to, or uses the data. [Figure 4C]FIG. 4C is an explanatory diagram of when plaintext data 4035A is encrypted or obfuscated in the storage device of terminal 4A in FIG. 4B and is then stored in 4030A of software 403A. [Figure 5A] FIG. 5A is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal that uses the authentication system of the present invention to decrypt encrypted data and deliver advertisements to a terminal (4A) that is used for viewing, listening to, or using the data. [Figure 5B] FIG. 5B is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal 5B that uses the authentication system of the present invention to decrypt encrypted data and distributes the encrypted data to a terminal (4A) that is used for viewing, listening to, or using the data via a network. [Figure 5C] FIG. 5C is an explanatory diagram of a server terminal 5C that decrypts encrypted data using the authentication system of the present invention and transmits the encrypted data by broadcast to a terminal (4A) that is used for viewing, listening to, or using the data. [Figure 6A] 6A is a flowchart showing the processing of the function that generates an OTP for an OTP token holder in the present invention. This is a basic OTP generation function. [Figure 6B] FIG. 6B is a flowchart showing the processing of a function for generating an OTP having a function for recording the number of times an OTP is generated for an OTP token holder in the present invention. [Figure 6C] FIG. 6C is a flowchart of a function for authenticating an OTP in the case where an access person to be authenticated is limited to the user identifier of a token holder, which has a function for recording the number of times of OTP authentication, etc., in the present invention. [Figure 6D] FIG. 6D is a flowchart of a function for authenticating an OTP in the present invention when there is no restriction on the accessor to be authenticated and the function for recording the number of times of OTP authentication, etc. [Figure 6E] FIG. 6E is a flowchart of the function for authenticating an OTP in the present invention when the function for recording the number of times of OTP authentication, etc. is removed from FIG. 6C. [Figure 6F] 6F is a flowchart of a function for authenticating an OTP in the present invention when there is no restriction on the accessor to be authenticated, which is a basic OTP authentication function. [Figure 6G]FIG. 6G is a flowchart showing the processing of a function for determining whether an access is made by the holder of an OTP token having a function for recording the number of OTP authentications, etc., and authenticating the OTP in the present invention. [Figure 6H] FIG. 6H is a flowchart showing the processing of a function for determining whether an access is made by the holder of an OTP token and authenticating the OTP in the present invention. [Figure 6X] Figure 6X is a diagram showing the data structure recorded when a user terminal (1A or 4A) accesses a server terminal (3C, 3D, 3E, 3F, 5A, 5B) that provides services using the authentication system of the present invention. [Figure 7A] FIG. 7A is one of the sequence diagrams for explaining the authentication system of the present invention (TB mainly uses block number Bn. It is also an explanatory diagram of BnTOTP type password). [Figure 7B] FIG. 7B is a diagram illustrating an authentication sequence when the contract administrator can change the internal variables KC and BC of the contract, which are seed values for calculating the password OWP, using the function fscb in the present invention. [Figure 7CA] FIG. 7CA is a sequence diagram showing the process of decrypting encrypted data and executing the decrypted plaintext data as a viewing / listening program in the present invention. [Figure 7CB] FIG. 7C is a diagram illustrating a sequence when plaintext data is encrypted and the encrypted data is distributed and delivered in the present invention. [Figure 7CC] FIG. 7CC is a diagram illustrating a sequence when the encrypted data that has already been viewed is decrypted in an offline state not connected to a network and viewed as plain text data in the present invention. [Figure 7D] FIG. 7D is a sequence diagram illustrating the operation of the authentication system when logging in to a web-based service such as a website or web application in the present invention. [Figure 7E] FIG. 7E is a sequence diagram for explaining how to enter, unlock, and start a service by authenticating with a password OWP using a valuable paper sheet or an NFC tag as an example in the present invention. [Figure 8A]FIG. 8A is a diagram illustrating the connection of terminals when logging in to a website (Example 1, Embodiment 1). [Figure 8B] FIG. 8B is a diagram illustrating the connection of terminals when using a valuable paper or key using a printed matter and an NFC tag (Example 2, Embodiment 2). [Figure 8C] FIG. 8C is a diagram illustrating the connection of terminals that use the software CRHN (403A) when encrypted data is distributed over a communication network (Example 3, Embodiment 3). [Figure 8D] 8D is a diagram for explaining the connection of terminals that use the software CRHN (403A) when encrypted data is broadcast by data broadcasting (another example of the third embodiment). [Figure 9A] This is a diagram explaining the overview of an authentication system using OTP tokens that uses a blockchain-type data structure in a distributed ledger system (DLS). [Figure 9B] This is a diagram explaining an overview of an authentication system using OTP tokens that uses a directed acyclic graph type data structure in a distributed ledger system (DLS). DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
[0026] The present invention is comprised of several elements. A representative diagram is shown in Figure 1. Explanatory diagrams of the terminal connections used in Figure 1 are shown in Figures 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D. Computer terminals (electronic computer terminals) such as server terminals and user terminals used in the present invention include the five major computer devices: a control and arithmetic unit (controller, arithmetic unit), a memory device, an input device, and an output device. Within the terminal, the control and arithmetic unit, memory device, input device, and output device are connected by wiring such as patterned conductor circuits or electrical wires. The control and arithmetic unit (controller, arithmetic unit), memory device, input device, and output device may be connected by wire (electrical cable or optical fiber) or wirelessly. The terminal is equipped with a wireless or wired communication controller (communication device) and is connected to a network 20, external terminals, etc., and may also be connected to external memory devices and input / output devices. The terminal is equipped with a power supply unit to supply power to operate the electronic computer terminal. Computers that use some kind of quantum rather than electronic computers, or classical computers that use machines such as gears that use mechanical energy rather than electricity or the movement of electrons, in other words, computer terminals that are not limited to the framework of electronic computers, may fall within the scope of the present invention as long as they use storage devices such as printed information on paper, semiconductor memory, magnetic disks, optical disks, hash functions, and distributed ledgers as described in this invention. 1. User UA's terminal DA (Terminal 1A) A user UA and his terminal 1A, which is equipped with a computer terminal DA or terminal 1A (terminal 1A in Figures 1 and 2A, Figure 2AA) that uses the OTP token of the present invention to display or authenticate an OTP. Terminal 1A has in its storage device a program for accessing server 3A of the blockchain, a URI indicating server P (server 3A in FIG. 3A) to be accessed, and a private key PRVA (private key information 101A in FIG. 2AA) used when accessing the blockchain. Terminal 1A has a communication device 12A and accesses server 3A via network 20. When accessing server 3A to request generation of an OTP, an OTP token having the token number TIDA of the present invention assigned to user identifier A calculated from private keys PRVA101A and 101A is required, as shown in the OTP generation function flowcharts of Figures 6A and 6B. When requesting OTP authentication, an OTP token having the token number TIDA of the present invention assigned to user identifier A calculated from private keys PRVA101A and 101A may also be required (Figures 6C, 6E, 6G, and 6H), and it may not be necessary to perform a process to determine whether user identifier A or user identifier A has been assigned an OTP token and is in their possession, as shown in the OTP authentication function flowcharts of Figures 6F and 6D. In addition to user UA of terminal 1A, there is also user UB of terminal 1B, user UC of terminal 1C, and user UP of terminal 4A. Like terminal 1A, terminal 4A is one form of user terminal that uses this authentication system. In this invention, user UP and user UA are the same person, and private key 101A and private key 401A are the same, but the symbols may be changed for the sake of explanation.
[0027] 2. Server P (Server 3A) <Specific assumptions in the examples, etc.> In the present invention, as shown in Figure 1, Server P (3A) and Server B (3B), which are nodes equipped with blockchain units that make up a distributed ledger system (DLS) such as a blockchain, are connected to each other via a network 20 that can also be encrypted. Ethereum is used for the distributed ledger system (DLS) such as a blockchain. In the known Ethereum, a new block is added to the blockchain approximately every 15 seconds (the value of 15 seconds is set when a blockchain such as Ethereum is created, and the creator of the blockchain can create it at any number of seconds, such as 15 seconds or 4 seconds), and approximately block number Bn x 15 seconds have passed since the time when the block number was zero. In the Ethereum mainnet and testnet, the consensus algorithms used between nodes that make up the blockchain, such as terminals 3A and 3B, for adding new data blocks to the blockchain, include Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Authority (PoA), and Proof of Stake (PoS). Other blockchain-based distributed ledger systems also include Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT). To implement the present invention, the Proof of Authority, Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance, or Proof of Stake algorithms may be used, as they are expected to consume less power and process a larger number of transactions. The present invention preferably uses a consensus method that consumes low power and has a high transaction processing speed, and for this purpose, a consensus algorithm similar to the management method of a centralized distributed ledger may be used. Since the present invention is not related to the consensus algorithm of a distributed ledger system, we will not go into detail about consensus, but in the examples of the present invention, we developed and implemented the present invention using the Ethereum testnet, which uses the proof-of-work or proof-of-authority type. Here, this invention assumes that the control unit (31A) and memory unit (30A) of server P (3A) are equipped with facilities capable of creating and processing Ethereum, one of the blockchain platforms, in the blockchain unit. While this application does not describe all of the elements that implement a blockchain system using Ethereum, in this invention, user terminals (1A and 4A in Figures 1A and 1B) and server terminals 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 3E, 3F, 5A, 5B, and 5C may have a blockchain control unit and blockchain data recording unit that can function as an Ethereum node. Server P (3A) is connected to network 20 via communication device 32A and, via network 20, is connected to another blockchain node terminal 3B and a group of terminals equivalent to multiple 3Bs, forming a distributed ledger system.
[0028] The user's computer terminal DA (terminal 1A) or terminal DC (terminal 1C) accesses the server 3A having the blockchain section via the network NT (network 20) (Figure 1A). Server 3A is assumed to have an operating system and web browser software installed, and to be capable of running ECMAScript (ISO / IEC 16262) and other standards. It also has client software installed and runs, such as Ethereum client software called geth (Go Ethereum, https: / / github.com / ethereum / go-ethereum, accessed January 3, 2021), which serves as an Ethereum node. As an example, the Ethereum blockchain is recorded in the recording unit. Ethereum has two types of accounts: user accounts (EOA: Externally Owned Accounts) and contract accounts. In this invention, user accounts (EOA) are called user identifiers, and contract accounts are called contract identifiers as they are smart contract addresses. This invention uses Ethereum as the blockchain platform, and the contract is based on the ERC721 standard, a smart contract standard for non-fungible tokens. The following three sources are references for the ERC721 standard: 1. Ethereum Foundation, https: / / eips.ethereum.org / EIPS / eip-721, accessed December 11, 2020; 2. OpenZeppelin, https: / / docs.openzeppelin.com / contracts / 3.x / erc721, accessed December 11, 2020; 3.0xcert.org, https: / / github.com / 0xcert / ethereum-erc721, accessed December 11, 2020. In Ethereum, in an ERC721 smart contract, the contract administrator (who has user identifier C calculated from private key 101C) issues tokens in units of one and sends them to users with user identifiers A and B. ERC721 tokens are issued to user identifier A by associating a token ID, which is expressed as an unsigned integer variable, with user identifier A, the holder of the token. In this invention, the token ID in the ERC721 standard is called the token number. Information that user identifier A owns token number TIDA is recorded in the contract. For example, as shown in 3014A in Figure 3AC, user identifier A has token ownership information (3015A) with a TIDA number, and user identifier B has token ownership information (3016A) with a TIDB number. This information records the final ownership information, such as when a token is issued from a contract to a certain identifier or transferred between different user identifiers. On the blockchain, transactions related to contract creation, transfer records, and changes to internal variables of the contract are recorded in a way that makes them difficult to tamper with, and past token holding history information cannot be erased. Once a contract program is recorded on the blockchain and deployed, it cannot be tampered with either.
[0029] <Tokens on a distributed ledger used in this invention> In implementing this invention, Ethereum was used as the blockchain platform. Furthermore, the ERC721 standard tokens used in Ethereum were adopted in implementing this invention because they could be used to issue non-fungible tokens with OTP on Ethereum. A smart contract (contract) equipped with a one-time password (OTP) program in an ERC721 standard token was used as the OTP token contract for the authentication system of the present invention. While the ERC721 standard was used in this implementation, this is only one example of the present invention, and the present invention can be implemented with any smart contract that can provide the functionality of the OTP token of the present invention on a distributed ledger. The OTP token of the present invention is not limited to ERC721 standard tokens or similar tokens and token smart contracts. In this invention, an OTP token or OTP generation token / OTP generation contract refers to a contract that performs processes such as ownership of the token that generates the OTP, token issuance process, token transmission process, and display of information such as the token name. The OTP authentication contract or the OTP authentication function within the OTP authentication contract has variables and processing units for calculating an OTP that matches the OTP generation function of the OTP generation contract, and can perform OTP generation and authentication processes. Figures 3AA, 3AB, and 3AC are explanatory diagrams of the contract, and Figure 3DA is an example when the authentication function is located in terminal 3D rather than terminal 3A. The diagrams explaining the server group (3A, 3B, etc.) with the blockchain section and the terminals (1A, 1C, etc.) connected to the blockchain section are based on the assumption that they are equipped with a control section (processing section) and a memory section (recording section) that can execute the Ethereum blockchain and contracts used in the examples. The details of the control unit and the memory unit comply with the Ethereum specifications and are also applicable to systems with similar blockchain infrastructures. In the present invention, a contract (OTP generation contract) is provided that enables an ERC721 standard token to have an OTP generation function and issue an ERC721 type OTP generation token. Then, the OTP generation contract is provided with an OTP authentication function that can be set to the same value as the seed value used for OTP generation by the OTP generation contract, or an OTP authentication contract is separately created, and the OTP authentication contract is provided with the OTP authentication function. The OTP generated by the OTP generation function is output to the user terminals 1A, 4A, etc., and the output OTP and the information necessary for OTP authentication are input from the user terminals 1A, 4A, etc. to the OTP authentication function of the contract related to OTP authentication or the OTP authentication function installed in the terminal 3D to verify and authenticate whether it is the correct OTP. If it is the correct OTP, the return value data when the authentication is successful is transmitted to the processing unit of the user terminal. The thing provided with the OTP generation function in the ERC721 standard like this is the OTP generation token of the present invention, and it enables the hardware TOTP token that can be owned by a person's hand used for logging in to services such as Internet banking (online banking) to be owned and used in a distributed ledger such as a blockchain.
[0030] <Token Number and Token Issuance of Non-Fungible Tokens of ERC721 Standard> In the one-time password generation function of the present invention and the contract including the same, for a token of the ERC721 standard, one token number TIDA is issued (minted) to a user with a user identifier A. The issuance function inside the contract (3042A in Figure 3AC) is used for token issuance. 3042A generally cannot perform the token issuance operation without the private key PRVC of the contract administrator (101C in Figure 1C).
[0031] <Transfer of Token and Transfer Restriction> In the ERC721 standard, the transmission and transfer of tokens can be freely performed between different user identifiers. The token (OTP token) that generates the OTP of the present invention conforms to the ERC721 standard, so the token number TIDA can be sent to a user with user identifier B or other users if desired by a user with user identifier A. Token sending is performed using the token sending function (3040A in FIG. 3AC) in FIG. 3AC. Note that the ERC721 standard does not provide a function that allows the contract administrator to prohibit the sending of tokens, but in the present invention, the execution of 3040A can be stopped or permitted using a transfer restriction variable and function (3041A). In the present invention, it was necessary to limit or prevent the transfer of tokens such as bank one-time password tokens, non-transferable tickets, and membership rights, so a transfer restriction processing unit 3041A was provided that controls the execution of the token transmission functions (transfer functions) and the functions related to permission to transmit (approve functions) in the ERC721 standard, and the transfer restriction processing unit was made to be able to change the processing using variables that can only be changed by the terminal 1C of the contract administrator (Owner), thereby making it possible to restrict transfer. Specifically, a boolean variable that controls the execution of the transfer function and a boolean variable that controls the execution of the approve function are set in the contract (the boolean variable is set as a global function that can be accessed from all functions within the contract), and a function taf is provided as a setter that can only be accessed by the contract administrator's identifier C (C is calculated from 101C of terminal 1C), and by using taf to rewrite the boolean variable that controls the execution of the transfer function and the boolean variable that controls the execution of the approve function, it is possible to switch between a transferable and non-transferable state. (Token transfer restrictions restrict the rewriting of token ownership information between different user identifiers. A user identifier corresponds to a user's private key, and token transfer restrictions actually restrict the exchange of tokens between different private keys.)
[0032] <One-time password contracts (smart contracts)> In the present invention, it is possible to issue one-time password tokens (OTP tokens) to users on the blockchain (token allocation and association), send tokens (token transfer between users), obtain rating information, obtain token name information, obtain token URI information, etc. There is also a one-time password generation contract (3008A or 3008AG shown in Figures 3AA, 3AB, and 3AC) equipped with a one-time password generation function that uses a secret value KC, a variable TB that changes with time (in the present invention, the block number Bn is used as TB), the token number TIDA, and a seed value S generated based on a user identifier A as arguments to a hash function fh to obtain a hash value, and returns the hash value as a one-time password. Furthermore, in the function or contract that authenticates a one-time password of the present invention, if the seed value S and hash function fh used in the function that generates a one-time password are synchronized with the seed value and hash function used to verify the function input as arguments in the function that authenticates a one-time password, it can be confirmed that they match if the password is correct. (Flowcharts explaining the processing of one-time password OTP generation function 3009A are shown in Figures 6A and 6B. Flowcharts explaining the processing of one-time password OTP authentication function 3018A are shown in Figures 6C, 6D, 6E, 6F, 6G, and 6H.) The OTP authentication function may be built into the OTP generation contract that includes the OTP generation function, or the OTP authentication function may be built into the OTP authentication contract in order to store the OTP generation contract and the OTP authentication function separately, and the OTP generation contract and the OTP authentication contract may be separated and recorded in block data of the same block number or different block numbers on the blockchain. Alternatively, the OTP authentication function may be in a terminal 3D that is not connected to the network, and the OTP generation function may be in a terminal 3A that is on the network, and the OTP acquired by terminal 1A at terminal 3A may be used for authentication at terminal 3D. It is also possible to have a system in which the contract is recorded on another blockchain with different authentication and generation functions, and the OTP generation and authentication are divided and shared between the two blockchains, but in that case, the calculation method, hash function fh, and seed value S used to calculate the password for the OTP generation function and OTP authentication function recorded separately on the two blockchains must match. For example, the seed values A, TIDA, KC, Bn and hash function fh used in the function arguments in the flowcharts for the OTP generation function in Figure 6A and the OTP authentication function in Figure 6F, as well as the calculation procedure using these, must match, and the OTP generation function and the OTP authentication function must be able to calculate the same OTP.Furthermore, if in F107 in Figure 6A a hash value is calculated from the seed value and hash function, and the hash value is not used as the OTP, but rather the remainder obtained by dividing the hash value by the Nth power of 10 is used as the OTP, then the remainder must be calculated in the OTP authentication function in the same way, and the OTPs calculated by the OTP authentication function and the OTP generation function must match and be synchronized so that the remainder obtained by dividing the hash value by the Nth power of 10 can be used to calculate the OTP as an N-digit unsigned integer. Among the seed values, A and TIDA are token numbers corresponding to the OTP token holder or the serial number of the token held, and are user-derived variables, but KC is a value that can be updated by the contract administrator, so a means must be provided to ensure that the KC value matches between the OTP generation function and the OTP authentication function. In addition, the variables Tm that change at a certain time T, such as the seed values Bn and BC, must also match. BC is a variable that must be matched by the contract administrator, but if a phenomenon occurs in which Tm and Bn do not match between the OTP authentication function and the OTP generation function, a means must be provided to make them match. Contracts with an OTP authentication function and an OTP generation function deployed on the same blockchain (same blockchain identifier, distributed ledger system identifier) can use the same Bn, but when operating contracts with an OTP authentication function and an OTP generation function separately between different blockchain identifiers, if a correction value is added or subtracted from Bn, which differs between blockchain identifiers, and Bn no longer matches, it is necessary to provide a means to ensure that Bn matches, such as a setter function.
[0033] <Calculating one-time password> In response to access from terminal DA (terminal 1A) of user UA, terminal 3A performs processing: it calculates user identifier A from private key PRVA (private key 101A) recorded in the storage device of terminal 1A. As a side note, Ethereum calculates a public key from a private key, calculates the hash value of the public key using a hash function, and then cuts off that hash value to use as the user identifier. Specifically, Ethereum creates a 64-byte public key from a 32-byte private key using a method based on an elliptic curve called Secp256k1. It is also used for signatures (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, ECDSA). The 64-byte public key is then used with a hash function similar to SHA-3 called Keccak-256 to calculate a 32-byte hash value, and by cutting off part of it, the remaining information becomes the user identifier (anonymized identifier). In the contract of the present invention, which is programmed into the blockchain according to the data in the blockchain section and blockchain record section of server P (terminal 3A), the OTP generation function checks whether user identifier A, the executor of the function, possesses the one-time password token (OTP token) issued by the contract. For the token holder, the token number TIDA, the contract's secret variable KC value 3011A (internal variable KC 3011A shown in Figures 3AA, 3AB, and 3AC), and the variable TB, which fluctuates on the blockchain at a certain time T, are used as arguments for the hash function fh (hash function fh 3010A shown in Figures 3AA, 3AB, and 3AC) as the key value (key value, seed value) for password generation. An example calculation is OTP = fh(TIDA, KC, TB). The same applies when confirming possession of user identifier A and the OTP token when the OTP authentication function is executed. Here, in the embodiment, a user identifier A is added to the key value, and in the present invention, OTP is calculated as fh(A, TIDA, KC, TB). The present invention uses an OTP token using an OTP calculation method characterized by using a one-time password BnTOTP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn) based on the block number using the latest block number Bn (3001A in Figure 3AA is block number Bn) for the TB. When Bn is used for Tm (or TB), OTP = fh(A,TIDA,KC,TB) or OTP = fh(TIDA,KC,TB) is acceptable. Specifically, OTP = fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn) or OTP = fh(TIDA,KC,Bn) is acceptable. The reason why OTP=fh(TIDA, KC, TB) can be used here is that, for example, in the case of an OTP that is updated every 60 seconds, even if the user who holds it changes, Bn changes every 60 seconds, so OTP=fh(TIDA, KC, Bn) calculated 60 seconds ago can be invalidated. In the embodiment of the present invention, OTP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, TB) is preferably used, partly because the user identifier A (and the private key 101A used to calculate the user identifier A) is intended to be used to monitor unauthorized use of the private key when logging in to a web service, etc. Furthermore, the TB uses the internal variable BC value 3013A of the OTP generation token contract (internal variable BC3013A shown in Figures 3AA, 3AB and 3AC), and 3013A can be changed to any value at any time using a setter function 3012A that can access the blockchain using the private key 101C of the contract administrator terminal 1C and rewrite 3013A, thereby using an OTP token that uses an OTP calculation method characterized in that the password can be changed according to the BC value set by the administrator as a one-time password OWP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, BC). When BC is used for Tm (or TB), OTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,TB) may be preferred over OTP=fh(TIDA,KC,TB). Specifically, OTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,BC) may be preferred over OTP=fh(TIDA,KC,BC). Here, the reason why OTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,TB) is preferable to OTP=fh(TIDA,KC,TB) is that, for example, KC and BC can be changed at any time by the contract administrator and, depending on the contract administrator's judgment, may not be changed for a long period of time, exceeding several years, or even at all. When the KC and BC are not updated for a long period of time or even at all, in the case of OTP=fh(TIDA,KC,BC), an OTP specific to the token number but not the user identifier is generated and authenticated when the user identifier held is changed due to token transfer. This poses the problem that users who have obtained OTPs can successively transfer OTP tokens and obtain OTPs, sharing, duplicating, and recording the OTP value OTP=fh(TIDA,KC,BC) (a problem similar to duplicating a duplicate key for a metal key). In contrast, by calculating the OTP OTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,BC), an OTP specific to the user identifier and token number can be generated and authenticated, and is therefore preferably used in the embodiments of the present invention. And similar to the BC value 3013A, the KC value 3011A can also access the blockchain using the private key 101C of the contract administrator terminal 1C, and change the 3011A using the setter function 3012A that can rewrite it to any value at any time. By changing the secret variables KC of both the one-time password BnTOTP and OWP, all key values KC of the OTP tokens belonging to the contract can be updated to any numerical value at any time. It is characterized in that the BC value and KC value that can be changed can also be regarded as the same, and the BC value and KC value can be regarded as the same and used as one variable for OTP calculation. In addition, a plurality of BC values and KC values can be prepared and used respectively, or a KC value (mapping variable KCA described later) unique to the user identifier or token number can be set and used for those KC values.
[0034] <Calculation of one-time password consisting of n-digit integers> In order to use it as a password of 7 to 6 digits of integers used in bank transactions such as online banking using the Internet, the information BnTOTP calculated by the hash function is type-converted into an unsigned integer, and the remainder when the integer value is divided by n is obtained to be an n-digit integer password. Here, n may take a value from 6 to 7. When a setter function fOTPN in which the variable n can be rewritten only by the contract administrator is set in the contract (when the variable n and the function fOTPN are recorded in 3031A), after setting n to 6 and recording and deploying (deploying) the contract on the blockchain, in order to increase the computing power required for a brute-force attack, it is also possible to raise n from 6 to 12 to make a 12-digit password. This is a method that is difficult to achieve with a hardware TOTP token. Although it is not preferable in terms of security, if the number of digits may be small, it is also possible to change n from 6 to 3 after creating the contract and set the number of digits of the displayed OTP to 3 digits. Furthermore, a contract can be provided with multiple OTP generation functions and authentication functions, with an OTP authentication function and OTP generation function for important operations (for example, making a large transfer or payment at a bank) and an OTP authentication function and OTP generation function for less important operations that require authentication being provided within the contract or on the terminal 3D. In the above, the value of n can be increased when performing an important operation and decreased when performing an operation of less importance, thereby changing the number of digits at the time of input and reducing the effort required to input the number of characters required for OTP authentication, making it easier for a person to input by hand or the like into the terminal's input device. The same 3031A is set in the generation contract and the authentication contract (or authentication function) so that the seed values in the OTP authentication function and the OTP generation function match, and even after the contract is deployed to the blockchain, when changing the value of 3030A, terminal 1C, which is the contract administrator, must send a setting change transaction to 3A and rewrite variables, etc. so that the values match on the generation contract and authentication contract sides. The one-time password of the present invention can be expressed as an unsigned integer or a hexadecimal number. Numbers, letters, symbols, etc. can be used for the password.
[0035] <Block number processing> A new block is linked to a blockchain every certain time, such as every 15 seconds or 10 minutes, and the block number Bn is incremented by one. When the time it takes for user UA to generate an OTP from server P (3A) on terminal 1A, retrieve it, display it, and authenticate it (the OTP authentication standby time) is too short, it is conceivable that, for example, a user may want to enter the OTP displayed on the display of terminal DA (1A) on a webpage such as an internet banking site, but because the OTP is updated every 15 seconds, a human cannot keep up with manual entry and cannot enter the OTP. In fact, during the development of this invention, a blockchain on the Ethereum test network, in which block numbers change every 15 seconds, was used, but the inventors occasionally found it difficult to enter the OTP manually. Therefore, we used a variable n to increase the display interval based on the block number Bn. Then, as Bn mod n, we divided Bn by n to find the remainder m, subtracted m from Bn to get Bnr (Bn-m=Bnr), and used Bnr instead of Bn as an argument to the hash function that calculates the OTP. For example, if the block number is 15 seconds and n is 2, the password will be changed when the block number Bn is odd or even, and the password display time can be increased from 15 to 30 seconds. Increasing n from 2 to 3, 4, 5, and so on, further increases the display time and authentication time. The functions and variables that generate, authenticate, display, and increase the time allowed for waiting for input for this OTP are shown in 3030A of Figure 3AC. Note that n is an unsigned integer greater than or equal to 1. n cannot be set to 0. The same 3030A is set in the generation contract and the authentication contract (or authentication function) so that the seed values in the authentication function and the generation function match, and even after the contract is deployed to the blockchain, when changing the value of 3030A, terminal 1C, which is the contract administrator, must send a setting change transaction to 3A and rewrite variables, etc. so that the values match on the generation contract and authentication contract sides.
[0036] <OTP using values determined by the blockchain> In this embodiment, a one-time password OTP token issuing unit, an OTP token and user ownership relationship recording unit, an OTP generation unit, and an authentication unit that verifies and authenticates the generated password are provided in the blockchain contract in the form of a smart contract that adds the OTP authentication unit of this invention to the EERC721 standard that is an embodiment of the Ethereum testnet. The block number Bn can be used in the blockchain unit. In Ethereum, a vote is held between nodes that make up the blockchain regarding the Gas Limit value (BlockGasLimit value). Ethereum also has the feature of allowing the block size to vary depending on the Gas Limit value. The V value 3004A and the block size BSZ value 3005A determined by this vote are also used as the seed value for the blockchain in this invention. For example, if all of the above are implemented, the one-time password BnTOTP can be generated using multiple arguments that serve as the seed value for generating the OTP, such as BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BC,V), or BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BSZ), or BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BC,BSZ). The OTP can also be treated as a pseudorandom number generator. When used in a smart contract for a TOTP-based pseudo-random number generator using block number Bn on Ethereum, BnTOTP=fh(KC,Bn), BnTOTP=fh(Bn), or BnTOTP=fh(fh(Bn)) may be used; in this invention, after confirming that a TOTP-based pseudo-random number generator using block number Bn can be implemented, this pseudo-random number generator was applied to an OTP authentication system. When used as a pseudo-random number, the token number TIDA or the mapping variable VU of the user's voting value, which will be described later, may be used as the seed value.
[0037] In the embodiment, Ethereum has an ECMAScript module called web3.js that connects the blockchain unit with the web browser on the user's device. Using the ECMAScript module, the user's private key, a specified user identifier, a contract identifier, a blockchain identifier, and a token name can be used to access the Ethereum blockchain on the web browser, operate the OTP generation function and OTP authentication function of the present invention, and obtain an OTP or the authentication result return value CTAU, which can be used to log on to a website (FIG. 8A), enter using a paper ticket 18A or a near-field communication (NFC) tag 19A, or as an electronic unlock key for an NFC tag-based lock (FIG. 8B). Furthermore, in the OTP authentication system of the present invention, the software CRHN (403A in FIG. 4A) is used to execute the OTP authentication function, and the return value data CTAU (CTAU indicates 3021A recorded in the contract of the blockchain shown in FIG. 3AA etc. and 4031A in FIG. 4B in which 3021A in FIG. 3AA is OTP authenticated and stored in the terminal 4A) obtained when the authentication result is correct is used, and the key data AKTB (4032A in FIG. 4B) obtained from outside the blockchain and the key data recorded in 403A are used. The OTP authentication system of the present invention can be used in a system that distributes key data TTKY (4033A in FIG. 4B) that performs common key encryption (symmetric key encryption) according to the program 403A using software secret key data CRKY (40302A in FIG. 4B), and data 4035A encrypted with that key data TTKY (4033A in FIG. 4B), and distributes and decrypts encrypted data that can be decrypted by a user who has been granted access rights as an ERC721 type token with a one-time password authentication function. The return value CATU3021A of the OTP authentication function 3018A, 3018A, or 3018DA may be changed by the contract administrator by providing a means for changing it, and may return one or more return values CTAU3021A.Furthermore, a mapping variable CATU3021A (mapping variable 3021A called CTAU[TIDA] or CTAU[A]) using the user identifier A or token number TIDA as a key and a setter function for changing the value of the variable using the token number or user identifier as a key may be provided.
[0038] 3. Network It is preferable that communication between the user UA's computer DA (terminal 1A) and the server P (terminal 3A) be encrypted over the network 20, which is the communication path. In the present invention, one-time passwords are exchanged between the terminal 1A and the server terminal 3A, and it is preferable that the communication path connecting the terminals 1A and 3A over the network 20 be encrypted. If the communication path is not encrypted, there is a risk that interactions with the blockchain over the network 20 may be read. It is also desirable for the blockchain infrastructure to have a method for concealing the details of transactions and contracts and information about contract variables. When configuring a network, wired and wireless communication methods may be used. When using the token of the present invention to generate and authenticate one-time passwords, two-way communication is required. However, depending on the usage, only the generation of one-time passwords can be performed using two-way communication, and authentication can be performed using a terminal 3D that reads a paper ticket or an NFC tag for locking and unlocking (the usage of the 3D is shown in Figure 8B). In addition, when decrypting encrypted data, encrypted data obtained through one-to-many broadcasting can be authenticated and decrypted using the authentication system of the present invention in accordance with the generated OTP. The broadcasting station is station 5C in space, and station 5CC, which operates it, communicates wirelessly using network 2. When decrypting encrypted data through two-way data communication, network 20 or the like is used.
[0039] 4. Services that require passwords 4A. Website Login Use <Login process> When the authentication system of the present invention is used to log in to or operate a website, the login process is performed using server SVLogin (terminal 3C in Fig. 8A). Fig. 8A shows a connection diagram of the terminals. Terminal 1A, terminal 3A, and terminal 3C are connected via network 20. Server terminal 3C may be a real server terminal 3C, a virtual server terminal 3C, or a terminal 3C that is a virtual machine. By storing storage device data of server terminal 3C in terminal 1A, constructing server terminal 3C as a virtual machine in terminal 1A, and connecting terminal 1A to terminal 3A via network 20 while terminal 1A and terminal 3C communicate with each other within terminal 1A, it becomes possible to log in to virtual machine terminal 3C constructed in terminal 1A. For example, terminal 3C may be an electronic book service or an online game server service that requires a login and whose service has ended. A web application that allows communication and exchange between the blockchain part of the server 3A and the user's terminal 1A using ECMAScript or the like on the terminal 3C sends and displays website data to the user, and using wallet software that has information on the user's private key 101A (if there is no wallet software, the private key information 101A itself is entered, written, and output on the website), inputs a token number that can be used to log in to the server terminal 3C that the user possesses into the website data, and from that information and the information in the wallet software, a one-time password generation function of the one-time password generation contract generates a block number-based one-time password BnTOTP using the user identifier A and token number TIDA as arguments, and when BnTOTP is entered on the website, the input value is authenticated using the one-time password authentication function of the one-time password authentication contract. BnTOTP, calculated by the OTP authentication function and generation function, is expressed as the argument and function BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn) using the hash function fh, the contract internal variable KC, and the above A and TIDA. Here, the wallet software can calculate private key information and user identifier information calculated from the private key, and some can even display the number of ERC721 tokens held for a particular private key and user identifier. (An example of wallet software is Metamask, a browser extension wallet software at https: / / metamask.io. Some can also communicate with the hardware wallet DWALT1603A, which stores private keys.) When the authentication result is correct, information about the blockchain, such as the user identifier A who accessed the server 3A and the token number TIDA, as well as the IP address or location information of the terminal 1A, the device ID unique to the terminal 1A, or the sensor value of the sensor 144A of the input device 14A of the terminal 1A, can be stored in the server 3A as the terminal environment value IPV in the data structure shown in Figure 6X, and it can be monitored for any unauthorized access. The sensor values of sensor 144A of terminal 1A are mainly sensor values of sensor 144A, environmental sensor 1440A, position sensor 1441A, motion sensor 1442A, and biometric authentication sensor 1443A, and are used with the user's consent. Although it is not desirable from a privacy standpoint, in unavoidable cases, the input itself of input device 14A such as 140A, 141A, 143A, and 142A may also be used. When using input devices such as 143A, 142A, 141A, and 140A as sensor values, they cannot be used without the user's consent to provide information. Here, the environmental sensor 1440A is a sensor that can measure information related to the environment around the terminal using physical means, such as a temperature sensor, humidity sensor, barometric pressure sensor, pressure sensor, illuminance sensor, light sensor, chemical sensor, or odor sensor. Position sensor 1441A includes a magnetic sensor, a geomagnetic sensor, or an accelerometer, and is a sensor that measures acceleration or magnetism as physical quantities, and is used for measuring the position of the terminal using gravitational acceleration, a magnetic compass function that indicates the orientation relative to geomagnetism, etc. Motion sensor 1442A includes both an accelerometer or a gyro sensor (angular velocity sensor), and is a sensor that detects motion such as the acceleration of the terminal, and measures the motion of the terminal. The biometric authentication sensor 1443A is a sensor when the terminal 1A has an image sensor such as a camera or thermography and performs authentication based on the structure of the face using the image sensor, a fingerprint sensor that performs fingerprint authentication using a scanner, a sensor that performs authentication based on the structure of the ear, or a sensor that performs authentication using motion or pressure signals sensed by the terminal worn when walking, etc. Known methods can be used for biometric authentication.
[0040] <Login execution and post-execution processing> After logging in, terminal 3C sends website and web application data to terminal 1A. The server terminal SVLogin terminal 3C records the values entered by the user on the login page using the input device on terminal 1A via the network and manipulates user data based on the entered values. Specific examples include transfer processing after logging in to internet banking, data recording / changing and voting on member sites, voting processing at online shareholders' meetings, and processing in online games. Depending on the processing after OTP authentication, the blockchain accesses the user and user terminal 1A, and when the processing is performed, an OTP generation function is executed to obtain the OTP. When the authentication function is executed using the obtained OTP as an argument, variables such as 3017A and 3017AA are changed. When used for authentication and login to a website, etc., 3017A or 3017AA may record the points or currency balance of a member who can use the service, and when information such as the login rights or electronic tickets of the present invention is presented at the time of service provision, the balance may be deducted by the amount of points or currency corresponding to the service. In addition to member points, membership-specific numerical values, and currency balances, important data such as online games that should not be tampered with may also be recorded. 3017A or 3017AA may change the balance at the instruction of other users in the contract or the contract administrator, and may perform transfer processing, such as adding a portion of one user's balance to another user's balance. (Here, when a paper or electronic ticket or a terminal that can serve as a login right is presented to a service providing device such as terminal 3D for authentication, 3017DA also records the points or currency balance of the member who can use the service, and when the information on the electronic ticket or paper ticket of the present invention is presented at the time of service provision, the balance may be deducted by the amount of points or currency corresponding to the service. The balance may be changed by instructions from other users or the administrator of terminal 3D within the data stored in the storage device of terminal 3D, and a transfer or money transfer process may be performed in which part of one user's balance is added to the balance of another user. If terminal 3D is connected to network 20 like terminal 3C and can be connected to node terminals 3A, 3F, and 3E, terminal 3D is considered to be equivalent to terminal 3C and to perform the same processes as terminal 3C.) 3017A and 3017AG represent the asset balance and data volume of the OTP token corresponding to the token number, and may be manipulated after the authentication function is executed. When the OTP authentication function 3018A is executed, 3021A, 3022A, and 3023A in FIG. 3AB may be included as processes included in the execution of the authentication function 3018A (or processes linked to and executed separately after the processing of the authentication function). Specifically, 3018A, 3021A, 3022A, and 3023A are Internet banking authentication contracts in which the customer's asset balance is recorded, and following the authentication function 3018A, there may be 3022A which has a process for transferring money to another user token number (assuming the token number and bank account number are associated) within the contract when the OTP authentication function of the source user matches the transfer destination within the balance recorded in 3017AA. 3022A may be used for processing transfers, fixed-term deposits, setting transfer limits, etc. It can also be used for purposes other than banking, such as in the financial sector (securities, insurance, etc.), voting on private or public membership sites, changing important matters, or recording important user data in online games.
[0041] <Detection of unauthorized logins> In the present invention, the IP address (hashed or processed value of the IP address) of the logged-in user, or location information (hashed or processed value of the location information), or the computer's device ID (or hash value), token number, and user identifier are recorded in 3011C of storage device 30C of SVLogin (terminal 3C in Figure 3C) in the data structure or data format shown in Figure 6X, and terminal 3C is equipped with processing units (3110C, 3111C, 3112C, 3113C in Figure 3C) that monitor the IP address (hashed or processed value of the IP address) of the logged-in user, or location information (hashed or processed value of the location information), or the computer's device ID (or hash value), and is equipped with processing units (3110C, 3111C, 3112C, 3113C in Figure 3C) that determine at any time whether a certain token number or user identifier is being accessed from a different IP address, different location information, or different device ID, and if so, notify the user and further block access. Here, the device ID of the computer may be an IPV value (data structure shown in FIG. 6X) or a hashed IPV containing information from sensors 144A (sensors shown as 1440A, 1441A, 1442A, and 1443A in FIG. 144A) of terminal 1A, including an acceleration sensor, magnetic sensor, pressure sensor (barometric pressure sensor), temperature sensor, etc., mounted on terminal 1A, in addition to a computer manufacturing ID such as a device ID, an operating software ID, and a web browser ID. This method may also be used in other use cases 4B, 4C, and 4T of the present invention. For example, if terminal 1A is a smartphone equipped with a magnetic sensor in position sensor 144A (1441A) capable of detecting three-dimensional magnetic fields and measuring geomagnetic fields, the orientation of the smartphone's built-in magnetic sensor will change depending on the orientation of the user terminal. In a normal access, there is only one access information from the user terminal corresponding to the magnetic sensor value. However, even if another user illegally obtains the private key and attempts to log in, the attacker must match the magnetic sensor value of the user's computer located at a distant location on Earth, making spoofing difficult. Multiple sensors can be used, not just one. For example, a geomagnetic sensor and a temperature sensor, or a temperature and barometric sensor (temperature and pressure sensor) can be combined. It is preferable to be able to use the IP address (and its hash value or anonymized value) in conjunction with the sensor value. Here, the sensors built into the terminal 1A will also be described. It is not necessary for all sensors to be built into the terminal, and it is preferable to employ one or more sensors. The environmental sensors of 1440A include a temperature sensor, an air pressure sensor (pressure sensor), a humidity sensor, and an illuminance sensor, and the measured values of these four types of sensors can be input individually to terminal 1A. The position sensor of 1441A includes a magnetic sensor that detects magnetism and an accelerometer that detects acceleration, and is a sensor that can detect the position of the terminal. The sensor measurements of the magnetic sensor and accelerometer can be input individually to terminal 1A. The motion sensor of 1442A includes an accelerometer and a gyro sensor that detects angular velocity, and is a sensor that can detect the movement of the terminal. The measurement values of the accelerometer (acceleration sensor) and gyro sensor can be input individually to terminal 1A. For example, the biometric authentication sensor 1443A may use a camera 142A for face or blink information, a fingerprint scanner for fingerprints, sensors for detecting vein patterns, irises, or ear structures, and a shoe-type motion sensor device or a group of motion sensors attached to clothing that correspond to an acceleration sensor of an external terminal that can communicate with the terminal 1A's 1442A or the terminal 1A's communication device 12A for gait information. For voice authentication, a terminal equipped with a microphone / sound sensor 143A can hash the audio information surrounding the terminal as unique audio information that the terminal can sense, and use the hashed audio information to determine the IPV value while protecting personal privacy. When using biometric authentication or privacy-related information as the information in Figure 6X, it may be preferable to hash, process, and anonymize the information acquired by the sensor. However, for financial purposes such as banking and securities, it may be preferable to record information such as IP addresses as is for security reasons.
[0042] <Countermeasures against unauthorized access using multiple private keys> In an embodiment of the authentication system of the present invention, a single private key 101A may be used, or a private key different from 101A, such as private key 101A2, may be used, and two or more private keys may be used to access functions and variables of a contract on server 3A having a blockchain unit from user terminal 1A or 1B, contract manager terminal 1C, etc., or to access terminal 3C or terminal 3D that provides a service. The authentication system of the present invention may also be used to decrypt encrypted data. When the token number of the OTP token associated with terminal 1A using private key 101A is TIDA, BnTOTP calculated by the OTP authentication function and generation function is expressed as the argument and function BnTOTP-1=fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn) using the hash function fh, the contract internal variable KC, and the above-mentioned A and TIDA. Here, in addition to the private key 101A installed in the terminal 1A, there is a second private key 101A2, and when there is a user identifier A2 calculated from the private key 101A2 and the token number TIDA2 of the OTP token issued in correspondence with it, the second BnTOTP-2 = fh(A2, TIDA2, KC, Bn) can be calculated. After generating BnTOTP-1 and BnTOTP-2 using the OTP generation function, authentication can be performed by executing the authentication function within the contract that has the authentication function using the user identifier calculated from the two private keys 101A and 101A2, the token number of the OTP token, and the OTP (BnTOTP-1 and BnTOTP-2 are shown here as an example, but in the case of OWP, the format OWP-1 and OWP-2 are also possible) as function arguments in the format A, TIDA, BnTOTP-1, A2, TIDA2, BnTOTP2-2. By using two private keys as described above, if one of the two private keys is leaked, for example, if 101A is leaked and abused, the function argument BnTOTP-2 (OWP-2 in the case of OWP) will be unknown to the attacker unless the other private key 101A2 is leaked, and the authentication function cannot be executed, which is expected to prevent unauthorized access. When multiple private keys are used to authenticate an OTP token, the contract that authenticates the OTP token must register the user identifier A calculated from private key 101A and the user identifier A2 calculated from private key 101A2 as the user identifiers used by the user UA in a variable within the contract or in the service provider's database. In addition to the user identifiers, the contract including the OTP authentication function may have a section that registers that the token numbers TIDA and TIDA2 have been distributed to the same user UA. The number of private keys is not limited to two, and may be three or more.
[0043] Two identifiers A and A2 of the UA or token numbers TIDA and TIDA2 may be registered in a terminal that serves as the service provider in this invention, such as server terminal 3C or 3D, and when logging in to a website, authentication may be performed by requiring the input of A, TIDA, and BnTOTP-1, and then authentication may be performed by requiring the input of A2, TIDA2, and BnTOTP-2. Instead of using a blockchain, it is also possible to perform authentication processing on the website login screen of the server terminal 3C or 3D where BnTOTP-1=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn) and BnTOTP-2=fh(A2,TIDA2,KC,Bn) are distributed separately by the server 3C, and require the input and authentication of OTPs for multiple OTP tokens on the server terminal 3C or 3D. In this case, 3C or 3D must associate the user identifiers A and A2 and TIDA and TIDA2 derived from the multiple private keys of user UA, and record these in the recording device of 3C or 3D. When using server terminals 3C and 3D to authenticate OTP tokens using multiple private keys, the server terminals 3C and 3D that authenticate the OTP token must register the user identifier A calculated from the private key 101A and the user identifier A2 calculated from the private key 101A2 as the user identifiers used by the user UA. Alternatively, the server terminals 3C and 3D that include an OTP authentication function may be provided with a section that registers that the token numbers TIDA and TIDA2 have been distributed to the same user UA. Recording is also required when the contract identifiers of the OTP tokens are different. The number of private keys is not limited to two, but may be three or more. The database of the correspondence between multiple private keys and the OTP tokens issued for them may be recorded only in the server terminal, only in the contract on the blockchain, or both. It is also possible to access both the server terminal 3C or 3D and the contract on the blockchain using multiple private keys.
[0044] Ethereum, which is used in implementing the present invention, uses a 256-bit private key per user identifier, but if two private keys are used in an embodiment of the OTP authentication system of the present invention, the private key becomes 512 bits, and if N private keys are used, OTP authentication becomes possible using a 256 x N [bit] private key, making it possible to extend the actual data length of the private key. Increasing the data length can also increase resistance to attacks by those attempting unauthorized access. For example, if three private keys are configured to be used, even if one of the three private keys is leaked, access to the contract's functions and variables will be prevented as long as the remaining two are not leaked. If the majority of the private keys are not obtained, the OTP tokens assigned to those private keys cannot be authenticated, preventing the provision of services. This is a type of multi-sig technology. (Multi-sig: multiple signatures using multiple private keys.) It may be possible to operate private key identity verification by combining multiple private keys and performing OTP authentication. For example, when there are two private keys, one is private key 101A2 that has been shared with a third party and has been verified, and the other is private key 101A that the user generated within terminal 1A, and immediately after starting to use the private keys and it is assumed that the private keys have not been leaked, user identifiers A2 and A calculated using both private keys 101A2 and 101A are registered on server terminal 3C of a third party or a third party that associates user identifiers with real persons UA by logging in using TIDA and TIDA2 tokens via OTP authentication on the website of the third party or the organization that performs the association. Using the OTP tokens with token numbers TIDA and TIDA2 assigned to A and A2, or A and A2, the administrator of terminal 3C can determine that UA, who knows A2's private key 101A2 communicated to user UA, uses user identifier A and has private key 101A corresponding to A. At this point, A, A2, and user UA are linked, and identity verification can be easily performed. Then, it may be possible to determine that A is the user identifier corresponding to the private key possessed by user UA, and use user identifier A as the destination address for tokens, etc., to issue and distribute, for example, login rights to a certain membership site, admission tickets to a certain venue, keys to lock and unlock, and OTP tokens to decrypt encrypted data. When issuing an OTP token of the present invention, it is necessary to confirm that the user identifier A or A2 is the identifier of a real user UA. It is also possible that an OTP token may be issued for a private key that is completely different from private key 101A due to an input error in user identifier A. It is therefore necessary to confirm whether the user identifier to which the OTP token is to be sent is that of an actual user, such as user UA, UB, or UC, who has recorded and can use the private key. Since identity verification is considered necessary, the above identity verification method is presented. However, this is only one form, and identity verification using an OTP token using multiple private keys is not necessarily performed when implementing the present invention. Other known identity verification methods may also be used.
[0045] <Contract signature information, including rating and contact information for the contract administrator> In addition to rating information, the name of the service provided by the contract, the name of the token, and explanations may be recorded in the signboard variable 3024A (KNBN, 3024A in Figure 3AC) and published as a public variable as signboard information. Also, the signboard information may be rewritable by the contract administrator. Specifically, in the case of Internet banking, necessary business information such as the bank's name, postal code, address of the bank's head office, corporate number, main telephone number (facsimile number), and contact information for the nearest ministry or agency that has jurisdiction over the bank may be entered into contract variables in 3024A and made public as public variables. Information legally required when providing services may be entered into the one-time password generation token contract or the one-time password authentication contract, and the contract may be programmed so that it can be rewritten by the contract administrator. The signboard information 3024A may be entered in the contract of the present invention as necessary and may be rewritable by the contract manager. 3024A may include a setter function required for rewriting that is accessible only by the private key 101C of the contract manager's terminal 1C.
[0046] <Rating> Rating information is recorded in the contract for the one-time password generation token to indicate the target age for the service, etc. Rating information is written in the public variable KNBN (3024A shown in Figures 3AA to 3AC), which serves as a signboard. The rating information written in 3024A describes the target users of the OTP token service. For example, if the present invention is used for car keys, this service is intended for licensed users over a certain age, so this information is written. Whether the service is aimed at minors or adults, and whether a license or other qualification is required, varies depending on the service. Here, it is preferable that the contract variable that stores the rating information is a public variable that can be viewed by all users. The rating may also be rewritable by the contract administrator.
[0047] 4B. Use as paper or IC-type admission tickets, tickets, or unlocking keys for entrances and building facilities Server SVLog (server terminal 3D shown in Figures 8B and 3D) is used when used for tickets, admission passes, and locking and unlocking building facilities. Figure 8B shows a diagram of the terminal connections. Server SVLog (terminal 3D) does not necessarily have to be a server if there are only a few users to process admissions, etc. It can also be a computer SVLog (terminal 3D) with smaller computing power, storage capacity, and physical size than a server. Terminal 3D can also be an embedded terminal that operates building locking devices, car locking devices, and engine starting devices. 3D can also be a terminal with an MCU for embedded systems (Micro Control Unit, microcontroller, microcomputer). In this invention, a password OWP generated from the blockchain is used for the recorded information on an IC tag / IC card type ticket 19A equipped with communication functions such as NFC or a paper ticket 18A (and a display surface 1500A of a display that displays the same OTP authentication information as the paper ticket 18A) (here, IC stands for Integrated Circuit).
[0048] 19A is a contactless NFC tag or an IC card with a contact terminal, and the user may set a PIN or the like as a password in 19A to prevent unauthorized use by users who are not the user of 19A. When communication between 19A and terminal 3D is performed to transmit authentication information such as OWP, password authentication using the PIN set in 19A is requested, and if password authentication is successful, information from the NFC tag may be transmitted to terminal 3D via communication device 32D of terminal 3D.
[0049] Here, PIN stands for personal identification number, and is, for example, a four-digit integer password. The PIN of 19A is used as a final means of confirming intent to use when using a service using 19A. Because 19A communicates wirelessly, a PIN may be used to prevent information from 19A from being transmitted to terminal 3D without the knowledge of the user who owns 19A. 19A may encrypt the content of communication when communicating with 3D wirelessly or via a wired method. The PIN may be used to encrypt authentication information using the OWP recorded in 19A (the OWP may be encrypted using a method such as symmetric key encryption with the PIN as a key). 18A and 1500A can confirm the intent of the user who owns them by manually presenting them, but 19A may allow a PIN code to be set because there is a risk that payments may be made even from a certain distance via wireless communication, etc. While using a PIN improves the security of 19A, requiring the user to enter a PIN each time the service is authenticated may require the user to spend time entering the PIN, which may reduce user convenience. Therefore, if 19A and NFC communication device 341D (said communication device 341D or 32D) that reads the wireless communication signal of 19A are contactless but have a communication distance of 10 cm (specifically, a known short-range wireless communication technology that uses a frequency of 13.56 MHz and has a communication distance of approximately 10 cm), and the service provider specifies the above-mentioned condition for 19A (that is, 19A with a communication distance of approximately 10 cm), and allows the provision of a service based on the authentication result using the authentication system of the present invention using NFC tag 19A even without a PIN, the present invention may be implemented in a way that does not require setting a PIN or the like, and simply holds 19A over 3D 32D or 341D to perform OTP authentication and provide a service based on the authentication result. (You can set a PIN for 19A for security reasons. You can also use 19A without setting a PIN. Not setting a PIN improves payment speed at entrances and ticket gates, and you can prioritize ease of use, usability, and convenience.) There are applications where a PIN is required and applications where it is not required for locking / unlocking key 19A used for keyless entry of automobiles, remote unlocking of automobile doors (communication distance is more than 10 cm and more than 1 meter), and locking / unlocking key 19A used for remote unlocking of building doors (communication distance is more than 10 cm and more than 1 meter). For automobile applications where the communication distance is more than 10 cm and more than 1 meter, a PIN may not be required for 19A. For locking and unlocking buildings, safes, and vaults where the communication distance is more than 10 cm and more than 1 m, it may be preferable to use a PIN for locking and unlocking as well.
[0050] The password OWP is calculated as OWP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, BC) using a hash function fh, a user identifier A, a token number TIDA, a contract internal secret variable KC value 3011A, and a variable BC value 3013A that can be changed by the contract administrator. OWP is calculated and generated by an OTP generation function 3009A using the hash function fh and arguments. In this example, 3009A includes a calculation process that can be expressed as OWP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, BC) where OTP=OWP. Paper ticket 18A is produced by printing OWP information obtained using one-time password OWP generation function 3009A of the present invention onto paper or the like. Information recorded in 18A includes at least user identifier A, token number TIDA, and password OWP. Information recorded in 18A can be displayed on 1500A. If service providing terminal 3D is equipped with a device such as a camera that can read 18A or 1500A, the authentication information can be read not only by valuable paper such as tickets, but also by safes, vaults, building doors, entrances and exits, vehicles such as automobiles, and electronic computer terminals that lock and unlock the doors, allowing entry and exit and locking. The NFC tag 19 can be manufactured by storing authentication information including a user identifier A, a token number TIDA, and a password OWP held by the terminal 1A in the 19A via the communication device 12A of the terminal 1A, and is used to release valuable paper such as tickets, tags for entry and exit, keys for locking and unlocking, or access control. As shown in FIG. 8B, it may be an NFC tag 19A that records A, TIDA, and OWP, a display screen 1500A of the terminal 1A that displays A, TIDA, and OWP, or a paper ticket 18A on which the screen 1500A is printed.
[0051] As shown in Fig. 8B, 18A and 1500A are read by the camera scanner 340D of the terminal 3D. At this time, 18A and 1500A may display character string information in which A, TIDA, and OWP are linked together, or may display barcode information (one-dimensional and two-dimensional barcodes). 8B, 19A may communicate with 32D of terminal 3D and transmit character string information that combines A, TIDA, and OWP. It is assumed that NFC is used for communication between 19A and 32D. The password OWP authentication function 3018DA (3018DA in Figure 3DA) provided in the control unit and memory unit (31D and 30D) of the terminal 3D that received A, TIDA, and OWP from 1500A, 18A, and 19A verifies whether the input OWP (ArgOWP) matches VeriOWP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, BC), which is calculated using the KC and BC values recorded in the terminal 3D, according to the flowchart for processing the OTP authentication function in Figure 6F or 6D. If they match, it is determined that authentication has been successful, and the terminal 3D operates the opening / closing device 350D or locking device 350D (locking / unlocking device 350D) or starting device 350D or access control device 350D of the device in which the terminal 3D is incorporated, to process entry at a ticket gate or entrance, or to unlock locked buildings, vehicles such as automobiles, and containers such as safes, and to start vehicles, computers, machines, and equipment.
[0052] Authentication function 3018DA receives as arguments the OWP (as OWP=ArgOWP), A, and TIDA from information 1500A, 18A, or 19A, following the flowcharts for OTP authentication function processing in Figures 6F and 6D. It then calculates VeriOWP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, BC) using KC value 3011DA, BC value 3013DA, and hash function 3010DA of 3D shown in Figure 3DA. The hash function fh, KC value, and BC value used to calculate VeriOWP and ArgOWP must all match the seed values KC, BC, and hash function fh of terminal 3A, which generates the OWP for 18A or 19A on the blockchain, and terminal 3D, which provides the service. If the return value of the authentication function 3018DA is the value when the authentication result is correct, the terminal 3D can open the opening / closing device of 350D, unlock the locking device (locking / unlocking device), and start the device, but if the authentication fails, the opening / closing device is closed, the locking device (locking / unlocking device) is not operated, and the device is not started. (If the variables and procedures used when calculating the OWP in 3A on the blockchain do not match the variables and procedures used when calculating the OWP on terminal 3D, even if 1500A, 18A, or 19A containing a correctly generated OWP is presented to terminal 3D, an incorrect authentication result will be calculated and entry processing, unlocking processing, etc. will not be possible. Specifically, even if user UA with NFC tag 19A containing correct authentication information presents it to terminal 3D on which incorrect 3011DA or 3013DA is recorded, terminal 3D will verify the OWP using incorrect authentication function 3018DA using the incorrect 3011DA or 3013DA, and will determine from the execution result of the authentication function that 19A is fraudulent and that entry or unlocking will not be possible, causing the opening and closing device or locking device to remain closed or sounding a warning buzzer.)
[0053] The contract administrator and administrators of the service and terminal 3D must match hash function 3010A of blockchain node terminal 3A with 3010DA of terminal 3D, match KC value 3011A of terminal 3A with 3011DA of terminal 3D, match BC value 3013A of terminal 3A with 3013DA of terminal 3D, match other variables and functions if used in the OWP calculation, and match and synchronize the OWP-type OTP calculation method and variables used in the calculation on terminal 3A and terminal 3D. Matching the OTP calculation method and the variables used in the calculation enables the OTP authentication service of the present invention in the real world using paper or NFC tags using 1500A, 18A, or 19A. When terminal 3D is a terminal that manages locks built into a building door or safe, if a change occurs to the secret values KC or BC, the user of the door or safe into which terminal 3D is built can access communication device 32D of lock management terminal 3D, which is provided in a position that the user can access after unlocking the locked equipment (for example, the back side of the safe door or the back side of the building door, or the indoor side of the building door), via a wired or wireless method, and update KC value 3011DA and BC value 3013DA of 32D according to software provided by the manufacturer of terminal 3D.
[0054] Comparing this invention to a metal key, if OWP=ArgOWP, the information A, TIDA, and ArgOWP is the key, and the information A, TIDA, and VeriOWP corresponds to the lock. In this invention, the information on the key and lock is variable, and the information on the key and lock cannot be synchronized, so authentication cannot be performed unless the conditions for calculating the key and the conditions for calculating the lock match. (For reference, in the case of BnTOTP, which is assumed to be used for logging in to websites, etc., the information A, TIDA, and ArgBnTOTP is the key, and the information A, TIDA, and VeriBnTOTP corresponds to the lock.) The OTP token that serves as the key to the blockchain and the OWP-type password generated by the OTP token can be shared using distributed ledger technology and stored in a state that makes it difficult to tamper with, but when implementing this invention in a situation where 3D cannot connect to 3A, the administrator of terminal 3D is required to update the lock information to the latest information, or to set information that can authenticate terminal 1A's OWP-type password, user identifier A, and token number TIDA with 1500A, 18A, or 19A.
[0055] In order to match the OWP calculated by terminal 3D and terminal 3A, one possible usage scenario is to not change the KC values 3011A·3011DA and the BC values 3013A·3013DA after the contract is deployed. Although this usage scenario poses security issues as passwords are not updated, it is envisioned that the system may be used, for example, as a one-time admission ticket for an event used by a small, limited community. While the KC and BC values can be changed, a usage scenario in which they are not actually changed may reduce the effort required by the service provider and make the present invention easier to use. In this case, it is preferable to specify the expiration date and warranty period on the OTP token. When used for products such as simple safes and locks, a product warranty period may be set and the contract management beyond that period may not be carried out at all, providing a service in the form of a disposable contract.
[0056] When 1500A, 18A or 19A is used as an admission ticket for a limited community event, in addition to the three required pieces of information, the user identifier A and the token numbers TIDA and OWP, the time when 1500A, 18A or 19A was manufactured or produced, its expiration date, the address of the place where the admission ticket can be used, the name and contact information of the person responsible for issuing the admission ticket and providing the service, etc. may be recorded on 1500A, 18A or 19A. Preferably, this information is displayed and printed as character string information on 1500A or 18A, and in the case of 19A, it is displayed as character string on the display of terminal 1A so that a person can visually confirm the information on the valuable paper. The three required pieces of information, user identifier A, token number TIDA, and OWP, can be displayed as a two-dimensional barcode that can be read by a camera or scanner, allowing the information required for authentication to be read by the 3D 340D. Also, since the OWP can be misused if it is read, the user identifier and token number can be written as a string of characters, and for separate authentication, the three required pieces of information, user identifier A, token number TIDA, and OWP, can be printed, displayed, or recorded as a two-dimensional barcode, with only the OWP recorded as a two-dimensional barcode, in a format such as 1500A or 18A. Regarding 1500A, terminal 1A may have a function to read out information other than OWP visually or audibly and inform the user of the token number, user identifier, service expiration date, and service provider information. If security is maintained, there may be an image recognition terminal that reads out 18A. (OWP is confidential information that must not be entered anywhere other than the service provider terminal 3D. If 18A or 1500A containing the OWP is read, read aloud, photographed, or recognized by image recognition using software with security issues, or if 19A information that is not protected by a PIN or the like is read, the OWP and other information may be leaked and used fraudulently.)
[0057] <Processing to mark OTP tokens used at entry, etc.> The terminal 3D or a contract on the blockchain may record in the execution count recording section 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA) of the authentication function 3018A (or 3018DA) whether the user performed the OTP authentication of the present invention, executed the authentication function, and was authenticated and used the service, a truth value indicating whether the ticket is valid, or an integer value indicating the number of times the ticket has been used. Alternatively, 3017A or 3017AG (or 3017DA) may be charged with a points or currency balance that can be used to use the ticket service, and when information on the electronic ticket 19A, paper ticket 18A, or screen-display ticket 1500A of the present invention is presented when the service is provided, the balance may be deducted by the amount of points or currency corresponding to the service. As when used in the website login process, when the OTP authentication function 3018A (or 3018DA) is executed, 3021A, 3022A, and 3023A (or 3021DA, 3022DA, and 3023DA) in FIG. 3AB may be performed as part of the processing included in the execution of the authentication function 3018A (or 3018DA). In the case of OTP tokens that are used by agreement between the service provider and the user, the function of marking as used may be performed by the contract administrator at the user's request or in the event of fraudulent use, by rewriting 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA) using the setter function set in the contract using terminal 1C and private key 101C. For example, at a ticket gate or service window, the numerical value of 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA) can be added as a boolean value indicating whether or not entry has occurred, or an integer indicating the number of times entry has occurred, and the balance of the variable 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA) can be charged with currency like a prepaid payment method, and the administrator terminal 1C can assign a process to an OTP token that can be accessed from user UA's terminal 1A to increase variable 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA) according to the numerical value of the charged currency. It is then possible to reduce the balance of 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA), which has been charged with a monetary value corresponding to the amount of service used, by an amount equivalent to the service fee. In this case, authentication function 3018A (or 3018DA) determines whether the balance of 3017A or 3017AA (or 3017DA) is higher than the service fee in steps F115 and F116 of the flowchart in Fig. 6D, and if the balance is insufficient, it is necessary to stop execution of the authentication function and perform processing such as prompting the user to recharge the balance or contacting the service provider.
[0058] <Detects and notifies normal or unauthorized entry> To investigate and determine whether the private key PRVA (101A of terminal 1A) has been leaked and the service is being used fraudulently, a security camera 342D may capture and store a picture of the user's appearance in association with the token number and user identifier recorded in SVLog (terminal 3D) when authentication is performed using 1500A, 18A, or 19A. The appearance is preferably biometric information such as face, physique, body type, motion, and gait. The biometric information may be used, for example, to prevent fraudulent entry to a venue where a service is provided. By copying 1500A, 18A, or 19A, which contains the same OWP authentication information, user identifier A, and token number TIDA, and reusing the OWP, it is possible to monitor whether different people are entering using the same authentication information (A, TIDA, and OWP). A surveillance camera 342D (342D in FIG. 8B) that records the user's appearance is shown in FIG. 8B as an example of recording biometric information. However, recording biometric information is not an essential function for the present invention, but is a function necessary for entrance processing at station ticket gates and entrances, and while a security camera 342D can be built into a large safe or vault, due to limitations on the battery capacity used in the power supply unit 37D of the terminal 3D and economic considerations, it may be difficult to use or unnecessary to use a security camera 342D when the terminal 3D is incorporated into a container such as a small safe or portable safe. Whether or not the security camera 342D can be installed can be determined depending on the application and embodiment. Similarly, when using 3D devices for car or building locks, 3D cameras may not be installed due to privacy concerns. 3D cameras may be installed for security reasons, sacrificing privacy. For example, security cameras may be desirable for taxis, buses, car rentals, and car sharing. Depending on the service, it may be necessary to inform users at the time of service provision or contract signing about the use of security cameras and other means of recording the user's presence.
[0059] As a security feature available for 3D when security cameras 342D are not used, light-emitting element 351D such as a lamp or sound-emitting element 352D such as a buzzer shown in FIG. 8B can be used to set the actions to be taken when authentication using OWP is successful and when it fails by sound or light. Specifically, when terminal 3D is attached to a container such as a safe, information used for authentication is recorded on NFC tag 19A, and terminal 3D inside the safe reads the information on NFC tag 19A using communication device 32D. If the authentication result is correct, the safe is unlocked, and if it is incorrect, a warning sound is emitted by a buzzer. Instead of a buzzer, communication device 32D may wirelessly emit a radio wave beacon or radio tag to the surrounding area. The security camera 342D may be used in combination with a light emitting element 351D such as a lamp or a sound generating element 352D such as a buzzer. For example, when a user UA attempts to authenticate by presenting a token number that has already been used and is invalid and has already been authenticated using 1500A, 18A, or 19A at a station ticket gate, the ticket gate opening / closing device 350D is closed to keep the UA in place, and the security camera 342D and a light-emitting element such as a lamp 351D or a sound-producing element such as a buzzer 352D are used in combination to alert those around, and the station staff are notified and can ask the user UA whether the token has been used fraudulently.
[0060] Not only when terminal 3D is a container such as a safe, but also when terminal 3D is at a ticket gate, entrance, car, or building, light emitting element 351D or sound generating element 352D is operated according to the output of the authentication result, and is used to notify the surroundings of terminal 3D (the surroundings are within the distance where 351D, 352D, or 32D can transmit a signal to the user or terminal) or the service provider whether the authentication result is correct. Note that light emitting element 351D may be a lamp such as a light bulb or a semiconductor element such as a light emitting diode that emits light when a current is passed through it.
[0061] <Detecting the number of authentications and the person who performed the authentication> 1. When the terminal 3D at the ticket gate or entrance is connected to the internetwork and is connected to the server 3A. It is assumed that if the private key PRVA is leaked and a user UA who has the right to use the card presents 1500A, 18A, or 19A by reading it with a 3D input device or communication device, another person UB will obtain the private key PRVA (101A) by some means, copy and record it on their own device, and use it fraudulently to pass through the entrance. Alternatively, fraudulent use due to the leaking and reuse of the OWP is also possible. By recording the appearance of the UB in the event of fraudulent use, image data that enables identity verification and tracking of the individual can be obtained, as well as the time of authentication payment, the location of the authentication terminal, the terminal number (station name, etc. at the ticket gate), walking behavior, etc. Then, the occurrence of authentication is recorded by incrementing variables 3017A and 3017AA that record the number of executions of authentication function 3018A of the authentication contract on the blockchain. In addition, the user UA is notified by email or other means that they have used a service at a certain entrance. If the user UA claims to the service provider that their ticket has been used fraudulently, the face, body shape, walking information, etc. of the UB who entered fraudulently can be compared to determine whether the user UA entered fraudulently. Here, when server 3D becomes a blockchain node like server 3A, 3D has the same functions as 3A, so authentication function 3018A is recorded in the blockchain part of 3D (300D and 310D), and user UA's terminal 1A can access the blockchain part of 3D instead of 3A and execute authentication function 3018A. In the event of fraudulent use, it may be necessary to suspend the use of the user UA's OTP token and limit the extent of the damage caused by the fraud. Therefore, a variable that allows the service provider to suspend the use of the user UA's OTP token using terminal 1C may be provided in the OTP token contract on terminal 3A, and this may be changed using a setter function. Alternatively, if the service provider's main server terminal, such as at a ticket gate, manages the balance of each token separately from the blockchain, this can be addressed by changing the settings for each customer on that main server terminal.
[0062] 2. When the terminal 3D at the ticket gate or entrance is connected to a local area network (LAN) and is connected to the server 3A. When terminal 3D is connected to a local area network of a station or facility and disconnected from internetwork 20, the storage device of terminal 3D must match hash functions 3010A and 3010DA used to generate 1500A, 18A, and 19A, match KC values 3011A and 3011DA, match BC values 3013A and 3013DA, and if other variables or functions are used in the OWP calculation, match them, and match and synchronize the calculation methods of OWP-type OTPs and the variables used in the calculations between terminal 3A and terminal 3D. Then, the number of times authentication was successful using authentication function 3018D or data changed during authentication may be recorded in 3017DA or 3016D. Through the LAN within a facility such as a movie theater or station, a staff member of the facility can access database 3116D (including 3114D and 3115D) of terminal 3D with a terminal that has access rights to terminal 3D, and can use the user identifier or token number as a key to search and understand the status of service provision for the OTP token with that token number. Also, if the information required for authentication cannot be read from the valuable paper leaf printed on 18A, the user identifier or token number can be obtained from 18A and compared with the customer information in 3116D to determine whether the user has a purchase history of OTP tokens and can be provided with the service (identification may be required for this procedure).
[0063] 3. When the device 3D is offline and not connected to the network. Even when terminal 3D incorporated in a ticket gate, entrance, car lock, building lock, or container lock such as a safe is not connected to network 20, the storage device of terminal 3D must ensure that hash functions 3010A and 3010DA used to generate 1500A, 18A, and 19A match, that KC values 3011A and 3011D match, that BC values 3013A and 3013DA match, and if other variables or functions are used in the OWP calculation, that they match as well, and that the OWP-type OTP calculation methods and variables used in the calculation between terminal 3A and terminal 3D match and are synchronized. Then, the number of times authentication was successful using authentication function 3018DA or data changed during authentication may be recorded in 3017DA or 3016D. Terminal 3D is located in a section that can be accessed after the lock is released, and communication device 32D of 3D is equipped with a connector or terminal for wired communication or a wireless communication device that can limit accessible terminals, and is equipped with a means for changing KC value 3011DA or BC value 3013DA of storage device 30D or changing hash function fh from the communication device of the user or administrator terminal (1A or 1C) via communication device 32D of terminal 3D, so that the OWP generated by OTP generation function 3009A of terminal 3A and the OWP generated by authentication function 3018DA become the same. By leaving room for updating KC value 3011DA or BC value 3013DA used to calculate the OWP, it is possible to periodically update the data that serves as the unlocking key for a locking device in a car or building, for example, and to update the key for the locking device in the car or building.
[0064] <Detecting the number of one-time passwords generated and authentication attempts> In this invention, one-time password generation and authentication are not performed by the same function of the contract. It is possible to provide a variable and processing unit that counts and increments the number of times each OTP generation function and OTP authentication function is executed at the time of generation and authentication, and these execution counts 3017A, 3017AG, and 3017AA are difficult to tamper with by using a blockchain. Of the variables that count the number of executions, monitoring variables 3017A and 3017AG used at the time of generation can help prevent fraudulent use. (Although not on the blockchain, 3017DA of terminal 3D is also a counting variable.)
[0065] For example, if there is a function to increment the number of times the OWP is generated on the blockchain when an OWP (18A) is generated as a paper ticket, it is possible to receive notification before the paper ticket data containing the OWP (or display screen data 1500A) is fraudulently used at the entrance and authenticated. In this case, a processing unit 3111D that monitors the blockchain is installed in the SVLog (terminal 3D) or the like, and it is necessary to detect changes in the one-time password generation count record variable 3017AG (number of calls) for the token with token number TIDA of the user providing the service, or the authentication count record variable 3017AA or 3017DA, and to contact the user who owns the token via email, a notification app, telephone line, or the like via the network. In addition to email, a non-fungible token indicating that the one-time password generation function was used may be sent to user identifier A, the owner of token number TIDA.
[0066] When a user does not have an email address, it is also possible to send a non-fungible token (fraudulent use notification token, notification postcard token) different from the OTP token indicating that a one-time password has been generated or authenticated to user identifier A. In this case, the non-fungible token functions like a receipt indicating the usage status. (This fraudulent use notification token can be used in other embodiments and applications of the present invention, such as website login, tickets and valuable paper slips using paper or NFC tags, and decryption of encrypted data, which will be described later. Note that it is difficult for a terminal 3D built into a car or safe, etc., to notify of fraudulent use when offline. In this case, it may be possible for terminal 3D to emit a wireless beacon to notify those around it.) In services that provide high-speed access to large numbers of people at ticket gates or facility entrances, in addition to capturing images of appearances using security cameras, service providers are expected to deter unauthorized entrants and authenticate them by asking them to present identification such as their Individual Number Card or passport, and by checking personal information such as their date of birth.When used for events that accommodate a small number of people or as accommodation vouchers for hotels and other lodging facilities, the person may be required to fill out their name at the reception desk and be authenticated by checking 1500A, 18A, or 19A before the service can be provided and used.
[0067] <Rating and signage information> As with the service using the server terminal 3C, in an authentication system using valuable paper or NFC tags and a terminal 3D that authenticates them, rating information 3024A is recorded in the contract for the one-time password generation token to indicate the target age of the user, etc. Signage information 3024A in the contract for the OTP token is also set in a similar manner. Examples include rating information such as qualifications and licenses required for users of vehicles, facilities, and devices such as automobiles, ships, and heavy machinery, as well as movie theater rating information. In addition, when 18A or 19A is attached to a product, the rating information is based on that product. For example, when managing the distribution of alcoholic beverages by attaching 18A, rating information such as "only for adults can drink" may be recorded.
[0068] 4C. Decrypting and Viewing Encrypted Data and Files The software CRHN (software 403A) can be used to decrypt encrypted data using the OTP authentication system using the blockchain of the present invention. Here, the software CRHN is software 403A in Figure 4B. Figure 8C shows a connection diagram of the terminal. When decrypting and viewing data 4034A (4034A in Figure 4B) such as an encrypted file, the present invention can utilize an authentication system that uses the computer DP (terminal 4A in Figure 4A) used by user UP to access server terminal 3A, generates and authenticates a BnTOTP using an OTP token assigned to terminal 4A's private key 401A, obtains the return value CTAU4031A of OTP authentication function 3018A, generates a common key TTKY4033A that can encrypt and decrypt files based on the return value 4031A, a pre-set password value AKTB4032A, a private key CRKY40302A specified inside software 403A, etc., and the software 403A calculation method, and decrypts and uses the software 403A to encrypt and decrypt files, and decrypts and uses encrypted data to view, listen to, print out, etc. information using the software 403A. For decryption, in addition to TTKY4033A calculated from CTAU4031A and AKTB4032A, TTKY4033A calculated from CTAU4031A, AKTB4032A and the obfuscated or encrypted key CRKY40302A built into the software CRHN is preferably used. Furthermore, in addition to the above key information, a key CAPKY40303A obtained from a contract with contract identifier APKY40301A recorded on a terminal that will be a blockchain node such as terminal 3A in accordance with a program recorded in software CRHN may be used to make it difficult to identify TTKY4033A, or the processing may be made more complex to make it difficult to identify 4033A, and the programs may be obfuscated and encrypted. In this case, the present invention functions as an access control technology for the content contained in the encrypted data.
[0069] <Distribution of encrypted data> The encrypted data 4034A is distributed from a server terminal 5B called SVCRHNdrive to the computer terminal 4A via the network 20 and stored in the storage device 40A. The server terminal 5B may be a real server, a virtual server, or a virtual machine terminal. It may also be a cloud-based data storage service. It may also have a version management function, and may have a function to record the update history of the encrypted data and the hash value of the encrypted data and display them to the user. The terminal 5B may have a function that allows a user to search for encrypted data that can be decrypted using the OTP generation token of the present invention that the user owns.The terminal 5B may also have a function that allows a user to search for the contract identifier of an OTP token and the corresponding encrypted data using keywords (data name, creation time, keywords, classification of books, etc., and rating information) provided by the issuer of the token (the issuer is assumed to be an individual, corporation, publisher, or software company). Terminal 5B may have a function that allows an e-commerce website or web app to sell books, audiovisual content, and software to customers by issuing an OTP token to a user identifier A calculated from the private key of customer terminal 4A. When conducting e-commerce transactions, terminal 5B may have a function for searching for OTP tokens and encrypted data corresponding to the OTP token, a function for notifying the customer of AKTB4032A and downloading the encrypted data, and a database for registering and storing personal information and contact information of OTP token purchasers, such as the customer's name, email address, user identifier, and phone number, when purchasing a token. Terminal 5B may record the user's address and notify the customer of AKTB4032A and the fact that the OTP token has been purchased by mail, for example.
[0070] Then, using contact information such as the customer's user name, email address, address information, and user identifier recorded in the database, any key information AKTB4032A required to decrypt file 4034A encrypted by 4032A, 4031A, 40302A, and 403A may be sent by email along with file 4034A encrypted by 4032A, 4031A, 40302A, and 403A. Alternatively, file 4034A encrypted with 4032A, 4031A, 40302A, and 403A is sent by email, and AKTB4032A is transmitted to user UP on user terminal 4A by means other than blockchain or email (such as delivering a document recording 4032A as a letter, sending it as an SMS message to a phone number, sending it by facsimile, or using private key 401A to receive a transaction describing AKTB3042A in a blockchain based on a different blockchain from the blockchain on which the OTP token exists), and UP inputs 4032A into 403A of 4A, which causes the OTP token to calculate TTKY403A from return value 4031A, key information 40302A of software 403A, and the calculation procedure of 403A, decrypting encrypted file 4034A and obtaining decrypted plaintext file 4035A, from which the data in 4035A can be viewed, executed, or used.
[0071] <Token circulation restriction function for decrypting encrypted data> The circulation of tokens may be restricted by the rights holder, who manages the tokens. In this embodiment, tokens can be transferred to others using the Ethereum ERC721 standard, but when transferring, the rights holder adds variables and processing 3041A to control the execution of the transfer function (send function 3040A). The OTP token of the present invention was invented in the process of using non-transferable TOTP tokens for internet banking on a blockchain, and is basically characterized by being equipped with a function to restrict transfer. If a service provider or content provider that supports OTP tokens does not allow the transfer of the OTP token of the present invention between different user identifiers, the transfer restriction variable and related function 3041A of the OTP token contract takes the value of a variable that prevents the execution of the send function 3040A. When the rights holder of the data or file content corresponding to the OTP token is the contract administrator (or when the rights holder entrusts the management of the contract to the contract administrator), if the value 3041A of the contract variable is changed so that the execution of the contract's send function 3040A changes from a stopped state to an executable state, the data or file can be transferred between users with different user identifiers.
[0072] An example of OTP token transfer is shown below. User UP (user of terminal 4A) and user UB (user of terminal 1B) can exchange OTP token information on the blockchain via network 20 and server P (server terminal 3A). The OTP token can also be transferred from UP to UB using send function 3040A. The UB that receives the OTP from the UP (actually, the UB has been accessed by 4A at 3A using private key 401A, and the owner information has been rewritten from UA to UB by 3040A in database or ledger 3014A, which records the correspondence between OTP tokens and user identifiers in the OTP token contract), can either download the encrypted file from terminal 5B, or copy and use the encrypted data held by the UP, who was the owner of the token, on terminal 1A, or obtain an encrypted file circulating on the network and decrypt the encrypted data. If AKTB4032A was used when encrypting the encrypted file, it is necessary to obtain 4032A from user UP. Content for which AKTB4032A is not set can be decrypted using encrypted file 4034A, CTAU4031A obtained by authenticating the OTP token, software 403A, and private key 40302A inside the software. By obtaining the transfer of the OTP token and notification of AKTB from user UP, and software 403A that can view encrypted data and encrypted data, user UB will be able to view the content data that UP was viewing, and will also obtain the viewing rights or ownership of that data. In an embodiment of the present invention, when a file encryption and decryption key TTKY4033A can be generated based on CTAU4031A, AKTB4032A, the private key CRKY40302A inside the viewing software 403A, the software 403A, etc., files encrypted with TTKY4033A can be decrypted.
[0073] The transfer function of OTP tokens using the transfer restriction function of the present invention is not limited to tokens for decrypting encrypted data, but can be used for all OTP tokens belonging to contracts having the OTP generation function of the present invention, and can be used for OTP tokens for logging into the website of terminal 3C shown in Figure 8A, and OWP tokens for generating paper or NFC tag-type tickets, valuable paper sheets, and password OWPs for creating keys for unlocking, etc. shown in Figure 8B. While OTP tokens are transferable within the contract program, depending on the service they support, they may be subject to usage restrictions imposed by the service rights holder, or to domestic and international laws and regulations. Changes to 3041A when imposing transfer restrictions are made are made by the contract administrator.
[0074] <Version control of encrypted data> The encrypted file distribution server terminal 5B may be equipped with so-called blockchain-type storage, which attaches data and files to transactions in block data on a blockchain platform that allows for extremely large block sizes and transaction data limits, and records the data in a distributed ledger. It is not limited to blockchain; any storage system that allows version control and is difficult to tamper with may also be used. (Specific examples of existing technologies and services that perform functions that would be preferable to include in terminal 5B include software development and version control platforms such as Github, Inc. of the United States and Github, a company owned by Github Japan, LLC.) Terminal 5B receives access from the user terminal and displays the corresponding encrypted file or OTP token according to the search key information requested by the user terminal, and using the electronic commerce function, presents the user identifier of the issuance and delivery destination for issuing the OTP token of a certain contract identifier to terminal 5B or the contract administrator terminal 1C of the corresponding contract identifier, performs payment for the purchase price, etc., purchases the OTP token, and instructs the issuance of the token to the user identifier of the OTP token purchaser.If AKTB4032A is required, AKTB4032A can be used during encryption to create and distribute an encrypted file 4034A. When distributing the above-mentioned 4034A, the AKTB4032A and the encrypted file of the content may be sent as an attachment to an email to the user. Alternatively, the AKTB4034A may be notified to the user by email, and the corresponding encrypted file may be downloaded from a download-only URI accessible to a terminal such as 5B. The URI may be written in the email, or if 5B is a member-only site with a login function, the URI may be displayed on a user-only display screen after logging in to communicate the URI to the user.
[0075] In an online storage system that can detect tampering or perform version control, if encrypted data 4034A is a book that is publicly available for sale, and the book data needs to be revised and a different version needs to be distributed, the revised version can be uploaded as encrypted data to 5B, which has version control functions, and distributed, while the data before the revision remains tamper-proof. In this case, the new encrypted data of the revised version can be decrypted with the old OTP token, which can decrypt the old encrypted file of the existing version. This is ideal for when there is a problem with a program, such as a computer game, rather than a book, and you want to distribute a revised version to improve it, and it is desirable to be able to decrypt it with the old OTP token, and it is assumed that it will be used for decrypting encrypted computer software data. In this case, the new version and the old version will remain the same contract identifier. Alternatively, the rights holder can encrypt the new version so that it can be decrypted with a new version token that is different from the old version, and distribute the encrypted data, while selling the old version token. This corresponds to, for example, a paper book, where both the old version that was printed and distributed and the new revised version are sold as physical items in bookstores and second-hand bookstores. An OTP token contract with a different contract identifier is deployed for the new version token and the old version token, and the user is notified. It is up to the consumer to decide whether or not to purchase the new version OTP token. (It is also possible to deploy an OTP token contract for each version in computer software.)
[0076] <Content Rating> To indicate the appropriate age for viewing the encrypted data, rating information 3024A of the encrypted file content that can be decrypted with the one-time password generation token is recorded in the contract of the token. The rating may be recorded in 40351A or 40352A in FIG. 4B. Content ratings are recorded on the blockchain, and others can access the ratings directly on the blockchain or search and view them from server terminals such as 5B or 3F, and consider purchasing tokens, etc. <Content Certificate> It is preferable to have a certificate from a third party that proves that the plaintext does not contain malicious programs when the encrypted data is decrypted. This is the information shown in 40351A and 40352A in Figure 4B. This also relates to content ratings, and it may be necessary to have a third party inspect the plaintext data of the content to check whether there are any problems with the program's operation.
[0077] <Content viewing environment> Even if a content certificate is used, a third party may unintentionally overlook the presence of a malicious program and issue a content certificate (40351A or 40352A in FIG. 4B). Therefore, it may be preferable for the execution environment of software 403A to be executed in a virtual machine environment.
[0078] <Function to detect browsing from multiple environments at the same time (unauthorized access detection function)> In the present invention, when the encrypted content is decrypted and viewed using the software CRHN, or when the software CRHN is viewed, A program that connects to the advertisement server CRHNcm (server terminal 5A in FIG. 5A) is executed, and advertisements are distributed from terminal 5A, and the information of the user who viewed the content or executed the software is also sent. IP address (hashed or processed value of IP address), Location information (hashed or processed value of location information), computer device information (or its hash value), terminal sensor value (or its hash value), The token number and user identifier are recorded in the terminal 5A as data as shown in Figure 6X. For a certain token number or user identifier, The terminal may be provided with a processing unit that constantly determines whether access is being made using a different IP address, different location information, different device ID, or sensor information from an input device attached to a different terminal. Here, the computer device information and computer equipment ID may use the computer manufacturing ID such as the device ID, the operating software ID, the web browser ID, as well as measurements or hashed measurements from the acceleration sensor, magnetic sensor, pressure sensor, temperature sensor, etc. installed on terminal 4A. This is intended for use by advertising servers as servers that monitor the unauthorized use of simple content, but is only used when the rights holder who distributes the software 403A or encrypted content requests the function to monitor the unauthorized use of content. When software 403A is viewed, the encrypted data can be decrypted by the OTP authentication system of the present invention without executing a program for connecting to server terminal 5A. In an embodiment, the right holder of software 403A of the present invention or the right holder of plaintext data of the encrypted data may record a program for connecting to 5A, and the program for connecting to server terminal 5A may be executed if the user of software 403A or the content agrees. (Here, rights holders are mainly those who have copyrights to software or content. Plaintext data is protected from the perspective of intellectual property rights, including copyright. Confidential information such as trade secrets of corporations is also protected as intellectual property. Plaintext data created by individuals is protected by copyright.)
[0079] Furthermore, the advertising function using 5A may not be necessary, for example, when the software of the present invention is used to encrypt and decrypt confidential information such as blueprints for a product before its release and to use it as an encryption tool for internal documents, and when providing the software to the association, it is possible to consider a form in which the advertising display function and the content fraud monitoring function using an advertising distribution server are not used.When used by individuals for hobby purposes, etc., the rights holder can install the advertising display function and the content fraud monitoring function using advertising, and for business use by individuals or corporations, the software and device of the present invention can be used without the advertising function.
[0080] The data and files are decoded and executed by the software CRHN (403A) of the terminal 4A, and the results are displayed on the display screen 450A, which is an output device, and if audio information is included, it is output as sound from the speaker 451A. The software can be used to make it difficult to take screen captures of images on the display screen of the software CRHN (in this case, the display 450A can be copied using a film or digital camera), and settings can be made to not allow printing from the content file or software side. Depending on the request of the content rights holder, printing can be made either impossible or possible. The viewer's user identifier can always be displayed on the content player screen.
[0081] <Viewing data offline> In this invention, even if a disaster or other event occurs and the device goes offline, is disconnected from the internetwork, and is isolated, there may still be data that the device user wishes to view using software 403A on terminal 4A. For example, it is conceivable that users may wish to access files containing information on evacuation routes or books such as encyclopedias that are useful in disaster situations. The blockchain itself is a database run by servers that can be distributed around the world, and is resistant to localized disasters. However, it is anticipated that the devices of disaster victims will not be able to connect to the network, and the software 403A they have on hand will not be able to connect to the blockchain, making it impossible to decrypt encrypted files. Therefore, in this invention, when a file is decrypted online using software 403A in advance of a disaster, viewed certificate data 4036A (4036A shown in Figure 4B; bookmark data, OFBKMK in this document) is created, and the encrypted key information recorded inside the certificate data is decrypted using the user private key PRVP (401A in Figure 4B) and used as the viewing key. In this case, too, the present invention functions as a technology for controlling access to content.
[0082] <Certificate data that has been viewed and used offline> In an embodiment of the present invention, First, key information TTKY4033A for encrypting and decrypting the file is calculated, and TTKY4033A is encrypted using the user's private key 401A or key information based thereon to produce CTTKY40361A, and 40361A is then encrypted using private key 40302A built into software 403A to produce ACTTKY40360A. Next, when terminal 4A performs OTP authentication and decrypts and views the data, the blockchain information such as the block number and the contract identifier of the one-time password generation and authentication contract are compiled into a single object data or file 40362A. Next, secret key 40302A is used as the key information for HMAC, and data obtained by concatenating 40360A and 40362A is used as the message for HMAC, and MAC value 40363A is obtained by HMAC. The data obtained by concatenating 40360A, 40362A, and 40363A is then used as the viewed certificate data OFBKMK4036A.
[0083] <Offline viewing> The viewed certificate data OFBKMK4036A is decrypted using the user's private key 401A and key information 40302A inside the software 403A to obtain TTKY4033A. Specifically, software 403A decrypts ACTTKY40360A written in OFBKMK4036A using 40302A to obtain CTTKY40361A. CTTKY40361A is then decrypted using 401A to obtain TTKY4033A, and the encrypted data and files are decrypted using TTKY, making them viewable. Information stored in 4036A can be encrypted using encryption methods such as symmetric key encryption and public key encryption, but symmetric key encryption is preferably used. Here, restrictions on viewing may not be necessary in the event of a disaster, but when the network is disconnected, it is difficult to distinguish whether the reason for the disconnection is a disaster or user convenience, and there may be files for which viewing should be restricted even in the event of a disaster, so software 403A may be provided with a function to set restrictions on viewing time, etc.
[0084] Some users may try to abuse the browsing function using 4036A when terminal 4A is offline and disconnected from network 20. Therefore, in order to protect the rights holder's content, it may be preferable to impose usage restrictions on users who browse offline using the certificate data that has already been viewed. (Note that the content rights holder may decide to use 4036A without imposing browsing restrictions.) As a specific example of the countermeasure and embodiment, when software 403A is used offline, it detects the time information of the computer or smartphone on which 403A is installed, authenticates certificate data OFBKMK4036A, and detects the time when the content was able to be viewed, confirms that the time on 4036A is earlier than the current time on the smartphone or other computer terminal, decrypts the information contained in 4036A to obtain 4033A, decrypts encrypted data or file 4034A, decrypts 4034A using 4036A, records the time when the viewing or the like was performed (the current time when viewing began on 4036A), and permits viewing only up to a time a specified time in the future from the current time when viewing began on 4036A. When the specified time has passed, it performs processing to stop viewing or stops software 403A, and stops the use of plaintext data 4035A.
[0085] Among the computer terminals 4A, many smartphone-type terminals 4A are equipped with a radio signal receiver 422A or 423A from the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for determining location information, and since the time is updated, this function is easily provided. Signals from GNSS contain time information. In computers that do not have a built-in means for obtaining time information, such as GNSS, that is difficult to remove, there is a risk that the time may be set offline in the computer's Basic Input Output System (BIOS) or other device to a value different from the actual time, preventing software 403A from obtaining the correct current time and causing software 403A to continue viewing even when it is time to stop viewing. To view the previously viewed certificate data OFBKMK4036A in software 403A, it is preferable to be able to receive time from broadcasting stations that broadcast time even during disasters, such as NITZ (Network ID and Time Zone), JJY, and GNSS. It is also preferable that the device capable of receiving the time information be difficult to remove. For example, the terminal's wireless communication device 422A or broadcast receiving device 423A and the CPUs (Central Processing Units) in control and calculation units 41A and 43A may be sealed with a metal shield, and the wireless device certification number (such as the Japanese wireless device construction design certification or the U.S. Federal Communications Commission FCC wireless device certification ID) may be engraved on the shield, or the shield may be sealed as a semiconductor package, or sealed with a transparent adhesive or other material that allows the internal components to be visible. It is preferable to mount a CPU including 41A or 43A and a GNSS, JJY, or NITZ receiver 422A or 423A on the same semiconductor package or the same semiconductor substrate, and to mount the CPU or system-on-chip (SoC) device as a control unit or control and calculation unit in a terminal. (Some SoC chips mounted on smartphones and tablet terminals sold as of 2020 have a built-in CPU, a modem for a wireless communication station that transmits NITZ, and a modem that receives GNSS (US GPS and Japan QZSS) wireless signals. Examples include SoCs from companies such as Qualcomm, Inc. of the United States.) An SoC is a single semiconductor chip, but it can also be a semiconductor component called a SIP (System in Package), in which multiple IC chips are mounted in a single package and sealed. Furthermore, NITZ (Network Identity and Time Zone), which uses base stations for mobile phones and smartphones, may not function if mobile phone base stations are damaged or stopped during a disaster. Therefore, it is preferable to be able to correct the time using time data from terrestrial radio stations away from the disaster area (such as JJY in Japan) or time data from radio stations in space such as GNSS. In addition to GNSS and JJY, which are systems that use broadcasting, it may also be possible to obtain time from satellite broadcasting. It is assumed that time information transmitted from weather observation satellites or broadcasting satellites in geostationary orbit is received by the user terminal. There may also be a radio station 5C that broadcasts the time on the moon's surface.
[0086] Among the memory devices in the user terminal, volatile RAM that records the private key information of program 403A when 403A is executed, and ROM or nonvolatile memory NVRAM that can record the user's private key information, may be mounted together with the CPU on an SoC or the like and sealed as a package. This is intended to prevent attacks by measuring electrical signals at the terminals of the components and reverse engineering, as the signal exchange of the memory device may be measured using an electrical signal measuring device from the parts where the components constituting the terminal are joined with solder or the like, and the private key of 403A may be read when the terminal is executed. To prevent reverse engineering of the connection path between the memory device and the control and arithmetic device, it is preferable to form the memory unit and processing unit used in this invention on the same substrate or seal them in the same package. (This requirement also applies to terminal 1A, terminal 4A, and terminal 3D.) It is preferable to make it difficult to access the memory device and the signal processing unit of the control device, so that if access is attempted, the memory device and the control device of the terminal may be destroyed. The control unit and memory unit of the terminal may be sealed with sealing resin or adhesive, or may be sealed with sealing resin or adhesive so that the terminal cannot be disassembled to access the memory unit or the control unit. However, it is sufficient that the storage device corresponding to the capacity of information required for the operation of the software is sealed, and a non-volatile semiconductor memory may be added to increase the storage capacity for storing encrypted data 4034A, for example, to improve the processing and convenience of the terminal. A magnetic disk such as a hard disk drive or an optical disk may also be used as the external storage device. Furthermore, the storage device storing 4034A may be removable from terminal 4A and handed over to another person for distribution.
[0087] <Restrictions and Permissions for Printing and Copying Content> Depending on the permission of the content rights holder of the encrypted data, files, etc., the content rights holder can include information indicating permission in the plaintext data 4035A decrypted from the encrypted data 4034A or in 403A, and 403A can print the content using a printer as an output device for personal use only. When printing, 403A can print the user identifier who printed the page, the token number, the time of printing, the name of the content, the contract identifier, the block number at the time of printing, and TOTP, etc., like a timestamp. This is to confirm the time of printing and the person who printed the printed text. The person who printed it is represented by a user identifier.
[0088] The content obtained by decrypting the encrypted data displayed on the display screen of terminal 4A may be able to be copied as images or videos using a terminal such as a silver halide camera, a film camera, a digital camera using an image sensor, or a smartphone equipped with a digital camera. Therefore, in order to simply prevent the content obtained by decrypting the encrypted data displayed on the display screen of terminal 4A from being copied as images or videos using a terminal such as a silver halide camera or a smartphone equipped with a digital camera, head-mounted display 453A (head-worn display 453A) is used. Note that the present invention does not necessarily require the use of head-mounted display 453A, and a display 450A mounted on a conventional desktop terminal, laptop or notebook terminal, mobile phone, or smartphone terminal may also be used. Here, when head mounted display 453A is worn, a biometric authentication function such as face authentication, iris authentication, authentication based on the structure of the ear, an illuminance sensor or light sensor, or a thermographic image of body temperature distribution may be performed using sensor 4530A of head mounted display 453A. The primary purpose of the authentication function is to confirm whether or not 453A is worn by an actual living body, and it is also possible to acquire personal biometric information to perform biometric authentication.
[0089] Software 403A may limit the output device 45A to which decrypted data is output. Specifically, 453A is used to simply prevent the display screen from being copied as an image or video using a film camera or digital camera. On the other hand, 450A is used when multiple people share and view the content on the display screen and allow the display screen to be photographed. Limiting these output methods can be determined by the rights holder of the content contained in the encrypted data. The output method is written in a program or the like in the plaintext data obtained when the encrypted data is decrypted, and the device to which the decrypted data is output when the program is executed and viewed is limited. The output of decrypted data, files, and content can be restricted for each output device, for example, using display devices and display devices such as head-mounted displays 453A and displays 450A, printers 452A, and speakers 451A.
[0090] Even when using 453A, if it is necessary to copy the screen, the manufacturer of software 403A may output it to 450A in addition to 453A. For example, when copying is made to obtain evidence for resolving a dispute over the contents of encrypted data, even if output by 453A is specified, the software setting information is disclosed to the investigative agency so that it can be viewed by 450A. Even if copying is restricted using head-mounted display 453A, upon request, the provider of software 403A can provide a version of 403A that allows screen copying to help resolve disputes between people involved in the dispute. For example, if the information displayed on the display violates laws and regulations (such as information that violates portrait rights) and there are victims of that information, when providing information to investigative authorities, lawyers, etc., the data that is intended to be available only on head-mounted display 453A of 403A may be displayed on normal display 450A so that the information can be shared to resolve the dispute.
[0091] From the perspective of information retention, it may be preferable for users who have viewed certificate data to be able to record the data on paper or other media for personal use, even offline. The computers, storage devices, and blockchain technologies used in this invention are not information recording media with a long track record like previously invented recording media such as paper, clay tablets, and stone tablets. Therefore, it is preferable for the rights holder of the information used in this invention to be able to record information regarding the ownership of the data and tokens used in this invention on paper or other media if they so wish. Music, video, and software data may also be retained more easily if they can be stored as plaintext files on storage devices such as magnetic tape or magnetic disks. The present invention is designed with the assumption that it will function for the same length of time as actual paper, that is, over 100 years and for centuries to come. The software of the present invention is designed with the perspective of preserving data from modern culture and lifestyles, with an emphasis on data ownership, content rights protection, and information recording, and is intended to pass on information to future generations. In this invention, it is possible to distribute files worldwide in the form of encrypted files, and the information is distributed in such a way that the encrypted data is decrypted using a key called an OTP token, but it is preferable that the rights holder who distributes the encrypted data responsibly store the plaintext data, which is the original of the encrypted data. The inventors do not intend for the original to be lost in preservation just because the data of a book has been sold worldwide. In addition, by collecting the issued OTP token and the corresponding encrypted data 4034A, software 403A, and decryption key information such as AKTB4032A and storing them as books or audio-visual information in libraries, etc., it may be possible to make it easier to preserve books produced by the means of the present invention for many years to come.
[0092] 4T. Use in broadcasting (non-bidirectional encrypted data distribution) One application of Figure 8C is encrypted data broadcasting. Figure 8D shows a connection diagram of terminals. As shown in Figure 8D, the encrypted data may be encrypted audio and video data broadcast by one-to-many wireless broadcasting, or it may be applied to encrypting radio or television broadcast data and transmitting it from broadcast station 5C (5C in Figure 8D), and then decrypting the received encrypted data using wireless receiver 423A built into terminal 1A of user UP to view the audio and video. The distribution of content via television broadcasting, etc., is the exchange of content in the form of data and files through two-way communication and on-demand distribution between a computer and a computer network as shown in Figure 8C, but is instead a live broadcast and live distribution between a broadcasting station server terminal 5C and multiple receiver terminals 4A (televisions with receivers) as shown in Figure 8D. Here, in the present invention, it is preferable that the multiple receivers 4A (television-type computer terminals 4A with broadcast receivers) can connect to the Internet and are equipped with the one-time password authentication system and encrypted content viewing function of the present invention.If the receivers cannot connect to the Internet or a global blockchain, in addition to the secret key information built into the receiver, the broadcasting station must transmit time information and block number Bn in the broadcast data, one-time password authentication, and part of the key information required for content decryption. This method allows for one-to-many data transmission, which allows data to be sent from one broadcasting station to multiple users. If radio waves that serve as the communication path can be independently secured, information can be transmitted to the public without worrying about congestion on smartphones or computer networks20, and is advantageous for sending public data such as newspapers, official gazettes, and textbook data, as well as audio and video. (Existing Japanese satellite and terrestrial digital broadcasting also uses IC cards and implements access control using symmetric key encryption.)
[0093] When applying the method of using the OTP token of this invention as a broadcast viewing right to decrypt and view encrypted broadcast data, access control becomes possible using a private key and a token assigned to the private key even without an IC card. Additional tokens can be issued and reissued without having to reissue an IC card, and the key information used for encryption on the contract side can be changed. However, although the encrypted data (content) is transmitted from the broadcast station in a one-to-many manner, the acquisition of the OTP, authentication, and acquisition of the return value of the authentication function are performed via the internetwork 20. Therefore, it is desirable that the broadcast data viewing terminal 4A using this method be equipped with both a wireless receiving device for receiving data from the broadcast station and a communication device for communicating with the Internet. In this invention, a television terminal 4A, a smartphone terminal 4A, or a tablet-type mobile terminal 4A with communication capabilities is assumed to be an embodiment such as the terminal 4A shown in Figure 8D.
[0094] Terminal 4A is not limited to a mobile terminal such as a smartphone, but may also be a television terminal 4A with a large screen that cannot be carried by a person. When using such a television-type terminal 4A, the private key may be recorded in an external recording device 46A and used as 401A. This embodiment is similar to a television device equipped with an IC card reader and having an existing access control function. Alternatively, private key 401A can be recorded in storage device 40 of television terminal 4A and used. However, in this case, when disposing of or transferring terminal 4A, it may be necessary to record information about private key 401A in a separate storage device and then erase 401A from 40A. In the present invention, if there is a private key stored in terminal 1A or terminal 4A without using a storage device for storing the private key such as a hardware wallet or an IC card (an IC card or NFC card that has a private key such as a personal identification number card), it is necessary to copy the private key to a new terminal or recording medium when disposing of or transferring the terminal, and then erase the data in the storage device of the terminal.
[0095] <About receiving devices not connected to the network> In FIG. 8D, the terminal 4A is not connected to the Internet, but when the terminal 4A has a wireless communication device that cooperates with the smartphone type terminal 1A, the terminal 4A may be connected to the Internet 20 through the terminal 1A.
[0096] If you do not have a means of connecting to the Internet and cannot communicate with a device that can connect to the Internet, there are two options: A and B. A. When using the method using OWP shown in Figure 8B. For example, terminal 1A acquires an OTP token for generating an OWP, and generates a password OWP while accessing terminal 3A using the OTP token. The generated password OWP, token number, and user identifier are input into television terminal 4A, or NFC tag 19A on which the password is recorded is read by 420A. If authentication is successful, the broadcasted encrypted data is decrypted using the return value CTAU recorded in the authentication function of terminal 4A, and if decryption is successful, the content can be viewed. B. Similar to Fig. 8B, when a seed value is included in the broadcast data and a decryption password is generated according to changes in the seed value. In the example shown in A, the only information that is the basis for TTKY4033A to be decrypted is CTAU4031A. Therefore, information corresponding to AKTB4032A may be entered into terminal 4A, and the key used to calculate TTKY4033A may be broadcast in the encrypted data during data broadcast. The broadcast key information may be kept secret or encrypted so that only 403A can decrypt it.
[0097] In the case of a television terminal 4A or the like equipped with only a wireless receiving device, time information or a block number Bn read by 5C from 3A or the like may be added to the information transmitted by the broadcast station 5C, and Bn may be received by the television terminal 4A, and an OTP may be generated and authenticated from an authentication function equipped in the terminal 4A and an internal secret variable used for the authentication function, and a key required for decrypting the encrypted data may be generated, and the encrypted data broadcasted may be decrypted as needed. The broadcast data may also include part of the key information for decrypting the encrypted content within the broadcast data.
[0098] The broadcast data can be recorded in encrypted form in the receiver's (television receiver's) memory device (corresponding to the television device's recording terminal), and if you want to watch it again, you can obtain the return value CTAU after authentication using the OTP token required for decryption, enter information such as AKTB, calculate the decryption key TTKY4033A, and use 4033A to decrypt and view the content of the recorded encrypted data.
[0099] <Television-type computer, television-type game machine, computer and game machine connected to television> If receiver terminal 4A is a television device, it is a device that can be used at home to share information with family members and for entertainment. Television devices with large screens are more suitable for sharing information with multiple people than head-mounted displays 453A. It is also possible for receiver terminal 4A to be a computer terminal with a television viewing function that can connect to the Internet. In this case, viewing of television broadcast data encrypted by software 403A and running computer game software in the form of encrypted data can be performed on the same terminal. A private key 401A corresponding to an OTP token assigned with rights to view broadcasts, play computer games, and log in to a website is recorded in terminal 4A, and it is possible to provide a multimedia terminal 4A that can use the OTP token to view encrypted television broadcasts, run encrypted game software, decrypt encrypted book data to read newspapers and magazines, and log in to an online game server terminal 3C using the OTP token.
[0100] <Location and type of broadcasting station> Although the terminal 5C can use either cable broadcasting or wireless broadcasting, this item preferably assumes a service that distributes information one-way to multiple receivers wirelessly.
[0101] The broadcasting station 5C may be installed on the ground or in the air, or it may be an artificial satellite in outer space. The satellite's orbit may be a geostationary orbit. It may be a satellite that moves along a certain orbit. It may be an artificial satellite that moves by thrust using an active propellant or the like. It may be used in a radio station that broadcasts time information such as JJY, or in a positioning satellite system that includes time information such as GNSS. It may be on a satellite such as the surface of the moon, or on a planet such as the Earth.
[0102] <Blockchain-embedded GNSS broadcasting station using one-time passwords as simple time stamps> It is also conceivable that the broadcast station 5C or 5C is a satellite-type terminal 5C that has the function of becoming a blockchain node like 3A, and the broadcast data is used for the encrypted data portion or timestamp portion of the positioning data of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). The positioning or time broadcasting terminal 5C may be a satellite terminal that moves along a certain orbit, or a terminal installed on a natural celestial body such as the surface of the moon. In this case, the broadcasting station 5C has a clock that calculates time, such as an atomic clock, and stores time data according to the clock or a local blockchain on a server within the satellite. Using the blockchain-based one-time password of the present invention recorded in the contract, the station can attach a hash value calculated using the time information, TB, and KC values, and transmit it as a radio wave containing a GNSS positioning signal. In addition to location information, it can also send unique encrypted data and timestamp information. Terminal 4A may also be able to receive time information from terminal 5C, which has become a GNSS broadcasting station. By attaching a BnTOTP or message authentication code (MAC) value to the positioning navigation data broadcast by the GNSS broadcasting station 5C, OTP authentication can be performed using 3A when the positioning information is distributed, which can also lead to checking the authenticity of the positioning information. Attaching the BnTOTP or OWP of the present invention to the positioning signal or positioning navigation data can prevent tampering with the positioning navigation data, and can prevent incorrect calculation of position information due to spoofing of the positioning signal and incorrect navigation due to incorrect position information. Using the above method, the terminal 4A can obtain authenticated position information and time information. If 5C is in space, another broadcasting station, 5CC, can communicate with it two-way and change part of the key information K of 5C’s blockchain at the instruction of 5CC.
[0103] <Rating> If rating is required, this will be specified in the contract and tokens will be issued to users from the contract. In the present invention, a variable KNBN that can describe rating information in a contract is provided in the contract.
[0104] 5. Service Provider, Token Owner For the user UA who is qualified to provide the service (for example, a bank account holder who has signed a contract for an OTP token that gives them the authority to log in to an internet banking website or web application) and their terminal 1A, the administrator UC issues an OTP generation token to the server P (terminal 3A), which is a node in the blockchain, from terminal 1C (terminal DC) via network 20 (network NT) using the user identifier A calculated from the private key 101A by the blockchain part of terminal 3A. The OTP generation token is recorded on the blockchain as a smart contract. A smart contract behaves as a program that is difficult to repair or tamper with, and once the contract is deployed to the blockchain section of the DLS blockchain system on terminals 3A and 3B, it cannot be tampered with, changed, modified, or deleted except for variables that can be changed using setter functions. The service administrator changes the values of the contract's KC value 3011A and BC value 3013A through function fscb3012A, which acts as a setter that changes internal variables within the contract. The contract function can be programmed with authorized user identifiers and conditions for execution. In the present invention, an internal seed value (internal secret variable) KC value 3011A or BC value 3013A for calculating an OTP that can only be executed by the administrator, and a function fscb3012A that only the administrator can access KC3011A or BC3013A are set, and only the administrator of the contract can rewrite and update the secret key information used to calculate the contract's OTP. The function fscb3012A may exist separately for both the KC value 3011A and the BC value 3013A, or it may be a function that rewrites the KC value 3011A and the BC value 3013A simultaneously. In the present invention, a dynamic password OWP is provided to the user by updating the KC value 3011A or BC value 3013A of the secret value of the password generated by the OTP token.The present invention is also characterized in that the KC value 3011A of the seed value is updated even in the one-time password BnTOTP using block number Bn, and therefore the contract is characterized in that the seed values KC3011A and BC3013A that can be rewritten by the function fscb and fscb are provided.
[0105] When issuing a token, the token contract administrator can assign a unique URI or character string information to the token, separate from the token number, in the form of a mapping variable with the token number as the key.The OTP token's serial number can be displayed as a one-dimensional barcode or similar on the software that handles the token, based on the URI information. This URI information is compliant with ERC721 and is a known function. The URI or string information can include the token's serial number, the URI of image information specific to the token (the URL of the image file on the web server where the image information is stored), etc.
[0106] <Measures to prevent the leakage of the contract administrator's private key> The service administrator, like other users, has a private key 101C for accessing the blockchain unit, and if the private key 101C (private key PRVC) recorded in the terminal 1C (terminal DC) of the contract administrator UC is leaked, the contract that manages the OTP tokens may be attacked, which could result in the rewriting of mutable internal variables of the contract or the malicious issuance of OTP tokens. Therefore, the contract may include a section that controls the execution of the contract using multiple private keys when rewriting the variables of the contract. A technology for controlling access to the contract may be implemented using a private key other than the private key 101C. A multi-signature technology may be used in which, instead of only 101C, one or more private keys different from 101C and 101C are used to access functions that can only be used by the administrator of the contract, and to view or rewrite variables.
[0107] Alternatively, when executing functions that are important for operating OTP tokens, such as internal variables of the contract that manage OTPs to enhance security or token issuance functions, there are contract internal variables that can be accessed and set using user identifier C, which is calculated from private key 101C, and private keys that have user identifiers D, E, F, and G other than user identifier C, and when executing the token issuance function or a function that changes KC value 3011A or BC value 3013A, it is determined whether the variables that can be set by user identifiers D, E, F, and G are executable values, and if any one of the values set by D, E, F, and G is a variable value that stops (hinders) the execution of the function, a function can be considered that interrupts the execution of the token issuance function, KC value / BC value setter functions, and other functions that change the state of the contract and can be changed only by the contract administrator.
[0108] The concept of accessing and setting from the private key with the user identifier C and the user identifiers D, E, F, and G other than user identifier C is the same as the idea of a safe or vault that has multiple dials and keys and can only be opened when all of the dials and keys are unlocked, if we use an analogy of an existing device. Just as a safe has multiple dials and metal keys and locks, and a locked safe cannot be unlocked unless these multiple elements are correctly unlocked, even if an attacker obtains private key 101C for user identifier C, they cannot manipulate the internal variables of the contract unless they can unlock multiple elements using the private keys of other users' identifiers D, E, F, and G (without multiple private keys, an attacker cannot unlock functions that perform important operations such as setter functions that rewrite contract variables and token issuance functions). In addition to the contract administrator's private key 101C (101C indicates user identifier C), there are one or more private keys held by other users (auditor user identifiers D, E, F, and G), all of which have true / false values that can be individually accessed and set, and functions for the contract administrator cannot be executed unless they take on the true value set by user identifiers D, E, F, and G. This is a variable such as 3042A or a memory unit of a processing unit in 3008A, 3008AG, and 3008AA in Figure 3AC.
[0109] Also, instead of all user identifiers D, E, F, and G agreeing to make the variable a true value of a boolean value, for example, 11 auditor users can be set up, and mapping-type boolean variables corresponding to these users can be provided, and the number of true values of the mapping-type variables (number of votes for true or false) can be tallied, and if the number does not reach a majority of the 11 users, the execution of the contract function that can be operated by the administrator can be stopped (in this case, too, in 3008A, 3008AG, and 3008AA in Figure 3AC, it is a variable such as 3042A or a memory unit of a processing unit). <Simple measures to prevent the leakage of the contract administrator's private key> In the specific example, five private keys for users C, D, E, F, and G are used, but two different private keys may be used to access the contract as a contract administrator to easily disable contract operations in the event of unauthorized access. A contract administrator's private key 101C and private key 101B for stopping the issuance of OTP tokens, etc., when 101C is leaked are prepared, and a function execution stop variable and its setter variable that can only be accessed by 101B are provided, and processing can be set for the OTP token issuance function and internal contract variables (3042A, 3043A, 3024A, 3030A, 3031A, 3011A, and 3013A in Figure 3AC) that executes the function when the function execution stop variable is true and does not execute the function when it is false. Under conditions where private key leakage does not occur or where leakage is acceptable, only a single private key 101C may be used to access the OTP token contract and change the state of the contract. However, it is preferable to use some kind of multiple private keys to provide protection in case the contract administrator's private key is leaked.
[0110] 6. Supplementary information about OTP tokens Using the URI information of the token, it is also possible to create symbols and patterns from the URI information. Of the 32-byte URI information that conforms to the ERC721 standard, each byte is separated from the beginning and each byte is assigned a numerical value, which can be used for things like card game numbers. When used as a login ticket for a website, the website may change its behavior according to the token's URI information after logging in to the website. When using a token as a ticket, the URI barcode may be displayed on a display and printed. The URI portion may also contain notes on when the token was issued. The URI information may be string information according to the ERC721 standard, or 32-byte hexadecimal information. The URI data length may be variable. When printing as a paper ticket, the application software used for printing may print necessary information such as the service name, contract identifier, user identifier, token number, password information, printing date and time (and user name and contact information, if necessary), as well as changing part of the printing design on the paper surface of the ticket according to the URI information of the token.
[0111] <Generating and retrieving a time-based one-time password using block number Bn> The basic operations of generating and authenticating a one-time password in the present invention will be described below, along with an authentication method using BnTOTP in the system shown in FIG. To generate and authenticate an OTP, a user terminal 1A, a server terminal 3A, and a network 20 are used. In the user terminal 1A, the private key 101A, the URI or the like in the network 20 of the server terminal 3A as a designated blockchain node, the contract identifier 3019A of the OTP token that generates the designated OTP, the user identifier A calculated from the private key 101A by processing in the blockchain unit, and the designated token number TIDA assigned to the user identifier A in the designated contract identifier 3019A are used as arguments. The OTP generation function 3009A shown in FIG. 3AA, 3AB, or 3AC is accessed through the blockchain access program of 1A and called via the network 20. The terminal 1A accesses the blockchain unit of the terminal 3A and performs processing according to the program of the OTP generation function 3009A of the contract recorded in the blockchain unit. In the embodiment of FIG. 1, when block number Bn is used to generate an OTP, OTP generation function 3009A shown in FIGS. 3AA, 3AB, and 3AC uses TIDA, KC, Bn, and A as arguments to hash function fh according to F100 to F105 of the flowchart shown in FIG. 6A. The arguments are then passed to the hash function to generate hash value BnTOTP as BnTOTP = fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn). OTP authentication function 3009A or 3009A then returns BnTOTP to terminal 1A. If the arguments entered by terminal 1A or the user calling the function do not match the condition in F101, execution of the OTP generation function is halted. Hash function fh is, for example, SHA-2 SHA256. In process F100 of the flowchart, two arguments, a user identifier A and a token number TIDA, are received as argument input to the OTP generation function 3009A. Note that multiple arguments, such as a third or fourth, may be received depending on the application. If the BnTOTP generated in F104 is not used as the return value here, as shown in F107, BnTOTP can be converted into an unsigned integer and the remainder obtained by dividing it by the nth power of 10 as an n-digit password can be transmitted as the n-digit password BnTOTP-n, or n can be set to 7 and the return value of the OTP generation function 3009A can be a 7-digit integer OTP, but in that case the OTP authentication functions 3018A and 3018DA must be programmed to perform the same calculation and verify the OTP. In an embodiment, an OTP token contract can be created that generates OTPs with both an OTP generation function that generates a 32-byte OTP using processing from F100 to F105 and an OTP generation function that generates an n-digit unsigned integer OTP using processing from F100 to F107 in the same contract. Normally, authentication is performed using an n-digit (a smaller number of digits is fine) OTP generation function and its corresponding OTP authentication function, and when performing highly important operations, authentication can also be performed using an OTP generation function with a larger data volume of 32 bytes (a maximum of 2 to the power of 256 in integers, which is assumed to make brute force attacks difficult) and its corresponding OTP authentication function.
[0112] In an embodiment of the present invention, Ethereum is used as the blockchain infrastructure, the hash function fh uses a SHA256 function that outputs a return value with a hash value of 32 bytes, and the option of F104 is not provided in the processing program of the OTP generation function, and an OTP generation function that calculates a 32-byte OTP as BnTOTP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn) (in FIG. 6A, a function that operates through the flowchart in the order of F100, F101, F102, F103, F104, and F105. Alternatively, in FIG. 6B, a function that operates through the flowchart in the order of F100, F108, F101, F102, F103, F104, and F105.) Two OTP generation functions were implemented in the OTP generation token contract: an OTP generation function that converts the BnTOTP into an unsigned integer and calculates a 7-digit OTP that is the remainder when divided by 10 to the power of 7 (a function that operates through the flowchart in the order of F100, F101, F102, F103, F104, and F107 in Figure 6A; or a function that operates through the flowchart in the order of F100, F108, F101, F102, F103, F104, and F107 in Figure 6B). The difference between Figures 6A and 6B is whether or not a change process F108 is performed to variables 3017A and 3017AG, which store the number of times the OTP generation function 3009A is executed, to record or increase the number of times the function 3009A is executed, or to increase or decrease the numerical balance required to execute function 3009A. F101 determines whether the user identifier of the function executor who executes the OTP generation function 3009A of the OTP token from the input arguments (user identifier of the function executor, message sender, msg.sender) matches the identifier of the user who is associated with and owns the OTP token with token number TIDA (user identifier A in this case). Without this process F101, a user who is not the owner of the OTP token would be able to execute the OTP function, so when the message sender executes 3009A, a process is required to determine whether the message sender is the holder of the OTP token. In F100, it is possible to input only TIDA for processing, but in reality, in F101, the user identifier of the function executor (the user identifier of the function executor, the message sender msg.sender) is input to the OTP generation function as A when the function is executed, so A is considered to be used as an argument and is entered in F101. (Note) Conditional statement F101 for generating an OTP token determines whether the user is the holder of an OTP token, but it is also possible to use this part as the number of OTP tokens held by a certain user identifier and generate an OTP using the token number as an argument when the number held is one or more OTP tokens, but even in this case, when checking the number of tokens held by the function executor, the user identifier msg.sender is used to check the balance (remaining number) of tokens for that user identifier (if the executor is user identifier A, msg.sender=A), so it may be considered that the user identifier is used to execute the function. What is described here is merely an example.
[0113] In the present embodiment, the hash function fh is SHA-2, SHA256, or SHA-3; alternatively, MD5, RIPEMD, SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 can be used. fh can be any cryptographic hash function. For example, when fh is SHA256, BnTOTP = SHA256(A, TIDA, KC, Bn). In the present embodiment, the variables are encoded and combined in argument order, and the hash value of that data is calculated using a function such as SHA256. A specific example is a process like SHA256 (EncodePacked(A,TIDA,KC,Bn)). Here, the function EncodePacked(WXY,Z) is a function, library, or processing method that wraps (packs) the variables W, X, Y, and Z in that order, encodes them, and outputs the message Mes. If the order in which the arguments are packed by the EncodePacked function changes, the data and the internal message Mes will change, and the argument values of SHA256(Mes) will change, so the hash value calculated from them will also change. For example, SHA256(EncodePacked(A,TIDA,KC,Bn)) and SHA256(EncodePacked(TIDA,A,KC,Bn)) will generate different hash values, BnTOTP.
[0114] The embodiment described here is characterized in that the arguments are based on four elements: TIDA, KC, Bn, and A. Four variables processed by performing hashing or the like based on TIDA, KC, Bn, and A may be used as arguments to the hash function fh after being processed within the OTP generation function. In other words, in the case of TIDA, KC, Bn, and A, for example, the arguments to the function that calculates the OTP may be derived from these four elements. TIDA and A may be linked to personal information, and if there is an agreement between the service provider and the user to use them, A and TIDA can be used, but if this is not the case, or if personal information must be handled with strict care by law, it may be necessary to anonymize A and TIDA and use them as arguments to the OTP authentication function. (In Ethereum, A and TIDA need to be used directly as EOAs and token numbers, and there is a risk that current Ethereum-based blockchains cannot meet this requirement.) Furthermore, from the perspective of protecting personal information, it is desirable for the blockchain infrastructure to keep transactions sent to the blockchain when purchasing or issuing OTPs confidential, so that they are not visible to anyone other than a select few. In Ethereum, user identifiers and token numbers for certain contract identifiers are visible worldwide, and by linking these identifiers to the user's personal information, it may be possible to infer which user is using which OTP token service. User identifier A, token number TIDA, and the contract identifier for the OTP token can be searched on server terminal 3F. In known examples, the service corresponding to terminal 3F is provided as a blockchain search service such as Etherscan and a blockchain search server terminal for performing the same. Terminal 3F may be equipped with a function to restrict searches for privacy protection or the like. For example, when user identifier A accesses and searches 3F, contract identifiers and transaction information related to A can be displayed, and information on transactions and contract identifiers permitted for disclosure can be browsed. When the present invention is implemented in a blockchain system of a public network where all transactions such as Ethereum are public, it may be required for the service provider and the issuer of the OTP token to manage information so as not to leak externally the record of the correspondence relationship such as user identifier A and user UA when verifying the identity of the user with the user identifier. The service provider holds customer information and services, the OTP token management organization issues the OTP token, and only the service provider and the user have the correspondence relationship between the token number of the OTP token and the personal information of the user, so that the personal information may be protected by not disclosing the information.
[0115] <Separation of OTP generation terminal and OTP authentication terminal> In the present invention, the OTP generation terminal and the OTP authentication terminal can be implemented on the same terminal 1A. Also, they can be used separately as an OTP generation terminal and an OTP authentication terminal. That is, there can also be a usage form such as a hardware type OTP generation portable terminal 1A having a communication-capable output device capable of generating and displaying an OTP, and a login authentication terminal 4A equipped with an OTP input device for website login. There is a terminal 1A that generates OTPs, 3A that has a blockchain part that causes terminal 1A to generate OTPs using OTP tokens, and a terminal 4A that can access terminal 3C that handles services such as websites, and terminals 1A, 3A, 3C and 4A are connected to a network 20, and after 1A executes an OTP generation function to generate an OTP and outputs it to output device 15A of terminal 1A, a user UA visually checks it and manually inputs it into the input device of terminal 4A, and terminal 4A performs OTP authentication using the input OTP and communicates and exchanges the result with terminal 3C, and depending on the authentication result, terminal 4A can be logged in and provide services.
[0116] <Time-based one-time password authentication using block number Bn and retrieval of authentication result> The operation of OTP authentication function 3018A, which verifies and authenticates the OTP shown in Figures 3AA, 3AB, and 3AC, is similar to OTP generation function 3009A, and within authentication function 3018A, TIDA, KC, Bn, and A are hashed using a hash function fh to determine VeriBnTOTP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn), and a conditional expression such as an IF statement is used to determine whether ArgBnTOTP matches VeriBnTOTP, which are TIDA and A entered as arguments to the one-time password authentication function when the user accesses server 3A, and the entered ArgBnTOTP, and if they match, the return value for when OTP authentication is successful is returned to terminal 1A. It is also possible to perform processing when authentication is successful. If they do not match, a return value for when authentication is not possible is returned to terminal 1A, and processing for when authentication is not possible is performed. Here, in the embodiment described above, BnTOTP generates a 32-byte OTP, but the same applies when BnTOTP is interpreted as an input n-digit password BnTOTP-n, which is a 7-digit integer password where n=7. Figures 6C to 6H show flowcharts related to the processing of authentication function 3018A. Typical connection diagrams for terminals are shown in Figures 1A and 1B.
[0117] The flowcharts of the authentication function 3018A shown in Figures 6C to 6H will now be described. In step F110 of the flowchart, three arguments, namely, the user identifier A, the token number TIDA, and the password ArgOTP, are received as argument input to the OTP authentication function 3018A. Note that the OTP authentication function may take multiple arguments, such as a fourth or fifth, depending on the application.
[0118] FIG. 6F is one embodiment of authentication function 3018A and is a basic processing example. Authentication using the processing shown in FIG. 6F can be used for terminal 3C, terminal 3D, and for decrypting encrypted data. F110 receives user identifier A and token number TIDA as arguments to the authentication function, and F113 calculates VeriOTP from the arguments. Block number Bn and secret variable KC value are used at this time. VeriOTP=fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn) is calculated, and F114 compares the input argument OTP, ArgOTP, with VeriOTP to see if they match. If they match, authentication is determined to be successful, and processing F116 is performed. If they do not match, processing F118 is performed. Examples of terminal connections using FIG. 6F are shown in FIGS. 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D. The form of the OTP authentication function in FIG. 6F can be used in terminal 3C and terminal 3D.
[0119] FIG. 6D adds a process F115 for rewriting boolean values or integer values after execution of OTP authentication function 3018A to variables 3017A, 3017AA, and 3017DA, such as boolean values and integers, used in the process of FIG. 6F. 3017A, 3017AA, and 3017DA are data such as boolean values, integers, and character strings. 3017A, 3017AA, and 3017DA are mapping variables with a token number as a key and a data type such as boolean, unsigned integer, or character string. The mapping variables are just one example, and it is sufficient if they can record data linked using the token number as a key. Examples of terminal connections using FIG. 6D are shown in FIGS. 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D.
[0120] FIG. 6C is a processing example intended for use in decrypting encrypted data or logging into a website. FIG. 6C adds processing F111 to the processing of FIG. 6D. In F111, it is determined whether the executor of authentication function 3018A is user identifier A. If not, processing is interrupted as indicated by F117. If, in F111, the executor of authentication function 3018A is user identifier A, processing of the authentication function in F112 continues. If the entered OTP = ArgOTP is valid, processing is performed in F113, F114, F115, F116, and F116. If, in F114, ArgOTP does not match VeriOTP, processing is interrupted as indicated by F118. FIG. 6E is a flowchart omitting processing F115 of FIG. 6C. Examples of terminal connections using FIGS. 6E and 6C are shown in FIGS. 8A, 8C, and 8D. FIG. 8B can be used when terminal 3D can connect to network 20 and can connect to terminal 3A.
[0121] Because the processing methods shown in Figures 6C and 6E use owner information 3014A in the contract related to the OTP token of 3A, the authentication methods described in Figures 6C and 6E cannot be used on terminal 3D unless a terminal on the blockchain such as 3A is connected to 3D and the information in 3014A is synchronized and shared. If terminal 3D is a processing terminal such as a station ticket gate or entrance, and is connected to terminal 3A via network 20 or has the same blockchain recording unit and control unit as terminal 3A, the processing of Figures 6C, 6E, 6G, and 6H can also be used on 3D. If terminal 3D is a container such as a safe or an automobile, and is unable to connect to network 20 due to limitations on the power supply device such as a battery provided in the terminal, or if the mobile body carrying the terminal is in an environment where radio waves cannot reach and the communication device is limited, it will be difficult to perform the processing of Figures 6C, 6E, 6G, and 6H. Depending on the application of the terminal 3D, Figures 6C, 6E, 6G, and 6H may or may not be used. Figures 6C, 6E, 6G, and 6H are examples of application forms.
[0122] Figures 6C and 6E include a process F111 that determines whether the executor (msg.sender) of authentication function 3018A is user identifier A. This process determines whether user identifier A, calculated using private key 101A held by the user during the login process to the website, is sending and executing the message, and suspends function execution by an executor of the authentication function who does not have the private key. The difference between Figures 6C and 6E is the presence or absence of process F115, which changes 3017A, 3017AA, or 3017DA when authentication is successful. Figure 6C includes F115, while Figure 6E does not.
[0123] Figures 6G and 6H include a process F119 that determines whether the executor of authentication function 3018A is the holder of an OTP token. This process is similar to process F101 described in the flowcharts of Figures 6A and 6B for the OTP generation function. When a message is sent to terminal 3A, a blockchain node, using the user's private key 101A during the website login process, process F119 determines whether the user holds an OTP token with token number TIDA, and interrupts the execution of the authentication function by an executor who does not have an OTP token. The difference between Figures 6G and 6H is the presence or absence of process F115, which changes 3017A, 3017AA, or 3017DA when authentication is successful. Figure 6G has F115, while Figure 6H does not.
[0124] <Calling functions of other contracts from a contract> The contract used in this invention may be completed in only one smart contract recorded in a certain block number, or the processing contents may be described separately in a smart contract with another contract identifier recorded in the same block number or in a smart contract with another contract identifier recorded in another block number. For example, a function of contract Y may be called from contract X and used. For example, in F116 of Figure 6F, in order to perform processing 3022A or 3023A in Figure 3AB, contract X having a contract identifier different from the authentication contract 3008AA of the OTP token may be accessed, function Y of the contract X may be executed, and then return value 3021A of authentication function 3018A may be output to terminal 1A. Alternatively, as another example, a function such as the hash function fh of contract X, which generates and authenticates OTPs, can be defined in another contract Y and can be selected and called like a library. In preparation for a situation where the cryptographic hash function fh can be used to calculate multiple message data for a single hash value due to improvements in the performance of computing terminals, causing hash value collisions, contract Y's hash function fh may be updated so that it can be used to calculate a stronger hash function fh and OTP, and contract X may be able to use contract Y's fh.
[0125] <Providing services using authentication result calls> The OTP authentication function is called, and OTP, A, or TIDA is input, and the service is provided using the returned authentication result CTAU3021A. Here we will explain in order: 4A. Use for logging in to a website, 4B. Use as a paper or IC admission ticket, usage ticket, or unlocking key for entrances or building facilities, 4C. Decryption and viewing of encrypted data and files, and 4T. Use in broadcasting (distribution of encrypted data via 1:n-number broadcasting).
[0126] <4A.Website login usage> To log in to websites, etc., a TOTP-type one-time password token based on the block number Bn is used, which is a variable TB that can be changed at a certain time on the blockchain. If the TB contains the latest timestamp 3002A on the blockchain, it can also be used as the TB.
[0127] TB can also use the block hash Bh (3003A), but when using the block hash, Ethereum and its smart contract programming language, Solidity, can call the block hash values of the up to 256th block numbers counting from the most recent block number, and in this case, it is considered that the calculation is performed with the block number Bn as an argument. When you think of Bh as being calculated with Bn as an argument, the method of using the block hash Bh is no different from the method of using the block number Bn. Expressed as an equation in Solidity, BnTOTP = (A, TIDA, KC, Bh), Bh = Blockhash(Bn), so BnTOTP = (A, TIDA, KC, Bh = Blockhash(Bn)). When using the block hash Bh, the block number Bn is also used, so BnTOTP = (A, TIDA, KC, Bh) and BnTOTP = (A, TIDA, KC, Bn) can be said to be similar calculation methods from the perspective of arguments. As described above, the method using the block hash value Bh is considered in the present invention to be a different form of the method using the block number Bn. The block hash can also be used as TB. However, care must be taken as the block hash can be manipulated by the administrator of the terminal that constitutes the node. Also, it is the hash value of the block data of a certain block number Bn, and although it is dynamic with respect to time, it is not a value that represents time.
[0128] If the block hash Bh is used as the block number for TOTP, it may be necessary to record the block hash on a blockchain platform such as Ethereum, or on a different server terminal or blockchain, and make that block hash value available to the contract that calculates the TOTP. Also, the block hash is a value that changes every 15 seconds in Ethereum, for example, so if the block hash is used instead of the block number, the calculations become more complex when you want to extend the time interval for generating and authenticating OTPs. If the block number Bn is used instead of the block hash Bh, a variable n is used to increase the display interval based on Bn, and the remainder m is obtained by dividing Bn by n as Bn mod n, and m is subtracted from Bn to obtain Bnr (Bn-m=Bnr). Bnr is used instead of Bn as an argument to the hash function that calculates the OTP, and the time for generating and authenticating the OTP can be extended by increasing the value of n to 15 seconds, 30 seconds, 45 seconds, or 60 seconds. In this invention, the block number Bn is preferably used because of its simplicity of calculation.
[0129] In the case of block hash Bh, Bh can be used to calculate a previous block hash Bh using Bn as an argument, but as mentioned earlier, Bn may be required for this calculation. The block hash value Bh itself is a hash value corresponding to the data of a certain block number Bn, and the block number is a variable whose value increases over time. An increase in the block number Bn can indicate the passage of time, but even if the block hash value changes or increases, it cannot indicate the time at which the hash value represented the data. In the present invention, there may be cases where it is better to use Bn and cases where it is acceptable to use Bh. If all seed values used in the calculation of the OTP generation function and the OTP authentication function are recorded, there is a possibility that the OTP obtained by the generation function can be authenticated by the authentication function. Since Bn is proportional to time data, it is preferable to use it when the service requires a time element, such as when using a timestamp element. On the other hand, it is also preferable to use Bh in addition to Bn if you want to generate a more random OTP and use it for logging in to a website, etc. When using the OTP token as a pseudo-random number generator, it is possible to make it more random by using Bh as a seed value for the OTP calculation together with the value V determined by voting between the DLS node terminals described below.
[0130] When Bh is used as a timestamp, unless the terminal providing the service has a database of Bh, block data, and block numbers, it is impossible to know what time the block hash Bh was. Also, while the frequency of block hash value collisions is considered extremely low, if there are two or more block numbers for a certain block hash value Bh, it becomes impossible to know which block number's time the generated BnTOTP was generated from. This problem can also occur if the hash function used by the blockchain infrastructure that calculates the block hash value is prone to hash value collisions.
[0131] An example of logging in to a website using BnTOTP as an OTP using server terminal 3C and contract 3008AG with an OTP generation function and contract 3008AA with an OTP authentication function, as shown in Figure 3AB, is shown. The blockchain is accessed using contract identifier CPGT3019A of the token including the OTP generation function and contract identifier CPAT3020A including the OTP authentication function, and authentication is performed using contract CPAT3020A including the authentication function using BnTOTP obtained from CPGT3019A, and the login process is performed using server terminal 3C (SVLogin) when the return value of the authentication function is used to log in to or operate the website. Here, BnTOTP may be expressed as BnTOTP = (A, TIDA, KC, Bn), or as BnTOTP = fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn, BC, V), which adds a value V determined by voting or a value BC that can be changed by the contract administrator to the arguments of the previous BnTOTP. Alternatively, BnTOTP may be expressed as BnTOTP = fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn, BC, V), which adds a block size BSZ. When terminals 1A, 1C, 3A, and 3C are connected via network 20 as shown in FIG. 8A, the value V and block size BSZ determined between nodes such as node 3A and node 3B in the blockchain can be used as pseudo-random elements. The block hash value Bh can also be used. For example, the formula for BnTOTP used in the present embodiment is BnTOTP = fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn, BC, V, Bh). When BSZ varies depending on V, V = BSZ, and BnTOTP = fh(A, TIDA, KC, Bn, BC, BSZ, Bh).
[0132] The arguments of the hash function fh of the present invention are A, TIDA, KC, Bn, BC, and V and Bh, but a calculation method may be used in which the hash values are calculated using a hash function based on KC, BC, or V or Bh, and then processed to make it difficult to guess how BnTOTP was calculated.The present invention is characterized in that the arguments and internal variables required for function processing include A, TIDA, KC, Bn or A, TIDA, KC, BC, and is further characterized in that variables such as A, TIDA, KC, Bn, BC, V, and Bh can be used.
[0133] Furthermore, BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BC,V,VU[TIDA]) may be used, which includes a mapping variable VU (VU[TIDA]) with the token number TIDA held by the user as a key as a seed value. The argument VU[TIDA], which is a seed value set by voting by the user, will be explained separately.
[0134] Terminal 1A receives the return value of the authentication function, and 1A processes the return value according to the website program running on 3C (SVLogin), or passes the return value to 3C. If the authentication result is correct, 3C provides internal services, allowing the user to view and operate the content. Examples include internet banking and membership sites. If the authentication result is incorrect, login is not permitted. Also, upon login, with the user's permission, blockchain information such as CPGT3019A, TIDA, Bn, user identifier A, and login time information are stored. IPV values include an IP address or an identifier based on an IP address such as a hash value of an IP address, location information, an ID unique to the terminal 1A, and a sensor value such as a sensor 144A of the input device 14A of the terminal 1A. The user identifier A, token number TIDA, and IPV value are associated in the form of Figure 6X in the 3C storage device, and stored in a database in a format that can be expressed as a table, etc. Figure 6X is an example, and any ledger data or database that can record that 3C is accessed by multiple IPVs for a given token number or user identifier will suffice. The information is collected with the user's consent, and some or all of it is pseudonymized (encrypted) or anonymized and stored with the user's consent.
[0135] As in the example shown in Figure 6X, when there is access from a different environment, that is, a different IPV value, using a user identifier derived from the same private key 101A, terminal 3C can have a function to infer that the access from a different environment is unauthorized access, notify that the private key of user UA has been leaked, and that there is a suspicion of unauthorized access to the user identifier A or token number TIDA and the corresponding contact information in the database recorded in terminal 3C for the combination of user identifier A and token number TIDA, and prohibit access according to the user's permission. The use of prohibiting unauthorized access is assumed to be when accessing and manipulating information that is important to the user, such as internet banking.
[0136] Depending on the service application, server terminal 3C may also be an embodiment that builds a database like that shown in Figure 6X and does not provide a function for notifying users of unauthorized access. For example, in the case of a simple membership site or a simple online game site, for a server terminal 3C equipped with a processing unit and a storage unit that provides the service, creating a database like that shown in Figure 6X that monitors user access may increase the computing resources and storage capacity of terminal 3C. This may result in an increase in the cost of using server terminal 3C. Furthermore, since the cost of protecting and managing personal information in the server terminal 3C is high, there may be a desire to provide a login service using the OTP authentication system of the present invention while reducing management costs by deliberately not collecting the personal information of accessing users in terminal 3C. To meet such demands, there is also an embodiment of a terminal 3C that builds a database as shown in Fig. 6X and does not provide a function to notify users of unauthorized access.
[0137] In 3C, recording of access information in the format of Fig. 6X and monitoring of unauthorized access are not essential functions for an OTP authentication system, but are functions that can be used after the service provider of server 3C and user UA of terminal 1A agree on whether or not access will be recorded in the format of Fig. 6X. The present invention can be implemented without recording access information and monitoring of unauthorized access in the format of Fig. 6X. However, in an OTP authentication system, if private key 101A is recorded and used in multiple terminals, it is preferable from a security standpoint to have a function that detects access from multiple different environments as shown in Fig. 6X.
[0138] An example of the use of Figure 8A is internet banking, where both terminal 3C, which manages the website and customer data, and terminal 3A, which manages the contract data on the blockchain, can be operated. The OTP generation contract (3008AG in Figure 3AB) allows the customer to generate an OTP, and then uses that OTP (mainly BnTOTP, but also OWP if it can be updated periodically) along with the user identifier and token number TIDA as arguments to authentication function 3018A, storing the number of authentication attempts as variables within the contract. Furthermore, after execution of 3018A, a mapping variable 3023A using identifier A or token number TIDA as a key may be provided, and function 3022A may be included to write and store the assets, points, evaluation value, and voting result values corresponding to user identifier A or token number TIDA in 3023A into the contract. 3023A and 3022A may then be included in authentication contract 3008AA or 3008A, programmed to operate if authentication is successful with authentication function 3018A, and provided in 3008AA or 3008A. Specifically, in internet banking, member sites, etc., there may be a value 3023A such as asset balance or points for a user identifier A or the token number TIDA of the OTP token held by the identifier A, and a function 3022A that writes and saves 3023A in the contract.
[0139] <Process to record the number of times the authentication function is executed when logging in to a website> When generating or authenticating the OTP (BnTOTP and OWP) of the present invention, the number of times the OTP generation function and authentication function are executed can be recorded in the contract in internal variable 3017A, 3017AG, or 3017AA. Here, internal variable 3017A, 3017AG, or 3017AA is a variable having a value corresponding to the token number. In the embodiment, variable 3017A is a mapping type variable with the token number as a key, and in addition to the mapping type, any variable that is associated with the token number using a data type such as a structure or class can be used in the present invention. (The mapping type is one of the types available in Solidity, the Ethereum smart contract programming language used in the examples.)
[0140] By recording the number of times the OTP has been authenticated or generated in internal variable 3017A, 3017AG, or 3017AA of the blockchain contract, if private key 101A of terminal 1A of user UA is leaked and an attacker accesses the blockchain using private key 101A without user UA's knowledge, executes the OTP generation function, and generates an OTP, the fact that the OTP generation function has been fraudulently executed and obtained is recorded in 3017A or 3017AG. User UA can detect whether private key 101A has been used fraudulently by seeing an increase in the number of executions of the OTP generation function, which user UA should not have executed to obtain the OTP (if 3017A is a point such as a fee required to generate an OTP, the balance will decrease). Alternatively, a transaction at the time of fraudulent use will be added to the transaction history of the user identifier corresponding to private key 101A. To detect the above-mentioned fraudulent use, servers 3C and 3D that provide OTP token services, 3F with a search function for blockchain transactions, etc., 3E that sells OTP tokens as tickets, etc., advertising distribution server 5A, and encrypted data distribution server 5B, etc., need to have the function of monitoring changes in the blockchain part of terminals 3A and 3B that serve as blockchain nodes, detecting changes in transactions belonging to user identifier A calculated from private key 101 and the contract identifier of the OTP token, and notifying the contact information of user UA. Not only when the OTP generation function is executed, but also when the OTP authentication function is executed and executed successfully, notification can be made from the above-mentioned 3C, 3D, 3E, and 3F to the email address or telephone number of the notification destination of the user UA, SMS (Short Message Service), or a transaction on the blockchain that sends a message to the user identifier A.
[0141] In Example 1, a method was considered in which the number of times the OTP generation function was executed was not recorded, but the number of times the OTP authentication function was executed was recorded. This was because, when considering sending transactions to the blockchain that change the number of times generation and authentication were performed, it was thought that it would be better to be able to generate passwords any number of times without counting them, and that recording the number of times only at the time of authentication would result in fewer transactions and reduce the load on blockchain resources and the storage devices and communication devices of the server that stores and controls them. However, from the perspective of security, it is preferable to record the number of times the one-time password generation function was executed. For OTP generation functions and authentication functions that perform operations of low importance, it is better not to record the number of times they are executed, as shown in Figures 6A and 6F, and for OTP generation functions and OTP authentication functions that perform operations of high importance, it is better to record the number of times they are executed, as shown in Figures 6B and 6D, and these functions may be used interchangeably. F115 in FIG. 6C, FIG. 6D, and FIG. 6G is a process that is performed when the OTP authentication function is executed and the authentication result is correct, and F108 in FIG. 6B is a function that records the number of times the OTP generation function is executed. Although not shown in the figure, corresponding to Figure 6B, the OTP authentication function may include a process similar to F108 in Figure 6B that records only the number of times the OTP authentication function is executed, separate from F115 in Figures 6C, 6D, and 6G, and instead of changing the number of executions at F115 during authentication, the process of F115 may be placed between F110 and F111 when the OTP authentication function is executed and an argument is passed at F110. It would be ideal if the number of times the OTP generation function and OTP authentication function were executed could be recorded on the blockchain in a tamper-resistant and immutable manner.
[0142] In the present invention, it is preferable that both the OTP generation function and the authentication function be able to record the number of times the function is executed. Recording the number of times the generation function is executed makes it possible to detect unauthorized access before it occurs. The OTP generation function is executed to generate a password such as BnTOTP or OWP, and this is used to execute the authentication function. When the above procedure is followed, if the private key 101A of the user UA is leaked and an attacker attempts unauthorized access, it is assumed that the generation function will be executed first. It is necessary to notify server terminal 3F or the like (for example, terminal 3C, terminal 3D, terminal 3E, terminal 3F, terminal 5A, or terminal 5B that are connected to network 20 and can access the blockchain part of server terminal 3A) of changes in the number of executions of the generation function on the blockchain for user identifier A, changes in transactions for user identifier A, or changes in internal tokens used in Ethereum, etc., using the user's phone number, email address, etc., and notify them of unauthorized access before executing the authentication function. When unauthorized access occurs, user UA notifies the service provider of terminal 3C or terminal 3D and stops using the service.
[0143] There are cases where terminal 3D cannot access network 20. In such cases, 3017A and 3017AG, which are executed when an attacker's terminal accesses terminal 3A and generates the OTP using the OTP generation function, change, and by notifying user UA of the change in the variables, it becomes clear that the OTP may have been obtained by an attacker and recorded on paper or an NFC tag. In this case, too, it is possible to consult with the service provider. It may also be preferable to make the authentication count record portion stored in the terminal 3D an immutable record portion that can detect tampering by assigning a hash value to each transaction, linking and storing the history of user access and authentication to the terminal 3D, like a blockchain.Even if it is not a blockchain type, it may be preferable as a means to counter tampering to assign a MAC value using HMAC to a certain key and authentication data in the terminal 3D as a message and record it periodically or for each specified number of authentications. In this way, by providing a variable that records the number of executions in either or both of the OTP authentication function and the OTP generation function, it becomes more difficult for an attacker to manipulate a user's token without the user UA's knowledge, thereby preventing unauthorized access.
[0144] <When a function including an authentication function manipulates variables within a contract during authentication> In relation to the process of recording the number of times the authentication function has been executed, the present invention can include a process in which a function including the authentication function manipulates variables within the contract at the time of authentication. Specifically, a process 3022A that includes an authentication function or follows the authentication function is set in the contract, and when the authentication function is executed in 3022A and authentication using a one-time password is successful, the internal variable 3023A of the contract can be rewritten. Here, the internal variable 3023A is a variable 3023A that has a value corresponding to a user identifier or a token number. An example of variable 3023A is a mapping type variable with the user identifier or token number as a key, and other variables that are associated with a user identifier or token number using data types such as structures and classes in addition to the mapping type can also be used in the present invention.
[0145] <Example of internet banking processing> As an example of a case where a function including an authentication function manipulates variables within a contract during authentication, it can be used for simple internet banking or a point usage system within a contract. In this case, authentication contract 3008AA can perform OTP authentication and record bank account balance information after authentication. The following example is provided for reference.
[0146] Set the customer variables to be used within the contract for the Internet banking or point usage system within the authentication contract in 1 to 4 below. 1. Bank account number GKBA (or point account number GKBA. GKBA may also be a token number or a user identifier), which is an identifier for the bank account (point account). 2. The anonymized value of the account name of the GKBA account, MIGA (it is not advisable to write the name without anonymizing it on an open blockchain platform). 3. ASTA, the balance of GKBA's assets. GKBA is a variable described in 3023A, and is a mapping variable ASTA [token number] with the token number (or user identifier) as the key. 4. A database GKDB that associates the token number TIDA or user identifier A corresponding to GKBA. GKBA, MIGA, and ASTA are expressed as mapping variables with a user identifier or token number as a key. The variables in items 1 to 4 above are set in contract 3008AA (or 3008A) with an OTP authentication function, and a process for transferring assets to another bank account number GKBA, including the OTP authentication function or authentication process, may be possible. (Other information that may be required may include account type, transfer limit, account opening date or block number, and anonymized identity verification information.)
[0147] There is a balance ASTA[TIDA] (3023A with TIDA as key) deposited in the OTP token with token number TIDA held by user identifier A, When user B also has a TIDA OTP token and a balance ASTA[TIDB], if A wants to transfer a value trs from A's ASTA to B's TIDB token, User UA specifies a portion of the balance ASTA[TIDA] (3023A with TIDA as the key) deposited in the OTP token with token number TIDA held by user identifier A, There is a function or process 3022A that transfers the balance deposited in the OTP token of the token number TIDB held by user identifier B to ASTA[TIDB] (3023A with TIDB as the key), A user with user identifier A performs OTP authentication using an OTP token with token number TIDA, and executes processing 3022A and authentication function 3018A (processing in which 3018 is incorporated into 3022A, or processing in which processing 3022A is continued after processing 3018A), and when the authentication result of the OTP function is correct, processing 3022A subtracts trs from mapping variable 3023A with TIDA as the key to obtain ASTA[TIDA]-trs, and then adds the numeric value trs specified by the user identifier who is the owner of TIDA to mapping variable 3023A with TIDB as the key to obtain the numeric value ASTA[TIDB]+trs, thereby changing the numeric value and transferring the numeric value trs. In this way, the OTP authentication system of the present invention can be used to implement a contract for performing financial operations including an OTP authentication function, or a contract for exchanging points on a member site.
[0148] It is also assumed that the customer can view and execute functions 3022A and 3023A indicating the asset balance by directly accessing the contract.
[0149] It is also conceivable that the bank will allow the customer to access server 3C and then manipulate the customer's asset balance in the contract. In this case, the bank, rather than the user, will receive transaction instructions for the numerical amount of the customer's assets according to instructions given after authentication on a web app website when the customer logs in, and will use a function to rewrite the balance to perform transfer procedures, etc.
[0150] Asset balances in internet banking can be recorded on either server 3C or the authentication contract, or both. The above is not limited to internet banking; numerical and quantitative data can also be used in similar ways on member sites, member voting sites, online game sites, etc.
[0151] <Method for determining whether an OTP token used to log in to a member site is valid or invalid> Examples of the use of website login include membership sites, financial transactions such as Internet banking, webmail, online storage, e-commerce sites (EC sites), social networking services SNS, voice and video distribution sites, online games, online meeting sites, etc. Similar to the case of banks, customers can be made to access the server terminal 3C. Here, it is conceivable that the right to log in is restricted by a period or the number of times. The following three are shown as embodiments of the present invention.
[0152] 1. A method of setting a period during which a one-time password can be displayed using a block number When the customer exceeds the specified block number after the token is issued, it is also possible to make it impossible to generate the OTP of the OTP token. This is sometimes set when it is necessary to set a deadline for the OTP generation part when the token expiration date expires within a certain period. A specific example is shown below. The block number BnMint at the time of token issuance of a certain token number is recorded in a contract that generates OTP as a mapping type variable with the token number as a key, and in the function that generates OTP, if the latest block number Bn at the time of execution is within the block number BnValid + BnMint corresponding to the period for which the numerical value is to be displayed, the OTP can be generated. For example, at the time of execution of the function that generates OTP, it is determined whether the current block number Bn satisfies the mathematical formula Bn < BnMint + BnValid, and when the block number Bn corresponds to the period for which the numerical value is to be displayed, the OTP generation function part is programmed so that the OTP can be generated, and when the specified block number is exceeded, the OTP generation of the OTP token cannot be performed.
[0153] 2. When the administrator of the contract can rewrite a variable that can be used to determine the validity or invalidity corresponding to the user's token number. For a customer UA's token number TIDA, when the expiration date or service provision ends in accordance with the terms and conditions, the contract administrator changes the mapping variable VALID[TIDA], which indicates whether the token associated with TIDA is valid or invalid, and the token changes from valid to invalid, thereby invalidating the token data. This process corresponds to the action of cutting a paper ticket at a ticket gate. It also corresponds to the action of stamping an admission ticket or cutting the ticket into stubs. The validity of an OTP token can be indicated by a boolean value, or it can be a numerical value like electronic money that has been charged to the token. When used like electronic money, values can be added or subtracted from the balance. The blockchain tokens of this invention are substitutes for real-world books, content, paper securities, and metal keys, and legal disputes may arise if the user and service provider do not agree. To avoid concentration of authority, the contract administrator and service provider are separate entities, and the contract administrator managing terminal 1C can invalidate or validate the OTP token by rewriting VALID[TIDA] at the request of the service provider managing terminals 3C and 3D. If VALID[TIDA] is an integer, the size of the number can be changed; if VALID[TIDA] is a string, the character format can be changed.
[0154] 3. When users are willing to use tokens When a customer UA, who is the owner of the token, wishes to give up the right to use the token or to temporarily stop using it, the user can use the user's private key 101A to set and display the intention in the mapping variable NOTE[TIDA] in the intention field corresponding to the token number TIDA of the OTP token of the contract identifier belonging to the user identifier A. The variable NOTE[TIDA] is changed by a setter function that records the private key 101A and can be accessed and changed only by the user with user identifier A who has been assigned an OTP token with token number TIDA in 101A. It is expected that intentions will be expressed using boolean variables, numbers, or string variables. In NOTE[TIDA], while strings can record any string, the amount of transaction data increases and there is a risk of accidentally writing a sentence with a typo. In distributed ledgers such as blockchains and DAGs, once a block is linked, transaction data within the block data cannot be rewritten or tampered with, so it may be preferable to express intentions using boolean variables or numeric options rather than arbitrary strings.
[0155] <Use as voting rights for member sites, etc.> For example, when voting, one can use the token of the present invention to log in to a website or web app using the token of the present invention and the one-time password authentication system, vote for the identifier of the candidate for which one wishes to vote on that computer screen, and record the vote in a variable of the token contract that generates and authenticates a one-time password on the blockchain. However, to implement the voting function, a contract with a built-in authentication function needs a setter function that confirms that user identifier A possesses a token with token number TIDA, and enters a value into the variable to be voted for only if the user possesses the token. The private key 101A and the intention field corresponding to the token number TIDA of the OTP token of the contract identifier belonging to user identifier A are set as a mapping variable VOTE[TIDA], and the variable VOTE[TIDA] can only be accessed by users who have 101A and can access it as user identifier A, and users can cast their voting values. If you want to keep the voting details secret and take a majority vote, you can make VOTE[TIDA] a private variable, run the voting on a blockchain platform that allows for confidentiality, and aggregate the VOTE[TIDA] results within the OTP token contract. For example, if the only options are 0 to 3, you can program the VOTE[TIDA] setter function to accept integers between 0 and 3, and then aggregate the number of OTP token votes for options with numbers 0, 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., the number of OTP token votes) to determine which of the integer options between 0 and 3 are indicated. Instead of tallying VOTE[TIDA] within the OTP token contract, you can use a program that aggregates VOTE[TIDA] data by reading the blockchain portion of nodes 3A and 3B using ECMAScript on terminals 3C and 3F.
[0156] <User-defined seed value VU[TIDA]> The BnTOTP generated by the OTP token can be used to generate pseudo-random numbers in the service you are logging into, using a seed value VU[TIDA] that can be set by voting by the user. For example, on terminal 1A, an OTP token with token number TIDA is issued to user identifier A. By adding a seed value VU[TIDA] determined by voting that the user can set as an argument to the seed value of BnTOTP and calculating an OTP such as BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BC,V,Bh,VU[TIDA]), the OTP can be used as an OTP token for generating OTPs, authenticating, and logging into a website, and the above BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BC,V,Bh,VU[TIDA]) can also be used as a simple pseudorandom number generator at the website login destination. Here, V is a value determined by voting (Ethereum uses the BlockGasLimit value as V), and Bh is the block hash Bh.
[0157] The authentication system and pseudo-random number generator using the OTP token with the user-configurable seed value VU[TIDA] may be useful for online games (online computer games) that require login to websites or web apps. The randomness of the OTP generated by the VU[TIDA] OTP token can be utilized to further hash or process the OTP and use it as a variable to determine randomness within the game. It can also be used for purposes other than gaming.
[0158] For example, the seed value KC value (and BC value) can be rewritten if the game administrator of terminal 3C is the contract administrator and can operate terminal 1C, but when the OTP of the OTP token that gives randomness to the user in the game is used as a pseudo-random number, the contract administrator may try to rewrite the KC or BC in an attempt to maliciously control the future appearance of the OTP data generated by the user's OTP token. Therefore, by preparing the contract with a setter function that allows the user of the token number TIDA to rewrite the variable VU[TIDA], which the contract administrator cannot control, it is possible to set a variable VU[TIDA] whose value can be rewritten at the user's discretion. By setting a seed value VU[TIDA] that can be set by an external user, the OTP calculation method becomes BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,BC,V,Bh,VU[TIDA]), and not only the KC value of the contract administrator but also VU[TIDA] exists, and variables that can only be controlled by the user and not by the contract administrator are included in the OTP (BnTOTP).As a result, it is possible to generate OTPs or pseudo-random numbers that respect the VU[TIDA] value specified by the user (respecting the will of the user based on the voting value of the transaction sent by the user), and this can be used in OTP authentication systems and services that use pseudo-random numbers. To use VU[TIDA], a setter function is required that allows only users with token number TIDA to change VU[TIDA]. (The voting variable VOTE[TIDA] used on the member site and the VU[TIDA] are treated the same as variables that can be set by users.)
[0159] In a specific implementation, as an example, the hash value BnTOTPrnv is expressed using the SHA-2 SHA256 hash function in the following formula: BnTOTPrnv = SHA256( EncodePacked(A,TIDA,KC,Bn,V,VU[TIDA]) ). Here, user identifier A, token number TIDA, secret variable KC, latest block number Bn at the time of password generation and authentication, The value V is determined by voting between blockchain nodes, and the seed value VU[TIDA] is the number that users hold and use to vote for TIDA tokens. BnTOTPrnv can be used as a one-time password for logging into online games, or as a number that determines pseudo-randomness within online games after logging in.
[0160] The one-time password BnTOTP, which has the VU[TIDA] as an argument, is a variable that is beyond the control of the online game administrator, and the administrator cannot tamper with it to set a value that would be disadvantageous to the game player.
[0161] As a side note, this premise would break if the administrator could deceive players and set a function during contract deployment that would allow the administrator to change VU[TIDA] as well. It is preferable to separate the person who manages the login and pseudo-random number generation tokens from the game administrator. It is also preferable for the contract to be kept confidential, and even more preferable if the contract's processing contents could be made public except for the confidential variables and transactions that change those variables. It is also preferable that transactions related to the VU[TIDA] set by the user cannot be viewed by anyone other than the user who set it (by keeping the voting value secret and allowing secret voting). The present invention may be used for the login rights and pseudo-random number generator of a computer game server on terminal 3C, or for the ownership rights and pseudo-random number generator of a computer game that can be executed by decrypting encrypted data on terminal 4A, or for making part of the random number control unit of terminal 3C that distributes online games open source.
[0162] As a supplementary note, in Ethereum, which was used in the examples of this invention, all internal variables, functions, processing contents, and transactions of contracts can be viewed by external users regardless of whether it is the mainnet or testnet, making it difficult for the contract administrator to hide the processing contents of the contract. One of the reasons for setting variables V and VU[TIDA] that are determined by voting is that, even if all transactions, contract variables, and processing details are public, as in Ethereum, and it seems possible to calculate the seed value of a user's one-time password, the BlockGasLimit value is adopted as V, which is determined by voting between nodes, and by allowing users to change VU[TIDA] to any value at any time, the aim is to make it more difficult for attackers to predict future passwords. To preferably implement the present invention, a blockchain in which contracts and transactions are kept confidential is preferred. In the financial field, such as banking, it is highly desirable to build the authentication system and authentication device of the present invention in a distributed ledger system such as a confidential blockchain.
[0163] As a supplementary note, if a DAG type rather than a blockchain type is used for the data linkage structure of the distributed ledger recording unit 300A, when Bn is not available, BC, which can be changed by the contract administrator, can be used as the seed value for OTP calculation instead of Bn, and the seed value variable within the smart contract can be changed by, for example, periodically incrementing the value of BC as time passes. In addition, VU[TIDA] can be used as a seed value for OTP calculation, just like BC. This is not limited to online games, but can also be used to generate pseudo-random values based on the one-time password generated by the smart contract of this invention when randomness is required for services after login.
[0164] <4B. Use as a paper or IC-type admission ticket, voucher, or unlocking key for entrances and building facilities> When printing information in a fixed format on paper or the like and generating a password to be used for entry, etc., there is a risk that authentication will be difficult using a one-time password synchronized with the block number Bn. Therefore, a semi-fixed password OWP is used, which is not synchronized with the time corresponding to each token number or each user identifier but can be changed at any time. Figure 8B shows an example of how terminals and devices are connected. For the purpose of explanation, Figure 8B, Figures 3AA, 3AB, 3AC, 3D, and 3DA will be mainly used.
[0165] Specifically, among the variables TB that can be changed at a certain time on the blockchain, instead of the block number Bn, there is provided a function fscb3012A that serves as a setter that can only be accessed by a user with a user identifier C calculated from the private key 101C of the terminal 1C that has the authority to manage the contract, there is provided a variable BC value 3013A that can be rewritten at any time on the blockchain only by the user who manages the contract with user identifier C, and a password OWP that uses BC instead of the block number Bn is used as a paper or IC type entrance ticket, usage ticket, or unlocking key for entrances and building facilities. Here, OWP is an administrator-changeable one-time password, and if the administrator does not change it, it will be a fixed password. If the administrator updates OWP periodically (every 60 seconds, 10 minutes, etc.), it can become a dynamic password close to TOTP. When treating OWP like TOTP (like BnTOTP), BC may be rewritable by the administrator, specified users, or all users. However, if the OWP is used for a paper ticket 18A, a safe, or a car key 19A rather than a TOTP, authentication by OWP will not be possible if the BC is rewritten in a short period of time like with TOTP (BnTOTP), so the contract administrator decides whether to change the BC and changes it at a certain time. When reproducing OWP using BnTOTP, the remainder r obtained by dividing the block number Bn by the unsigned integer variable M is used, and Bnr is obtained by subtracting r from Bn to obtain Bnr (Bn-m=Bnr). When calculating Bnr instead of Bn as BnTOTP=fh(A,TIDA,KC,Bnr), the variable M can be significantly increased and manipulated to generate, display, and authenticate the same BnTOTP value over a period of several weeks, months, or even years. With the aforementioned BnTOTP, once a certain number of months or years have passed and the set block number is exceeded, the Bnr changes and the BnTOTP changes automatically. However, even in this case, a function similar to the OWP method is required, which allows the contract administrator to set the KC in case the KC setting the BnTOTP is leaked. Also, if the terminal 3D cannot connect to the blockchain and the correct block number or time cannot be measured, it may be difficult to use the BnTOTP method, and it may be preferable to use the OWP method, which uses the OTP authentication function 3018DA set on the terminal 3D.
[0166] To calculate the password OWP, at least the following four variables are used as arguments of the hash function fh to generate the password OWP. To generate a one-time password, use the token number TIDA. Secret key information KC recorded in the contract, Three variables, BC, which can be changed at any time by the contract administrator, are always used. Then, the user identifier A calculated from the private key 101A of the terminal 1A can be added to the fourth variable to form a password unique to the OTP token with token number TIDA of the user UA. The four TIDA, KC, BC, and A are used as arguments for the hash function fh to generate the hash value OWP as the password OWP=fh(TIDA, KC, BC, A), and the OTP generation function returns this value and transmits the OWP to terminal 1A. Here, the OWP is converted into an unsigned integer, and the remainder obtained by dividing it by 10 to the power of 7 as a 7-digit password can be transmitted as the 7-digit password OWP-n7. Here, if the password is n digits instead of 7 digits, it will be written as OWP-n. In this embodiment, the hash function is SHA256 or SHA-3. In this embodiment, the variables are encoded and combined in the order of the arguments, and the hash value of the data is calculated using the SHA256 function, etc. Since the message information changes depending on the encoding order, the hash value also changes depending on the order in which the arguments are encoded. In the present invention, the variables for generating the hash value that becomes the password OWP need only be derived from the four variables TIDA, KC, BC, and A. In other words, TIDA, KC, BC, and A may be calculated, and some of the variable data may be omitted, or the anonymized data may be hashed and processed using a hash function and used as an argument.
[0167] An important point is that if the user identifier A is added to the variable, when the token is transferred, the user identifier part of the seed value (the argument of the hash function that calculates the OTP) that calculates the hash value will change, and a different password OWP will be generated. For example, since user identifiers A, B, and C have different identifiers, when an OTP token that generates an OTP using the user identifier as an argument can be transferred from A to B, the OTP generated by user identifier B using the OTP generation function and the OTP generated by user identifier A using the OTP generation function will have different values. On the other hand, if the user identifier is not used as an argument to the hash function fh, when a token is sent and transferred to a user with a different user identifier, the contents of the semi-static password OWP do not change, and the same password value is shared. For example, it is the same as transferring a piece of paper with a fixed, secret PIN number written on it, or a metal key that is easily duplicated; if the information written on the paper is duplicated or a duplicate key is made based on the shape of the metal key, and if the token is in circulation, countless duplicate keys that can unlock the lock can be duplicated during that circulation.To prevent duplication of the above key information, the user identifier A can be included as an argument to the hash function fh that calculates the OTP, or even if the user identifier is not included, the contract administrator is required to manually rewrite the BC value 3013A at regular intervals using the function fscb3012A. If the administrator of contract C accesses and changes variable BC at approximate times and intervals, either manually or using an automated program, the password OWP will be similar to TOTP. For example, the administrator of contract C can use an automated program using pseudo-random numbers to periodically update the password approximately every day, week, month, or several years, and it is also possible that the specific date for the periodic update is determined using pseudo-random numbers and the seed value is changed (the time to change the seed value is roughly determined, but the exact time of the change is determined by a random value or human will). This provides a pseudo-TOTP authentication system with a random nature.
[0168] <Password OWP authentication and authentication result call> The password OWP can also be authenticated in the same way as BnTOTP, which is used for login processing on a website. User terminal 1A accesses a contract containing an OTP generation function for an OWP-type OTP token on terminal 3A and generates an OWP-type OTP using the generation function. Then, the OWP generated by the generation function, along with user identifier A and token number TIDA, are accessed by service-providing 3D (access control terminal 3D) and entered as arguments to OTP authentication function 3018DA. Next, from A, TIDA input as arguments of the OTP authentication function, and ArgOWP (or n-digit integer password ArgOWP-n) input as an argument, within the OTP authentication function 3018A, TIDA, KC, BC, and A are used with the hash function fh to obtain VeriOWP (or n-digit integer password VeriOWP-n). Using a conditional expression such as an IF statement, it is determined whether ArgOWP (or ArgOWP-n) matches VeriOWP (or VeriOWP-n). If they match, the processing when authentication is successful can also be performed. If they do not match, the processing when authentication fails is performed. This process is similar to logging in to the website distributed by the terminal 3C using BnTOTP. However, when logging in to the website distributed by the terminal 3C connected to the network using BnTOTP, the OTP authentication functions 3018A and 3018AA of the node terminal 3A are used. When presenting OWP to the terminal 3D that can be disconnected from the network 20, there is a difference in that the OTP authentication function 3018DA is used. (When the terminal 3D is connected to the network 20 and can be connected to the node 3A, 3018A and 3018AA can also be used.)
[0169] <Manufacture and use of a valuable paper leaf 18A such as a paper ticket using OWP, authentication by a digital device such as an IC tag 19A> Using the terminal 1A and the server 3A through the network 20, the password OWP is generated from the OTP generation contract on the blockchain by the OTP generation function 3009A. Then, the generated password OWP, user identifier A, and token number TIDA are printed on paper or the like using a printer or the like as a string, barcode, or both, to manufacture a paper ticket or valuable paper leaf 18A. At this time, the printed 18A may also be printed with information necessary to provide services such as the OTP generation contract identifier, the name of the service corresponding to the OTP generation token, the printing date and time, the expiration date of the valuable paper leaf, the name and contact information of the service provider, error correction codes, and MAC values. The information contained in the barcode of the valuable paper 18A and the character string information contained in the IC tag 19A may include a delimiter for separating the variables OWP, A, and TIDA. Also, some or all of the barcode data may be encrypted in such a way that only the authenticating service provider knows the encryption key.
[0170] When the OWP, A, and TIDA variables contained in the valuable paper sheet 18A are displayed and printed as barcodes, they are preferably two-dimensional barcodes, but multiple or one one-dimensional barcodes are also acceptable, as long as the optical imaging element 430D, such as a camera, can read the barcode printed or imprinted on 18A used for authentication and the numerical and character string information contained in the barcode.
[0171] The variables OWP, A, and TIDA included in the valuable paper sheet 18A may be displayed as barcodes on the screen 1500A of the display 150A of the 1A. The contents of the display 1500A may be printed and used as 18A. The display screen of 1500A and 18A, which has printed the display screen of 1500A, may transmit the user identifier A, token number TIDA, and password OWP to terminal 3D by having 340D of terminal 3D read the barcode (or character string).
[0172] The information of the user identifier A, token number TIDA, and password OWP to be recorded on the valuable paper sheet 18A may be recorded in a recording device of the NFC tag 19A (IC tag / IC card 19A), which may then communicate with the terminal 3D providing the service via the communication device 32D or 341D of the terminal 3D, thereby transmitting the user identifier A, token number TIDA, and password OWP to the terminal 3D.
[0173] A user UA who presents a valuable paper sheet 18A to a camera / scanner device 340D of a terminal 3D or an NFC tag 19A to 341D and 32D, The terminal 3D reads the information of the user identifier A, token number TIDA, and password OWP written in 18A via 340D, and passes the variables as arguments TIDA, user identifier A, and password ArgOWP to the authentication function 3018DA (3018DA in FIG. 3DA) of the storage device 30D of the terminal 3D, Inside the OTP authentication function 3018DA, according to the processing of the flowchart in Figure 6F or Figure 6D, VeriOWP is calculated for ArgOWP using the seed value of the secret variable such as KC recorded in the terminal 3D and the user identifier A and token number TIDA which are arguments of 3018DA, and it is determined whether the ArgOWP and VeriOWP input to 3018DA match, If they match, the return value 3021DA when the OTP authentication is successful is returned as the return value CTAU of the function, and if 3022DA is to be executed, it is executed before returning 3021DA. It also determines whether the ArgOWP and VeriOWP input to 3018DA match, and if they do not match, returns the return value 3021DA when OTP authentication fails as the return value of the function.
[0174] When the terminal 3D obtains 3021DA in accordance with the return value 3021DA or 3022DA of the function of 3018DA in the case where OTP authentication is successful, it operates an access control device, a starting device, an opening / closing device, or a locking / unlocking device 350D that locks and unlocks for the user UA who has presented the valuable paper sheet 18A to the camera 340D or the NFC tag 19A to 341D and 32D. When 3021DA is a value indicating successful OTP authentication, the terminal 3D controls the part 350D that performs access control such as opening / closing and locking, and opens / closes the gate device at the ticket gate or entrance so that the user UA can enter or exit. If the part 350D that performs access control such as locking is a building door, a car door, a car engine, or a computer starter, it unlocks the door, allowing use of the device, facility, or equipment. If the locked part 350D is a container such as a safe, it unlocks the safe.
[0175] When 3021DA is the value when OTP authentication is successful, the terminal 3D unlocks the locked part 350D and can use 351D and 352D to notify the user UA and those around the terminal 3D that the unlocking has been successful with light or sound. When 3021DA is a value when OTP authentication fails and entry is not permitted, 351D or 352D can be used to emit light, sound, or a radio signal when OTP authentication fails to notify those around the user of the presence of the user whose authentication has failed. Furthermore, a terminal 3D that can use a security camera or the like 342D can also take pictures of the appearance of a user UA who has presented 18A or 19A to the terminal 3D. 342D is used for devices and equipment such as large safes, vaults, computer terminals, and industrial processing equipment, locking devices for building doors, locking devices for automobiles, ticket gates, and entrances (entrances, exits, entrances and exits). Examples of where it is difficult to use 342D and where it may not be used include locking devices and entrances for buildings and automobiles that have power supply restrictions or where privacy is a consideration, locking devices for containers such as safes (some home safes and briefcase safes) that are difficult to install due to battery power restrictions and the size restrictions of 342D, and lock-type locking devices (small locks such as padlocks and wire locks). Although surveillance by a camera using 342D is not essential to the present invention, it is preferable to use it in applications where it is necessary for crime prevention, such as at ticket gates and entrances.
[0176] In the case where the terminal 3D does not have a device 350D for unlocking the terminal, and for example, the entrance / exit gates or ticket gates are guarded by humans to manage entry and exit, when 3021DA is the value when OTP authentication is successful, 351D or 352D can be used to notify the user UA or users or security personnel around the terminal 3D that the terminal has been unlocked by light or sound. Also, even if 3021DA is a value in which OTP authentication fails and entry is not possible, a special light or sound can be emitted in the event of failure, which is different from when OTP authentication is successful using 351D or 352D, to alert those around to the presence of a user whose authentication has failed. Furthermore, a terminal 3D that can use security cameras 342D can also take pictures of the user UA's appearance.
[0177] The security camera 342D (342D in FIG. 8B) that records the appearance of the user UA is a necessary function for entrance processing at station ticket gates and entrances, and may not be necessary if the terminal 3D is incorporated into a container such as a safe. Similarly, when the terminal 3D is used for locking a car or a building, it may not be installed out of consideration for privacy.
[0178] It is preferable that the terminal 3D is provided with a database or ledger unit 3116D that records the status of service provision by correlating the user identifier A and token number TIDA with the service provision time T and the number of times the service was provided 3017DA (or the number of times the service was provided and the price value of the service, and the user's appearance information when a security camera 342D is used). To correctly record the service provision time, it is necessary to receive JJY, GNSS, NITZ, etc., or to manually correct the time on the terminal 3D. If the terminal 3D is battery-powered, it may be possible to consider a configuration in which the service provision time T is not recorded because time information cannot be used due to power limitations. There may also be cases in which time information cannot be used on a terminal 3D built into a safe, etc.
[0179] However, when the database or ledger unit 3116D is used for purposes such as a home safe, a portable safe, or a lock, the terminal 3D may not be equipped with the database or ledger unit 3116D due to economic considerations such as the capacity and price of the control device and storage device. Furthermore, from the information 3116D of terminal 3D installed in a locking device of a computer, a car, a building, or a container such as a safe, the user of terminal 1A may be able to know how many times the unlocking process or start-up process has been performed, or how many times the unlocking process was performed at what time, by accessing terminal 3D using the wired communication device (or wireless communication device) of terminal 1A. In addition to wired communication, encrypted wireless communication can be used between terminal 1A and terminal 3D to check the status of 3D and the history of unlocking processes. From the unlocking history of terminal 3D such as 3116D, it can be known whether a user other than the user of 1A has illegally unlocked the device using an NFC tag 19A with OWP. If the terminal 3D is equipped with a camera that reads the unlocking key 18A based on paper or the like, it can be determined whether the unlocking has been performed using the unlocking key 18A based on paper or the like.
[0180] When terminal 3D is used as a ticket gate or entrance terminal, and is connected to network 20 and can connect to terminal 3A, 301C and 311C can be provided with a function for monitoring unauthorized access and entry, similar to the login monitoring unit for terminal 3C to a website. In addition, when 3C and 3D are connected to network 20 and equipped with a device that serves as a terminal that becomes a node, they can become a blockchain node like 3A and 3B, and in that case they can also have a recording unit and a control unit related to the blockchain (300D or 300C and 310D or 310C).
[0181] When the terminal 3D is used as a ticket gate or entrance, and the 3D is connected to a local area network within the facility that has the ticket gate or entrance, The terminal 3A has a blockchain unit 300D and a blockchain unit 310D that are different from the block data recorded in 3A and 3B, using the same blockchain infrastructure as the recording unit and control unit related to the blockchain of the terminal 3A, Inside 300D, there may be provided an authentication contract similar to 3008AA having an authentication function 3018DA having a hash function fh, seed values KC and BC, etc., which are used by terminal 1A to access terminal 3A on network 20 and generate an OWP. Deploy the OTP generation token contract 3008AG to the terminal 3A, deploy an authentication contract with an OTP authentication function 3018DA that calculates and authenticates OTP in the same way as 3008AG to the terminal 3D, synchronize the seed values of the two contracts, and perform authentication such as 1500A, 18A, and 19A, and perform processes such as entry.
[0182] <Authentication by digital devices such as IC tags> The NFC tag 19A can be a contactless IC card, a contactless IC tag (RFID tag), or a contactless IC card (RFID card) that can write user identifiers, token numbers, and password OWP as a short-range wireless communication device (NFC device).
[0183] The NFC tag 19A can be used in automobiles and the like. When used for an automobile to transmit OWP authentication information to the terminal 3D mounted on the automobile by remote control using 19A by encrypted wireless communication, perform OWP authentication at 3D, and unlock the locking device 350 of the automobile or start the prime mover, 19A has a battery and an input device such as a push button that can input unlocking or locking or both, and has a light-emitting element such as a light-emitting diode as an output device that indicates wireless communication (and whether the battery is depleted) when the button is pressed. Here, the key of the automobile is an example of 19A and can also be used for building doors, safes, or facilities. Taking the case where the terminal 3D is a terminal that manages the locking and starting of an automobile as an example, the terminal 3D may be a terminal that controls a motor drive circuit that unlocks the door of an electric vehicle and operates the motor of the electric vehicle, or a control terminal of a device that unlocks the door of an engine vehicle (an automobile using a heat engine) and starts the engine electrically by a starter motor or the like, or an electronic computer terminal that can perform control to decelerate or gradually stop the engine. The terminal 3D that controls the motor or engine according to the cruising distance and speed may be able to eliminate restrictions such as the cruising distance and speed limit when authenticated using the authentication system of the present invention.
[0184] The NFC tag 19A may be in a form that does not include a battery or an input / output device. For example, the NFC tag 19A may be a card-type device or a tag-type device that complies with ISO 14443 Type B. In a known contactless IC card technology called ISO14443 Type B, an antenna coil for communication and power reception is formed in a card-type or tag-type device. Power is supplied to the NFC tag 19A by electromagnetic induction from the NFC tag reader / writer (in the case of a terminal 3D, the 3D communication device 32D or the NFC tag signal receiver 341D) through the antenna coil of the NFC tag 19A, so no battery is used.
[0185] The NFC 19A may have other necessary information in addition to the OTP authentication of the present invention. Specifically, the NFC tag 19A may have a private key 101A2, and after performing OTP-type OTP authentication to unlock the vehicle door, communication may be performed via NFC when the engine is started, and the terminal 3D may connect to the internetwork 20 using 101A2. At the blockchain node 3A, TOTP authentication may be performed using a BnTOTP-type OTP token assigned to 101A2, and the vehicle may be started by logging into the vehicle's operating system in the same way as logging into a website. In the above case, a constant connection to the network 20 is required. This may be used in a vehicle connected to the internetwork 20. When a vehicle performs BnTOTP-type authentication to start the engine, it is necessary for the user UA to be able to use the NFC tag 19A to start the vehicle even when the network 20 is unavailable (due to a communication failure, disaster, etc.). Therefore, OWP-type OTP authentication may be performed using the user identifier A, token number TIDA, and password OWP stored in the NFC tag 19A, and the engine may be started with restrictions such as limiting the vehicle's driving range to a range set in advance by the vehicle manufacturer.
[0186] The NFC19A may be equipped with other devices and processing units required in addition to the OTP authentication of the present invention. For example, a device that operates as ISO14443 Type B, a wireless communication device for realizing a keyless entry system for automobiles, and processing such as encryption of wireless signals may be added separately depending on the application.
[0187] The present invention does not particularly limit the radio frequency used by the near-field communication device. According to known wireless communication technologies, the near-field communication device can use the 130 kHz band, 13.56 MHz band, 433 MHz band, 900 MHz band, 2.4 GHz band, etc. Specifically, the 13.56 MHz band is used for contactless IC tags and NFC tags, but a radio frequency other than 13.56 MHz may also be used. For example, the 2.4 GHz band may be used. Specific examples of standards related to NFC include 13.56 MHz band standards such as ISO / IEC 18092, ISO 14443 Type A, and ISO 14443 Type B. In the 2.4 GHz band, there are known wireless communication standards such as the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802.11 and 802.15.1 series, which can also be used in the present invention.
[0188] In an embodiment, the NFC tag 19A of the present invention can use the 13.56 MHz band and the 2.4 GHz band. The NFC tag 19A conforms to ISO 14443 Type B and can communicate with the 3D communication devices 32D and 341D at a distance of about 10 cm. However, if the NFC tag 19A uses a wireless personal area network (wireless PAN), the communication distance may exceed 10 cm.
[0189] The NFC tag 19A may be included in a wearable computer terminal, or the wearable computer terminal may have the functionality of the NFC tag 19A. For example, when there is a computer terminal 1A, a wearable computer terminal 1B, and an NFC tag 19A, An NFC tag 19A is connected as an external storage device of a wearable computer terminal 16B of the wearable computer terminal 1B, and the NFC tag 19A is connected to the wearable computer terminal 12B instead of the wearable computer terminal 16B. The terminal 1A accesses the storage device of the NFC tag 19A via the communication device 1B, It may be possible to write the user identifier, token number, and password OWP required for authentication using OWP. Alternatively, the wearable computer terminal 1B accesses the server terminal 3A via the internetwork 20 and generates an OWP, It may be possible to write the previous password OWP, user identifier, and token number.
[0190] There are no restrictions on the type (use and shape) of the wearable computer terminal used in the present invention, but the main types include bracelet and watch types (a bracelet or smart watch terminal equipped with the functionality of NFC tag 19A), ring types (a ring or ring terminal equipped with NFC tag 19A), belt types (a belt equipped with NFC tag 19A), clothing types (NFC tag 19A attached to, knitted into, or sewn into clothing), and shoe types (an NFC tag 19A is equipped on the surface of footwear, or an NFC tag 19A is equipped in the insole p...
Claims
1. A computer device equipped with an information acquisition device or an input device capable of acquiring information and a storage device capable of storing the acquired information. A computer network system including a node of the computer network system, The computer network system includes a node having a recorder using a blockchain, A function unit or a calculation processing algorithm that can be used by the computer device to calculate and obtain a hash value or a digest value of the obtained information, A computer network system having features that are included in the data block or smart contract portion of a blockchain of a distributed ledger system.
2. The computer network system according to claim 1 , wherein the information acquisition device is an image acquisition device or a camera, and the information is image information.
3. 2. The computer network system according to claim 1, wherein the information acquisition device is a voice input device or a microphone, and the information is voice information.
4. 2. The computer network system of claim 1, wherein the information acquisition device is a thermal imaging device, and the information is thermal image information.
5. 2. The computer network system according to claim 1, wherein said information acquisition device is an input device capable of inputting biometric information, said information including biometric characteristics.
6. said computer device has a feature capable of photographing a part of a human body; The computer device photographs and scans infrared rays emitted from the skin surface of the human body as thermal images or image information of temperature distribution, The present invention has a feature that, in an environment where the part of the human body to be photographed is not illuminated, it is possible to obtain biological feature information of a temperature distribution and a thermal image of the part of the human body.
5. The computer network system according to claim 4.
7. 7. The computer network system according to claim 6, wherein said computer device has a feature capable of photographing a part of a person's face including the area around the eyes.
8. Using the computer network system according to claim 1, A computer network system, characterized in that the computer device or the node performs login or locking / unlocking processes.
9. Using the computer network system according to claim 8, A computer network system, characterized in that the computer device or the node performs login or locking / unlocking processes for automobiles or transportation equipment.
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