Information processor

JP2025021553APending Publication Date: 2025-02-14SUBARU CORP
View PDF 1 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023125334
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-08-01
Publication Date
2025-02-14

AI Technical Summary

Benefits of technology

【0009】 本発明によれば、車両盗難の可能性を低減させることができる。

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 2025021553000001_ABST
    Figure 2025021553000001_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

To reduce the possibility of vehicle theft.SOLUTION: An information processor of the present invention includes a first transmission unit associated with a specified vehicle by a radio wave of a specified frequency for transmitting first key identification information, one or more processors, and a storage medium storing a program executed by the one or more processors, in which the program includes one or more instructions, and the one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to execute a process of stopping transmission of the first key identification information by the first transmission unit when it is determined that a radio wave intensity of the predetermined frequency has increased.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 2
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a technology for an information processing device serving as a portable device that locks and unlocks vehicle doors by transmitting unique identification information for each key via radio waves. [Background technology]

[0002] Some portable electronic keys capable of locking and unlocking a vehicle have a smart entry function.

[0003] A vehicle system with a smart entry function uses a repeater to amplify weak radio waves emitted by the vehicle or electronic key, creating the illusion that an electronic key, which is actually located far away and therefore unable to lock or unlock, is located near the vehicle. This makes it possible to unlock the vehicle doors and start the engine, making it possible to steal the vehicle.

[0004] To prevent this, Patent Document 1 below discloses a technique in which an anti-theft device is installed separately from the electronic key, causing the vehicle-mounted device to mistakenly recognize the signal transmitted by the electronic key as noise. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0005] [Patent Document 1] JP 2017-223019 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0006] However, with the technology described in Patent Document 1, the transmission of the electronic key signal continues, so if the anti-theft device is disabled by some means, theft cannot be prevented.

[0007] The present invention has been made in view of the above circumstances, and has an object to reduce the possibility of vehicle theft. [Means for solving the problem]

[0008] An information processing device according to one embodiment of the present invention comprises a first transmission unit that transmits first key identification information linked to a specific vehicle via radio waves of a specific frequency, one or more processors, and a storage medium storing a program executed by the one or more processors, the program including one or more instructions that cause the one or more processors to execute a process of stopping the transmission of the first key identification information by the first transmission unit when it is determined that the radio wave strength of the specific frequency has increased. Effect of the Invention

[0009] According to the present invention, the possibility of vehicle theft can be reduced. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0010] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a vehicle system according to a first embodiment. [Diagram 2] 3 is a block diagram showing functions of a control unit of the smart key. FIG. [Diagram 3] 5 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a process executed by a control unit of the smart key. [Figure 4] FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a vehicle system according to a second embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing functions of a control unit of an associated device according to a second embodiment. [Figure 6] 10 is a flowchart showing an example of a process executed by a control unit of an associated device according to the second embodiment. [Figure 7] FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a vehicle system according to a third embodiment. [Figure 8] FIG. 13 is a block diagram showing functions of a control unit of an associated device according to a third embodiment. [Figure 9]13 is a flowchart showing an example of a process executed by a control unit of an associated device according to the third embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0011] DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, an embodiment of a vehicle system according to the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0012] <1. First embodiment> <1-1. Vehicle system configuration> An example of the configuration of a vehicle system 1 according to a first embodiment of the present invention is shown in Fig. 1. Note that Fig. 1 shows only the configuration of the main parts of the vehicle system 1 that are mainly related to the present invention.

[0013] The vehicle system 1 includes a smart key 2 as an information processing device of the present invention and a vehicle 3. The smart key 2 may be a master key 2m or a sub-key 2s, but in the following description, no distinction will be made between them and they will be referred to as the smart key 2.

[0014] The smart key 2 is a device (information processing device) carried by a driver or the like as a key for remotely locking and unlocking the doors of the vehicle 3.

[0015] The smart key 2 is configured to include a control unit 4, a memory unit 5, an unlocking operation button 6, a locking operation button 7, and a communication unit 8.

[0016] The control unit 4 performs various processes based on user operations on the smart key 2 and communication with the vehicle 3.

[0017] The storage unit 5 comprehensively refers to a ROM (Read Only Memory) in which the programs executed by the control unit 4 are stored, a RAM (Random Access Memory) used as a work area, etc. A part of the storage unit 5 may be provided inside the control unit 4.

[0018] The control unit 4 and the storage unit 5 are formed, for example, as one IC (Integrated Circuit) chip.

[0019] The storage unit 5 stores first key identification information Kid1 and second key identification information Kid2.

[0020] The unlocking operator 6 is an operator such as a button that is operated to unlock the doors of the vehicle 3. The unlocking operator 6 supplies an operation signal to the control unit 4 in response to an operation on the unlocking operator 6.

[0021] The control unit 4 transmits a predetermined signal related to unlocking in response to an operation signal input from the unlocking operation element 6 via wireless communication.

[0022] The locking operator 7 is an operator such as a button that is operated to lock the doors of the vehicle 3. The locking operator 7 supplies an operation signal to the control unit 4 in response to an operation on the locking operator 7.

[0023] The control unit 4 transmits a predetermined signal for locking in response to an operation signal input from the locking operation element 7 via wireless communication.

[0024] The communication unit 8 includes a first transmission unit 9, a second transmission unit 10, and a reception unit 11. The first transmission unit 9 transmits a signal including the common information CD and the first key identification information Kid1 by weak radio waves. The signal transmitted from the first transmission unit 9 at this time is referred to as a "normal signal S1." The reach of the normal signal S1 is approximately 1 m or several meters from the smart key 2.

[0025] The second transmission unit 10 transmits a signal including the common information CD and the second key identification information Kid2 as a weak radio wave. The signal transmitted from the second transmission unit 10 at this time is referred to as a "fake signal S2." The reach of the fake signal S2 is approximately 1 m or several meters from the smart key 2.

[0026] The common information CD contained in both the genuine signal S1 and the false signal S2 is, for example, manufacturer information and model information of the vehicle 3, and is the same information even if the individual vehicles 3 are different as long as they are the same model.

[0027] The first key identification information Kid1 included in the normal signal S1 is identification information assigned to the smart key 2 that is permitted to remotely operate the corresponding vehicle 3.

[0028] The second key identification information Kid2 contained in the false signal S2 is identification information for which no corresponding vehicle 3 exists, and is identification information for which remote control is not permitted for at least all vehicles 3 belonging to the same manufacturer or model.

[0029] That is, the fake signal S2 is a signal in which information other than the key identification information is made identical to that of the genuine signal S1.

[0030] The normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2 are transmitted using the same frequency band. The predetermined frequency used to transmit the normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2 is referred to as a "first frequency f1."

[0031] The normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2 are assumed to be constantly transmitted regardless of the control of the control unit 4. Alternatively, the normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2 may be constantly transmitted from the start of the control of the control unit 4.

[0032] It should be noted that the transmission of the regular signal S1 can be stopped under the control of the control unit 4 only if there is a risk of theft.

[0033] The first transmission unit 9 or the second transmission unit 10 may be capable of transmitting an unlock signal when the unlock operation button 6 is operated, or a lock signal when the lock operation button 7 is operated. The range of the unlock signal or the lock signal is set to be wider than that of the genuine signal S1 or the fake signal S2, for example, from 10 m to several tens of meters.

[0034] The communication unit 8 may include a separate transmitting unit (not shown) for transmitting the unlock signal and the lock signal.

[0035] The receiver 11 is capable of receiving radio waves in a predetermined frequency band that includes a first frequency f1 used to transmit the normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2.

[0036] The control unit 4 is capable of measuring or acquiring the reception strength of the radio waves received by the receiving unit 11.

[0037] Next, the configuration of the vehicle 3 will be described. The vehicle 3 includes a vehicle control unit 12, a vehicle storage unit 13, a door operator 14, a start button 15, a vehicle communication unit 16, a door lock actuator 17, and an engine-related actuator 18.

[0038] The vehicle-side control unit 12 performs various processes in response to the result of receiving a signal transmitted from the smart key 2 or in response to a user operation on the vehicle 3.

[0039] The vehicle-side storage unit 13 collectively refers to a ROM in which a program executed by the vehicle-side control unit 12 is stored, a RAM used as a work area, and the like. A part of the storage unit 5 may be provided inside the vehicle-side control unit 12.

[0040] The vehicle-side control unit 12 and the vehicle-side storage unit 13 may be provided in the vehicle 3 as one or more ECUs (Electronic Control Units).

[0041] The vehicle-side storage unit 13 stores authentication information Dau for authenticating a signal transmitted from a genuine smart key 2 corresponding to the vehicle 3. The authentication information Dau is information that can determine whether the key identification information Kid included in the genuine signal S1 is correct or not, i.e., whether the genuine signal S1 includes the first key identification information Kid1 or not.

[0042] The door operator 14 is, for example, an operator such as a button provided on a handle of a door of the vehicle 3 , and detects an operation on the door operator 14 and supplies an operation signal to the vehicle-side control unit 12 .

[0043] The start button 15 is, for example, an operator such as a button provided near the steering wheel of the vehicle 3 , and detects an operation of the start button 15 and supplies an operation signal to the vehicle-side control unit 12 .

[0044] The vehicle-side communication unit 16 is configured to include a transmitting unit and a receiving unit (not shown), and is capable of receiving wireless communication of at least the first frequency f1.

[0045] When an operation signal is input from the door operator 14, the vehicle-side control unit 12 determines whether the vehicle-side communication unit 16 is receiving the above-mentioned normal signal S1, and drives the door lock actuator 17 according to the determination result.

[0046] The door lock actuator 17 is an actuator for switching the doors of the vehicle 3 between an unlocked state and a locked state, and is an actuator such as a motor for driving a door locking mechanism.

[0047] When the door operator 14 is operated while the doors of the vehicle 3 are locked, the vehicle-side control unit 12 drives the door lock actuator 17 to control the doors to change from the locked state to the unlocked state.

[0048] Furthermore, when the door operator 14 is operated while the doors of the vehicle 3 are in an unlocked state, the vehicle-side control unit 12 drives the door lock actuator 17 to control the door to change from the unlocked state to the locked state.

[0049] The door operator 14 may be configured to be used only for either unlocking or locking the doors of the vehicle 3.

[0050] When an operation signal is input from the start button 15, the vehicle-side control unit 12 determines whether or not the vehicle-side communication unit 16 is receiving the above-mentioned normal signal S1, and drives the engine-related actuator 18 according to the determination result.

[0051] The engine-related actuator 18 collectively refers to various actuators related to the engine of the vehicle 3. The engine-related actuator 18 includes, for example, a throttle actuator that drives a throttle valve, an injector that injects fuel, and a starter motor used to start the engine.

[0052] When an operation signal is input to the start button 15 and the vehicle communication unit 16 receives the above-mentioned normal signal S1, the vehicle control unit 12 executes a process for starting the engine.

[0053] Note that this is an example in which the vehicle 3 is an engine vehicle. In the case where the vehicle 3 is an electric vehicle, various actuators for enabling the electric vehicle to start are controlled by the vehicle-side control unit 12 instead of the engine-related actuator 18.

[0054] <1-2. Anti-theft control> The control unit 4 of the smart key 2 performs control to prevent the vehicle 3 corresponding to the smart key 2 from being stolen.

[0055] The functions of the control unit 4 are shown in FIG. The control unit 4 executes the programs stored in the storage unit 5 to have a transmission start function F1, a radio wave intensity acquisition function F2, a transmission stop function F3, an unlock signal transmission function F4, and a lock signal transmission function F5.

[0056] The transmission start function F1 is a function for starting both the transmission of the regular signal S1 by the first transmission unit 9 and the transmission of the fake signal S2 by the second transmission unit .

[0057] It is desirable to stagger the timing at which the genuine signal S1 starts to be transmitted from the fake signal S2. If both signals are transmitted at exactly the same timing, when the vehicle 3 receives a signal containing the genuine signal S1 and the fake signal S2, it may not be able to distinguish the genuine signal S1 from the fake signal S2, and it may not be possible to unlock the doors of the vehicle 3.

[0058] The radio wave intensity acquisition function F2 is a function for acquiring the received radio wave intensity measured for the first frequency f1. The measurement of the received radio wave intensity may be performed by the receiver 11, or may be performed by the controller 4 based on the signal output from the receiver 11.

[0059] The transmission stop function F3 is a function that stops the transmission of the regular signal S1 by the first transmission unit 9 when the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1 is high. Note that the transmission stop function F3 does not stop the transmission of the fake signal S2 by the second transmission unit 10.

[0060] A case where the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1 is high may occur, for example, when a weak radio wave transmitted from the smart key 2 by a person attempting theft is relayed or amplified.

[0061] When the received radio wave strength of the first frequency f1 is high, the transmission stop function F3 stops the transmission of the normal signal S1, and from then on, signals that do not contain the normal signal S1 are relayed and amplified, making it difficult to unlock the doors of the vehicle 3 or start the engine by a so-called relay attack.

[0062] There are several methods for determining whether the received radio wave strength is high or not. In one method, a threshold value to be used for comparison is stored in the storage unit 5 or the like, and the transmission stop function F3 determines whether the received radio wave strength is high or not by comparing the acquired received radio wave strength with the threshold value.

[0063] The threshold value used in this case is desirably set based on the received radio wave strength when the regular signal S1 and the fake signal S2 are received without relaying or amplification. In addition, when setting the threshold value, it is desirably set with a certain margin, taking into consideration the aging of the equipment, the receiving environment, etc.

[0064] The other is to compare the received radio wave strength from a predetermined time ago with the current received radio wave strength, and determine that the received radio wave strength is high if it has changed in an increasing direction by more than a predetermined amount.

[0065] When the received radio wave strength is high, the transmission of the normal signal S1 may be stopped for a predetermined period of time, such as several minutes, several tens of minutes, or several hours, or may be stopped until the received radio wave strength is no longer determined to be high.

[0066] The received radio wave strength of the first frequency f1 may be high when other devices are using the same frequency band. In such a case, it is not necessary to stop the transmission of the regular signal S1 by the transmission stop function F3.

[0067] In order to avoid unnecessarily stopping the transmission of the normal signal S1, the transmission stop function F3 may determine whether or not the signal received with high strength by the receiving unit 11 contains the first key identification information Kid1 or the second key identification information Kid2.

[0068] Then, the transmission stop function F3 stops the transmission of the normal signal S1 when it determines that the received radio wave strength of the first frequency f1 is high and when the signal with high radio wave strength at the time of reception contains at least one of the first key identification information Kid1 and the second key identification information Kid2.

[0069] This makes it possible to stop the transmission of the regular signal S1 only when there is a high possibility that a relay attack is being carried out.

[0070] The unlock signal transmission function F4 is a function for transmitting an unlock signal by radio waves when a signal indicating that the unlock operating element 6 has been operated is input.

[0071] The locking signal transmission function F5 is a function that transmits a locking signal by radio waves when a signal indicating that the locking operator 7 has been operated is input.

[0072] <1-3. Processing flow> An example of the flow of processing executed by the control unit 4 of the smart key 2 will be described with reference to FIG.

[0073] In step S101, the control unit 4 starts transmitting the normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2.

[0074] In step S102, the control unit 4 acquires information on the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1.

[0075] In step S103, the control unit 4 determines whether the received radio wave strength is high or not based on the acquired information on the received radio wave strength. In this determination process, for example, the received radio wave strength information may be compared with a threshold value, or new and old received radio wave strength information may be compared.

[0076] When it is determined that the received radio wave intensity is not high, the control unit 4 returns to step S102. That is, in normal operation, the control unit 4 repeatedly executes both the processes of step S102 and step S103.

[0077] On the other hand, if it is determined that the received radio wave intensity is high, the control unit 4 performs processing to stop the normal signal S1 in step S104.

[0078] Next, in step S105, the control unit 4 determines whether or not a transmission restart condition for the normal signal S1 is satisfied. The transmission restart condition may be, for example, the elapsed time after the process of step S104 is executed, or the intensity of the received radio wave.

[0079] If it is determined that the transmission restart condition is not met, the control unit 4 repeats the process of step S105.

[0080] On the other hand, if it is determined that the transmission restart condition is met, the control unit 4 restarts the transmission of the regular signal S1 in step S106. This process is realized by, for example, the transmission start function F1 of the control unit 4.

[0081] <2. Second embodiment> The vehicle system 1A in the second embodiment includes a smart key 2A, a vehicle 3, and an associated device 19. A configuration example of the vehicle system 1A will be described with reference to Fig. 4. Note that the same components as those in the first embodiment are given the same reference numerals and the description will be omitted as appropriate.

[0082] The smart key 2A includes a control unit 4A, a storage unit 5A, an unlocking operation button 6, a locking operation button 7, and a communication unit 8A.

[0083] The communication unit 8A includes a first transmission unit 9 and a reception unit 11, but does not include a second transmission unit . That is, the communication unit 8A is capable of transmitting the normal signal S1 but is incapable of transmitting the false signal S2.

[0084] Accordingly, the first key identification information Kid1 is stored in the storage unit 5A, and the second key identification information Kid2 is not stored.

[0085] As shown in FIG. 2, the control unit 4A has a transmission start function F1, a radio wave intensity acquisition function F2, a transmission stop function F3, an unlock signal transmission function F4, and a lock signal transmission function F5.

[0086] The transmission start function F1 is a function for causing the first transmission unit 9 to start transmitting the normal signal S1.

[0087] The radio wave intensity acquisition function F2, the transmission stop function F3, the unlock signal transmission function F4, and the lock signal transmission function F5 are the same functions as those in the first embodiment, and therefore redundant explanations will be avoided.

[0088] The function of transmitting the fake signal S2, which the smart key 2A does not have, is provided instead by the associated device 19. The associated device 19 is preferably carried together with the smart key 2A, and for example, the smart key 2A and the associated device 19 are carried hanging from the same key holder.

[0089] The associated device 19 includes a control unit 20 , a storage unit 21 , and a communication unit 22 .

[0090] The control unit 20 includes a decoy signal transmission start function F6 for transmitting the decoy signal S2 (see FIG. 5).

[0091] The storage unit 21 comprehensively refers to a ROM in which the programs executed by the control unit 20 are stored, a RAM used as a work area, etc. A part of the storage unit 21 may be provided inside the control unit 20.

[0092] The control unit 20 and the storage unit 21 are formed, for example, as one IC chip.

[0093] The storage unit 21 stores second key identification information Kid2 used for transmitting the disguise signal S2.

[0094] The communication unit 22 includes a second transmission unit 10A. Under the control of the control unit 20, the second transmission unit 10A constantly outputs a disguise signal S2 including the second key identification information Kid2.

[0095] That is, in the vehicle system 1A in the second embodiment, the smart key 2A transmits the regular signal S1 and the associated device 19 transmits the false signal S2, thereby thwarting a relay attack.

[0096] The process executed by the control unit 4A in the second embodiment is similar to the process shown in Fig. 3. In step S101, the control unit 4A executes a process of starting only the transmission of the normal signal S1.

[0097] Moreover, an example of the process executed by the associated device 19 is shown in FIG. The control unit 20 of the associated device 19 performs processing to start transmission of the disguise signal S2 in step S201 of FIG. As a result, the second transmitter 10A of the associated device 19 starts transmitting the camouflage signal S2.

[0098] In the vehicle system 1A of the present embodiment, the smart key 2A and the associated device 19 are provided separately, so that the smart key 2A does not need to be provided with a function for transmitting the camouflage signal S2.

[0099] Therefore, the cost of the smart key 2A itself can be reduced, and for example, the cost incurred when the smart key 2A breaks down can be reduced.

[0100] In addition, when the vehicle 3 is changed to another vehicle of the same manufacturer or model, the smart key 2A is also replaced to correspond to the new vehicle 3, but the associated device 19, which is separate from the smart key 2A, can continue to be used as it is without being changed. This makes it possible to reduce costs.

[0101] <3. Third embodiment> A vehicle system 1B in the third embodiment includes a smart key 2B, a vehicle 3, and an associated device 19B. An example of the configuration of the vehicle system 1B will be described with reference to Fig. 7. Note that the same components as those in the first and second embodiments are given the same reference numerals and descriptions thereof will be omitted as appropriate.

[0102] The smart key 2B includes a control unit 4B, a storage unit 5B, an unlocking operation button 6, a locking operation button 7, and a communication unit 8B.

[0103] The communication unit 8B includes a first transmission unit 9 and an information receiving unit 23, but does not include a second transmission unit 10 or a receiving unit 11B. That is, the communication unit 8B is capable of transmitting the normal signal S1, but is unable to transmit the false signal S2 or receive the signal with the first frequency f1.

[0104] Accordingly, the first key identification information Kid1 is stored in the storage unit 5B, and the second key identification information Kid2 is not stored.

[0105] As shown in FIG. 2, the control unit 4B has a transmission start function F1, a radio wave intensity acquisition function F2, a transmission stop function F3, an unlock signal transmission function F4, and a lock signal transmission function F5.

[0106] The transmission start function F1 is a function for causing the first transmission unit 9 to start transmitting the normal signal S1.

[0107] The radio wave intensity acquisition function F2 is a function for acquiring the measurement result of the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1 from the associated device 19B. That is, unlike the first and second embodiments, the smart key 2B does not have the function of measuring the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1.

[0108] The transmission stop function F3, the unlock signal transmission function F4, and the lock signal transmission function F5 are the same functions as those in the first embodiment, and therefore redundant explanations will be avoided.

[0109] The associated device 19B has the function of transmitting the spoof signal S2 and the function of measuring the received radio wave intensity, which the smart key 2B does not have. It is preferable that the associated device 19B is carried together with the smart key 2B. For example, the smart key 2B and the associated device 19B are carried hanging from the same key holder.

[0110] The associated device 19B includes a control unit 20B, a storage unit 21, and a communication unit 22B.

[0111] The control unit 20B includes a camouflage signal transmission start function F6 for transmitting the camouflage signal S2 and a received radio wave intensity measurement function F7 (see FIG. 8).

[0112] The received radio wave intensity measurement function F7 is a function obtained by separating the measurement function and the measurement result acquisition function included in the radio wave intensity acquisition function F2 of the control unit 4 in the first embodiment.

[0113] The storage unit 21 comprehensively refers to a ROM in which programs executed by the control unit 20B are stored, a RAM used as a work area, etc. A part of the storage unit 21 may be provided inside the control unit 20B.

[0114] The control unit 20B and the storage unit 21 are formed, for example, as one IC chip.

[0115] The storage unit 21 stores second key identification information Kid2 used for transmitting the disguise signal S2.

[0116] The communication unit 22B includes a second transmission unit 10B, a reception unit 11B, and an information transmission unit 24. The second transmission unit 10B constantly outputs a disguise signal S2 including second key identification information Kid2 under the control of the control unit 20B.

[0117] That is, in the vehicle system 1B in the third embodiment, the smart key 2B transmits the regular signal S1 and the associated device 19B transmits the false signal S2, thereby thwarting a relay attack.

[0118] The receiving section 11B of the communication section 22B is capable of receiving radio waves in a predetermined frequency band including the first frequency f1 used for transmitting the normal signal S1 and the fake signal S2. Based on the reception in the receiver 11B, the received radio wave intensity measuring function F7 in the controller 20B measures the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1.

[0119] Information on the measured received radio wave intensity is transmitted to the smart key 2B by the information transmitting unit 24 of the communication unit 22B.

[0120] The process executed by the control unit 4B in the third embodiment is similar to the process shown in Fig. 3. In step S101, the control unit 4B executes a process of starting only the transmission of the normal signal S1.

[0121] The acquisition process in step S102 is a process for receiving radio wave intensity information from the associated device 19B.

[0122] Moreover, an example of the process executed by the associated device 19B is shown in FIG. The control unit 20B of the associated device 19B performs processing to start transmission of the disguise signal S2 in step S201 of FIG.

[0123] In step S221, control unit 20B measures (calculates) the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1.

[0124] The control unit 20B performs a process of transmitting the received radio wave intensity information measured in step S222 to the smart key 2B.

[0125] Thereafter, control unit 20B repeatedly executes the processes of steps S221 and S222.

[0126] In the vehicle system 1B of the present embodiment, the smart key 2B and the associated device 19B are provided separately, so that the smart key 2A does not need to be provided with a function for transmitting the camouflage signal S2.

[0127] Therefore, the cost of the smart key 2A itself can be reduced. Furthermore, even when changing and maintaining the vehicle 3, the associated device 19B can be continued to be used as is, thereby reducing costs.

[0128] <4. Modifications> In the above example, the number of the camouflage signal S2 is one, but the number of the camouflage signals S2a, S2b, S2c, S2d, etc. may be two or more. Each of the camouflage signals S2a, S2b, S2c, S2d, etc. is a signal including different second key identification information Kid2a, Kid2b, Kid2c, Kid2d, etc. It is preferable that the second key identification information Kid2a, Kid2b, Kid2c, Kid2d, etc. included in each of the camouflage signals S2a, S2b, S2c, S2d, etc. is an identification information for which no corresponding vehicle 3 exists.

[0129] In the above-described examples, a transmitting section is provided for each signal to be transmitted, but it is also possible to provide a single transmitting section that outputs a composite signal obtained by combining the respective signals.

[0130] Furthermore, the timing for starting transmission of the camouflage signal S2 may be set to after the doors of the vehicle 3 are locked. In other words, by not starting transmission of the camouflage signal S2 before the doors are locked, it is possible to reduce power consumption related to the transmission process, and it is possible to realize long-term operation of the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) and the associated device 19 (19B). Furthermore, by reducing power consumption, it is possible to reduce the capacity of the battery to be installed, and the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) and the associated device 19 (19B) can be made smaller.

[0131] When the unlocking operation button 6 or the locking operation button 7 of the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) is pressed, a signal different from the normal signal S1 or the fake signal S2 may be transmitted at the first frequency f1. In this case, the received radio wave intensity of the first frequency f1 may also become stronger, and the control unit 4 (4A, 4B) may control the first transmission unit 9 to stop transmitting the normal signal S1. At this time, in the vehicle 3, door unlocking control and door locking control are executed in response to the reception of the unlock signal and lock signal, so no problem occurs even if the transmission of the regular signal S1 is stopped. Furthermore, by stopping the transmission of the normal signal S1 even for a certain period of time, the power consumption of the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) can be reduced.

[0132] It is also possible to configure so that while the unlocking operation button 6 or the locking operation button 7 is being pressed, the normal signal S1 is not stopped even if the received radio wave intensity for the first frequency f1 increases.

[0133] In each of the above-described examples, the control unit 4 (4A, 4B) performs a process of stopping the normal signal S1 in step S104 in Fig. 3. However, the control unit 4 (4A, 4B) may perform a control to weaken the normal signal S1 or a control to strengthen the fake signal S2. This makes it possible to disable the doors from being unlocked or the engine from being started, or to buy time.

[0134] Further, although the vehicle systems 1 (1A, 1B) each have a function of transmitting the false signal S2, the embodiment of the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the vehicle system 1 (1A, 1B) may only have a function to transmit a normal signal S1, a function to measure the received radio wave strength of the first frequency f1, a function to determine whether the received radio wave strength is high or not, and a function to stop transmitting the normal signal S1 based on the comparison result.

[0135] However, by transmitting the false signal S2 together with the genuine signal S1, it is possible to prolong the time it takes to unlock the door in a relay attack. This makes it possible to buy time before the transmission of the genuine signal S1 stops, making it possible to stop the transmission of the genuine signal S1 before the door is unlocked, or to create a situation in which only the false signal S2 is being transmitted when the engine is started after the door is unlocked.

[0136] As an example different from the above-mentioned examples, the vehicle 3 can be configured to constantly transmit radio waves of the first frequency f1, and the smart key can send a reply when it enters a range where it can receive radio waves from the vehicle 3.

[0137] Specifically, a threshold value can be set based on the strength of the received radio waves when the smart key properly receives radio waves emitted from the vehicle 3, and the system can be configured so that the normal signal S1 is not transmitted (i.e., transmission is stopped) when the strength of the received radio waves for the first frequency f1 is equal to or greater than the threshold value. At this time, the disguise signal S2 may be transmitted, or the disguise signal S2 may not be transmitted.

[0138] <5. Summary> As described in each of the above examples, the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) as an information processing device includes a first transmission unit 9 that is linked to a specific vehicle (the vehicle 3 corresponding to the smart key 2, 2A, 2B) by radio waves of a specific frequency (first frequency f1) and transmits first key identification information Kid1, one or more processors (control units 4, 4A, 4B), and a storage medium (memory unit 5, 5A) in which a program executed by the one or more processors is stored, the program including one or more instructions, and the one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to execute a process of stopping the transmission of the first key identification information Kid1 by the first transmission unit 9 when it is determined that the radio wave strength of the specific frequency (first frequency f1) has increased. This allows the amplification of radio waves due to a relay attack or the like to be detected and the transmission of the regular signal S1 to be stopped. Therefore, in a relay attack, it becomes impossible to unlock the doors of the vehicle 3 or start the engine, making it possible to prevent theft of the vehicle 3.

[0139] As described in the first and second embodiments, the smart key 2 (2A) as an information processing device includes a receiver 11 that receives radio waves of a predetermined frequency (first frequency f1), and one or more instructions may cause one or more processors (control units 4, 4A) to execute a process (step S102) of measuring the reception strength of the radio waves of the predetermined frequency (first frequency f1) at the receiver 11. That is, the receiver 11 may be provided inside the housing of the smart key 2 (2A). This makes it possible to obtain the received radio wave intensity without using wireless communication, and to quickly stop the transmission of the regular signal S1. This makes it more difficult to steal the vehicle 3.

[0140] As described in the first embodiment, etc., the smart key 2 as an information processing device may be provided with a second transmission unit 10 that transmits second key identification information Kid2 that is not linked to a specific vehicle (the vehicle 3 corresponding to the smart key 2) via radio waves of a specific frequency (first frequency f1). Since the smart key 2 is capable of transmitting a false signal S2 along with the normal signal S1, the processing time of the authentication process on the vehicle 3 side, which is performed in response to receiving radio waves of the first frequency f1, can be extended. This makes it possible to buy time before the transmission of the genuine signal S1 stops, making it possible to stop the transmission of the genuine signal S1 before the door is unlocked, or to create a situation in which only the false signal S2 is being transmitted when the engine is started after the door is unlocked.

[0141] As described in each embodiment, in the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) as an information processing device, one or more instructions may cause one or more processors (control units 4, 4A, 4B) to execute a process (step S104) of stopping the transmission of the first key identification information Kid1 when it is determined that the radio wave strength of a predetermined frequency (first frequency f1) has increased by comparing the measured radio wave strength with a threshold. This makes it possible to prevent theft of the vehicle 3 through simple processing that places a small processing burden.

[0142] As described in each embodiment, in the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) as an information processing device, one or more instructions may cause one or more processors (control units 4, 4A, 4B) to execute a process (step S104) of stopping the transmission of the first key identification information Kid1 when it is determined that the radio wave strength of a predetermined frequency (first frequency f1) has increased by comparing the most recently measured radio wave strength with the radio wave strength measured a predetermined time ago. As a result, even if the transmission output of the regular signal S1 changes due to, for example, deterioration of the smart key 2 (2A, 2B) over time, it becomes possible to properly detect radio wave amplification due to a relay attack, thereby making it possible to prevent theft of the vehicle 3.

[0143] The program of the present invention is a program stored in a storage medium (memory unit 5, 5A) and executed by one or more processors (control units 4, 4A, 4B), which executes the following processes: transmitting first key identification information Kid1 linked to a specific vehicle (vehicle 3 corresponding to the smart key 2, 2A, 2B) via radio waves of a specific frequency (first frequency f1); and stopping the transmission of the first key identification information Kid1 when it is determined that the radio wave strength of the specific frequency has increased.

[0144] In addition, the information processing method of the present invention is an information processing method executed by a smart key 2 (2A, 2B) as an information processing device, and includes a process of transmitting first key identification information Kid1 linked to a specific vehicle (vehicle 3 corresponding to the smart key 2, 2A, 2B) by radio waves of a specific frequency (first frequency f1), and a process of stopping the transmission of the first key identification information Kid1 when it is determined that the radio wave strength of the specific frequency has increased.

[0145] Such a program and information processing method can provide the various functions and effects described above. [Explanation of symbols]

[0146] 2, 2A, 2B Smart key (information processing device) 4, 4A, 4B Control unit (processor) 5, 5A Storage section (storage medium) 9 First Transmission Unit 10, 10A, 10B Second transmitter 11, 11B Receiver Kid1 First key identifier Kid2 Second key identifier f1 First frequency (predetermined frequency)

Claims

1. a first transmission unit that transmits first key identification information associated with a specific vehicle by radio waves of a specific frequency; one or more processors; A storage medium storing a program executed by the one or more processors, The program includes one or more instructions, The one or more instructions may be for the one or more processors to: When it is determined that the radio wave intensity of the predetermined frequency has increased, a process of stopping the transmission of the first key identification information by the first transmission unit is executed. Information processing device.

2. a receiving unit for receiving radio waves of the predetermined frequency, The one or more instructions cause the one or more processors to execute a process of measuring a reception strength of a radio wave having the predetermined frequency in the receiving unit. The information processing device according to claim 1 .

3. and a second transmission unit that transmits second key identification information that is not associated with the specified vehicle by radio waves of the specified frequency. The information processing device according to claim 1 .

4. The one or more instructions may be for the one or more processors to: When it is determined that the radio wave intensity of the predetermined frequency has increased by comparing the measured radio wave intensity with a threshold value, a process of stopping transmission of the first key identification information is executed.

4. The information processing device according to claim 1.

5. The one or more instructions may be for the one or more processors to: When it is determined that the radio wave intensity of the predetermined frequency has increased by comparing the latest measured radio wave intensity with the radio wave intensity measured a predetermined time ago, a process of stopping transmission of the first key identification information is executed.

4. The information processing device according to claim 1.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Antitheft device

    JP2017223019A