Light-triggered transponder

Abstract

To provide a method for securing an object.SOLUTION: A method for securing an object includes: embedding at least two micro transponders (MTPs) into a taggant, a plurality of taggants, a packaging, or the object, or a combination thereof to generate at least one legitimate matched pair, the MTPs each being configured with respective identifiers; indexing the respective identifiers of the MTPs to the object; storing indexing information associated with the MTPs and the object in a database of a digital security system; reading the respective identifiers via an identifier reader; and verifying, on the basis of the reading, the indexing information to determine whether the respective identifiers are associated to the legitimate matched pair.SELECTED DRAWING: None

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001]

[0001] The present disclosure relates to an optimized optically triggered transponder. [Background technology]

[0002] As described in U.S. Patent No. 7,098,394, very small optically triggered transponders (MTPs) are available for providing identifiers, for example, as identifiers used in conjunction with nucleic acid assays. These have been proven stable under physiological conditions. Therefore, they can be used as implantable tagging devices for animals, as described in more detail in U.S. Patent No. 8,353,917. MTPs can provide output signals as RF or optical (U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018 / 0091224). Such MTPs are available as p-Chip® transponders from PharmaSeq, Inc., Monmouth Junction, NJ.

[0003]

[0003] Optical MTPs are triggered by a narrowly focused light beam that can be pulsed to provide the data clock used by the MTP. Conventional MTPs can be equipped with a photodiode to acquire clock pulses from the modulated light beam. When the light is on, photogenerated charge is collected, charging the photodiode junction capacitor and resulting in a voltage rise across the capacitor. When the light is turned off, the voltage across the photodiode capacitor drops as the charge is discharged through a parallel-connected resistor. The value of this resistor sets the RC time constant of the rising and falling edges of the pulse at the front end of the clock recovery circuit. If the resistance is too high, the length of time required to discharge flooding charges in the photodiode area during high illumination conditions can cause clock bit loss. If the resistance is too low, small amounts of photogenerated charge during very low illumination conditions can make it difficult to charge the photodiode capacitor. Furthermore, these charges are rapidly lost through the resistor, resulting in clock failure. Therefore, there is a need, among other things, for an improved optical transponder clock recovery circuit. Summary of the Invention

[0004] According to some embodiments of the present disclosure, an optically triggered transponder is provided that includes a clock recovery circuit optimized to facilitate MTP signal transmission and enhanced MTP ID reading.

[0005]

[0005] In some embodiments, the optically triggered transponder may include a reverse antenna system that provides accurate MTP signal transmission and processing and may be configured to connect to an MTP ID reader with a greater read distance and simpler processing.

[0006] In some embodiments, the light-triggered transponder may be included in a security inlay to establish the bona fides of an item. For example, the security inlay may be used to verify high-value items and / or items for which food safety, fair trade, and sustainability claims have commercial value (e.g., lettuce, coffee beans, etc.). However, the security inlay is not limited to use with any particular item or class of items. The security inlay may include: (a) a bottom inlay segment; (b) a top inlay segment configured to fit into or be placed on top of the bottom inlay segment; and (c) a light-triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side positioned between the two inlay segments, the bottom side being glued to the bottom inlay segment and the top side being glued to the top inlay segment, the security inlay configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the light-triggered transponder so that it cannot be read.

[0007] In some embodiments, optically triggered transponders can be configured with durable self-destruct capabilities to provide a super anchor for object authentication, object tracing and tracking.

[0008] In some embodiments, one or more super anchors may be utilized in conjunction with various objects to implement smart paper contracts and improve document security.

[0009]

[0009] In some embodiments, one or more super anchors may be integrated with blockchain technology to generate secure document smart contracts.

[0010]

[0010] It is to be understood that the present disclosure is not limited in its application to the details and arrangements of construction set forth in the following description or illustrated in the drawings. The present disclosure is capable of embodiments in addition to those described and of being practiced and carried out in various ways. Also, it is to be understood that the phraseology and terminology employed herein and in the abstract are for the purpose of description and should not be regarded as limiting.

[0011] It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are explanatory only and are not limitations on the claimed subject matter.

[0012]

[0012] Various objects, features, and advantages of the disclosed subject matter can be more fully appreciated by reference to the following detailed description of the disclosed subject matter when considered in conjunction with the following drawings, in which like reference numerals identify like elements. [Brief explanation of the drawings]

[0013] [Figure 1]

[0013] FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of the operation of an MTP sensor system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 2]

[0014] 1 illustrates a schematic diagram of an exemplary MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 3]

[0015] 1 illustrates a side view representation of an exemplary MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 4]

[0016] 1 is a top view representation of an illustrative MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 5]

[0017] 1 illustrates a functional block diagram of an exemplary MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 6]

[0018] 1 illustrates a schematic diagram of a clock recovery circuit according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 7]

[0019] 1 illustrates a cross-sectional view of a photoconductor according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 8]

[0020] 7 illustrates a timing diagram of voltage signals and light intensity at each node of FIG. 6 according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 9]

[0021] 1 illustrates a functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 10A]

[0022] 1 illustrates, in simplified form, how a string is transmitted under prior art systems. [Figure 10B]

[0023] 1 illustrates, in simplified form, how a string of characters is transmitted under a reverse antenna system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 11A]

[0024] 1 shows one illustrative diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 11B]

[0025] 10 shows another illustrative diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 12]

[0026] 1 illustrates a security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 13]

[0027] 1A and 1B are cross-sectional views of an example security inlay according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 14]

[0028] 1 shows a close-up view of an example security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 15]

[0029] 1 is a flowchart illustrating an example process configured to utilize an optically triggered transponder with durable self-destruct capability according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 16]

[0030] 1 illustrates a diagram of a process for implementing a smart paper contract according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 17]

[0031] FIG. 1 illustrates an example system diagram for generating secure document smart contracts using blockchain integration according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0014]

[0032] It is to be understood that the disclosed subject matter is not limited in its application to the details of construction and the arrangement of components set forth in the following description or illustrated in the drawings. The disclosed subject matter is capable of other embodiments and of being practiced and carried out in various ways. It is also to be understood that the phraseology and terminology used herein is for the purpose of description and should not be regarded as limiting. Those skilled in the art will therefore appreciate that the conception upon which the disclosure is based may readily be utilized as a basis for the designing of other structures, methods, and systems for carrying out the several purposes of the disclosed subject matter. The claims, therefore, should be regarded as including such equivalent constructions insofar as they do not depart from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0015]

[0033] While the disclosed subject matter has been described and illustrated in the foregoing exemplary embodiments, it will be understood that the disclosure has been made by way of example only, and that numerous changes in the details of implementation of the disclosed subject matter can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0016]

[0034] FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of an optical microtransponder (MTP) sensor system 100 (“system 100”) according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. System 100 includes an MTP reader 102 and an MTP 104. In some embodiments, the MTP 104 is bonded or adhered to an object via an adhesive to act as an identifier for the object. The MTP 104 may be adhered to, embedded within, or otherwise attached to an object 110, which may be any object requiring individual, unique identification (ID) data, such as a microscope slide, a test animal or insect, clothing, or an electronic component. A close-up view of the MTP 104 is shown in the breakout shown in FIG. 1 to illustrate the OTMP components of the substrate 160, optical element 150, and optical communication circuitry 155. The height of the MTP 104 may be, for example, approximately 20 μm to 60 μm and may depend on the number of stacked layers and sensors for a particular MTP 104. The MTP 104 may be an integrated circuit that may typically reside in a persistent, dormant, unpowered state until it is powered on when illuminated with an excitation beam 132 from the MTP reader 102. Upon illumination, the MTP 104 may power on (typically instantaneously, e.g., in much less than one second) and transmit a data beam 133 to the MTP reader 102 via light or RF. The data beam 133 may be radiation (e.g., from a light-emitting diode (LED)) in some embodiments and a reflection / absorption mechanism (e.g., shuttering through an LCD) in other embodiments. In alternative embodiments, the MTP 104 receives a separate stimulus, such as a code modulated onto the excitation beam 132, that initiates transmission of sensor data. Alternatively, receiving data from an internal sensor or a linked sensor triggers transmission of the data beam 133. Some embodiments of the system 100 may include an on-board power source, such as a battery, and / or one or more subsystems powered by an on-board power source. Such subsystems may include, but are not limited to, volatile memory that may be sustained by battery power, one or more sensors in addition to the light element 150, and / or other features.

[0017]

[0035] In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 is a visible focused light or laser beam, and the data beam 133 is an infrared light beam radiation (e.g., from an infrared light emitting diode). The data beam 133 may include a signal that identifies the particular MTP 104 to the MTP reader 102, for example, using a unique identification number for the particular MTP 104. Using the unique identification, the MTP reader 102 may transmit data to a computer (not shown) to uniquely identify the object 110. In some embodiments, a user operates the MTP reader 102 to illuminate the MTP 104 with light or other electromagnetic signals, which causes the MTP 104 to transmit the data beam 133 via the light or other electromagnetic signals. For example, in some embodiments, the range of the electromagnetic spectrum used by the MTP 104 for this signaling may include one or more subsets of the sub-terahertz portion of the spectrum, including infrared and longer wavelengths. The data beam 133 is then received by the MTP reader 102. MTP reader 102 can then decode data beam 133 carrying the identification data to positively identify object 110 .

[0018]

[0036] A "laser" is defined herein as a coherent, directional light, which may be visible light. Light sources include light from communication light-emitting diodes (LEDs), solid-state lasers, semiconductor lasers, etc. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may comprise visible laser light (e.g., 660 nm wavelength). In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 during operation may illuminate an area larger than the area occupied by the MTP 104, thereby allowing a user to easily locate and read the MTP 104. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may comprise light of other wavelengths in the visible and / or invisible spectrum necessary to provide sufficient power generation using the photocell of the MTP 104. The data beam 133 may be emitted at a different wavelength than the excitation beam 132. For example, the data beam 133 may be IR light at 1300 nm, and the excitation beam is red light at 660 nm. However, other wavelengths, such as the near-infrared (NIR) band, may be used for optical communication, and alternative embodiments may use other communication techniques, such as reflective signaling methods, to return modulated data signals to the MTP reader 102. In some alternative embodiments, the OTMP 104 is a micro-transponder (MTP) that includes an antenna (e.g., an integrated antenna) for communicating ID information to a corresponding reader via radio waves rather than light-based signals.

[0019]

[0037] The clock recovery circuit 106 may extract a clock pulse signal from the received modulated optical beam, as described in further detail below with respect to Figures 6-8. In one embodiment, the light in the pump beam 132 is amplitude modulated (e.g., pulsed) at approximately 1 MHz to provide a data clock that may be used by the MTP 104, for example, to provide operating clock pulses for the transmitted ID data bits. The timing of the pulses may be set so that the duty cycle and average power level are within the requirements for registration as a Class 3R laser device.

[0020]

[0038] An exemplary MTP, such as a p-Chip, may be a monolithic (single-element) integrated circuit (e.g., 600 μm×600 μm×100 μm) capable of transmitting its identification code via radio frequency (RF). FIG. 2 illustrates a schematic diagram of an exemplary MTP according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. The MTP may include photocells (202a, 202b, 202c, 202d), a clock recovery circuit 206 (e.g., a clock signal extraction circuit), a logic state machine 204, a loop antenna 210, and a 64-bit memory (not shown) that supports, for example, over 1.1 billion possible ID codes. The photocells, when illuminated by a pulsed laser, may provide power to the electronics on the chip with approximately 10% efficiency. The chip may transmit its ID through a modulated current in the antenna 210. The varying magnetic field around the chip may be received by a nearby coil in the reader, and the signal may be digitized, analyzed, and decoded. p-Chips can be fabricated on silicon wafers in foundries using CMOS processes similar to those used in the manufacture of memory chips and computer processors. The wafers can undergo post-fabrication processing, including laser coding, passivation, thinning, and dicing, to obtain individual p-Chips. The p-Chip surface can be made of silicon dioxide, which is deposited as a final passivation layer.

[0021]

[0039] FIG. 3 illustrates a side view representation of an exemplary MTP 104 in accordance with at least one embodiment of the present invention. The MTP 104 may comprise a stack of individual integrated circuit layers 300, 302, 304, 306, and 308. Layer 302 may support protective and passivation layers. Layer 304 may comprise logic circuits, clock circuits, sensor circuits, and transmitter circuits. Layers 306 and 308 may comprise reservoir capacitors, and 300 is a substrate. Those skilled in the art will recognize that the functionality of the MTP 104 can be organized into other configurations of layers. For example, the stacking may comprise uniformly stacked layers of different thicknesses, such as may be fabricated in a 3D IC process known in the art.

[0022]

[0040] MTP 104 can be fabricated using mixed-signal fabrication techniques typically used to create sensor electronics or analog-to-digital converters that include both analog and digital devices. In an illustrative embodiment, each layer is approximately 12 μm thick and measures 100 μm×100 μm. In one embodiment, MTP 104 measures 100×100×50 μm. Alternative embodiments may use more or fewer layers, depending, for example, on the sensor application.

[0023]

[0041] FIG. 4 illustrates a top view representation of an exemplary MTP 104. The diagram depicted in FIG. 4 is of the top layer 302 of FIG. 3. In one embodiment, a transmissive element such as an LED array 400 is provided on top of layer 302, surrounding the periphery of MTP 104. In other embodiments, the LED array may be implemented as a single LED (shown in phantom as LED 420) in the center of 410, or as other topographies for directional light emission. The arrangement of LED array 400 illustrates an example embodiment that emphasizes light generation. Alternative embodiments may include various topographical layouts advantageous for power harvesting, sensor data capture, etc. In some embodiments, the LEDs may include focusing lenses or other optics.

[0024]

[0042] Centrally located on the top layer 302 is an array 401 of photocells 402, 404, 406, and photoconductor 408. As illustrated, each photocell in the array 401 can be physically sized to create power for a specific circuit within the MTP 104, and one can be dedicated to clock / carrier signal extraction as described below with respect to FIG. 4. Photocell 402, which has the largest area, generates a voltage Vdd (a negative voltage, Vneg in some embodiments) to operate an output transistor 416 to drive an electron emission transmitter (implemented in some embodiments as an LED in the optical communication circuit 155). Photocell 404 generates a positive voltage for the logic / sensor circuit 410, and photocell 406 generates a negative voltage Vneg for the logic / sensor circuit block 410. Photoconductor 408 is used, for example, to extract clock pulses to operate the logic / sensor circuit 410. As illustrated, the power cell is coupled to a capacitor, for example in layer 306 or 308, to store energy generated by the photocell when illuminated by laser light. In some embodiments, the energy extracted from the clock photoconductor 408 is applied to a differentiator (described below with respect to FIG. 6), which extracts clock edges that are amplified and used to provide timing signals to logic and sensing circuits. As illustrated, a plurality of identification fuses 418 are located on surface 414. By opening selected ones of these fuses, the MTP 104 is provided with a range of unique identification codes that exceeds the default base page of code values ​​that may be hard-coded into the chip logic. In alternative embodiments, the ID values ​​may be electronically coded using electronic antifuse technology. Furthermore, some embodiments include electronic memory for data, signal processing, and identification storage.

[0025]

[0043] 5 illustrates a functional block diagram of an exemplary MTP 104 in accordance with at least one embodiment of the present invention. The MTP 104 may include a photoelectric element 150, an energy storage 504, a clock / carrier extraction network 506 (i.e., clock recovery circuit 106), a sensor 508, logic 510, a transmit switching circuit 512, and a transmit device 155, such as an IR LED 155. The photoelectric element 150 may include a clock extraction photoconductor 408, energy harvesting photocell arrays 404, 406, and dedicated photocells, such as a transmit photocell 402. The energy harvesting photocell arrays 404 and 406 may be coupled to the energy storage 504 and may include photovoltaic cells that convert light energy from illumination into electrical current.

[0026]

[0044] A clock photoconductor 408, which is part of the clock recovery circuit and can be physically located differently from the recovery circuit, can detect a clock pulse signal for the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506. In some embodiments, the energy storage 504 is a plurality of capacitors, with at least one capacitor coupled to a photocell in the photocell arrays 404, 406. The energy stored in the energy storage unit 504 can be coupled to an electronic circuit. As the laser light is pulsed, energy from the laser can accumulate and the MTP 104 can operate on the stored energy. Unlike the photocell arrays 404 and 406, in some embodiments, the energy of the photocell 402 is not stored, and the transmitter switching circuit 512 can “dump” all of that energy to the transmit element 155 via the output transistor 416. Once the received laser pulse energy is extracted by the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506, a logical state machine (i.e., logic 510) can form a data packet comprising ID bits and sensor data and provide them to the transmit data switch 512 for formation of an optical transmit signal. The logic 510 can directly combine the sensor signal and ID signal(s) into a composite data frame of an OOK (on-off modulated) emitter. The modulation symbols can be applied to the transmitter 512 and transmitted with each pulse of energy.

[0027]

[0045] If present, the sensor(s) 508 may comprise one or more sensors for measuring, for example, biological cells or physiological properties. Any analog data from the sensor(s) 508 may be converted to a pulse-width modulated signal or other binary signaling method that encodes the analog quantity in the time domain in a manner suitable for pulsing an IR light-emitting diode for direct transmission to the MTP reader 102, without requiring conventional power- and area-intensive analog-to-digital conversion techniques. Illustrative sensors include, but are not limited to, a dielectric sensor, a proportional to absolute temperature (PTAT) sensor, a pH sensor, an oxidation-reduction potential sensor, and / or an optical sensor.

[0028]

[0046] Clock Recovery Circuit

[0029]

[0047] 6 is a schematic diagram of a clock recovery circuit 506 in accordance with one or more embodiments of the present invention. The clock recovery circuit 506 may include a photoconductor 602 (shown in detail in FIG. 6) having a resistance R1 that varies with received light intensity, a reference resistor 604 having a fixed resistance R2, an amplifier 606, and an inverter 608. A source terminal of the photoconductor 602 is coupled to a first terminal of the resistor 604 at node A. Node A is coupled to an input of the amplifier 606, and an output of the amplifier 606 is coupled to an inverter 608 that generates a recovered clock signal at its output.

[0030]

[0048] The series combination of photoconductor 602 and resistor 604 forms a voltage divider R coupled between voltage VDD and ground. Specifically, in this embodiment, the drain terminal of photoconductor 602 is coupled to voltage VDD from energy storage 504, which maintains the voltage when illumination is off, and the second terminal of resistor 604 is coupled to ground. Because resistance R1 of photoconductor 602 varies with received light intensity and the voltage at node A is determined by the ratio of resistances R1 and R2, a modulated light input incident on photoconductor 602 produces a modulated voltage signal at the input of amplifier 606.

[0031]

[0049] In some embodiments, a coupling capacitor 610 is added before the amplifier 606. The voltage divider R and the coupling capacitor 610 form a differentiator that can extract clock edges when the modulating frequency is low, on the order of a few kilohertz (approximately 1 MHz or higher, which may not be necessary). An inverter 608 digitizes the analog output of the amplifier 606, resulting in an example digital waveform as shown in FIG. 8. FIG. 8 illustrates a timing diagram of the optical intensity and voltage signals at each node of the clock recovery circuit 506 with coupling capacitors of FIG. 6.

[0032]

[0050] FIG. 7 illustrates a cross-sectional view of an exemplary photoconductor 602 according to some embodiments of the present invention. In some embodiments, the size of the photoconductor 602 can be 5 μm by 5 μm or larger. As illustrated in FIG. 6, the photoconductor 602 can use a long-channel n-MOSFET in an isolated deep n-well bucket. The n-well and deep n-well (Dn-well) can completely encapsulate the p-well in the p-substrate and the transistor components, i.e., the source, drain, and gate, confined in the bucket. A gate layer made of, for example, polysilicon material can be disposed on an insulating layer such as silicon dioxide (SiO2). The polysilicon material spectrally absorbs shorter wavelengths of light, such as blue light, but passes longer wavelengths, such as red light. When using an excitation beam 132 with a longer wavelength, such as a red light beam, the polysilicon material filters out shorter wavelengths and passes longer wavelengths. Therefore, it suppresses shorter wavelengths. For example, a room light (e.g., a fluorescent light) flickering at a 60 Hz rate may generate some interference or noise with more of the spectrum in the shorter wavelength (blue wavelength) range, and the polysilicon material effectively blocks the flickering from the room light and allows only the desired energy beam (e.g., red light) to pass through.

[0033]

[0051] Furthermore, the photoconductor 602 (which may also be called a photoresistor) allows the clock recovery circuit 106 to function under both low and high illumination conditions, in contrast to photodiode-based clock recovery circuits. For example, under sufficiently high illumination, excess flooding charge in the photodiode cannot be sufficiently discharged, resulting in malfunction of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit. In contrast, the photoconductor 602 can be operated in current mode and may be less affected by high-illumination flooding phenomena because photocharge is constantly drained by the electric field in the photoconductor 602. In addition, the deep n-well bucket of the photoconductor 602 is isolated such that the n-well physically forms a potential barrier that prevents charge generated outside of this bucket from entering the bucket, ensuring that only photons reaching the inside of the bucket can contribute to the conductivity of the photoresistor 602. Therefore, excess photo-generated charge during high illumination, which could result in malfunction of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit, is suppressed in the clock recovery circuit 106.

[0034]

[0052] Additionally, this FET device can have a very small physical footprint. The inverter 608 can comprise a static CMOS inverter device, comprising NMOS and PMOS transistors, with two states: high or low. When the inverter input is above a reference voltage, it is considered high; when it is below the reference voltage, it is considered low; and the output is then inverted. The static CMOS inverter can also function as an analog amplifier because it has sufficiently high gain in its narrow transition region to amplify the signal, allowing the clock recovery circuit 506 to have a very small footprint. In cases where the extracted clock pulse is very low, the amplification by the amplifier 606 may not be sufficient to reach the threshold voltage for inverting the logic state; in these cases, the inverter 608 can further increase the overall amplification to reach that threshold.

[0035]

[0053] The clock recovery system can be applied to MTPs that output signals at RF and MTPs that output signals optically (e.g., via an LED), such as those described in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14 / 631,321, filed Feb. 25, 2015.

[0036]

[0054] Reverse Antenna System

[0037]

[0055] Each p-Chip can have a unique serial number or identifier (ID) programmed into it. The p-Chips can be read by an MTP reader (e.g., a wand) without duplicate IDs. The MTP reader can be a handheld device connected to a standard Windows PC, laptop, or tablet used to read MTPs, and can read the serial number or ID of each individual p-Chip.

[0038]

[0056] FIG. 9 illustrates a functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in FIG. 9, the exemplary MTP ID reader may be USB-powered and may include a USB 2.0 transceiver microcontroller, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a power converter and regulator, a laser diode with a programmable current driver, an optical collimation / focusing module, and a tuned air-coil pickup with a high-gain, low-noise differential RF receiver. The laser, for example, emits an average of 60 mW of optical power modulated at 1 MHz at a 658 nm wavelength when reading a p-Chip identifier (ID). The ID is read when the p-Chip is placed within appropriate proximity (e.g., <10 mm) from the reader. The p-Chip-generated waveform is compared to a data clock (laser modulation) used to synchronize the transmitted ID data bits. The resulting ID readout from the p-Chip is rapid (<0.01 seconds) and reported on a PC or tablet. An MTP ID reader may be able to read the p-Chip under difficult conditions, such as through a sheet of white paper, blue glass (approximately 1 mm thick), or a sheet of clear plastic laminate. Other MTP readers are being developed (e.g., instruments for reading IDs with p-Chips in fluids). Another version may be a battery-powered Bluetooth reader that can be used with a PC or cell phone.

[0039]

[0057] Some embodiments may provide an efficient means of increasing the signal strength emitted by these small MTPs. p-Chip data may be transmitted using data coding that results in one-third to two-thirds of the transmitted bits having a value of 1. The average for all IDs may be half the data having a value of 1. A "1" digital signal is transmitted, for example, with the laser on, and a "0" digital signal is transmitted with the laser off (energy stored in a photocell provides the small amount of energy transmitted). The signal power tracks the ratio of 1s to 0s in the data. Some embodiments may transmit the same "1" digital signal currently being transmitted, but the "0" digital signal is transmitted with the laser on and current flowing in the opposite direction to that for the "1" digital signal. This results in all IDs being transmitted at the same power. Data may be transmitted when the laser is on. This may result in twice the power in the transmitted signal (on average, 6 dB more signal at the receiver). The method may result in easier signal processing and easier distinction between 1s and 0s. This can lead to MTP ID readers with greater reading distances and simpler processing.

[0040]

[0058] For example, the p-Chip® MTP can be queried using a light that flashes at 1 Mhz with a 50% duty cycle. This can be accomplished using a laser or focused LED, etc.

[0041]

[0059] FIG. 10A illustrates, in simplified form, how the string "1101" is transmitted under the older system, and FIG. 10B illustrates, in simplified form, how the string "1101" is transmitted under the reverse antenna system described herein. For each off / on cycle, such as c1, c2, c3, or c4 in FIGS. 10A-10B, the MTP ID reader looks for a radio signal identifying a "1" digital signal or a "0" digital signal transmission. As shown in simplified form, for the first exemplary MTP output in FIG. 10A, illustrating a prior art system, a "0" is transmitted when the light source is off. However, the photocell capacitance used to transmit the "0" is limited. In effect, this limited signal represents a "0." The limited energy available for the "0" means that the signal-to-noise ratio in the MTP reader is limited by the SNR for the "0." This means that, in principle, a "1" can be read at a significantly longer distance, but the MTP signal may only be read at a shorter distance than is available for the "0" component of the signal. Provided herein is a method that includes reversing the direction of current in the RF output antenna to transmit a "0" digital signal, such that substantially the same current is used for a "1" digital signal and a "0" digital signal (see FIG. 10B). In some embodiments different from FIG. 10B, any given bit ("1" or "0") or digital signal in the p-Chip® MTP may be transmitted within eight consecutive optical cycles.

[0042]

[0060] One means of reversing the antenna current is to use a switching circuit such as an H-bridge. Figure 11A shows an illustrative diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 11A, the antenna 10 is connected to a voltage source V in and H-bridge 20. Selectively closing switches S1 and S4 can direct current through antenna 10 in the direction shown by the arrow. Selectively closing switches S2 and S3 can direct current through antenna 10 in the opposite direction.

[0043]

[0061] FIG. 11B shows another illustrative diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Another means of reversing antenna current is to use two switches, such as S1A and S2A in FIG. 11B, and two antennas (e.g., 10A, 10B). Selectively closing switch S1A can direct current through antenna 10A in one direction, as indicated by the arrow. Selectively closing switch S2A can direct current through antenna 10B in the opposite direction. When S1 is selectively closed, current travels in direction D1. When S2A is selectively closed, current travels in direction D2, opposite direction D1. The antennas may be formed in separate metal layers or on the same layer. Only one FET (S1A or S2A) may be closed at any given time. When either FET is turned on, reverse current may be coupled to the other antenna. The body diode of the off FET may provide a current path for the coupled signal.

[0044]

[0062] In some embodiments, the antenna options described herein may be achieved in a monolithic integrated circuit, which may be approximately 2 mm by 2 mm by 0.2 mm thick or smaller in size.

[0045]

[0063] In some embodiments, signal strength for an MTP incorporating the two-phase transmission described above increases by approximately 6 dB. This will increase the reliable read distance of an MTP reader. In some embodiments, the number of cycles involved in transmitting one bit is eight data periods. Each laser cycle is one data period. Each time the number of data periods doubles, there is a 3 dB signal processing gain. Eight data periods is three doublings (2, 4, 8). This results in a 9 dB signal processing gain. By increasing from 8 to 64 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64) or 128 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128), the signal processing gain can increase from 9 dB to 18 dB (for 64 repetitions) or 21 dB (for 128 repetitions). When using a 1 MHz laser, a current p-Chip using 8 repetitions for its 64 data cells can transmit IDs at a rate of 2,000 per second. By increasing the repetition rate to 128, the read rate can be reduced to 128 reads per second with a signal gain of 21 dB. This can result in an increased read distance. The laser rate can be increased or decreased (for example, within the range of 500 kHz to 5 MHz). The repetition rate can be controlled by selecting one of eight repetition rates (three additional memory bits).

[0046]

[0064] security inlay

[0047]

[0065] MTPs can also be used to implement security features. These can be RF signaling MTPs or optical signaling MTPs.

[0048]

[0066] Such a security feature is enhanced if the MTP cannot be removed from the secure object without destroying the MTP functionality. An illustrative object that may require such a security feature is a bottle of fine wine. Wine is used as an illustrative object herein to facilitate illustration and description of the structure and function of the security inlay, however, as noted above, security inlays are not limited to use with wine bottles. Provided herein are inlays that include an MTP that may be designed to destroy the MTP when a tape or foil seal is broken.

[0049]

[0067] In some embodiments, the light-triggered transponder may be utilized in a security inlay for security purposes. For example, the security inlay may provide a reliable method for authenticating wine. In the wine industry, the cork or stopper may be sealed with a capsule or foil designed to prevent the stopper from being removed without peeling the capsule. This provides a degree of security. However, for top-quality wines, obtaining equipment to duplicate the capsule may be valuable to the unscrupulous. Additional sealing waxes may be present, but these have the same drawbacks that increase the monetary value of counterfeits.

[0050]

[0068] An example security inlay may include: (a) a bottom inlay segment, (b) a top inlay segment configured to fit and be positioned within the bottom inlay segment, and (c) a light-triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side positioned between the two inlay segments, the bottom side glued to the bottom inlay segment and the top side glued to the top inlay segment. The security inlay is configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the light-triggered transponder so that it cannot be read.

[0051]

[0069] FIG. 12 illustrates a security inlay fitted to a wine bottle. As illustrated in FIG. 12, the inlay 10 is shown beneath the capsule 20 of a wine bottle 22. FIG. 13 is a cross-sectional view of an exemplary security inlay design according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in FIG. 13, the inlay 10 is composed of two sections, a top section 10A and a bottom section 10B, with an MTP 18 mounted between them. The sections can be made from clear or partially clear plastic by one of several techniques, such as heated plastic 3D printing, molding, or pressing. In some embodiments, a specially formulated MTP 18 that is mechanically fragile is used. For example, the structural integrity of the MTP can be reduced by a notch 12 on the back of the MTP or by thinning the MTP very thin (e.g., about 10 to about 30 microns). The MTP can be glued to the inlay to ensure breakage. The adhesive spot can be asymmetric, as illustrated, to ensure uneven force when the top inlay section is separated from the bottom inlay section. As shown in FIG. 13, one half of the MTP can be glued (glue 16) to the bottom inlay 10B and the other half can be glued to the top inlay 10A. Grooves can be made in both the top and bottom of the inlay to accommodate the glue. In one embodiment, as illustrated in FIG. 13, the bottom inlay segment has a bottom groove to accommodate glue that will adhere to the bottom side of the optically triggered transponder. The top inlay segment has a top groove to accommodate glue that will adhere to the top side of the optically triggered transponder.

[0052]

[0070] The two inlay halves can be held in place by a mechanical fit (including slight cuts and corresponding ridges) or a weaker element, such as a weak glue droplet appropriately placed around the perimeter of the inlay (between the halves). The inlay design ensures that when the two inlay halves are pulled apart (when the capsule is removed from the bottle), the MTP breaks and no longer functions electrically. If a would-be counterfeiter were to cut the capsule around the inlay, the glue 26 can be selected to resist solvent washout (e.g., by being polymerized). The glue 26 can also be applied in a neat pattern that can be visualized by the human eye or imaging equipment. The glue pattern can be on the weakest surface at the top, or both the top and bottom can have glue patterns. With such features, attempts to recycle the inlay would be visually detectable. At the same time, the inlay and inner MTP are mechanically stable and can be easily manipulated by hand or robot, as long as they are handled properly.

[0053]

[0071] FIG. 14 shows a close-up view of an example security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in FIG. 14, the inlay 10, which may resemble a thin button, may be glued to both the stopper / cork 24 and the capsule 20 with glue 26. If the bottled wine is original, the MTP ID can be read using, for example, a custom ID reader (e.g., a wand) or a mobile phone-based attachment, cover, or application. However, removal of the capsule from the bottle (before the wine bottle is opened) splits the inlay into two parts and, at the same time, permanently damages the MTP located inside the inlay 10. The MTP may no longer be read. From this, validation of the bottle of wine is no longer possible.

[0054]

[0072] The size of the inlay can be selected to cover all or most of the top surface of the stopper 24. In some embodiments, the inlay spans the opening of the wine bottle. A would-be counterfeiter may not be able to dig out the inlay without defeating the MTP. When the bottle is properly opened, the top 10A peels off along with the capsule. The bottom does not substantially interfere with use of the corkscrew. In some embodiments, the bottom is made thinner to further facilitate use of the corkscrew.

[0055]

[0073] The winemaker may receive the inlay from a specialized factory. The inlay may be glued to the cork and then glued to the capsule by the winemaker. The gluing may be done continuously, or the glue may be pre-placed on the top and bottom of the inlay. The glue may be cured by any number of mechanisms, including photopolymerization (as the inlay in some embodiments is at least translucent), chemical curing, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. A capsule may be pressed onto the inlay to ensure that the inlay is properly glued.

[0056]

[0074] Alternatively, the capsule manufacturer may pre-glue the inlay to the inside of the capsule. The winemaker may then glue the inside center of the capsule to the cork. This may be accomplished by having the inlay in the capsule pre-treated with glue (possibly protected with a removable plastic wrap). In this situation, the only thing the manufacturer would need to do to authenticate the wine is remove the wrap before placing the inlay capsule on the wine bottle.

[0057]

[0075] If the capsule is transparent, the MTP can be read immediately. If an opaque capsule is used, an opening can be made in it to read the MTP in the inlay. The opening can be small so that the inlay 10 can still be well glued to the capsule.

[0058]

[0076] In some embodiments, the capsule top comprises metal foil, except for a small window to allow interrogation by an MTP photodetector. The window may be covered with a clear plastic coating. In some embodiments, the capsule is a laminate of opaque and clear materials, with the opaque material missing at the window.

[0059]

[0077] In some embodiments, the MTP can be larger, possibly in one dimension, than those sold as p-Chip® transponders. This size can ensure good asymmetric adhesion to the top and bottom inlay portions. Authentication is possible along the entire chain of custody, from the winemaker through the distribution chain to the customer. At every step, reading the MTP ID can validate the authenticity of the wine.

[0060]

[0078] If required, a connection to a central wine database can be made over the Internet, and the MTP ID can be provided to the database and recorded therein together with a timestamp and the identity of the MTP reader device. From this, if appropriate arrangements are made, the data provider can maintain the history of the bottle of wine. If the end customer wants to check the authenticity of the wine, several approaches can be possible. First, the fact that the supplier can read the ID in the customer's presence provides reassurance. Second, the supplier can search the database and present the customer with the bottle's history. Third, the customer can enter the MTP ID and use an app on their smartphone to retrieve the bottle's history. Fourth, if the customer has their own ID reader, the customer can verify the information themselves.

[0061]

[0079] This provides a reliable method for authenticating wine or other objects. The disclosed security inlays can be resilient to manipulation involving the entire inlay, can be highly sensitive to separation of the halves, can be easily installed, and can be unobtrusive in most situations.

[0062]

[0080] While the present invention is illustrated with a wine bottle, it can be used with any container sealed with a capsule or tape, where an inlay containing a portion of the capsule or tape must be separated from the container. Such uses may include bottles containing pharmaceuticals, perfume bottles, or similar bottles. Other applications may include labels or other elements placed on or incorporated into plastic, metal, and / or composite materials, including CPG consumer goods. In the case of shipping boxes, the tape may be sufficiently adhesive that it cannot be removed without damaging the box substrate, e.g., cardboard. Similarly, the label may be sufficiently adhesive that it cannot be removed without damaging the label and / or the underlying container.

[0063]

[0081] If the wine bottle uses a screw-top closure, such as a Stelvin® closure, the security inlay may be attached to the bottle below the threads and on the side below the capsule. In some embodiments, the bottom of the inlay may have a curved bottom shape that fits the neck of the bottle. In some embodiments, the capsule may be glued to the wine neck in the area of ​​the security inlay.

[0064]

[0082] A capsule may refer to a tight-fitting metal or plastic foil that forms part of the closure of an object so that the object cannot be opened without breaking the capsule. A laminate is a bond, fusion, adhesion, etc. between polymer layers or between a polymer layer and a fabric layer so that, within the scope of the anticipated application, the laminate is a unitary structure.

[0065]

[0083] The disclosure described herein relates to MTPs with enhanced signaling and methods of making or using the same.

[0066]

[0084] Monolithic security functionality including MTP

[0067]

[0085] Monolithic security features can be created by casting, embedding, or incorporating an MTP into a substrate via an additive manufacturing process. Such security features can also be made by attaching the MTP to a substrate after the MTP is formed. Monolithic security features can be designed to carry the MTP to or across an external feature whose structure and composition cause the MTP to crack or otherwise permanently disable the MTP. For example, an MTP can be embedded in heat-shrink tubing that seals a twist cap. An MTP can be deposited so that the twist cap is loosened. An MTP can encounter a ramp, wedge, or other structure on a container. The heat-shrink substrate can be designed to deform while passing through the structure, but not completely absorb or dissipate the forces building up from the structure. When the MTP encounters and moves over the structure, resistance can force the MTP or MTP subcomponent to break, thereby disabling the MTP or MTP subcomponent.

[0068]

[0086] Multiple MTP indexed security features

[0069]

[0087] The present invention may establish a higher level of security using authentication of multiple micro-transponders or a combination of micro-transponders and taggants (e.g., QR codes, barcodes, RFID tags, etc.) as matching pairs. All taggants must be present and readable to validate the content. Taggants may be placed next to each other or at different locations on or within an object, and / or at least two different types of security markings may be combined to form a composite security marking. The failure of any micro-transponder or other taggants to respond may indicate non-authentic content. At least one micro-transponder in the multi-level indexing sequence may be a fragile chip that can be physically rendered unable to respond when the container is first opened. A fragile chip can be manufactured by post-fabrication processing, i.e., thinning the chip substrate to ensure it breaks when bent or attempted to be removed from the substrate. In some embodiments, methods to ensure chip disablement may be implemented by designing a fracture surface or by cutting a slot into the chip to cut off the antenna.

[0070]

[0088] In one embodiment, a physical object (eg, a container) may be attached to chip A and chip B from a normal pairing when both signals respond to interrogation.

[0071]

[0089] In one embodiment, if a physical object has only chip A attached and chip B is not physically present for interrogation by the reader, the reader may not authenticate the product because the database requires responses from both chips. If a physical object has both chip A and chip B present but chip B can be destroyed when opened, the reader may not authenticate the product because chip B has been disabled.

[0072]

[0090] In one embodiment, similar to the example of a physical object having chip A and chip B, the physical object may have different pairwise or canonical pairing indexing via chip C and chip D. While the pairing of chip C and chip D may be canonical, it may be unique and not equal to the pairing of chip A and chip B. If a counterfeiter obtains chips A and C and adds them to their packaging, the reader may not be able to authenticate the chips because chip A and chip C do not constitute a canonical pairing.

[0073]

[0091] Optically triggered microtransponder (MTP) with durable self-destructing superanchor

[0074]

[0092] Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been identified and can be employed as key elements in physical and digital-based anti-counterfeiting and authentication systems. PUFs are physical entities embodied in a physical structure that are easy to evaluate but difficult to predict, even for an attacker with physical access to the PUF. A key element to PUFs is the use of natural, randomly occurring features or characteristics that can be used as unique distinguishing features of otherwise very similar individual objects. PUFs rely on the uniqueness of their physical microstructure, which typically includes a random component that is already inherently present in the physical entity or explicitly introduced or generated in the physical entity during its manufacture. The nature of the physical microstructure associated with a PUF is virtually uncontrollable and unpredictable. To evaluate a PUF, a so-called challenge-response authentication scheme is used. The "challenge" is a physical stimulus applied to the PUF, and the "response" is its reaction to the stimulus. The response depends on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure and can therefore be used to authenticate the PUF and the physical object it forms part of. A particular challenge and its corresponding response together form a so-called "challenge-response pair" (CRP).

[0075]

[0093] In practical applications, a PUF can be interrogated in some way, called a challenge. The PUF has a response to the interrogation that clearly reveals, identifies, or documents its unique random function. The response is then compared to a digital reference. If the PUF's unique random function matches the digital reference, the challenge results in a positive authentication. If the PUF's unique random function differs from the digital reference, the challenge may fail, thereby rendering the PUF and the corresponding physical object to which it is attached inauthentic or counterfeit.

[0076]

[0094] The definition of a PUF relies on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure and may focus on naturally occurring random physical structures or phenomena to obtain uniqueness such that the degree of difficulty in replicating or cloning the chip may be exceptionally high. The challenge in demonstrating the random functionality of on-chip PUFs is based on ring oscillation and FPGA architectures, both of which may degrade over time and may not be durable for long periods of time.

[0077]

[0095] Despite the wide range of PUFs conceived and used, several key problems remain to be solved. While a PUF's digital reference at its inception may be locked and substantially unchanging over time, the physical PUF used to generate the digital reference may quickly begin to degrade. Over time and / or as a result of handling, environmental, or usage conditions, a genuine, original PUF may eventually lose or modify its unique characteristics to the point that it may fail to challenge its digital twin. In this case, a genuine article may be mistakenly identified as a fake or counterfeit item. This creates a need to provide a more durable method for ensuring the authenticity of an object.

[0078]

[0096] The present disclosure provides an innovative approach to assigning uniqueness by applying an MTP with a unique ID to multiple similar objects. In some embodiments, non-random features may be assigned, embedded, or incorporated into the object. In some embodiments, the non-random features may be difficult to reach, and any attempt to manipulate or alter the unique feature results in it being disabled or destroyed. Furthermore, embodiments of the present disclosure may be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive with high levels of durability and reliable functionality. The combination of ultra-durability and tamper-resistant construction may lead to a Super Anchor (SA).

[0079]

[0097] The main concept of this disclosure is to provide an object (super anchor) with a unique embedded feature to increase the object's durability. The ultra-durable object can be embedded in the matrix of a chip. Other attempts to utilize durable approaches for ICs, i.e., on-chip devices, involve various microstructures of the chip itself. In this disclosure, the super anchor can have high durability because the MTP ID number is a unique, fixed feature that can be integrated into, but separate from, the bulk medium (e.g., the chip structure). The unique feature can be isolated from bulk degradation. The super anchor can provide a non-random bus secure feature. The super anchor can be tamper-proof and / or self-destruct in response to attempts to change the unique ID. A further application of the self-destruct design can be used to ensure authentic packaging so that containers and vessels cannot be reused to hold counterfeit items. For example, an example end use of the self-destructing super anchor can be utilized in security inlays.

[0080]

[0098] FIG. 15 is a flowchart illustrating an example process configured to utilize super anchors for physical object authentication according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. A durable, self-destructing super anchor may be utilized for object authentication, object tracing, and tracking under the control of a digital security system including a manufacturer database. The digital security system may include one or more computing devices to facilitate object authentication, object tracing, and tracking. The digital security system may include at least a security computing device that communicates with multiple user computing devices over a network. The security computing device may include a processor, memory, and a communications interface for enabling communication over the network. The digital security system may receive MTP registration information from an MTP ID secure reader (e.g., an ID reader) over the network and process the MTP ID information.

[0081]

[0099] In step 1501, a super anchor (SA) can be fabricated by embedding or incorporating an MTP with a unique ID onto a taggant, onto a taggant substrate, or within a layer of the taggant. The taggant may or may not have a PUF embodied in its physical structure. The super anchor can be fabricated by incorporating an MTP into the taggant structure, while the taggant can be made as part of a multi-layer manufacturing process. An example of co-manufacturing of a taggant and a super anchor can be casting a thermoplastic tag or label via an in-mold process. An example of multi-layering co-manufacture can include laminating an MTP onto a credit card, label, or tape, whereby the MTP becomes part of the monolithic structure of the tag or object. The formed tag or taggant can be a label, dot, laminate, tape, or any physical structure. The primary purpose of a taggant may include: (1) providing a surface for affixing a super anchor to a physical object for tracking the physical object, and / or (2) acting as a passive or active part of a tamper-evident, tamper-resistant, or self-destruct mechanism.

[0082]

[0100] For example, a super anchor can be depicted as a light-triggered MTP with a unique ID attached to or embedded in a chip taggant that has a physically unclonable function (PUF) along with self-destruct and high durability capabilities.

[0083]

[0101] In step 1502, the unique ID number of the MTP may be registered in a digital security system and / or manufacturer database and indexed to the MTP.

[0084]

[0102] In step 1503A, the manufactured SA with a unique ID number or unique serial number can be digitally indexed and attached to a physical object. The super anchor may or may not have an acceptable means of attaching it to a physical object as part of its structure and composition. The means, methods, and processes for adhering the super anchor to a physical object can vary widely depending on the composition and use conditions of the physical object receiving the super anchor. The super anchor can be directly attached to the physical object using known materials and processes, such as adhesives, sealants, waxes, tapes, and films. The glue or other adhesive can be cured by any number of mechanisms, including photopolymerization, chemical curing, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The material can have an immediate or latent action. The attachment material can be reactive. The reactive material can be activated by pressure, chemicals, heat, light, sound, or other radiation sources. Such materials and processes are exemplary and not limiting. The super anchor can be sutured or injected into the object.

[0085]

[0103] In some embodiments, super anchors can be supplied and used as unattached objects with reactive sites or substrates, potentially modified for specific attraction and binding of chemical and / or biological species, with or without subsequent processing, interrogation, and identification of the attached species. After identification, the bound species can be eliminated, thereby regenerating the super anchor. Thus, super anchors may be capable of forming platforms and scaffolds for random or precise growth sequencing in automated or semi-automated processes. Unattached super anchors, with or without reactive sites or substrates, can be dispersed in a continuous medium, such as a fluid. The dynamic object information of a super anchor can be identified by capturing its unique ID at one or more sites in a sealed vessel. The dynamic object information can be used to determine the flow characteristics of the continuous medium. Real-time rheological and tribological data can be calculated. Algorithms and software for computational fluid dynamics have been developed and can be used to document flow dynamics and velocity gradients in great detail. Modeling of industrial material flow and reaction conditions, documentation of mixing equipment performance, and fluid handling system design can be greatly improved.

[0086]

[0104] In step 1503B, data associated with the physical object stored in the digital security system may be updated with the object index information so that the physical object can be located and read using its unique ID number and product data in the digital security system. The product data may include product serialization, or an identifier associated with the physical object, such as a radio frequency identification (RFID), a QR code, etc.

[0087]

[0105] In step 1504, upon receiving the physical object with the manufactured SA attached, the user may securely log into the digital security system via the user computing device to begin the authentication process for the physical object.

[0088]

[0106] In step 1505, a secure reader (eg, an ID reader) may be utilized to illuminate an SA attached to a physical object and receive an SA signal.

[0089]

[0107] In step 1506, the secure reader may receive the SA signal and decode the received SA signal to obtain a unique ID number or serial number indexed to the SA. The user computing device may run an application to communicate with the secure reader to receive the decoded ID of the SA associated with the physical object.

[0090]

[0108] In step 1507, the user computing device may communicate with the digital security system over the network and send the decrypted ID of the SA to the digital security system. The digital security system may compare the decrypted unique ID associated with the physical object with the ID number stored in the digital security system.

[0091]

[0109] In step 1508A, based on the comparison result, the digital security system may determine whether the decoded unique ID number is registered.

[0092]

[0110] In step 1508B, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID is not registered, the digital security system may generate a "not authentic" message for display on a user interface of the user computing device.

[0093]

[0111] In step 1508C, the digital security system may update data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity validation.

[0094]

[0112] In step 1509A, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID number is registered in the digital security system, the digital security system may further determine whether the decoded unique ID number matches a stored ID number associated with the physical object.

[0095]

[0113] In step 1509B, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID number does not match the stored ID number associated with the physical object, the digital security system may generate a "not authentic" message for display on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0096]

[0114] In step 1509C, based on the determined authenticity result of 1509A, the digital security system may update data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity validation.

[0097]

[0115] In step 1510A, in response to determining that the decoded unique ID matches a stored ID indexed to the physical object, the digital security system may generate an "authentic" message for display on a user interface of the user computing device.

[0098]

[0116] In step 1510B, based on the determined authenticity result of 1510A, the digital security system may update data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity validation.

[0099]

[0117] Embodiments of the present disclosure may provide an MTP with an ultra-durable super anchor that is utilized for tagging, authenticating, and preventing counterfeiting of physical objects.

[0100]

[0118] In some embodiments, the manufactured Super Anchor (SA) may be combined with RFID or QR code technology and certain encryption technologies to further enhance tracing and anti-counterfeiting protection of physical objects.

[0101]

[0119] In some embodiments, the manufactured SA can be printed as a label on any type of surface of a physical object, hi some embodiments, the manufactured SA can be printed as a label to replace RFID or QR codes for special security document transfers.

[0102]

[0120] Embodiments of the present disclosure may provide MTPs with ultra-durable super anchors combined or integrated with business systems, databases of digital security systems, distributed ledgers, blockchains, blockchain interoperability, and object and financial-based blockchain interoperability.

[0103]

[0121] In some embodiments, storing the secure unique ID number of the manufactured SA indexed to the attached physical object may be implemented by storing the registered unique ID of the SA and associated data associated with the physical object on a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger. In this way, the registered unique ID and associated data may be saved and stored in a manner that makes it virtually impossible to tamper with. Furthermore, storing the secure registered unique UD and associated super anchor on a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger may enable remote object authenticity validation and tracing, for example, by authorized recipients along the supply chain of the related physical object or group of objects.

[0104]

[0122] In some embodiments, the above process may be adapted for use in analyzing flow characteristics and / or other features of a continuous medium. For example, in step 1503A, an SA may be dispersed in a continuous medium (e.g., rather than being physically attached to a solid medium). The SA may then be illuminated and responded multiple times, as described above. Each time may be recorded, and the location of the SA within the medium may also be recorded. These time-stamped SA locations may be processed to determine at least one flow characteristic of the continuous medium, as described above.

[0105]

[0123] Micro-transponder-based smart paper contracts

[0106]

[0124] The authenticity of paper-based credentials may not be secure. A great deal of fraud can occur when authenticating paper-based credentials. For example, diplomas can be ordered online from universities anywhere in the world, printed, and sent directly to anywhere. Fake credentials can be used and sent to doctors, psychologists, or other professionals for various fraudulent purposes. Document authentication typically takes time and costs consumers significant amounts of money, which must be avoided. Furthermore, record searches can delay housing and real estate transactions by days, disrupting business flow and revenue generation.

[0107]

[0125] A p-Chip® MTP (e.g., possibly configured as a durable self-destructing super anchor) may be utilized to implement MTP-based smart paper contracts. Embodiments of the present disclosure describe techniques for MTP-based paper contracts that may provide low-cost registration and authentication of processing devices while increasing the traceability and security of digital or printed paper items.

[0108]

[0126] MTP-based smart paper contracts may eliminate the multiple steps and costs of creating secure, authentic digital records and smart contracts. MTP-based smart paper contracts may provide low-cost registration and authentication of printers and marking devices, increasing the traceability and security of printed items. MTP-based smart paper contracts may use machine tokenization for service payments, etc. Unlike print-based security features from watermarks or special dyes or pigments embedded in paper document and credential substrates, and two-dimensional codes such as QR and data matrix codes, p-Chip® MTPs are not easily replicated and offer a very affordable option for digital authentication.

[0109]

[0127] Adding a document or physical record to a digital security system or similar functional database, data lake, or computer-based archive and verification system requires that the document be scanned and a unique ID or serial identifier added. Smart paper contracts based on the p-Chip® MTP may have a low-cost energy-activated identifier attached and / or embedded in the substrate of the MTP that gives the document a unique, physically unalterable ID number.

[0110]

[0128] As used herein, the terms "smart contract," "smart paper contract," "printed item," or "printed object" may include all types of printable items, including, but not limited to, contracts, financial transactions, transcripts, certificates, checks, secure credentials, medical records, quality records, deed searches for residences, and title searches for automobiles, boats, agricultural equipment, and recreational vehicles, etc. For example, MTP-based smart paper contracts may be utilized to create documents such as secure credentials, contacts, certificates, quality records, etc. Specific raw material and product characteristics may be documented by certificates of analysis, medical records, genomic certificates such as varieties or certified seeds.

[0111]

[0129] As used herein, the term "paper" is used for clarity but does not limit embodiments of the present invention, which may include all printing-related substrates such as synthetic paper, film, cardboard, plastic, metal wood, and composites. Additionally, concepts of the present disclosure may encompass label and packaging printing as a novel method for creating secure "smart labels," secure "smart tags," and secure "smart packages." The present invention may encompass both traditional 2D and 3D printing processes for the substrates and printed items described above.

[0112]

[0130] FIG. 16 illustrates a functional diagram for implementing a smart paper contract according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in FIG. 16, functional unit 16A may include databases and operations associated with sender and receiver activities. A smart contract sender (e.g., a document sender) may register an achievement or event with a digital security system (at block 1602) via a first computing device. Sender and document data may be stored as a customer record in database 1601 (e.g., DB1). The sender may create a print purchase order (at block 1603) and store the order and associated financial data as customer financial data in database 1604 (e.g., DB4). The smart contract sender may forward the secure print data to a smart contract receiver (e.g., a document recipient) (at block 1605).

[0113]

[0131] As illustrated in FIG. 16, functionality 16B may include databases and operations performed by authorized printer(s) and marking device(s) associated with the digital security system.

[0114]

[0132] At block 1613, the authorized printer(s) and marking device(s) may be registered in the digital security system using their assigned security serial numbers. The authorized printer may receive a purchase order from a sender. The authorized printer may convert (at block 1614) secure print data associated with the purchase order into machine-executable instructions. The received secure print data and purchase order may be stored in a database 1616 (e.g., DB2). The authorized printer may obtain (at block 1612) a security substrate and print (at block 1615) a secure document. The security substrate (at block 1612) and the act of printing the secure document (at block 1615) may be stored in a database 1617 (e.g., DB4). The authorized marking device may be configured to obtain (at block 1618) a security ink and print (at block 1619) a 2D security mark on the secure document. The terms "security substrate" and "security ink" refer to legacy materials and processes for creating secure documents by printing. Many commercially available substrates and inks exist. An example of a security substrate could be paper with a watermark or embossed structure. Another example could be paper pre-printed with "invisible ink." Under normal sunlight illumination, the ink is non-reflective in the visible spectrum. When exposed to UV light, the pre-printed lettering or markings would down-convert the higher energy light into the visible spectrum, making it visible to the observer. Paper can be natural or synthetic-based, hence the more general term "substrate." Synthetic papers can be more expensive and are made with specific spectral responses designed to their bulk properties, providing another level of security. The incorporation of color-shifting (gonio-apparent) fibers into the printed paper or substrate can add another layer of security, as the threads exhibit unique color reflectances that can change as the document's viewing angle changes. The color shift is a function of the material.This material is very expensive, and for documents produced in official states, it may be a controlled substance. Security ink may be a specific physical structure of pigments or dyes that can result in varying reflectance (observable color) to humans and / or machines. Both the security substrate (block 1612) and security ink (block 1618) may be raw materials sourced by the printer. Customers have the ability to specify the security substrate and ink, or any combination, as part of their print order to obtain a secure document.

[0115]

[0133] 2D security marking is currently the cutting edge of printing technology. In addition to using secure inks and secure ink combinations, printed designs can have intentional structures printed in great detail. Careful inspection or low-magnification magnification can reveal microstructures that a simple counterfeiter may not notice or be able to create. 2D security marks can also be PUFs, following the original definition by Virginia Tech, in that their microstructure is a function of variations in ink droplet flight, absorption into the print substrate, and drying. 2D structures can be photographed and digitized. Digital features can be identified through a combination of edge-finding algorithms for shape and other image factors such as area, color, and brightness. Digital files can be given unique IDs. The unique IDs and file images can be archived in a database and indexed to digital files. Furthermore, digital image captures can be compared to archived images to determine authenticity as PUF challenge-response sequences.

[0116]

[0134] The recent development of attaching or embedding RFID devices into printed paper provides another level of security for printed documents, whereby the RFID tag number becomes part of the digital identification number or digital ID for the printed document. RFID-enabled sheets are available for digital printing platforms such as HP Indigo printers. In some cases, RFID tags can be attached to documents after printing. The advantages of using RFID technology for printed document authentication are consistent with their use in other security media. The disadvantages of this security mechanism are that it can be cloned by unauthorized entities, is not durable in use, and is expensive. The embodiments described herein can be used with RFID-enabled sheets in addition to, or instead of, the 2D security marks described above.

[0117]

[0135] The printed secure document with the 2D security mark and / or embedded RFID tag may be shipped to the document recipient (at block 1620), and associated records may be stored in database 1621 (e.g., DB5). The secure document with the 2D security mark may be sent to the smart contract recipient (at block 1622) along with an invoice. The smart contract recipient may both receive a digital copy of the secure document via email or text message over the network (at block 1606) and receive the printed secure document with the 2D security mark via mail. The smart contract recipient may receive and sign the secure document (at block 1607). A digital twin of the signed document may be created and stored in database 1609 (e.g., DB6) (at block 1608). The smart contract recipient may process or pay the invoice associated with the received document over the network via a second computing device and store a transaction record in customer financial database 1611 (e.g., DB7). A financial transaction record of the paid invoice may be sent (at block 1623) via the second computing device to a digital security system and stored in a database 1624 (e.g., DB8). The MTP-based document security measures described herein may be used in place of or in combination with traditional 2D security marks and / or embedded RFID tags. In either case, smart paper contracts formed using the embodiments described herein may be more durably secure than documents secured by traditional 2D security marks and / or embedded RFID tags alone.

[0118]

[0136] Secure document smart contract generation with blockchain integration

[0119]

[0137] In some embodiments, blockchain can be used to apply a predetermined collision-resistant hash function to trace and track smart contract documents. As used herein, a collision-resistant hash function refers to a special type of hash function, i.e., a mathematical function or algorithm that maps data of any size to a bit string of a fixed-size hash value, which is also designed to be a one-way function, i.e., a function that is easy to compute for all inputs but difficult to invert given a random input image. Preferably, collision-resistant hash functions are designed so that it is difficult to find two different data sets d1 and d2 such that hash(d1) = hash(d2). These are hash functions for which a certain sufficient security level can be mathematically proven. In the present security solution, the security of cryptographic hash functions is further improved by the fact that, as disclosed herein, the MTP ID number reading of a marking with a smart anchor, particularly a composite security marking, is performed at a specific location and time, where a physical object bearing the marking is actually present at such location and time. This can be used either to increase the absolute security level that can be achieved, or to allow the use of collision-resistant hash functions that work with smaller data sets, e.g., shorter data strings as input and / or output, while still providing a given required security level.

[0120]

[0138] By utilizing blockchain technology, the MTP ID can be used with a collision-resistant hash function to generate a smart contract. Creating a smart contract can involve a multi-level indexing process for object authentication, tracing, and tracking. For example, combining a unique MTP ID number 1 associated with each printable page in a box of smart paper with a unique ID number 2 associated with the carton containing all of the smart paper can allow the smart paper to arrive at the printer with a pre-defined identifier that can be readily integrated into the blockchain's collision-resistant hash function when printed. Furthermore, in this disclosure, each authorized printer and / or marking device can have its own unique identification number 3. The unique MTP ID 1 from the paper can be combined with the carton's unique ID 2 and the authorized printer's or marking device's unique serial ID number 3. Furthermore, all associated MTP IDs can be applied to a collision-resistant hash function to create a similar blockchain-compatible identity. This identity can be used as an additional level of security to register a printer or marking device for machine tokenized payments. In some embodiments, the unique ID1 of the smart paper MTP may be used to register the fax machine and increase the security of the fax machine for data transmission.

[0121]

[0139] FIG. 17 illustrates an example system diagram for generating secure document smart contracts while integrating with blockchain. The example system 1700 may include multiple smart paper SPs (Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPCs (Mi) 1705, authorized printing devices 1706, authorized p-chip PUF readers 1707 (e.g., p-chip identifier readers), and a blockchain secure archive 1710. The multiple smart paper SPs (Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPCs (Mi) 1705, and authorized printing devices 1706 may be embedded with respective super anchors consisting of respective p-chip MTPs and super anchors. The authorized p-chip super anchor readers 1707 may be registered with a serial number in a digital security system. The authorized p-chip super anchor readers 1707 and collision-resistant hash functions 1708 may be embedded in the digital authorized printing devices 1706.

[0122]

[0140] The unique serial number of the p-Chip of the authorized p-Chip super anchor reader 1707 may be used to generate a corresponding hash value by a collision-resistant hash function 1708, thereby adding an additional layer of security. In some embodiments, the collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be performed electronically by the printing entity in real time from the digital authorized printing device 1706, although it may be fully integrated with the printing workflow.

[0123]

[0141] In some embodiments, a digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be configured to receive secure document content 1701 and print instructions 1702 from a user over a network and generate a secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be configured to load a smart paper container SP(Ni) 1703 from a smart paper SPC(Mi) 1705 to create a printed article for the secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally authorized printing device 1706 may communicate with and automatically control an authorized p-Chip super anchor reader 1707 to read the super anchor IDs of the loaded smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705.

[0124]

[0142] In one embodiment, the digitally authenticated printing device 1706 may be embedded or have a super anchor embedded therein that includes an MTP with an ID number to increase the security posture of the printing device 1706. The embedding may allow the digitally authenticated printing device 1706 and its output to be recognized as a verified and trusted source.

[0125]

[0143] In one embodiment, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be registered through a blockchain trust center, allowing all subsequent printing to be secured within the blockchain, thereby eliminating a costly and time-consuming step. To generate a highly secure document smart contract, a collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be applied to the p-Chip MTP ID number associated with the digitally authorized printing device 1706, the print instruction 1702, and the print time and print date stamp generated by the printing device 1706.

[0126]

[0144] In one embodiment, incorporating the p-Chip into the paper and paper container may provide two additional levels of security, as both are associated with a unique super anchor with its own unique ID number. For example, a smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 may be created by embedding a p-Chip MTP with a 2D super anchor into a printed paper and linked to the 2D p-Chip ID numbers (e.g., first ID and second ID). A smart paper container SPC(M i ) 1705 is a third p-Chip MTP in a paper container SPC (M i ) 1705 and linked to a third ID number. A digitally authorized printing device 1706 may have an MTP embedded or built-in with a fourth ID number. A collision-resistant hash function 1708 is generated by embedding the MTP in the smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and smart paper container SPC(M i ) 1705, and its partners or their licenses, may create smart contracts pre-manufactured for printing. Thus, existing physical records scanned for digital archiving purposes or newly created records may immediately become part of a smart contract.

[0127]

[0145] The collision-resistant hash function 1708 can be applied to other entity- or document-specific information to significantly increase security at exceptionally low cost. For example, there are various reasons for increasing document security at lower cost. 1) Using more than one print-based super anchor may not be cost-effective. 2) Using the 2D security markings and p-Chip ID numbers from the smart paper 1704, one p-Chip ID number from the paper container 1705 and one p-Chip ID number from the digitally authorized printing device 1706, a single security document can be provided with multiple levels (e.g., four levels) of unique identification information. 3) Replacing existing 2D security markings with one to three or more p-Chips could significantly improve document security while significantly reducing the operating costs for the printing device and the cost of secure printing for the end user.

[0128]

[0146] In some embodiments, p-Chip authentication can be applied to individual print cartridges for security-grade inks that can be associated with different brands. Using a unique p-Chip ID number for the ink cartridge along with a different p-Chip ID number for the printing device can be another way to significantly increase security for existing 2D printing-based systems.

[0129]

[0147] In some embodiments, smart paper and smart paper containers can be labeled with a material lot number and container number. The lot number can have unique Certificate of Analysis (CoA) information that can identify multiple physical constants for the product and / or batch of material. The respective p-Chip ID numbers indexed to or associated with smart paper and smart paper containers can be replaced with or configured to include the smart paper container's material lot number and container product number. In one embodiment, any number of unique variable physical data points for a batch can be used as a PUF. Furthermore, the super anchors described above can be added to 3D printing devices to generate secure 3D prints.

[0130]

[0148] Authenticating 3D printed objects with embedded MTP using a process that translates into a smart contract

[0131]

[0149] The present disclosure provides cost-effective methods and systems for the identification and authentication of parts and components created by additive manufacturing. The proliferation of additive manufacturing processes, equipment, and techniques holds great promise to revolutionize the physical production of objects, increasing speed while reducing capital costs for equipment and the cost per unit of printed objects. Cost reductions may make it feasible to create and sell non-original counterfeit products. The negative impacts of counterfeiting are well established, including lost revenue and taxes and increased warranty claims. While these harmful consequences have a significant negative impact on a global scale, there may be even greater concerns regarding human health and safety of counterfeit parts, which can lead to substantial injury and death to humans and animals.

[0132]

[0150] Attaching a p-Chip® MTP to a printed object can provide the object with a unique identification number that can be protected from counterfeiting by utilizing the challenge-response mechanism described above. As described above, the p-Chip® MTP can be used to convert the printed object into smart paper and / or smart contracts by the methods outlined in the smart paper described above.

[0133]

[0151] The p-Chip® MTP can be directly incorporated into the printed object by placing it on the print stage. For example, the MTP can have an adhesive or tape that is activated by mechanical, thermal, or radiation-based methods to fuse to the object. The MTP can be incorporated using a sacrificial medium that can be destroyed by the printing process, a sub-process, or a post-printing process. The p-Chip® MTP can be directly incorporated into the printed object by tape, asset tags, or labels. Security inlays can be used to discourage MTP substitution.

[0134]

[0152] In some embodiments, the p-Chip® MTP can be incorporated as a subcomponent, where the p-Chip® is mechanically attached or embedded in a matrix by a separate process or by additive manufacturing. For example, one manifestation can be a thin base with an embedded MTP. The base can be made of the same material as, or compatible with, the material of the object to be printed. Printing can occur on top of the thin base. Alternatively, the thin base can be attached by an adhesive, coating, or polymeric material of an organic, inorganic, or hybrid composition. In some embodiments, similar materials and shapes, such as pegs, tabs, labels, caps, or any other structural element of a finished part, component, subcomponent, or assembly, can be used with the embedded MTP. In some embodiments, structures can be attached and fused to the printed part as an exterior surface. The MTP and the component containing the MTP can be intentionally overprinted to allow for durability of the MTP during its useful life as a covert security feature.

[0135]

[0153] MTPs can be added to specific features of the printed article that can provide mechanical protection during use or act as overt or covert functions to read during the distribution and useful life of the article. Existing robots can be used to cut out objects immediately after printing as a separate station in the workflow by any means or as a separate process.

[0136]

[0154] As explained above, MTPs can be printed or attached to objects and can be combined with 2D security marking, RFID, and other known PUF technologies for an additional layer of security to the object. MTPs can be manufactured as labels printed on objects. MTPs can be embedded in paper documents as smart contracts.

[0137]

[0155] A variety of materials may be used in the end use application, such as additive manufacturing of metals, ceramics, plastics, polymeric materials, single component, multi-component mixtures, and combinations thereof, including medical and dental implants for humans and animals.

[0138]

[0156] MTP 3D printed objects may require a range or limitations of effectiveness, such as specific use conditions, temperature range, flexibility characteristics, etc. Bulk properties of the printed material, such as flexibility, bend radius, and coefficient of expansion, can be carefully considered to ensure that stresses are not introduced that could disable subcomponents, destroy the MTP chip, or cause the part to bleed during use. For example, an MTP label can be printed on an object to which RFID has been applied to provide flexibility and an additional layer of security to the object. For example, depending on the materials and methods used in manufacturing the transponder antenna and the transponder's chip-bonding method and orientation on the substrate, all passive RF transponders may have a minimum (e.g., 3-inch diameter) allowable bend radius (radius of curvature). Flexing or bending the finished passive RFID transponder medium to a radius smaller than this minimum radius at any point in the application process can result in RFID failure from either antenna breakage or destruction of the chip-antenna bond. RFID label manufacturers can provide values ​​for minimum bend radii. Objects printed with MTP labels can have extra bending flexibility compared to regular RFID labels. For example, p-Chips have been successfully attached to and read from 1 / 4-inch automobile brake lines.

[0139]

[0157] Specific issues for additive manufacturing of ceramics and metals may apply. All materials and equipment common to additive manufacturing can be utilized for 3D printed objects by MTP. For example, laser marking of polymer materials can be used to create identification and 2D security marks. Laser marking is a commercial process in which laser marking pigments are embedded in a matrix (polymer, paint, adhesive, plastic, etc.).

[0140]

[0158] Pigments can be randomly dispersed in a composite material. The composite material can be irradiated with high-energy radiation, and the pigments respond by heating and carbonizing the continuous phase surrounding the part or coating, thereby changing color. Controlling the radiation beam can create symbols, structures, or identification numbers embedded in or on a part. Laser marking can be an affordable way to add part numbers to objects, but laser marking pigments, radiation sources, and automated controls are ubiquitous. This is not a very secure marking. When laser marking is used and random features are characterized as described to print smart contracts, they can create super anchors that may be more secure than simple laser marks. These methods can be widely used in carbon-based materials and composites.

[0141]

[0159] Another method of laser marking is direct metal ablation: a high-power laser can erode the metal surface, changing the surface color (anodizing) and leaving a permanent mark.

[0142]

[0160] Super anchors can replace laser markings and 2D security marks for plastic and organic-based objects. They can be used for defensive security purposes. 3D printers for ceramics and metals can have high-power lasers for sintering. In some embodiments, super anchors can be attached to inorganic 3D printed articles with 2D laser marks. In some embodiments, super anchors can be attached to inorganic 3D printed articles to replace 2D laser marks and increase security.

[0143]

[0161] In some embodiments, the light-activated MTP may include longer waveforms being developed for IC signaling, such as terahertz.

[0144]

[0162] In some embodiments, acoustic signals can be utilized instead of light to transmit and read the MTP chip ID. Compatible equipment and circuit elements, including modulation-demodulation circuits, coding-decoding circuits, and MTP readers, can be developed through piezoelectric devices on the MTP chip that are associated with corresponding acoustic signals.

[0145]

[0163] Additionally, a mobile application may be provided that is compatible with a corresponding MTP reader for scanning an MTP attached to a physical object. The mobile application may be executed to communicate with a digital security system for registering physical objects that have an MTP label attached or an MTP embedded therein. The mobile application may be executed to communicate with a digital security system for tracking and authenticating physical objects that are replicated in the digital security system. The mobile application may be executed to read an MTP ID printed on an object with a corresponding MTP reader and send the read ID directly to the digital security system or similar functional database for object authentication processing as described in FIG. 15.

[0146]

[0164] Enhanced read distance Micro Transponder (MTP)

[0147]

[0165] Current generation MTPs can have limited reading capabilities when attached directly to a metal substrate. The modulated light required to activate the MTP's solar cell can interact with the metal substrate, which can generate eddy currents in the metal. The generated eddy currents can reduce the RF signal strength response from the MTP. The ability to successfully acquire and decode the RF signal containing the MTP's unique identity number is a function of the signal distance between the MTP and its reader.

[0148]

[0166] Embodiments of the present disclosure describe techniques for enhancing read distance for MTPs by eliminating eddy currents. Signal distance for p-Chips attached directly to metal surfaces can be reduced by up to 30% compared to non-metallic substrates. Enhanced read distance MTPs can be embedded with durable, self-destructing PUF functionality, as described. It may be possible to build a physical gap between the metal substrate and objects affected by eddy currents. Such schemes may rely on tapes, shims, or filled polymer adhesives, laminates, or films external to integrated circuit (IC) fabrication and construction. Given the wide range of substrates and attachment methods for p-Chip® MTP end uses, a single, high-volume, affordable solution may not be possible for post-fabrication separation of the MTP from the metal substrate. Achieving resistance to eddy currents from the metal substrate as part of the on-chip structure can be highly advantageous.

[0149]

[0167] In some embodiments, successful eddy current elimination can be achieved with active or passive materials and / or combinations thereof. Active materials can absorb, scatter, destroy, or reflect eddy currents away from the chip and its signals. Filler materials such as ferrite are also known to act as active materials. Passive materials do not interact with eddy currents at all and can provide physical isolation between the substrate and IC signals. Glass, ceramic, and inorganic media are known materials that provide passive isolation and are compatible with IC manufacturing.

[0150]

[0168] In some embodiments, the base layer or layers near the base of the IC design may be fabricated from passive materials or filled with active materials, which are formed post-foundry by attaching a passive or active substrate to the MTP chip.

[0151]

[0169] Various methods or techniques may be utilized for the base layer of an IC design, including but not limited to: 1) Physical build-up process by vapor or chemical deposition. While most passivation layers are built to eliminate corrosion of ICs and components, extending the thickness of the backside of the chip by depositing a non-conductive inorganic layer acts as a physical spacer to separate the IC and its circuitry from the metal substrate that causes interference. 2) Physical layer build processes from liquid media followed by thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistries. The two chemistries described are capable of producing durable, non-conductive films and structures with excellent adhesion to other inorganic surfaces. Such sol-gel systems can be applied as liquid coatings by casting, spraying, dipping, or spin-based application to precise films. 3) Attachment of active or passive monolithic layers to the wafer by liquid, gel, or solid media followed by thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry. The same sol-gel systems can be used as adhesives to bond other structures, such as glass sheets, to the backside of IC wafers. In some embodiments, the passive monolithic layer can be a glass or filled glass structure. 4) Hybrid organic-inorganic polymer matrices may be considered as they have greater flexibility and may be an organic route to lower temperature applications. One drawback of sol-gel films is that they can be brittle. Adding small amounts of organic material to inorganic sol-gel systems can reduce brittleness. The material trade-off for creating hybrid sol-gels is a deterioration in high temperature resistance.

[0152]

[0170] Any end use application may be directed to metal or may include metal filler layers or particles.

[0153]

[0171] This disclosure may identify known or perceived use conditions, ranges of effectiveness, or limitations. While high-temperature use conditions are an important feature of p-Chip® MTPs, metal objects used in low-temperature or ambient temperature applications, such as asset tagging, are equally important. Thus, organic-based eddy current elimination schemes may also be utilized for low-temperature to ambient temperature applications. Various materials may be used during the manufacturing process of MTPs with enhanced signal distance, including, but not limited to, inorganic films, coatings, and adhesives, high-temperature hybrid organic-inorganic matrices and materials, and high-temperature organic insulating materials.

[0154]

[0172] Certain products or techniques that may be used in combination with the disclosed MTP. Various elements, devices, modules, and circuits are described above with respect to their respective functions. These elements, devices, modules, and circuits can be considered as means for performing their respective functions as described herein.

[0155]

[0173] While the foregoing is directed to embodiments of the present invention, other and further embodiments of the invention may be devised without departing from the basic scope thereof, which scope is determined by the following claims.

[0156]

[0174] All publications and references, including but not limited to patents and patent applications, cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety, to the same extent as if each individual publication or reference was specifically and individually indicated to be incorporated by reference herein as if fully set forth. Any patent application to which this application claims priority is also incorporated by reference herein in the manner described above for publications and references.

[0157]

[0175] Although several embodiments have been discussed above, other implementations and applications are within the scope of the following claims. While the invention herein has been described with reference to particular embodiments, it should be understood that these embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles and applications of the present invention. It should therefore be understood that numerous modifications can be made to the exemplary embodiments and other configurations can be devised without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the following claims. More specifically, those skilled in the art will recognize that any embodiment described herein can advantageously have, and is described as having, sub-features of other embodiments.

Claims

1. A transponder, one or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation; a clock recovery circuit comprising a photoconductor having a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power source, the photoconductor having a resistance configured to vary in response to a received radiation intensity, the clock recovery circuit configured to generate a recovered clock; A transponder comprising:

2. 10. The transponder of claim 1, further comprising a reverse antenna system connected to the at least one photocell and configured to transmit data.

3. 10. The transponder of claim 1, wherein the photoconductor is configured to generate a modulated voltage signal at a source terminal of the photoconductor in response to a modulated radiation signal incident on the photoconductor.

4. The clock recovery circuit an amplifier coupled to the source terminal of the photoconductor through a capacitor for receiving the modulated voltage signal and outputting an analog signal generated from the modulated voltage signal; an inverter coupled to the amplifier and configured to digitize the analog signal of the amplifier to generate the recovered clock; 4. The transponder of claim 3, comprising:

5. 4. The transponder of claim 3, wherein the clock recovery circuit comprises a resistor having a first terminal connected to the source terminal of the photoconductor and a second terminal connected to ground, and wherein the modulated voltage signal at the source terminal of the photoconductor is determined by a ratio of a resistance of the photoconductor to the resistance of the resistor.

6. The transponder of claim 1 , wherein the transponder has a unique identifier.

7. 10. The transponder of claim 1, wherein the transponder is a monolithic integrated circuit measuring less than about 2 mm by less than 2 mm by less than 0.2 mm thick.

8. The transponder of claim 1 , wherein the electromagnetic radiation comprises one or more subsets of the sub-terahertz portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.

9. A transponder, one or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation; a reverse antenna system connected to the at least one photocell and configured to transmit data; A transponder comprising:

10. 10. The transponder of claim 9, wherein the transponder is configured to transmit its identifier in a modulated current through the reverse antenna system.

11. 10. The transponder of claim 9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises one or more antennas and a plurality of electrical switches, the system configured for two-phase transmission to direct current flow through the antennas and the plurality of electrical switches.

12. 12. The transponder of claim 11, wherein the two-phase transmission is performed such that a "1" bit digital signal is transmitted in one direction through one of the antennas with a first current flow and a "0" bit digital signal is transmitted in an opposite direction at one of the antennas with a second current flow.

13. 10. The transponder of claim 9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises a forward antenna and a reverse antenna.

14. 10. The transponder of claim 9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises a single antenna.

15. 10. The transponder of claim 9, wherein the reversible antenna system is configured for the two-phase transmission to transmit a "1" bit digital signal and a "0" bit digital signal at substantially the same power.

16. 10. The transponder of claim 9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises at least one loop antenna surrounding the one or more photocells.

17. 10. The transponder of claim 9, comprising encoding such that the number of cycles involved in transmitting one bit is eight data periods.

18. 10. The transponder of claim 9, comprising encoding such that the number of cycles involved in transmitting one bit is 64 data periods.

19. A transponder, a monolithic integrated circuit having dimensions of less than about 2 mm x less than 2 mm x less than 0.2 mm (thickness); a reversible antenna system comprising one or more antennas and a plurality of electrical switches, the antennas and switches configured for two-phase transmission to direct current flow through the antennas and the plurality of electrical switches; A transponder comprising:

20. 20. The transponder of claim 19, wherein the two-phase transmission is performed such that a "1" bit digital signal is transmitted in one direction through an antenna with a first current flow, and a "0" bit digital signal is transmitted in the opposite direction at the antenna with a second current flow.

21. 20. The transponder of claim 19, wherein the antenna comprises a forward antenna and a reverse antenna.

22. 20. The transponder of claim 19, wherein the antenna system comprises a single antenna.

23. 20. The transponder of claim 19, wherein the reversible antenna system is configured for the two-phase transmission to transmit a "1" bit digital signal and a "0" bit digital signal at substantially the same power.

24. 20. The transponder of claim 19, wherein the one or more antennas are loop antennas that surround one or more photocells.

25. A security inlay comprising: a bottom inlay segment; a top inlay segment configured to mate with the bottom inlay segment; an electromagnetic radiation triggered transponder mounted between two inlay segments, the inlay having a top side and a bottom side, the bottom side being positioned on the bottom inlay segment and the top side being positioned on the top inlay segment, the security inlay being configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the electromagnetic radiation triggered transponder so that the transponder cannot be read; Equipped with a security inlay.

26. 26. The security inlay of claim 25, wherein the transponder includes a notch configured to direct a cleave line of the transponder such that electronics are compromised during operation.

27. 26. The security inlay of claim 25, wherein the bottom inlay segment includes a bottom groove configured to receive glue for adhering to the bottom side of the transponder, and the top inlay segment has a top groove configured to receive glue for adhering to the top side of the transponder.

28. 28. The security inlay of claim 27, wherein the bottom groove and the top groove are located on opposite sides of the notch.

29. 26. The security inlay of claim 25, wherein the top and bottom sides of the transponder each comprise adhesive disposed on non-adjacent portions of the top and bottom sides, respectively, of the transponder.

30. 26. A security inlay according to claim 25, wherein the two segments are configured so as not to be easily separable when manipulated prior to being adhered to an object requiring the security inlay.

31. 26. A method of securing an object, comprising adhering a security inlay according to claim 25 via a bottom inlay segment to the object, and adhering the bottom inlay segment to a tape or capsule that provides closure to the object.

32. 1. A monolithic security inlay comprising: Inlay segments; an electromagnetic radiation triggered microtransponder (MTP) coupled to the inlay segment and having at least one monolithic security self-destruct function; A monolithic security inlay comprising:

33. 33. The monolithic security inlay of claim 32, wherein the MTP is attached directly to or cast into a molded label configured to be attached to a physical object.

34. 33. The security inlay of claim 32, wherein the MTP is attached directly to or cast into a molded label, and then a physical object is formed on or around the molded label that encompasses the MTP.

35. 33. The monolithic security inlay of claim 32, wherein at least one monolithic security self-destruct feature is configured to carry the MTP to or across an exterior structural feature to disable the MTP.

36. 33. The monolithic security inlay of claim 32, wherein at least one monolithic security self-destruct feature is configured to rotate or engage a foreign object or structure to contact the MTP, which is then incapacitated from induced stress.

37. 1. A method of securing an object, comprising: Embedding at least two microtransponders (MTPs) in a taggant, a plurality of taggants, packaging, or said object, or a combination thereof, to generate at least one authentic matching pair, each of said MTPs configured with a respective identifier; indexing the object with the respective identifier of the MTP; storing indexing information associated with the MTP and the object in a database of a digital security system; reading said respective identifiers via an identifier reader; verifying the indexing information based on the reading to determine whether the respective identifier is associated with the legitimate matching pair; and A method for fastening an object, comprising:

38. 38. The method of claim 37, wherein at least one regular matching pair is associated with at least two different MTPs embedded in the taggant, the plurality of taggants, the packaging, or the object, or any combination thereof.

39. Each MTP: one or more photocells configured to receive light; a clock recovery circuit comprising a photoconductor having a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power source, the photoconductor having a resistance configured to vary in response to received light intensity, the clock recovery circuit configured to generate a recovered clock; a reverse antenna system connected to the at least one photocell and configured to transmit data; 38. The method of claim 37, comprising:

40. 38. The method of immobilizing an object of claim 37, wherein each MTP is embodied with at least one monolithic security self-destruct feature.

41. 1. A method of securing an object, comprising: embedding or attaching at least one microtransponder (MTP) and at least one taggant to an object to generate at least one authentic matching pair, said MTP and taggant each configured with a respective identifier; indexing the object with the respective identifiers of the MTP and taggant; storing the MTP and taggant and indexing information associated with the object in a database of a digital security system; reading said respective identifiers via an identifier reader; verifying the indexing information based on the reading to determine whether the respective identifier is associated with the legitimate matching pair; and A method for fastening an object, comprising:

42. 42. The method of claim 41, wherein the at least one taggant comprises a QR code, a bar code, an RFID tag, or a combination thereof.

43. 42. The method of claim 41, wherein the embedding or attaching is performed to position the at least one MTP and at least one taggant next to each other or at different locations on the surface of or within the object.

44. 42. The method of claim 41, wherein said embedding or attaching is performed to combine said at least one MTP and at least one taggant into a single composite security marking.

45. 1. A method for authenticating a physical item, comprising: configuring a super anchor having a first identifier, the super anchor comprising an electromagnetic radiation triggered micro transponder (MTP); registering and storing, by a processor of a server computing device, the first identifier associated with the physical item indexed to a first item number stored in a database of a digital security system; the super anchor device being embedded in a taggant attached to the physical item, the database being configured to store a plurality of identifiers and a plurality of item numbers indexed to respective physical items; illuminating the super anchor device with an identifier reader; receiving and decoding, by the identifier reader, a response signal from the super anchor to obtain a second identifier associated with the physical item; determining, by the processor of a server computing device, whether the physical item is authenticated based on the second identifier; and A method comprising:

46. Determining whether the physical item is authenticated includes: determining whether the second identifier is registered in the database; determining whether the second identifier matches a first identifier indexed to the item number of the physical item in response to determining that the second identifier is registered in the database; 46. ​​The method of claim 45, further comprising:

47. Determining whether the physical item is authenticated includes: displaying an authentication message on the identifier reader in response to determining that the second identifier matches a first identifier indexed to the item number of the physical item.

46. ​​The method of claim 45, further comprising:

48. 46. ​​The method of claim 45, wherein the MTP is embedded in a substrate of the taggant in a multi-layer manufacturing process.

49. 1. A method for authenticating a physical item, comprising: configuring a super anchor with at least one micro transponder (MTP) and at least one taggant on the object to generate at least one regular matching pair, the MTP and taggant each configured with a respective first and second identifier; registering and storing, by a processor of a server computing device, the first and second identifiers associated with the physical items indexed to a first item number stored in a database of a digital security system, the database being configured to store a plurality of identifiers and a plurality of item numbers indexed to respective physical items; illuminating the super anchor device with an identifier reader; receiving and decoding, by the identifier reader, a response signal from the super anchor to obtain a third identifier associated with the physical item; reading the super anchor device with a taggan reader; receiving and decoding, by the taggent reader, a response signal from the super anchor to obtain a fourth identifier associated with the physical item; determining, by the processor of a server computing device, whether the physical item is authenticated based on the third and fourth identifiers; A method comprising:

50. Determining whether the physical item is authenticated includes: determining whether the third and fourth identifiers are registered in the database; in response to determining that the third and fourth identifiers are registered in the database, determining whether the third and fourth identifiers match the respective first and second identifiers indexed to the item number of the physical item; 50. The method of claim 49, further comprising:

51. Determining whether the physical item is authenticated includes: displaying an authentication message on the identifier reader or the taggan reader in response to determining that the third and fourth identifiers match the respective first and second identifiers indexed to the item number of the physical item.

50. The method of claim 49, further comprising:

52. 1. A system for generating secure document smart contracts, comprising: a plurality of super anchors, each super anchor comprising an electromagnetic radiation triggered micro transponder (MTP) having an identifier, each MTP linked to its respective identifier and registered in the security system; a smart paper having embedded therein at least one super anchor having a first identifier; a smart paper container having embedded therein a second super anchor having a second identifier; an authorized printing device registered in the security system and having embedded therein a third MTP having a third identifier; an identifier reader registered in the security system using a reader identifier, wherein the identifier reader is incorporated into the authorized printing device and configured to read the first super anchor to obtain the first identifier and to read the second super anchor to obtain the second identifier; A system comprising:

53. the authorized printing device, receiving secure document content and printing instructions from a user over a network; generating a printed article for the secure document smart contract based on the secure document content and the printing instructions; 53. The system of claim 52 configured to:

54. 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the authorized printing device is in communication with a processor configured to execute a hash function to generate respective hash values ​​associated with the secure document smart contracts, the respective hash values ​​being stored in a blockchain secure archive and linked to the secure document smart contracts in the blockchain secure archive for printing an item authentication.

55. 55. The system of claim 54, wherein the respective hash values ​​are associated with the first identifier of the smart paper and the second identifier of the smart paper container.

56. 55. The system of claim 54, wherein the respective hash values ​​are associated with the first identifier of the smart paper, the second identifier of the smart paper container, the third identifier of the authorized printing device, and the reader identifier.

57. 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the authorized printing device is a 3D printing device.

58. 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the first identifier of the smart paper is configured to include a material lot number of the smart paper.

59. 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the second identifier of the smart paper container is configured to replace or include the container product number of the smart paper container.

60. 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the MTP is manufactured in a process that eliminates eddy currents to enhance MTP read distance.

61. 61. The system of claim 60, wherein the process comprises applying an active or passive monolithic layer to an MTP wafer by liquid, gel, or solid medium, followed by thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry.

62. 62. The system of claim 61, wherein the passive monolithic layer comprises a glass or filled glass structure.

63. 53. The system of claim 52, wherein the smart paper further comprises a 2D security mark, an RFID tag, or a combination thereof.

64. 1. A system for generating secure smart contracts, comprising: a plurality of super anchors, each super anchor comprising an electromagnetic radiation triggered micro transponder (MTP) having an identifier, each MTP linked to its respective identifier and registered in the security system; at least one super anchor having a first identifier; an authorized 3D printing device that is registered in a security system and has embedded therein a second MTP having a second identifier, wherein the 3D printer: receiving secure content and printing instructions from a user over a network; generating a 3D printed article for the secure smart contract based on the secure document content and printing instructions; configured to: an identifier reader registered in the security system using a reader identifier, wherein the identifier reader is incorporated into the authorized printing device and configured to read at least the first super anchor to obtain the first identifier; A system comprising:

65. 65. The system of claim 64, wherein the 3D printed article comprises the first super anchor and a 2D laser mark.

66. 65. The system of claim 64, wherein the 3D printed article includes the first super anchor without a 2D laser mark.

67. 1. A method for monitoring a continuous medium, comprising: configuring a super anchor having a first identifier, the super anchor comprising an electromagnetic radiation triggered micro transponder (MTP); Dispersing the super anchor in the continuous medium; illuminating the super anchor device with an identifier reader at a first time when the super anchor is at a first location within the continuous medium; receiving and decoding, by the identifier reader, a first response signal from the super anchor; storing first data indicative of the first time and the first position in response to the first response signal; illuminating the super anchor device with the identifier reader at a second time when the super anchor is at a second location within the continuous medium; receiving and decoding, by the identifier reader, a second response signal from the super anchor; storing second data indicative of the second time and the second position in response to the second response signal; processing the first data and the second data to determine at least one fluid property of the continuous medium; A method comprising:

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