Information processing system, information processing method, and program

The information processing system analyzes log data and communication patterns to identify attack routes in vehicle networks, addressing the challenge of specifying complicit components in multi-stage cyber attacks.

JP7585569B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-19NTT SECURITY (JAPAN) KK
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2021030478
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-02-26
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2041-02-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing systems struggle to identify the components involved in multi-stage cyber attacks on vehicles without specifying the components, making it difficult to understand the factors leading to the attack and potential events that may occur.

Method used

An information processing system that includes an acquisition unit for log data, a configuration information acquisition unit, a component specifying unit, an attack route specifying unit, and an output unit to analyze communication patterns and specify attack routes using a directed graph, facilitating the identification of complicit components.

Benefits of technology

Enables easier identification of components involved in cyber attacks within vehicle networks, clarifying the attack route and factors contributing to the attack.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

To easily estimate a component which takes part in or is engaged in a detected attack, in a system which includes a network and a plurality of components communicating with each other over the network.SOLUTION: An information processing system includes: an acquisition unit which acquires log data of a system including a network and a plurality of components communicating with each other over the network; and an output unit which outputs, when an attack is detected in the system, information on one or more attack paths including information on the components related to a path of the attack, on the basis of the log data and network configuration information of the system.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 4
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to an information processing system, an information processing method, and a program. [Background technology]

[0002] There is a technology that realizes a security operation center (SOC) for vehicles that detects cyber-attacks and other attacks and identifies the scope of their impact by analyzing output data from security sensors installed in vehicles such as automobiles.

[0003] For example, a system is known in which a SOC server detects abnormal operation based on log data transmitted from an in-vehicle network, estimates the scope of the impact, the degree of danger, the type or cause of the threat, etc., and transmits response instructions to the vehicle (see, for example, Patent Document 1). [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0004] [Patent Document 1] JP 2020-119090 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005] In order to take measures against attacks such as cyber attacks, it is desirable to identify the system components involved in or complicating the attack, and then clarify the events that may occur as a result of the attack (which can be derived from the characteristics of those components). In particular, in a system such as a vehicle that is composed of many components, it is difficult to clarify the factors that caused the attack to succeed or the events that may occur as a result of the attack without identifying the system components that participated in or complicate the attack.

[0006] Patent Document 1 discloses, for example, a method of estimating the scope of the influence of an abnormal operation by estimating devices connected on the same bus as a device that generated log data indicating abnormal operation. However, this alone makes it difficult to estimate devices that contributed to or were involved in an attack.

[0007] One embodiment of the present invention has been made in consideration of the above-mentioned problems, and makes it easy to estimate the components that are complicit or involved in an attack when an attack is detected in a system that includes a network and multiple components that communicate via the network. [Means for solving the problem]

[0008] In order to solve the above problems, an information processing system according to an embodiment of the present invention comprises: Installed in a vehicle An acquisition unit that acquires log data of a system including a network and a plurality of components that communicate via the network; vehicle If an attack is detected in a configuration information acquisition unit that acquires network configuration information including information on a communication pattern between the components included in the network corresponding to the vehicle; a component identification unit that identifies the components related to the attack based on log data acquired by the acquisition unit; an attack path identification unit that uses the information on the communication pattern to identify a progression direction of the attack; The attack To Related Components The nodes are the communication paths between the nodes related to the attack, and the links are the directed graph that indicates the direction of the attack. and an output unit that outputs information on one or more attack paths. Effect of the Invention

[0009] According to one embodiment of the present invention, in a system including a network and a number of components communicating via the network, when an attack is detected, it becomes easy to infer the components that are complicit or involved in the attack. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0010] [Figure 1] 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of an overall configuration of an information processing system according to an embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of an in-vehicle network according to an embodiment. [Diagram 3] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of a computer according to an embodiment. [Figure 4] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of a SOC server according to an embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of an estimation unit according to an embodiment. [Figure 6] FIG. 1 is a diagram (1) showing an example of network configuration information according to an embodiment. [Figure 7] FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of network configuration information according to an embodiment; [Figure 8] FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of network configuration information according to an embodiment. [Figure 9] FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of network configuration information according to an embodiment. [Figure 10] FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of network configuration information according to an embodiment. [Figure 11] FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating an example of log data according to an embodiment. [Figure 12] 10 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a process of a SOC server according to an embodiment. [Figure 13] 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a related log extraction process according to an embodiment. [Figure 14] FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining a related log extraction process according to an embodiment; [Figure 15] 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a log data association process according to an embodiment. [Figure 16] 11 is a diagram for explaining an extraction process by indirect comparison according to an embodiment. FIG. [Figure 17] 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a component identification process according to an embodiment. [Figure 18] FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining a process for identifying a component according to an embodiment; [Figure 19] 11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a connection relationship specifying process according to an embodiment. [Figure 20] 11 is a diagram for explaining a process for identifying a connection relationship according to an embodiment; FIG. [Figure 21]11 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a process for identifying an attack path according to an embodiment. [Figure 22] FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining a process for identifying an attack path according to an embodiment; DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0011] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. Note that the embodiment described below is an example, and the embodiment to which the present invention is applied is not limited to the following embodiment.

[0012] <Overall composition> 1 is a diagram showing an example of an overall configuration of an information processing system according to an embodiment. The information processing system 1 includes, for example, a SOC (Security Operation Center) server 10 and a SIRT (Security Incident Response Team) server 40 that can communicate with each other via a communication network.

[0013] The SOC server 10 is an information processing device having a computer configuration, or a system including a plurality of information processing devices. The SOC server 10 acquires, for example, log data of an in-vehicle network 100 transmitted by a vehicle 20 such as an automobile, and performs vehicle security monitoring to detect a cyber-attack on the vehicle 20 and identify the attack path using the acquired log data. For example, when the SOC server 10 detects a cyber-attack on the vehicle 20 (hereinafter simply referred to as an "attack"), it transmits a report including information indicating that the attack has been detected and information on one or more attack paths to the SIRT server 40 or the like.

[0014] Here, the attack path refers to components of the in-vehicle network 100 related to the detected attack path, the connection relationships between the components, the direction of attack, etc. Preferably, the attack path represents the progress of the attack as a directed graph in which the components connected to the in-vehicle network 100 are nodes and the communication paths are links. However, the attack path is not limited to this, and may be represented as an undirected graph that does not include a direction, or may be a list of components that are involved in or contributed to the attack.

[0015] The SOC server 10 acquires the log data 31 transmitted by one or more vehicles 20 from a log server 30 that collects the log data 31 from one or more vehicles 20. However, without being limited to this, the SOC server 10 may acquire the log data 31 transmitted by one or more vehicles 20 from one or more vehicles 20 via a mobile communication network. For example, the function of the log server 30 may be included in the SOC server 10.

[0016] In addition, the SOC server 10 can obtain security information 51 from an external server 50 operated by, for example, Auto-ISAC (Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center) or the like via a communication network such as the Internet. This security information 51 includes various cybersecurity information such as cyber threats and potential vulnerabilities related to connected cars.

[0017] The SOC server 10 may detect an attack on the vehicle 20 based on the acquired log data 31 and security information 51, or may detect an attack on the vehicle 20 based on an attack detection notification sent from the vehicle 20 or the log server 30, etc.

[0018] In addition, the SOC server 10 may have a function of implementing a provisional measure against the vehicle 20 based on the acquired security information 51 or an instruction from the SIRT server 40 when an attack against the vehicle 20 is detected.

[0019] The SIRT server 40 is an information processing device having a computer configuration, or a system including a plurality of information processing devices. The SIRT server 40 is a server operated by an organization (SIRT) that takes security measures against external threats that threaten the safety of products, for example, by vehicle manufacturers or in-vehicle device manufacturers, etc., in order to ensure the safety of products that the manufacturers manufacture and sell. The SIRT is also called a PSIRT (Product Security Incident Response Team).

[0020] The SIRT server 40 has a function of, for example, when a response policy determined for each manufacturer based on a security report transmitted by the SOC server 10 is input, implementing permanent measures including the response policy on the vehicle 20. The SIRT server 40 may also have a function of sharing security information 51 with an external server 50 and instructing the SOC server 10 or the vehicle 20 to take temporary measures on the vehicle 20 based on the security information 51.

[0021] (Example of an in-vehicle network) Fig. 2 shows an example of an in-vehicle network according to an embodiment. Note that the configuration of the in-vehicle network 100 mounted on the vehicle 20 varies depending on the vehicle manufacturer, so the configuration of the in-vehicle network 100 shown in Fig. 2 is merely an example.

[0022] In the example of FIG. 2, the in-vehicle network 100 includes a plurality of networks such as an information system NW (network) 210, a drive system NW 220, a chassis system NW 230, a body system NW 240, . . . , an external communication device 260, an ODB-2 connector 270, a gateway 200, and the like.

[0023] The information network 210 includes one or more ECUs (Electronic Control Units) connected to a bus (communication path) 211 such as Ethernet (registered trademark), CAN (Control Area Network) (registered trademark), or MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport) (registered trademark). The ECU is an electronic control device that realizes a predetermined control function by executing a predetermined program. The ECUs 201a and 201b connected to the information network 210 include, for example, in-vehicle devices such as IVI (In-Vehicle Infotainment) that realize the provision of information and entertainment in the vehicle 20. The IVI has, for example, functions such as car navigation, audio, video player, and vehicle setting, as well as communication functions such as USB (Universal Serial Bus), Bluetooth (registered trademark), and wireless LAN (Local Area Network).

[0024] The drive system NW 220 includes one or more ECUs 250c, 250d, etc., connected to a bus (communication path) 221 such as CAN or FlexRay (registered trademark). The ECUs 250c, 250d connected to the drive system NW 220 are connected to, for example, sensors and actuators, and control an engine, brakes, motor, etc. by executing a predetermined program.

[0025] The chassis system NW 230 includes one or more ECUs 250e, 250f, etc., connected to a bus (communication path) 231 such as a CAN or a FlexRay. The ECUs 250e, 250f connected to the chassis system NW 230 are connected to, for example, sensors and actuators, etc., and control steering, suspension, etc. by executing a predetermined program.

[0026] The body system NW 240 includes one or more ECUs 250g, 250h, etc., connected to a bus (communication path) 241 such as a CAN or a LIN (Local Interconnect Network). The ECUs 250g, 250h connected to the body system NW 240 are connected to, for example, sensors and actuators, etc., and mainly control interior components such as an air conditioner, doors, and lamps by executing a predetermined program. In the following description, "ECU 250" is used to indicate any ECU among the ECUs 250a to 250h.

[0027] The external communication device 260 includes a mobile communication device 261 connected to the gateway 200 by a network (communication path) 265 such as Ethernet, and a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication device 262. The mobile communication device 261 connects to a communication network 202 via a mobile communication network 201 such as LTE (Long Term Evolution) or 5G (5th Generation), and communicates with the log server 30, the SOC server 10, the SIRT server 40, or the like. The V2X communication device 262 performs vehicle-to-vehicle communication, road-to-vehicle communication, or pedestrian-to-vehicle communication, for example, by Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) communication, cellular V2X communication, or the like.

[0028] The OBD-2 connector 270 is a connector for connecting a diagnostic device for performing fault diagnosis to the in-vehicle network 100 .

[0029] The gateway 200 is connected to an information system NW 210, a drive system NW 220, a chassis system NW 230, a body system NW 240, an external communication device 260, and an OBD-2 connector 270, and is a relay device that transfers data between networks and converts protocols.

[0030] Note that the gateway 200, the mobile communication device 261, the V2X communication device 262, and the like may be realized by, for example, the ECU 250. In the following description, components that communicate via the in-vehicle network 100, such as the multiple ECUs 250, the gateway 200, the mobile communication device 261, the V2X communication device 262, and the OBD-2 connector 270, may be simply referred to as "components."

[0031] (Regarding log data) Components included in the in-vehicle network 100, such as the gateway 200, the external communication device 260, and the ECU 250, have the function of continuously acquiring log data indicating their own operation history, etc., and transmitting the acquired log data to a log server 30, etc.

[0032] For example, security sensors such as a firewall, an IDS (Intrusion Detection System), an antivirus, a message filter, or an error sensor are implemented in the gateway 200. When a predetermined event (e.g., an error) occurs in these security sensors, the gateway 200 generates log data including information about the event that has occurred, and transmits the generated log data to the log server 30 or the like at a predetermined timing.

[0033] Similarly, security sensors such as a firewall, an IDS, an antivirus, a message filter, or an error sensor are also implemented in the external communication device 260 and the ECU 250. When a predetermined event (e.g., an error) occurs in these security sensors, the external communication device 260 and the ECU 250 generate log data including information on the event that has occurred, and transmit the generated log data to the log server 30 or the like at a predetermined timing.

[0034] In addition, the mobile communication device 261 of the in-vehicle network 100 may store the generated log data in a memory unit or the like, and transmit the log data stored in the memory unit or the like in a lump to the log server 30 or the like at a predetermined timing.

[0035] (Processing Overview) For example, in order to take measures against an attack on the in-vehicle network 100, it is desirable to identify the components of the system that contributed to or were involved in the attack and then clarify the events that may occur as a result of the attack, in an attack consisting of multiple stages. In particular, in the in-vehicle network 100 and the like that includes multiple networks and communication protocols as shown in Fig. 2, it is difficult to clarify the cause of the success of the attack and the events that may occur as a result of the attack without identifying the components of the system that contributed to or were involved in the attack.

[0036] Patent Document 1 discloses, for example, estimating the range of influence of an abnormal operation on devices connected on the same bus as a device that has generated log data indicating an abnormal operation. However, with this method, for example, when an error is detected in the information system NW 210 in Fig. 2, only ECUs 250a, 250b, ... connected to the bus 211 of the information system NW 210 are listed, and it is not possible to identify the components of the system that have contributed to or been involved in the attack.

[0037] Therefore, the SOC server 10 according to this embodiment has a function of listing possible attack paths when an attack is detected in the in-vehicle network 100 as shown in FIG. 2, for example.

[0038] For example, the SOC server 10 stores in advance in a storage unit or the like network configuration information related to the network configuration of the in-vehicle network 100 as shown in Fig. 2. Alternatively, the SOC server 10 may acquire the network configuration information of the in-vehicle network 100 from the vehicle 20, an external server 50, or the like.

[0039] Furthermore, when an attack is detected in the in-vehicle network 100, the SOC server 10 outputs information on one or more attack paths including information on components related to the attack path based on the log data and network configuration information of the in-vehicle network 100. Preferably, the SOC server 10 outputs the information on the attack path in the form of a directed graph in which the components related to the attack are nodes and the communication paths between the nodes related to the attack are links. Note that a method for outputting the information on the attack path will be described later with a specific embodiment as an example.

[0040] As a result, according to the information processing system 1 of this embodiment, when an attack is detected in an in-vehicle network 100 that includes a network and multiple components that communicate via the network, it becomes easy to estimate the components that are complicit or involved in the attack.

[0041] Note that, like the in-vehicle network 100, this embodiment can also be applied to other information processing systems capable of identifying network configuration information.

[0042] <Hardware configuration> The ECU 250, the gateway 200, the mobile communication device 261, the V2X communication device 262, and the like in Fig. 2 each have a hardware configuration of a computer 300 as shown in Fig. 3. Also, the SOC server 10, the SIRT server 40, the log server 30, the external server 50, and the like in Fig. 1 each are configured by one or more computers 300, for example.

[0043] 3 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration of a computer according to an embodiment. The computer 300 has, for example, a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 301, a memory 302, a storage device 303, a network I / F (Interface) 304, and an internal bus 305. The computer 300 may further have an external connection I / F 306, an output device 307, an input device 308, a communication device 309, or the like.

[0044] The CPU 301 is a processor that realizes various functions by executing programs stored in a storage medium such as the memory 302 or the storage device 303. The memory 302 includes a random access memory (RAM) that is a volatile memory used by the CPU 301 as a temporary storage area, and a read only memory (ROM) that is a non-volatile memory that stores programs for starting the CPU 301. The storage device 303 is a large-capacity storage device such as a solid state drive (SSD) or a hard disk drive (HDD). The network I / F 304 includes one or more interfaces that connect the computer 300 to a network such as the communication network 202 or the in-vehicle network 100.

[0045] The external connection I / F 306 is an interface for connecting an external device to the computer 300. Various devices such as a sensor, an actuator, an information terminal, or an external memory can be connected to the external connection I / F 306. The output device 307 is an output device (e.g., a display, a speaker, or a lamp) that outputs to the outside. The input device 308 is an input device (e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a microphone, a switch, a button, or a sensor) that accepts input from the outside. The input device 308 and the output device 307 may be an integrated input / output device (e.g., a touch panel display, etc.). The communication device 309 is a communication device that performs various communications such as mobile communications such as LTE, 5G, wireless LAN communications, or short-range wireless communications such as Bluetooth. The internal bus 305 is commonly connected to each of the above components and transmits, for example, address signals, data signals, and various control signals.

[0046] <Functional configuration> (SOC server functional configuration) 4 is a diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the SOC server according to an embodiment. The SOC server 10 realizes an acquisition unit 401, an estimation unit 402, an output unit 403, etc. by executing a predetermined program on one or more computers 300 included in the SOC server 10. At least a part of the above functional configurations may be realized by hardware.

[0047] As an example, the SOC server 10 stores the network configuration information 410 in a storage unit such as the storage device 303 in Fig. 3. As another example, the network configuration information 410 may be stored in a storage server or the like external to the SOC server 10.

[0048] The acquisition unit 401 executes an acquisition process to acquire log data 31 transmitted by the in-vehicle network 100 of one or more vehicles 20, for example, from the log server 30. Note that the in-vehicle network 100 is an example of a system including a network and a plurality of components that communicate via the network.

[0049] When an attack is detected in the in-vehicle network 100, the output unit 403 executes an output process to output information on one or more attack paths, including information on components related to the attack path, based on the log data acquired by the acquisition unit 401 and the network configuration information 410.

[0050] The estimation unit 402 performs an estimation process to estimate one or more attack paths including information on components related to the attack path by associating log data for a predetermined period of time from the log data 31 acquired by the acquisition unit 401.

[0051] With the above configuration, the output unit 403 outputs, for example, a report including information on one or more attack paths estimated by the estimation unit 402 based on the log data 31 and the network configuration information 410 to the SIRT server 40 or the like.

[0052] 4 is an example. For example, the function of the estimation unit 402 may be included in the output unit 403. The SOC server 10 may have a function of detecting an attack based on the log data 31, and may detect an attack on the in-vehicle network 100 without receiving an attack detection notification from outside. Furthermore, the estimation unit 402 may acquire only network configuration information corresponding to the vehicle 20 in which an attack has been detected from outside the SOC server (for example, the external server 50 or the vehicle 20).

[0053] As a modified example, the output unit 403 may estimate and output information on one or more attack paths using an estimation model that has been machine-learned in advance using the network configuration information and log data of the attacked vehicle 20 as learning data and the information on the attack paths as teacher data. In this case, the SOC server 10 may not have the estimation unit 402 because it can obtain information on one or more attack paths by inputting the network configuration information and log data of the vehicle 20 in which an attack has been detected into the trained estimation model.

[0054] (Functional configuration of the estimation unit) 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of an estimation unit according to an embodiment. The estimation unit 402 includes, for example, a configuration information acquisition unit 501, a related log extraction unit 502, a configuration element identification unit 503, a connection relationship identification unit 504, and an attack path identification unit 505.

[0055] The configuration information acquisition unit 501 acquires network configuration information corresponding to the vehicle 20 in which an attack has been detected, from the network configuration information 410 stored in advance in, for example, the storage device 303 of the SOC server 10. Note that the configuration information acquisition unit 501 may acquire network configuration information corresponding to the vehicle 20 in which an attack has been detected, from, for example, the external server 50, the vehicle 20, or the like.

[0056] The network configuration information 410 includes, for example, a topology information DB (Database) 411, a network information DB 412, an application information DB 413, an ECU information DB 414, and a communication pattern DB 415, as shown in FIG.

[0057] 6 to 10 are diagrams illustrating an example of network configuration information according to an embodiment. Fig. 6(A) illustrates an example of a topology information DB 411 according to an embodiment. The topology information DB 411 stores topology information of the in-vehicle networks 100 of a plurality of vehicles 20.

[0058] 6A, the topology information DB 411 includes items of information on a vehicle identification number, a node X, and a node Y. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20, and may be, for example, a vehicle identification number (VIN). The node X indicates a component (such as an ECU) at the connection source, and the node Y indicates a component at the connection destination.

[0059] In the topology information DB 411 shown in Fig. 6(A), the in-vehicle network 100 of the vehicle 20 with the vehicle identification number "JP0000000000000001" indicates that the node X "TCU601" is connected to the node Y "CGW602" as shown in Fig. 6(B). Similarly, it is indicated that the node X "CGW602" is connected to two nodes Y "IVI603" and "ENGINE604".

[0060] The topology information DB 411 may be stored in a graph format in which components such as the TCU 601, CGW 602, IVI 603, and ENGINE 604 are treated as nodes, and connections between the components are represented by links 611, 612, and 613, as shown in FIG. 6B.

[0061] 7A and 7B show an example of the network information DB 412 according to an embodiment. The network information DB 412 stores information on communication paths connecting to each ECU (an example of a component) included in the in-vehicle network 100 of a plurality of vehicles 20.

[0062] In the example of FIG. 7(A), the network information DB 412-1 includes items of information such as a vehicle identification number, an ECU, an Ethernet (registered trademark) interface, and an Ethernet segment. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20, as described above. The ECU is the name or identification information of a component connected to the in-vehicle network 100. The Ethernet interface is the name or identification information of an Ethernet interface possessed by each component. The Ethernet segment is the name or identification information of an Ethernet segment (the smallest unit of a physical network in which communication is performed in an Ethernet interface) to which each component is connected via an Ethernet interface.

[0063] 7A shows, for example, that the Ethernet interface "eth0" of the ECU "TCU" of the vehicle 20 having the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" is connected to the Ethernet segment "Ethernet-0." Similarly, it shows that the Ethernet interface "eth0" of the ECU "CGW" is connected to the Ethernet segment "Ethernet-0."

[0064] In the example of Fig. 7(B), the network information DB 412-2 includes items of information such as a vehicle identification number, an ECU, a CAN interface, and a CAN bus. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20 as described above. The ECU is the name or identification information of a component connected to the in-vehicle network 100. The CAN interface is the name or identification information of a CAN interface possessed by each component. The CAN bus is the name or identification information of a CAN bus to which each component is connected via a CAN interface.

[0065] 7B shows, for example, that the CAN interface "can0" of the ECU "CGW" and "IVI" of the vehicle 20 having the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" is connected to the CAN bus "CAN-0". It also shows that the CAN interface "can1" of the ECU "CGW" is also connected to the CAN bus "CAN-1", and the CAN interface "can0" of the ECU "ENGINE" is connected to the CAN bus "CAN-1". In this way, the network information DB 412 may be composed of a plurality of network information DBs 412-1 and 412-2.

[0066] 8A and 8B show an example of the application information DB 413 according to an embodiment. The application information DB 413 stores information on communication paths corresponding to each application (another example of a component) included in the in-vehicle network 100 of the multiple vehicles 20, identification information, and the like.

[0067] In the example of Fig. 8(A), the application information DB 413-1 includes items such as a vehicle identification number, an Ethernet segment, an application identifier, and an application. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20 as described above. The Ethernet segment is information indicating the name or identification information of an Ethernet segment to which an ECU that executes an application is connected. The application identification information is identification information for identifying an application. The application is information indicating the name, function, etc. of an application.

[0068] The application information DB413-1 shown in Figure 8 (A) indicates, for example, that an ECU executing the application "traffic jam information notification" in vehicle 20 with vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" is connected to the Ethernet segment "Ethernet-0."

[0069] In the example of FIG. 8(B), the application information DB 413-2 includes items such as vehicle identification number, CAN bus, CAN ID, and application. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20 as described above. The CAN bus is information indicating the name or identification information of the CAN bus to which the ECU that executes the application is connected. The CAN ID is information indicating the CAN ID used by the application. The CAN ID is an identifier that indicates the data content and the destination node, etc., contained in the data transmitted via the CAN bus. The application is information indicating the name or function, etc. of the application.

[0070] 8(B) indicates that an ECU that executes an application "rotation speed notification" in vehicle 20 with vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" is connected to CAN bus "CAN-0" and uses CAN ID "0x192". In this manner, application information DB 413 may be composed of a plurality of application information DBs 413-1, 413-2.

[0071] 9A and 9B show an example of the ECU information DB 414 according to an embodiment. The ECU information DB 414 stores communication addresses or identification information corresponding to the components included in the in-vehicle networks of the multiple vehicles 20.

[0072] 9(A), the ECU information DB 414-1 includes items such as a vehicle identification number, a MAC address, and information on an ECU. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20 as described above. The MAC (Media Access Control) address is information indicating a MAC address assigned to an ECU. The ECU is information indicating a name, identification information, etc. of an ECU (an example of a component) connected to the in-vehicle network 100.

[0073] The ECU information DB 414-1 shown in FIG. 9A indicates, for example, that the MAC address of the ECU "TCU" in the vehicle 20 having the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" is "02:00:00:00:01:01".

[0074] 9B, the ECU information DB 414-2 includes items such as a vehicle identification number, an IP address, and information on an ECU. The vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20 as described above. The IP (Internet Protocol) address is information indicating an IP address assigned to an ECU. The ECU is information indicating the name or identification information of an ECU (an example of a component) connected to the in-vehicle network 100.

[0075] 9B shows, for example, that the IP address of the ECU "CGW" in the vehicle 20 having the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" is "192.168.0.2." In this way, the ECU information DB 414 may be made up of a plurality of ECU information DBs 414-1, 414-2.

[0076] 10A and 10B show an example of the communication pattern information DB 415 according to an embodiment. The communication pattern information DB 415 stores information on communication patterns between components included in the in-vehicle networks of a plurality of vehicles 20.

[0077] In the example of Fig. 10(A), the communication pattern information DB 415-1 includes items such as information on the vehicle identification number, the CAN bus, the CAN ID, and the receiving ECU. As described above, the vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20. The CAN bus is information indicating the name or identification information of the CAN bus to which the receiving ECU is connected. The CAN ID is information indicating the CAN ID of the CAN data received by the receiving ECU. The receiving ECU is information indicating the name or identification information of the ECU that receives the CAN data.

[0078] The communication pattern information DB415-1 shown in Figure 10 (A) indicates, for example, that in vehicle 20 with vehicle identification number "JP0000000000000001", the receiving ECU receiving data with CAN ID "0x192" on CAN bus "CAN-0" is "IVI".

[0079] In the example of FIG. 9(B), the communication pattern information DB 415-2 includes items of information such as a vehicle identification number, a source IP address, a destination IP address, an IP protocol, a source port number, and a destination port number. As described above, the vehicle identification number is identification information for identifying the vehicle 20. The source IP address is the IP address of the source component. The destination IP address is the IP address of the destination component. The IP protocol is information indicating a communication protocol such as UDP (User Datagram Protocol) or TCP (Transmission Control Protocol). The source port number is information indicating the port number of the source. The destination port number is information indicating the port number of the destination.

[0080] 10B shows that there is a communication pattern in which, for example, in a vehicle 20 having a vehicle identification number "JP0000000000000001", transmission is performed with a source IP address "192.168.0.1" and a destination IP address "192.168.0.2". In addition, in this communication pattern, it is shown that communication is performed with an IP protocol "UDP" and a destination port number "31000". In this way, the communication pattern information DB 415 may be composed of a plurality of communication pattern information DBs 415-1 and 415-2.

[0081] Returning now to FIG. 5, the description of the functional configuration of the estimation unit 402 will be continued.

[0082] The configuration information acquisition unit 501 acquires, for example, the network configuration information corresponding to the vehicle identification number of the vehicle 20 in which an attack has been detected, from the network configuration information 410 described with reference to FIGS.

[0083] The related log extraction unit 502 extracts log data related to the detected attack from the log data 31 acquired by the acquisition unit 401. For example, the related log extraction unit 502 acquires log data corresponding to the vehicle identification number of the vehicle 20 in which the attack was detected from the log data 31 acquired by the acquisition unit 401. In addition, the related log extraction unit 502 acquires log data for a predetermined period set in advance from the log data corresponding to the vehicle identification number of the vehicle 20 in which the attack was detected.

[0084] Preferably, the related log extraction unit 502 associates the extracted multiple pieces of log data by using the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501. For example, the related log extraction unit 502 extracts log data related to the detected attack by directly or indirectly comparing the extracted multiple pieces of log data with items that are predefined as comparable.

[0085] The component identifying unit 503 executes a component identifying process for identifying a component (such as an ECU) related to the detected attack from the log data extracted by the related log extracting unit 502 .

[0086] The connection relationship identifying unit 504 executes a connection identification process for identifying the connection relationships between the components identified by the component identifying unit 503, using the topology information included in the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquiring unit 501.

[0087] The attack path identification unit 505 uses communication pattern information included in the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501, and the detection date and time of the log data, etc., to execute an attack path identification process for identifying the progression direction of an attack in the connection relationship identified by the connection relationship identification unit 504. Note that the component identification process executed by the component identification unit 503, the connection relationship identification process executed by the connection relationship identification unit 504, and the attack path identification process executed by the attack path identification unit 505 will be described later with specific examples of embodiments.

[0088] (Example of log data) Fig. 11 is a diagram showing an example of log data according to an embodiment. In the example of Fig. 11, the log data 31 includes items such as detection date and time, vehicle identification information, sensor name, ECU name, input interface name, output interface name, source MAC address, destination MAC address, application identifier, CAN ID, and detection event.

[0089] The detection date and time is information indicating the date and time when a predetermined detection event was detected. The vehicle identification number is information indicating the vehicle identification number of the vehicle 20 in which the detection event was detected. The sensor name is information indicating the name or function, etc. of the security sensor that detected the detection event. The ECU name is information indicating the name or identification information, etc. of the ECU that detected the detection event.

[0090] The input interface name is information indicating the name or identification information of the interface through which the data was input when the detection of the detection event is caused by the input of data in the ECU. The output interface name is information indicating the name or identification information of the interface that output the data when the detection of the detection event is caused by the output of data in the ECU. The source MAC address is information indicating the source MAC address included in the data that detected the detection event. The destination MAC address is information indicating the destination MAC address included in the data that detected the detection event.

[0091] The application identifier is information indicating an application identifier included in the data in which a detection event is detected. The CAN ID is information indicating a CAN ID included in the data in which a detection event is detected. The detection event is information indicating the name or identification information of the detected detection event.

[0092] Each record of the log data 31 stores log data transmitted to the log server by an ECU that detects a predetermined detection event, for example, when the detection event is detected in the in-vehicle network 100 of the vehicle 20.

[0093] <Processing flow> Next, the process flow of the information processing method according to this embodiment will be described.

[0094] (SOC server processing) Fig. 12 is a flowchart showing an example of processing by the SOC server according to an embodiment. Here, an overview of the processing executed by the SOC server 10 and the estimation unit 402 described in Figs. 4 and 5 will be described. The detailed processing content will be described later with reference to Figs. 13 to 21.

[0095] In step S1201, when the SOC server 10 receives an attack detection notification indicating that an attack has been detected from, for example, the log server 30 or the vehicle 20, the SOC server 10 executes the processes from step S1202 onward. Note that the attack detection notification includes information such as, for example, the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the attacked vehicle 20 and the detection time when the attack was detected.

[0096] In step S1202, the acquisition unit 401 acquires log data 31 as shown in FIG. 11 from, for example, the log server 30 or the like.

[0097] In step S1203, the configuration information acquisition unit 501 of the estimation unit 402 acquires, from each of the DBs 411 to 415 included in the network configuration information 410, network configuration information corresponding to the vehicle identification number of the attacked vehicle 20 included in the attack detection notification.

[0098] In step S1204, the related log extraction unit 502 of the estimation unit 402 executes a related log extraction process to extract log data related to the attack from the log data 31 acquired by the acquisition unit 401.

[0099] In step S1205, the component identification unit 503 of the estimation unit 402 executes a component identification process to identify components related to the attack, using the log data extracted by the related log extraction unit 502 and the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501.

[0100] In step S1206, the connection relationship identification unit 504 of the estimation unit 402 executes a connection relationship identification process to identify the connection relationships between the components identified by the component identification unit 503, using the topology information included in the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501.

[0101] In step S1207, the attack path identification unit 505 of the estimation unit 402 executes an attack path identification process to identify the direction of attack based on the communication pattern information included in the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 or the detection date and time of the log data.

[0102] In step S1208, the output unit 403 of the SOC server 10 outputs information on one or more attack paths estimated by the estimation unit 402. For example, the output unit 403 outputs to the SIRT server 40 or the like a report listing one or more attack paths in which the progress of the attack is expressed in a directed graph, with components related to the detected attack as nodes and communication paths used in the progress of the attack as links.

[0103] (Related log extraction process) 13 is a flowchart showing an example of related log extraction processing according to an embodiment of the present invention, which shows an example of related log extraction processing executed by the related log extractor 502 in step S1204 in FIG.

[0104] In step S1301, the related log extraction unit 502 acquires log data of the vehicle 20 in which an attack has been detected from the log data 31 acquired by the acquisition unit 401. The log data 31 acquired by the acquisition unit 401 includes, for example, a plurality of log data 1401-1406 having different vehicle identification numbers, as shown in Fig. 14(A). For example, when the vehicle identification number included in the attack notification is "JP0000000000000001", the related log extraction unit 502 selectively acquires the log data 1401, 1402, 1404-1406 including the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" from among the plurality of log data 1401-1406.

[0105] In step S1302, the related log extraction unit 502 determines whether or not the log data of the vehicle 20 in which the attack was detected in step S1301 was acquired, and if the log data was acquired, the process proceeds to step S1303. On the other hand, if the log data of the vehicle 20 in which the attack was detected was not acquired in step S1301, the related log extraction unit 502 ends the process in FIG.

[0106] When the process proceeds to step S1303, the related log extraction unit 502 extracts log data within a predetermined period from the log data acquired in step S1301. For example, as shown in FIG. 4B, the log data 1401, 1402, 1404 to 1406 acquired in step S1301 includes information on the detection date and time. The related log extraction unit 502 excludes log data (e.g., log data 1406) that has elapsed a predetermined period from the log data 1401, 1402, 1404 to 1406, and selectively acquires the log data 1401, 1402, 1404, and 1405 within the predetermined period. This allows the related log extraction unit 502 to exclude old data that is less related to the detected attack.

[0107] In step S1304, the related log extraction unit 502 determines whether or not log data within the predetermined period was acquired in step S1303, and if log data was acquired, the process proceeds to step S1305. On the other hand, if log data within the predetermined period was not acquired in step S1303, the related log extraction unit 502 ends the process in FIG.

[0108] In step S1305, the related log extraction unit 502 associates the log data extracted in step S1303 with each other, using the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501. For example, the related log extraction unit 502 executes a log data association process as shown in FIG.

[0109] Fig. 15 is a flowchart showing an example of a log data association process according to an embodiment. This process shows an example of a process that the related log extraction unit 502 executes in step S1305 in Fig. 13 on the extracted log data acquired in step S1303 in Fig. 13.

[0110] In step S1501, the related log extraction unit 502 acquires one piece of log data from among the log data extracted in step S1303 that has not yet been acquired.

[0111] In step S1502, the related log extraction unit 502 determines whether or not the log data has been acquired, and if the log data has been acquired, the process proceeds to step S1503. On the other hand, if the related log extraction unit 502 has not been able to acquire the log data, the process proceeds to step S1505.

[0112] In step S1503, the related log extraction unit 502 directly compares the acquired one log data with the other log data extracted in step S1303 of FIG. 13, and extracts other log data related to the acquired one log data.

[0113] For example, the related log extraction unit 502 compares the value of an item predefined as "directly comparable" in one acquired log data with the value of an item having the same meaning as the predefined item in each of the other log data, and determines whether the values ​​match. If the values ​​match, the related log extraction unit 502 extracts other log data containing the matching value. Note that, for example, among the items included in the log data 31 shown in FIG. 11, for example, the source MAC address, destination MAC address, application identifier, or CAN ID are predefined as "directly comparable".

[0114] In step S1504, the related log extraction unit 502 indirectly compares the acquired one log data with other log data not extracted in step S1503, and extracts other log data related to the acquired one log data.

[0115] For example, the related log extraction unit 502 searches for predefined network configuration information (e.g., network information, application information, etc.) using the value of an item predefined as "indirectly comparable" as a key in one acquired log data. The related log extraction unit 502 also compares the value obtained by the search with the value of an item included in other log data that was not extracted in step S1503, and if the values ​​match, extracts other log data that includes the matching value.

[0116] Fig. 16 is a diagram for explaining extraction processing by indirect comparison according to one embodiment. Here, an example will be described in which the log data 1401 and the log data 1402 extracted in Fig. 14(B) do not have directly comparable items, and therefore an indirect comparison is performed. Note that it is assumed here that the configuration information acquisition unit 501 has already acquired, as network configuration information, records corresponding to the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" from each DB as shown in Figs. 6 to 10.

[0117] The related log extraction unit 502 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, for example, the ECU name "CGW" and the input interface name "eth0" in the log data 1401 as keys. This searches for, for example, network information 1601 as shown in Fig. 16. From this network information 1601, it is found that the log data 1401 is log data related to the Ethernet segment "Ethernet-0".

[0118] Next, the related log extraction unit 502 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using the Ethernet segment "Ethernet-0" and, for example, an application identifier "0x123" in the log data 1401 as keys. This searches for, for example, application information 1602 as shown in Fig. 16. The related log extraction unit 502 can indirectly identify, based on this application information 1602, that the log data 1401 is log data relating to the application "traffic jam information notification."

[0119] Similarly, the related log extraction unit 502 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, for example, the ECU name "CGW" and the output interface name "can0" in the log data 1402 as keys. This searches for, for example, network information 1611 as shown in Fig. 16. From this network information 1611, it is determined that the log data 1402 is log data related to the CAN bus "CAN-0".

[0120] Next, the related log extraction unit 502 searches for the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using the CAN bus "CAN-0" and, for example, the CAN ID "0x2e8" in the log data 1402 as keys. As a result, for example, application information 1612 as shown in FIG. 16 is searched for. The related log extraction unit 502 can indirectly specify, based on this application information 1612, that the log data 1402 is also log data relating to the application "traffic jam information notification." In this case, the related log extraction unit 502 extracts the log data 1402 as log data related to the log data 1401.

[0121] Returning now to FIG. 15, the explanation of the flowchart will continue.

[0122] When the process of step S1504 ends, the related log extraction unit 502 executes the processes of steps S1501 and S1502 again, and when there is no unacquired log data, the process proceeds to step S1505.

[0123] In step S1505, the related log extraction unit 502 outputs the log data extracted in steps S1503 and S1504 to the component identification unit 503 and the like as log data related to the detected attack (hereinafter referred to as related log data).

[0124] (Identification of components) 17 is a flowchart showing an example of a component identification process according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is executed by the component identification unit 503 in step S1205 of FIG.

[0125] In step S1701, the component identifying unit 503 acquires one piece of log data from among the unacquired log data among the related log data extracted by the related log extracting unit 502.

[0126] In step S1702, the component identification unit 503 determines whether or not the log data was acquired in step S1701, and if the log data was acquired, the process proceeds to step S1703. On the other hand, if the component identification unit 503 cannot acquire the log data in step S1701, the process proceeds to step S1706.

[0127] In step S1703, the component identification unit 503 acquires the ECU name written in the acquired log data.

[0128] In step S1704, the component identification unit 503 determines whether the acquired log data is communication-related log data. For example, the component identification unit 503 determines that log data including items such as a source address, a destination address, or a CAN ID among the items of the log data 31 shown in FIG. 11 is communication-related log data. If the acquired log data is communication-related log data, the component identification unit 503 shifts the process to step S1705. On the other hand, if the acquired log data is not communication-related log data, the component identification unit 503 returns the process to step S1701.

[0129] In step S1705, the component identification unit 503 acquires the names of the communication source and destination ECUs from the communication-related log data. For example, the component identification unit 503 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using the source address, destination address, CAN ID, or the like as a key from among the items of the log data 31 shown in Fig. 11, and acquires the names of the ECUs related to the communication.

[0130] Fig. 18 is a diagram for explaining a process for identifying a component according to an embodiment. Here, an example will be described in which the component identifying unit 503 acquires the name of a communication source or destination ECU from communication-related log data 1401, 1402 as shown in Fig. 18. Note that it is assumed here that the configuration information acquiring unit 501 has already acquired, as network configuration information, a record corresponding to the vehicle identification number "JP000000000000001" from each DB as shown in Figs. 6 to 10.

[0131] The component identification unit 503 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, for example, the source MAC address "02:00:00:00:01:01" and the destination MAC address "02:00:00:00:01:02" in the log data 1401 as keys. This searches for, for example, ECU information 1801 as shown in Fig. 18. In this case, the component identification unit 503 acquires the ECUs "TCU" and "CGW" included in the ECU information 1801 as ECUs related to the attack path.

[0132] Similarly, the component identification unit 503 searches for the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, for example, the ECU name "CGW", the output interface name "can0", and the CAN ID "0x28" in the log data 1402 as keys. This searches for, for example, network information 1802 and communication pattern information 1803 as shown in Fig. 18. In this case, since the network information 1802 and the communication pattern information 1803 have the CAN bus "CAN-0" as a common item, the component identification unit 503 associates these two pieces of information and acquires the receiving ECU "IVI" as an ECU related to the attack path.

[0133] Returning now to FIG. 17, the explanation of the flowchart will continue.

[0134] When the process of step S1705 ends, the element identifying unit 503 executes the processes of steps S1701 and S1702 again, and when there is no unacquired log data, the element identifying unit 503 moves the process to step S1706.

[0135] In step S1708, the configuration element identifying unit 503 outputs the ECU names acquired in steps S1703 and S1705 to the connection relationship identifying unit 504 and the like as ECUs related to the attack.

[0136] (Connection relationship identification process) 19 is a flowchart showing an example of a process for identifying a connection relationship according to an embodiment. This process shows an example of a process for identifying a connection relationship executed by the connection relationship identifying unit 504 in step S1206 in FIG.

[0137] In step S1901, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 acquires topology information of the in-vehicle network 100 from the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquiring unit 501. For example, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 acquires topology information 600 in a graph format as shown in Fig. 6(B). Alternatively, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 may acquire topology information in a list format as shown in Fig. 6(A) and generate topology information 600 in a graph format as shown in Fig. 6(B).

[0138] In step S1902, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 identifies, from among the nodes included in the acquired topology information 600, for example, nodes corresponding to each of the ECUs 1800 related to the path identified by the component identifying unit 503 in FIG.

[0139] Fig. 20 is a diagram for explaining a process of identifying a connection relationship according to an embodiment. In the example of Fig. 20, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 identifies that an ECU "TCU" included in an ECU 1800 related to a path corresponds to a node "TCU601" in the topology information 600, based on an ECU name "TCU". Similarly, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 identifies that ECUs "CGW" and "IVI" included in an ECU 1800 related to a path correspond to nodes "CGW602" and "IVI603" in the topology information 600, respectively.

[0140] In step S1903 of Fig. 19, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 identifies links connecting the nodes identified in step S1902. In the example of Fig. 20, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 identifies a link 611 connecting the nodes "TCU601" and "CGW602" and a link 612 connecting the nodes "CGW602" and "IVI603". In this process, the node "ENGINE604" and the link 613 that are not related to the attack path are excluded from the topology information 600, and connection relationship information 2010 indicating the nodes and links related to the attack path is obtained as shown in Fig. 20.

[0141] In step S1904, the connection relationship identifying unit 504 outputs the connection relationship information 2010 obtained in the processes of steps S1901 to S1903 to the attack path identifying unit 505 and the like.

[0142] (Identifying attack routes) 21 is a flowchart showing an example of an attack path identification process according to an embodiment. This process shows an example of an attack path identification process executed by the attack path identification unit 505 in step S1207 of FIG.

[0143] In step S2101, the attack path identification unit 505 acquires one piece of connection relationship information from unacquired connection relationship information among one or more pieces of connection relationship information output by the connection relationship identification unit 504. For example, the attack path identification unit 505 acquires connection relationship information 2010 as shown in FIG.

[0144] In step S2102, the attack path identification unit 505 determines whether or not the connection relationship information was acquired in step S2101, and if the connection relationship information was acquired, the process proceeds to step S2103. On the other hand, if the attack path identification unit 505 cannot acquire the connection relationship information in step S2101, the process proceeds to step S2108.

[0145] When proceeding to step S2103, the attack path identification unit 505 acquires, for example, communication-related log data from the related log data extracted by the related log extraction unit 502 in step S1204 of Fig. 12. For example, the attack path identification unit 505 acquires, from the related log data, log data including items such as a source address, a destination address, or a CAN ID as communication-related log data.

[0146] In step S2104, the attack path identification unit 505 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, as a key, values ​​of items such as source address, destination address, or CAN ID included in the communication-related log data. As a result, the attack path identification unit 505 identifies the components that are the communication source or destination in the connection relationship information 2010 acquired in step S2101.

[0147] FIG. 22 is a diagram for explaining an attack path identification process according to an embodiment. In FIG. 22, the attack path identification unit 505 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, for example, the source MAC address "02:00:00:00:01:01" and the destination MAC address "02:00:00:00:01:02" of the log data 1401 as keys. As a result, the attack path identification unit 505 can obtain, for example, ECU information 2201 as shown in FIG. 22 as a search result. In this case, the attack path identification unit 505 can identify, from the search result, the node "TCU601" corresponding to the source MAC address as the source, and the node "CGW602" corresponding to the destination MAC address as the destination.

[0148] Furthermore, the attack path identification unit 505 searches the network configuration information acquired by the configuration information acquisition unit 501 using, for example, the ECU name "CGW", the output interface name "can0", and the CAN ID "0x2e8" of the log data 1402 as keys. As a result, the attack path identification unit 505 can obtain, for example, the network information 2202 and the communication pattern information 2203 as shown in Fig. 22 as search results. In this case, the attack path identification unit 505 can identify the node "IVI603" corresponding to the CAN ID "0x2e8" as the destination from the search results.

[0149] In step S2105 of FIG. 21, the attack path identification unit 505 identifies the direction of the link between the nodes from the communication source and the communication destination identified in step S2104. For example, in FIG. 22, the attack path identification unit 505 updates the link 611 between the nodes "TCU601" and "CGW602" to a directional link from the source to the destination. Similarly, the attack path identification unit 505 updates the link 612 between the nodes "CGW602" and "IVI603" to a directional link to the destination. In this way, the attack path identification unit 505 can create, for example, attack path information 2210 as shown in FIG. 22.

[0150] In step S2106, the attack path identification unit 505 determines whether all links in the attack path information 2210 are directional links, and if all links are not directional links, moves the process to step S2107. On the other hand, if all links in the attack path information 2210 are directional links, the attack path identification unit 505 returns the process to step S2101.

[0151] In step 2102, the attack path identification unit 505 identifies the direction of a link whose direction is not specified among the links included in the attack path information 2210 based on the date and time information of the log data. For example, the attack path identification unit 505 arranges (sorts) the log data including information (e.g., ECU name, CAN ID, etc.) capable of identifying a component among the related log data extracted by the related log extraction unit 502 in ascending (or descending) order by the detection date and time, etc. In addition, the attack path identification unit 505 determines the direction of a link whose direction is not specified among the links included in the attack path information 2210 according to the sorting order. For example, the attack path identification unit 505 determines the direction of a link whose direction is not specified by setting the log data having an earlier detection date and time as the start point and the log data having a later detection date and time as the end point.

[0152] When the process of step S2107 is completed, the attack path identification unit 505 executes the processes of steps S2101 and S2102 again, and when there is no unacquired connection relationship information, the process proceeds to step S2108.

[0153] When the process proceeds to step S2108, the attack path identification unit 505 outputs, to the output unit 403, one or more pieces of attack path information created in the processes of steps S2103 to S2107.

[0154] The output unit 403 of the SOC server 10 outputs a report including one or more pieces of attack path information output by the attack path identification unit 505 to, for example, the SIRT server 40 or the like.

[0155] Through the above processes, when an attack is detected in the in-vehicle network 100, the SOC server 10 outputs information on one or more attack paths including information on components related to the attack path, based on the log data and network configuration information of the in-vehicle network 100. In addition, the SOC server 10 can output the information on the attack path in the form of a directed graph in which the components related to the attack are nodes and the communication paths between the nodes related to the attack are links.

[0156] 1 and the functional configuration of the SOC server 10 described in FIGS. 4 and 5 are merely examples, and various modifications and applications are possible. For example, at least a part of the functional configurations of the SOC server 10 may be provided in the SIRT server 40, the vehicle 20, the log server 30, the external server 50, or the like. In addition, the SOC server 10 may output a report including information on one or more attack paths not only to the SIRT server 40 but also to, for example, the vehicle 20 or the external server 50, or the like.

[0157] Furthermore, the information processing system and the information processing method according to the present embodiment are not limited to the in-vehicle network 100 mounted on the vehicle 20, but can also be applied to other communication networks capable of identifying network configuration information.

[0158] Furthermore, the one or more pieces of attack path information including information on components related to the detected attack path output by the SOC server 10 is not limited to the attack path information 2210 as shown in Fig. 22, and may be, for example, the connection relationship information 2010 as shown in Fig. 20. The one or more pieces of attack path information including information on components related to the detected attack path output by the SOC server 10 may be information in a list format in which information on components related to the attack is arranged in chronological order.

[0159] As described above, according to the embodiment of the present invention, in a system including a network and multiple components that communicate via the network, when an attack is detected, it becomes easy to estimate the components that are complicit or involved in the attack.

[0160] Although one embodiment of the present invention has been described in detail above, the present invention can be modified and applied in various ways within the scope of the gist described in the claims. [Explanation of symbols]

[0161] 1. Information Processing Systems 31 Log Data 100 In-vehicle network (network) 200 Gateway 250 ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 261 Mobile communication devices 262 V2X communication equipment 401 Acquisition Department 402 Estimation section 403 Output section 410 Network configuration information 600 Topology Information 2010 Connection relationship information (information showing connection relationships) 2210 Attack Path Information (Attack Path Information)

Claims

1. An acquisition unit that acquires log data of a system including a network mounted on a vehicle and a plurality of components that communicate via the network; a configuration information acquisition unit that acquires, when an attack is detected in the vehicle, network configuration information including information on a communication pattern between the components included in the network corresponding to the vehicle; a component identification unit that identifies the component related to the attack based on the log data acquired by the acquisition unit; an attack path identification unit that identifies a progression direction of the attack using information on the communication pattern; an output unit that outputs information on one or more attack paths that indicate the progression direction of the attack in a directed graph in which the components related to the attack are nodes and communication paths between the nodes related to the attack are links based on the progression direction of the attack; An information processing system having the above configuration.

2. a related log extraction unit that extracts log data related to the attack from the log data acquired by the acquisition unit; The information processing system according to claim 1 , wherein the component identification unit identifies the component related to the attack from log data related to the attack.

3. The information processing system according to claim 1 , wherein the network configuration information includes information on a topology of the network.

4. An information processing system as described in claim 3, which uses information on the topology of the network to identify connection relationships between the components related to the path of the attack.

5. The information processing system according to claim 1 , wherein the network configuration information includes information on communication paths connecting each of the components included in the network.

6. The information processing system according to claim 1 , wherein the network configuration information includes information of communication addresses or identification information corresponding to the plurality of components connected to the network.

7. An information processing system described in any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the information of the one or more attack paths includes information of electronic control devices included in the attack paths.

8. The information processing system A log data acquisition process for acquiring log data of a system including a network mounted on the vehicle and a plurality of components that communicate via the network; When an attack is detected in the vehicle, acquiring network configuration information including information on a communication pattern between the components included in the network corresponding to the vehicle; A process of identifying the component related to the attack based on the log data acquired in the log data acquisition process; A process of identifying a direction of the attack using information on the communication pattern; a process of outputting information on one or more attack paths that indicate the progression direction of the attack in a directed graph in which the components related to the attack are nodes and communication paths between the nodes related to the attack are links based on the progression direction of the attack; An information processing method.

9. A program for causing an information processing system to execute the information processing method according to claim 8.

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