Cryptographic erase by internal and / or external action

By splitting the MEK into internal and external components, the method enables secure cryptographic erasure of SEDs, addressing the reliability issues of existing technologies and ensuring data protection even in failure states.

JP7590085B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-26INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
View PDF 4 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
JP2022515611
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-03-03
Filing Date
2020-09-03
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
2040-09-03

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current data centers face challenges in reliably performing cryptographic erasure of failed or obsolete self-encrypting drives (SEDs), leading to risks of forensic recovery of data and the need for physical destruction of drives to prevent data exposure.

Method used

A method where the media encryption key (MEK) is split into two parts, with one key (Key1) stored within the device and the other (Key2) managed externally, allowing cryptographic erasure to be performed by both internal and external actions, ensuring secure destruction of the MEK regardless of the SED's failure state.

Benefits of technology

Ensures secure and reliable cryptographic erasure of data by preventing access to the MEK, even in failure scenarios, thus protecting data integrity and eliminating the need for physical destruction of drives.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure 0007590085000001
    Figure 0007590085000001
  • Figure 0007590085000002
    Figure 0007590085000002
  • Figure 0007590085000003
    Figure 0007590085000003
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

A device-implemented method for enabling and / or performing cryptographic erase via internal and external actions. In one exemplary aspect, a request to read data is received at a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form. In one approach, a first key stored within the device is accessed. In another approach, the first key stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The data in encrypted form is read from the storage medium. The data in encrypted form is decrypted using the media encryption key. The decrypted data is output. A method for writing encrypted data is also presented.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to cryptographic erasure, and more particularly, the present invention relates to techniques and systems for enabling cryptographic erasure by internal and / or external action. [Background technology]

[0002] The term "cryptographic erasure" generally refers to disabling access to an encryption key that is necessary to decrypt data in some way. A cryptographic erasure can be performed, for example, by erasing all copies of an encryption key, deleting portions of an encryption key, disabling access to subkeys that are necessary to generate or unlock an encryption key, etc. Permanently disabling an encryption key renders it impossible to decrypt data that was encrypted using that encryption key, effectively rendering the encrypted data unencryptable.

[0003] It has been established that current data centers have a major problem with being unable to reliably perform a cryptographic erase of all failed or retired self-encrypting drives (SEDs). For example, an SED may fail in such a way that it can no longer communicate with the system in which it is contained. In such a failed state, the SED cannot receive a command to perform a cryptographic erase or respond to such a command with a status indicating that the command to perform a cryptographic erase was successfully completed. This is a problem for data centers who do not want to expose themselves to the risk of data being forensically recovered from the solid-state drive (SSD) or hard disk drive (HDD) memory of failed SEDs that cannot reliably perform a cryptographic erase. Currently, these data centers typically resort to physically destroying those drives in an effort to prevent forensic recovery. Users morally return those drives to the manufacturer or repurpose them for fear of data disclosure.

[0004] Note that the Media Encryption Key (MEK) used to encrypt or decrypt data on an SED is not stored in plaintext on modern SEDs. Instead, the MEK is cryptographically wrapped (e.g., it is itself encrypted or otherwise obfuscated). There is some belief that this approach may not be strong enough in very long runs, and that key wrapping techniques may be broken in the foreseeable future (e.g., by quantum computing).

[0005] Regardless of the scope of the problem, or whether there is a legitimate concern that the wrapped key can be decrypted or decrypted, it is arguably true that there are entities that do not want to rely on or completely trust the drive to handle the non-volatile storage and cryptographic erase of the MEK. Such users may much prefer to provide the MEK to the drive after each power-up cycle, rather than storing the MEK on the SED, to ensure that the MEK can be discarded and all ciphertext can be created with the cryptographic erase performed. This gives the user control over the MEK, and said user does not have to worry about instances where the drive fails in a way that does not allow the cryptographic erase to be performed by the drive. Because the MEK is only stored non-volatilely outside the drive, it can be discarded by the user, regardless of how the SED fails. However, a compromise of the user's key store in which the MEK is held, or an interception of the communication of that MEK with the SED (and a breakdown in any of the surrounding security) makes the MEK vulnerable to capture or retrieval.

[0006] One way that allows for the ability to perform cryptographic erasure of SEDs externally is through the use of a direct key serving model used by LTO-4 (the first generation of encryption-capable LTO tape drives). Note that the way in which keys are handled external to the encryption-capable device determines whether or not they are cryptographically erasable. However, certainly if an entity's key management is done properly, it should be able to reliably perform a cryptographic erasure of all copies of the MEK associated with a failed SED drive. However, if no copies of a key remain, the data encrypted under that key (i.e., the ciphertext) will no longer be decryptable and thus effectively inaccessible or "cryptographically erased," so copies of the key are typically made and stored in distributed locations to ensure that the key remains usable to decrypt data. Thus, as more copies of the key are made, it becomes significantly more difficult to secure the key management.

[0007] After the LTO-4 era, SED technology was standardized with loose conformance to Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specifications such as the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class (SSC), which includes (first) Enterprise and (more recently) Opal. Both of those SSCs support cryptographic erase in multiple different ways. For example, in the case of Opal, there are at least four different ways to invoke cryptographic erase. However, neither TSG SCC supports cryptographic erase by an external entity independent of the SED itself (i.e., if the SED is unable to honor the methods (commands) specified by the SSC). The MEK is always stored on the SED, usually in a cryptographically wrapped form. If someone could somehow figure out how to crack the wrapped MEK, they would be able to recover all the associated ciphertext stored on the failed SED. Summary of the Invention

[0008] A device-implemented method, according to one aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to read data at a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form. A first key stored within the device is accessed. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The encrypted form of the data is read from the storage medium. The encrypted form of the data is decrypted using the media encryption key. The decrypted data is output. The method allows for cryptographic erasure of locally encrypted data to be performed by both internal and external actions.

[0009] A device-implemented method, according to another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to read data on a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form. A first key stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved. A second key is retrieved from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The encrypted form of the data is read from the storage medium. The encrypted form of the data is decrypted using the media encryption key. The decrypted data is output. The method allows for cryptographic erasure of locally encrypted data to be performed by both internal and external actions. If a removable storage medium is used, the first key travels with the medium, but the data remains secure until the second key is provided.

[0010] A device-implemented method, according to yet another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to write data to the storage medium in encrypted form at a device configured to perform data operations on the storage medium. A first key stored within the device is accessed. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The requested data is written to the storage medium in encrypted form using the media encryption key. The method allows for cryptographic erasure of the written encrypted data to be performed by both internal and external actions.

[0011] A device-implemented method, according to yet another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to write data to a storage medium in encrypted form at a device configured to perform data operations on the storage medium. A first key stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The requested data is written to the storage medium in encrypted form using the media encryption key. The method allows for cryptographic erasure of the written encrypted data to be performed by both internal and external actions.

[0012] In the various approaches, a device performing any of the methods is preferably configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device, such that the first key cannot leave the device, and thus removal of the first key from the device effectively performs a cryptographic erase on any encrypted data on the device, since the first key cannot leave the device.

[0013] The various techniques described herein are applicable to many types of storage media, including non-volatile memories and magnetic recording tapes.

[0014] Other aspects and techniques of the present invention will become apparent from the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the drawings, illustrating by way of example the principles of the invention. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0015] [Figure 1] 1 is a diagram of a network architecture according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Diagram 2] 2 is a diagram of a representative hardware environment that may be associated with the server and / or client of FIG. 1 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. [Diagram 3] 1 is a diagram of a tiered data storage system according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 4] 1 is a flow chart of a method according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Diagram 5] 1 is a flow chart of a method according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 6] 1 is a flow chart of a method according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 7] 1 is a flow chart of a method according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 8] 1 is a table showing the current state of the art for disposing of and protecting standard storage products that use SEDs. [Figure 9] 1 is a table illustrating an exemplary procedure for disposing of and protecting a storage product that uses SEDs, according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 10] 1 is a table illustrating an exemplary procedure for disposing of and protecting a storage product that uses SEDs, according to one embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0016] The following description is made for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the present invention and is not intended to limit the inventive concepts claimed herein. Moreover, particular features described herein can be used in combination with other described features in each of the various possible combinations and permutations.

[0017] In this specification, unless otherwise specifically defined, all terms are to be given their broadest possible interpretation, including the meanings set forth in this specification and the meanings understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and / or the meanings defined in dictionaries, treatises, etc.

[0018] It should also be noted that, as used in this specification and the appended claims, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" include plural referents unless otherwise specified. It will be further understood that the terms "comprises" and / or "comprising," as used herein, indicate the presence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements, or components, or combinations thereof, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, or groups thereof, or combinations thereof.

[0019] The description herein discloses multiple preferred approaches for systems, methods, and computer program products for enabling cryptographic erasure of locally encrypted data to be performed by both internal and external actions. In one approach, the Media Encryption Key (MEK) used to encrypt / decrypt the data is split into two parts, with one key split (Key1) stored with the data and the other key split (Key2) managed externally. In one approach, Key1, which is in non-volatile form, is stored only with the data, optionally in wrapped (e.g., encrypted or otherwise protected) form. Key2, which may be stored in non-volatile form, is stored only external to the device / product containing the data, so that Key2 must be provided to the device reading the data to enable encryption and / or decryption. The MEK can only be calculated if the device has both Key1 and Key2.

[0020] In one common approach, data is stored on a self-encrypting drive (SED). Key1 is managed internally to the SED and may be stored on the SED in raw or wrapped form. Key2 is provided to the SED at least once after a power-on cycle or other cold boot or both to allow the MEK to be calculated internally to the SED.

[0021] In another common approach, data is stored on a storage medium, such as on magnetic recording tape, in non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM of solid-state memory, hard disk, etc.), etc. Key1 is stored on and / or with the storage medium, and may be stored in a wrapped form, and Key2 is provided to the drive, computer, etc. to enable the drive, computer, etc. to calculate the MEK.

[0022] In one exemplary aspect of the invention, a device-implemented method, according to another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to read data at a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form. A first key stored within the device is accessed. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The data in encrypted form is read from the storage medium. The data in encrypted form is decrypted using the media encryption key. The decrypted data is output.

[0023] In another exemplary aspect of the invention, a device-implemented method, according to another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to read data at a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form. A first key stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved. A second key is retrieved from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The data in encrypted form is read from the storage medium. The data in encrypted form is decrypted using the media encryption key. The decrypted data is output.

[0024] In another exemplary aspect of the invention, a device-implemented method, according to another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to write data to the storage medium in encrypted form at a device configured to perform data operations on the storage medium. A first key stored within the device is accessed. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The requested data is written to the storage medium in encrypted form using the media encryption key.

[0025] In another exemplary aspect of the invention, a device-implemented method, according to another aspect of the invention, includes receiving a request to write data to a storage medium in encrypted form at a device configured to perform data operations on the storage medium. A first key stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved. A second key is received from an external source. A media encryption key is generated using the first and second keys. The requested data is written to the storage medium in encrypted form using the media encryption key.

[0026] Exemplary Computing Environment Figure 1 illustrates an architecture 100 according to one approach. As shown in Figure 1, a number of remote networks 102 are provided, including a first remote network 104 and a second remote network 106. A gateway 101 may be coupled between the remote network 102 and a proximate network 108. In the context of this architecture 100, each of the networks 104, 106 may take any form, including, but not limited to, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN) such as the Internet, a public switched telephone network (PSTN), a private network, etc.

[0027] In use, the gateway 101 acts as an entry point from the remote network 102 to the proximal network 108. In this manner, the gateway 101 can function as a router that can direct a particular packet of data arriving at the gateway 101 to its destination, and as a switch that provides a particular packet with the actual path into and out of the gateway 101.

[0028] Further included is at least one data server 114 coupled to the proximate network 108, accessible from the remote network 102 via the gateway 101. It should be noted that the data server 114 can include any type of computing device / groupware. A plurality of user devices 116 are coupled to each data server 114. The user devices 116 may be directly connected through one of the networks 104, 106, 108. Such user devices 116 may include desktop computers, laptop computers, handheld computers, printers, or any other type of logic. It should be noted that in one approach, the user devices 111 may be directly coupled to any of the networks.

[0029] A peripheral device 120 or a series of peripheral devices 120 (e.g., facsimile machines, printers, network and / or local storage units or systems, etc.) may be coupled to one or more of the networks 104, 106, 108. It should be noted that the database and / or additional components may be utilized in or integrated into any type of network element coupled to the networks 104, 106, 108. In the context of this description, a network element may refer to any component of a network.

[0030] According to some approaches, the methods and systems described herein may be implemented with or on top of a virtual system and / or system that emulates one or more other systems (such as a UNIX® system that emulates an IBM® z / OS® environment, a UNIX® system that virtually hosts a Microsoft® Windows® environment, a Microsoft® Windows® system that emulates an IBM® z / OS® environment, etc.). In some approaches, this virtualization and / or emulation may be augmented using VMware® software.

[0031] In other approaches, one or more of the networks 104, 106, 108 may represent a cluster of systems, commonly referred to as a "cloud." In cloud computing, shared resources such as processing power, peripherals, software, data, servers, etc. are provided to any system in the cloud in an on-demand relationship, thereby enabling access and distribution of services across many computing systems. Cloud computing typically involves Internet connections between systems operating in the cloud, although other approaches to connecting systems may be used.

[0032] Figure 2 illustrates a representative hardware environment associated with the user device 116 and / or server 114 of Figure 1, according to one approach. The diagram illustrates a typical hardware configuration for a workstation, including a central processing unit 210, such as a microprocessor, and several other units interconnected via a system bus 212.

[0033] The workstation shown in FIG. 2 includes an input / output (I / O) adapter 218 for connecting peripherals such as random access memory (RAM) 214, read only memory (ROM) 216, and disk storage unit 220 to bus 212, a user interface adapter 222 for connecting a keyboard 224, a mouse 226, a speaker 228, a microphone 232, and / or other user interface devices such as a touch screen and a digital camera (not shown) to bus 212, a communications adapter 234 for connecting the workstation to a communications network 235 (e.g., a data processing network), and a display adapter 236 for connecting bus 212 to a display device 238.

[0034] An operating system such as Microsoft Windows® Operating System (OS), macOS®, UNIX® OS, etc. may reside on the workstation. It will be appreciated that the preferred techniques may be implemented on platforms and operating systems other than those mentioned above. The preferred techniques may be written using eXtensible Markup Language (XML), C, or C++, or a combination of these, or other programming languages, together with object-oriented programming methods. Object-oriented programming (OOP), which is increasingly used to develop complex applications, may be used.

[0035] Referring now to FIG. 3, a storage system 300 is shown according to one approach. It is noted that, according to various aspects, some of the elements shown in FIG. 3 may be implemented as hardware and / or software. The storage system 300 may include a storage system manager 312 to communicate with a plurality of media and / or drives on at least one upper storage tier 302 and at least one lower storage tier 306. The upper storage tier 302 preferably includes one or more random access and / or direct access media 304, such as hard disks in a hard disk drive (HDD), nonvolatile memory (NVM), semiconductor memory in a solid state drive (SSD), flash memory, SSD arrays, flash memory arrays, etc., or other media described herein or known in the art, or combinations thereof. The lower storage tier 306 preferably includes one or more underlying storage media 308 including sequential access media such as magnetic tape and / or optical media in a tape drive, slow access HDD, slow access SDD, etc., or any other sequential access media described herein or known in the art, or combinations thereof. The one or more additional storage tiers 316 may include any combination of storage memory media according to the requirements of the designer of the system 300. Additionally, either the upper storage tier 302 and / or the lower storage tier 306 may include any combination of storage devices and / or storage media.

[0036] The storage system manager 312 may communicate with the drives and / or storage media 304, 308 on the upper storage tier 302 and the lower storage tier 306 via a network 310, such as a storage area network (SAN) or other suitable network type shown in FIG. 3. The storage system manager 312 may communicate with one or more host systems (not shown) via a host interface 314, which may or may not be part of the storage system manager 312. The storage system manager 312 and / or any other components of the storage system 300 may be implemented in hardware and / or software and may utilize a processor (not shown), such as a central processing unit (CPU), field programmable gate array (FPGA), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), etc., to execute commands of the type known in the art. Of course, any arrangement of storage systems may be used, as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art upon reading this description.

[0037] In other approaches, storage system 300 may include any number of data storage tiers and may include the same or different storage memory media in each storage tier. For example, each data storage tier may include the same type of storage memory media, such as HDDs, SSDs, sequential access media (tapes in tape drives, optical disks in optical disk drives, etc.), direct access media (CD-ROMs, DVD-ROMs, etc.), or any combination of storage types of media. In one such configuration, upper storage tier 302 may include a majority of SSD storage media for storing data in a storage environment that runs above, and the remaining storage tiers, including lower storage tier 306 and additional storage tier 316, may include any combination of SSDs, HDDs, tape drives, etc. for storing data in a storage environment that runs below. In this manner, data that is accessed more frequently, data with a higher priority, data that needs to be accessed more quickly, etc. may be stored in upper storage tier 302, and data that does not have any of these attributes may be stored in additional storage tier 316, including lower storage tier 306. Of course, those skilled in the art, upon reading this description, may devise many other combinations of storage media types to implement different storage schemes in accordance with the techniques and aspects presented herein.

[0038] According to some approaches, a storage system (such as 300) may include logic configured to receive a request to open a data set, logic configured to determine whether the requested data set is stored in multiple related portions in a lower storage tier 306 of the tiered data storage system 300, logic configured to move related portions of the requested data set to an upper storage tier 302 of the tiered data storage system 300, and logic configured to assemble the requested data set on the upper storage tier 302 of the tiered data storage system 300 from the related portions.

[0039] Of course, this logic may be implemented according to various approaches, as a method on a device and / or system, or as a computer program product.

[0040] Inventive Methods for Enabling Cryptographic Erasure The following description discloses several preferred approaches for systems, methods, and computer program products for enabling cryptographic erasure of locally encrypted data to be performed by both internal and external actions. In one approach, the MEK used to encrypt / decrypt the data is split into two parts, with one key split (Key1) stored with the data (e.g., in an SED, on tape, etc.) and the other key split (Key2) managed externally. In one approach, Key1, which is in non-volatile form, is stored only with the data, preferably in a wrapped form. Key2, which may be in non-volatile form, is stored only external to the device / product containing the data, so that Key2 needs to be provided to the device reading / writing the data to enable encryption and / or decryption. The MEK can only be calculated if the device has both Key1 and Key2.

[0041] In one common embodiment, data is stored on an SED. Key1 is managed internally to the SED and may be stored on the SED in raw form, or more preferably in wrapped form. Key2 is provided to the SED at least once after a power-on cycle and / or cold boot of the SED to allow the MEK to be calculated.

[0042] In another common approach, data is stored on a storage medium such as a magnetic recording tape, in NVRAM, etc. Key1 is stored on or with the storage medium, or both, and may be stored in a wrapped form. For example, Key1 may be stored as part of the magnetic recording tape, in a tape cartridge memory, or both. In this way, Key1 is made portable with the magnetic recording tape. Similarly, for an NVRAM device, Key1 may be stored in NVRAM, in a separate memory, etc., and Key2 is provided to the tape drive, computer, etc. to enable the tape drive, computer, etc. to calculate the MEK.

[0043] Cryptographic erasure inside the SED While much of the description below is presented in the context of an exemplary implementation that uses SEDs, this description is done solely by way of example and to provide background as an aid to the reader, and thus the concepts and teachings presented below are equally applicable to implementations that use storage media such as magnetic recording tapes, memory cards, and the like.

[0044] 4, a flow chart of a method 400 is shown according to one approach. Method 400 may be performed in accordance with the present invention in a variety of ways, particularly in any of the environments shown in the other figures described herein. Of course, method 400 may include more or fewer operations than those specifically illustrated in FIG. 4, as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand upon reading this description.

[0045] Each of the steps of method 400 may be performed by any suitable component of an operating environment. For example, in various approaches, method 400 may be performed in part or in whole by a computer, drive, or other device including one or more processors. A processor (e.g., a processing circuit, chip, or module, or a combination thereof) implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably including at least one hardware component may be utilized within any device to perform one or more steps of method 400. Exemplary processors include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or the like, combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing device known in the art.

[0046] 4, method 400 may begin at operation 402, where a device configured to perform a data operation on a storage medium, such as reading data from and / or writing data to the storage medium, receives a request to read data, the data being stored in encrypted form on the storage medium. The request may simply request the data or may include additional information, such as Key2 (see below).

[0047] At operation 404, a first key (Key1) stored in the device is accessed, for example, from the device's memory, ASIC, etc. As previously discussed, in some approaches, the first key is stored in the device in raw (unencrypted) form. In other approaches, the first key is stored in the device in a wrapped form (e.g., encrypted, password protected, obfuscated, etc.). Information to unwrap the first key, such as another key, a password, etc., may be received and used to unwrap the first key.

[0048] In a preferred embodiment, the device is configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device, however, a controller internal to the device may have access to the first key within the device.

[0049] In operation 406, a second key (Key2) is received from an external source. The external source may be any external source. For example, the external source may be a data requestor, a key store, a key server, a key entered by a user (e.g., via a keyboard, by inserting a flash drive, etc.).

[0050] A media encryption key (MEK) is generated using the first and second keys at operation 408. Any known technique may be used to create the MEK from the first and second keys, for example, by performing an exclusive OR of the first and second keys.

[0051] At operation 410, the encrypted form (i.e., ciphertext) of the requested data is read from the storage medium, e.g., using conventional techniques. The storage medium may be of any type disclosed herein, e.g., magnetic tape, magnetic disk, NVRAM, etc. Thus, the device may be any type of data storage device, e.g., a tape drive, SSD, HDD, encryption-enabled USB drive, NVRAM module, etc.

[0052] The ciphertext of the requested data is decrypted using the MEK to provide an unencrypted form of the data (i.e., plaintext) in operation 412. The ciphertext of the requested data may be copied to a buffer and then decrypted, may be decrypted "on the fly" of the read (e.g., operations 410 and 412 are performed simultaneously), etc.

[0053] The decoded data is output in operation 414 to a requestor of the data, such as via a host interface.

[0054] When the second data is to be stored by the device on the storage medium, the second data is received. A third key may be received from a second external source. A second media encryption key may be generated from the first and third keys. The data is encrypted using the second media encryption key, and the encrypted data is written to the storage medium. Note that the second external source may be the same as or different from the external sources mentioned above. Similarly, the third key may be different from or the same as the second key. If the third key is the same as the second key, the drive typically does not need to receive the third key again.

[0055] In the following, various aspects of the operation of Fig. 4 are illustrated. Such aspects are presented merely as examples and are not intended to be limiting. Moreover, such aspects may be combined in any manner, according to the many possible approaches of the present invention.

[0056] The MEK may be created from two separate keys using any technique known in the art and / or that would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art upon reading this description. For example, one way to create a MEK key that requires the use of both Key1 and Key2 to compute is to let Key1 and Key2 be two independently generated random numbers, and then perform a calculation that requires both Key1 and Key2, such as the exclusive OR or concatenation of the two values ​​of Key1 and Key2, to calculate the MEK. The MEK may alternatively be "split" into two (or more) key splits (e.g., Key1 and Key2) using a key splitting algorithm (e.g., Shamir, Blakely (Euclidean), etc.).

[0057] Key1 may originate from any possible source. Key1 is preferably created inside the SED, which is the most secure approach since no copy of Key1 needs to exist outside the SED unless it is intentionally copied from within.

[0058] In other approaches, Key1 may be created external to the SED and provided to the SED, for example, Key1 may be programmed into the device during a manufacturing build, may be programmed into the device when data is written, etc.

[0059] In a further approach, which may include additional features and operations from any other approach described herein, Key1 and / or Key2 may be calculated contemporaneously with the writing of data. For example, in the case of a write where a new MEK may be used, the MEK may be generated (e.g., by random number generation or other known techniques), and then a key split for Key1 and Key2 may be calculated from the MEK using known key splitting algorithms such as Shamir, Blakely (Euclidean), etc. The generation of the MEK and the calculation of the key split are preferably performed by the device. Key1 may then be kept internal to the device, and Key2 may be exported from the device for external storage. In various aspects, this MEK generation is performed preemptively (i.e., before a write command is received so as not to impact the time required to process the write) or responsively (e.g., in response to a write command) (in which case Key2 is preferably exported from the device for external storage prior to completion of the command for the write operation).

[0060] In one aspect, Key1 may be specific to a particular set of data, and thus a device may store multiple unique Key1s, each associated with a unique data set.

[0061] The SED is preferably configured to not allow any external visibility of Key1, nor any transfer or copying of Key1 from the SED.

[0062] Key2 can be created inside the SED (if a key splitting algorithm is used to create the key split that becomes Key2, which is the preferred method), created outside the SED, etc.

[0063] In an exemplary approach, Key1 is a first key split of the MEK, a first random number of the same length (in bits) as the MEK. Key2 is a second key split of the MEK, a second random number of the same length as the MEK. Key1 is processed with Key2 in a predefined manner to generate the MEK. For example, an exclusive OR (or the like) of Key1 and Key2 may be performed to generate the MEK. Alternatively, instead of an exclusive OR operation (or the like), standard key derivation techniques (e.g., using hashing or encryption) may be used to calculate the MEK. Any form of key derivation that requires processing of both Key1 and Key2 for the calculation of the MEK may be acceptable. If a key split was used to generate Key1 and Key2 from the MEK, the calculation used to create the MEK from Key1 and Key2 will be the complement or inverse calculation (of the split).

[0064] Note that with this key splitting technique, if you do not have the MEK, the only way to compute the MEK is to have both Key1 and Key2. In general, in the context of M-of-N key splits, this key splitting technique can be thought of as an implementation of needing 2-of-2 key splits (what Key1 and Key2 are) to reconstruct the (MEK) key. An alternative, but inferior, embodiment is to set M to 2, generating N key splits greater than 2, but discarding or destroying all but two of the other key splits, and only using the remaining two of those key splits (which effectively reduces the key splits to 2-of-2, but increases the complexity of the combination calculations).

[0065] One preferred approach to implement a split key MEK is to extend TCG Opal (or other TCG SSC) to support this concept of two key splits, where one key split (Key1) is managed inside the SED and the other key split (Key2) is managed outside the SED. Anyone familiar with the intricacies of TCG Opal SSC will understand that there are numerous ways to implement this concept and therefore the invention is not limited to the exemplary illustrations presented herein.

[0066] In one exemplary approach, a wrapped form of Key1 is stored only in non-volatile memory within the SED. Key2 is stored in non-volatile form only external to the SED and therefore must be provided to (or accessed by) the SED at least once after a power-on cycle and / or cold boot in order for the MEK to be calculated. The MEK can only be calculated if the SED has both Key1 and Key2. Thus, Key2 must be provided to (or accessed by) the SED in some form. There are many ways this can be done, according to various aspects. One way is for the SED to support a Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) client and to request and receive Key2 over a secure channel from an external key manager of a type known in the art. Alternatively, Key2 may be provided to the SED in a manner similar to the way Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are in clear text form, such as over a secure tunnel (e.g., TLS).

[0067] Preferably, Key1 is stored in wrapped form on the SED and cannot be unwrapped until a wrapping key (which may depend on a PIN provided to the SED to authenticate different users to different roles supported by the SED) is provided. Thus, whatever portion of the wrapper key is provided to the SED from outside the SED to enable unwrapping of Key1 is provided to the SED. After all information required to calculate the MEK (including Key2) has been provided to or accessed by the SED, the SED can calculate the MEK and then either decrypt existing ciphertext, resulting in plaintext (e.g., to respond to a host read), or encrypt newly received customer data in plaintext form into ciphertext (e.g., to comply with a host write).

[0068] In one approach, Key2 is a PIN associated with some Administrative Security Provider (hereafter "AdminSP") role that is enabled after an authorized entity, such as the drive owner, authenticates using a System Identification Number (SID) or some other PIN associated with the role with appropriate privileges.

[0069] The Key2 PIN may be allowed to be changed. In one approach, the Key2 PIN starts with some predefined value, such as a default value, e.g., all zeros (0x000...). One contemplated implementation allows the Key2 PIN to be changed, but only before the PIN of the first administrative authority of the AdminSP (e.g., AdminSP.Admin1) is customized, to not allow inadvertent cryptographic erasure of data encrypted by the MEK due to unintended modification of the Key2 PIN. Alternatively, the Key2 PIN may be allowed to be changed at any time, to provide an alternative way of invoking cryptographic erasure.

[0070] When Key2 is set to a newly generated random number, even though the PIN for Key2 may appear to be logically generated outside the SED (e.g., by the user and the user's external key management infrastructure), its generation may actually be simply the result of an invocation of the SED's Random method, a command (which is an unauthenticated service) that SEDs must support if they conform to the TCG Opal specification. In response to the Random method, the SED will calculate and return (provide) a new random number to the host using any known and acceptable technique.

[0071] Alternative implementations include making the SED the source of Key2 generation in some or all cases. In that case, Key2 may be read from the SED. Ideally, this implementation would continue along the general path proposed above, thereby allowing this implementation to be performed using existing TCG Opal methods (commands). For example, one approach would generate Key2 using the Random method in the SED. The PIN for AdminSP.Key2 is then personalized by the host to that same random value read from the SED via Random. Note that by changing the PIN for Key2 from its default value, the host has assumed responsibility for storing this PIN. To do this, the SED stores the last random number generated by Random in volatile memory only, and then designates that last random number generated as a candidate for Key2. If the PIN for AdminSP.Key2 is set to this same value, the SED will allow Key2.PIN to be changed to this new value. Note that if the host attempts to set the AdminSP.Key2 PIN to a value other than the last random number provided by Random, the SED may, optionally, refuse to accept this PIN change and post an appropriate error code indicating that the command failed. In this case, the SED may continue to follow the default value for Key2 PIN (i.e., all zeros = 0x000...), which essentially reverts the SED to the same standard behavior (i.e., how TCG Opal-compliant SEDs currently operate).

[0072] Cipher Note that one standard way for an SED to authenticate a PIN is by hashing the PIN and comparing that value to the hash of that PIN (since it was stored non-volatilely on the SED) that was calculated when the PIN was first set. In the above discussion, the PIN for AdminSP.Key2 is used as Key2. Note that this particular PIN should be treated differently from other PINs in that the hash of this PIN should not be stored in the SED because it may be considered that storing it in the SED will not be secure at some point in the future (i.e., if the hash is cracked in the future, e.g., by quantum computing). At the very least the hash provides a way to try brute force guesses. That is, there are good reasons not to rely solely on the hash of the PIN as a method for authenticating the AdminSP.Key2 PIN. Thus, since the PIN for Key2 cannot be authenticated independently of verifying the validity of the MEK itself, the Key2 role is preferably given no privileges other than to change its own password. This removes the direct and immediate need to authenticate its PIN.

[0073] Finally, Key1 and Key2 are exclusive-ORed, combined, etc. to create the MEK.

[0074] One way to verify that the resulting MEK is correct (e.g., versus being one bit wrong, which would occur if Key2 was one bit wrong) may be to use the concept of a key signature, which involves encrypting a known value with a key, and the resulting ciphertext is stored as a signature of that key.

[0075] In a preferred approach, verifying that the resulting MEK is correct is to perform key management within the SED in such a way that having Key2 available is a requirement for successfully unwrapping Key1. For example, key derivation from Key2 may create a keystream that is exclusive-ORed with the wrapped key structure, etc., before being stored in non-volatile form within the device. An 8-byte checksum built into the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key wrap then serves to verify the validity of both Key2 and the other wrapper key used to wrap Key1. Thus, key derivation is preferably used on Key2 to create enough derived key material to span the entire wrapped key structure. Exclusive-ORing that keystream with the wrapped key structure (WKS) creates a new protected wrapped key structure (PWKS) that is stored in place of the original WKS. At this point, any bit in the PWKS has a 50% chance of being right or wrong, and any speculative "fix" to the PWKS can essentially settle (with sufficiently converged fixes) into any of a very large number of possible key wrap structures. Thus, the exclusive-OR of the keystream with the wrapped key structure itself is effectively a second wrapping, enabling yet another approach where the data inside the double wrap is the MEK, and the combination is achieved by performing two unwraps.

[0076] Note that in some of the above techniques, the Key2 PIN will be what is called a Cryptographically Sensitive Parameter (CSP). If data passing between the SED and the host may be recorded, the channel between them should be protected using some form of encryption of data in flight (EDiF), such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Fibre Channel-Security Protocol (FC-SP), or Transport Layer Security (TLS). In some data centers, there is no concern about data passing to and from the SED within their environment, the only concern is what happens to the SED after it leaves its protected environment, so an absolute guarantee of cryptographic erasure is desirable.

[0077] Note that for the XTS mode of encryption (e.g., XTS-ASE-256), there are two keys associated with the encryption: a cipher key and a separate tweak key. In some approaches, these keys can both be generated (by key derivation) from a single root key. Accordingly, a 256-bit MEK can be provided and used to generate (by key derivation) the two 256-bit keys required for XTS-ASE-256.

[0078] Cryptographic erase options in a SED implementing various aspects of the present invention include one or more of the following: 1. When a user wishes to perform a cryptographic erase of an operational SED, the user simply invokes one of several different methods to perform a cryptographic erase as proposed herein. The wrapped key structure is overwritten, at which point Key1 is unrecoverable. In this situation, there is no need to also erase Key2, and since Key1 has been lost, the MEK is now unrecoverable. 2. If the user wants to perform a cryptographic erase of the SED (perhaps because the SED is an inoperable SED that does not respond to commands, or is a missing SED) but is unable to perform "1" for some reason, the user has another option to instead erase Key2, which the user controls independently of the SED. In this situation, there is no need to erase all wrapped versions of Key1, and the loss of Key2 makes the MEK unrecoverable. In this situation, even if at some future point someone is able to crack the wrapped key structure of the failed SED and gain access to Key1, all that work will be for naught, since the MEK remains unusable. In that case, an erased Key2 is required. Thus, the situation remains that the only viable path to access the customer's data is to crack the encryption algorithm (e.g., XTS-ASE-256) that is protecting the ciphertext of the user data itself. 3. If the user is particularly concerned about the security of the cryptographic erase, the user may choose to delete both Key1 and Key2. This scenario is most likely if there is a concern that Key2 may have been recorded (e.g., even if protected by some secure channel, that security was (possibly subsequently) breached and Key2 was recorded during transmission to the SED). But if not, there should be no reason to require the deletion of both Key1 and Key2 because of the cryptography involved. One common approach that is fairly resilient (e.g., against the SED becoming inoperable) is to always attempt to erase both Key1 and Key2, but be satisfied as long as there is verification that one of those two erases succeeds.

[0079] Cryptographic erasure of magnetic recording tapes and other portable memory As mentioned above, in some approaches, the encrypted data is stored on a non-volatile storage medium, such as a magnetic recording medium (e.g., tape, disk) or semiconductor memory (e.g., NAND flash, NVRAM, etc.). Again, any of the acts, concepts, etc. presented above may be used in this approach.

[0080] Referring now to Figure 5, a flow chart of a method 500 is shown according to one approach. Method 500 may be performed in accordance with the present invention in a variety of ways, particularly in any of the environments shown in the other figures described herein. Of course, method 500 may include more or less operations than those specifically illustrated in Figure 5, as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand upon reading this description.

[0081] Each of the steps of method 500 may be performed by any suitable component of an operating environment. For example, in various approaches, method 500 may be performed in part or in whole by a computer, drive, or other device including one or more processors. A processor (e.g., a processing circuit, chip, or module, or a combination thereof) implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably including at least one hardware component may be utilized within any device to perform one or more steps of method 500. Exemplary processors include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or the like, combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing device known in the art.

[0082] 5, method 500 may begin at operation 502, where a device configured to perform a data operation on a storage medium, such as reading data from and / or writing data to the storage medium, receives a request to read data, the data being stored in encrypted form on the storage medium. The received request may simply be a request for the data or may include additional information, such as Key2 (see below).

[0083] A first key (Key1) stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved in operation 504. This may include retrieving the first key from the medium on which the data is stored, from a memory physically coupled to the medium such as a cartridge memory, etc.

[0084] The storage medium may be of any type disclosed herein, such as, for example, a magnetic tape, a magnetic disk, NVRAM, etc. Thus, the device may be any type of data storage device, such as, for example, a tape drive, an SSD, an HDD, etc.

[0085] As previously mentioned, in some approaches, the first key is stored in raw (unencrypted) form on or with the storage medium, or both. In other approaches, the first key is stored in a wrapped form (e.g., an obfuscated form, such as encrypted or password protected) on or with the storage medium, or both. Another key or information, such as a PIN, password, etc., for unwrapping the first key may be received and used to unwrap the first key.

[0086] In a preferred embodiment, the device is configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device, but a controller internal to the device may access the first key from the storage medium or other source coupled to the storage medium.

[0087] At operation 506, a second key (Key2) is received from an external source. The external source may be any external source. For example, the external source may be a data requestor, a key store, a key server, or a key entered by a user (e.g., via a keyboard, etc.).

[0088] A media encryption key (MEK) is generated using the first and second keys, at operation 508. Any known technique may be used to create the MEK from the first and second keys.

[0089] At operation 510, the requested data, in ciphertext form, is read from the storage medium, for example using conventional techniques.

[0090] The ciphertext of the requested data is decrypted using the MEK in operation 512. The data may be copied to a buffer and then decrypted, may be decrypted "on the fly" of the read (e.g., operations 510 and 512 are performed simultaneously), etc.

[0091] The decoded data is output in operation 514, for example to a requester of the data.

[0092] When the second data is to be stored by the device to the storage medium, the second data is received. A third key may be received from a second external source. In that case, a second media encryption key is generated using the first and third keys. The data is encrypted using the second media encryption key, and the encrypted data is written to the storage medium. It is noted that the second external source may therefore be the same as or different from the external sources mentioned above. Similarly, the third key, when received, may be different from or the same as the second key.

[0093] In the following, various operational aspects of FIG. 5 are presented. Such aspects are presented merely as examples and are not intended to be limiting. Moreover, such aspects may be combined in any manner, in accordance with the many possible approaches of the present invention. For example, method 500 may include or incorporate features similar to those presented above with respect to FIG. 4 (e.g., key generation, etc.).

[0094] Key1 may be stored with the storage medium, e.g. on the storage medium itself, or with the storage medium, e.g. in a separate memory, or both. Key1 is preferably stored in a wrapped form. For example, Key1 may be stored on a portion of a magnetic recording tape, in a tape cartridge memory, or both. In this way, Key1 is made portable with the magnetic recording tape. Similarly, in the case of a NVRAM device such as a memory stick, memory card, etc., Key1 may be stored in the NVRAM of the device, in a separate memory of the device, etc.

[0095] Key1 is preferably created internally to the device (e.g., drive, computer, etc.) that is manipulating the storage medium. The device is preferably configured to not allow any external visibility of Key1, except to the storage medium and / or memory associated with the device, nor copying of Key1 outside of the device. The device preferably transfers Key1 to the storage medium and / or memory associated with the device, and deletes Key1 from the device. Thus, Key1 exists only with the storage medium, such as the storage medium associated with a removable media device, in some approaches.

[0096] For devices where the storage medium is integral to the device itself (e.g., Self-Encrypting Drive (SED) type HDD or SSD, NVRAM module, etc.), Key1 may be stored with the device. For example, in a sealed (possibly hermetically) SED enclosure, Key1 may be kept somewhere, usually within its rectangular boundaries. In the case of an SSD, the main non-volatile memory (where user data is stored) is often NAND flash. Key1 may be stored there (possibly in wrapped form). In other approaches, Key1 may instead be held in a separate non-volatile memory inside the enclosure (from the user data), such as in a different NAND or NOR flash chip, in magnetic random-access memory (MRAM), in spin-transfer torque random-access memory (STT-RAM), in ferroelectric random-access memory (FeRAM), in phase-change memory (PCM), in resistive random-access memory (RRAM), or in other forms of NVRAM (this term is less technology specific than its predecessors). Note that Key1 may also be stored in a form of erasable ROM, such as EEPROM. Thus, in various approaches, Key1 may be stored in a different type of memory than the storage medium that stores the user data.

[0097] In another approach, Key1 is created outside the device and provided to and stored on the device.

[0098] Key2 can be created internally on the device, externally on the device, or with joint contributions from both internal and external sources.

[0099] Key2 may be provided and / or stored in volatile memory (e.g., SRAM) within the tape drive, computer, etc. to enable the drive, computer, etc. to calculate the MEK. In one approach, Key2 may be entered into the tape drive, computer, etc. each time it is required. In another approach, Key2 may be provided to the device and then stored in volatile memory in the tape drive, computer, etc. and kept internal to the device, in which case Key2 is preferably wrapped.

[0100] It should be understood that the various approaches herein may be implemented using a wide range of storage media, including, for example, NVRAM technologies such as NAND flash memory, NOR flash memory, phase change memory (PCM), magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM), and resistive RAM (RRAM). To provide background and merely to assist the reader, the various approaches may be described with reference to a type of non-volatile memory. This reference is made merely by way of example and should not be considered a limitation on the invention as defined in the claims.

[0101] In one exemplary approach, Key1, which is in non-volatile form, is stored only with the storage medium in a wrapped form, and Key2, which may be temporarily stored in volatile memory, is stored only external to the storage medium in non-volatile form.

[0102] A drive, computer, etc. that operates the storage medium can retrieve Key1 from the storage medium, receive or obtain Key2, and calculate the MEK.

[0103] Key2 is preferably not stored locally on the drive, computer, etc., but may be provided to the drive, computer, etc. in some form. According to various aspects, there are many ways this can be done, including any of the approaches set forth in the previous section. For example, one way is to have the drive, computer, etc. support a KMIP client and receive Key2 over a secure channel from an external KMIP server (key manager) of the kind known in the art.

[0104] In some approaches, Key2 is stored locally, preferably in wrapped form, on a drive, computer, etc. The key to unwrap Key2 may be received from a user, received from a key manager, etc.

[0105] Key1 is preferably stored with the storage medium in wrapped form and cannot be unwrapped until the drive, computer, etc. is provided with a wrapper key (which may be or be dependent on a personal identification number (PIN) provided to the drive, computer, etc. to authenticate different users for different roles supported by the drive, computer, etc.). Thus, whatever portion of the wrapper key is provided to the drive, computer, etc. from outside the drive, computer, etc. to enable unwrapping of Key1. After the drive, computer, etc. has accumulated all the information necessary to calculate the MEK (including Key2), the drive, computer, etc. can calculate the MEK and then either decrypt existing ciphertext (e.g., to respond to a host read), resulting in plaintext, or encrypt new customer data in plaintext form into ciphertext (e.g., to comply with a host write).

[0106] In one approach, Key2 is a PIN, as described in the previous section.

[0107] Alternative implementations include making the drive, computer, etc. the source of generation of Key2 in some or all cases, in which case Key2 may initially be read from memory of the drive, computer, etc.

[0108] Preferably, the approach implemented in the tape drive would be such that Key1 is obtained from the tape media, Key2 is obtained from some interface, and the MEK calculation is internal to the tape drive and never leaves the tape drive.

[0109] Writing using an SED with cryptographic erase enabled While much of the description below is presented in the context of an exemplary implementation that uses SEDs, this description is done solely by way of example and to provide background as an aid to the reader, and thus the concepts and teachings presented below are equally applicable to implementations that use storage media such as magnetic recording tapes, memory cards, and the like.

[0110] Referring now to FIG. 6, a flow chart of a method 600 is shown according to one approach. Method 600 may be performed in accordance with the present invention in a variety of ways, particularly in any of the environments shown in the other figures described herein. For example, method 600 may include or incorporate features similar to those presented above with respect to FIG. 4, and in some embodiments, a device may be enabled to perform the operations of FIGS. 4 and 6. Of course, more or less operations than those specifically described in FIG. 6 may be included in method 600, as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand upon reading this description.

[0111] Each of the steps of method 600 may be performed by any suitable component of an operating environment. For example, in various approaches, method 600 may be performed in part or in whole by a computer, drive, or other device including one or more processors. A processor (e.g., a processing circuit, chip, or module, or a combination thereof) implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably including at least one hardware component may be utilized within any device to perform one or more steps of method 600. Exemplary processors include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or the like, combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing device known in the art.

[0112] 6, method 600 may begin at operation 602, where a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, such as reading data from and / or writing data to a storage medium, receives a request to write data to the storage medium in encrypted form. The request may simply request to write the data or may include additional information, such as Key2 (see below).

[0113] At operation 604, a first key (Key1) stored in the device is accessed, for example, from the device's memory, ASIC, etc. As previously described, in some approaches, the first key is stored in the device in raw (unencrypted) form. In other approaches, the first key is stored in the device in a wrapped form (e.g., an obfuscated form, such as encrypted, password protected, etc.). Information to unwrap the first key, such as another key, a password, etc., may be received and used to unwrap the first key.

[0114] In a preferred embodiment, the device is configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device, however, a controller internal to the device may have access to the first key within the device.

[0115] At operation 606, a second key (Key2) is received from an external source. The external source may be any external source. For example, the external source may be a data requestor, a key store, a key server, or a key entered by a user (e.g., via a keyboard, etc.).

[0116] A Media Encryption Key (MEK) is generated using the first and second keys at operation 608. Any known technique may be used to create the MEK from the first and second keys, for example, by performing an exclusive OR of the first and second keys.

[0117] At operation 610, an encrypted form (i.e., ciphertext) of the requested data is written (e.g., by conventional techniques) to a storage medium using the media encryption key. The storage medium may be of any type disclosed herein, such as, for example, a magnetic tape, a magnetic disk, NVRAM, etc. Thus, the device may be any type of data storage device, such as, for example, a tape drive, an SSD, an HDD, an encryption-enabled USB drive, an NVRAM module, etc.

[0118] Aspects of the various operations and components of Figure 6 are preferably similar to those described above in the section describing Figure 4, but may include features from any other section herein. Such aspects are presented merely as examples and are not intended to be limiting. Moreover, such aspects may be combined in any manner, in accordance with the many possible approaches of the present invention.

[0119] Writing to magnetic recording tape and other portable memories As mentioned above, in some approaches, the encrypted data is stored on a non-volatile storage medium, such as a magnetic recording medium (e.g., tape, disk) or semiconductor memory (e.g., NAND flash, NVRAM, etc.). Again, any of the acts, concepts, etc. presented above may be used in this approach.

[0120] Referring now to FIG. 7, a flow chart of a method 700 is shown according to one approach. Method 700 may be performed in accordance with the present invention in a variety of ways, particularly in any of the environments shown in the other figures described herein. For example, method 700 may include or incorporate features similar to those presented above with respect to FIGS. 4-5, and in some embodiments, a device may be enabled to perform the operations of FIGS. 5 and 7. Of course, more or less operations than those specifically illustrated in FIG. 7 may be included in method 700, as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand upon reading this description.

[0121] Each of the steps of method 700 may be performed by any suitable component of an operating environment. For example, in various approaches, method 700 may be performed in part or in whole by a computer, drive, or other device including one or more processors. A processor (e.g., a processing circuit, chip, or module, or a combination thereof) implemented in hardware and / or software and preferably including at least one hardware component may be utilized within any device to perform one or more steps of method 700. Exemplary processors include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or the like, combinations thereof, or any other suitable computing device known in the art.

[0122] 7, method 700 may begin at operation 702, where a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, such as reading data from and / or writing data to a storage medium, receives a request to write data to the storage medium in encrypted form. The received request may simply be a request to write data or may include additional information, such as Key2 (see below).

[0123] A first key (Key1) stored on and / or with the storage medium is retrieved in operation 704. This may include retrieving the first key from the medium on which the data is stored, from a memory physically coupled to the medium such as a cartridge memory, etc.

[0124] The storage medium may be of any type disclosed herein, such as, for example, a magnetic tape, a magnetic disk, NVRAM, etc. Thus, the device may be any type of data storage device, such as, for example, a tape drive, an SSD, an HDD, an encryption-enabled USB drive, an NVRAM module, etc.

[0125] As previously mentioned, in some approaches, the first key is stored in raw (unencrypted) form on or with the storage medium, or both. In other approaches, the first key is stored in a wrapped form (e.g., an obfuscated form, such as encrypted or password protected) on or with the storage medium, or both. Another key or information, such as a PIN, password, etc., for unwrapping the first key may be received and used to unwrap the first key.

[0126] In a preferred embodiment, the device is configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device, but a controller internal to the device may access the first key from the storage medium or other source coupled to the storage medium.

[0127] At operation 706, a second key (Key2) is received from an external source. The external source may be any external source. For example, the external source may be a data requestor, a key store, a key server, or a key entered by a user (e.g., via a keyboard, etc.).

[0128] A media encryption key (MEK) is generated using the first and second keys, at operation 708. Any known technique may be used to create the MEK from the first and second keys.

[0129] In operation 710, the requested data is written to the storage medium in ciphertext form using the media encryption key (eg, according to conventional techniques).

[0130] Aspects of the various operations and components of Figure 7 are preferably similar to those described above in the section describing Figure 5, but may include features from any other section herein. Such aspects are presented merely as examples and are not intended to be limiting. Moreover, such aspects may be combined in any manner, in accordance with the many possible approaches of the present invention.

[0131] Systems according to various approaches include a device configured to perform data operations on a storage medium, the device including a processor and logic integrated into the processor, executable by the processor, or integrated into the processor and executable by the processor, the logic configured to cause the device to perform some or all of the operations described above (e.g., the operations of FIGS. 4-7).

[0132] According to various approaches, a computer program product for enabling and / or performing cryptographic erase includes a computer-readable storage medium having program instructions embodied therein, the program instructions being executable by a device configured to perform some or all of the operations previously described (e.g., the operations of FIGS. 4-7).

[0133] Example Implementation An exemplary process for protecting an encryption-capable storage device, such as a self-encrypting device (SED), according to one approach includes the following acts. 1. Generate Key1 and store it inside the storage device in a secure manner inside the storage device. Typically, Key1 is not stored in a non-volatile memory in the form of plaintext. 2. Generate Key2 and store it outside the storage device. A. If Key2 is created inside the storage device, Key2 is removed from the storage device. B. If Key2 is created outside the storage device, it is provided to the storage device when needed. 3. The storage device uses Key1 and Key2 to calculate the Media Encryption Key (MEK). 4. The MEK is used, directly or indirectly, to encrypt data to produce ciphertext, and to decrypt ciphertext to produce plaintext.

[0134] An exemplary process for regaining access to an encryption-capable storage device, such as a self-encrypting device (SED), after a power outage or cold boot according to one approach includes the following acts. 1.Key2 is provided to the storage device. 2. Access Key1 inside the storage device, which may involve cryptographically unwrapping Key1 and may require Key2 and one or more access keys (e.g., PINs). 3. The storage device uses Key1 and Key2 to calculate the Media Encryption Key (MEK). 4. The MEK is used, directly or indirectly, to encrypt data to produce ciphertext, and to decrypt ciphertext to produce plaintext.

[0135] A process for disposing of devices or securing stolen devices For example, if a storage device is to be retired because its background error rate has become too large (which may occur, for example, due to too many write cycles) or perhaps because it has "broken down" and is no longer able to complete some operations successfully, an exemplary process that may be performed according to one approach includes the following acts. 1. Send a command to the storage device instructing it to perform a cryptographic erase of Key1 2. Did the cryptographic erase of Key1 complete successfully? If yes, the cryptographic erasure of data encrypted under that MEK was successful. In this case, there is no need to destroy Key2, but destruction of Key2 can be performed. If no, then you cannot trust that a cryptographic erase has occurred. Destroy Key2 outside of the storage device, thus performing a cryptographic erase of the storage device by external means. Power down or cold boot the storage device to ensure that the storage device does not hold a volatile image of the keys.

[0136] Note that key deletion may also be performed in the reverse order, with Key2 being destroyed first, followed preferably by attempting to delete Key1. An exemplary process according to one approach includes the following acts. 1. Destroy Key2 outside of the storage device, thus performing a cryptographic erase of the storage device by external means. 2. Send a command to the storage device to perform a cryptographic erase of Key1 3. Did the cryptographic erase of Key1 complete successfully? If yes, then destroying Key1 and Key2 successfully cryptographically erased data encrypted under that MEK. Power down or perform a cold boot of the storage device to ensure that the storage device does not hold a volatile image of any keys. However, if the answer is no, then Key2 external to the storage device is discarded, thus achieving a cryptographic erase of the storage device by external means.

[0137] Note that if a cryptographic erase of a storage device is not performed before the storage device is stolen or removed from the storage system, and the storage device is subsequently lost, for example during transport to another location, then since physical access to the storage device is not possible, it is no longer possible to cryptographically erase the data by destroying Key1; instead, Key2 must be destroyed, which is possible even if physical access to the storage device is not available.

[0138] Figure 8 shows an example of what can currently be achieved without the use of the present invention, and Figures 9 and 10 show an example of what can be operationally achieved using one or more techniques of the present invention. The tables of Figures 8-10 are self-explanatory and are presented merely as examples.

[0139] The present invention may be a system, method, and / or computer program product at any possible level of technical detail of integration. The computer program product may include a computer readable storage medium including computer readable program instructions for causing a processor to perform aspects of the present invention.

[0140] A computer readable storage medium can be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions for use by an instruction execution device. A computer readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of computer readable storage media includes portable floppy disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), static random access memory (SRAM), portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD), memory sticks, floppy disks, mechanically encoded devices such as punch cards or ridge structures in grooves in which instructions are recorded, and any suitable combination thereof. As used herein, a computer-readable storage medium should not itself be construed as a transitory signal, such as an electric wave or other freely propagating electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., light pulses passing through a fiber optic cable), or an electrical signal transmitted over a wire.

[0141] The computer readable program instructions described herein may be downloaded from a computer readable storage medium to each computing device / processing device or to an external computer or storage device over a network (e.g., the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, or a wireless network, or a combination thereof) that may include copper transmission cables, optical transmission fiber, wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. A network adapter card or network interface within each computing device / processing device receives the computer readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer readable program instructions for storage on a computer readable storage medium within each computing device / processing device.

[0142] The computer readable program instructions for carrying out the operations of the present invention may be assembler instructions, instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, configuration data for an integrated circuit, or source or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Smalltalk®, C++, and procedural programming languages ​​such as the “C” programming language or similar programming languages. The computer readable program instructions may execute entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet Service Provider). In some embodiments, to carry out aspects of the invention, electronic circuitry including, for example, programmable logic circuitry, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or programmable logic arrays (PLAs), may execute computer readable program instructions to customize the electronic circuitry by utilizing state information of the computer readable program instructions.

[0143] Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks included in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer readable program instructions.

[0144] These computer readable program instructions may be provided to a processor of a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, the instructions being executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce means for performing the functions / operations specified in the blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. These computer readable program instructions may be stored on a computer readable storage medium in a specific manner such that the computer readable storage medium on which the instructions are stored comprises an article of manufacture containing instructions for performing aspects of the functions / operations specified in the blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, and may direct a computer, programmable data processing apparatus, or other device, or combination thereof, to function.

[0145] Computer readable program instructions may be loaded into a computer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other device such that the instructions, which execute on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device, perform the functions / acts specified in the blocks of the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, thereby causing a series of operable steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other device to generate a computer-implemented process.

[0146] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods, and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowcharts or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of instructions, comprising one or more executable instructions for implementing a specified logical function. In some alternative implementations, the functions shown in the blocks may occur in a different order than the order shown in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may in fact be executed as one step, executed simultaneously, executed substantially simultaneously in a partially or fully overlapping manner in time, or executed in reverse order, depending on the functionality involved. It is also noted that each block in the block diagrams and / or flowchart diagrams, as well as combinations of blocks included in the block diagrams and / or flowchart diagrams, may be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system that executes the specified functions or operations or executes a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0147] Additionally, systems according to various embodiments may include a processor and / or logic integrated into and / or executable by the processor, the logic configured to perform one or more of the processing steps enumerated herein. The processor may be any configuration as described herein, such as a separate processor or processing circuit, including many components such as processing hardware, memory, I / O interfaces, etc. By integrated, we mean that the logic is embedded in the processor as hardware logic, such as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), FPGA, etc. By executable by the processor, we mean that the logic is hardware logic accessible by the processor, software logic (such as firmware, part of an operating system, part of an application program, etc.), or some combination of hardware and software logic, configured to cause the processor to perform some function when executed by the processor. The software logic may be stored in any memory type known in the art, local and / or remote. Any processor known in the art may be used, such as software processor modules and / or hardware processors, such as ASICs, FPGAs, central processing units (CPUs), integrated circuits (ICs), graphics processing units (GPUs), etc.

[0148] It will be apparent from the description provided above that multiple combinations may be made and that the various features of the systems and / or methods described above may be combined in any manner.

[0149] It will be further appreciated that aspects of the present invention may be provided in the form of a service that is deployed for customers to provide the service on demand.

[0150] The description of various aspects of the present invention is presented for illustrative purposes, but is not intended to be exhaustive and is not limited to the disclosed techniques. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that many changes and modifications are possible without departing from the scope of the described aspects. The terms used in this specification are selected to best explain the principles, practical applications, or technical improvements over the technology found in the marketplace of various techniques, or to allow other skilled in the art to understand the techniques disclosed herein.

Claims

1. receiving, on a device configured to perform a data operation on a storage medium, a request to read data, the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form; accessing, by the device, a first key stored within the device; receiving, by the device, a second key from an external source; generating a media encryption key using the first and second keys; the device reading the data in encrypted form from the storage medium; the device decrypting the data in its encrypted form using the media encryption key; said device outputting said decrypted data; wherein the device is a tape drive and the storage medium is a magnetic recording tape. A method for implementing the device.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first key is stored in raw form on the device.

3. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising storing the first key in a wrapped form on the device, the device receiving information for unwrapping the first key.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the device is configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the storage medium comprises a non-volatile memory.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the first key is stored in a non-volatile memory within the device that is a different type of memory than the storage medium.

7. receiving, by the device, second data for storage on the storage medium; receiving, by the device, a third key from a second external source; generating a second media encryption key using the first and third keys; the device encrypting the data using the second media encryption key; the device writing the encrypted data to the storage medium; The method of claim 1 , comprising:

8. A computer program for enabling and / or performing a cryptographic erase, the computer program causing a device to carry out a method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. A storage medium storing the computer program according to claim 8.

10. receiving a request to read data on a device configured to perform a data operation on a storage medium, the device being a tape drive, the storage medium being a magnetic recording tape, and the data being stored on the storage medium in encrypted form; the device retrieving a first key stored on the storage medium and / or in a tape cartridge memory that stores the device with the storage medium; receiving, by the device, a second key from an external source; generating a media encryption key using the first and second keys; the device reading the data in encrypted form from the storage medium; the device decrypting the data in its encrypted form using the media encryption key; said device outputting said decrypted data; Including, A method for implementing the device.

11. The method of claim 10 , wherein the storage medium comprises a non-volatile memory.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the first key is stored in a non-volatile memory within the device that is a different type of memory than the storage medium.

13. The method of claim 10 , wherein the device is configured to prohibit transfer of the first key outside of the device.

14. 11. The method of claim 10, wherein the first key is stored in raw form on and / or with the storage medium.

15. 11. The method of claim 10, wherein the first key is stored in wrapped form on or with the storage medium, or both, and the device includes receiving information to unwrap the first key.

16. receiving, by the device, second data for storage on the storage medium; receiving, by the device, a third key from a second external source; generating a second media encryption key using the first and third keys; the device encrypting the data using the second media encryption key; the device writing the encrypted data to the storage medium; The method of claim 10 , comprising:

17. A computer program product for causing a device to carry out the method according to any one of claims 10 to 16.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Data processing device and data processing system, and control method thereof

    JP2011248859A

  • Storage medium management system, storage medium management method, and program

    JP2012212294A

  • Data security using request-supplied keys

    JP2018160919A

  • Technology For Fine-Grain Encryption And Secure Key Injection On Self-Encrypting Drives

    US20190266103A1