Generating keys for use in secure communications
The method and system for key generation using privacy providers and exclusive OR operations on private tables address the vulnerability of existing encryption schemes to quantum computing, ensuring secure and scalable communication.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2022519684
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Patents
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2019-12-05
- Filing Date
- 2020-09-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-09
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-09-30
AI Technical Summary
Existing encryption schemes are vulnerable to advances in computing power, particularly quantum computing, and rely on computational assumptions that can be easily broken, posing a risk to the security of encrypted communications.
A method and system for key generation that does not require direct communication between user devices, utilizing a network of privacy providers to generate a common key through exclusive OR operations on private tables shared with each provider, ensuring information-theoretic security without relying on computational assumptions.
Provides secure communication that is resistant to quantum computing attacks and does not require complete trust in any single entity, ensuring future-proof security and scalability.
Smart Images

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Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The following relates to data communication systems and encryption schemes utilized in such systems, and more particularly to methods and systems for key generation for secure communications. [Background technology]
[0002] Data communication systems are used to exchange information between devices. The information exchanged includes data organized as a string of digital bits formatted to be recognizable by other devices and allow the information to be processed and / or recovered. The exchange of information may occur over a publicly accessible network, such as a communication link between two devices, over a private network within an organization, or between two devices within the same private component, such as within a computer or POS device. Numerous communication protocols have been developed to allow the exchange of data between different devices. Communication protocols exchange data in a robust manner, often with error correction and error detection capabilities, allowing the data to be directed to the intended recipient and recovered for further use. Since the data may be accessible from other devices, it is susceptible to interception and observation or manipulation. The confidentiality of the information requires that measures be taken to secure the information and ensure its confidentiality, generally using various types of encryption methods.
[0003] Various encryption schemes, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), are based on computational assumptions and may be susceptible to being broken by advances in algorithms and hardware. For example, the advent of quantum computers will bring about a major leap in computing power. However, an adversary or intruder attempting to intercept encrypted communications may be able to access the power of quantum computing to decrypt the encryption and gain access to communications that are supposedly secure. For medium- and long-term security, this may present a significant challenge, as the intruder or eavesdropper (an entity known as "Eve") may store communications transmitted today and await the widespread availability of algorithms and hardware capable of decrypting current encryption schemes years or decades down the line.
[0004] It is therefore an object of the present invention to provide a system and method by which the above-mentioned disadvantages are obviated or mitigated and which facilitates achieving desired attributes. Summary of the Invention
[0005] In one aspect, a method is provided for key generation for secure communications between a first user computing device and a second user computing device that does not require direct communication during key generation between the first user computing device and the second user computing device, the method for key generation using a plurality of privacy providers, each comprising a computing device, the method for key generation using a first private table including values having associated indexes each shared with the first user computing device and one of the privacy providers, and a second private table including values having associated indexes each shared with the second user computing device and one of the privacy providers, the method including performing: receiving, by the second user computing device, indexes each associated with values in the second private table, each index received from a respective privacy provider sharing their value, each index being associated with a value that matches an indexed value in the first private table received by the respective privacy provider from the first user computing device; and generating a common key for the secure communications by combining the indexed values in the second private table.
[0006] In a particular case of the method, generating the common key includes performing an exclusive-or (XOR) operation on the indexed values of the second private table.
[0007] In another instance of the method, the method further includes using the common key to securely communicate between the first user computing device and the second user computing device using a one-time pad (OTP) encryption approach.
[0008] In yet another aspect of the method, the number of indexed values represents a number of bits to be communicated by the first user computing device to the second user computing device.
[0009] In yet another aspect of the method, the values in the first private table and the second private table are generated using a quantum random number generator (QRNG).
[0010] In yet another instance of the method, the method further includes marking the value in the second private table used to generate the common key as used by the second user computing device.
[0011] In yet another aspect of the method, the method further includes performing, by the second user computing device, an erasure of values in the second private table used to generate the common key.
[0012] In yet another aspect of the method, the method further includes authenticating, by the second user computing device, the common key using an authentication service.
[0013] In yet another aspect of the method, the method further includes performing, by the second user computing device, privacy amplification that includes applying a linear matrix to the common key.
[0014] In yet another aspect of the method, receiving an index associated with a value in the second private table includes receiving a value determined by performing an exclusive-or (XOR) operation on the indexed values in the first private table and the second private table by each respective privacy provider.
[0015] In another aspect, a system for key generation for secure communication with a first user computing device that does not require direct communication during key generation with the first user computing device is provided, the system including one or more processors and a data storage, the system configured to execute: a table module for communicating with one or more privacy providers each including a computing device, a first private table including values having associated indexes each shared with the first user computing device and one of the privacy providers, the one or more processors communicating with the data storage device and configured to execute: a table module for receiving indexes each associated with values in a second private table, the second private table including values having associated indexes each shared with one of the privacy providers, each index received from a respective privacy provider sharing their value, each index being associated with a value that matches an indexed value in the first private table received from the first user computing device by the respective privacy provider; and a common key module for generating a common key for the secure communication by combining the indexed values of the second private table.
[0016] In the particular case of the system, a common key module generates the common key by performing an exclusive-or (XOR) operation on the indexed values of the second private table.
[0017] In another case of the system, the one or more processors are further configured to execute a communications module that uses the common key to securely communicate with the first user computing device using a one-time pad (OTP) encryption approach.
[0018] In another aspect of the system, the number of indexed values represents the number of bits to be communicated by the first user computing device.
[0019] In another aspect of the system, the values in the first private table and the second private table are generated using a quantum random number generator (QRNG).
[0020] In another aspect of the system, the table module marks values in the second private table that were used to generate the common key as used.
[0021] In yet another embodiment of the system, the one or more processors are further configured to execute an erasure module for performing an erasure of values in the second private table used to generate the common key.
[0022] In yet another embodiment of the system, the one or more processors are further configured to execute an authentication module for authenticating the common key using the authentication service.
[0023] In yet another embodiment of the system, the one or more processors are further configured to execute an amplification module for performing privacy amplification that includes applying a linear matrix to the common key.
[0024] In yet another aspect of the system, receiving an index associated with a value in the second private table includes receiving a value determined by performing an exclusive-or (XOR) operation on the indexed values in the first private table and the second private table by each respective privacy provider.
[0025] These and other aspects are contemplated and described herein. The above summary presents representative aspects of the systems and methods to aid readers skilled in the art in understanding the following detailed description. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0026] An embodiment of the present invention will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0027] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a conceptual diagram of a computing environment for key generation for secure communications, according to one embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a conceptual diagram of a system for key generation for secure communications, according to one embodiment. [Diagram 3] 1 is a flowchart of a method for key generation for secure communication, according to one embodiment. [Figure 4] 3 illustrates an exemplary representation of the results of private table generation and distribution by the system of FIG. 2. [Figure 5A] FIG. 3 illustrates an example of key reconstruction for Alice according to the system of FIG. 2. [Figure 5B] FIG. 3 illustrates an example of key reconstruction for Bob according to the system of FIG. 2. [Figure 6] 3 is a plot illustrating an example of a minimum percentage of fraudulent providers normalized by the total number of providers according to the system of FIG. 2. [Figure 7] 3 is a plot showing an example of the probability of attack for five different scenarios by the system of FIG. 2. [Figure 8] 3 is a plot showing the probability of being attacked as a function of the probability of the privacy provider failing for the system of FIG. 2 for 10 privacy providers; [Figure 9] 3 is a plot showing the probability of being attacked as a function of the probability of the privacy provider failing for the system of FIG. 2 for 50 privacy providers; [Figure 10] 3 is a plot showing the probability of being attacked for four privacy providers as a function of the probability that the privacy provider fails according to the system of FIG. 2; DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0028] The embodiments will now be described with reference to the figures. It should be understood that for simplicity and clarity of description, where deemed appropriate, reference numerals may be repeated among the figures to indicate corresponding or similar elements. In addition, numerous specific details have been described to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments described herein. However, those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments described herein may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known methods, procedures, and components have not been described in detail so as not to obscure the embodiments described herein. Additionally, this description should not be considered as limiting the scope of the embodiments described herein.
[0029] It will also be understood that any module, unit, component, server, computer, computing device, mechanism, terminal, or other device illustrated herein that executes instructions may include or otherwise have access to computer-readable media, such as storage media, computer storage media, or data storage devices (removable and / or non-removable), for example, magnetic disks, optical disks, or tapes. Computer storage media may include volatile and non-volatile removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storing information, such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tapes, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store desired information accessible by an application, module, or both. Any such computer storage media may be part of the device or may be accessible or connectable thereto. Any applications or modules described herein may be implemented using computer-readable / executable instructions that may be stored or otherwise retained by such computer-readable media and executed by one or more processors.
[0030] The following relates to data communication systems and encryption schemes utilized in such systems, and more particularly to methods and systems for key generation for secure communications.
[0031] Cybersecurity is considered by many to be the most important public asset. Many encryption schemes are ubiquitously used for digital communications and are generally based on some computational assumptions about a hypothetical eavesdropper or intruder. One example is the widely used Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) protocol, which assumes that it is difficult to factor a large integer into its two prime factors. To an adversary in possession of this decomposition, the communication between the involved parties will appear completely transparent. In 1994, an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring large integers was discovered, thus breaking the RSA scheme. Conceivably, a malicious eavesdropper could easily memorize current encrypted communications and use technological advances in the future to decrypt the information.
[0032] In various approaches, two communicating computing entities (called Alice and Bob) must pre-share a quantum string, for example, via quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques. Advantageously, the present embodiment can substitute the need to pre-share via QKD in some cases and the inherent risks that pre-sharing requires, and thus does not require any material to be pre-shared directly between Alice and Bob. Some approaches use a Certificate Authority (CA) to support authentication and aid in Alice and Bob's key generation, but such approaches that use a CA generally rely on computational assumptions to ensure security against potential adversaries or still require pre-shared material between Alice and Bob to generate the keys.
[0033] In general, one-time pad (OTP) approaches provide information-theoretic security from eavesdroppers. However, trusting any party to distribute the keys required for communication in a key agreement scheme would likely be foolish. The embodiments of the present disclosure address this substantial challenge, among others. The protocol for data securitization provided herein can significantly reduce the likelihood of being subject to data breach or denial of service (DoS) attacks by using a protocol that is independent of Eve's time and computational resources. Furthermore, the protocol for data securitization provided herein can be considered secure against most computational attacks, including quantum computing attacks.
[0034] One-Time Pad (OTP) approaches generally provide information-theoretic security. In the case of one-time pad approaches, two communicating parties share a random key known only to the two parties, and can therefore communicate securely by encrypting messages using the key. Any eavesdropper listening to the conversation can generally never distinguish an intercepted message from random noise. Thus, the communication is information-theoretically secure. However, a substantial technical challenge is distributing a private key between any two parties, known as the key distribution problem. In certain approaches, a key provider entity can achieve this service by distributing a private key to any two parties that require a key. However, such protocols require complete trust in the key provider entity, since that entity can easily use the provided key to access all communications between the two parties. Moreover, such an arrangement introduces a single point of failure, which is particularly dangerous in most practical situations.
[0035] Recently, one-time pad encryption has become much cheaper due to the exponential decline in the cost of hard drives and computer memory. However, scalability is generally an issue with various approaches to OTP. In the present embodiment, by providing a key management layer for OTP, OTP encryption can be made widespread, thus solving the scalability problem.
[0036] The embodiments of the present disclosure provide a protocol for key distribution, but advantageously do not require complete trust in any particular agent or entity involved in the protocol. The embodiments provide a protocol that represents an information-theoretically secure mobile communication protocol that can be used for peer-to-peer encrypted communications.
[0037] The embodiments of the present disclosure use a certain number of entities or parties, called privacy providers. In order to decrypt data exchanges between any two parties using this protocol for communication or to access private data stored on a server, it would be necessary to coerce or coordinate a majority of the privacy providers. In one example, this possibility can be substantially minimized by locating different privacy providers in different countries, such as Switzerland, Panama, Cyprus, Canada, the United States, and Germany. In this way, data disclosure cannot be effectively legally enforced by governments alone. In further cases, significant financial losses may be imposed on the privacy providers in the event of disclosure. Advantageously, the protocol of the present disclosure defines a communication protocol whose cybersecurity does not depend on computational assumptions and thus can be considered secure against future potential attacks due to technological advances (such as with quantum computers).
[0038] In the protocol of this disclosure, given a first party (called A or Alice) and a second party (called B or Bob) that wish to communicate, the privacy providers can be used collectively to generate the common key necessary for the parties to communicate, for example using OTP encryption.
[0039] In some cases, the key agreement phase of the protocol may require at least a subset of the privacy providers to be online, but the actual communication between parties A and B may occur after the key agreement phase, where the privacy providers are not required to be online. In some cases, the protocols described herein may begin to set up a network of privately shared keys between parties that may never have met each other, and those keys can be used at a future point in time to communicate even if the privacy providers are offline. Advantageously, each party only needs to communicate with a limited number of privacy providers, but can still have key distribution with any other party using the scheme, effectively achieving the same result as a two-party key exchange.
[0040] Advantageously, the protocol of the present embodiment can achieve information-theoretically secure communication without computational assumptions. Also, advantageously, the protocol of the present embodiment only requires that at least one of the privacy providers is not corrupted or compromised. Also, advantageously, the protocol of the present embodiment can be future-proof, where encrypted data stolen today is likely to be considered secure against future attacks. Thus, the protocol of the present embodiment can be considered quantum secure, even taking into account future technological advances.
[0041] FIG. 1 illustrates that in an exemplary embodiment, a diagram of a computing environment may include a first user computing device 10 (referred to as “A,” “Alice,” or a first corresponding device) interconnected to a second user computing device 12 (referred to as “B,” “Bob,” or a second corresponding device) by a network of communications links 20. The exemplary environment also includes one or more privacy providers 15 in communication with the network 20. The network may be any suitable communications architecture, e.g., the Internet, a wide area network, a local area network, a mobile communications structure, etc. The communications link may be any suitable communications approach, e.g., a landline, a wireless connection, a short-range communications connection, or other forms of communications. The devices 10, 12 and the privacy provider 15 may be executed on any suitable type of computing device, e.g., a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a tablet, a smartphone, a wearable device, an Internet-of-things (IOT) device, a server, a distributed computing system, dedicated hardware, etc.
[0042] 2, a diagram of a system 150 for key generation for secure communications is shown, according to one embodiment. In this embodiment, the system 150 executes on a single computing device 10, 12. In further embodiments, the functions of the system 150 may execute on multiple devices 10, 12 and / or privacy providers 15. In other embodiments, components of the system 150 may be distributed among two or more computer systems, which may be distributed locally or remotely, for example, using cloud computing resources.
[0043] FIG. 2 illustrates various physical and logical components of one embodiment of system 150. As illustrated, system 150 has several physical and logical components, including a central processing unit ("CPU") 152 (including one or more processors), a random access memory ("RAM") 154, a user interface 156, a network interface 160, non-volatile storage 162, and a local bus 164 that allows CPU 152 to communicate with other components. CPU 152 executes an operating system and various modules, as described in more detail below. RAM 154 provides relatively responsive volatile storage for CPU 152. User interface 156 allows an administrator or user to provide input via an input device, such as a mouse or touch screen. User interface 156 also outputs information to an output device, such as a display. Network interface 160 enables communication with network 20 or other computing devices and servers located remotely from system 150. Non-volatile storage 162 stores programs and operating systems, including computer-executable instructions for implementing the operating system and modules, as well as any data used by these services. Additional stored data may be stored in database 166. During operation of system 150, the operating system, modules, and associated data may be retrieved from non-volatile storage 162 and placed in RAM 154 to facilitate execution.
[0044] In one embodiment, the system 150 further includes several concept modules that execute on the one or more processors 152, including a table module 172, a common key module 174, an authentication module 176, an amplification module 178, a communication module 180, and an erasure module 182.
[0045] Advantageously, in some cases, the hardware containing critical cryptographic information, e.g., pre-installed keys and any additional generated keys, can be physically separated from the hardware that performs the steps of the protocols described herein. For example, a Hardware Security Module (HSM) can be used to store key material and / or perform secure cryptographic operations. In this way, a physical layer of cybersecurity can ensure that access to encrypted data is limited to end users 10, 12.
[0046] In an embodiment of the present disclosure, one or more keys 50 may be stored by user "A" and one or more keys 52 may be stored by user "B". In some cases, these keys may be installed on the computing devices 10, 12 themselves, or on separate devices collocated with their respective counterparts, allowing for a one-time pad (OTP) encryption scheme for any communications made to / from each device. In some cases, bulk keys may be stored with the devices before being received by the users of the respective devices.
[0047] The system 150 can generate a plurality of random numbers using a random number generator (RNG). In some cases, the RNG can be a quantum random number generator (QRNG) based on natural input, e.g., light. Some eavesdroppers attempt to find flaws in pseudo-RNGs to break encryption. Thus, using a QRNG can create a defense against such a class of attacks. In one example, it has been determined that a QRNG can be implemented using a smartphone camera and can generate random bit rates greater than 1 Mbps.
[0048] In one embodiment, the protocol includes two phases: 1) a key distribution phase, and 2) a key agreement phase. At the end of the protocol, the two devices, Alice 10 and Bob 12, share a common key that can then be used for secure communication, for example via a one-time pad (OTP). The generation of the key and the physical distribution of the key from the privacy provider to the user is called the first phase of the protocol, the key distribution phase.
[0049] In the key distribution phase, we consider two devices, Alice 10 and Bob 12, connected to a communication network 20. We also consider n privacy providers 15P1, P2, ..., P n Consider a set of n keys, K1,K2,…,K n where K i ={0,1} l where l is very large. In some cases, a table of these keys can be pre-installed on Alice's device before accessing her device. i is the privacy provider P i Thus, Alice and P i is K i This strict dual ownership holds for all key tables. In most cases, each table of keys is shared with only one of the users and privacy providers. Similarly for Bob, he shares n tables of keys with n privacy providers. P i Let H1,H2,…,H be the table of keys known only by B. n where H i ={0,1} l and l is very large. In particular, table H i is the privacy provider P i In this way, Bob and P i is H i It is the only device that owns Ki The j-th bit of K (i,j) (Similarly, H i Let the j-th bit of H (i,j) Let P3, H3,28 be the 28th value in table H3 uniquely shared between Bob and P3. The value H3,28 can be either 0 or 1. Although this disclosure generally refers to each index as referring to a single bit as the associated value, it should be understood that the value can be in any suitable unit, such as, for example, a bit, a byte, a number or sequence of numbers, an alphanumeric character or sequence of numbers, etc.
[0050] Table of keys K1,K2,…,K held by Alice n is the table of keys H1,H2,…,H held by Bob n This is advantageous in a network setting with many users (e.g., 10 million or 1 million users) where each user cannot share several key tables with all other users. By allowing the key tables to be different, the approach of the present embodiment is highly scalable in a network setting.
[0051] In the second phase of the protocol, the key agreement phase, Alice and Bob determine that in some cases any single data provider can AB without access to the value of AB In one embodiment, this second phase of the protocol can include the following four parts: "authentication", "key distribution", "key authentication control" and "privacy amplification".
[0052] As a result of the second phase, the two parties, Alice 10 and Bob 12, then share a secret common key that can be used for communication, either immediately or at some point in the future. Advantageously, after completion of the second phase, the privacy provider does not need to be online or accessible for Alice and Bob to communicate in the future. In some cases, future communication between Alice and Bob may include using an OTP approach with a shared key. In some cases, after communication, Alice and Bob may erase information used in previous phases of the protocol from their tables shared with the privacy provider. This may be referred to as the key erasure phase.
[0053] FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of a method 300 for key generation for secure communications, according to one embodiment.
[0054] In block 302, for example, as part of a key distribution phase, the table modules 172 of both the first user device (Alice) and the second user device (Bob) receive their respective private tables of keys. Each private table is received from a respective one of the privacy providers and is unique for each pair of user and privacy provider. These private tables are distributed in a secure manner. In some cases, each provider needs to maintain a number of tables at least equal to the number of users (or a subset thereof), and each user needs to maintain a number of tables equal to the number of privacy providers (or a subset thereof). In some cases, once all the keys in a private table are used, a new private table needs to be received from the corresponding privacy provider. Thus, Alice receives table K1 from privacy provider P1, K2 from privacy provider P2, and so on. For clarity of explanation, these tables are of dimension n×l. A (where n is the number of privacy providers and l AThe matrix H is a matrix shared between Bob and the privacy provider, i.e., of length l (not necessarily equal to l). s The first row H1 of table K is shared between Bob and P1, the second row H2 is shared between Bob and P2, and so on. i is the length l A,i and table H i is the length l S,j For simplicity, for each i and j, and for some l>0, A,i =l S,j =l.
[0055] Figure 4 shows a representation of one example of the results of private table generation and distribution. In this example, Alice and Bob share their bit-ordered tables with each of the privacy providers, each of which knows only their respective portions of the users' tables K and H.
[0056] In some cases, the private table may be organized in memory in a matrix format. In one example, the information in the first row of the table is shared only between the respective user and one of the privacy providers. In most cases, different users have different series of binary numbers shared with the same privacy provider. In this way, each user has a private table that is substantially different from other users, except for coincidentally similar entries. In some cases, the series of binary numbers may be indexed by integers, and these indexes may be used in the key agreement phase to construct a common key, as described herein. In this way, the common key is known only by the respective user. In one embodiment, each privacy provider provides each of the users' private tables with a subgroup of the binary numbers contained in the private table. In some cases, the binary numbers may be generated by a QRNG. For example, the first row of the private table may be provided by a first privacy provider, the second row of the private table may be provided by a second privacy provider, and so on. In some cases, the private tables may be generated by a pseudo-RNG, a physical RNG, or a QRNG, stored on a physical device, and distributed to users by a trusted agent. In some cases, the private table may be stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM).
[0057] In some cases, Alice and Bob can authenticate with each other and / or with a privacy provider. For example, any suitable authentication protocol can be used, such as the Kerberos Network Authentication Service. In some cases, the authentication protocol can be assumed to communicate over a secure connection. Advantageously, once the key agreement phase is completed, Alice 10 and Bob 12 can communicate at any time in the future, and their communications remain secure even if it is found that a future protocol breaks a previous authentication protocol.
[0058] In the key agreement phase, at block 304, a common key module 174 on both the first user device (Alice) and the second user device (Bob) generates a common key via communication with a privacy provider via a network interface 160. In this way, Alice and Bob, who are likely to have never communicated before and share no initial information, use the support of the privacy provider to construct a common key k without directly communicating any key parameters to generate the common key. This common key is privately shared between Alice and Bob and remains unknown to any of the privacy providers if two or more privacy providers are used. In most cases, it can be assumed that authentication and key agreement can be performed over an authenticated channel. In one embodiment, the generation of the common key can include the following. · Alice generates n randomly indexed groups X i A Each group X i A is a set of integers of size m < l. · Alice sends each indexed group X (e.g., over a public communication channel) to each respective privacy provider P i A iAn eavesdropper can listen in on these communications because the communications contain only the serial index number needed to find the value stored in the table, and no information retrievable about the value itself, since there is no correlation between the index and its associated binary value. Alice records the bit associated with the random index she generated. In this way, Alice can store the matrix Y A and construct the entry
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[0059] In another embodiment, the generation of the common key may include: ·Alice decides on a certain amount of bits that she wants to share with Bob, called m bits. ·Alice decides which private table key value she wants to use. In some cases, Alice may use each row of her private table in left-to-right order. Alice keeps track of the position r of the first unused bit (i.e., the rth bit is the first unused bit in Alice's list). · Alice broadcasts her values of r, m, and Bob's identity to all privacy providers, most likely over an authenticated channel. Each privacy provider P i relays the values of r, m, and Alice's identity to Bob. Bob decides which private table key value he wants to use. In some cases, Bob may use each row of his private table from left to right. Bob keeps track of the position s of the first unused bit. Bob broadcasts the value of s to all privacy providers. Each privacy provider P i For j=0,1,2,..m-1, L( i,r+j,s+j )=K( i,r+j ) XOR H (i,s+j) The first user, Alice, is then informed of the presence of the sigma , and the identity of Alice and Bob. Alice is responsible for each privacy provider P i to acknowledge receipt of said communication. ·K (i,r+j) and L (i,r+j,s+j) Using the received values of, Alice calculates the parity bit N for each j=0,1,2,…,m-1. (l,r+j,s+j) =L (i,r+j,s+j) XORK (i,r+j) is decided privately. i Assuming that is honest in executing the protocol, N (l,r+j,s+j) =L (i,r+j,s+j) XORK (i,r+j) =K (i,r+j) XOR H (i,s+j) XORK (i,r+j) =H (i,s+j) Therefore, Alice and Bob then (i,s+j) The i-th privacy provider P i Only Alice and Bob have H (i,s+j) Please note that the SEC has knowledge of In some cases, Alice and Bob may share the same component key H with each other using key authentication, as described herein. (i,s+j) It can be verified that the information is shared. Alice and Bob each XOR the component keys to generate K AB or K common Then, the jth bit of the secret key is
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[0060] At the end of the key agreement phase, Alice and Bob have a common, secure key K that can be used immediately or in future applications. common For example, this can be used to achieve information-theoretic security in communications over a one-time pad approach in general-purpose communication channels such as optical fiber, cellular, or the Internet.
[0061] While the above embodiment describes specific communications and decisions, other suitable variations can be used. In the above embodiment, Alice uses the bits in her private table of keys from left to right. In another embodiment, Alice may apply a random permutation before selecting each bit to use. More specifically, note that if Alice wants to send m bits to Bob, she needs a key of length m, i.e., a sequence of purely random binary numbers of length m. To construct this key, Alice can determine a sequence of n indexes, one for each data provider, which she can remap to binary numbers by looking up the values in her table.
[0062] In one example, Alice can pick the numbers 34, 45, and 104 for the first privacy provider. Then, Alice can look at the first row of the table (in one example, the row shared only with the first privacy provider) and look up the values in positions 34, 45, and 104. Suppose Alice finds 1, 1, 0. Alice does not share the binary values with anyone, but instead shares the values 34, 45, and 104 with the first privacy provider. The first privacy provider receives the numbers 34, 45, and 104 and can reconstruct the same series as Alice (1, 1, 0). Alice can repeat these steps with multiple privacy providers. In this way, Alice has a series of n binary numbers (initially 1, 1, 0), each series shared with only one privacy provider. Anyone can listen in on the conversation between Alice and the provider without gaining any information about the binary values themselves. The information on the table is only available to Alice and the respective privacy provider, so that for example, anyone listening to 34, 45, 104 has no information at all about the series (1,1,0). Alice can XOR all n series of length m (in our example, m is equal to 3) and obtain another series of length m that only she knows. To reconstruct this series, an intruder needs all series that go into the XOR operation. Thus, the privacy provider would need all cooperation to reconstruct the series, which is highly unlikely. The series resulting from the XOR operation is a secret shared key that can be used by Bob and Alice for communication using OTP, for example.
[0063] In the above example, in order for Bob to arrive at the common key, each privacy provider can communicate the relevant series to Bob. In this example, the first privacy provider communicates the series 1, 1, 0 to Bob (i.e., the first series of binary numbers used by Alice to reconstruct the private key). To communicate the series (1, 1, 0) to Bob, the first privacy provider can pick three indices from the table shared with Bob that remap to (1, 1, 0), and in some cases the indices can be chosen randomly as long as they remap to (1, 1, 0). For example, assume that in the first row of Bob's table, in this example the series of binary numbers shared with the first privacy provider, positions 78, 98, 132 have the binary numbers 1, 1, 0, respectively. The first privacy provider communicates 78, 98, 132 to Bob. An eavesdropper listening to this conversation cannot reconstruct any further information. However, when Bob receives the ordered set of indexes from the privacy providers (i.e., 78, 98, 132), he can reconstruct the series 1, 1, 0 by looking up the binary digits in each row of his private table, and thus the position specified by the first privacy provider, in the first row. The above steps are repeated by all privacy providers. Thus, Bob arrives at having a matrix n × m, where n is the number of privacy providers and m is the length of the secret k. Bob XORs all of the n series of length m to obtain the common key K. common can be reached.
[0064] In another example, Alice may have a table with n rows (n in this example is also the number of privacy providers) and a fairly large number of columns. For purposes of this illustrative example, the number of columns is equal to 10 for simplicity. The first row is (1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1). This series of binary numbers is known only by Alice and the first privacy provider. In contrast, the first row of Bob's table may be (0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1). This series of binary numbers is known only by Bob and the first privacy provider. Alice may send the series (2,5,1) to the first privacy provider, and the series is determined by Alice converting the positions indicated by the series as indexes in the table into binary numbers such as (2,5,1) -> (0,1,1). The first privacy provider may also perform such conversion such that only Alice and the first privacy provider know the binary series. The first privacy provider can then communicate the same series (0,1,1) to Bob. To do so, the first privacy provider can pick a random index in the series shared with Bob that is remapped to (0,1,1). In this example, it can communicate to Bob either (3,4,5), (9,10,8), or (6,10,8), or any other series of indices that are remapped to (0,1,1). For example, if the first privacy provider sends Bob (9,10,8), Bob can look up these indexes in his private table to arrive at the same binary sequence as Alice (0,1,1). Alice and Bob can perform the above steps with all n privacy providers, resulting in each having a series of n binary numbers. If an XOR operation is each applied to these series of numbers, a secret common key can be constructed that can only be reconstructed. These steps can be performed in reverse for communication from Bob to Alice. Assume that Eve, a malicious intruder, wishes to reconstruct the private key.Even if Eve listens to all the conversations between Alice, Bob and the privacy provider, it is impossible for her to reconstruct the private key, since the binary numbers are generated randomly, and Eve has no way to convert each index into a remapped binary number (in the above example, Eve cannot map (2,5,1) to (0,1,1)). Now, assume that the privacy provider wants to reconstruct the private key. Since each privacy provider knows only its own part of the series used by Alice and Bob in the XOR operator, it is impossible to predict the final result of the XOR, and thus the key can remain secret.
[0065] 5A and 5B show another illustrative example of key generation for Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice initiates an exchange with three privacy providers P1, P2, and P3. The public messages from Alice to the three privacy providers are [3,5,6], [1,2,6], and [3,4,5], respectively. In this example, for n=3, X1 A = [3,5,6], X2 A = [1,2,6], and X3 A = [3,4,5]. These sets of serial numbers are associated in their respective tables with key values [1,1,0], [0,1,1], and [1,0,1]. The privacy provider then generates Bob's serial numbers such that the serial number is a set of indexes that reproduces the same key value in Bob's table. Among many possibilities, those sent by the privacy provider in the diagram are [2,3,4], [4,5,6], and [1,4,5]. In this example, for n=3, X1 B = [2,3,4], X2 B = [4,5,6], and X3 B = [1,4,5]. At the end of this phase, all bits used for communication are marked as used so that the bits are not used again.
[0066] Advantageously, the approach of the present embodiment is independent of the type of communication and therefore can be used for video calls, voice calls, emails, messages, and any kind of data that Alice wants to send to Bob, and advantageously, Alice does not need to know in advance the amount of bits that will be sent to Bob, since she can adjust this amount during runtime.
[0067] In another embodiment, each privacy provider P i By having the parties select the keys used for encryption, no RNG at the user level may be required. In this way, when Alice initiates communication with Bob, both parties immediately receive a set of indexes that can be locally mapped to the same binary strings, the indexes being different for Alice and Bob for the same data privacy provider. The different strings obtained by the different privacy providers are combined into a common key that is equal for Alice and Bob, as described herein. In this embodiment, the generation of the common key may include: Alice decides how many bits she wants to communicate to Bob. If Alice needs to send m bits, she sends this information (the number of bits m and the recipient Bob) to each privacy provider P i Send to. Each privacy provider P i For example, a QRNG can be used to generate a random binary sequence s of length m. i ∈{0;1} m Each privacy provider generates a i Remap to table K i Match m indices in (shared with Alice). This set of indices is k i Similarly, each privacy provider can define a set of indexes for Bob, h i Each privacy provider marks the index used in this communication round as used. Each privacy provider may provide public channels i Through Alice and h i to Bob. Advantageously, since these indexes contain a serial number to reconstruct the key, they have no information about the actual key, and therefore an eavesdropper can listen to this exchange without gaining any useful information. Alice derives the matrix Y by matching the indexes sent by each privacy provider to a shared table. A Create a Y A is a matrix with n rows and m columns, where the element
number
number
number
number
[0068] In another embodiment, each privacy provider P i By having Alice select the key used for encryption, no RNG at the user level may be required. In this way, when Alice needs to reconstruct the secret key shared with Bob, Bob immediately receives from each privacy provider a set of values that can be used to generate the secret key. In this embodiment, the generation of the common key may include: Alice decides how many bits she wants to communicate to Bob. If Alice needs to send m bits, she sends this information (the number of bits m and the recipient Bob) to each privacy provider P i Send to. Alice's Table K i (Privacy Provider P i For each of the tables K, Alice considers the first m unused bits. i Suppose the last used bit in is at index j, then Alice can use a sequence of bits (Y A i =K ij+1 ,K ij+2 ,…,K ij+m ), Alice marks those bits as used. Alice considers that the i-th row is Y A i The matrix Y A Build. Each privacy provider P i is a sequence of bits N i =(K ij+1 xor H i,s+1 ,K ij+2 xor H i,s+2 ,…,K ij+m xor H i,s+m ) where j is the number of entries in table K. i is the last used bit in table H i The most recently used bit in each privacy provider P i is N i Mark the bits used to construct as used. Each privacy provider has a public channel i Advantageously, since these indices involve exclusive-or operators on series on random bits, they have no information about the actual key, and therefore an eavesdropper can listen in on this exchange without gaining any useful information. Bob is a matrix Y whose i-th row is a Series B Create a Y B i =(N i,1 xor H i,s+1 ,N i,2 xor H i,s+2 ,…,N i,m xor H i,s+m )=Y A i Bob is Y B Mark all bits used in the construction of as used. Alice is Y A The common key k is obtained by XORing the rows of A where the key has length m. Bob Y B The common key k is obtained by XORing the rows of B where the key has length m.
[0069] The above embodiments for generating a common key do not require random number generation (specifically a QRNG) at the user level and involve the same number of bits exchanged over the network, and are therefore much less computationally and / or resource intensive for the user device.
[0070] Both Alice and Bob each have a key k that they can use to encrypt communications with each other. A and k B In some cases, in block 306, before using the common key for communication, the authentication modules 176 of both the first user device (Alice) and the second user device (Bob) validate the authenticity of the key, i.e., k A =k BAny suitable approach for key verification may be used. In an exemplary approach, Alice and Bob obtain the final key k A and k B In this example approach, Alice uses a hash function H to find A =H(k A ), where s A is a binary sequence of length L. The choice of hash function may be application specific, since the cost and security requirements of this function may vary widely depending on the context of use. As an example, the SHS-256 hash function may be used. Another example may be the set of two universal hash functions such as the Toeplitz matrix T. · Alice has a pair of numbers (j;s A;j ) to broadcast. Bob uses the same hash function H to find B =H(k B ), where s B is a binary string of length L. Bob receives the pair (j;s A;j ) and for all pairs communicated by Alice, A;j =s B;j Determine whether or not.
[0071] In another exemplary approach for key validation, the key validation is performed by i A and Y i B This approach generally involves more bits being exchanged between Alice and Bob, and therefore higher communication costs, but it allows users to identify and exclude privacy providers potentially performing denial of service attacks. In this example approach, Alice uses a hash function H to find i,A=HY i A Calculate where s i,A is a binary string of length L, and Y i A is the number of K i , position X i A Represents a bit in Alice has a pair {i;s i,A} to Bob. Bob uses the same hash function H to find i,B =H(Y i B ), where s i,B is a binary string of length L, and Y i B teeth,
number
[0072] In the above approach for key validity checking, some information about the key k can be disclosed. In the first approach, more information is disclosed, but there is a trade-off between having a large L with higher reliability of the key's authenticity and having a small L with less information disclosed but less certainty of the key's authenticity. In the second approach, a substantial advantage is the ability of Alice and Bob to identify the privacy provider that is executing a DoS attack. In another approach, Alice and Bob can randomly check some of the bits of k A ≠k B and k A and k B up to a probability that is less than an acceptable threshold.
[0073] In some cases, in block 308, the amplification modules 178 of both the first user device (Alice) and the second user device (Bob) can perform privacy amplification. During key validity checking, Alice and Bob may have needed to release some information about the key that Eve might have accumulated in an attempt to reconstruct the key. Among two sets of universal hash functions, to arbitrarily reduce the amount of information that Eve has, if r < m, Alice and Bob can publicly select a function g: {0,1} m →{0,1} r and construct a new revised key k = g(K). The resulting revised k can be distributed approximately uniformly given all the information that Eve has and can thus be used securely. The size r of the new revised key, as well as the choice of the function g, may depend on the amount of information that Eve could have obtained during key validity checking, which depends on the hash function used in the key validity check test. Since the hash function is application-specific, the choice of both H and g may depend on a particular application.
[0074] At block 310, the communication modules 180 in both the first user device (Alice) and the second user device (Bob) communicate a shared key k=k A =k B using an OTP approach over the respective network interfaces 160. In some cases, the communication may use an OTP approach. · Alice encrypts her first message using the one-time pad scheme k: msg:ctx=OTP(msg;k), where ctx is the encrypted message, msg is the original message, and OTP is the one-time pad scheme used with key k. · Alice sends a message to Bob over a public communication channel. Bob decrypts the message: msg=OTP -1 (ctx;k).
[0075] The above OTP approach is also applied in reverse to Bob's encrypted message sent to Alice.
[0076] In some cases, in block 312, the erasure modules 182 of both the first user device (Alice) and the second user device (Bob) can perform key erasure to ensure security even if any of the tables are stolen from either user. In one example, both parties can flip all used bits with probability 0.5, i.e., for each bit marked as used, a probability of 0.5 is evaluated as to whether the respective bit x is flipped to 1-x. This evaluation ensures that even if the device is lost, previous communications cannot be decrypted. In this way, even if the device is stolen, there is still no way to reconstruct the original data, even if it is stored in a cloud computing environment. In some cases, the privacy provider can also erase its own keys. In these cases, there is certainly no way to recover the transmitted information. In another case, consider the case where Alice is a user who wants to store information on one or more servers and access it at a later stage or grant access to Bob. The information may be a key or it may be the data itself, and this information may be stored in the provider in the manner described herein. By keeping the information intact, the privacy provider allows the data to be reconstructed in the future by Alice or any other authorized user who shares the key table with the privacy provider.
[0077] In the example of an encrypted phone call, for each m bits of a message sent, an additional nm bits must be sent (where n is the number of privacy providers), plus a (negligible) number of bits must be sent for authentication (e.g., Alice only needs to know K i The f bits taken as the unused bits of the first f in i(The amount of data exchanged up front between Alice and the privacy provider to initiate a two-minute call (roughly 1.2MB in the VOiP protocol) is therefore roughly 3.6MB (assuming n=3), which requires roughly 0.04s to read the data from memory (assuming the QRNG keeps constantly updating a small register with new random numbers), plus the time required to send the data to the provider. The privacy provider must match the keys and send the same amount of data to Bob. Assuming Bob can read data from the register at the same rate (90MB), this results in a latency of roughly 0.3 seconds to initiate a two-minute call. This latency is commercially reasonable considering the added value of encryption.
[0078] In some cases of method 300, the randomness may be assumed to arrive from a RNG (e.g., a QRNG) located on the user's device. In other cases, a number of random numbers (e.g., quantum random numbers) may be pre-installed on the user's device. In these cases, for example, the user device may be replaced, e.g., via a subscription service, whenever the key has been fully used. In further cases, the quantum random numbers may be pre-installed and stored on a separate memory storage device in communication with the user's device, whereby the memory storage device may be replaced when the pre-installed numbers have been fully used.
[0079] In general, the communication system between the privacy provider and the device is likely to be the weakest part of the protocol. In some cases, legal enforcement can be used to ensure compliance by the privacy provider, consisting of having the privacy provider sign a contract. This contract can legally force the privacy provider to reimburse the end user in case of data (key) leakage, if the end user is liable. Even with a legal contract, the privacy provider can still engage in undesirable activities, but the probability of all privacy providers engaging in these activities can be considered negligible. In particular, if the privacy providers are diverse, e.g., diverse in interests, backgrounds, geographic locations, etc., the probability of everyone's cooperation is significantly lower. In some cases, the role of the privacy provider can be provided, at least in part, to national authorities. In some cases, an additional layer of encryption can be used, e.g., at least AES-128. This additional layer of security may be implemented on the user device.
[0080] In some cases, for a large enough organization, assuming devices are only used to communicate with each other within the same organization, the organization itself may act as the privacy provider and manage the generation and distribution of keys.
[0081] In some cases, privacy providers can be authenticated so that DoS attacks by any privacy provider can be immediately identified. The privacy provider can then be banned and removed from the role. In some cases, privacy providers can be compensated for their role, and DoS attacks are discouraged as they result in a permanent loss of income.
[0082] Advantageously, it is impossible for each single privacy provider to reconstruct the encryption key without cooperating with all the other privacy providers. This means that as long as at least one of the privacy providers is honest, the key cannot be reconstructed and key reconstruction (KR) attacks are not possible. In some cases, a single dishonest privacy provider can perform a denial of service (DoS) attack by providing wrong data to Alice and / or Bob during the exchange phase of the protocol. The following provides a common key generation in block 304 according to another embodiment. In this embodiment, components are provided to avoid potential DoS attacks.
[0083] In this embodiment, to generate the keys that Alice and Bob need to use to communicate, e.g., using OTP, Alice communicates with n privacy providers P1, P2, P3, ..., P n The n points generated by Alice lie on a polynomial of degree g, where 1≦g≦n-1. The intersection between the polynomial and the y-axis of the Cartesian plane uniquely identifies the key used to communicate between Alice and Bob. The privacy provider distributes the n points to itself using a table shared with Bob, which it can use to reconstruct the polynomial and therefore the common key.
[0084] The degree of the polynomial g affects the security of the protocol and therefore When g is too small, for example g=1, it may be easy for a few privacy providers to cluster together and perform a KR attack, since there are few enough points to reconstruct the polynomial. At the same time, when g is very small, it is very difficult to perform a DoS attack, since many privacy providers have clusters that stop Bob from reconstructing the key. When g is excessively large, a larger number of corrupted providers is likely needed to perform a KR attack, but a smaller number of privacy providers is sufficient to perform a DoS attack. For example, when g=n-1, the above-described approach for executing block 304 is used.
[0085] Considering the above tradeoffs, determining the value of g depends on the number of providers n, the probability that a provider is dishonest, the cost of a KR attack (e.g., high in mobile communication and data storage applications) versus the cost of a DoS attack (e.g., high in data storage), and the cost of having a large number of privacy providers.
[0086] In this embodiment, there are two users, Alice and Bob, and n providers P1, P2, ..., P n In particular, there exists a set of K i Alice and P i is a set of bits of length l that is privately shared between ij ∈{0;1} is the relationship between Alice and P i represents the value of the jth bit in the set shared between H i Bob and P i A key is a set of keys shared between two parties. Consider a situation where Alice wants to construct a shared key with Bob that can be used for communication or any other application requiring a key, for example, using OTP encryption. Alice can construct such a key and share it with Bob using a secret sharing protocol (e.g., Shamir's secret sharing protocol). For illustrative purposes, the key can be considered as a number k, and in further cases, the key can be described in binary bits. In this embodiment, a particular secret sharing protocol is used as an example, but any suitable secret sharing protocol can be used. In this embodiment, an exemplary approach for common key generation can include the following: Alice generates a polynomial of degree g that intersects the y-axis at k in the Cartesian plane, where g is an integer and g∈[1;n-1]. Here, f A f A (0) is the common key k A is a polynomial such that Alice chooses exactly n random points on the generated polynomial. The random points are a1={x1;f A (x1)},a2={x2;f A (x2)},…,a n where x i ≠0, ∀i. ·Each point a i About Alice, Alice and P i has not been used previously in communications between
number
number
[0087] Note that when g=1, the above approach is information-theoretically equivalent to the previous approach.
[0088] To determine the approximate optimum value of g, the following can be considered: Given n privacy providers and a gth degree polynomial, at least g+1 dishonest privacy providers are needed to perform a key reconstruction attack. The probability that a provider does not follow the protocol can be considered equal to q, and the probabilities can be considered uncorrelated. Then the final probability of a KR attack is:
number
number
[0089] In the worst case scenario, a dishonest privacy provider will try to engage in both KR and DoS attacks simultaneously. Figure 6 shows an example plot of the minimum percentage of dishonest providers as a function of g normalized by the total number of providers n. On the vertical axis is the minimum percentage of providers that must be dishonest to perform an attack as a function of the polynomial degree g, where both quantities are divided by n. Taking the minimum of the two curves gives, for every point g, the minimum percentage of dishonest players required to perform at least one of the two attacks. As is evident from the plot, a value of g equal to n / 2 provides a more secure configuration, but different attacks may have different costs to the final user, and therefore the optimal g can be moved further to the left or to the right. For example, in the case of mobile communications, KR attacks may be significantly more costly than DoS attacks, and therefore the optimal g will be closer to n.
[0090] The actual probability of being attacked as a function of g can be determined by calling the probability that a provider is corrupted q and assuming that there is no correlation between these probabilities. The total probability of being attacked is equal to:
number
[0091] Consider the example where n=10 and different values of q are used, specifically q1=0.01, q2=0.02, q3=0.03, q4=0.05, q5=0.1. Figure 7 shows an example plot of the probability of attack for five different scenarios q1 to q5. On the vertical axis is the probability of being attacked for n=10 as a function of g. In the optimal case g=4, the probability of attack is: p1=10 -10 (For scenario q1), p2=10 -8 , p3=10 -7 , p4=10 -6 , and p5=10 -4In particular, even in unfavorable scenarios where the probability of having a corrupted provider is around 0.2, the net gain in the probability of attack reaches three orders of magnitude (from 0.1 to 0.0001). Therefore, this risk is well within the bounds of what can be considered commercially reasonable in practice.
[0092] For each value of q, we again consider the probability of being attacked, for the exemplary case of n=10. We consider the example where the optimal degree of g is equal to n / 2. Figure 8 shows an example of the results in a plot. On the vertical axis is the probability of being attacked, calculated for the optimal value g=n / 2, as a function of q, for n=10, with the line y=x. As can be seen, for values of q below 0.55, the total probability of being attacked is improved. For values of q less than 0.2, the improvement is several orders of magnitude. Figure 9 shows a plot of the probability of being attacked, calculated for the optimal g=n / 2, as a function of q, for n=50, with the line y=x. Figure 10 shows a plot of the probability of being attacked, calculated for the optimal g=n / 2, as a function of q, for n=4, with the line y=x.
[0093] Two general assumptions are made about the security of the embodiments described herein: First, at least one of the privacy providers is honest and sound, i.e., they do not cooperate with other privacy providers and do not reveal keys to anyone who should not have access to them. Second, the keys are properly provisioned, i.e., none of the other parties (the intruder, the privacy provider, and / or the device manufacturer) knows the full set of keys on or sent to any device.
[0094] Advantageously, this embodiment allows for scalability. In a network, the number of users, n, can be very large. With a large number of users, if a user requires each user to share a key with another user, this can take as many as n(n-1) / 2 (i.e., n 2In contrast, the use of a privacy provider can reduce the total number of keys, such as in this embodiment, to only n keys, since each user only needs to share their keys with the privacy provider, not with other users. The same scaling of n keys applies to multiple, say m, privacy providers.
[0095] Advantageously, the present embodiment can be implemented through the modification of various schemes, such as IPSec and VPN.
[0096] Advantageously, the present embodiment allows the use of multiple privacy providers for higher security and reliability. For example, in a single privacy provider approach, there is generally a single failed node, and therefore the probability of a data breach occurring is the probability of a data breach occurring at that privacy provider (called p). In the present embodiment with multiple privacy providers, the probability of a data breach is effectively arbitrarily small, even if the probability of a data breach occurring at each single privacy provider is still equal to p. Thus, for a realistic value of p (e.g., p is less than 20%), the probability of a data breach occurring at, for example, 10 privacy providers is several orders of magnitude smaller than a single privacy provider p. In one example, with 10 privacy providers, and p equal to 0.05 on an annual basis (i.e., an average of 1 data breach every 20 years), the probability of a data breach occurring is approximately 0.0001% (i.e., an average of 1 data breach every 1,000,000 years).
[0097] The use of a privacy provider as described in this embodiment provides at least the following advantages: Information-theoretic security when combined with OTP encryption. · Easy implementation with current technology (e.g. using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)). The privacy provider can be offline (after the key generation step) during the communication of encrypted data, which can mitigate latency or denial of service attacks. Highly scalable with respect to the number of users, so that when a new user joins, the privacy provider provides the new user with a new key table, so that old users are not affected. Highly scalable with respect to the number of privacy providers, whereby as the number of users increases by k, the number of privacy providers to ensure security simply scales linearly with k, along with the number of key tables for each user. Minimal time delay in the resulting communication since no privacy provider communication is required after key generation. In an example experiment of a VPN using two privacy providers, the ping time for communication was 90 ms, which is a significant improvement over other approaches. · Sharing secrets reduces the probability of failure. Government enforcement is possible by enforcing legal requirements on its own privacy providers and handing over key tables to law enforcement. International cooperation could be implemented, for example each country would own a privacy provider and communications would remain secure for any individual country unless all countries cooperated. A hierarchical design of privacy providers can be implemented, for example, such that each country / major organization has its primary privacy provider and distributes trust among a set of secondary privacy providers.
[0098] Furthermore, the use of multiple privacy providers provides at least the following advantages: · Users do not need to trust in a single centralized entity. Since privacy providers operate independently, in reality, there is no single privacy provider that can decrypt Alice and Bob's communications. In this way, users do not need to share their data with privacy providers. In addition to providing protection against DDOS attacks, the use of multiple privacy providers reduces the chances of a hack or data breach from a single node or single point of failure. · Users can dynamically choose which privacy provider to use for their communications. · Messages from Alice to Bob do not need to pass through the privacy provider, and therefore do not require the privacy provider to always be online for the communication to take place. Alice and Bob can instruct the privacy provider to provide a certain amount of keys in anticipation of a later communication. The privacy provider does not need to be online when the communication later takes place. o In one example of this embodiment, Alice can simply send to the privacy provider (i) Bob's address and (i) the length of the message she sent separately to Bob. The hub then prepares the key instructions (which are the same length as the message) and sends them to Bob, whereas in other approaches a centralized entity receives the message from Alice and resends it to Bob, so the entity has to disadvantageously manage twice the traffic.
[0099] While the present invention has been described with reference to certain specific embodiments, various other aspects, advantages, and modifications thereof will be apparent to those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as outlined in the claims appended hereto. The entire disclosures of all references cited above are incorporated herein by reference.
Claims
1. 1. A method for key generation for secure communication between a first user computing device and a second user computing device, the method not requiring direct communication between the first user computing device and the second user computing device during key generation, the method comprising:
1. A method for key generation using multiple privacy providers, each comprising a computing device, comprising:
1. A method for key generation using a first private table and a second private table, comprising: the first private table includes indexes having associated values, each index in the first private table being stored on the first user computing device and at one of the plurality of privacy providers; the second private table includes indexes having associated values, each index in the second private table being stored on the second user computing device and stored at one of the plurality of privacy providers; and performing the following operations by the second user computing device: receiving an index, each received index corresponds to an index in said second private table; each received index is received from one of the plurality of privacy providers that has stored an associated value of the matched index; the associated value of the matched index in the second private table for each received index matches the associated value of the matching index in the first private table; the matching index in the first private table is received from the first user computing device by the same privacy provider that stored the associated value of the received index for the second user computing device; and generating a common key for said secure communication by combining the indexed values of said second private table. A method comprising:
2. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of generating a common key comprises performing an exclusive-or (XOR) operation on the indexed values of the second private table.
3. 3. The method of claim 2, further comprising using the common key to securely communicate between the first user computing device and the second user computing device using a one-time pad (OTP) encryption approach.
4. The method of claim 3 , wherein a number of indexed values represents a number of bits to be communicated by the first user computing device to the second user computing device.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the values in the first and second private tables are generated using a quantum random number generator (QRNG).
6. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising marking a value in the second private table that was used to generate the common key as used by the second user computing device.
7. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising performing, by the second user computing device, an erasure of values in the second private table used to generate the common key.
8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising authenticating, by the second user computing device, the common key using an authentication service.
9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising performing, by the second user computing device, privacy amplification comprising applying a linear matrix to the common key.
10. 1. A system for generating a key for secure communication with a first user computing device, without requiring direct communication with the first user computing device during key generation, the system comprising: one or more processors; and a data storage device, the system communicating with one or more privacy providers, each comprising a computing device; a first private table including indexes having associated values, each index in the first private table being stored on the first user computing device and at one of the plurality of privacy providers; a second private table including indexes having associated values, each index in the second private table being stored in the data storage device and in one of the plurality of privacy providers; The one or more processors are in communication with the data storage device and are configured to: A process in which a table module receives an index, the process comprising: each received index corresponds to an index in said second private table; each received index is received from one of the plurality of privacy providers that stored the associated value of the matched value; the associated value of the matched index in the second private table for each received index matches the associated value of the matching index in the first private table; the matching index in the first private table is received from the first user computing device by the same privacy provider that stored the associated value in the data storage device; and a common key module generating a common key for said secure communication by combining indexed values of said second private table; configured to execute system.
11. 11. The system of claim 10, wherein the common key module generates the common key by performing an exclusive-or (XOR) operation on the indexed values of the second private table.
12. 12. The system of claim 11, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a communications module that uses the common key to securely communicate with the first user computing device using a one-time pad (OTP) encryption approach.
13. The system of claim 12 , wherein a number of indexed values represents a number of bits to be communicated by the first user computing device.
14. The system of claim 10 , wherein the values in the first and second private tables are generated using a quantum random number generator (QRNG).
15. 11. The system of claim 10, wherein the table module marks values in the second private table that were used to generate the common key as used.
16. 11. The system of claim 10, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute an erasure module to perform an erasure of values in the second private table used to generate the common key.
17. The system of claim 10 , wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute an authentication module for authenticating the common key using an authentication service.
18. 11. The system of claim 10, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute an amplification module to perform privacy amplification comprising applying a linear matrix to the common key.
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